Today, Iranian representatives, accompanied by Brazilian and Turkish counterparts, met with the IAEA’s Director General, Yukiya Amano. The purpose of the meeting was to present a letter to Amano—as called for in the May 17, 2010 Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey, and Brazil—formally notifying the IAEA of the Islamic Republic’s acceptance of the terms laid out in the Declaration, including its commitment to deposit 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey.
So what happens now? The Joint Declaration is, in its way, a complicated diplomatic undertaking. The odds that it will actually be executed in full seem relatively small, in our view. But, over the next several weeks, both the United States and Iran will be working to position themselves so that they are not blamed by important “audiences” if the deal falls apart. These “audiences” include domestic constituencies, but, even more significantly, they include critical players on the United Nations Security Council—e.g., Brazil, Turkey, and China.
Here is a guide to the next steps in the process.
With the transmission of the Iranian letter, the proverbial ball is now in the court of the so-called “Vienna Group”—the United States, Russia, France, and the IAEA. These players were, of course, centrally involved in the development of the Baradei proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) last October.
How will the Vienna Group respond to Iran’s letter? In broad terms, four alternative responses are possible:
- “Yes”—the Vienna Group can accept the proposal.
- “No”—the Vienna Group can reject the proposal.
- “Yes, but…”—the Vienna Group can indicate that it is willing to work with the Joint Declaration, but wants to clarify specific issues—i.e., the precise amount of (LEU) to be transferred out of Iran and/or whether Iran will continue enriching uranium at the significantly higher level (almost 20 percent) required to produce new fuel for the TRR. Other possible concerns requiring clarification could include who will pay for the fabrication of new fuel for the TRR (something which is not addressed at all in the Joint Declaration) and how much time is actually required to fabricate new fuel (France now seems to be indicating that it could take longer than the one year stipulated in the Joint Declaration).
- “No, but…”—the Vienna Group can decline to work with the Joint Declaration, unless Iran complies with some additional requirements—such as cessation of uranium enrichment at the nearly 20 percent level, or suspension of all enrichment activities.
It is unlikely that the Vienna Group will offer an unequivocal “yes” or “no” in responding to the Iranian letter. So far, the Obama Administration’s position toward the Brazil-Turkey deal has been a version of option #4, “no, but…” Since last week, the Administration has said, in effect, that, even if Iran did everything required of it by the Joint Declaration, it would still need to suspend enrichment in order to avoid the imposition of new sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.
To avoid being perceived as not being able to take “yes” for an answer, will Washington be willing and able to pivot to some version of “yes, but…” with regard to the Brazil-Turkey nuclear deal? And, if it does make such a pivot, will the concerns raised by the United States as part of its “yes, but…” be perceived by key international constituencies as legitimate, or at least reasonable? Or, will U.S. concerns be seen either as poorly disguised “poison pills” meant to kill the Joint Declaration or as attempts to renegotiate the Declaration’s terms?
In this regard, if the United States offers “yes, but…”, with the matter of Iran’s continued enrichment to the near-20 percent level as its principal concern, that position might attract at least some international support, given that a number of non-Western countries question why Iran would need to continue enriching at this higher level if the basic issue of refueling the TRR had been addressed. (In writing this, we recognize the legal argument that Iran has a right to enrich up to this level; we are making a fundamentally political point here.)
On the other hand, if the United States offers “yes, but…” and focuses on increasing the quantity of LEU to be shipped out of Iran as its main concern, that is more likely to be perceived by key countries as an attempt to renegotiate the deal—and would almost certainly be rejected by the Iranians. Indeed, if Washington proceeds in this way, it confirms our hypothesis that the Obama Administration is, in fact, not interested in finding a way to make the Brazil-Turkey deal work.
Once the Vienna Group has responded to the Iranian letter, what will Tehran do? Even if the United States behaves in “provocative” ways, will Iranian negotiators still be authorized to sit down with representatives from the Vienna Group parties to discuss details of the Joint Declaration and its implementation? How will those negotiators (be perceived to) handle their discussions with the Vienna Group? And—assuming that the United States does not go ahead and ram a new sanctions resolution through the Security Council during the next month—will Iran actually transfer 1,200 kilograms of LEU to Turkey, as specified in the Joint Declaration?
How these questions get answered during the next few weeks will largely determine who “wins” and who “loses” from the Brazil-Turkey nuclear deal.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
kooshy – what on earth are you talking about?
The situation in November, and still prevailing in December, was this:
- Turkey offering to take LEU in escrow until Iran receives fuel.
- Turkey confirming that Iran has right to enrich.
- Iran saying no.
The only meaningful difference between then and now is “Iran says yes”.
Alan
Fallowing is your exact words that started me arguing that the May BIT declaration is fundamentally different then a proposal suggested by Turkey in December 09
The only thing that was suggested in December and not agreed by Iran then was exchange in Turkey which I did not ad to my points, now it seems that you agree that they are not the same deals, Thank you for that
Alan says: May 25, 2010 at 11:58 am
“As it happens, what we have today is in effect what was on the table in December had the Iranians wanted to do it then.”
As for Fardieh and what she and I thinks or what Ahmadinijad said then, it wouldn’t change anything the essence of matter is that Iranian negotiator negotiated on a plan, a deal to be approved by Tehran later, it did not. Like it happens any normal negotiations, later on for one reason and another they were not satisfied by the term of the deal and asked for objective guarantees as well as other terms and they got what they perceived to be in Iran’s interest what is wrong with that what does negotiations means to you; if this is not called a negotiation what other term would you like to call it.
kooshy – of course the Tripartite deal is not the same as the October proposal. I never said it was. I said it was the same as the November proposal. If it wasn’t, then “escrow” means something different in your dictionary to mine, and when Davutoglu acknowledges the right to enrich, it doesn’t mean the same thing as when Erdogan acknowledges it.
Regarding Farideh Farhi – are you saying that Ahmadinejad DID NOT say what she quotes him as saying because you consider her a “Green”?
Alan
Farideh Farahi is a green activist; I have stopped reading her comments, similar to David Sanger of NYT, by now I can guess what their reporting would be, it’s a waste of time. Nerveless as I mentioned twice before I have already agreed with you that Turkey in December proposed (my guess is at the request of US) that the exchange of fuel to be taken place in Turkey. So no need for you send me articles proving that there was a proposal by Turkey that we have all read back then. To be sure you can see that the place of exchange was not listed in my 4 points of differences (that I mentioned also twice) between the October/December proposals and the May declaration by BIT. Here again are my original pointed differences between the two “deals”
1-There is a cap of 1 year time limit to supply the TRR fuel
2-Unconditional return of LEU to Iran in case the deal falls through
3-Acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich LEU
4-Adding 2 new international observers on Iran’s side namely Turkey an Brazil
To feed the western uninformed consumers you and the western media can pretend as much as you want that this is the same deal as was agreed in October that did not get final approval in Tehran. The unshakeable reality and facts are that they are substantially different, where Important objective guarantee issues that Iran required now are realized in this May declaration which was not included in original Vienna proposal which “Iran agreed in principal in October ”to be taken to Tehran for final approval, which Iran did not approve and asked for objective guarantees, naming a few, exchange in batches for LEU processing, timing, place of exchange, guaranteed return of LEU if the deal doesn’t materialize , in the May BIT Tehran declaration Iran almost got all of what they asked for, here is what Iran got in this version that was approved by Tehran that was not in Vienna agreement.
1-Simultaneous exchange means no processing of Iran’s deposited LEU
2-Guaranteed return of LEU if the deal doesn’t materialize
3-Exchange in Turkey instead of sending the LEU to Russia
4-A cap of 1 year for exchange and delivery of TRR fuel
5-Recognizing Iran’s right to enrich as an NPT member state
In all honest does this seem to you as the same deal of October, it surly doesn’t to me or Mr. Khamani and Jalili, if it did for sure wouldn’t get signed with Mr. Erdogan or without.
pirouz_2,
Since Russia will supply the nuclear fuel for Bushehr #1, for a number of years, one might ask what the cost of operating Bushehr #1 will be, compared to Bushehr #2 (assuming Iran will provide the nuclear fuel for #2).
The substantial decline in oil production, in Iran, due to inadequate investment, needs to be considered as a cost of the nuclear program (on the assumption funds available in effect were diverted from oil production).
And this was the one from MERIP – “Anatomy of a Nuclear Breakthrough Gone Backwards” -giving the Ahmadinejad quote:
http://merip.org/mero/mero120809.html
kooshy – let’s try again ….
http://todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-193034-102-turkey-offers-help-to-overcome-confidence-crisis-over-irans-leu.html
From 16 November 2009. The popular phrase used during this phase of negotiations was “escrow”. By definition, that guarantees the security of the LEU. Davutoglu is also quoted here as saying “Countries should be able to produce enriched uranium for civilian purposes, but the process must be transparent and for peaceful goals,” Davutoğlu underlined. “We are not doing this to favor Iran as our approach to nuclear arms and nuclear energy issues is valid for other countries as well,” he added.
Masoud – the entire core of the TRR was replaced with one of Argentinian manufacture, not just the purity of the plates that were supplied for it.
The P5 agreed their draft sanctions resolution on Friday May 14 and circulated it to the other UNSC members that day (including Turkey and Brazil of course). Turkey, Brazil and Iran met on May 16 and announced their deal on May 17. On May 18, the P5 tabled the proposed resolution at the UNSC. I understand it is unusual to table something so quickly after circulation of the draft, but this appears to be targeted at Congress to defer the passing of legislation for unilateral sanctions on Iran that was due on May 28 as much as a response to the Tripartite deal.
I saw an interesting quote the other day in this:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LE13Ak01.html
“In an interview with Khabar Online on May 11, Ali Khorram, Iran’s former ambassador to Vienna, while acknowledging the importance of such active diplomacy, used a soccer analogy, expressing concern that diplomacy that turns hyper-active only on “minute 90″ of a match will prevent the country’s “diplomatic efforts from being taken seriously”".
Masoud;
The same arguement applies to both Iran and Japan (and any other country for that matter).
Assuming that there is no “security” related derive behind Iran’s ambitions, from a PURELY ECONOMICAL point of view, a detailed cost-benefit analysis BASED ON THE TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE to the country in question must be made:
1)Based on the available technology to the country in question (and there is a big difference between Iran and Japan in that sense), it should be considered that how much energy/money should be spent on enrichment or yellow cake production, how much does it cost (again based on the available technology) to construct and maintain a nuclear reactor, how much does it cost to SAFELY dispose of the nuclear waste (again based on the available technology), how much the Uranium itself cost etc. and then a cost/KW-h of electricity should be estimated for the nuclear power.
2)A similar cost-benefit analysis should be made for electricity production based on fossile fuels.
Then the comparison should be made between the two options. From what I HAVE HEARD (and I have no first hand information on this), it is much cheaper for Iran to generate electricity using fossile fuel than it is using nuclear energy.
Of course unless you start working on the technology, you will never progress to a level that you can produce the nuclear energy cheaply, so there is this very VALID counter-arguement to what I just said.
At any rate whenever a massive investment like this is to be made other options must be carefully examined, so as to make sure you are not spending money “unwisely”.
For example, this money could have been spent (instead of nuclear technology) to decrease Iran’s dependence on foreign technology for oil refinery construction, oil discovery and production, and petrochemical production. How wise is it for Iran to invest this amount of money on the “nuclear technology” option as opposed to some other venture for R&D?
Another very important point is that Iran PERSISTS on Uranium enrichment, and as for the explanation it is being said that it wants “independence” because it cannot rely on outside to supply it with the fuel. Well, Iran does not have the necessary Uranium to provide for a single Bushehr for more than 7-10 years. So we are already dependent on outside (for Uranium) wether we have the enrichment capability or not. This is especially important when it comes to Iran vs. West because there is no way that the West would let us buy Uranium freely.
A similar arguement DOES NOT apply to Japan because:
First of all Japan has NEITHER oil NOR Uranium, so they are dependent on the outside no matter what they choose. It would be even smarter for them to diversify their energy resources so that if they have difficulty in obtaining one resource they can try their chances with the second resource.
Secondly, Japan is very much part of the west, it has no worries about US or EU trying to block its access to the global Uranium resources.
By the way, I strongly believe that Japan too, had the security aspect of the nuclear “option” in a corner of its head when it decided to go for nuclear energy.
IMHO, the “security” aspect of the nuclear technology is a very important derive in Iran’s quest to obtain full fuel cycle technology. And furthermore, not only do I not blame them for this, to the contrary I think they have every right to have such concerns and it is very wise of them to try to obtain the nuclear technology and the security “option” which comes with it. It is their right under NPT, and it is a very wise decision too.
Pirouz_2
I have no information about how much cheaper/more expensive it would be for Iran to produce nuclear energy than other countries. And honestly, I wouldn’t claim any report that claimed it does?Maybe the figure you quoted was talking about Iran’s efficiency in enriching Uranium? In any case, the relevant standard is that it would be cheaper for Iran when compared with the cost of diverting exportable oil to domestic consumption. Saying it doesn’t make economic sense for Iran to have uranium enrichment technology is like saying it doesn’t make sense for Japan to have petroleum refinery technology.
MAsoud
Alan, I think the Argentinians had the expertise to convert the TRR reactor, because it was very similar to reactors the US built for Argentina. When we talk about converting the reactor to 20%, we are talking about the ‘purity’ of the metal rods, and there’s no reason that I can see that this would affect the physical form factor, or the basic metallurgical properties these rods would need. I could be wrong, but whatever the case, the Argentinians don’t posses machining equipment that is beyond US or French capabilities.
I honestly don’t know what you mean when your talking about Iran caving two days after a draft resolution is circulated. Wasn’t the draft unveiled the day after the Tehran declaration? Maybe your talking about something else?
Masoud
Dear Alan
Unfortunately I was unable to open any of the links you provided in your response, you are right they must have been formatted in a textile script or maybe they are scripted for “your eyes only “
However and never less, I did not dispute that there was no suggestion by Turkey back in December of 09 for LEU exchange in Turkey if you noticed I did referenced four differences in between the original Oct. –Dec. 09 deal and the May declaration by BIT, which you did not “elaborate” to address, if they qualify as major changes to the original proposal. Once more it would be a great service to me and the rest of the audience on this blog if you can explain why “As it happens, what we have today is in effect what was on the table in December”. Again the changes I pointed to are:
1-There is a cap of 1 year time limit to supply the TRR fuel
2-Unconditional return of LEU to Iran in case the deal falls through
3-Acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich LEU
4-Adding 2 new international observers on Iran’s side namely Turkey an Brazil
Can you send a link to any article (Textile script is fine) that suggest this points were included on any deal beside the May Tehran declaration by BIT.
Thank you
James;
I am not sure exactly what you mean when you say:
“The Financial Times reported the other day that China has obtained a uranium mining concession in Niger, a country which has sent all of its yellowcake to France for the past 15 years.”
Are you saying that Iran can perhaps do a similar thing with one of the Uranium producing countries as China did with Niger?
If that is what you mean, then I must say that Iran is no where even “near” where China stands in terms of global power. This upcoming sanctions will already prohibit Iran from making any investment (or any sort commercial enterprize) in any Uranium producing country. There is no way that the West would let Iran have access to global Uranium market, this is not like an “enrichment program” where if you have the technology you don’t need to ask for permission to do enrichment. You have to import the Uranium from outside, and that is a BIG vulnerability in your possible energy sector planning. I am sure you Americans (with your dependence on foreign oil) know this better than anybody else.
“The FT also reported that Iranian oil production has dropped by about 400,000 barrels per day, due to obsolete facilities and inadequate investment. I share your curiousity regarding the relative expense of electircity from oil or gas in Iran, vs. nuclear power plants.”
Iran has the 4th largest “proven” oil reserves in the entire world. It has the 2ND largest gas reserves in the world. And not to mention Irans huge potential for Solar power plants. Germans and the Danes have recently started feeding their entire cities electricity consumption through solar power, despite the fact that they have incomparablly less potential for Solar energy than Iran, and again a much higher electricity demand than Iran.
As such, if one wants to argue regarding the economic merits of a nuclear power option with no security aspect for Iran, one has to address the issues regarding the purely cost-benefit analisys of that option for Iran.
I am rather ignorant on that issue, that is why I am very much open to anyone who can provide me with reliable information on this matter.
However, as it stands right now, it looks to me (and I am not saying that I know it for a fact, but it certainly looks that way) asif the most important derive behind Iran’s nuclear program is its security problems.
AND IN MY OPINION THEY HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY AND MOREOVER, THEY HAVE EVERY MORALE RIGHT AND LEGAL RIGHT (UNDER NPT) TO HAVE A “VIRTUAL” NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY.
So “IF”
If some mean that he can buy nuclear fuel rods from a Sears store – then the answer is no. But he wants to buy them from Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. – then we have plenty of those rods especially Iran needs for its TRR – because our Chalk River nuclear Isotope plant is the top supplier of nuclear isotopes for cancer treatment to international hospitals.
It’s interesting to note that everyone seem to be concerned whether Tehran should be allowed to run its centrifuges or not – but no one is talking about what the 118-strong member countries of NAM demanded during the NPT Review Conference – or how 230 kilogram of highly enriched uranium (enough to make 3-5 nuclear bombs) found missing from a US laboratory ended up in Israel over four decades ago.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/04/30/ahmadinejad-to-attend-npt-review-conference-2010/
Masoud – didn’t the Argentinians convert the TRR core from the US-supplied HEU one to their own LEU one, then supply the new plates?
I don’t know exactly how long it takes to make the fuel. Iran has allowed a year in the Tripartite deal though.
Well, you could be right that it is an Iranian masterplan, but I really can’t see it. Just the very fact that Iran caved in two days after a draft UN resolution is circulated makes me suspicious of that theory. If they don’t now ship out the LEU, something they could have done at any time since November, who will be left in their corner?
….. I guess not.
kooshy – try “this”:http://todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-193034-102-turkey-offers-help-to-overcome-confidence-crisis-over-irans-leu.html/ and “this”http://ilna.ir/fullstory.aspx?ID=89290/ from November. There are also quotes from El Baradei available which say Iran wasn’t happy with this and wanted the exchange simultaneously on Iranian soil (confirmed eventually by Iran in a letter to the IAEA in February). It should be noted however, that this is different to the Iranian position in September 2009, as Ahmadinejad was quoted then as saying “We have offered to whoever is prepared that we will buy the material from them. Of course, we are prepared to hand over 3.5 percent material, have them enrich it up to 19.75 or 20 percent and deliver it back to us.”:http://merip.org/mero/mero120809.html/
I hope this textile formatting lark works ……
Cyrus,
Re May 25th 12:39pm – - Your understanding accords with mine, that Iran was willing all along to do the LEU “exchange” and the issue was adequate security for completion of the deal.
Pirouz_2,
The Financial Times reported the other day that China has obtained a uranium mining concession in Niger, a country which has sent all of its yellowcake to France for the past 15 years.
The FT also reported that Iranian oil production has dropped by about 400,000 barrels per day, due to obsolete facilities and inadequate investment. I share your curiousity regarding the relative expense of electircity from oil or gas in Iran, vs. nuclear power plants.
Persian Gulf,
Iran needs to keep the moral high ground, meaning proceeding with the LEU “exchange” even if sanctions are voted in. Iran should draw attention to any unnecessary delays in the arrival of the rods/plates (whatever) from France.
Alan,
There’s no way fuel fabrication takes a year. If the French can do it, they can do it in three months. This was an ‘arbitrary’ time line set by the Americans to coincide with Iran’s running out of it’s current stock of fuel in the October proposal. Iran just agreed to these terms to paint the US in the corner. The Argentinians got the specs from the Americans originally anyways, so there’s no way that the fabrication of this fuel would be technically challenging.
I think your perception of Iran being pushed into this deal is inaccurate. Erdogan isn’t really issuing ultimatums, it’s all just one big passion play. If Iran cancels the deal, what could Erdogan do? Replace Iran with India as it’s western neighbor? Turkey needs Iran for trade, and for energy. Without Iran Turkey is susceptible to Russian blackmail. It’s recent soft power initiatives in the region also depend on Iran. It’s not very unlikely that in the (distant)future, it would even seek to expand these ties to security cooperation as well. Turkey is protecting it’s own interests here, not acting out of third world solidarity. It after all still does brisk arms business with Israel, and has a significant forces deployment in Afghanistan.
The same goes for Brazil. Brazil under Lula, was hugely complicit in the propping up the Hatian regime after ouster of Aristide in Haiti. It even refused to vote with Iran in a crucial IAEA BOG vote last year. It’s not opposed to accommodating the US. It’s concerned by the idea that Brazil’s program can eventually be rolled up, just like the US is trying to do to Iran, and enticed by the business opportunities that Iran’s 70 million person market represents. The lecturing and shocking ‘last-minute’ deals are meant for public international consumption. Over the past several years, Iran’s developed a tendency to stage these sort of ’set plays’, to force the US to react in ways that Iran can then spin to it’s advantage. Iran’s offering of a swap last September was one such play. The past couple of weeks with Iran’s npt review pre-conference, Ahmadinejad’s Address to the npt conference(where he declared that Iran would be calling Amano’s and Ban-ki’s bluff in accepting the deal), Ahmadinejad’s interviews, the G15 conference, the hiker moms ‘humanitarian gesture’, Brazil’s high-level visit, two sets of naval war games, NAM’s hard line against Israel, the consensus document due out at the end of this month, Lebanon’s assumption of UNSC presidency, the 11th hour ‘negotiations’ etc were just another such set play, all timed to go off one after another, so as to poke the US in the eye enough that it does something stupid. It seems to have worked so far. The question is, how far back will the US be able to walk itself in the coming weeks. I’m even tempted to throw in the de-classification of the Israel-SA nuclear documents. Of course I don’t mean to overplay Iran’s ability control and time all the events I just mentioned, but when you look at the sheer amount of positive events that have come to pass in the last month in half, it can’t just be fortunate happenstance. Iran wouldn’t go into a huge orchestrated operation like this if it didn’t know in advance what it’s bottom line was going to be. I would say Iran at the very least knew the basic outline of the deal weeks in advance, although it’s possible there was some quibbling over the details. The theater was meant to afford Turkey and Brazil some credibility for them to push the urgency of accepting the current deal.
Masoud
Alan
“kooshy – the Turks originally offered to take the LEU in December as a solution to the impasse that had developed from October. Iran rejected it. That is what Erdogan was referring to when he threatened to call off his trip to Tehran because he hadn’t heard anything new from Iran.”
Yes there was a suggestion and even Mr. Larijani and Mr. Mottaki made a trip to Turkey, but do you know if Turks agreed to unconditionally return the LEU in December
Or if as a NATO and UNSC member did they agree with accepting Iran’s right to enrichment, are this conditions new or was there in December suggestions, you may knew the inside story that we did not hear on the news back in December, then you may want to elaborate what was offered by the Turks in December of 09.
Thank you
Cyrus – sorry, I didn’t realise you were making a firm statement about it, so was just confirming what you said with Soltanieh’s comments today.
I very much doubt the fuel is available off the shelf though. The 20% LEU might be, but certainly not the fuel plates, unless France has made them in the interim, which would only be possible if the Argentinians had provided the specs for them. The Iranians seem to be expecting it to take a year though.
kooshy – the Turks originally offered to take the LEU in December as a solution to the impasse that had developed from October. Iran rejected it. That is what Erdogan was referring to when he threatened to call off his trip to Tehran because he hadn’t heard anything new from Iran.
Cyrus:
“Iran never intended nor planned on firing its reactors solely using domestic uranium. Iran’s enrichment program was intended to provide a domestic source of nuclear fuel to hedge against international cutoffs and price fluctuations. Iran’s neighbors are rich in uranium — Central Asia in particular. Many countries with zero uranium deposits are nuclear power generators, ie Japan.”
Ok, so since Iran has to rely on the imported Uranium for its reactor(s), the following questions come to my mind:
1) How much would KW-h of Electricity cost Iran if it tries to produce it through nuclear energy? How does this amount compare to the rest of the world nuclear electricity production cost (Ihave heard it’s twice the world average, do you -Cyrus- or anyone else have any information in that regards)? And how does this compare to the cost of producing electricity by fossil fuel (of which we have plenty)?
2) What is in your (Cyrus) opinion the reason for Iran’s persistence on Uranium enrichment? I mean since we will have to import Uranium from outside, we won’t be able to have an “independent” nuclear energy production irrespective of our enrichment capabilities (those centrifuges -even if we have a million of them- will still need the imported Uranium to enrich). This becomes especially important given the influence of the West over countries with significant Uranium deposits (ie. Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan).
3) Assuming -just for the sake of arguement- that the main derive behind Iran’s nuclear program is “security”, why should that be a bad thing that we will have to “deny”? We are not Iranian diplomats here, and I see nothing wrong in Iran wanting to have a “capability” (without actual production) for the purpose of deterrence! We have been attacked by a US proxy (Iraq under Saddam), by US itself (during Iran-Iraq war), and eversince the end of that war we have been CONSTANTLY under the threat of a military attack, and just recently we have been even threatened to be the target of a nuclear attack (even without having any nuclear weapons). WHAT WOULD BE SO WRONG, UNCIVILIZED OR BARBARIC IF WE WANTED TO HAVE A VIRTUAL CAPABILITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERRENCE?
Alan
“As it happens, what we have today is in effect what was on the table in December had the Iranians wanted to do it then.”
Alan as everyone on this blog knows above statement is an incorrect statement the differences are substantial between the Oct. Vienna deal and the recent Tehran declaration by BIT countries
To name the few
1-There is a cap of 1 year time limit to supply the TRR fuel
2-Unconditional return of LEU to Iran incase the deal falls through
3-Acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich LEU
4-Adding 2 new international observers on Iran’s side namely Turkey an Brazil
These may be what are called objective guarantees that could prevent Iran to be stiffed again; it would be more honest if informed commentators like you would genuinely point to these substantial differences in this matter rather than towing the US government and US media lines.
Sincerely
Alan – yes I know that the Iranian LEU in turkey is not supposed to be the source of the fuel sold to Iran — precisely my point. Iran doesn’t need to wait for the fuel to be fabricated; the fuel can be purchased and delivered to Iran right now from existing commercial suppliers.
And the Iraniasn did say that they agreed in principle with the deal originally. They did not “reneg” or “reject it” as some Western commentators (who were keen to see the deal die) claimed. Iran simply asked for assurances beyond blind trust that the fuel would be delivered. The US said “my way or the highway” (with obviously no intention of delivering the fuel, and obviously with the full intention of forcing Iran to reject the offer, thus allowing the US to paint Iran as the “intransigent” party, claim that “diplomacy has not worked” and thus justify further sanctions which are meant to lead up to war.) However the Turks and Brazilians stepped in and apparently provided Iran with the necessary assurances. So the US is now trying to back out of the deal itself — Madam Clinton just announced that Iran’s acceptance of the deal is a “transparent ploy” — the same deal the US offered to Iran, as you noted. So obviously, like I always said, this deal was not meant to be accepted.
Robert Naiman’s piece in dailykos is interesting reading!
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/5/25/869686/-U.S.-Media-Censors-U.S.-Support-of-Iran-Fuel-Swap
Cyrus – Soltanieh told the BBC today that the LEU to be deposited in Turkey is not intended for further enrichment. It is to held there until the fuel plates are received. His belief was that it would eventually be sent to Russia, or whoever supplies the 20% U.
I wouldn’t describe the downfall of the initial TRR deal as the US moving the goalposts, but would certainly describe it as US inflexibility though. However, I think Iran’s own domestic opposition had a lot to do with the initial failure too. As it happens, what we have today is in effect what was on the table in December had the Iranians wanted to do it then.
Re your 11.32 – I agree. Of course, those offers to restrict their program were made while Khatami was president. I’m not sure of their status now.
PS: the “Japan Option” is nonsense talk. ANY country with a nuclear program can be said to have the “Japan Option” of rapid breakout. According to the IAEA, there are 40 countries that have the option of quickly making nukes if they wanted to. Having a Japan option is not the same as seeking or intending a Japan option. Having the option to build nukes simply comes with the territory of becoming technologically advanced in the nuclear field, just as someone holding a butter knife automatically has the “option” to use it as a murder weapon. However, considering the additional restrictions that Iran has offered to place on its nuclear program– for example, to open its program to multinational participation, and immediately convert all LEU to reactor fuel rods, it doesn’t seem that Iran is terribly interested in keeping that option open much.
Dear Dan Cooper
I completely agree with you that the American people need to be more educated about the hypocrisy and double standards of their government in the Middle East.However the standards U.S media , which is completely controlled by the Zionist lobby makes it difficult to inform and educate the American people about international issues ! All the big news channel talk about the same twisted facts such as : Israel is facing an existential threat , Ahmadinejad wants to wipe Israel , Ahmadinejad denies the holocaust….etc. They don`t tell the American people about Israel`s massive nuclear arsenal nor they talk about the 30 years of U.S bullying that Iran is suffering for not having a U.S puppet regime like Saudi Arabia and Egypt!
Regards
Pirouz_2: Iran never intended nor planned on firing its reactors solely using domestic uranium. Iran’s enrichment program was intended to provide a domestic source of nuclear fuel to hedge against international cutoffs and price fluctuations. Iran’s neighbors are rich in uranium — Central Asia in particular. Many countries with zero uranium deposits are nuclear power generators, ie Japan.
Iran’s enrichment to 20% is symbolic (If I remember right less than a dozen centrifugees are actually involved) so there is no chance that its output can be used for bombs (nevermind that to make weapons-grade uranium, Iran would have to do far more than enrich to 20%) So Iran’s insistence on continuing enrichment to 20% until it actually receives the promised fuel should not been seen as anything other than CYA.
And, no one said that Iran’s LEU has to be material made into nuclear fuel rods. There are existing caches of commercial reactor fuel (such as that made from decomissioned Soviet nuclear weapons in Russia) available for purchase. In fact had Iran just been permitted to make its purchase of reactor fuel rods in the regular course of affairs and subject to IAEA safeguards as usual, there would have been no need for all the latest drama which has certainly not served US interests.
My bet has always been that this was a deal meant to be rejected, that the US in general does not want to resolve this standoff, certainly not in any way that allows Iran (or, by implication, other developing countries) to retain the right to enrich uranium. Otherwise, there were numerous opportunities to resolve this standoff and at each step, the US has simply raised the bar and moved goalposts. The same is happening again.
US-Israel Iranophobia is anothe example of the latest study by Professor Daniel Bar-Tal (Tel Aviv University) have found out that an average Israeli prefer to live in ‘self-denial’ as he/she is not interested to know the facts about the Israel-Palestine conflict.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/study-israelis-prefer-to-live-in-self-denial/
Serifo
I totally agree with your post.
I think it is vitally important to indentify the root of the problem between Iran and the West.
I strongly believe that the root of the problem is the Zionist regime in Tel Aviv and its lobby organisations in USA and other countries around the world.
In my opinion, the best way to combat this problem is to educate the American and the Israeli’s public opinion that The Zionist regime with its sick ideology is not acting on their best interest and will eventually have catastrophic consequences for both countries and the world in general.
Masoud;
“That said, i also disagree with your interpretation of Iran’s nuclear strategy as first and foremost an all out sprint for a ‘Japan option’ that delivers ’security’, but we can leave that for another day.”
Do you have any reliable source of information regarding how much it would cost Iran to produce 1 KW-h of electricity using the nuclear option (including, nuclear west disposal costs, enrichment costs, maintenance costs of the reactor, etc. etc. etc.)?
I heard from someone it would cost Iran twice the world average? Do you or anyone elsehas any reliable information on that?
I also heard that Iran’s own Uranium deposites are enough to keep Bushehr running for 7-10 years and after that we will be dependent on Uranium ore imported from outside; do you or anyone else have any reliable source of information on that?
I think “IF” all I just mentioned is true (especially the limitted quantity of Iranian Uranium deposites, because that would indicate that in near future our nuclear “energy” program will be dependent on imports no matter what), then I think it won’t be too wrong to assume that probably “security” is the most important derive behind Iran’s nuclear program. I believe that Mr. ElBaradei was in that opinion too and it seems that Leveretts have got a similar impression from their talks with Iranian officials too.
In the long run, the significance of the Brazil-Iran-Turkey deal will be in its world-stage political ramifications.
Iran’s inner political circle astutely surmised in December that the deal offered in Vienna was simply a device to engage Iran in protracted negotiations while
a) depriving it of much needed capability for medical isotopes in short and long term in order to exert additional pressure,
b) creating an atmosphere of belligerence attributed to Iran in the media by continually leaking information from negotiations implicating Iran’s intransigence and eventually accusing Iran of not being serious and returning to sanctions, and
c) exploring additional internal partners to destabilize the regime
The courting of Brazil and turkey, among other emerging powers, was focused on the strategy of rattling the unipolar US construct. China and Russia were smiling behind the scenes as they watched (and gently encouraged) the paralysis of US decision making as US domestic lobbying forces were making decision de facto. Irrespective of how the US responds (which I tend to believe will be in the “No, but” category), the myth of US singular dominance is being deconstructed little by little. Not by Iran alone, but through a smart policy by China and Russia and the engagement of emerging powers.
At this point, I believe that Iran has prepared for a watered down list of sanctions.
Iran will move ahead with the swap deal in order to continue to build the status of Brazil and Turkey, and give ample argument to the Chinese and Russians to slow any additional step with real teeth. The swap will have little impact at this point because expectations within the IAEA is that Iran will (at least) double its current enrichment capability by the end of summer. Iran will move to increase the cost of occupation to the US to counteract planned covert action by US (new Gen. Petraeus plan).
Iran analysts (the real ones with a track record and no political connection) must be questioning the wisdom of this course. It is difficult to envisage how this approach will strengthen the goals of the US policy. One must wonder to what extent policy is now being controlled in Washington by non-US and foreign-interest driven considerations. I suppose we will have to wait and find out!
Persian Gulf – I follow what you post, and I think you have very interesting things to say about this.
Masoud – I think what you say is true up to a point, and that Iranian FP strategy does to an extent seek to persuade others of the feasibility of defying the US, but ultimately the US will have more clout with those others, unless there is another superpower with commensurate clout, such as China.
I don’t think Iran wants to be isolated. I think they genuinely fear true isolation. As much as US posturing strengthens Iran, so does Iranian posturing strengthen the US. There are signs that the US has cottoned on to that, and it seems that they are targeting Iran’s diplomatic assets in a more subtle way than that to which we have become accustomed.
I think a telling phrase was Erdogan’s comment that Iran will have a month to deliver the LEU or it is “on its own”. If they don’t, they may not even have Turkish or Brazilian support at the UNSC.
The Obama administration is under pressure from the Zionist regime in Tel Aviv and its lobby groups inside the senate, congress,…etc.After last weeks breakthrough by Brazil and Turkey , only corrupt and U.S puppet governments would support sanctions against Iran !
If significant sanctions go through , you will see more Nato troops bodies returning home from Afghanistan and probably more western Embassies under attack! :) Don`t call this terrorism because it`s not , instead call it a “pre ” deterrent against a falling Empire that seeks to enslave other countries under its corrupt system….
Arnold,
It was just a joke Arnold. It never quite sinks in with my that web forums don’t do tone of voice very well. I actually find myself in agreement with you shockingly often.
I don’t think anything you wrote is wrong per se, but I do believe that focusing on Iran’s ability to manufacture nuclear weapons doesn’t do justice to Iran’s full ‘nuclear strategy’, if we can call it that. Actually I think the most significant part of Iran’s strategy doesn’t even involve weapons at all. I don’t think Iran will openly go nuclear any time in the near to mid future, even if there is a significant war. Iran correctly calculates that it would not be able to out do America or even Israel in this area even if it put all it’s resources in to this program, which could turn it into a North Korea like pariah overnight. On the other hand, it can take the moral high ground by expressly spurning the development and use of nuclear weapons even while demonstrating it’s ability to make them. This course of action isolates it’s opponent’s while gaining it international prestige. It’s starting to pay dividends. An Iran that’s constantly reminding the world of it’s rights under the NPT to leave the treaty and manufacture a bomb is not one which could have goaded Turkey and Brazil into open defiance of the US. There are three conditions needed for this strategy to work:
1. It needs to be clear to the world that Iran has the capacity to produce weapons.
2. It needs to be clear to the world that Iran is not producing them.
3. Iran needs to be threatened with nuclear destruction by those with weapons.
They key here is that the more fully point number three is fulfilled, the more effective this strategy is, and once it even looks like Iran is starting to move to nuclear weapons, it looses all the gains it has made. The US and Israel can threaten Iran with nuclear obliteration until doomsday. The US may even go as far as performing nuclear tests in some isolated part of a Persian Gulf Sheikhdom, and Iran won’t respond by making any moves in the nuclear arena which can be interpreted as having no civilian application. It will not break or suspend the NPT. It will take the moral high ground, and use America’s own trillion dollar programs to isolate it from the rest of the world. It is not trying to convince American(or Israeli) domestic audiences that it obliterate them. Iran is trying to convince Third World countries that it is feasible for them to disobey American dictates.
Well, at least that’s my read on it.
Masoud
Masoud, did I seem angry? I thought my tone was apologetic, in that someone who read something I wrote thought I meant increase to 20% when what I meant was increase the rate of 3.5%. I don’t think I disagree with you often Masoud.
But I guess it’s for the best because you raise an important question:
What is Iran’s strategy?
First, I’m not qualified to speak for any Iranian strategist. I’m just guessing based on information that becomes public here.
I think the US is deterred militarily at least until things have settled down in Afghanistan. Because of that, I don’t see Iran needing a full Japan option for at least 5 years, and I’m not positive Iran is ever going to _need_ a Japan option.
So, by my calculations, in five years Iran will have maybe 8, maybe 10, maybe 6 bombs worth of uranium enriched to some degree. If things move the way they are moving, Iran will also have begun work on plutonium at Arak. So Iran can give about a ton away now and have 7, 9, maybe 5 bombs worth instead if that gets fuel for the TRR.
I don’t see Iran as rushing to do anything. Iran is managing its environment while steering down a path that is very likely to eventually result in Iran having a Japan option.
But if the situation was to take a sudden and unexpected turn for the worse tomorrow, Iran is also positioned to at the very least create uncertainty about its capabilities in time for that to be a strategic asset. This ability is increasing steadily. Not in a dash, but continuously. Iran should be in a better position a year from now than it is now. 1) It will have a bigger stockpile 2) It will not be long before Iran begins to disperse its stockpile for some reason which will make it more difficult to bomb. 3) It may have demonstrated more abilities, such as casting uranium to metal.
If the United States is willing to negotiate, Iran is not so desperate that it cannot make gestures and slow parts of the process. Iran absolutely will not negotiate away its right to a Japan option, not even for a short time. The idea that Iran may go even further and constrain Iranian leaders a generation from now is just ludicrous.
I see Iran as having a pretty conservative strategy. Just keep enriching, keep building technology and when the West eventually decides to admit it cannot stop that, be ready to accept that admission.
Arnold;
You’ll have to bear with me, English is not my first language. :-)
Yes, thats what I meant, Iran’s system is not populist, no matter who the president is. In fact Mousavi/Karoubi would have been even worse than Ahmadinejad (IMHO).
Arnold, I understood what you meant. But I’m sure pirouz_2 understands your position a little better now.
I know the other day I attributed something you said to Eric, and didn’t bother to clear it up later, maybe your subconsciously a little angry about that still? Well i’m sorry if that helps.
In any case, though I agree with you in broad strokes, I think in general you put a little too much emphasis on Iran’s stockpile of enriched Uranium, and the rate at which they enrich it. Whereas, what is really important is Iran’s industrial capability in producing centrifuges on a large scale, and other technological machinery as needed, and the safety of the logistics chain supplying that industrial network. That’s the difference between a theoretical capability to produce one to five bombs in six months, or dozens of bombs in eight months. That said, i also disagree with your interpretation of Iran’s nuclear strategy as first and foremost an all out sprint for a ‘Japan option’ that delivers ’security’, but we can leave that for another day.
Masoud:
Sorry, but by rate, I meant go from less than 4 kgs a day of LEU to more than 4 kgs a day.
Is Iran really permanently unable to fuel its own reactor? I’m not sure. Either way, if a resolution passes, Iran will probably put at least another 160 centrifuges on making 20% uranium. Iran accepted a TRR deal.
I’m just guessing though. Iran will figure out what to do.
Pirouz:
Well there’s always the 2013 election. But you must be saying that Iran’s system is unpopulist regardless of its President, not that Mousavi is more of a populist than Ahmadinejad. I’ll defer to your observations on that.
Persian Gulf:
Iran will get more votes than it has ever gotten. The UN Security Council is on the US home-court in a whole lot of ways. On the other hand, what the UNSC does is not the most important thing to watch on this issue. While the US gets resolutions, Iran gets a bigger stock of uranium. I think this is strategically a good trade for Iran.
Eventually the US will realize that it cannot pressure Iran to stop enriching or prevent Iran from getting a Japan option.
@Persian Gulf;
Don’t worry about a coup in Turkey. That is LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE. Don’t look at the rhetorics from Erdogan’s government, they are simplly trying to push secular forces out of the balance of power in Turkey, in favoure of Islamic fundamentalists.
Turkish military stands NO CHANCE of making a coup, Turkey is already under complete hegemony of World Bank/IMF, and there is no way that the Turkish military can do something like that against their wishes.
Besides even if there is a coup in Turkey, how do you suppose that will affect us in Iran?!?! Turkey does not have the international weight to make any significant change to or against our benefit.
@Arnold Evans:
Actually thats an excellent idea (to increase the rate of enrichment after each round of sanctions), the only problem is that we will have increasing problems with IAEA for any enrichment above 20%; because we have no civilian use for Uranium above 20% (as far as I know).
Another extremely important thing that Iran must do is that NO MATTER WHAT, it has to increase the investment in the R&D of various technologies/fields of science (eg. Metallurgy, Material Science, Pharmacology, Agriculture) to several billions of dollars. The problem is that, that sort of action would require a POPULIST government; and that, UNFORTUNATELT, is something that Iran is badly lacking!
let’s hope that we are not going to see another coup in Turkey in the coming year.
if the resolution get passed even by this concession on Iran’s part, then what is the point of continuing the cooperation? the passage of the resolution effectively means Iran’s desire for Japan’s status is dead. or let’s say this, if Iran can’t even get 6 countries to abstain (3 are supposed to be there with this concession and other ties), that are non-western regardless of any political intimation, then what is the point of declaring peaceful intention day and night? who are we convincing with over emphasizing on the peaceful nature of the program?
I would suggest Iran ship the uranium out of the country, continue enriching at its current rate, and increase the rate after any sanctions resolution.
My expectation is that Iran will either do that, or something more clever.
There will not be a sanctions resolution before the US commits to supplying the TRR. After the TRR is refueled, or the US has committed to it, a sanctions resolution doesn’t mean anything except a symbolic increase in hostility.
The US has the difficult task now, assuming the US has some bizarre ideological commitment to not supplying the TRR. There really is not a good way for the US to say no at this point.
Fortunately for the US, a lot of the US’ audience doesn’t need a good way to say no to Iran.
This is still the year the US will realize broadly and explicitly that there is no way to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option.
Iran would be well advised to ship out the Uranium no Turkey no matter what happens. It can declare that they are acting in a manner consistent with the US state department demands as expressed in early May, and they expect sufficient pressure to be brought to bear on the US to make it stand by the agreement it forced down Iran’s throat. They can even offer to sit down and clarify any other conditions of the deal, but they should get the Uranium into Turkey, and the clock started on the ETA of the rods.
@JohnH;
I don’t think that Iran stands much of a chance in stopping the sanctions. Unless there is some significant shift -which in my opinion is highly improbable- Iran won’t be able to get the three extra “No” votes, so that they could even “hope” that an abstination by China would stop the sanctions. I highly doubt that any of the African nations or Mexico will oppose the US will.
So I think what Mottaki is trying to do is to bring as much division in UNSC as possible. If they can manage one more “No” or abstention, I think that will be a great success for them.
I think they should base their decisions on how to react to the enactment of the sanctions, and in my opinion their best course would be to start using their influence in the region to negatively affect US interests. In so doing they would send a message that sanctions against Iran will have some costs for USA in this region.
How effective is their influence and how much they can actually damage US interests in Afghanistan and Iraq remains to be seen.
John,
There are fifteen votes on the council, if Iran gets 6 to abstain or vote against, that leaves 9 to vote for and pass the sanctions.
I think it’s safe to say it’s got Turkey, Lebanon and Brazil for an abstention at the least. It used to run arms to and reportedly maintains close intelligence ties with Bosnia, so that’s maybe one more. Although Iran has some popularity in Africa, translating this into votes on to the UNSC is not trivial. Uganada has politely declined to voice much support, Nigeria has been more responsive, but it’s at the most a question mark. I don’t think Gabon is in play. Both Austria and Japan have economic ties with Iran they want to develop further, so they might help water down sanctions, but are too close with the US and Europe to defy them outright. Mexico has to deal with the US as a neighbor. So, we are left with maybe four or five for Iran, meaning two of the p-5 need to abstain in order to defeat the sanctions without a veto. So, i think in the final analysis it all rests on China’s soldiers, if they abstain then the Russians won’t want to look like Western lackey’s and will do the same, which will make it easier for some other states to follow suit. Of course, the US would never let itself be humiliated in this way so it simply would not put it to a vote. You never know though, Hillary Clinton is extremely stupid. Sometimes I like to think she’s a secret Quds force asset sent to infiltrate and sabotage Aipac’s political infrastructure.
Masoud
Masoud, under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Council decisions on all substantive matters require the affirmative votes of nine members.
So Iran needs 6 votes to prevent sanctions. Who would abstain? Mexico, Bosnia, Nigeria, Gabon, China?
I imagine Mottaki has his travel plans all firmed up.
John H:
Iran needs seven votes (or more precisely, non-votes)to torpedo sanctions. Maybe your counting on Russia and china to definitely back Iran. I wouldn’t count on it, they will vote for a resolution as long as it’s watered down enough. I can see them voting for something close to Clinton’s draft.
Masoud
I think Iran should do what it can to carry through with the deal as agreed. Does France have the needed fuel rods or plates to hand, or do they need to be manufactured? What time would be required to ship the LEU to Turkey? And where in Turkey?
We can hope, JohnH.
Mottaki just arrived in Mexico. Mexico is a non-permanent member of the UNSC. I wonder what they’ll be talking about.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=127595§ionid=351020101
Iran only needs 5 votes to torpedo sanctions. They already have three.