President Obama’s already diminishing chances to “steam roll” the Iran-Turkey-Brazil Joint Declaration by ramming new sanctions against the Islamic Republic through the United Nations Security Council during the next few weeks got even smaller this morning, when Israeli naval commandos stormed Turkish-flagged ships in international waters off Gaza, killing at least 16 people in the process. Turkey—currently a non-permanent member of the Security Council—promptly asked that the Council convene in emergency session; this session convened in New York at 1 pm today.
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s government will surely demand a response from the Council which the Obama Administration will just as surely be unwilling to support. Even before this incident, during a visit to Brasilia this past weekend, Erdoğan publicly criticized the United States and its European partners for refusing to take a “fair, sincere, and honest approach” to the Iranian nuclear issue. If the United States declines to condemn Israel for attacking Turkish vessels on the high seas and killing civilians in the process, but still insists that the Security Council sanction Iran over enriching uranium, one can only imagine the reaction of Erdoğan’s government—and, for that matter, many other governments around the world—to such an egregious display of hypocrisy and double standards.
The Israeli attack on the Turkish ships comes at a particularly inopportune moment, from Washington’s perspective, as the Obama Administration was already losing support among key international players—most notably China—for moving rapidly to impose new sanctions on Iran.
Since the announcement of the Iran-Turkey-Brazil Joint Declaration in Tehran on May 17 and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s announcement the next day that the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany had agreed on the (incomplete) text of a draft sanctions resolution, we have been deeply skeptical that China would be willing, in the end, to ram a new sanctions resolution through the Council without giving the Joint Declaration a chance to “work”.
Certainly, the proximity of these two developments has complicated Beijing’s ongoing effort to balance the various interests it has at stake in the Iranian nuclear issue—e.g., China’s increasingly strategic ties to Iran, its crucially important relationship with the United States, its place as a permanent member of the Security Council, and its commitment to dealing with international problems through diplomacy. (For a fuller discussion, see the monograph on Sino-Iranian relations that we co-published last year, through the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies). Along with these other interests, Chinese decision-makers must now also consider China’s place as a recognized leader of the “global South”, and the potentially negative impact on its interests and international standing if Beijing is seen to be helping the Obama Administration “shut down” the Brazilian-Turkish diplomatic initiative with Iran.
That this balancing act is extremely sensitive for Beijing is evident in China’s public posture. As we have predicted for some time (see here and here), China extracted substantial substantive concessions from the Obama Administration regarding the specific measures contemplated in the draft sanctions resolution. As Tony Karon reported last week,
“Not only has Beijing watered down the sanctions to be adopted by the Security Council in order to ensure they don’t restrain China from expanding its already massive economic ties with Iran; Chinese analysts also claim that, in the course of a protracted series of negotiations with Washington, their government also won undertakings from Washington to exempt Chinese companies from any U.S. unilateral sanctions that punish third-country business partners with the Islamic Republic.”
China was perhaps understandably reluctant to “stiff” the United States on Iran sanctions immediately after the extent of the concessions it won from the Obama Administration was publicly revealed in the draft text of the new sanctions resolution. Since May 17-18, official China has been, to say the least, restrained in its public pronouncements on next steps with the Joint Declaration and in the Security Council. Indeed, beyond reiterating China’s support for the “two-track” approach and saying vaguely positive things about the Joint Declaration, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen have not offered much insight into the government’s thinking.
But, on May 29, China Daily published what we believe is an important Op Ed, “Iran Deserves a Break”, by Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, which is linked to the Foreign Ministry and various government-sponsored research institutions working of international security and foreign policy issues. While, at an official level, China continues working to avoid a public confrontation with the United States over diplomatic “next steps” on the Iranian nuclear issue, we believe that this Op Ed supports our hypothesis about where Beijing will ultimately come down:
“The recent tripartite agreement on nuclear-material swapping among Iran, Turkey and Brazil shows that influential countries other than major Western powers have started helping resolve sensitive global issues. Such efforts should be applauded and encouraged, especially because last year, US President Barack Obama said that instead of depending on America alone, other countries, too, should try and resolve world issues.
Before the tripartite agreement was signed, the UN Security Council was expected to adopt a resolution imposing fresh sanctions on Iran for refusing to swap its low-enriched uranium with another country. Now, Iran has agreed on the location, time and amount of low-enriched uranium to be swapped and has submitted the list of provisions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), although it does not fully conform to the [Agency’s] conditions.
SINCE THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED, PRE-PLANNED PUNITIVE ACTIONS, TOO, SHOULD BE ALTERED ACCORDINGLY, MEANING THERE IS NO LONGER ANY RATIONALITY IN IMPOSING FURTHER SANCTIONS ON IRAN” (emphasis added).
The Op Ed then appears to challenge directly the Obama Administration’s renewed insistence that Iran must suspend uranium enrichment in order to avoid new sanctions:
“Since Iran is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is legally entitled to peaceful use of nuclear power, IT IS PREPOSTEROUS TO SAY THAT IT SHOULD NOT PROCESS NUCLEAR MATERIALS TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY” (again, emphasis added).
The writer also appears to caution both Russia and the United States against trying to “shift the goalposts” on Iran after the fact:
“US and Russian leaders had hinted that the participation of Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran on May 17 was the last chance for Iran to avoid fresh UN sanctions. The tripartite nuclear deal was reached after strenuous efforts, and Iran earnestly hopes it would help it to avoid further sanctions. So high is Iran’s hope that it has threatened to scrap the deal and go it alone if the UN Security Council still goes ahead with its plan to impose fresh sanctions…sanctions, actually, are a way of dragging a country to the talks’ table. Hence, they should not be imposed randomly.”
And, just in case anyone missed the bottom line, here is the conclusion:
“As for the Iranian nuclear issue, it can be settled only through dialogue, interaction and cooperation, and hence the UN Security Council should not impose fresh sanctions against the country, because it may only succeed in causing suffering to the Iranian people”.
The Islamic Republic, of course, has so far carried out its specific obligations under the Joint Declaration—in particular, it has provided an official letter to the IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, indicating its commitment to the Declaration’s terms. (It is now up to the “Vienna Group”—the IAEA, along with the United States, Russia, and France—to respond to the Iranian letter.)
–As long as Iran continues to act in what China and other important non-Western players consider a reasonable way regarding implementation of the Joint Declaration, the sanctions train is not leaving the station—no matter how many times Secretary Clinton and America’s UN ambassador, Susan Rice, announce “All aboard”.
–And, if the Obama Administration continues to fix on suspension of enrichment as its main substantive argument for not working with the Joint Declaration, it will lose the “P-5” unity it claims to have forged.
Moreover, if the Obama Administration continues refusing to work with the Joint Declaration and pushes for sanctions at the same time it blocks any meaningful response to Israel’s latest provocation, it will not only “lose” on the Iranian nuclear issue—it will severely damage America’s already strained credibility as an international leader.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Eric, even that.
A couple of things: it is very very difficult to conceive a scenario in which Iran expels inspectors this year, next or before a reasonable swap would have been done – and that’s the only scenario in which it matters (which raises the question, what does the US know that it is taking this as an important consideration when it is almost inconceivable). But if there comes to be a crisis of the degree that Iran seriously considers withdrawing from the NPT, months before that, most likely, the situation would have changed enough for Iran to take the uranium back, and it would be able.
Only if the US attacks Iran out of the blue, with no build-up or warning, before any LEU/medical fuel exchange, does it matter that the LEU is out of the country. But it’s not like the US is in a position to attack Iran if only the LEU wasn’t there. Right now the LEU is not serving as a significant part of Iran’s deterrent at all.
Arnold,
Minor point:
“If Iran can get the uranium back just by asking then there really is no tangible difference from it staying in Iran until the trade.”
I’d originally said that too, but there’s one difference at least in theory: If the LEU stayed in Iran, Iran could just shove aside the IAEA watchmen and take back its LEU. Not so if the LEU is in Turkey.
Arnold – I have just read it and it is perfectly fair. We have different perspectives, and one of us will be right and one wrong, or possibly both a bit right and a bit wrong. Let’s see what happens next.
One thing I would raise is that while I agree that a deal is “trivially easy”, I do think it is constrained by the UNSC/IAEA rules, because there are issues that need to be sorted out within that framework for the authenticity of it to remain. However, a deal could be struck quickly that encompasses steps to resolve the various issues over time. Assuming both want to of course.
Arnold – well, she’s talking bollocks isn’t she? That’s about as incoherent as it gets.
I’ve not read your other post yet, but I will have a close look and respond – perhaps not tonight, but I will.
Cyrus,
Do you have any figures on the comparative cost of Iran’s enrichment (LEU) compared with what Russia will charge for the LEU supplied to Bushehr #1 when it opens later this year?
Iran can retain its ability to enrich LEU even if it obtains LEU from Russia for #1 and even perhaps #2 at Bushehr.
The Iranian underinvestment in its energy facilities is an expensive part of the price Iran pays for its nuclear programme.
Arnold,
Are you suggesting Hillary Clinton characterizes as the “international consensus” that Iran does not have the right to enrich uranium, even to 5% or lower purity?
Is Clinton claiming that the position of Israel is the “international consensus”?
Alan, what you would accept, how you would resolve this issue of you represented the United States seems to be more different from how US policymakers are inclined than you recognize.
July 26,2010:
MR. GREGORY: All right, but let’s be specific. Are you talking about a nuclear umbrella?
SEC’Y CLINTON: We, we are, we are not talking in specifics, David, because, you know, that would come later, if at all. You know, my view is you hope for the best, you plan for the worst. Our hope is–that’s why we’re engaged in the president’s policy of engagement toward Iran–is that Iran will understand why it is in their interest to go along with the consensus of the international community, which very clearly says you have rights and responsibilities. You have a right to pursue the peaceful use of civil nuclear power. You do not have a right to obtain a nuclear weapon. You do not have the right to have the full enrichment and reprocessing cycle under your control. But there’s a lot that we can do with Iran if Iran accepts what is the international consensus.
I’ll look at the Feb and April letters again. I remember distinctly the February letter described the guarantee as something like “substantial political guarantees”. Obama’s letter goes into more detail. Iran’s guarantees were a US declaration of support, Russian participation and IAEA participation.
I think we can ignore everything except the IAEA participation out of hand. Russia has not delivered Bushehr or the S-300s due to US pressure. That is no guarantee at all. IAEA participation deserves one more sentence. If the Board of Governors directs the IAEA director not to return the fuel, the IAEA will not return the fuel. The US has demonstrated that it has the votes to get the BOG to go along with it. From an Iranian perspective that is the crux of the entire issue, and the US and its co-voters are motivated more by Israeli strategic concerns than by any principle of justice or fairness.
So the November deal as far as I can gather would have left the US in a position to deny Iran its uranium unless Iran suspends.
For the US, that was the whole point, as far as I can gather. The United States was going to gain something tangible from the deal. What the US was going to gain was a lever of pressure on Iran, in that it could hold Iranian uranium hostage. This is not only symbolism.
Obama says he needed “space for negotiations” or something. Don’t believe that. What does that even mean? He claims he has offered talks with no pre-conditions, and did so publicly in line with the campaign promise he was elected on. If that was the case, what does he need this space for? If Iran can get the uranium back just by asking then there really is no tangible difference from it staying in Iran until the trade.
Obama was not trying to get “space for negotiations” (Obama insulting our intelligence again, that is literally nonsense with the meaning of it is not even coherent), he was trying to get leverage.
Iran, in saying it would release smaller amounts to the IAEA was offering the US smaller amounts of leverage, even though it was an amount that Iran would not consider meaningful.
Turkey in saying the uranium would remain Iran’s property to be returned at Iran’s discretion was following the words of Obama’s letter – taking advantage of the fact that Obama is constrained by the need to seem reasonable not to express his real motivations to a third party. The US gets no leverage at this point.
I don’t make too much of Turkey’s explicit support for Iran’s right to enrich, I consider that more of a sweetener. But the deal as presently structured does not have a risk that once the uranium is gone the US can add new conditions for its return. That is important. That is new. That is not contemplated in any Western writing about the deal, neither letter, nothing any Western figure at any level has said this.
So my understanding of our difference on this is that we agree that this is a good deal for Iran, we agree that, at least the May deal does not give the US leverage over Iran’s program. We differ on when this deal became available. I hold that Iran rejected the deal when it was structured as a bad deal, one that would give the US leverage and allow the US to create new conditions. You think Iran rejected the deal when it was a good deal.
I gather you think Iran rejected a good deal because Iran doesn’t prosecute foreign policy in a clever way. We disagree drastically on this. I’ve always been impressed by Iran’s foreign policy. I think Iran held out for Turkey to turn a bad deal into a good one which was clever policy in itself, far more clever than I would have hoped for until I saw it happen.
I’ll tell you if you trust me, I did not consider the deal good in November or February. If I had read the April letter, it would not have dispelled my suspicions at all. I did not believe Iran would ever see the uranium once it left, nor would it get TRR fuel without a suspension. That’s what I’ve written repeatedly all year at mideastreality.blogspot.com . If Iran’s leadership is as suspicious of the US as I am, it really did not expect that it could accept the TRR deal presented at those times and get uranium. I still think I was right, but even if you disagree, if I honestly didn’t think the deal was good, Iran’s leadership honestly could have thought the deal was not good.
I consider the deal good now. For the reasons I’ve said. I think there are new elements. If the uranium leaves today and France says there are payment problems or a backlog or whatever, Iran can recall the uranium, Turkey will give it back. This is really not effectively different than if the uranium had been in Natanz all along. If the Board of Governors requests that the IAEA hold the uranium until France’s problems are resolved, it isn’t the IAEA’s uranium, Turkey has committed that it only respects the request of Iran in that situation. This is new and not what I expected two weeks ago.
If the US wants a deal where Iran accepts the AP and enriches, without further restrictions, it can get that trivially easily. It can get that before the month is over. The US is not really constrained by UNSC rules or IAEA rules, if it was, there actually would not be an issue. This whole episode is a matter of the US bending and distorting procedures to accomplish a political/strategic objective of maintaining Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly.
The US will not get it by saying it would not accept it, which is what the US is saying now. The US is, in every way, acting like a country that does not accept Iranian nuclear capability despite the fact that it has no options to remove that capability.
Cyrus –
Don’t worry, I get what you’re saying just fine. I just don’t necessarily agree with it.
“Iran has already offered to permanently implement the AP in exchange for having its right to enrichment recognized. And Sec of State Clinton is clearly on the record, stating explicitly that Iran does not have the right to have the full nuclear fuel cycle.”
Can you give me references for those? Thanks.
If the first is true, we have the makings of a deal already. If the second is true, we don’t. But I struggle to see how Clinton has any grounds to say that with any conviction.
The earlier Iranian offers were made well before Obama’s time of course. I agree they were substantial and should have been accepted. Are they on offer now?
Sorry Alan but you’re just not getting it. Iran has already offered to permanently implement the AP in exchange for having its right to enrichment recognized. And Sec of State Clinton is clearly on the record, stating explicitly that Iran does not have the right to have the full nuclear fuel cycle.
What’s going on is this: the US has for several years now tried to re-write the NPT to
1- exclude the right to enrichment but characterizing that as simply a “loophole” that had to be closed by restricting enrichment to a select few nations that would effectively gain a monopoly on providing nuclear fuel to all other nations, and
2- Make the Additional Protocol universally binding without having to get the approval of every single one of the 190 signatory states. They tried to say that the AP was just a modification of everyone’s original safeguards, and so should not need to be approved — but that didn’t fly. So now they’re trying to foist it upon the world through UNSC resolutions that legally CANNOT force a country to sign onto a treaty.
Iran has done far more than its share of allowing the IAEA to verify its program – not only by suspending enrichment for 2.5 years and even voluntarily implementing the AP for that time period, but also on occasion allowing inspections in excess of even the AP which is not binding on Iran. Iran has also offered to permanently place additional restrictions on its nuclear program well in excess of the AP, such as for example opening the program to joint participation. These offers were ignored, and the goalposts were kept moving in order to simply deny Iran — and by implication, other developing nations — their right to enrichment. Sorry, won’t fly.
Arnold – I agree – the October Deal is not the same as the May Deal. However, the NOVEMBER Deal IS the same as the May Deal. I can’t see a difference. Escrow in Turkey. The LEU was NOT to be used for further enrichment in either case, it was a guarantee that Iran would get it back if the fuel wasn’t delivered. Obama’s letter says so. The letter to the IAEA from France, Russia, and the US dated 12 February 2010 says so.
According to the Obama letter, Iran never responded to the escrow idea. The most that can be found is a suggestion that Iran offered to exchange LEU in Turkey in lots of 400kg simultaneously, in a letter to the IAEA dated 6 January 2010.
This “offer”, such as it was, was withdrawn in the letter to the IAEA dated 19 February 2010, where Iran stated “… Iran is ready to exchange the TRR required fuel assemblies with the LEU material produced at Natanz simultaneously in one package or several packages in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
So, no entertainment, as Kooshy suggests, of the escrow idea there at all – not in Turkey, not in Iran; not as a whole, not in bits, not in a tree, not with a fox.
Even if they were offering escrow in Iran, there would be no effective difference to the normal state of the LEU because it is permanently under IAEA seal in Iran anyway.
Now, the advantage to the US and IAEA of a TRR deal was as a confidence building measure to create space for comprehensive negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme. Obama says so in his letter, El Baradei said so in his BOG speech in November. Furthermore, Obama clearly hints in the letter to Lula that the US would tolerate Iran enriching for fuel purposes.
So why the cold response? It seems to me the most unsettling aspect of the deal for the US has been they didn’t expect the Iranians to agree. And they didn’t expect them to agree because they had been saying no to precisely the same proposal for months. I suspect they expected some kind of equivocal step to try to defer sanctions, not the apparent unequivocal acceptance of the escrow in Turkey. They had to slap them down to lend credibility to their efforts to defer unilateral US sanctions. They also had to respond to Salehi shouting from the rooftops that Iran could still enrich to 20% at will. And it may well be that the Chinese and Russians, as much as they sought to put Iran on the spot, also sought to put the US on the spot.
Also, the sanctions track and the TRR track are not the same thing, and mutterings from the administration appear to be trying to get that point across.
Now, you say Iran must have done this because something new was offered. As I see it, this can only be a supposed right to enrichment. But that, judging by Obama’s letter, appears to be implicit in US thinking. It was also explicitly stated by Turkey in November 2009, exactly as it is explicitly stated by Turkey in the May deal. Yet neither Turkey nor Brazil can guarantee Iran’s rights, and it is nothing more than a precursor deal to a true swap deal. So all Iran has effectively done is publically confirm a willingness to place 1200kg of LEU in escrow in Turkey.
Why has Iran been saying no for so long? Firstly because they haven’t been able to agree amongst themselves on what side of the road to drive on for most of the last year. Secondly, because “standing up for their rights” is probably a vote winner. Thirdly, they may have thought they could split the P5, or at the very least, the UNSC, and generate a cascade of support in the way we appear to be witnessing over the Gaza blockade.
I think things changed that meant, on balance, the Iranians felt those objectives were no longer achievable, appropriate, or relevant.
They saw international isolation looming, particularly the abandonment by China and Russia, and in clear moves by the NAM to be more flexible at the NPT Review than Iran wanted. Iran also needed the TRR plates comparatively urgently, and there was a growing consensus in Iran that a deal was a good idea in these circumstances.
Another aspect to it could be that Iran wanted to wait until they had another 600kg of LEU in stock, perhaps to try to maintain this false, and very dangerous sense of nuclear ambiguity. If so, that is a miscalculation because of the cost in international support – nobody wants another nuclear weapon state, and nobody wants any kind of bust-up over the possibility Iran might have them.
Do I think a deal is possible where Iran adopts the AP and the US accepts their right to enrich? Absolutely. With bells on. For the reasons above. But it has to be achieved through the IAEA framework and a series of confidence building measures, so Iran needs to play their part in resolving the issues. After all, it is hardly as though the UNSC can simply change it’s mind and say we didn’t really mean it, sorry, have a cup of tea and a biscuit instead.
As you, Arnold, constantly say, Iran’s fuel cycle is irreversible. They know how to do it and that will never change. So having it fully safeguarded serves a purpose for the US, partly for self-evident non-proliferation purposes, but also (and here I am hypothesising) in what appears to be necessary for the future – a kind of dual containment policy, with Iran on one side and Israel on the other.
Just because US foreign policy IS held hostage to the Lobby doesn’t mean they want it that way. It is clearly untenable in the future, and it seems it can no longer be a question of “if” that ever changes – it’s a question of when and how to bring it about.
Eric
For a better understanding here is “the” full explanation by the “since editor in chief”
Stop the hypocrisy about Israel
By David Frum, CNN contributor
June 1, 2010 1:12 p.m. EDT
http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/06/01/frum.gaza.flotilla.israel/
Kooshy,
“Yes Eric This Israeli “Scientific” experiments are indeed very sonic, but fortunately not booming anymore, and lately it is becoming quite scenic, so now we have sonic and scenic scientific experiments.”
It’s all clear to me now.
What we thought were Israeli “commandos” climbing down ropes to the deck of the ship were actually research assistants climbing down to attach sound recording devices to the bottom of the rope. Had the hot-headed Palestinian terrorists on board the ship not entirely misinterpreted the peaceful intentions of these research assistants, Israeli supersonic jets would soon have flown overhead and generated a sonic boom that could have been recorded by the sound devices. Most likely, the Israeli scientists would have concluded that the sonic boom sound was unpleasant to human ears. As a result, Israel would have immediately ceased its sonic-boom flights over Lebanon.
The very fact that those sonic-boom flights over Lebanon have not ceased is proof of all this, of course, and the Palestinian terrorists on board those ships are solely to blame for the suffering that those Lebanese civilians must continue to endure. I hope those terrorists can live with themselves.
Eric
“About 50 years ago, the US Air Force conducted a little experiment to determine how the American public felt about sonic booms. Surprisingly enough, we didn’t like it, and the experiment ended rather quickly, possibly before enough sonic booms had occurred to yield a valid statistical sample. I’m sure the Israelis are just more careful scientists.”
Yes Eric This Israeli “Scientific” experiments are indeed very sonic, but fortunately not booming anymore, and lately it is becoming quite scenic, so now we have sonic and scenic scientific experiments
Eric,
The Israeli overflights of Lebanon are illegal. Not that Israel takes too many pains to observe international law, when it suits its purposes to ignore those laws.
And with all the photographing of southern Lebanon that takes place, where were the scuds hidden? None to be hidden, one presumes?
Fiorangela,
“Israel flies numerous missions each day over Lebanon, deliberately creating a sonic boom which harms the Lebanese civilian population below.”
About 50 years ago, the US Air Force conducted a little experiment to determine how the American public felt about sonic booms. Surprisingly enough, we didn’t like it, and the experiment ended rather quickly, possibly before enough sonic booms had occurred to yield a valid statistical sample. I’m sure the Israelis are just more careful scientists.
kooshy,
Was the American game plan to get most of the Iranian LEU out of Iran, and then to try to obtain an Iranian agreement not to enrich further LEU? The question is really whether the US had a position at variance with Israel’s demand that Iran do no uranium enrichment.
Has anyone learned whether France can deliver the fuel to the TRR in a fairly short time-frame?
Eric, thanks for your gentle response and the additional information.
I’ve heard another explanation, from an authoritative source in the Obama administration, that suggests that you and the rest of us poor mortals are simply not sufficiently technologically informed to understand the situation.
Here’s how Wendy Sherman explained what happened: N Korea fired the torpedo and it created a sonic wave that caused the S Korean ship to fracture.
There you have it.
Which raises this predicament: Israel flies numerous missions each day over Lebanon, deliberately creating a sonic boom which harms the Lebanese civilian population below.
If N Korea is to be sanctioned for using sonic technology to harm another, shouldn’t Israel also be called to account for the same offense?
James Canning: YOU have put YOUR finger on a salient point:
“Israel clearly wants zero Iranian enrichment.”
that applies to Israel’s desire for Iran’s nuclear posture as well.
Arnold, I have tried this before but it didn’t sink
There are important differences in all 3 proposals namely Oct. Dec. and May that point to maturity of a proposed deal due to an Iranian bazaar style of negotiations.
Iran was for a swap deals from the get go (for confidence building or to expose bad faith) but was not to be stiffed again like they were in Paris. There was no backing by Iran from the “principal idea of a swap”, but the devil were in the details that had to be negotiated, which is clearly evident in the Obama Letter to Lula it shows that the Americans were also negotiating for a mutual agreement. This confidence building details for Iran was possible with an “Iranian Style Negotiations” which eventually produced a deal Iran was able to accept with enough objective guarantees not to be stiffed by the west again. However as pointed by the Turks and the Brazilians disappointment, the American side with the leadership of Mr. Obama himself was again negotiation in bad faith that was to be exposed end of the story. Like any commercial deal the points to be agreed and accepted was to be similar like normal commercial escroe instructions.
Place of escrow
Duration of the escrow
Rights of the parties to the escrow, during and after the deal
Some people don’t want to understand that, but can’t produce any evidence that when did Iran was objecting to the principal of a swap, it did object to a deal with no terms, like what happened to Mr. Rohani in Paris. Iran wouldn’t have agreed without recognizing Iran’s right to enrich, duration, a guaranteed return and place of the escrow (a Muslim country with some leverage).
The Persians were playing chess when Davy Crockett’s coonskin hat was a fashion statement at the Alamo
Israelis celebrating the attack on the Turkish ship:
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=6a3_1275348204
Eric,
You have your finger on a salient point: Will the US accept Iranian enrichment below 5%? Israel clearly wants zero Iranian enrichment.
And more New York Times scare-mongering about Iran being able to build two nukes! Zero evidence Iran’s government wishes to build any nukes.
Obama needs to comprehend the fundamental Israeli delusion that Hamas can be strangled by the blockade of Gaza. The Financial Times has an excellent leader today: “Israel is lost at sea”.
Do you believe the US would accept Iranian enrichment if Iran adopted the Additional Protocol? As you’ve probably noticed, others on this thread have said that Iran would take that deal in a heartbeat if the US would actually agree with it.
And not only that, that was the situation the prevailed in February 2006. Iran was implementing the AP, was enriching under UN supervision, and was open to negotiations limiting the scope of its enrichment as long as that right was recognized.
Alan, do you believe the US has completely climbed down and is willing now, for the first time since the Iranian revolution, to accept Iran has having a full nuclear program with the full range of nuclear capabilities that implies? What indication do you have that this is the case?
Another thing to keep in mind is that while the AP allows the IAEA to verify that there is no current weapons program, it does not prevent a country, in an emergency, from leaving the NPT and building a weapon from that point. The AP does not and would not in Iran’s case change the strategic options available.
I think you may overestimate how averse Iran is to ratifying the AP, and how much that might impact the strategic situation – especially in an environment where it is secure that the information from an AP investigation would not be used to create new laptops of death (as there would be no reason to if laptops of death were not tied to suspension demands) and that information would not be used to provide the US with targeting information (as if the US accepts Iran having full nuclear capabilities, bombing its nuclear program would not longer be ‘on the table’).
Fiorangela… you might try:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIbKMguBC8Y&feature=related
Alan,
As Arnold rhetorically asks, other than the location of the escrowed LEU, what is different between the October deal and the May deal? I gather you actually agree they are otherwise the same deal, but you conclude from that that the US must actually like the May deal since it liked the October deal and the slight difference between the two deals doesn’t matter since the US would never exploit its influence over the “escrow holder” in any event.
Arnold apparently is more skeptical about that last part. So am I. Why are you not?
Alan,
“Do the US still REALLY want to cease all Iranian enrichment ad infinitum? I think they certainly did, once, but I strongly doubt they want that now. They may want it while they see what they feel is an aggressive Iran, but what about an Iran with the AP ratified?”
Do you believe the US would accept Iranian enrichment if Iran adopted the Additional Protocol? As you’ve probably noticed, others on this thread have said that Iran would take that deal in a heartbeat if the US would actually agree with it. Do you think the US would, with or without some sweeteners added? If more would be necessary, what do you think the US would require?
Alan:
You agree the US still opposes the uranium remaining in Iran. What do you see as the practical difference between this deal and the uranium remaining right where it is now and only transferring once an actual trade is made?
What do you see as the practical difference between this deal and a deal that you admit the US opposes and that you admit Iran proposed itself?
Did Iran have a credible indication that it could recall the uranium in any deal presented in November? I don’t think the uranium was being held in escrow in November but being processed – but there is nothing to say Iran was given an explicit right of recall.
The deal did not at all exactly match the deal Ahmadinejad spoke of in September. At all. A deal can be structured so that Iran makes a commitment but leaves the West with freedom to impose more pressure on Iran, or it can be structured so that the West does not get any leverage over Iran’s program from the transaction.
The October proposal, and I’m not the inventor of the idea that the proposal was meant as non-negotiable – that comes from Clinton and Obama – did give the US leverage. In fact it was openly expressed that the deal, in the view of the US, was a step toward Iran accepting that it uranium stock would remain beneath what could be further enriched into one weapon permanently.
It is clear what the West wanted to get in October. From the US point of view, the deal meant that Iran would accept that the NPT has “rights and responsibilities”. The rights are to fuel, the responsibility is to suspend enrichment in line with the resolutions. The US was not willing to change the terms in any way that would allow Iran to get fuel without accepting that “responsibility”. That’s what the US would have gotten from the October deal, and why the US supported the October deal.
It does not get that from the May deal. It is possible to stow uranium in Turkey and keep that flexibility for the West, but the May deal does not do that. It is much harder to stow the uranium on Iranian territory and do that. That’s why the US opposed stowing the uranium on Iranian territory. Why do you think the US opposed (and still opposes) the uranium staying in Iran?
From memory, Iran was turning the deal down on Saturday before the announcement, and would have known about the draft resolution being in the capitals by then. It seems to me that between Saturday and Sunday, terms were reached that gave Iran confidence that it really would get its uranium back if it asked.
I’ve never seen that idea expressed explicitly until it was in writing published that Monday.
You think China said something between Saturday and Monday? That does not seem plausible to me. Whatever new was said was said in the negotiating sessions between Iranian, Brazilian and Turkish officials.
Here’s how it works overall though.
My understanding of the October deal is that it was a bad deal. Further, the West did not seem to me to be inclined to make it a good deal. If it was a good deal for Iran, if it didn’t give the US leverage to get a suspension, what was in it for the US? If there was nothing in it for the West, why was the US supportive?
That is a serious question you haven’t addressed. The US has to get less from the deal than it expected in October, because there is a clear gap in enthusiasm for the deal on the part of the US and the entire US proliferation and foreign policy communities then and now.
My understanding of the May deal is 1) that it is a good deal for Iran. 2) It is not in any practical way different than Iran keeping its uranium in Kish or even Natanz.
It is a face-saving measure for the US because it follows the letter of the terms expressed in the Obama letter, which the US did not publish and that would never have come to light if the Obama administration didn’t anger Brazil and Turkey by seeming, to Brazil’s and Turkey’s diplomats, to be going back on the deal. It does not meet the US intention of the October deal though.
The US, according to you, is fooling everybody into thinking it now opposes the deal when it really favors it. No US figure has said in public that Iran can enrich if it ratifies the AP. Every US statement, from the President, from unnamed officials, from Samore, from everyone is that Iran must be pressured into suspending in line with the UN resolutions. The easiest explanation is that the US really opposes the deal.
Iran, according to you, is fooling everybody in to thinking it favors the deal on its own when it really does not.
Everyone is lying. All the diplomats are fooled. If that’s what you have to believe to believe Iran was compelled to accept this deal, for me it would be easier to just believe Iran was not compelled to accept the deal.
Fiorangela,
I didn’t intend to put egg on your face. You’re entirely right to have questioned the North Korean attack story.
But wait – there’s more! Maybe we’re too harsh here:
“South Korea said the serial number handwritten in Korean [or the torpedo] was strong evidence of Pyongyang’s involvement in the sinking.”
Although North Korea claims it stamps serial numbers into the metal of its torpedos, South Korea has determined that North Korea actually hand-writes serial numbers on its torpedos – apparently in some type of ink that is almost entirely unaffected by sea water (or explosions). And what, you might wonder, was the serial number hand-written this particular torpedo? Easy enough to remember: “No. 1.”
http://www.france24.com/en/20100528-north-korea-south-korea-warship-attach-march-kim-jong-il
The article cited below adds even more incriminating evidence. It reports that the torpedo was found to have matched a design on some sales “brochures” that an unnamed North Korean torpedo salesman had given to some unnamed prospective customer of North Korean torpedos. South Korea neglected to produce the North Korean brochures, presumably because it wanted to prevent North Korea from learning their contents or finding out that South Korea had obtained them.
http COLON SLASH SLASH newamericamedia DOT org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-south-korean-ship DOT php
Alan,
If Turkey and Brazil were acting on behalf of the US to pressure Iran into accepting a bad deal…and Iran accepted that deal, then why is the US still opposing it? Unless of course, the deal was so bad that the US had expected and hoped Iran to reject it. Is that what you are trying to say? Forgive me if you have addressed this point before. I haven’t read every comment.
Apologies for the misspelling….
That still intact “torpedo” did more than puncture a hole, it split the Cheonan in two, literally. The two halves of the ship were salvaged quite far apart.
More likely it was an American rising mine.
See: http://newamericamedia.org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-south-korean-ship.php
That still intact “torpedo” did more than puncture a whole, it split the Cheonan in two, literally. The two halves of the ship were salvaged quite far apart.
More likely it was an American rising mine.
See: http://newamericamedia.org/2010/05/did-an-american-mine-sink-the-south-korean-ship.php
Eric – If I have to have egg on my face, make mine fish eggs.
There’s no place left to get accurate reporting. NPR is not objective; C Span this morning was outrageous. Steve Scully was Pres. of White House Correspondents, he teaches journalism & mentors student journalists; exec. producer of C Span, but he was absolutely incredulous that Israel does harmful things to Palestinians in West Bank. On the other hand, he all but licked Wendy Sherman’s toes under the desk as she asserted, with Scully’s unquestioning affirmation, that “N Korea sunk the ship;” “Iran has enough fuel for a bomb.” No challenge, no push back, no probing, just adulation of a fellow occupant of the Washington bubble.
Arnold
“Do you think if Turkey had told Iran that it could not commit in writing that Iran would have the right to have to fuel returned within a year if the West does not meet its commitment Iran would have taken the deal?”
Spot on , we also should remember Iran holds on the gas valve
Arnold – no, that’s not the issue.
If the LEU was in escrow in Turkey in November, they could recall it and call off the deal. What’s the difference?
The October deal WAS negotiable – otherwise how did it vary to an offer of escrow in November?
And where did the Iranian problems come from, when the October deal mirrored EXACTLY what Ahmadinejad had publically mooted in September? That is, the export of 3.5% LEU for further enrichment and conversion to fuel plates. Where was the guarantee in that?
If the terms were not available 2 days before it was signed, how do you explain Erdogan pulling out of his trip to Tehran “unless they have something new to say”? Or Davutoglu’s officials saying he was talking to the US three times a day during negotiations?
So, it appears to me that Iran proposed a deal in September, then changed their mind in October. Why? Perhaps they no longer trusted the West to deliver. So escrow was offered instead. But no, Iran now wanted to neither export their LEU, nor exchange their LEU in advance. They wanted simultaneity of exchange in Iran (as confirmed by El Baradei, and in a letter sent to the IAEA in February). We are now talking about an almost total retraction from late September.
So contrary to what you say, Iran has NOT been expressing a willingness to do this deal on any terms remotely similar to the current ones since the start of October. They were still turning down escrow in Turkey just days before the Tripartite deal. Then they changed their mind. Why?
Is the answer “China”? Turkey? Brazil? The NAM? The NPT Review Conference? Is it an evolving consensus amongst the Iranian elite that a deal is now a good thing?
And is the US REALLY opposed to a TRR deal? With that letter from Obama out there? Have both sides now got what they really want, but couldn’t admit to anyone? Do the US still REALLY want to cease all Iranian enrichment ad infinitum? I think they certainly did, once, but I strongly doubt they want that now. They may want it while they see what they feel is an aggressive Iran, but what about an Iran with the AP ratified?
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64I26F20100520
A photo at the top of this article shows the salvaged South Korean ship. Other photos show the recovered torpedo. What’s especially frightening about this North Korean torpedo is that appears to be not much the worse for wear. Except for some salt-water rust, it looks like it could be dusted off and re-used. The shaft is perfectly straight, the gears don’t seem to be missing any teeth, the relatively fragile propellers at the end are not bent at all.
Those North Koreans have really got something there: a torpedo that can blow a hole right through the armored side of a naval vessel, and yet cause virtually no damage to the torpedo itself. No wonder the South Koreans are so worried!
It appears the photographer ran out of film before he could get a shot of the hull piece that had been pierced by the torpedo. But I guess when you have a photo of the torpedo, that’s good enough.
Eric, Fiorangela:
China is quite aware that North Korea didn’t torpedo the Cheonan. The Americans are aware that the Chinese know that. That issue will have no play on the Iran deliberations. HRC is playing to the conservatives of South Korea, Japan, and home.
Fiorangela,
“There’s something fishy about the claim that N Korea attacked S Korea ship.”
D’ya think? When was the last time you can recall that it took a navy several weeks to figure out whether a torpedo had pierced the hull of one of its ships?
From Enduring America website:
“An American official says, ‘The situation is that [the Israelis] are so isolated right now that it’s not only that we’re the only ones who will stick up for them. We’re the only ones who believe them –– and what they’re saying is true.’ Another ’senior Administration official’ has indicated that there will be no strong US action against Israel, ‘The president has always said that it will be much easier for Israel to make peace if it feels secure.’”
there’s something fishy about the claim that N Korea attacked S Korea ship.
The conclusion that N Korea did it is based on speculation, “the way N Korea does things.”
The China Matters link posted here last week mentioned US involvement in a rescue effort? or investigation? that resulted in the death of a S Korean.
Hillary C is working N Korea evilness for all its worth, to get China on board sanctions against N Korea. Wendy Sherman is strategizing that China will do what Russia does, and Russia will do what China does, re sanctions.
I think HRC does not give a fig about what happens re N Korea; somehow, I haven’t figured it out but the propellers on my tinfoil hat are spinning, somehow, HilRC intends to use N Korea as leverage to press China to sanction Iran.
This may all have been an exercise that was unnecessary, not that HRC has persuaded compliant IAEA to carry her (nuclear) water.
The hypocrisy stinks to high heaven. Video shows that IDF attacked a civilian ship in international waters and killed 10-20, but “more information is needed before we can form a judgment.”
Precious little hard evidence is offered to support the conclusion that N Korea and its president deliberately sunk a S Korea ship; motives are even ascribed. Based on that scant and speculative conclusion, N Korea — a nation whose children are already malnourished to the point that a 7-year old N Korean is 12 pounds lighter and several inches shorter than the international average– is to be socked with crippling sanctions.
Something is rotten in Washington.
The deal as signed by Iran does not give the US a means to pressure Iran to suspend enrichment. The deal presented in October would have, as when France announced that deliveries are delayed, Iran would have had no recourse. And these delays would be easy to invent unless and until Iran suspended enrichment.
The West was adamant that the terms of the deal were non-negotiable.
I don’t think the terms presented in May were available two days before Iran signed the agreement.
At this point, the United States is no longer enthusiastic about the deal, when it was in November. The United States had an expectation about the deal then that it does not have now. What do you think that expectation was?
At this point, Iran seems happy to proceed with the deal as signed. Iran had reservations about the deal in November that it does not have now.
Here’s the overall issue: unless you think the deal is bad for Iran, you’re claiming Iran was pressured into doing something that Iran has always expressed a willingness to do. The idea that Iran needs pressure to accept the deal really requires some reason that Iran perceives the deal as negative, and have don’t think a reason for Iran to perceive the May deal as bad exists. Do you have one?
Arnold – I am I suppose. Overall though, it’s just striking to me how we see little analysis from Iran’s diplomatic perspective over this, and I think more attention should be paid to it. At the very least, there are two forces at play – the one driving US policy decisions, and the one driving Iranian decisions. Both have a domestic angle, and both have an international angle.
To answer your question, I’m not sure. It depends on other factors too, such as where Iran judged the Chinese position to be; perhaps also whether they wanted to string it out to the NPT Review Conference. But as far as I can see, a deal in writing for Turkey as the custodian of the LEU with a guaranteed return in the event of failure was on offer in November.
There is something in what Eric says though, that the possibility exists for Iran to be diplomatically fried in the West for recalling the LEU in a year. Perhaps that risk is smaller, or the story less compelling, if they were to reclaim it from Kish and send it back to Natanz. But that is just as applicable now as then too.
M.Ali,
“It should be no surprise that some of the westerners that on Scott’s blog were supporting the Iranian Green movement are now supporting the Israeli response in this crisis.”
Disappointing. I’d have thought Scott and his supporters would welcome aid to the Palestinian people affected by the blockade. Who’d have guessed, eh? But then who’d have guessed that Scott’s website would seem like a funeral parlor right after the Brazil-Turkey deal was announced? At least his people perked up the day after that announcement, when Hillary Clinton announced that she’d lined up the necessary support for more devastating sanctions agains the Iranian people.
Alan:
You seem very committed to the idea that Iran was pressured into accepting the TRR deal. I can’t see a single aspect of the deal presented that would have ever been unacceptable to Iran.
Do you think if Turkey had told Iran that it could not commit in writing that Iran would have the right to have to fuel returned within a year if the West does not meet its commitment Iran would have taken the deal?
Given an express commitment to return the fuel that Iran judges as credible, there is no practical difference from if the fuel was in Kish from Iran’s point of view.
Let it not be said that the New York Times is incapable of keeping its priorities straight. In the upper right corner of the front page appears the flotilla-raid story. But front and center, in type just as large, appears this headline:
“Iran is Said to Have Fuel for 2 Nuclear Weapons – Inspectors’ Findings Bolster U.S. Call for Sanctions”
What will be the long-term impact of this incident on US/Israeli relations? I’d estimate at least double the impact of the Biden-visit settlement snafu.
What’s two times zero?
The real impact of this event on US/Israel relations may not become clear for some time, but my hunch is that it will be this: Casual observers of the relationship will anticipate that this incident will lead to reduced US support for Israel. And then that won’t happen. Those casual observers will find that amazing. And then they will think about that.
Chris
“Thanks to US tax payers, Israel is on the road to becoming a modern rogue racist state.”
Israel has always been a rogue recist state.
Gustav:
“G5+1 demanded in their proposal the suspend of enrichment unless confidence about the peaceful activity is obtained.”
I thought you may have been really curious. The above statement is a deal breaker. The United States is quite able to ensure that the IAEA board, or any commission the US appoints, never votes that confidence has been obtained. Until the US accepts Iranian enrichment, and further accepts Iran having the same nuclear capabilities Japan and Brazil have, Iran is, at least in my view and over the long term, strategically far better off with sanctions.
It is very difficult to make a principled legal or technical argument that Iran has fewer rights than Japan or Brazil – but the US position is that Iran must not have equal capabilities. The US position is unchanged from nearly as soon as Iran’s current government came to power and is independent of any aspect of Iran’s nuclear program.
The US uses the supposed “lack of confidence” as a means to accomplish its permanent objective of preventing Iran from reaching the status Japan and Brazil have reached. The US will pursue that objective for as long as it is able. If Iran was to suspend today, the US would continue concocting reasons that there is a lack of confidence at least until a pro-US regime is installed in Tehran.
Persian Gulf…
On the surface, it does look like that Ankara is drifting apart from its cozy relationship with the Zionist regime – but if one read behind the line – the Turkey-Israel- USA friendship remain intact, expect Ankara’s foreign policy toward it neighboring countries. The latest Israeli act terrorism on the international waters, in which three Turkish vessels and some of its citizen were targetted- shows Ankara’s old friendship behind the scenes.
The other things to note are – Though Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), under a moderate Islamic leadership, has ruled Turkey since 2002 – Turkish Army and the Judiciary is still filled with pro-West and pro-Israel secular Kemalists. They already have carried out two unsuccessful plots to topple AKP government – Ergenekon and Balyoz. Both plots carried Israeli Mossad finger-prints. The US still maintains one of its largest foreign military base at Incirlik, home to 40-90 “Made in America” nuclear weapons…..
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/05/18/nuclear-swap-is-it-a-trap-for-islamic-republic/
Meanwhile, Israel. What on earth are they up to this time? Do they fear the loss of US support so much that they are playing such big cards so soon? They seem to be forcing Obama into officially supporting their blockade of Gaza, or officially opposing it. He will NOT appreciate that. It’s big.
Erdogan has said the remaining two vessels in Cyprus will get a Turkish naval escort to Gaza. He’s painted himself into a corner now too. Maybe he is also trying to force US intervention, because a naval confrontation between Israel and Turkey is very serious stuff.
But the real point here is that the Gaza blockade is the most despicable, criminal, inhumane and racist act one people can inflict on another. It is so apalling, and the international complicity in it so reprehensible, that something, somewhere has to give because the entire world is sitting and watching and doing nothing.
Surely there must be some honour amongst some politicians somewhere, and I fervently hope Erdogan has found some.
–As long as Iran continues to act in what China and other important non-Western players consider a reasonable way regarding implementation of the Joint Declaration, the sanctions train is not leaving the station—no matter how many times Secretary Clinton and America’s UN ambassador, Susan Rice, announce “All aboard”. FL & HML
—-
This is where this issue starts and ends I think. What do those other states want of Iran, and how likely is Iran to toe their line? I’d say quite a bit, and very.
Still little is made of China’s agreement to a sanctions draft on May 14, communicated to the UNSC that day. The sanctions story around the Tripartite deal wasn’t a response to the deal; the deal was a response to the sanctions story.
The flap since the Tripartite deal was announced seems to do with the surprise at the speed of it, and the administration’s attempts to deal with it as a separate issue to the overall nuclear program.
It is clear that Iran highly values its diplomatic assets. Because of that, it may be that the US appears to have found a way to exert meaningful pressure – i.e. that those assets apply the pressure, in their own interests to be sure, but in a way that suits US outcomes too.
Dear Mr Leverett and Mrs Leverett,
can you please expain why Iran did not accapt the proposal from G5+1 in June 2008?
Don’t you think, that this was a Grand Bargain?
It did not not demand stopping the enrichment. G5+1 demanded in their proposal the suspend of enrichment unless confidence about the peaceful activity is obtained. A commission would had proven the implementation of the deal.
Thanks.
The reaction of the U.S government to the Israeli convoy attack , shows that the U.S government still with the same policy of ” say nothing and do nothing ” when it comes to Israel`s illegal activities. Had the attacks been perpetrated by Iran or another ” rogue state ” , we would have seen strong condemnation by U.S and the call for strong sanctions against Iran or that ” rogue state ” !
This clearly exposes the U.S hypocrisy and double standards , I just hope the U.S lead sanctions against Iran will be effected by this event !
It’s time to really get it through our heads that the U.S. wholeheartedly supports Israel and its numerous crimes. We have to step outside the box in terms of trying to see if there is distance between them. Any distance is an illusion of the moment to dazzle us with hope that isn’t actually there.
The real hope lies in powerful alliances of so-called less powerful countries that have broken or might break from the American death spiral. What hope, really, for a Grand Bargain between the US and Iran? Consider actions to strengthen the alliance between Turkey and Iran, between Brazil and Venezuela, between China and Pakistan, and stronger interrelations among these groupings.
i realise that usa truly fights against terrorism, but at the same moment i cant explain why after the accident with turkey flotilia israel is discussed as agressor.. we have to be supported as all that happened was just our attempt to prevent terrorism..
U.S. blocks Security Council criticism of Israeli raid
The Salt Lake Tribune
Updated: 05/31/2010 10:17:30 PM MDT
http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_15200395
A rogue bully state with a veto power protecting her rogue baby client state
It should be no surprise that some of the westerners that on Scott’s blog were supporting the Iranian Green movement are now supporting the Israeli response in this crisis.
Eric,
“…A theologically-motivated regional superpower with a nuclear arsenal.”
“For a second there, I thought the second sentence referred to Israel itself, which would have made it accurate, but then I realized the author was referring to Iran.”
Good point. It is rarely mentioned these days that Israel’s whole settlement policy is “theologically motivated” although it is often justified in security terms. Back in the 60’s and 70’s the Labor party in Israel suported the so called “Allon Plan” where Israel would surrender the densely populated internal areas of the West Bank but would keep a thin strip of land along the Jordan River as a first line of defense against a land attack from the East.
The Likud and other extremists religious forces (today in power) rejected the Allon Plan even though it addressed the security issue because of their obssession with stealing and settling the Palestinian territory. This is why the settlers insist, with government help, on creating settlements even in the center of Palestinian cities such as Hebron.
where DO the Leveretts find these photos?
Rice sitting guard behind an obviously annoyed Obama reminds me of a similar photo of Condi Rice sitting behind George Bush. You could almost see Condi’s puppeteer’s hand up Bush’s jacket, making his mouth move as she spoke the words through a stiff ventriloquist’s smile.
Sometimes I learn more from the headline of a New York Times headline than from the story itself. Take this one, for example:
“Israeli Raid Complicates U.S. Ties and Push for Peace”
Until I read this, I hadn’t even known that there WAS a push for peace.
Israel a terrorist state.
I’m hereby launching my own one-man campaign advocating for the disarmament of Israel.
It was appropriate for Libya and South Africa; it’s essential to disarm Israel.
Israel has demonstrated time and again that it is incapable of conducting its affairs in compliance with accepted norms. Its leadership and its population occupy a dangerous psychological ledge; leadership perpetually re-traumatizes Israelis with reminders of victimhood and holocaust until the entire state suffers from a collective case of PTSD. The tension can only be relieved by killing, and Israel’s hasbara habit has inured it from normal guilt and shame consequent to its actions. Israel is a state without a conscience.
Israel has the fourth largest military in the world, the largest in the region, and is nuclear armed. There is no ‘machinery’ — to borrow al-Assad’s term — of accountability to ensure anyone of Israel’s intentions regarding their use of its horrific arsenal, and Israel has used proscribed weapons in the past, as well as threatened to use nuclear weapons against Iran.
If all these characteristics applied to Iran, the US would have invaded and taken over the government. Benjamin Netanyahu is far more dangerous to the world and to his own people than was Saddam Hussein: again, Israel actually HAS nuclear weapons.
In addition, Israel’s increasing militarization has not resulted in a corresponding increasing sense of security among Israelis; rather, the inverse is true: the more boated Israel’s armamentarium becomes, the more emboldened and homicidal Israel behaves, the more fear is required to keep Israelis supportive of yet numbed to the reality of Israel’s immoral behaviors. Increasing the size and strength of Israel’s power to kill has not made Israelis happier, and will not make Israelis happier. The only alternative, then, is to disarm Israel for the good of the Israeli people in order that they may achieve peace and security — and a level of psychological stability.
The international community must come together to demand that Israel disarm. Israel’s nuclear arsenal must come under NPT guidelines. Israel must be compelled to surrender its chemical and biological weapons; its missiles must be closely monitored, and its nuclear submarines called back to home port and out of the waters of the Persian Gulf.
Israel must be required to withdraw to 1967 borders and to pay reparations to Palestinians, Lebanon, and Syria.
This is what Ban Ke Moon must demand of the international community. The United Nations should establish a Truth and Reconciliation project to resolve the deep fissures between Middle Eastern states.
For its part, the United States must stop, completely, any further transfers of weapons or funding to Israel until Israel complies with the demands of the international community to disarm. Thereupon, US money pledged to Israel should first be diverted to pay Israeli reparations debts to Palestine and Lebanon.
In addition, the US must disband offices and agencies of the US government that are acting on behalf of Israel to attempt to harm the economy of Iran. Israel and the US must pay reparations to Iraq and to Iran for crimes and plunder committed against those nations.
This is what the people of the United States MUST demand of their government, if they ever expect to be able to stand tall in the world.
Thanks to US tax payers, Israel is on the road to becoming a modern rogue racist state.
is Israel getting close, given the outcome of the NPT conference, almost the death of Israel-Turkey relationship, and South Africa’s document (probably with the U.S blessing)…, to a de-jure nuclear status? what will the region be looking like after?
I just heard on CBS Bibi saying that Israeli commandos killed 19 and wounded another 80 passengers “in self-defence”!!
Propaganda galore …..Hasbara is telling us that the Freedom Floatilla was carrying armament for Hamas. I wonder if Erdogan put one of the 49 American nuclear bombs from US military base in Turkey in one of the Turkish boats!
Another good Hasbara piece I found – The Reporters Without Borders (RWB) has honored both Iran’s Spiritual Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad among its 2010 list of ‘The Forty Predators of Press Freedo’ which doesn’t include Obama, Sarkozy, Markel and Netanyahu – but does include Putin and Hu Jinatao.
Anyone interested to know who are behind the RWB?
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/the-forty-predators-of-press-freedom/
Oh, and what happens when this criminal state does pull the nuclear trigger and allows one of it’s subs in the Persian Gulf drop one on Tehran. It’s not beyond imagination. I am sure WigWag would love that, wouldn’t he?
Now, I’m not one that readily bashes Israel, because there are many that will do that bidding. But, let’s call this for what it is: Criminal State Terrorism. Israel cabinet and Knesset met prior to the flotilla taking its maiden voyage.
This criminal act in international waters was approved at the highest levels of Israeli government. It should be demanded that these criminals be brought up on charges in the Hague.
I would have loved to see the MSM headlines if Iran had done this?
Andrew Sullivan’s blog also had an amusing passage quoted from some other blog:
“Israel may face, in the coming year, a threat to its existence the likes of which it has not experienced before: A theologically-motivated regional superpower with a nuclear arsenal.”
For a second there, I thought the second sentence referred to Israel itself, which would have made it accurate, but then I realized the author was referring to Iran.
Samuel,
Thanks for the link to Andrew Sullivan’s piece. I like this passage the best:
““So 30 activists managed to beat up 30 armed commandos! Here’s also a lovely linguistic touch: “rioters.” Rioters? These were people on their own boat in international waters, resisting a military attack. That makes them rioters? In that word alone, you get a glimpse into the Israeli mindset.”
He complains about “rioters?” That’s quite an improvement over the usual “terrorists,” and for a brief moment those Palestinians were actually mere “activists.”
Castellio,
Thanks. The US will continue to be unable to act intelligently in the Middle East, for years and years to come. We know the reasons. Other countries need to fill the gap.
Samuel,
Andrew Sullivan has come to comprehend that foolish US “support” of Israel is working against Israel’s own best interests.
James is on to something. He writes: Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey and other countries need to tell Israel it must get out of the Golan Heights and the West Bank.
Lets be honest: America will remain tied to Israel; America and Israel have broken the UN willfully and purposefully. A new way forward must be found. We should support new alliances and, as citizens of countries no longer able to respond with reason or moral integrity, call for and support the alliances of those countries that can.
I’m not sure if anyone else has been reading the influential American Blogger Andrew Sullivan today but he has been taking a very hard line against Israel’s actions. This is not the editorial page of the NY Times and it probably isn’t the “tippimg point” to a more evenhanded U.S. policy but it is good to see the formerly pro-Israel Sullivan horrified by what Israel represents today.
wwww.andrewsullivan.com
“The suicide continues … and US aid to Israel, especially military aid, should be suspended until the Israeli government starts acting like something other than a rogue state.”
——-
“So 30 activists managed to beat up 30 armed commandos! Here’s also a lovely linguistic touch: “rioters.” Rioters? These were people on their own boat in international waters, resisting a military attack. That makes them rioters? In that word alone, you get a glimpse into the Israeli mindset.
And remember that it is not Gaza that is besieged; it’s Israel. Try repeating that to yourself as long as it takes for you to become a columnist for the Washington Post.”
———————
“It staggers me to read defenses of what the Israelis have done. They attacked a civilian flotilla in international waters breaking no law. When they met fierce if asymmetric resistance, they opened fire. And we are now being asked to regard the Israelis as the victims.
Seriously.
This is like a mini-Gaza all over again. The Israelis don’t seem to grasp that Western militaries don’t get to murder large numbers of civilians because they don’t like them, or because they could, on a far tinier scale, hurt Israelis. And you sure don’t have a right to kill them because they resist having their ship commandeered, in international waters. The Israelis seem to be making decisions as if they can get away with anything. It’s time the US reminded them in ways they cannot mistake that they cannot.”
Eric:
You have a very good sense of humour. I had never seen this side of you before! :-D
Agree with Cyrus–”It is important to note the very first Article in the Joint Declaration in which Brazil and Turkey endorse Iran’s — and any other nation’s — right to enrich uranium.”
What it boils down to is the nuclear cartel–the former colonial powers (the P5+1) vs. the rest of the world.
And the US expects the rest of the world to simply fall in line!
Rehmat,
A decline in the influence of the US in the Middle East might be a very good thing. US politicians will remain the dupes or stooges of Israel for many years to come. Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey and other countries need to tell Israel it must get out of the Golan Heights and the West Bank.
Is Obama unable to comprehend that Israel must end the blockade of Gaza? Is it expecting too much from the president to grasp this fact?
The NY Times’ current story on the Israeli raid on the aid flotilla leads with a photo of Israeli medical personnel rushing a wounded Palestinian to a hospital in Haifa. As if that’s not humane enough already, it turns out that the Israeli army flew this poor Palestinian in by helicopter — all the way from his ship way out in international waters! Can you imagine that – flying way out into the Mediterranean Sea just to pick up some poor injured guy who probably hates you? One’s heart is so warmed by such photos that it hardly even seems necessary to read the article.
Between the TRR and the flotilla, it is a very difficult time right now for US diplomacy. We’ll see how long it takes for the US to regain its composure.
It will take a very long time for the Americans to win their freedom. I can only hope the Arabs will find a way to succeed first.
Hillary is being groomed…
Turkey as a member of NATO should demand Obama to attack Israel – as according to NATO doctrine, an attack on any NATO member would be considered as an attack on all NATO members. But we all know it will never happen. But if Islamic Republic had attacked the Freedom Floatilla – I bet Obama would have been the first to nuke Iran back to 10th century.
I cannot forget what Professor Edward Said once said: “The Arabs will get their freedom only when the Americans get their freedom”.
The lated count-down is 19 civilian dead and 80 injured.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/05/27/freedom-flotilla-under-israeli-threats/
The Obama regime is more or less an extention of the Bush regime. Perhaps more hypocritical.
It is important to note the very first Article in the Joint Declaration in which Brazil and Turkey endorse Iran’s — and any other nation’s — right to enrich uranium. This is a blatant challenge and contradiction to US policy, which has until now denied that there was a “right” to enrichment at all, and claimed that it amounted to no more than a “loophole” in the NPT which had to be closed by limiting enrichment to a few nations. The Non-Aligned Nations have of course consistently rejected that argument but when China backs the Declaration, it is implicitly also backing the right to enrichment that Iran and most other nations assert. I can’t think of a more major defeat for the US position than this, but it is being ignored. And to think, the whole mess could have been simply avoided if the US had not prevented Iran from simply buying the reactor fuel for the TRR on the open market, as usual. I wonder if playing cute by restricting Iran’s TRR fuel was worth it for Clinton.