Please click on this link;

http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/?q=node/2093

I just don’t think the psychology helps us find a way out of the current dilemma. So I don’t pay it much attention.

I think we all know that Israel and Iran once saw themselves as having mutual interests, but a return to those days doesn’t seem likely. I agree with your first paragraph except for two things: I don’t think the U.S. defense industry is a big impediment to U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. That industry would be happy to sell arms to Iran, if Iran and the U.S. were again on friendly terms. You’re confusing cause and result in this case. U.S. defense interests would love a friendly Iran; they simply are powerless to effect this. So they sell to Israel. Certainly there are few people in the world more amoral than arms merchants.

The second thing I differ with is your point about “if the U.S. behaved rationally . . .” Here we are discussing psychology again. Nations like human beings are rational some of the time at best. To posit that something will occur if only so-and-so behaved rationally is almost a counsel of despair. The Israelis often don’t behave rationally, as you yourself point out. Why expect Americans to do better?

I do enjoy your comments, despite the disagreements.

Israel’s friction points with Iran, with whom it had had friendly as well as lucrative relations for many years, until 1. Khomeini’s rise put an end to an Iran-Israel oil transshipment arrangement that saw Iran shipping oil to a Rothschild-built pipeline to Eilat, whence Israel kept some for domestic use and sold the rest to Europe; and 2. the end of the Iran-Iraq war put an end to Iran’s function as ready market for Israeli weaponry that Israel had enjoyed,a continuation of Israel’s role as weapons supplier to the Shah. (see Ronen Bergman’s “The Secret War with Iran” for reporting on Iran’s 50-year long position as major customer to Israel’s arms merchants.)
That Israel is keen to reestablish the oil deal is suggested by Doug Feith’s pre-Iraq war bargain with Chalabi http dir dot salon.com/news/feature/2004/05/04/chalabi/ Feith was, of course, at the core of the cabal that fixed intelligence to push US toward war in Iraq.

But I argue that Israel ‘psychological’ status is equally, if not more important to understand Israel’s beef with Iran, and inasmuch as Israel’s University of Pennsylvania prof. of political science Ian Lustick discussed Israel’s motivations in its current conflict with Iran in a conference in Seattle, WA in Dec. 2009 www dot edmaysproductions.net/webvideo/irannuke.wmv Lustick argued that the power of Holocaust in shaping Israeli perspective cannot be overemphasized, and he explained how Jabotinsky’s philosophy of the “Iron Wall” — Israeli overwhelming military might as a pedagogic tool to debilitate Arabs — is challenged by Iran.

I submit that it is a mistake to dismiss an understanding of the psychological forces that motivate Israel, particularly as Israel is heavily militarized, nuclear armed, and exercises disproportionate influence on US foreign policy.

Anything is possible? No. There are domestic political imperatives, geostrategic realities, and simple concepts like force-to-space ratios that make a land war with Iran, for example, impossible for the forseeable future.

I hope rfjk is right about the possibility of a grand bargain. Let’s assume for a moment that Iran is open to same. Does Obama have the political capital/guts/willingness to make it happen? I question whether he can defy the neocons and the Israelis over this. He’s shown himself to be relatively establishmentarian in outlook. In other words, he’s politically cautious — too cautious, in my view. But then the example of Dallas, Memphis, and Los Angeles must weigh on him, even if only subconciously.

So, anything is possible. The past two decades have witnessed naked power grabs in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. As a result, we cannot consider naked power grabs to be out of the question. And they could justify the capture of some Iranian provinces under the guise that they are only being used as a bargaining chip to be returned when Iran starts “behaving correctly.” (Similar to how Israel justifies holding onto the Occupied Territories, but only because the Palestinian side refuses to respond to continual, generous Israeli peace offers.)

Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t work out because the locals fought back. What may prove attractive to delusional military planners is the fact most of the Iranian provinces bordering the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and holding the bulk of natural gas, are very thinly populated. So resistance from the locals could theoretically be minimized. However, oil and natural gas investments require decades of security. Any occupation would require willful obliviousness, perhaps politically mandated, to the length and extent of security required. Given the delusion manifested in Iraq and Afghanistan, I don’t mis-underestimate the elites’ capacity for delusion.

It’s not as simple as saying, “Iran can sell gas anywhere it wants.” There are good reasons why gas is normally piped, not shipped. As I said, pipelines are less conducive to American “protection” and financial intermediation. The US would like to force the market into liquefying the gas, which would more closely resemble today’s oil market finance, distribution, and “protection.”

Barring Israel, Iran would sell its oil to the highest bidder. The US Navy is what ensures the US has a veto, if it ever was to choose to exercise it, over all oil from the gulf region to Asia or Europe. The unilateral sanctions imposed by the US on Iran were authored by Israeli lobbying organizations for the explicit purpose of punishing Iran for supporting anti-Israel groups. There really is not a more complex explanation for US/Iranian hostility than Israel. Establishing and maintaining Israel despite regional opposition is a very expensive project the West, led by the US, has undertaken.

Here is why the US has decided not to attack Iran. It was written in 2007 and will remain valid at least until the US is no longer pursuing military objectives in Iraq or Afghanistan.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071901958.html

Beyond Iraq’s borders, the options become difficult: engaging in hot pursuit against weapon supply lines over the Iranian border or striking explosives factories and staging areas within Iran. This sort of escalation is opposed by the Iraqi government and American military leaders. The Defense Department fears what is called “escalation dominance” — meaning that in a broadened conflict, the Iranians could complicate our lives in Iraq and the region more than we complicate theirs.

This would have dire consequences for the US and Britain:
1) the relevance of Wall Street would diminish, since long term contracts would supplant much spot and futures trading on Wall Street and in London.
2) the importance of the dollar would diminish because contracts could be negotiated in the currencies of the two parties (or even bartered) without dollar intermediation.
3) pipeline routes would have no need for US naval protection.

I worry that the US is drawing a line in the sand regarding Iran. The attitude is that Iran must be in the US sphere of influence, period. If Iran will not buckle under US pressure and China acquiesce in it, then the US will attack. The attack would not be as advertised. Its primary goal would not be Iranian nuclear facilities. Rather, after an air campaign targeting Iranian communications and transportation capabilities, it would focus on occupying oil-rich Khuzestan, next to Iraq and a coastal strip along the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. This would give the US effective control of key Iranian energy assets, particularly the giant South Pars natural gas field located under the Persian Gulf. It would ensure that natural gas would not flow by pipeline, but by tankers in liquefied form under US “protection.” It would be traded in dollars on British and American exchanges.

This is not an Israeli issue, though Israel’s public relations campaign alleging an existential threat is useful in making the case for war. It’s certainly an easier sell than trying to make Iran seem threatening to the US itself. Rather, issue the goes to the heart of American power–military, financial, and energy. Given these stakes, the movers and shakers may well feel compelled to attack, regardless of the risks. The alternative–watching their power erode even more–would simply be unthinkable.