(Photo Credit: White House Photostream)
Richard Weitz, writing at World Politics Review, provides an assessment of the Obama administration’s “game plan” for this week’s Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
According to Weitz, the Obama administration is seeking to differentiate itself from its predecessors and enhance American non-proliferation credibility by focusing on all three goals of the Treaty: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
One of the administration’s objectives seems to be to brand the United States as not simply an enforcer of existing rules, but as a creative, forward-looking sculptor of those rules.
It is clear that the Obama administration is trying to build momentum behind an array of nuclear efforts. From Weitz’s piece:
In terms of tactics, the Obama administration has sought to build momentum in support of its NPT strategy by securing a cascade of nuclear successes, including several last month. In addition to the recent signing of the New START Treaty, the White House released a new Nuclear Posture Review that reduces the number and role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policies, including by imposing greater restrictions on when the United States will threaten to use nuclear weapons against other countries. From April 12-13, moreover, Washington hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit, which adopted proposals aimed at strengthening the security of the most dangerous nuclear materials and technologies within four years to prevent their misuse for nuclear terrorism.
Weitz’s full article can be read here.
– Ben Katcher
Thank you, Alan and Eric, for your efforts at educating me and all of us.
Sahimi’s chronology/narrative is helpful also. Having read the three parts posted on Payvand, I’m now comparing Iran’s behavior with India’s development of nuclear weapons. Most glaring situation regarding India is that as of 2009, the US is giving technical assistance to a non-NPT nuclear state. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=27218&terms=iran Of course, the same applies to the US-Israel nuclear situation, but Israel doesn’t really have nuclear weapons, it has nuclear ambiguity. Wonder what the half-life is of spent nuclear ambiguity?
Eric – yes, they’ll be back to mess with our lives again soon.
Regarding that link, you had indeed already thanked me, but you’re still more than welcome! There is another marvellous exchange between Khalidi and Benny Morris over Khalidi’s “Before Their Diaspora” pictorial history. Suffice to say, Khalidi knocks poor old Benny into a cocked hat. I can’t immediately find a link, but will try and unearth one for that too.
Alan,
Enjoy your weekend sans govenment, and take heart in the old Thomas Jefferson statement: “The government that governs least governs best.” I’m sure they’ll be back at the first opportunity, lest anyone start to think he could get by with less of them.
I still remember a few months back, by the way, when I mixed up Walid Khalidi, whom you justifiably praised, and Rashid Khalidi – the Columbia professor (apparently no relation) – whose writing is less impressive. I don’t know whether I ever thanked you for linking to that exchange of letters among 4 or 5 writers, including Khalidi, but I enjoyed reading them greatly, so: thank you.
Eric – no, I don’t think we disagree at all. It’s just a question of untangling the real chain of events, not the chain of events Hillary Clinton et al would have us to believe. It’s a bit like, in fact it is exactly the same as, Walid Khalidi’s lovely description of a particular form of Zionist propaganda – “the multi-purpose half-truth”.
On the subject of the modified 3.1, I don’t believe this forms part of the IAEA/UNSC “referral”. It is the Alleged Studies that is the main issue. I recall a debate with a rather snarky Andreas Persbo over this, and how binding these modifications are on Iran. What strikes me as a key issue over that is how binding any Subsidiary Arrangements are if Iran can unilaterally decide to start enriching to 20% rather than the agreed 5% and NOT be in violation. There certainly hasn’t been any legal repercussions to that so far.
On another note, we have no government here in London this morning. Exciting times. Never has the maxim of POETS Day ever been more apt (that is, Push Off Early, Tomorrow’s Saturday.)
Alan,
I’ve made the substance of my position pretty clear by now, but I do want to comment on the language that’s too often used in describing the (imagined) authority of the UNSC to enforce Iran’s obligations under the NPT/Safeguards Agreement. The key offending phrases (worded slightly differently by those who use them) are “the referral of the file to the UNSC,” which is thought to be bad for Iran, and the “return of Iran’s file to normal status at the IAEA,” which is thought to be good for Iran.
Under either phrase, the UNSC is looked upon as if it were some father called in to settle a dispute between two of his children. The IAEA complains that “Johnny hit me!” and the UNSC spanks Johnny. The only problem with this analogy is that the UNSC is not Johnny’s father.
There is nothing in the NPT/Safeguards Agreement that talks about “referring files” to the UNSC. As Masoud has pointed out, the IAEA is expected to “report” certain things to the UNSC, as it did in the September 2005 and February 2006 resolutions you cited (among others), but nothing that Iran ever signed up for gives the UNSC the right to play disciplining “father” here. If the IAEA had done what the Safeguards Agreement says it’s supposed to do when it gets into a dispute with Iran – demand arbitration under Article 22 – and the arbitration panel sided with the IAEA, and Iran then refused to comply with the arbitration panel’s decision, I would think the UN would have solid ground for getting upset and adopting an Article 39 resolution, on the ground that Iran posed a “threat to the peace” because it failed to observe its solemn treaty/agreement obligations after being ordered to do so by an independent arbitration panel.
But that solid ground just isn’t there when the UNSC has essentially arrogated the arbitrator’s decision-making power to itself.
Fiorangela,
Alan wrote (and I agree completely):
“Fiorangela – the non-compliance pertains to Iran’s refusal to enter into a dialogue over the “alleged studies”. These existed PRIOR to an agreement between Iran and the IAEA to settle all outstanding grievances according to a Work Plan, and were NOT considered enough of a grievance to be included in that Work Plan. Iran settled the Work Plan grievances, whereupon the IAEA decided to escalate the Alleged Studies to grievance status as well. They refuse to let Iran see originals of the evidence.”
In other words, Iran argues (correctly, it seems to me) that the IAEA (at the behest of certain countries who shall remain unnamed) is engaged in the diplomatic version of what is known in the business-transactions world as “deal creep.” In Iran’s view, the IAEA seems to have concluded that it has the right to ask about just about anything that pops into its head – even things that used to not bother it but now (with a little coaxing from its friends) do bother it greatly.
My understanding, incidentally, is that Iran’s violation consists also of its insistence that it never became subject to the new Code 3.1 provision that requires earlier disclosure of its nuclear facilities. It’s taken the position that it remains subject to the original “180 day rule,” since the Majlis never approved the new “earlier disclosure” rule and eventually affirmatively rejected it. Iran is technically correct about that under the “Additional Agreements” language, though I think the IAEA has a pretty strong “estoppel” argument unless Iran’s IAEA representative was telling the IAEA, during the time frame when Iran was voluntarily complying with the new “earlier disclosure” rule, that Iran nevertheless considered itself free to revert to the old rule at any time if the Majlis affirmatively rejected the new rule. I don’t understand that Iran was telling the IAEA that, and so, as an American lawyer, I’d sympathize with the IAEA’s “estoppel” position (though NOT with some arguments I’ve read that the LANGUAGE of the Additional Agreements also dictates this result – that is clearly not the case).
However, since I don’t consider those “estoppel” arguments free from doubt by any means, I’d end up siding with Iran on this one, for the simple reason that Iran eventually made it abundantly clear that, whichever side was correct on the “binding” or “non-binding” nature of Iran’s undertaking on new Code 3.1, Iran was not planning to follow it in the future. In other words, it put the IAEA clearly on notice that it was following the “old” Code 3.1 going forward.
What this translates out to is that (1) Iran didn’t violate Code 3.1 in connection with Natanz, since it indisputably hadn’t agreed to the new Code 3.1 by then; and (2) Iran didn’t violate Code 3.1 in connection with its Qom facility, since Iran had made it clear by then that it was reverting to the old Code 3.1.
Alan,
I don’t really see any disagreement between us on this. My original point was simply this:
While it is true (or at least the IAEA has decided that it’s true) that Iran has violated its Safeguards Agreement under the NPT, it is NOT the case that Iran has violated its Safeguards Agreement under the NPT BECAUSE Iran has failed to comply with the UNSC cease-enrichment resolutions. If you read the typical pronouncements by Hillary Clinton, and many others, on the subject, it is very difficult not to come away with the impression that, once the IAEA has “referred” Iran’s (alleged or actual) non-compliance with the NPT/Safeguards Agreement to the UNSC and the UNSC has thereupon adopted a resolution requiring Iran to take some action, that Iran’s failure to take that action, in and of itself, amounts to a violation of the NPT/Safeguards Agreement. The UNSC has no authority to enforce the NPT/Safeguards Agreement, nor to declare that a signatory country has violated the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement. The only authority the UNSC has in this context is to be found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and that’s where my earlier analysis comes in. That leaves the UNSC fewer practical choices than most observers believe it has:
1. It can adopt an Article 39 resolution, which can be enforced if necessary by armed force – which hasn’t happened and which Russia and China aren’t likely to let happen, since the US has shown a certain tendency to take it upon itself to decide when such a resolution hasn’t been complied with and to enforce it without requesting further permission from its friends on the Security Council.
2. It can adopt an Article 40 resolution (as it’s done) and frankly acknowledge that Iran’s failure to comply with that resolution does NOT mean, in and of itself, that Iran has violated any of its NPT/Safeguards Agreement obligations and that, as a practical matter, there’s nothing the US can do about Iran’s non-compliance unless and until it can persuade its UNSC buddies to “upgrade” that Article 40 resolution to an Article 39 resolution (which, again, isn’t likely to happen).
3. It can adopt an Article 40 resolution (as it’s done) and NOT frankly acknowledge that Iran’s failure to comply with that resolution does not mean, in and of itself, that Iran has violated any of its NPT/Safeguards Agreement obligations. This course of action allows any UNSC member who is so inclined (and we all know which UNSC member has such inclinations), with carefully worded pronouncements, to dupe the world into believing that the UNSC has authority to enforce the Iran’s NPT/Safeguards Agreement obligations, that its resolution amounts to such an enforcement action, and, therefore, that Iran’s failure to comply with that “enforcement action” means that Iran is violating Iran’s NPT/Safeguards Agreement obligations and is, in short, a naughty, naughty boy that ought to be sent to its room without its supper (or perhaps bombed back to the Stone Age).
Masoud,
“I just realized that most of my last post made no sense feel free to ignore it. But while i’m here, this is the section of the iaea statute that deals with the security council. Article XII paragraph 7C:
1. …The Board shall report the non-compliance to … to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with article XIX, suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership.”
Exactly: the IAEA merely REPORTS the non-compliance to the Security Council. This IAEA statute does NOT authorize the UNSC to take any action to enforce the NPT nor any particular country’s Safeguards Agreement, nor does this statute, the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement provide that Iran’s non-compliance with some UNSC resolution will constitute a violation of the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. If the UNSC takes action in response to such a “report,” therefore, it needs to look elsewhere for its authority to take that action. And the only place it’s going to find that authority is in Chapter VII (Articles 39-42) of the UN Charter, which I discussed at length in my earlier post.
I might add that, even if this quoted portion of the IAEA statute were potentially troublesome for Iran, this “IAEA statute” is not something that Iran has ever signed, and I found nothing in Iran’s Safeguards Agreement that suggests this IAEA statute is somehow incorporated, by reference or otherwise, into Iran’s obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. In other words, Iran is bound by the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement, not by this statute. That probably makes no difference here, since nothing you’ve cited would cause trouble for Iran in the circumstances we’re considering, but it could become an issue if, for example, the IAEA were to argue that this statutory language, authorizing the Board to “take one or both of the following measures,” somehow “trumped” Article 22 of the Safeguards Agreement, which appears clearly to give Iran a right to insist on arbitration of its disputes with the IAEA – rather than grant the IAEA carte blanche (as this IAEA statutory language appears to give it) simply to act as judge and jury on such disputes.
I just realized that most of my last post made no sense feel free to ignore it. But while i’m here, this is the section of the iaea statute that deals with the security council.
Article XII paragraph 7C:
1. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with article XIX, suspend any non- complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership.
Eric – I don’t think it is necessarily correct to view UNSC resolutions in the context of the NPT. The NPT issue starts and finishes with an IAEA finding of non-compliance. That has indisputably happened. What happens next can be decided by the UNSC according to their own articles, which has also happened.
The key point seems to me to be what motivates the UNSC to act. That is a finding of non-compliance, and the referral of the file to the UNSC to act as it sees fit.
Iran’s position is that the finding of non-compliance is politically motivated and insists their file is returned to normal status at the IAEA. It was in response to the referral to the UNSC that Iran withdrew co-operation with the Additional Protocol.
But, various commentators are correct to say that Iran has been found in non-compliance with their Treaty obligations. The fact that the actual finding of non-compliance appears to be a total nonsense is what is obscured in the way the media interprets the issue.
Fiorangela – the non-compliance pertains to Iran’s refusal to enter into a dialogue over the “alleged studies”. These existed PRIOR to an agreement between Iran and the IAEA to settle all outstanding grievances according to a Work Plan, and were NOT considered enough of a grievance to be included in that Work Plan. Iran settled the Work Plan grievances, whereupon the IAEA decided to escalate the Alleged Studies to grievance status as well. They refuse to let Iran see originals of the evidence.
Eric,
I think the relevant standard is that the IAEA Board needs to ask the DG to “refer” the issue to the UNSC. I can’t offer you a reference to that, but i think it somehow builds on the language of the UN charter:
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
Maybe the authority for the board to do this is conceded by all states that sign on to the IAEA charter?
The IAEA board resolutions don’t exactly meet this standard. The closest they come is Paragraph 8 of GOV/2006/14 only asks the DG to “convey” the issue to the security council, earlier in Paragraph 2, the DG is asked to “report” the issue and all related reports and resolutions. This inconsistency was something much harped about by Iranian diplomats(after the resolution was issued, of course).
I have no idea how international law is conducted, but if it is anything close to as inane and pedantic as British common law is as practiced in Canada, it may be that the UNSC has no authority to take any action in this case. Of course it’s all highly irrelevant as i can’t ever see this coming before any kind of court.
Masoud
Alan,
I neglected to discuss the September 2005 IAEA resolution you mentioned. Its only reference to the UNSC is this:
“2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director
General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s
verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of
confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to
questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;”
The IAEA is not suggesting the UNSC has any authority under the NPT to do anything about Iran’s alleged non-compliance. It is referring instead, and only, to the UN’s general peace-keeping authority “as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” leaving entirely open the specific bases on which the UNSC might exercise that “responsibility.” When the UNSC looks around for such a basis, it’s not going to find anything in the NPT to support it, nor did it ever claim otherwise. It’s only going to find something in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which brings one right back to the Article 40 v. Article 39 analysis I laid out in my earlier email.
Fiorangela,
“Do you know anything about the 1983 denial of permission to restart nuclear development, and what weight ‘prior bad acts’ would have on present and future acts and demands?”
I’m afraid that I don’t, other than what I’ve read in the general press over the years and now largely forget, though I’m presently reading Muhammad Sahimi’s excellent six-part analysis of the Iran nuclear program, which originally appeared in Payvand over a two year period (2003 – 2005), which I suspect answers that thoroughly.
Alan,
The question is what is meant by “was escalated to the UNSC in February 2006.” The only mention of “escalation” in the Feb 2006 resolution was this sentence, in which the IAEA Board called upon El Baradei to REPORT the situation to the UNSC:
“Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these
steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and
resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;”
That’s it. The IAEA Board also declared that it remained “seized” (sic – should be “seised”) of the matter, and certainly didn’t request the UNSC take any action — merely that a “report” be given to the UNSC. Needless to say, the IAEA did not undertake to advise the UNSC on what the UNSC ought to do, or had a right to do, after hearing that “report,” but it is nonetheless telling that the IAEA cited no authority under the NPT (or any other agreement, statute, treaty or other document) on which the UNSC might base any action it decided to take. Nor, it is equally telling to note, did the UNSC ever state any basis on which it took action – other than Articles 40 and 41 of the UN Charter, as I discussed at length in my earlier post.
In short, the IAEA did not ASK the UNSC to take any action, the IAEA did not suggest the UNSC had AUTHORITY to take any action under the NPT, and the UNSC ITSELF did not claim it had any authority to take action under the NPT. The UNSC said, in essence, to the IAEA:
“You haven’t asked for us to take any action, nor have you suggested any basis on which we might have authority to take any action, nor have you mentioned why you haven’t bothered to escalate this to an arbitration panel is you are clearly entitled and required to do when such a dispute arises with Iran [see Article 22 of the Iran Safeguards Agreement]. Nonetheless, we have concluded that you need our help, and we see no need for you to waste time with some silly arbitration process, regardless of what that silly Safeguards Agreement might require. And so we’re going to help you.”
It’s hard to reach any other conclusion. At the very least, Iran had a right to insist that its dispute with the IAEA be arbitrated under Article 22 of the Iran Safeguards Agreement. Nothing in the Safeguards Agreement provides that the IAEA is free simply to skip that dispute-resolution procedure and “escalate” the dispute to the UNSC.
Thanks for the analysis of Art. 38 vs 40 vs 41, Eric.
Do you mind explaining exactly what grounds are used as the basis of the complaint against Iran? The two arguments I’m aware of are, that Iran is not in compliance with additional protocols with which it was not technically required to comply (since Majlis did not vote to submit to additional protocols), and that Iran was not to be trusted since it had carried on nuclear activities in secret from 1983 until 2002.
Regarding the last claim, Muhammed Sahimi has explained that Iran sought permission under NPT and through IAEA to restart nuclear activities, but that US blocked the otherwise-granted permissions. Therefore, Iran pursued a program of nuclear development that complied with the letter of the law in most respects.
I have not been able to find any explanation of this 1983 situation other than Sahimi’s. Do you know anything about the 1983 denial of permission to restart nuclear development, and what weight ‘prior bad acts’ would have on present and future acts and demands?
Eric/Kooshy,
You’ve given me alot to read, which I’m about to do, but one thing I can categorically say is that the IAEA HAVE found Iran in non-compliance with their Safeguards Agreement, in September 2005, which was escalated to the UNSC in February 2006. See the two resolutions with those dates on this page:
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iaea_resolutions.shtml
Eric / Alan
Here is excerpts from Gordon Prather 8/2/2006 article title
UN on Trial
Meanwhile, back at UN Headquarters in New York, Bonkers Bolton prevented the Security Council from condemning Israeli for its atrocious actions, while strong-arming it into passing Resolution 1696 which;
Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations –
1. Calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
2. Demands, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA;
What does that mean – acting under Article 40?
Well, in this case it means the Board of Directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has asked the Security Council to determine under Article 39 that Iran’s refusal to re-suspend certain IAEA Safeguarded activities constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”
Understandably, the Security Council has refused to make such a determination, and has, instead, invoked Article 40 –
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
The Security Council went on to underline
the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme, and calls upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
In other words, the Security Council has once again refused to make the determination that Bonkers Bolton has been demanding.
So, once again, Bonkers repeated the false allegations he had previously made about Iran’s IAEA Safeguarded programs and repeated the false claim that the Security Council actually had actually made the determination he had been demanding.
Four months have passed since the Security Council called upon Iran to fully and verifiably suspend its nuclear programs, and nearly two months have passed since the EU3-plus-three made its generous offer inviting Iran to enter into negotiations and avoid further Security Council Action.
Let us not forget that this diplomatic activity was preceded by more than three years of Iranian noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement.
Sadly, Iran has consistently and brazenly defied the international community by continuing its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the continued intransigence and defiance of the Iranian leadership demands a strong response from this Council.
The Resolution before us today does just that.
Mr. President, we are pleased the Council has taken clear and firm action in passing this Resolution. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran constitutes a direct threat to international peace and security and demands a clear statement from the Council in the form of a tough Resolution.
What did the Iranians have to say about Bolton’s outrageous strong-arm tactics?
The sole reason for pushing the Council to take action, as highlighted in the proposed resolution, is that Iran decided, after over two years of negotiations, to resume the exercise of its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, by partially reopening its fully safeguarded facilities and ending a voluntary suspension.
Today’s proposed action by this Council – which is the culmination of those efforts aimed at making the suspension of uranium enrichment mandatory – violates the fundamental principles of international law, the Non Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board resolutions. It also runs counter to the views of the majority of UN member states, which the Security Council is obliged to represent.
Alan,
I still can’t claim to have researched this thoroughly, but I have looked at the NPT itself, which plainly includes no undertaking by Iran to abide by a UNSC resolution reached after a dispute between Iran and the IAEA has been “referred” by the IAEA to the UNSC – much less a UNSC resolution adopted without any such “reference” having occurred. I found nothing in the NPT even authorizing a “reference” of disputes to the UN in the first place.
Nor does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement include any provision giving the UNSC authority to referee disputes between the IAEA and Iran. In fact, the Safeguards Agreement has an entirely different procedure for resolving disputes between Iran and the IAEA: an arbitration provision under Article 22, which, to my knowledge, was never invoked in the dispute that led to UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803.
So far, then, I see no basis for concluding that Iran’s failure to comply with any of those UNSC resolutions constitutes, in and of itself, a violation of the NPT. (Nor, for that matter, have I found, in the first place, any formal “reference” of this dispute by the IAEA to the UN, though I did not look hard for such a formal “reference” since, as I just explained, I found nothing in the NPT or the Safeguards Agreement suggesting that such a “reference” would mean anything under either document.)
This leaves the question of whether Iran must abide by those UNSC resolutions whether or not its failure to comply with those resolutions would constitute, in and of itself, a violation of the NPT. In other words, must Iran abide by those UNSC resolutions merely because the UNSC saw fit to adopt them and Iran is, after all, a member of the UN? This, and this alone (as best I can tell), is precisely the argument used by those who have argued that Iran is bound to comply with those UNSC resolutions. Here is a classic example of this argument, which can be found on a web page of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, written by Amy Reed:
“After Iran broke its suspension of enrichment activities in August 2005, it justified this action by reminding the IAEA that the suspension had been voluntary and non-legally binding. Iran further argued that neither the NPT nor the IAEA statute provided a legal basis for requiring Iran to further suspend these activities. Legally, Iran was correct; the IAEA is not given the right under either the NPT or its own statute to require states to suspend fuel cycle activities.”
“However, UN Resolution 1696 itself created a legal obligation for Iran to suspend, rendering Iran’s earlier legal references moot. Under 1696 Iran is demanded to “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” Unlike the IAEA board requests of Iran to suspend such activities, this request is not voluntary and is legally-binding. According to Article 25 of the UN Charter, “members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter,” meaning that Security Council resolutions are legally as powerful as the UN Charter itself.”
“– Amy Reed is a Junior Fellow for Nonproliferation the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.”
That appeared to be it – the entire basis on which Ms. Reed believed lay Iran’s obligation to comply with UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803. Those resolutions, however, were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Articles 39-42 – set forth in full at the end of this post), which is more specific than the general language of Article 25. Article 25, read without any background or reference to Chapter VII, might well (though not necessarily) be interpreted just as Ms. Reed interprets it. but Chapter VII lays out more specifically what the UN may do and not do if a UN member state declines to comply with a Chapter VII resolution, and it turns out that the answer to that question depends on whether the Chapter VII resolution has been adopted under Article 39 (armed force OK to enforce) or Article 40 (armed force not OK).
My analysis of UNSC Chapter VII resolutions is presented below in an email (edited and supplemented here) I sent to Dr. Alan J. Kuperman in response to his infamous 12/24/09 “bomb Iran” op-ed in the New York Times. I concluded that, absent a UNSC finding under Article 39 that Iran’s nuclear program is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” – a finding which has never been made and is not likely to be made unless the situation changes very substantially – all that the UNSC can do is (just as it has done so far) adopt resolutions under Article 40, implemented under Article 41 with non-military remedies, that essentially “call upon” Iran to take certain actions (“without prejudice” to Iran’s “rights, claims or position”) – failing which the UNSC may not use armed force unless it first adopts a much tougher resolution under Article 39 (which Russia and China, probably needless to say, are not likely to approve).
Here is my email to Dr. Kuperman (edited and supplemented for our present purposes):
“Iran’s point, argued in several writings (e.g. its 26 March 2008 Note Verbale — a good starting point for you) and speeches, and fleshed out here with some background taken for granted in Iran’s sometimes sketchy (and occasionally muddled) arguments, is that a binding Chapter VII resolution, at least in this context, must be based on Article 39, not on Article 40. That may strike you as a picky distinction, but you’ll learn it’s not if you take the time to dig a little deeper.”
“Article 41, mentioned most often in the Iran/nuclear resolutions, is procedural: it merely spells out ways the SC can put some (non-military) teeth in resolutions it’s previously (or simultaneously) adopted under either Article 39 or Article 40. Predicating a resolution on Article 41 does not transform an Article 40 resolution into an Article 39 resolution. ”
“None of the Iran/nuclear resolutions is an Article 39 resolution. In other words, as Iran has correctly pointed out several times, the Security Council has never found that Iran’s nuclear program is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” (It may be worth your while to reread the last sentence before continuing, especially when you recall that you started your day — or at least my day — by recommending that we drop some bombs on Iran.) Instead, the SC has acted under Article 40, a “baby step” provision that enables the SC to “prevent an aggravation of the situation.” Article 40 provides that “the Security Council may, BEFORE making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.” (Emphasis added to “before.”)”
“And what might the Security Council do once it “duly takes account of [a state's] failure to comply” with such “provisional measures?” Well, as should be obvious, the SC may decide it’s time to whack that state upside the head by adopting a resolution under Article 39. And if and when the SC does that, none of that wishy-washy “without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions…” language that appears in Article 40 (but not in Article 39) will any longer be available to the uncooperative state. It will be hardball time, and the stubborn state will have to comply. But not until then — or so Iran argues, and my conclusion is that Iran has logic and authority on its side.”
“One might argue, and I suspect those who would like to bomb Iran have argued, that there is a “back door” route to Article 42 (armed-force remedies). The argument goes something like this: Since Article 41 provides that the “Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,” and an Article 40-based resolution is, after all, a “decision” of the UNSC, it follows that Article 41 remedies are available to implement an Article 40-based resolution. Indeed, this plainly appears to be the basis for the UNSC Iran resolutions’ citation of Article 41. I certainly can accept this argument so far. But the argument continues (or so I presume: I’ve not heard or read of anyone actually laying it out in detail) a step too far: Since Article 42 provides that, should the “Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary…,” it follows that the UNSC can rely on Article 42 (i.e. an armed-force remedy) to enforce an Article 40-based resolution if it turns out that the milder remedies available under Article 41 have not proved to be sufficient.
The weakness of this “extended” argument, however, becomes apparent when one quotes the entire sentence of which I just quoted a part: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The UNSC’s authority under Article 42 to ” take … action by air, sea, or land forces” thus is limited to what is “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” That, in turn, implies that the UNSC has determined that it indeed is necessary to “restore international peace and security.” If the UNSC has not determined that such a necessity exists, Article 42 does not authorize the use of armed-force remedies.”
“This begs the ultimate question, then: How, exactly, does the UNSC declare that a need exists to “restore international peace and security?” The answer seems plain: it simply adopts a resolution to that effect under Article 39, which reads as follows:”
“”The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”"
“Absent such an Article 39 resolution (for example, when only an Article 40 resolution has so far been adopted), the UNSC has not laid the basis for an armed-force remedy under Article 42.”
“Are you beginning to see the difference between an Article 40 resolution and an Article 39 resolution? ….”
In closing, do you wonder why the Security Council has never based an Iran/nuclear resolution on Article 39? Being unafraid to state the obvious, I’ll answer that question: because the Security Council doesn’t consider Iran’s nuclear program to be a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” You do; they don’t. And so they don’t think we should drop bombs on Iran. You do; they don’t.”
[END OF EMAIL TO DR. ALAN J. KUPERMAN]
In short, I see no basis in the NPT, in Iran’s Safeguards Agreement or in the UN Charter to conclude that Iran’s failure to comply with UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 constitutes, in and of itself, a violation of the NPT. Nor, though this conclusion goes beyond our initial question (answered in the preceding sentence) do I find any basis for the conclusion that Iran’s failure to comply with these resolutions warrants the use of armed-force remedies under Article 42. For that, the UNSC first must adopt a resolution under Article 39, and I don’t foresee that happening any time soon.
Eric
****************************
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Alan,
Here’s a link to UNSC Resolution 1696 (the first “cease enrichment” resolution):
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement
The preamble, which normally lays out the grounds for the adoption of the resolution, mentions the UNSC’s concern over a number of unresolved questions in several IAEA reports, but does not mention that the IAEA has actually “referred” the matter to the UNSC. I do not mean to say that such a “referral” did not occur, merely to point out that it’s not mentioned here.
I’m sure there’s a simple “yes” or “no” answer to the question of whether the UNSC adopted these resolutions (1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803, if I remember my numbers correctly) pursuant to a formal “referral” from the IAEA. I just don’t know that answer, and I don’t see it stated here, in the preamble to 1696, where I would expect to see it laid out clearly.
Alan,
“If the NPT/Safeguards agreements provide for referral to the UNSC in the event of non-compliance, then is there not a legally defensible sequence there?”
Certainly the UNSC (or someone) must ultimately be an arbiter in the event of a dispute over whether Iran (or any other NPT signatory) is in non-compliance and, if so, what ought to be done about it. That may be the basis for the UNSC resolutions calling upon Iran to cease uranium enrichment, but I’m not aware that that’s the case. I would have expected the UNSC to act under Article 39 rather than Article 40 in that event, since Article 39-based resolutions must be complied with by the target country and may be enforced with military means if they are not. Article 40, by contrast, provides for resolutions that merely “call upon” the target country to do (or not do) something. There’s been no finding, under an Article 40 resolution, that the target country is a “threat to the peace,” as is required for Article 39 resolutions. (This part I am sure of.)
It may be (even though I don’t understand this to be the case), that the IAEA has found Iran to be in non-compliance, has “referred” this non-compliance to the UNSC, and that the UNSC has responded by acting in this timid “Article 40″ manner. Again, that’s not my understanding, but I may well be incorrect about this, so please correct me if I’m wrong. I do not claim to have researched in any depth the jurisdictional base for these Article 40 UNSC resolutions in this case.
If my understanding is correct — i.e. that the UNSC was NOT acting on that jurisdictional basis when it passed those resolutions, then I believe my analysis in my earlier post is entirely correct: the fact that the UNSC has chosen to adopt an Article 40-based “cease enrichment” resolution, with which Iran chooses not to comply, does not mean Iran has violated the NPT. If, as I argued there, the UNSC resolution had instead demanded that Iran stop doing something which the NPT also prohibited Iran from doing, and Iran chose not to comply with that resolution, then Iran indeed would be in violation of the NPT – but NOT because the UNSC had adopted that resolution.
Eric – it’s an interesting discussion point regarding the NPT and the UNSC. If the NPT/Safeguards agreements provide for referral to the UNSC in the event of non-compliance, then is there not a legally defensible sequence there? Ultimately the NPT/Safeguards can only be enforced by the UNSC, so there must be some legal grounding to the process at least.
Of course, Iran disputes the legality of the referral in the first place, and it doesn’t seem reasonable that there should be no recourse to some kind of arbiter. However, I agree that the issue is far too technical now to be easily spun in Iran’s defence, which of course means it is easily spun by the US in their favour, something which Clinton et al exploit mercilessly.
Fiorangela,
I should add: Not to date myself, but when I was born, Interstate 71 was nothing but a gleam in some freeway designer’s eye.
Fiorangela,
Technically West Side, though just barely. Broadview Road was the dividing line. I grew up in a small suburb called Broadview Heights, more or less due south. I think it’s best known for being the exact spot where the 9/11 plane that crashed in Pennsylvania made its U-turn and started heading back toward Washington. (I’m often surprised at how few Broadview Heights residents seem to be aware of that claim to fame.) I’ve been in San Francisco since 1975, though.
Rehmat,
I think it is a serious mistake for Kourosh Ziabari to state that Iran seeks in effect the destruction of Israel when this clearly is very far from the truth. Iran has given numerous signals it will accept whatever deal the Palestinians make with Israel, so a confirmation of Israel’s right to existence etc etc within its “pre-1967″ borders, would be approved – - tacitly or otherwise – - by Iran.
Eric – East side or West side? (our Ohio license tags stipulated that they were invalid west of I-71;)
We moved to Shaker Hts on the day Iranian students occupied the embassy in Tehran. At the time, that wasn’t our biggest worry; we were more concerned that it was raining and the rented van had a hole in the roof. The two-year old was sick and the 3-year old was cranky. Volker had just ratcheted up interest rates, putting our loan in jeopardy. And the house we thought we had sold back in Maryland was no longer sold because Volker…. Interesting times.
Eric:
Dear Eric:
I appreciate both of your comments.
Indeed I checked about your first comment and it seems that the author may have just re-hatched what was written from two other sites one written in January 2010 and another written in 2007. So the article does not necessarily represent the authors own research.
Second – you are absolutely correct. Not many people would distinguish the fact that violating the UNSC does not mean you have violated the NPT. Unfortunately, not many people are aware of the NPT requirements and can easily be swayed by those who intend to mis-lead them.
Thank you again.
Ahmadinejad played rope-a-dope with GS and the poor lad tried to use his humiliation to demonstrate that his antagonist was a loon. Best laugh I’ve had today.
An interesting interview with Michael Hoffman by young Iranian journalist and author, Kourosh Ziabari:
http://www.rebelnews.org/opinion/middle-east/219525
Kooshy,
I don’t normally pay much attention to George Stephanopoulos (though I used to when he worked for Bill Clinton, in part because we hail from the same home town — Cleveland, Ohio). In reading the piece you cited, I was struck most by the fact that GS hasn’t matured. He’s a bright guy, but his “mind guide” seems still to be that sort of wise-guy, barely-out-of-college sarcasm that he ought to have outgrown long ago (especially since, in this case, his own desire to be sarcastic caused him to miss entirely Ahmadinejad’s own sarcasm about Bin Laden living in Washington, DC).
Rehmat,
Bravo! Hillaryu Clinton spouts obviously absurd comments about Ahmadinejad being “anti-Semitic” and other absolute rubbish intended to deflect attention for ongoing oppression of the Palestinians by the Israelis. Surely she is not so stupid as to believe Syria would deliver scuds to Hezbollah? That gal is totally out of her depth, and she is ill-serving the best interests of the American people.
kooshy,
Yes, I agree Ahmadinejad has shown great pluck and courage under heavy fire from the Israel-centric US newsmedia. He is doing a good job of underlining for the entire world American hypocrisy, duplicity and gross stupidity. Thank you, Israel lobby (and stooges in the US Congress, etc.)!
Eric
That makes sense; especially since I think for a man with Osama’s physical characteristic it is much easier to find an impersonator decoy in D.C. then Tehran, Iranian’s are generally shorter and not as dark like Ahmadinijad, and Khamanaie
On the contrary it is rather easy to find men with similar height and color characteristics in D.C.
Very interesting comments by American readers on ABC’s George’s Bottom Line blog, with regard to his interview this morning with president of Iran and the Osama Bin Laden
http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2010/05/ahmadinejad-bin-laden-lives-in-dc.html
Kooshy,
I can’t say I’m entirely surprised to learn that bin Laden is now living in Washington, DC.
Remember I mentioned that he’d won the trip for four to Disney World in the school auction? He won only because hardly anyone else had bid on that item after they learned that the trip didn’t include a return flight. Someone overheard Bin Laden remarking that that didn’t matter to him, since he was planning a longer US trip anyway. He said he’d like to take a look at the Golden Gate Bridge while he was there, and then the Hoover Dam, the Sears Tower in Chicago and finally the White House and Capitol Building in D.C. Typical tourist stuff – I guess that’s why I forgot to mention it yesterday.
I naturally assumed he’d done all that and then flown home to Tehran. But I guess he must have liked Washington so much that he’s never left.
Eric FYI
It seems that the ever sharp and always smart reporter of ABC news George Stephanopoulos was reading your report of the
Bin Laden’s Tehran all star fiesta and just dropped the Bomb on Ahmadinejad with one final, smart, ultimate question
Ahmadinejad: Osama Bin Laden Not in Iran, More Likely in D.C.
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/iran-president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-osama-bin-laden-washington/story?id=10558090
Elisa,
Notwithstanding my harsh comment about Dr. Sahimi (which I stand by entirely), I agree his article is quite interesting, an apparently thorough “review of the literature” on hand-wringing predictions about the imminent Iranian bomb.
One point Dr. Sahimi raised brings to mind a similar observation, though (I think) one that is even more well-founded. He wrote:
“And just the other day, Hillary Clinton claimed that Iran has violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Apparently, the secretary of state does not know that there is a vast difference – technically and legally – between violating the NPT and being in non-compliance with some provisions of the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.”
I suspect most will find the distinction he draws here, valid or not, to be hair-splitting. A more important and valid distinction, however, which Hillary Clinton and dozens of others often blur, is the distinction between (1) Iran’s ignoring (a more accurate choice of verb than “violating”) a UN Security Council resolution demanding that Iran cease enrichment; and (2) Iran’s violation of the NPT.
If Iran at least arguably has violated the NPT (even through some minor non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, or through its failure to answer questions which it claims it has no obligation to answer), that fact provides Hillary Clinton all she needs to mislead her audience to believe something that is not at all true: that, BECAUSE Iran has violated UNSC resolutions calling for it to cease enrichment, THEREFORE Iran has violated the NPT — i.e. that Iran’s violation of the UNSC resolution is itself a violation of the NPT.
In fact, there is no “link” there: nothing in the NPT states, or even hints, that a signatory country’s failure to abide by some UNSC resolution is, in and of itself, a violation of the NPT. If, of course, the UNSC resolution demands that Iran take some action that the NPT also happens to require, then violation of that UNSC resolution amounts to a violation of the NPT as well, but only because both the resolution and the NPT happen to require (or condemn, as the case may be) the very same conduct. If, to the contrary, the UNSC resolution demands some action that is NOT required under the NPT (cessation of uranium enrichment, for example), then there is no link at all; violation of the UNSC resolution is NOT also a violation of the NPT.
How many people who listen to pronouncements by Hillary Clinton (and many, many others) do you suppose believe, mistakenly, that Iran is violating the NPT simply because Iran is ignoring UNSC resolutions calling for it to cease uranium enrichment?
Elisa,
“Now I don’t agree with [Sahimi's] opinions about the “green movement” in fact he was one of the initial Iranian dissidents who started the false claim about the elections being rigged – always from anonymous sources…”
Dr. Sahimi is shockingly biased in his writing on the Greens, Ahmdinejad and the election. I agree that his writing on Iran’s nuclear program is more pleasing to read, since it agrees with what many of us believe. Nonetheless, I would take with a large grain of salt anything that Dr. Sahimi writes on any subject. Be careful to separate out opinion from (alleged) fact. If you like the opinion, by all means accept it. If you like the fact, by all means check it independently.
Matthew,
Did Mr. Amano happen to mention the respects in which Iran is not cooperating — the subject matter of the questions posed by the IAEA that Iran has declined to answer? If he didn’t, could you try to find that out and let us know? (Most of us already do, but I’m trying to wean you away from this tendency you’ve exhibited to ask questions that seem to suggest a certain fetching naivete on your part for which I’m not entirely sure you deserve credit.)
“Yukiya Amano, the director general of the I.A.E.A., told the opening session of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty review conference here on Monday that his agency “remains unable to confirm that all nuclear material is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation.”
Isn’t Amano Japanese? If I’m not mistaken, Japan still does not have a clean bill of health from the IAEA after decades of inspections. Ironic, isn’t it?
The NPT Review Conference is meant to be a ministerial level event but Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the only head of a sovereign state, who attended the conference, thus proving how much Tehran gives importance to NPT in establishing a world without nukes. Under UN Protocols, Dr. Ahmadinejad was given a chance to address the conference as an honorary speaker. Contrary to that, Hillary Clinton in her speech at American Jewish Committee Annual Gala Dinner on April 30 – showed which country she will be representing at the conference – dubbing Iranian President “anti-Semitic”. “We will not compromise our commitment to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons….. Transferring weapons to these terrorists (Hamas and Hizb’Allah) – especially long-range missiles – would pose a serious threat to the security of Israel…”.
Bowing to the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and local Israel Lobby groups demand – the representatives from the US, France, Britain and Canada made fool of themselves by walking out during Dr. Ahmadinejad’s speech – showing how much they can tolerate ‘freedom of speech’ which they love to teach to the Muslim world. Barack Obam message to the conference bordered on his ‘self-denial’ of the US nuclear and imperialist record in the past. The national director of Anti-Defamation League (an Israeli lobby organization), Abraham Foxman, issued a statement on May 3 on ADL website, praising those countries which boycotted Dr. Ahmadinejad’s speech.
Ahmadinejad exposes the hypocrisy of his accusers
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/05/04/ahmadinejad-exposes-the-hypocrisy-of-his-accusers/
From the New York Times this morning:
“Yukiya Amano, the director general of the I.A.E.A., told the opening session of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty review conference here on Monday that his agency “remains unable to confirm that all nuclear material is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation.”
What say ye?
The following article was published today in antiwar.com. It is written by Muhammad Sahimi. Now I don’t agree with his opinions about the “green movement” in fact he was one of the initial Iranian dissidents who started the false claim about the elections being rigged – always from anonymous sources; however the article about Iran’s nuclear history and all of the false claims by the U.S., Israel and the U.K. going back since the 1979 Revolution to today is a good historical account. He also makes a nice point at the end about Hillary Clinton’s statements at the UN NPT Review Conference.
Iran’s Ever Imminent Nukes: A History of Hysteria
by Muhammad Sahimi, May 05, 2010
http://original.antiwar.com/sahimi/2010/05/04/irans-ever-imminent-nukes/
Ahmadinijad’s interview with English Al Jazeera 5/4/2010
http://english.aljazeera.net/video/americas/2010/05/201054215520763407.html
Eric
I just read on an Iranian news site (Jahan News) (Robert Dreyfuss) of American Journal “Nation” got visa to go to Iran and to meet with some officials for the 4th times in recent years, just remember that since the June election Mr. Dreyfuss has been seriously critical of Iran’s government and solidly behind the greens, at one point he called pro government supporters fascist, but now he gets visa to go back to Iran, at the same time Iranian reports cannot obtain visa to cover their own president from the most democratic Sorry the first democracy in the history of the living species.
Kooshy,
Slavin makes excellent points. I hadn’t been aware that Iranian reporters were so restricted in the US. So much for all of the Western press belly-aching about not having their Iranian visas renewed after the 2009 election.
No need to sanction Iran:
Prevention of nuclear terrorism ought not to be made an excuse for the creation of a regime of technology denial that would condemn hundreds of millions to even greater suffering.
Above all, a new international order should be based on justice and fair play, not on “might being right”, which is the basis of the international institutions created after World War II.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-05/04/content_9805591.htm
Freedom of Press in the ever just western democracies Obama style visa denied to Iranian press to prevent reporting on Ahmadinijad’s UN visit
US Should Welcome Iran’s Reporters
This is a guest note by Barbara Slavin, freqent TWN contributor and author of Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation. Slavin has visited Iran seven times.
Let my reporters come: Iranian reporters blocked from covering Ahmadinejad
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to New York to speak at the review conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is unlikely to help resolve the escalating dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.
But since the Obama administration allowed him to come – a U.S. obligation as host to the United Nations – it should also have permitted the Iranian president to bring Iranian journalists with him. Unfortunately, their visas have been denied.
A State Department spokesman declined comment on the reasons, noting that the visa application process is “considered confidential.” But Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” suggested one reason: “We’re not going to permit Iran to change the story from their failure to comply” with nonproliferation obligations.
Restrictions on the press have been a factor in the three-decade-long dialogue of the deaf that passes for U.S.-Iran relations. Iran until recently has behaved better than successive U.S. administrations, giving visas to U.S. reporters to cover events such as a recent nuclear conference in Tehran and Iran’s presidential and parliamentary elections.
However, the Bush administration refused to accredit Iranian reporters to cover the 2008 U.S. elections. And Iranian news organizations have been largely confined to a 25-mile radius around the U.N. while U.S. reporters have been free to travel outside Tehran.
Throughout the long Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, journalists from both countries interpreted each other’s policies and helped domestic audiences see adversaries as human beings. What’s more, Russian journalists based in the U.S. came to understand the strengths of the U.S. political system. That sort of experience should be available to Iranian journalists, particularly those who work for hard-line outlets that routinely denigrate the United States.
The situation for journalists in Iran has never been easy and has deteriorated significantly since fraud-tainted presidential elections in Iran last year. More than 30 Iranian journalists remain in prison and foreign reporters based in Tehran must exercise care for fear that they will also face prison or be expelled. Still, U.S. officials who rightfully criticize Iran’s crackdown should jump at the chance to allow Iranian reporters to experience U.S. freedoms.
Let the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency open a Washington bureau, let its reporters go to White House and State Department briefings and have President Obama and other top U.S. officials give interviews to its editors and writers. That would make it harder for Iran to censor information about U.S. policies and make it easier for U.S. media outlets to demand reciprocal rights in Tehran. At a time when confrontation appears to be building again between the two countries, the more access their journalists have to each other, the better.
– Barbara Slavin
Transcript of Ahmadinejad’s speech at UN, May 4:
http://www.americanpendulum.com/2010/05/transcript-of-ahmadinejads-speech-at-u-n-nuclear-nonproliferation-conference/
James
I certainly believe it was a good decision for Iran to participate in NPT review at the head of state level, Iran clearly captured the media and was able to deliver its message, basically defending the rights of the south, from what I have read it made a big impact in majority of NAM countries specially the Muslim world, and that’s what Iran wanted, in the majority of the world they walked out countries are being laughed at as cowards who wouldn’t dare to hear since they can’t respond with reason.
The American/ Western childish act yesterday elevated Ahmadinijad’s position in the rest of the world, for sure he has the courage to stand up to pressure and ridicules and defend his position.
kooshy,
Thanks for the link to Russia Today’s interview with Ahmadinejad. He is quite right about there being strong diffences in US ruling circles, regarding how to approach Iran. He said that in six visits to the US, he has met a number of reporters, but they always ask the same questions. His belief this is the result of an outside group imposing the agenda is certain to be true. Holocaust, holocaust, holocaust. Nothing about his wish for a referendum in Palestine/Israel about how to proceed politically.
Fioarangela,
Do you get the feeling Hillary Clinton is well out of her depth? She seems to lack entirely that sense of history which should be a primary qualification for the post.
Alan, Disaster zone indeed.
I’m aware of how sexist this sounds, but hear me out: Hillary Clinton’s appearance at UN was deplorable: her hair looked like it hadn’t been shampooed; it was not neatly arranged and she had to brush it from her face a number of times.
Why does this matter?
The representative of the most powerful nation in the entire known universe should look the part. Despite the fact that she had the ‘home field advantage,’ not having had to travel 7,000 miles and endure hostile gatekeepers at her entrance to the US and the UN, Hillary did not look prepared for the engagement.
Her physical presence was reflected in her policy statements, which likewise suffered in comparison to the statement of both Mr. Marty Natalegawa, Ambassador from Indonesia, who spoke for the NAM and of Pres. Ahmadinejad. Both leaders laid out plans for nuclear controls and nonproliferation that were more equitable and more rational than Clinton’s plan, and they presented their plans before she did. Clinton looked like a sophomore who hadn’t done her homework so she copied the best stuff from her ‘mates,mashed it together, and slipped it under the prof’s door just before deadline.
The Guardian commented on the relative performances of US and Iran and the NAM:
“As the Iranian leader spoke, delegations from the US, Britain and other EU states walked out, but his speech was greeted with applause from many remaining delegates. Speeches by the non-aligned movement, a bloc of more than 100 states which carries clout at the NPT conference, and by Brazil, echoed many of Ahmadinejad’s themes, emphasising disappointment with the disarmament efforts of the established weapons powers. “I think the Americans have got an uphill struggle based on the speeches here today,” said Anne Penketh, an analyst at the British American Security Information Council. ”
Hillary Clinton would be well-advised to begin that “uphill struggle” with a visit to the hairdresser. Preferably in Tehran.
Eric
You forgot to mention that Roger Ailes was the auctioneer
I wonder why Iran doesn’t simply agree to the same nuclear arms limits and inspections as Israel.
Eric,
I did watch the interview and I think on this one, Rose, met his match and then some!
Ahmadinijad’s interview with Russia today TV
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQjUHvwwPB4&feature=channel
I didn’t see any comments regarding this:
US 5113 — Iran 0
Sakineh,
You’re welcome. We need a little humor once in a while.
Incidentally, Charlie Rose’s interview of Ahmadinejad is very interesting reading. See Kooshy’s link, which has both the video and the transcript.
Eric,
Thanks for that! The smile is back on my face again.
Sakineh,
From Fox News story:
“In December 2009 it was widely reported that one of Bin Laden’s wives, six of his children and 11 grandchildren were living in a compound in Tehran.”
People really shouldn’t doubt Fox News as much as they do. A friend of ours knows an Iranian woman who went to school years ago with a niece of bin Laden’s housekeeper’s grandmother, and so we often hear stories about the raucous pool parties at bin Laden’s Tehran compound. You should see Ahmadinejad in a swimsuit, she says! And don’t get her started about Rafsanjani! The cocktail waitresses are careful to stay out of pinching distance, we hear. Mousavi mostly sits in a corner and broods, I hear, but he’s been known to loosen up after a couple of Mai Tais and a big plateful of fried falafel patties with Mrs. bin Laden’s (Wife #4) special Poppy Dip.
This woman also works on weekends at the school attended by bin Laden’s two youngest children. She helped set up tables for a fund-raising auction at the school just three weeks ago. Bin Laden was there (in disguise, naturally — he reportedly was dressed up to look like an Arab). He was the winning bidder on a trip for four to Disneyword — picked it up for probably half of what it was worth, I hear. He wasn’t so lucky, though, on the most expensive item on the auction block that night: a case of LaFitte Rothschild (1982, she thinks, but she couldn’t remember the year for sure). Bin Laden bid it up to way over what it was worth, mostly because it turned out that Hugo Chavez wanted it badly too, but at the very end some guy standing in the back of the room held up his bidding paddle and won it with a shut-out bid a good 50% over what bin Laden had last bid. Some people were saying the winning bidder was a shill for Khamenei (who usually attends in person, but couldn’t make it this year), but it turned out he was representing a consortium made up mostly of MEK leaders who’d apparently had their eyes on that particular case for quite some time. That really upset Khamenei, I heard (I don’t think he likes those MEK guys at all), especially when he heard that the consortium also included Hillary Clinton, Gordon Brown and some grand-nephew of the Shah. But Khamenei reportedly perked up quite a bit when he learned that 50% of the auction proceeds were being donated to SINBO (Secret Irananian Nuclear Bomb Organization — whoops, I wasn’t supposed to mention that!). Even so, I’ve heard Khamenei will be sending Ahmadinejad in person to bid at next year’s auction, just so this sort of thing doesn’t happen again.
I had thought we were the only ones in the US who knew what was really going on over there, until I flipped on my TV a few nights ago and saw some Fox News reporter telling the exact same story I just told! Naturally, I felt a little less special now, but I at least owe it to Fox News to confirm the truth of what this guy reported. Credit where credit is due.
I recommend also John Feffer’s comments today, in Foreign Policy in Focus: “The Israeli Exception”. “North Korea and Israel have a lot in common . . .”
http://co108w.col108.mail.live.com/default.aspx?wa=wsignin1.o
Gideon Rachman has some perceptive comments in the Financial Times today (May 4th): “A nuclear-free world? No thanks”. I would add that Iran should keep the moral high ground, with its continuing effort to achieve a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.
Robert Gibbs attacked Ahmadineajad for claiming the US had threatened Iran with a possible nuclear strike, when that is precisely what Bob Gates had so foolishly done just recently!
Here is the pre-war Iran / Al Qaeda linkage necessary to justify war.
Iraq war scenario is playing out again.
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/05/03/usama-bin-laden-living-comfortably-iran-documentary-asserts/
I know, you say who pays attention to Fox New, but it’s replicated by sycophant sites.
Ahmadinijad’s interview by Charlie Rose last night 5/3/10
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10990
Interesting piece. It again reveals the Obama administration’s entry into the diplomatic disaster zone of seeking Arab/NAM isolation of Iran in return for US concessions over Israel-related issues (in this case the proposal of a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East).
It also reveals precisely zero appreciation for the key NAM issue of the politicising of the IAEA, and the obstruction of the passing of nuclear technology to non-nuclear states.
It seems as though the US wants nothing, just so long as they don’t lose anything. It may be that the only way anything constructive can come of this is if the NAM force the issue, which doesn’t look hugely likely either.