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	<title>Comments on: Where Is The Evidence of Imminent Regime Change?</title>
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		<title>By: kooshy</title>
		<link>http://www.raceforiran.com/where-is-the-evidence-of-imminent-regime-change#comment-3706</link>
		<dc:creator>kooshy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 23:58:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.raceforiran.com/?p=1831#comment-3706</guid>
		<description>For US to negotiate in good faith with current Iranian government will require accepting Iran’s independence, currently as in the past there are few elements that will prevent this policy change, although US had signed the Algiers Accord internally it never accepted to implement this accord in a serious way. 

1-For US to accept an independent Iran means hands off of Iranian internal and external affairs which is a part of the Algiers Accord. This will require a mindset that has not yet formed in the majority of US intelligencia and academicians especially with ones who are consulted on policy making. This group simply can’t accept that Iran can be outside of US hemisphere of influence most importantly with regards to its external affairs they believe any difficulty for Iran with Its internal affairs will form a more favorable Iranian policy toward the West Mr. Haass’s recent article is an example of this group.

2-Accepting independent Iran will also require a complete reshaping of US Asian and European policy which with current US global affairs is no less than a revolution in itself that is the reason why the foreign policies of both US’s political parties are so similar although the rhetoric is different.

3-“Who lost Iran” was the blame game of late seventies and early eighties that was generated even in between politicians from the same party. The implication was that        how unacceptable the outcome of Iranian revolution was for the US global architecture. Regardless of change in administrations US policy makers have not been able to recover or replace from the loss of Iran ever since the Iranian revolution this is clear with the same sanctions regime that has been in place ever since the Carter administration

4-US policy makers of both parties and the US military believe that US has paid a heavy price for loss of Iran, but they still believe an independent Iran will toll an even heavier price on US global hegemony in terms of effect of Iran’s independence on other Middle Eastern and North African countries which historically are considered sphere of western nations, global energy distribution for rising economic powers is another consideration that has prevented accepting an independent Iran. 

5-Israel is an important part of US’s overall Middle East policy that can influence the US but only as a tool of this policy and not as a cause, otherwise she is used as pawn for the balance of power purposes and is needed in this current atmosphere


6-Refusing to realign the current US global policy with new realties will leave no choice for policy makers and the US military but to try to re exert hegemony over Iran. For them this is the easiest and maybe the only option that can prevent diminishing American global power. In reality this group is living in a bubble of its own making for them thinking out of this bubble can’t materialize for seeable future
.
7-Rising regional and new economic powers will eventually make the reality acceptable to this group but it will come at a heavier price for US to pay changing from US to G7 and then G8 and now G20 is an evident of changing global power structure, even with imposing sanctions for over 30 years Iran is the 16th largest economy in the world it can’t be ignored for long, Iran for sure will reform as it has but will not have another revolution that will allow foreign influence over its independence that is what Iranians have fought for over last couple of centuries. Historically Iranian cultural mentality can’t accept hegemony from a foe or a friend.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For US to negotiate in good faith with current Iranian government will require accepting Iran’s independence, currently as in the past there are few elements that will prevent this policy change, although US had signed the Algiers Accord internally it never accepted to implement this accord in a serious way. </p>
<p>1-For US to accept an independent Iran means hands off of Iranian internal and external affairs which is a part of the Algiers Accord. This will require a mindset that has not yet formed in the majority of US intelligencia and academicians especially with ones who are consulted on policy making. This group simply can’t accept that Iran can be outside of US hemisphere of influence most importantly with regards to its external affairs they believe any difficulty for Iran with Its internal affairs will form a more favorable Iranian policy toward the West Mr. Haass’s recent article is an example of this group.</p>
<p>2-Accepting independent Iran will also require a complete reshaping of US Asian and European policy which with current US global affairs is no less than a revolution in itself that is the reason why the foreign policies of both US’s political parties are so similar although the rhetoric is different.</p>
<p>3-“Who lost Iran” was the blame game of late seventies and early eighties that was generated even in between politicians from the same party. The implication was that        how unacceptable the outcome of Iranian revolution was for the US global architecture. Regardless of change in administrations US policy makers have not been able to recover or replace from the loss of Iran ever since the Iranian revolution this is clear with the same sanctions regime that has been in place ever since the Carter administration</p>
<p>4-US policy makers of both parties and the US military believe that US has paid a heavy price for loss of Iran, but they still believe an independent Iran will toll an even heavier price on US global hegemony in terms of effect of Iran’s independence on other Middle Eastern and North African countries which historically are considered sphere of western nations, global energy distribution for rising economic powers is another consideration that has prevented accepting an independent Iran. </p>
<p>5-Israel is an important part of US’s overall Middle East policy that can influence the US but only as a tool of this policy and not as a cause, otherwise she is used as pawn for the balance of power purposes and is needed in this current atmosphere</p>
<p>6-Refusing to realign the current US global policy with new realties will leave no choice for policy makers and the US military but to try to re exert hegemony over Iran. For them this is the easiest and maybe the only option that can prevent diminishing American global power. In reality this group is living in a bubble of its own making for them thinking out of this bubble can’t materialize for seeable future<br />
.<br />
7-Rising regional and new economic powers will eventually make the reality acceptable to this group but it will come at a heavier price for US to pay changing from US to G7 and then G8 and now G20 is an evident of changing global power structure, even with imposing sanctions for over 30 years Iran is the 16th largest economy in the world it can’t be ignored for long, Iran for sure will reform as it has but will not have another revolution that will allow foreign influence over its independence that is what Iranians have fought for over last couple of centuries. Historically Iranian cultural mentality can’t accept hegemony from a foe or a friend.</p>
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		<title>By: rfjk</title>
		<link>http://www.raceforiran.com/where-is-the-evidence-of-imminent-regime-change#comment-3662</link>
		<dc:creator>rfjk</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 13:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.raceforiran.com/?p=1831#comment-3662</guid>
		<description>Not only is regime change unlikely for all the reasons Karon and the Leverett&#039;s have intelligently given, but sanctions without united and solid support by the top 20 industrial powers is a LOSER! Except for maniacs &amp; ideologues, everyone else knows this just like Karon says. Right now the US is playing games for time in the absence of anything substantive to move on.

And apparently the lunatic notion of US exceptionalism dies hard, even among its opponents. The US can no more impose its will upon Iran than it can on Venezuela. Nor is containment an option either with 19 of those industrial states overtly or covertly doing business with the Iranians. This isn&#039;t the latter, bi-polar global order of the 20th century, its a 21st century multipolar paradigm of great (plural) and lesser regional powers.

The French begged for it and found themselves all the more an irrelevant and impotent power to their great disappointment. A word to the wise. Today&#039;s global order is where going to bed with your allies one evening, can find them cutting your throat the following morning. Its an era of strange bedfellows and the true manure of &quot;realpolitik.&quot; Its a game American &#039;republicanism&#039; is well suited for, better even than the previous defunct global order.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Not only is regime change unlikely for all the reasons Karon and the Leverett&#8217;s have intelligently given, but sanctions without united and solid support by the top 20 industrial powers is a LOSER! Except for maniacs &amp; ideologues, everyone else knows this just like Karon says. Right now the US is playing games for time in the absence of anything substantive to move on.</p>
<p>And apparently the lunatic notion of US exceptionalism dies hard, even among its opponents. The US can no more impose its will upon Iran than it can on Venezuela. Nor is containment an option either with 19 of those industrial states overtly or covertly doing business with the Iranians. This isn&#8217;t the latter, bi-polar global order of the 20th century, its a 21st century multipolar paradigm of great (plural) and lesser regional powers.</p>
<p>The French begged for it and found themselves all the more an irrelevant and impotent power to their great disappointment. A word to the wise. Today&#8217;s global order is where going to bed with your allies one evening, can find them cutting your throat the following morning. Its an era of strange bedfellows and the true manure of &#8220;realpolitik.&#8221; Its a game American &#8216;republicanism&#8217; is well suited for, better even than the previous defunct global order.</p>
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		<title>By: taqieh</title>
		<link>http://www.raceforiran.com/where-is-the-evidence-of-imminent-regime-change#comment-3635</link>
		<dc:creator>taqieh</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 05:13:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.raceforiran.com/?p=1831#comment-3635</guid>
		<description>From its title, I presume that this commentary from Ben Katcher, is of a personal nature and directed to Robert Kagan and Richard Haass, but since it&#039;s out there for our prying, I would take the liberty of offering a couple remarks. First Karon&#039;s case, albeit thoughtful, is far from &quot;compelling&quot;. First, the contention that recognizing that support for Iran’s opposition is due to the fact that almost no one believes sanctions will work, is flawed and certainly not prevalent. A more acceptable contention would have been that this late support stems from the resilience and the steady growth of the Green Movement and that this option seems more timely than &#039;crippling&#039; sanctions. Also a deal with a ‘rogue” regime like Iran is certainly possible and definitely considered if in the best interest of the US. Finally setting aside the question of whether &quot;a new Iranian revolution is unlikely&quot; or not, which is pure speculation at this point, the statement that &quot;The question for U.S. policymakers and analysts should not be whether “regime change” is desirable, but whether it is a likely outcome given the relevant facts and historical evidence&quot;, seems also irrelevent, for even in the case of a its possible outcome in the present context, it is rather obvious from the statements of the various probable &#039;new leaders&#039;, that their policy in regards to the nuclear issue is set to remain unchanged from the present one. Thus the question still remains one of imposing the US will on Iran, likely by force, or learning to live with and contain a nuclear Iran.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From its title, I presume that this commentary from Ben Katcher, is of a personal nature and directed to Robert Kagan and Richard Haass, but since it&#8217;s out there for our prying, I would take the liberty of offering a couple remarks. First Karon&#8217;s case, albeit thoughtful, is far from &#8220;compelling&#8221;. First, the contention that recognizing that support for Iran’s opposition is due to the fact that almost no one believes sanctions will work, is flawed and certainly not prevalent. A more acceptable contention would have been that this late support stems from the resilience and the steady growth of the Green Movement and that this option seems more timely than &#8216;crippling&#8217; sanctions. Also a deal with a ‘rogue” regime like Iran is certainly possible and definitely considered if in the best interest of the US. Finally setting aside the question of whether &#8220;a new Iranian revolution is unlikely&#8221; or not, which is pure speculation at this point, the statement that &#8220;The question for U.S. policymakers and analysts should not be whether “regime change” is desirable, but whether it is a likely outcome given the relevant facts and historical evidence&#8221;, seems also irrelevent, for even in the case of a its possible outcome in the present context, it is rather obvious from the statements of the various probable &#8216;new leaders&#8217;, that their policy in regards to the nuclear issue is set to remain unchanged from the present one. Thus the question still remains one of imposing the US will on Iran, likely by force, or learning to live with and contain a nuclear Iran.</p>
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		<title>By: JohnH</title>
		<link>http://www.raceforiran.com/where-is-the-evidence-of-imminent-regime-change#comment-3628</link>
		<dc:creator>JohnH</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Feb 2010 03:08:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.raceforiran.com/?p=1831#comment-3628</guid>
		<description>The North Korean regime has been in imminent collapse for almost 60 years. Since the US has waited that long for North Korea, it makes perfect sense to wait another couple decades for Iran to collapse...

Intransigence rules! It worked with the Soviets, ergo it must work with any foe. (as long as the US doesn&#039;t collapse first!)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The North Korean regime has been in imminent collapse for almost 60 years. Since the US has waited that long for North Korea, it makes perfect sense to wait another couple decades for Iran to collapse&#8230;</p>
<p>Intransigence rules! It worked with the Soviets, ergo it must work with any foe. (as long as the US doesn&#8217;t collapse first!)</p>
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