As we look forward to the next round of discussions between Iran and the P5+1 regarding the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities—discussions which some reports suggest might take place during November 13-15—it is worthwhile to step back and consider some of the fundamental questions at stake. One of these questions, which receives little attention in the ongoing commentary about the Iranian nuclear issue, is the legal authority of the United Nations Security Council to “enforce” the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements with individual countries. We are pleased to publish a highly original and provocative (in the best sense of the word) analysis of this question by Eric A. Brill, a Harvard-trained lawyer. This analysis can be accessed by clicking here; a synopsis of Eric’s analysis is appended below but we highly recommend reading the full article as well and, again, it can be accessed here.
The Iran Nuclear Dispute–A New Approach, by Eric A. Brill
Iran rarely sees eye to eye with the United States, the UN Security Council or the International Atomic Energy Agency. But all agree on this: On certain conditions, the IAEA may “refer” Iran’s nuclear “file” to the Security Council for enforcement. They disagree strongly on whether the conditions have been satisfied. The IAEA referred Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council in 2006, finding Iran in “non-compliance” based solely on disclosure violations prior to November 2003. The Security Council has responded enthusiastically, adopting five increasingly punitive resolutions (the Iran Resolutions).
One assumes that something is written, somewhere, authorizing the Security Council to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. In fact, nothing but baseless assumptions, wishes and imagination support this belief. There is no such thing as a “referral” process under which the Security Council has authority to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Iran is just as mistaken as its adversaries to believe there is.
The IAEA is authorized – sometimes required – to report certain matters to the Security Council. But the purpose of those reports is not to enable the Security Council to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. It is to notify the Security Council that reasons exist (in the IAEA’s view) to consider whether Iran’s nuclear program is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” under Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (a Peace Threat). The Security Council may take many strong measures under Articles 40 and 41, even military action under Article 42 – but only if the Security Council first determines that Iran’s nuclear program is a Peace Threat.
Despite the US’ strong urging, Russia and China have refused to let the Security Council do this. They have been so cautious that neither “Article 39″ nor any of its threshold phrases – “threat to the peace,” “breach of the peace” or “act of aggression” – appears anywhere in the Iran Resolutions. Even its key single words are conspicuously absent: One searches in vain through many thousands of words for a single appearance of “threat” or “breach” or “aggression.” The United States was denied the “green light” it had claimed in 2003, when it argued that the Peace Threat determination in Resolution 1441, adopted four months earlier, authorized the US to attack Iraq without explicit permission from the Security Council.
Russia and China probably believed they could accomplish two objectives by approving the Iran Resolutions: dole out tough remedies when pressed by the United States, yet prevent another US “end run” to war by refusing to agree that Iran’s nuclear program is a Peace Threat. In their effort to rein in the United States, however, they invalidated even the carefully limited resolutions they approved. Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to intervene in a country’s affairs only when it determines that a Peace Threat exists, not otherwise.
Very few people would take Iran’s word for any of this. But most would accept an authoritative ruling issued by a distinguished international panel of jurists. Iran’s Safeguards Agreement authorizes it to request binding arbitration of disputes, even if the IAEA has “referred” Iran to the Security Council. The arbitrators are likely to rule in Iran’s favor on most or all questions Iran might present. Iran never has been charged with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the IAEA never has charged that Iran’s nuclear program has been in “non-compliance” at any time since 2003. The IAEA simply misrepresents to the Security Council that Iran is “required” to take various “confidence building measures” that it nevertheless acknowledges are “voluntary,” and the Security Council purports to transform these voluntary measures into iron-fisted Security Council demands by exercising “referral” authority it does not possess.
Iran’s predictable arbitration victory would replace its ineffective protests with an authoritative confirmation that Iran is being asked to perform obligations that do not exist, to accept restrictions that no one has a right to impose. A favorable ruling would not be enough, however – it could even increase the risk of war by highlighting the apparent impotence of the IAEA and the Security Council. The United States might cast itself as the world’s last defense against a nuclear-armed Iran. Many observers would still wonder whether Iran is developing nuclear weapons because it refuses to observe the Additional Protocol and revised Code 3.1. Though Iran voluntarily did so for several years without receiving the anticipated benefits, it probably would achieve better results after its position has been bolstered by an independent validation of its nuclear rights.
Iran’s position is likely to deteriorate if it instead continues its stubborn passivity, enabling the United States to shape world-power public opinion. Seven in 10 Americans believe Iran already has nuclear weapons. Six in 10 agree that the US should bomb Iran if diplomacy and sanctions do not persuade it to give up its nuclear program – 25% would bomb today. Left unchallenged, the United States is unlikely to change direction. Pressure is building for military action, and may become irresistible once most Americans conclude – as inevitably they will – that “sanctions have not worked.” An arbitration ruling in Iran’s favor would create a promising opportunity to resolve this too-long-running dispute. To see this argument in its full form, please click here.
Hi Eric,
I think article 34 can serve as a gateway to any subsequent enforcement measure, unless there is reason enough to believe it can’t. Article 40 is explicitly drafted to preclude an article 39 determination, and article 42 makes direct reference to restoring ‘peace and order’, ie there is an implied precondition on 42 that a determination has been made that the same has been disrupted, and article 39 is the only grounds on which the sc has been explicitly authorized to make such a determination. Article 41 makes no such direct reference to a pt determination so as long as the matter is under security council ‘consideration’, eg via a prior article six resolution, this is a means of recourse open to it.
I haven’t reviewed the unsc resolutions for a while, but i do remember thinking them quite flawed when i did.
Masoud,
I wrote: “…UNSC must pass through the A30 “gateway” to get to A40.”
As you probably figured out, “A30″ (or “Article 30″) should have read “A39″ (or “Article 39″). A typo worth correcting so that I don’t mislead you.
Masoud,
On Article 40:
There are only 4 UNSC resolutions that even mention it, for whatever that may be worth.
As you say, it does permit the UNSC only to “call upon” the parties involved in the dispute to take action. That means (a) the UNSC cannot “call upon” any other state to take action; and (b) it can’t require anyone to do anything.
As you’ll soon see when you review 1696 in this light, the UNSC’s enthusiasm led it to overstep both bounds, though those oversteps were hardly its worst procedural flaws in 1696. It “demanded” that Iran cease enrichment, which it had no authority to do under Article 40, and it “called upon” “all states” to do certain things.
Most important for your analysis, I suspect you’re reaching the same conclusion I initially did (though I abandoned it after further research): that Article 40 doesn’t require a peace threat determination. One can argue that Article 40 must precede action under Article 41 or 42, but not necessarily precede a PT determination under A39. I suspect that’s your thinking too. One can’t challenge that reasoning from the text alone, but it’s pretty widely accepted in the literature (which reflects, in part, the drafting history) that the UNSC must pass through the A30 “gateway” to get to A40, not merely to get to A41 and A42.
Eric
P.S. I think you should give careful thought to my previous question: How do you get to A41 without a PT determination but conclude you can’t get to A42 without one?
Masoud,
How do you conclude Article 42 requires a PT determination, but not Article 41?
One thing I wanted to clarify: i believe action under article 42 does indeed require a peace threat determination, so in short:
article 40: nonsensical when coupled with a peace threat determinaiton
article 41: can be exercised with or without a peace threat determination
article 42: requires peace threat determination, only enforcement article that is ‘binding’.
Masoud,
It will take me a while to get back to you.
On “imaginative,” you’re right that it is often a backhanded compliment. But not always: usually you can tell whether it’s sincere by noticing whether the complimenter used the same adjective to describe his own argument. You’ll notice I did.
“Can you put in play language…”
**Can you put in plain language…**
Eric,
Thanks for taking the time to respond. Though i do plan on finishing the assigned reading, Johanson seems to pull the pass-the-buck-via-citation trick as well. Can you put in play language a sketch of the arguments for believing that article 39 constitutes an exclusive gateway to any chapter 7 measures, or at least point out a more specific reference out of the several he mentions ” (see eg. Pellet 1991: 651-654; de Wet 2004: 18, 133; Gazzini 2005: 7; Sarooshi 1999: 33; Simma 2002: 718, 726)”. And is it just me or isn’t article 40 of chapter seven explicitly designed to be invoked before article 39, and if this is the case, where does that leave the “general rule”, keeping in mind that there are only two additional ‘enforcement’ articles in chapter 7? Am I understanding you correctly that these arguments are universally of the ‘weak sauce’ variety?
I do like how Harvard trained lawyers use ‘imaginative’ as a backhanded compliment, but I honestly can’t see much creativity in what I wrote. To me, the charter seems quite black and white on these issues, though admittedly i am quite a bit outside of my comfort zone on these issues.
Masoud,
“I believe I rely principally on a fresh analysis of the text of the UN Charter.”
I don’t suggest by this that I’ve not backed up my conclusions with citations, as you’ll find when you reread this portion of my article (Part 2). I think you’ll find that, while some writers try to fit Resolution 1696 (the first Iran Resolution) into the category of “implied Article 39 resolution,” they simply assign it to that category without any analysis of whether such an implication is really supportable in the circumstances, simply because the SC took action under Article 40 without expressly determining the existence of a Peace Threat and without explicitly stating that it was acting under Article 39 or under Chapter VII generally (rather than under a particular Chapter VII article other than Article 39). Consider, for example, whether Patrik Johanson’s article presents any sound reason for “implying” a Peace Threat determination in Resolution 1696, or instead simply lists it among his examples.
That being so, in my view, the support for an “implied Article 39 resolution” rationale for Resolution 1696 amounts to nothing more than “The Security Council adopted it, and so it must have done so in compliance with the UN Charter.” On that point, please take another look at my analysis of Article 25 in my article, which concludes that Iran (or any UN member) signed up to be bound by UNSC actions taken in accordance with the UN charter, not UNSC actions that are not so taken.
Masoud,
“By the by, while I do appreciate that the ‘It’s never happened that way before’ type arguments are sometimes necessary, I think that in the grand scheme of thing they are relatively ‘weak sauce’.”
I think you’ll find that those who reach contrary conclusions rely on that same “weak sauce” far more often than I do to support their conclusions. I believe I rely principally on a fresh analysis of the text of the UN Charter. One key exception: I thought, as you apparently still do, that one need not treat Article 39 as the sole “gateway” to Chapter VII, which led me to more imaginative analyses (and I find yours to be equally imaginative) that I’ve since concluded aren’t supportable simply because the “weak sauce” of that “Article 39 gateway” assumption seems to have been eaten and digested pretty thoroughly by most or all scholars who write about Chapters VI and VII.
Masoud,
Please take a look at Patrik Johansson’s article cited at footnote 24 of my article, specifically on Article 39′s status as the “gateway” to Chapter VII (Articles 39-51). I think you’ll conclude you can’t get there through Article 34, which is part of Chapter VI. Once you’ve reached that conclusion (if you do – look beyond Johansson’s article if necessary to reach that conclusion), keep in mind that limiting itself to Chapter VI leaves the Security Council with very little power. Chapter VII is where its power over Iran lies, and it can reach Chapter VII only through the “gateway” of Article 39. One can debate whether it is appropriate to “imply” that the Security Council has passed through the Article 39 gateway or must instead announce clearly that it is doing so, but there is no real disagreement that it must pass through that gateway.
If I were you, I wouldn’t proceed much farther with your analysis before you either put it into this proper frame or offer a more detailed argument as to why it need not be put into that frame.
Masoud,
To answer just one narrow question, “call upon” means non-binding.
Eric,
Thanks for your response but I think you have mis-understood some of what I meant to say. I will try and take more time to read your post in full, and clarify things. Very little to say in the meantime, but here it goes anyway:
“That diverted attention from the fact that the Security Council had authority to act in the circumstances, if at all, only under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which requires a Peace Threat determination.”
I see no evidence for this.
”
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
.
.
.
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.”
The question begged by article 40 is “Which situation?”. You seem to assume that the only proper basis for exerting Article 40 authority would be the preceding Article 39. Why? Why can’t article 34 be used to determine whether a dispute is likely, and then pass through article 39, fail to make peace threat determination, but take steps under article 40 in order to mitigate the situation anyway? Actually I think it would actually become impossible to make use of this specific article(article 40) of chapter seven once such a peace threat determination is made. So your assertion that chapter seven necessitates a successful peace threat determination seems patently false to me. Neither do I buy your implied argument that chapter 6/7 ‘discontinuity’ is more than enough to assume this is how things ought to work.
Additionally just because article 39 specifies that the security council can make a peace threat determination and proceed to make decisions, in implied accordance with article 25, which then becomes binding on member states, why should this imply that the council can not exercise article 41 and 42 independently of such a determination, and the consequent article 25 compulsory(for member states) character of the arrived at ‘decisions’?.
By the by, while I do appreciate that the ‘It’s never happened that way before’ type arguments are sometimes necessary, I think that in the grand scheme of thing they are relatively ‘weak sauce’.
That turned out to actually be quite a bit, and i don’t have time to proofread, so apologies for the rough presentation. Once we’ve come to a resolution on this point it will be easier to tackle our differences on some other subjects.
p.s.
I haven’t been able to read your post in full but if you didn’t answer this question before, maybe you can take a crack at it now: Do believe that the security council ‘calling upon’ member states to take certain actions constitutes a binding directives as per article 25?
p.p.s. by ‘unsantcioned’ i meant to write ‘unsanctionable’ in my previous post
cheers,
Masoud
MASOUD:
I’m replying to several of your comments made on October 18 at 8:33 AM, which I thought were excellent despite my disagreement on some points.
YOU WROTE:
1. … Over all I don’t think [arbitration under Article 22 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement] is advisable… because there is a lot to lose, and very little to gain. … There is no telling how impartial the third panelist will be. … The decision to seek an arbitration hearing should be made with at least as much attention to the politics of the situation as is given to the legal merits of the arguments.
MY REPLY:
As I explained in response to another person’s similar comments: (1) I can understand concluding that there’s less to gain than I predict (though obviously I think my prediction will turn out to be correct), but I don’t see what could be lost by trying; (2) I’m confident an impartial panel could and would be chosen; and (3) I recognize that politics often intrudes in legal disputes, but I carefully phrased my four questions with that in mind. I doubt an arbitration panel could avoid deciding them on their non-political merits.
YOU WROTE:
2. Your arguments rejecting the “implicit article 39 [resolution]” line of reasoning did not strike me as waterproof….
MY REPLY:
Others made this point too, as I’d expected. Despite some support for this “implied Article 39 resolution” argument in the literature, I find it unpersuasive here. In light of the explicit insistence of Russia and China (with good reasons) that all arguable references to a “Peace Threat” be carefully removed from the resolution language presented by the US’ John Bolton, I think no “implied” Peace Threat can fairly be discerned in the first Iran Resolution (1696). All previous Security Council resolutions (three) based on Article 40 had explicitly declared a Peace Threat and cited Article 39 as well (see footnote 27 of my article). Though the later Iran Resolutions were instead based on Article 41, that did not eliminate the requirement of a Peace Threat determination. Yet no language changes or additions were made to accomplish this in any of the later Iran Resolutions. Part 2 of my article argues this in more detail.
I don’t think this matters much looking back. What’s done is done. The Iran Resolutions are accepted as valid principally because there is no higher authority to declare that they were not validly adopted. But I think my conclusion is important going forward. If Iran’s supporters desire to prevent further Security Council action, they should highlight the absence of a clear Peace Threat determination in the Iran Resolutions and stress the need for what many commentators agree upon (including several commentators who accept the “implied Article 39 resolution” argument for the Iran Resolutions): the Security Council should be expected to take two unambiguous steps whenever it acts under Chapter VII: (1) state clearly its determination that a Peace Threat exists, as Article 39 requires; and (2) state explicitly that it is acting under Article 39, or under Chapter VII generally without limiting its declaration to a particular Article. Doing so would eliminate any mistaken impression that the Security Council is purporting to (1) enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, which it has no authority to do; or (2) act under Chapter VII without determining that a Peace Threat exists, which it has no authority to do.
Intentionally or not, the Security Council left most observers with the mistaken impression that it was enforcing Iran’s Safeguards Agreement pursuant to the “referral” it had received from the IAEA. That diverted attention from the fact that the Security Council had authority to act in the circumstances, if at all, only under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which requires a Peace Threat determination. As a result, few noticed that the required Peace Threat determination was not only very far from clear but, in my opinion, did not occur at all.
YOU WROTE:
3. I think you reject Iran’s approach to the matter too hastily. Per the UN Charter, the Security Council can only intervene (a) in order to resolve a “dispute;” or (b) if it has made a “peace threat” determination. Since, as you note, there is no peace threat determination, the idea that there is a dispute becomes central [to] the legitimacy of all the resolutions issued thus far. If Iran can close that hole, I think it would stand a much improved chance of challenging the [Iran Resolutions]. A general understanding that El-Baradei’s finding of non-compliance and subsequent report or referral to the Security Council was in error would go a long way towards that end. I think you are severely mistaken when you assert that the IAEA can report “anything it wants to, at anytime” to the Security Council….
MY REPLY:
The Security Council has no authority to resolve a “dispute” that has not given rise to a Peace Threat. This is important to bear in mind. Chapter VI (not Chapter VII) of the UN Charter lays out a procedure under which the Security Council can offer dispute-resolution assistance. Acting under Chapter VI, however, the Security Council cannot force its will on either party. It can do that only under Chapter VII, and only if it first determines that a Peace Threat exists.
The Peace Threat-determination requirement is intended to prevent Chapter VII authority from being exercised against a country merely because the Security Council (or its dominant member) is upset with a country’s behavior. The Security Council must also determine that the country’s behavior poses a Peace Threat. Iran’s nuclear program provides the Security Council a useful basis (or convenient excuse, depending on one’s point of view) for a Peace Threat determination that it lacks, say, for Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, whose behavior is also considered objectionable by the US but cannot plausibly be characterized as a Peace Threat. Nevertheless – useful basis, convenient excuse, or whatever – the Security Council must actually make a Peace Threat determination before it has authority to act under Chapter VII. As I explained above, it did not do this explicitly in the Iran Resolutions, and I don’t believe such a determination can fairly be implied. Conversely, no “Peace Threat” determination is required for Security Council action under Chapter VI, but the Security Council’s authority under Chapter VI is very limited. The Security Council can’t have it both ways.
Just as I wrote, the IAEA may report to the Security Council pretty much “anything it wants to, at any time.” Please take a look at the sources I cited for that assertion. Like many others, you appear to believe that the Security Council may do more or less whatever it wants once a matter has been properly referred to it by the IAEA and, therefore, that the focus of our attention ought to be on whether the IAEA was justified in “referring” Iran to the Security Council. I find no support for that view, nor does it make practical sense. It would overstate the IAEA’s role as a “gate keeper” for Security Council actions under Chapter VII. The IAEA’s job is to let the Security Council know when something comes up that may (or may not) amount to a Peace Threat. It is the Security Council’s job to decide whether or not it is. If it likes, the Security Council may determine that a Peace Threat exists even if the IAEA has made no report at all.
Nor would your interpretation accurately reflect actual Security Council practice. As I point out in my article, in most cases where the IAEA has reported to the Security Council a country’s “non-compliance” under its Safeguards Agreement, the Security Council has either taken action under a UN Charter provision other than Chapter VII or it has taken no action at all. This historical fact reflects, as it should, that the determination of whether a Peace Threat exists is to be made by the Security Council, not (in effect) by the IAEA.
In our situation, the conclusion was hardly foregone. All that the IAEA reported in 2006, after all, was that Iran had been in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement several years earlier (prior to November 2003). The IAEA did not find that Iran was in non-compliance when the report was made in 2006, nor that Iran had ever engaged in any activity prohibited by the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement. It reported only that Iran had failed to disclose prior activities that had been permissible under the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Had Iran’s supporters focused attention on the proper question – “Does Iranian conduct which the IAEA reported in 2006 as having occurred prior to November 2003 amount to a Peace Threat in 2006?” – maybe the world would have noticed that the Security Council never explicitly answered that key question, or even addressed it. That is why we are left now to quibble over whether an answer to that threshold question may fairly be “implied” from vague language in the Iran Resolutions, or even from the mere fact that they were adopted (what might be labeled the “since they were adopted, they must be authorized” argument).
I disagree that Iran is wise to focus on disputing the IAEA’s finding that it cannot verify “non-diversion.” Iran’s Safeguards Agreement leaves that factual question to the IAEA’s judgment. That is why such disputes are the (sole) “carve-out” from the arbitration provision of Article 22 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Article 19 requires the IAEA to give Iran ample opportunities to change the IAEA’s mind on whether it can verify non-diversion (if Iran chooses to keep trying), but the IAEA ultimately gets to decide – not an arbitration panel or anyone else. In short, what you recommend, and what I acknowledge Iran has so far tried to do, is that Iran pointlessly frame a dispute that its opponent in that dispute (the IAEA) is indisputably authorized to decide. Why that strikes you (and many others) as a good idea escapes me entirely. I think Iran is better off carefully framing important questions that will be decided by someone other than the IAEA – an arbitration panel – and almost certainly in Iran’s favor.
YOU WROTE:
4. As for the picture you paint of an eventual rapprochement between the US and Iran, I find it quite “rose-colored” to say the least. There is no historical evidence to suggest that the US is concerned by nuclear proliferation rather than projecting power, and plenty of evidence to the contrary.
MY REPLY:
It’s not clear to me why you conclude my suggestion depends on an “eventual rapprochement between the US and Iran.” I find it ironic that many who claim to be resisting unwarranted US encroachments on Iranian sovereignty nevertheless propose a course of action based principally on suggested Iranian reactions to hoped-for US behavior – for example, a suggestion that Iran agree to observe the Additional Protocol if and when the US (or perhaps the Security Council) formally acknowledges Iran’s right to enrich uranium. I certainly would welcome a more favorable US attitude, but my suggested approach would not depend on it. If a rapprochement between the US and Iran ever occurs, it will not occur because the US has a change of heart, admits its mistakes, and approaches Iran in a new spirit of sincere friendship. It will occur (if at all) because the US loses much of its current support from other countries, who come to understand that Iran’s position is actually the correct one on several important points. For just a few examples: that the IAEA does not actually claim that Iran has been in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement since late 2003 (setting aside the Code 3.1 question); that neither the NPT nor Iran’s Safeguards Agreement gives the IAEA or the Security Council any right to restrict Iran’s enrichment of uranium, or to require Iran to observe the Additional Protocol or make whatever other disclosures the IAEA may see fit to require. Learning the answers to these questions may have no effect on other countries’ views of the Iran nuclear dispute, and it may be that the US couldn’t care less whether it does or not. I think it would matter a great deal, however, and I certainly see no downside in Iran taking the initiative to find out.
This might surprise you, but I doubt that an Iranian arbitration demand would result in arbitration actually occurring. My strong hunch is that it would be sufficient – and quick and cheap – for Iran to demand arbitration (or simply to announce that it intends to do so) and to state what questions it will ask to have arbitrated. The US probably would “clarify” its position on those questions in an effort to demonstrate that Iran’s arbitration demand is unnecessary. The US probably would make clear, for example, that it is not really claiming that the IAEA has authority to restrict Iran’s enrichment rights, or to require Iran to observe the Additional Protocol, or to insist that Iran perform other obligations not stated in its Safeguards Agreement. If so, those concessions would come as a big surprise to many observers, who will then wonder what, exactly, are the important “international obligations” that Iran is said to have breached. If the US instead decides not to make those concessions, arbitration might indeed be necessary, in which case Iran would get to the same result a bit more slowly but more authoritatively.
YOU WROTE:
The US’s stated goals of restricting proliferation are nothing but pretexts to isolate and weaken Iran so as to demonstrate its power to the rest of the world.
MY REPLY:
Maybe so, but I don’t think this means Iran is better off passively pointing this out rather than taking the actions I suggest.
YOU WROTE:
5. Iran’s best bet to make itself unsanctioned doesn’t rest with hopes of coming to some kind of understanding with its antagonists, but in pursuing substantive free trade, banking, customs, and visa arrangements with its near neighbors. … This needs to be the main focus of Iran’s nuclear diplomacy and foreign policy generally over the next five years.
MY REPLY:
As I explained above, I don’t consider an arbitration demand to be an attempt to seek “understanding” with the US. I consider it more an alternative to that. I’m not sure what makes you believe Iran can “make itself unsanctioned” by doing what you recommend, but I would strongly encourage Iran to make those efforts. They would not be precluded or adversely affected by a demand for arbitration, nor vice-versa.
YOU WROTE:
6. I do like the idea of taking the initiative and putting questions to [an arbitration] panel, if only to deny the US led cabal the opportunity to frame the questions such a panel would address. But these questions should be much simpler than those you have laid out. I.E. “Does Iran have the right to enrich Uranium”, “What provisions of the instruments executed between Iran in the IAEA allow for the DG or BOG to find that Iran must cease enrichment, provide information on conventional military programs etc…”, “Does the DG have the power to compel Iran to sign and ratify arbitrary treaties” etc…”
MY REPLY:
I don’t think your suggested questions are quite so “simple” legally as they may sound. An arbitration panel would have authority only to interpret Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, and I phrased my four questions with that limit clearly in mind. To ask instead “Does Iran have the right to enrich uranium?”, for example, would inevitably cause the panel to give an incomplete and unsatisfying answer, since a full answer would take it well beyond the scope of its authority. Getting answers to the questions I’ve suggested would be useful enough and clearly within the arbitration panel’s jurisdiction.
Cyrus – the Alleged Studies don’t fall outside their “jurisdiction”, but they have only limited ability to investigate them. So far, as I understand it, the IAEA has approached the Alleged Studies as a transparency issue, rather than seeking a special inspection measure.
The February 2008 report considered the Work Plan questions closed, with the exception of the Alleged Studies, as opposed to “all outstanding questions”. The Work Plan pertained to P1/P2 centrifuges as opposed to IR1/2/3/4 centrifuges, which was brought up again in the May 2008 report (referencing questions dating back to 2004), along with a number of related questions.
Alan – your claim that IRan is “non-compliant” is simply ridiculous, especially in light of the Feb 2008 IAEA report that specifically cleared up all the outstanding issues regarding IRan’s past nuclear activities (and note that the unverified allegations about building missile warheads etc from the so-called Laptop of Death falls outside of the IAEA’s jurisdiction since it doesn’t involve nuclear materials.)
James – it was Argentina, who apparently refuse to business with Iran over it on account of the Buenos Aires bombing. Apparently France is the only possible supplier, at least for the TRR.
There was an interesting report today that the next round of negotiations will focus on Russia using Iranian LEU for Bushehr instead. Russia may not actually use it, as they consider the Iranian LEU too impure, but Iran can still export it there of course.
Alan,
My understanding is that the IAEA gives its approval for a purchase made directly from the supplier country (most likely France, in this case). I’m trying to remember what country supplied the fuel for the TRR last time around.
James – where are the IAEA going to get it from?
Alan,
Are you saying in effect that the IAEA cannot approve the Iranian application to refuel the TRR, unless the P5+1 give the go-ahead?
Surely it is rather stupid to provoke Iran into enriching to 20%. Unless this is a scheme of warmongers.
A German lawyer tells the UN resolution are against international law:
http://www.irananders.de/nc/home/news/article/interview-un-resolutionen-gegen-den-iran-verstoesst-gegen-voelkerrecht.html
James – yes I do.
I suppose the IAEA are within their rights not to help because Iran is in a non-compliant Safeguards status, and one of the penalties is to withhold help. But they are clearly not doing that, however the IAEA themselves obviously cannot deliver what Iran wants.
Alan,
Do you agree Iran has a right to refuel the TRR, and that the IAEA should have put the application through?
Richard:
Once again, it seems the IAEA, in concert with the Western intelligence agencies, has no capability to distinguish between a military interested in knowing how to build a nuclear weapons and a government intent on developing and deploying nuclear weapons. The two programs are not the same.
The IAEA will always be very interested in the extent of either “program”, no question. It is the natural path to proliferation. The IAEA knows the military is involved in Iran’s nuclear program (Iran acknowledges it), so they seek to know the extent, and always will. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t be doing their job. It’s simply unavoidable.
Alan: “The pattern of concealment pertained to pre-2003. What I am talking about here is the strange behaviour of Iran over these issues, as though they wanted outsiders to think they were concealing something.”
Sorry, but that is simply reaching. It’s pure speculation. Once again, the whole issue is almost certainly a matter of paranoia as I indicated, every time Iran announces some improvement in its technology, it’s spun as if their ongoing advancement was “concealed” and then this bogus terminology is used to imply that this means there is a military dimension to their program.
If the IAEA wishes to know where the Iranian centrifuge technology is being used, 1) that is outside their purview since their purview is to verify that declared nuclear material is not being diverted to military uses, and 2) centrifuge technology isn’t going to be used anywhere there ISN’T nuclear material. So asking where Iran got its centrifuge technology, where it is in its development of that technology, who is funding it or conducting the research, ALL that is completely IRRELEVANT to the fundamental issue of whether Iran has a military nuclear weapons program.
This sort of thing reminds of Nasrallah’s speech the other day where he complained that the Hariri Tribunal is going around asking for information from gynecology clinics in Lebanon. Nasrallah asks what does this have to do with the Hariri assassination? The answer is that it’s a general intelligence fishing expedition.
And that is precisely what the IAEA is doing. It’s poking around in the hopes that some nuclear weapons program will fall into its lap and it can then yell, “Ah-hah!” like some Inspector Clouseau.
As for military connections to their technology, once again, it is entirely reasonable for the Iranian military or ANY military to be interested in funding and supporting a nation’s nuclear energy program precisely for the reason that it assists that military in both determining how to construct a nuclear weapon which is in the purview of ANY military with nuclear armed enemies and in determining how to defend that technology from potential attack as well as in general providing funding for a highly expensive technology that other state agencies may not have the budgets to support. The IDF in Israel supports tons of technology R&D companies in Israel and no doubt occasionally takes advantage of those technologies where they have military applications.
The fact remains that if Iran got its centrifuge technology from Pakistan, OBVIOUSLY it would have been obtained via military channels between Iran and the Pakistani military who ARE developing and deploying nuclear weapons. This does not indicate in the slightest that IRAN is DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING nuclear weapons.
Once again, it seems the IAEA, in concert with the Western intelligence agencies, has no capability to distinguish between a military interested in knowing how to build a nuclear weapons and a government intent on developing and deploying nuclear weapons. The two programs are not the same.
Does anyone really believe that Japan, South Korea and Brazil do not have the technical data to construct a nuclear weapon should they decide to do so? Brazil perhaps not since there are no nuclear armed enemies in South America. But Japan and South Korea I am quite sure have hard drives loaded with the design specs developed over many years from open sources and concealed research specifically on how to construct a functional nuclear weapon, despite the stated intentions never to do so.
But when Iran does the same thing, all hell breaks loose even though Iran is LEAST likely to be able to make use of a small number of nuclear weapons.
And we don’t even know Iran is doing the same thing, at least not since 2003.
The reality remains that Iran is THE most inspected nuclear energy program in the world, despite not being on the AP. And the IAEA has NOTHING to show for it, as it confirms in EVERY single report it has issued on Iran for nearly a decade. ALL it has is more technical fishing questions.
And for this, we have a so-called “liberal” American President preparing to go to war.
Kooshy,
I owe you a response to your comment on why the IAEA has never requested arbitration (in a nutshell, I agree with you, and had overlooked your larger point in your earlier response).
Eric
Alan,
“Iran has been in a status of non-compliance since 2005, resulting from non-compliant activities from pre-2003. I agree there have been no further non-compliances since then.”
That’s a very interesting statement – one among several that I plan to respond to when I have time this weekend.
fyi,
You make an excellent point. The US was very foolish to interfere with Iran’s IAEA application to refuel the TRR. France blundered by trying to force Iran to stop enriching LEU, as a trade-off for the refueling of the TRR. The issues should have been kept separate, and in fact the TRR refueling application should have gone through unhindered. Blunders by American policy makers are only too obvious here.
Richard:
Exactly WHICH aspects of their program that was previously concealed which are now not concealed does the IAEA have specific questions about?
Centrifuges, laser enrichment, military connections to them.
Exactly what questions? Not general fishing questions, but questions which have any real significance in determining the purpose of the nuclear program.
Why are their military connections to them.
And if the IAEA would stop nitpicking, it’s likely Iran would answer them all. The fact is Iran knows most of these questions are intended to RAISE suspicion, not alleviate them. It’s motivation to cooperate with the IAEA is correspondingly reduced.
Iran quite possibly does think this way.
And how much of that has been really significant rather than merely used to raise suspicions? How many of those “third party” revelations ended up being nothing at all?
The whole thing was first revealed by a third party. Fordow was revealed by a third party.
My understanding is that ElBaradei said at the conclusion of the Work Plan that ALL questions were resolved, and Iran at that time said it expected its file be returned to normal status. You are now claiming that questions that were resolved then were re-opened by SUBSEQUENT behavior on the part of Iran which suggests that the behavior was ongoing earlier.
This is still ridiculous. Again, the questions are minor technical issues. WHO CARES whether Iran has a P-2 centrifuge or some other type of processing? Iran has the legal right to do ANY form of uranium processing it wants as long as it’s not enriching to weapons grade. Having the capability to enrich to weapons grade has not to my knowledge ever been established as grounds for violation of a SG. If so, Japan, South Korea and Brazil and probably other countries would all be in violation. So why is the IAEA making a big deal of when and how Iran is developing its enrichment technology?
Because they want to understand where it is being used.
No, they don’t. I’ve just looked at the most recent report. There is no accusation of “concealment” in it, still less a “pattern of concealment”. What the IAEA claims is that Iran has not responded to IAEA requests which Iran specifically states fall outside their SG. None of the questions mentioned seem to me to be relevant to determining whether Iran’s program is military in nature. They are all technical issues about the design of facilities and the like, with no specific justification as to what relevance these questions have to determining the purpose of the Iranian program.
You’re right, they stopped saying it over the last few reports, but it was commonplace before that. Look at GOV/2008/38 para 21 for example “Only through the expeditious resolution of these outstanding issues can doubts arising therefrom about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme be dispelled, particularly in light of the many years of clandestine activities by Iran”
In any case, Iran freely concede that it was concealed because they knew what would happen if the West found out.
What “strategic ambiguity”? They don’t have any nuclear weapons, like Israel, to be concealed. They have some facilities and some research programs. Besides which, the US and Israel clearly don’t believe there is any “ambiguity” in Iran’s behavior.
I don’ think they have either, but you can be ambiguous with or without weapons, or about a capability.
Again, how is it a “pattern of concealment” when Iran reveals its programs? You’re suggesting Iran pulled out of the AP so as not to reveal its P-2 centrifuge and then deliberately leaks it a few weeks later? What’s wrong with this picture?
So you admit the file is closed on the P-2. So now naturally Iran is working on a more advanced centrifuge, which it then reveals, so now Iran is again CONCEALING information? What’s wrong with THIS picture?
The pattern of concealment pertained to pre-2003. What I am talking about here is the strange behaviour of Iran over these issues, as though they wanted outsiders to think they were concealing something.
The issue is that because Iran is justified for doing these things, the IAEA needs to stop raising unjustified suspicions in the language of its reports.
But yet if Iran keeps on doing these things, the IAEA never quite believes what they say, so it justifies IAEA suspicions. Like I said, my point is the deficit of trust goes both ways.
Eric:
“If Iran says that, it doesn’t mean it’s violating its SA. Nor does the IAEA’s inability to verify non-diversion entitle the IAEA to impose more obligations on Iran.”
No, it does not mean Iran is violating its SA, and no, the IAEA cannot impose extra obligations; they can only call upon Iran to do extra things.
I think our debate may be better characterised as about the status of non-compliance as opposed to non-compliant activity.
Iran has been in a status of non-compliance since 2005, resulting from non-compliant activities from pre-2003. I agree there have been no further non-compliances since then.
How does Iran get out of non-compliant status? My view is that it would need to answer the questions arising from the original non-compliant activities. At this point they have not done that.
With regard to the Alleged Studies, there has been no non-compliance finding over them, therefore my view would be that these should not impede Iran regaining compliant status.
Whether it would happen that way in practice is a different question of course.
Richard
The IAEA’s purpose is NOT to PREVENT “nuclear weapons proliferation”, it is to determine when it is taking place.
Whether a state has disclosed as soon as it has started building a nuclear enrichment plant or whether it discloses ninety days before inserting nuclear material really is irrelevant to that purpose. The only function of the time difference is to give the world more time to determine if that facility is for peaceful or military purposes. HOW it determines whether that facility is for peaceful or mililtary purposes is more important.
And centrifuge design does not tell you that, even if that centrifuge is so efficient as to make enriching to weapons grade level extremely easy. What matters is that the IAEA is able to determine WHEN those centrifuges actually ARE enriching to weapons grade level.
It’s important not to get bogged down in these sorts of technical details. It’s precisely the confusion over purpose and procedure that allows the war mongers to blow up a minor technical violation of a technical reporting requirement into a “failure to comply with the NPT”.
In essence what you say here is true. But I think you miss the point of why the IAEA are interested in the centrifuges. They don’t really care about the design so much. They want to understand the military involvement, because it is a pointer to possible military use of them. That is part of the IAEA, to use your words, “determining when proliferation is taking place” and “how it is determined”.
On Heinonen, I don’t think there’s a smoking gun there. The Gareth Porter reference is interesting, but some of it is rebutted by Heinonen in that interview I posted below. Your second reference is a direct reference to the same interview, which if you remove some nonsense from the reporter, is really quite informative. On Scott Ritter, he doesn’t provide a single specific instance of a Heinonen transgression. I would very much like to know about one, but in the meantime, Ritter’s guilty of what he says Heinonen is guilty of. In any case, El Baradei has never said (in IAEA reports anyway) that there is a full understanding of the centrifuge program.
Alan,
I’ve just skimmed your long comment, and so you may have addressed this point, but I think you did not: What is wrong with the IAEA saying simply: “We can’t say one way or another whether Iran has diverted nuclear material?” You still seem to be assuming that the IAEA has the right to keep trying, as long as it wants, to get to a point where it can verify non-diversion and that, as long as the IAEA feels like trying, Iran has to help it in any way the IAEA may ask. My point is that, while Iran may (and should, I think) volunteer to help in ways that go beyond what it promised to do in its Safeguards Agreement, it is not required to do so. It is entitled simply to say to the IAEA: “We understand you don’t feel you can verify non-diversion. We wish you felt differently about that, but we accept your conclusion, as we must. We understand you would like us to help you learn more about our nuclear program so that maybe some day you can verify non-diversion, but we are not willing to keep disclosing more and more. If you can’t verify non-diversion, you can’t verify non-diversion. So be it.”
If Iran says that, it doesn’t mean it’s violating its SA. Nor does the IAEA’s inability to verify non-diversion entitle the IAEA to impose more obligations on Iran.
That’s my point. Do you feel you’ve acknowledged, as I think you must, that that point is valid, and framed your comments with that point in mind? As I said at the outset, maybe you have and my quick reading of your comment caused me to miss it, but it appeared from that quick read that you had not.
Arnold:
Suggesting Iran may want ambiguity is hardly a stretch. Japan may well act in the same way, particularly if directly threatened by the US.
Regarding a neutral IAEA ending the assertion that questions are unanswered:
Ahmadinejad says “we have a laser enrichment capability”.
IAEA asks “where”.
Iran refuses to answer.
How is that an issue of IAEA neutrality? How does the IAEA “end the assertion”?
You might not like what the IAEA says, but it is too easy to simply sit and allege they are biased. The fact remains there are questions still unanswered from the start of the investigation.
All:
You guys are looking at this the wrong way.
You should put your effort into finding face-saving ways for US/EU and Russia to climb down from their perch and not Iran.
For all their victories have been phyrric.
Richard:
Try replacing the word “reveals” with “announces” and the word “concealing” with “previously unannounced.” Does seem to take the “edge” off it, doesn’t it?
You’re 100% right. Sorry. It crossed my mind at the time, but I was trying to make the point in the context of the concealment language used in the IAEA reports, and the nature of the non-compliances, which were to do with concealment.
Natanz and Arak were NOT non-compliances, and by describing them as concealed, it does make them sound as though they WERE non-compliances (even though they were concealed too).
Eric:
Back again. Crap round of golf.
In your last sentence, are you referring to the pre-October 2003 violations? If so, which ones? My understanding is that the last two were (1) contamination; and (2) questions concerning the P1/P2 centrifuges. Both were resolved the IAEA’s satisfaction a very long time ago.
The contamination was, but the centrifuges were not. P-2 means Pakistan-2. Iran used the Pakistan-2 design to manufacture the Iran-2 – the IR-2. To all intents and purposes, it is the same thing (with design modifications). The IR-2 issue is still open.
Far more important, it is simply not the case that “the IAEA then has to verify their declarations are accurate.” That’s important enough to warrant repeating and expanding: the IAEA does not have any duty to verify that Iran’s declarations are accurate and, since it has no such duty, it has no corresponding right to insist that Iran assist it to perform this non-existent duty.
What am I missing here?
Surely they must verify their declarations are accurate – how else can they verify non-diversion? There would be no point in inspections otherwise; they could simply say Iran says it’s all OK, so we say it’s all OK.
The IAEA has a duty to TRY to verify non-diversion – that is certainly true. And Iran has a duty to assist the IAEA in this effort — to the extent of Iran’s stated obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. With that information in hand, along with whatever else Iran may choose to add, the IAEA is required to determine whether or not it can verify non-diversion, and to verify non-diversion if it can. If it cannot verify non-diversion, it is required only to declare that it cannot verify non-diversion – just as it has declared for very many countries over the years.
Which is precisely what it does with Iran, surely? In the process, it sets out why it cannot verify the non-diversion. I don’t see the confusion?
The IAEA once did “so inform” the UNSC about Iran, of course, in early 2006, when it reported that Iran had failed to make required disclosures for an extended period of time ending in October 2003. At that point, the UNSC was authorized to determine whether Iran’s reported non-compliance was or was not a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (problematic in the circumstances, of course, since the IAEA’s “referral” explicitly stated that Iran’s non-compliance had continued only until October 2003, several years before the “referral”). Whatever decision the UNSC might make in response, however, that decision would necessarily be based on Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter – not on the Safeguards Agreement, over which the UNSC has no enforcement authority whatsoever. Before and after that “referral,” all enforcement authority under the Safeguards Agreement lay only in the hands of the IAEA. And that authority remained exactly the same after the “referral” as it had been before the “referral.” It did not include any right to require Iran to disclose more information than its Safeguards Agreement requires, merely to help the IAEA to perform a “duty” that does not even exist.
OK, but does the UNSC need to be enforcing the CSA? In telling Iran to do certain things, even if some of things pertain to Safeguards, doesn’t it stand up simply because it is a UNSCR, distinct in every way from an action under the CSA?
If arbitration accomplishes nothing else, it will dispel many mistaken beliefs that I now recognize are held even by well-informed observers. For example, how many understand that none of the following statements is correct?
1. The IAEA has found that Iran failed to disclose that it engaged in activities prohibited under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
Just to be clear: Yes, those activities per se are not prohibited under the NPT or CSA, however they are not in compliance with the CSA if they are not declared within the required timeframe.
2. The IAEA has found that Iran failed to declare a nuclear facility at Natanz when required under its Safeguards Agreement.
3. The IAEA has found that Iran failed to declare a nuclear facility at Arak when required under its Safeguards Agreement.
4. When the IAEA referred Iran to the Security Council, it reported that Iran was not complying with its Safeguards Agreement.
Again, to be clear, in the specific IAEA Board Resolution referring Iran to the UNSC, it didn’t mention non-compliance, but it did “recall” the previous IAEA Board Resolution that did find non-compliance.
5. Iran’s Safeguards Agreement grants the UN Security Council authority to enforce it under certain circumstances.
6. The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions on Iran because Iran is not complying with its Safeguards Agreement.
Goes to no. 4. It has become rather complex though, because I believe the sanctions are largely over not complying with UNSCRs, as opposed to not complying with the CSA. Similarly, when Clinton et al bang on about Iran not complying, they invariably say not complying with “international obligations” as opposed to the CSA.
Mr. Canning: “I join with you in challenging Paul’s contention that nothing can be done to influence American public opinion. Relentless exposure of the liars and cheats who conspired to set up an illegal invasion of Iraq, and were rewarded for their crime, is obviously part of the way forward.”
Yes – and we can see how fast that is progressing.
So wasn’t Bush interviewed just this week? And how many reports in the MSM indicated that he was due for appearing before the ICJ? Oh, yes, none.
And how is Dick Cheney doing? The guy he shot in the face can’t even get an apology.
Who was at the White House last week? Oh, yes, Condi Rice – being asked for advice.
Yes, the relentless prosecution of the Iraq war criminals is proceeding nicely – they’re hanging Tariq Azziz.
Email me when Bush and Cheney and the rest of that lot suffer ONE SINGLE INCONVENIENCE from their actions – or even are NOT STILL PROFITING from their actions.
Mr. Canning: I would like to see specific cites for the Russians being concerned over the 20% enrichment and SPECIFICALLY that being the reason they went along with the sanctions. By SPECIFICALLY I mean a statement saying that, not just a “linkage” between the 20% announcement and the fact that Russia supported the sanctions.
Because I do not remember any such statement during my review of the entire TRR negotiation and subsequent events that I did a while back here in that really long post.
Arnold: “If you put those four questions to Mark Fitzpatrick, or Joshua from armscontrolwonk, or even Alan here, would they answer in a way that clearly exonerates Iran, or would they answer in a way that leaves their audience misled as you had been earlier?”
Good question. I think from Alan’s responses to me on the issue of Iranian “concealment” that we know the answer. EVERYTHING Iran does is spun as “somehow Iran is still lying to us”. Probably because, oh, you know, the Muslim religion allows them to lie with inpunity – even when they’re telling the truth.
All of which is again one of these irrelevant issues the Iran bashers focus on in order to distract from my main points that I always raise over and over about the REAL issues which are that Iran has no nuclear weapons program, has no need for one, couldn’t use on if they did have one, has said so, and the IAEA and the 2007 NIE have said so, and even if they did, there is no legal justification for doing anything about it.
But no, the Iran bashers have to focus on irrelevant matters like when did Iran say or do this or that, or Iran’s civil rights record, or Iran’s internal political disagreements, and the like.
It’s all a red herring to disguise a fundamental dislike and distrust of Iran and Muslims in general. I keep urging people not to fall into these traps but it appears to be a waste of breath.
Eric
“The answer to that question quickly became obvious to me.”
Eric- obviously the obvious answer was not the reason why I raised the question, as you mention that would be an easy conclusion, but my point was that the reason IAEA did not asked for arbitration was because is not an independent impartial international body like what it suppose to be, and is structured to do the work for the big powers and nuclear haves, and was forced to go to the UNSC instead of asking for arbitration since there US has more authority and control of the file, arbitration even if favorable (as you have pointed) is not going to relive Iran’s case from the UNSC once Iran’s file is there. Now that the Iran’s file is in the UNSC the only way Iran’s file can leave UNSC is if it is allowed by US, ala Libya. So in my opinion there is too much risk on side of Iran to ask for a presumably impartial arbitration panel and hoping for a presumably favorable ruling (which you have raised in your four questions), knowing that even that ruling cannot and most probably will not relive Iran’s dossier from UNSC. Even if given a knock out, Iran cannot change the western media’s tone while is risking and arbitration for just an ineffective media campaign for the western audience that it don’t control.
Alan: Perhaps a better summation is this. You – and the IAEA – believe that every time Iran “reveals” something, it “proves” Iran was “concealing” it previously.
This is both painfully obvious in the real world and utter bullshit when spun in a politicized way. Even the terminology is bogus. Try replacing the word “reveals” with “announces” and the word “concealing” with “previously unannounced.” Does seem to take the “edge” off it, doesn’t it?
And it’s precisely this use of propaganda phrasing that makes me suspect your motivations.
Alan: “The reasons they are not convinced is because of unanswered questions about the now unconcealed program that was previously concealed.”
Exactly WHICH aspects of their program that was previously concealed which are now not concealed does the IAEA have specific questions about?
“For example, the books have NOT been officially closed on centrifuges or laser enrichment. They WERE closed on laser enrichment, but Ahmadinejad re-opened it as an issue in February. The centrifuge issue has morphed from P2 to IR2/3/4, but it is still basically the same issue, and there are still outstanding questions on it.”
Exactly what questions? Not general fishing questions, but questions which have any real significance in determining the purpose of the nuclear program.
We hear all the time about “unanswered questions” in some vague generality. The reality from what I have read is that most of these questions pertain to minor technical details of when Iran did this or that. NONE of them appear to be relevant to determining the PURPOSE of the Iran program, which, as ElBaradei repeatedly said when he was in charge, are ultimately unknowable anyway.
While these questions may fall under the purview of the SG, if they are merely being used to raise suspicions about the purpose of the Iranian program, they are not relevant to the real issue.
“I think there is an element of that, but it is not simply that. I think Iran’s pattern of concealing certainly impacts heavily on trust and to that extent the proving a negative problem is genuine, but as I said above there are still questions outstanding pertaining directly to the now unconcealed program.”
Once again, the phrase “pattern of concealment” is a spin statement, not a statement of fact. This is precisely why I don’t trust the sort of person who changes a statement of fact into an opinion.
“It’s not impossible because the questions are answerable.”
And if the IAEA would stop nitpicking, it’s likely Iran would answer them all. The fact is Iran knows most of these questions are intended to RAISE suspicion, not alleviate them. It’s motivation to cooperate with the IAEA is correspondingly reduced.
“However, much of what the IAEA has found out about Iran originated from investigations kicked off from third party information.”
And how much of that has been really significant rather than merely used to raise suspicions? How many of those “third party” revelations ended up being nothing at all?
“Several questions, including the Alleged Studies, remained unresolved at the end of the AP period. They were addressed, and some resolved, under the Work Plan in 2007.”
My understanding is that ElBaradei said at the conclusion of the Work Plan that ALL questions were resolved, and Iran at that time said it expected its file be returned to normal status. You are now claiming that questions that were resolved then were re-opened by SUBSEQUENT behavior on the part of Iran which suggests that the behavior was ongoing earlier.
This is still ridiculous. Again, the questions are minor technical issues. WHO CARES whether Iran has a P-2 centrifuge or some other type of processing? Iran has the legal right to do ANY form of uranium processing it wants as long as it’s not enriching to weapons grade. Having the capability to enrich to weapons grade has not to my knowledge ever been established as grounds for violation of a SG. If so, Japan, South Korea and Brazil and probably other countries would all be in violation. So why is the IAEA making a big deal of when and how Iran is developing its enrichment technology?
“They say it all the time. In one way or another, it appears in nearly every report.”
No, they don’t. I’ve just looked at the most recent report. There is no accusation of “concealment” in it, still less a “pattern of concealment”. What the IAEA claims is that Iran has not responded to IAEA requests which Iran specifically states fall outside their SG. None of the questions mentioned seem to me to be relevant to determining whether Iran’s program is military in nature. They are all technical issues about the design of facilities and the like, with no specific justification as to what relevance these questions have to determining the purpose of the Iranian program.
“Why? I don’t really know, but strategic ambiguity must be a possibility.”
What “strategic ambiguity”? They don’t have any nuclear weapons, like Israel, to be concealed. They have some facilities and some research programs. Besides which, the US and Israel clearly don’t believe there is any “ambiguity” in Iran’s behavior.
“What behaviour? Ahamdinejad saying Iran has a laser enrichment capability when the IAEA had closed the file on it.”
How is the disclosure of a part of the Iranian program possibly considered a “pattern of concealment”? Especially when, since Iran is operating without the AP, Iran believes it is not required to disclose peripheral matters until the time specified in the version of the SG they are operating under. This is not a “pattern of concealment” – this is Iran doing only as much as they are obligated to under their original SG as a result of the threats and abuse Iran has taken from the West, including from a politicized IAEA.
“Iran pulling out of the AP with the P2 question unresolved, then leaking to the press weeks later that they had a P2 centrifuge under development (then stonewalling the IAEA on it).”
Again, how is it a “pattern of concealment” when Iran reveals its programs? You’re suggesting Iran pulled out of the AP so as not to reveal its P-2 centrifuge and then deliberately leaks it a few weeks later? What’s wrong with this picture?
“Iran revealing the IR2 centrifuge 18 months later, 3 days after the IAEA eventually “closed” the file on the P2.”
So you admit the file is closed on the P-2. So now naturally Iran is working on a more advanced centrifuge, which it then reveals, so now Iran is again CONCEALING information? What’s wrong with THIS picture?
“Iran pulling out of the modified 3.1 in order to build Fordow in secret.”
Which has been covered over and over as being entirely justified.
“Look, Iran may be justified for doing these things, but the IAEA still has to deal with it.”
The issue is that because Iran is justified for doing these things, the IAEA needs to stop raising unjustified suspicions in the language of its reports.
Arnold,
I’m fairly sure I do, but it may take a while to find them. You should recall tne noise made about the change in “breakout” time, for Iran to enrich to 95%, if it started from a base of 20% U as compared with LEU.
Iran has indicated it will suspend the enriching to 20% as part of a TRR deal. Obviously it is Russia asking for this, as I have not seen anything from the US. The US seems focused on trying to get substantially more LEU to Turkey as part of the deal.
I will check for best references and get them to you!
Sakineh,
Thanks and I see what you mean. The truth is coming out, and I was gratified to see General Shelton come out on network TV in the US with a clear statement that Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld ignored the orders of George W. Bush and went ahead with preparations for insane invasion of Iraq even though Bush told them Iraq had nothing to do with al-Qaeda or the Taliban (or the attack on the World Trade Center).
The warmongering neocons bamboozled a weak president, sad to say.
Kooshy,
“If I understood correctly, IAEA has the same legal right to ask for arbitration as Iran has, if correct why they did not asked for arbitration and decided to refer the file to UNSC instead.”
The answer to that question quickly became obvious to me.
Arnold
“If the arbitration panel shapes its answer the way Samore would, and I think that is the most likely outcome, an answer that is minimally technically wrong and maximally misleading, then Iran’s cause would be harmed. You’d read and analyze the entire decision the way you’ve read and analyzed documentation that is already publicly available. Those who are less in-depth in their search for information will continue to be mislead – with the additional factor that the arbitrators, in their mind, found in the US’ favor.”
I think for this same reason early on Iran decided that arbitration at most will decide to be impartial, with a benign ruling and based on Eric’s thesis they need a hands down knock out to get any traction, so they figured at best their chances is 33% for a favorable ruling and at most 50% for a real impartiality ruling which in any case the westerners (you read US) can and will spin via the western media.
If I understood correctly, IAEA has the same legal right to ask for arbitration as Iran has, if correct why they did not asked for arbitration and decided to refer the file to UNSC instead.
Just one can imagine that after the arbitration, every one of almost daily reports by David Sanger on Iranian Nuclear issue will begin like this, “……….Iranian nuclear program which recently was judged by an independent arbitration panel at Iran’s own request……………” what do you suppose the beginning and end of this sentence will be.
James Canning,
” A US attack on Iran is very unlikely, if dedicated and wll-informed opponents of foolish military adventures in the greater Middle East, by the US, keep exposing the truth.”
I think the irony was lost in my post. I am with you on this! I was being “ironical.” Please read the post again. You may get a whiff/hint of it.
Eric has been doing a fine job exposing the liars.
James:
The specific statement you’ve made that Iran’s 20% enrichment was a tipping point for Russia and China that caused them to support a new resolution.
Do you have any evidence or tangible reason to believe that?
Eric:
My point is that you weren’t convinced that Iran must be hiding something by accident. You were convinced because of a deliberate program by your government that had the objective of increasing pressure on Iran to relinquish a legal right it has to attain the capabilities Japan has.
I applaud that you’ve taken the initiative to see past this deliberate program of deception but that program and its objective continue. I think we can agree on that.
If you put those four questions to Mark Fitzpatrick, or Joshua from armscontrolwonk, or even Alan here, would they answer in a way that clearly exonerates Iran, or would they answer in a way that leaves their audience misled as you had been earlier?
One judge in this process would be chosen by Amano, whose writing I cannot distinguish from Gary Samore’s or the most partisan members of the US nuclear policy establishment. Another judge will be chosen by the president of the ICJ, and would be subject to heavy lobbying by the United States and the effectiveness of that lobbying is outside of Iran’s control.
If the arbitration panel shapes its answer the way Samore would, and I think that is the most likely outcome, an answer that is minimally technically wrong and maximally misleading, then Iran’s cause would be harmed. You’d read and analyze the entire decision the way you’ve read and analyzed documentation that is already publicly available. Those who are less in-depth in their search for information will continue to be mislead – with the additional factor that the arbitrators, in their mind, found in the US’ favor.
The same way you read the UNSC resolutions carefully and find that they don’t actually say what they were deliberately designed give their audiences the impression of, you would read the arbitration ruling and find that underneath a lot of misleading language, the ultimate answer is no, Iran has not violated its safeguards agreement.
Alan could do a great job coming up with questions for the US to add to the docket. It is really a stretch for me to try to do so. But I’m 100% certain they could and would, if that’s the strategy the US chooses to use in engaging the arbitration matter. Or the US could develop a more effective strategy I have not thought of. The point is that the US is not going to helplessly watch the foundation of its efforts to pressure Iran be nullified. The US has plenty of tools it can use to prevent that in plenty of ways.
So the risk of the arbitration request is that the result comes back that does not exonerate Iran. Or does not exonerate Iran in language any more plain that what you’ve already read. With the right judges, the US could ask a question, do non-weapons NPT states effectively have a responsibility to implement the AP – and get back a binding yes. That would mark a major change to the treaty and defeat for the right non-weapons states to determine as laid out in the NPT their level of disclosure in their CSA.
We’ve gone over the risks many times, including the posts you’ve just responded to of Iran unilaterally committing to implement the AP. You don’t see that because you don’t want to see it but here again: 1) The AP has more requirements that Iran can be claimed to be flagrantly violating if it does not agree with the US’ maximal interpretation of the language. 2) The AP will provide information that can be used to concoct more laptops of death and make them more convincing. 3) The AP will provide information about people and places that are vulnerable to the active covert sabotage efforts the US has in place right now, making those efforts more effective. 4) The AP will give the US better information to use if it decides to militarily attack Iran’s nuclear program – and the better information the US has, the more confidence US generals will have that a strike could “work” and therefore the more likely the US is to carry an attack out.
If at this point you don’t agree that there are at least risks to Iran committing to implement the AP, then I can’t see how you’re looking at the issue honestly.
Arnold,
YOU WROTE: “US officials happen not to say that Iran is in violation of its safeguards agreement. They say it is not upholding its “international obligations”…. I think it is very naive of you to think Iran has some magic tactic that will allow it to win a PR battle against the government of the United States fought over the US population.”
MY REPLY: The essence of my suggestion is that Iran take advantage of a prescribed dispute-resolution procedure, which almost certainly would yield a decision in its favor, to establish that its legal position on several important questions – most important: that it is complying with its obligations under the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement – is correct, and so the US’ position on those important questions is incorrect. I then predict that establishing the correctness of its legal position will yield some PR benefit for Iran – certainly much more than it now achieves merely by protesting loudly and often that it is correct and its critics are not.
You distinguish – technically correctly – between “Safeguards Agreement” and “international obligations.” But do you suppose more than, say, 0.1% of the world’s population draws that distinction? And even among those few who do, what do you suppose they think the US has in mind when it accuses Iran of violating its “international obligations?”
I cannot say for sure (any more than you can say the opposite for sure) that obtaining a favorable legal ruling and attempting to exploit it for PR advantage will work on very many Americans, but I can tell you that it has, in effect, worked already on one American: me. For many years, as a casual observer of this dispute, I was convinced that Iran was flagrantly violating its Safeguards Agreement, and I couldn’t help wondering why it would be doing so – other than because it was secretly developing nuclear weapons. I’ve taken the time to look into the matter, but very few other Americans have done so or ever will. An authoritative ruling from an independent arbitration panel would be an effective substitute for many of them. I think you’d be surprised how many intelligent and educated Americans will be swayed by facts and law. Even for those whose positions do not change, facts and law might diminish the strength of their convictions sufficiently that they will no longer press so strongly for yet another avoidable US war in the Middle East.
The extent to which the US has managed to control this debate is, I believe, revealed clearly in this passage from the opening of Part 3 of my article, which passage ends with a concise statement of why I think why I think Iran would be wise to demand arbitration:
EXCERPT FROM ARTICLE:
The Iran nuclear dispute is often presented less than clearly in the lengthy preambles to the Iran Resolutions. A good example began with the IAEA Board resolution that formally “referred” Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council in early 2006 (GOV/2006/14). The IAEA Board stated that, in order for “confidence [to be] built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme,” the Board “deems it necessary” for Iran to take several “confidence building measures:” suspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider whether to build a heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and take various “transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals [and] documentation … as the Agency may request….” The Board expressly acknowledged that each of these “confidence building measures” would be “voluntary and non-legally binding.” For this reason, it could not and did not require Iran to take any of them. But the Board instructed the Director General to tell the Security Council just the opposite: “The Director General [shall] report to the Security Council of the United Nations that THESE STEPS ARE REQUIRED OF IRAN BY THE BOARD….” (Emphasis added.) The dutiful Director General’s misstatement to the Security Council was soon reflected in Security Council Resolution 1696: “The Security Council … calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps REQUIRED BY THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS in its resolution GOV/2006/14….[and] DEMANDS that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities….” (Emphasis added.)
Since then, as the Iran nuclear dispute has moved up and down the imaginary chain of command (see Part 1 of this article), Iran’s failure to take these voluntary steps has been repeatedly cited by both the Security Council and the IAEA as a serious violation of the resolutions adopted by both bodies. By the time the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 four years later, its displeasure had ballooned to this:
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/15), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,…. (Emphasis in original.)
A casual reader may be forgiven for not noticing that neither the preceding paragraph, nor any of the IAEA reports or Security Council resolutions it cites, states that Iran is breaching any obligation under its Safeguards Agreement. If Iran were to point this out, the reader might ignore its protest. An independent arbitration ruling making this fact clear might be more persuasive.
END OF EXCERPT FROM ARTICLE.
Arnold,
YOU WROTE: “Iran has officials who study the issues closely. It is also extremely presumptuous for you to claim, after relatively little familiarity with the case, that you’ve figured out a better way to manage Iran’s strategic policy than the people who’ve worked on the issue professionally for decades.”
MY REPLY: Many of us here, and on other websites, succumb to the temptation to offer advice. Perhaps we shouldn’t, but we do. Iran is free to ignore our advice, of course. None of us who offer advice to Iran ever suggests otherwise.
YOU WROTE: “You must admit there are risks to your suggestions – clearly it is at least possible (and I think most likely) that your suggestions would leave Iran worse off rather than better.”
MY REPLY: I don’t admit that, or even see it. You may be right, but those risks are sufficiently obscure that I don’t yet see them. Can you elaborate?
YOU WROTE: “But Iran’s people have not authorized you to evaluate and weigh the risks on their behalves.”
MY REPLY: You’re correct, of course; they have not.
Kamran,
Bravo! More “liar lawyer” regurgitation of talking points by HILLARY CLINTON. Got to please the Israel lobby! And what nuclear facility at Qom? Wasn’t it empty when its “existence” was disclosed?
Amazing and absurd lies made by Hillary Clinton!
SECRETARY CLINTON: Our problem is not with their reactor at Bushehr. Our problem is with their facilities at places like Natanz and their secret facility at Qom and other places where we believe they are conducting their weapons program.
The IAEA:
The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.
Since February 2007, the Agency has taken a large number of environmental samples at FEP, the results of which have indicated a level of enrichment of uranium of less than 5.0% U-235.
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility.
Iran has estimated that, between 9 February 2010 and 20 August 2010, a total of approximately 310 kg of UF6 enriched at FEP was fed into Cascade 1 and that 22 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 was produced. This material is under containment and surveillance.
As of 7 April 2010, the results of the environmental samples taken at PFEP indicate that the maximum enrichment level in the DIQ (i.e. less than 20% U-235 enrichment) had not been exceeded at that plant.
Since October 2009, the Agency has been conducting, on average, one design information verification (DIV) at FFEP per month. The Agency has verified that the construction of the facility is ongoing. As of 18 August 2010, no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. The results of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 16 February 2010 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.
The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the PIV carried out at UCF in March 2010,30 and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at UCF as declared by Iran is consistent with those results.
The total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 remains 371 tonnes (some of which has been transferred to FEP and PFEP), which remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance.
The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.
Arnold,
The Russian foeign ministry said today: “Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed the principled support by Russia of the IAEA as a unique international platform to exchange experiences, knowledge and achievement in the nuclear field FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL ITS MEMBER STATES. . .” [Emphasis supplied] (available at mid.ru)
Arnold,
YOU WROTE: “Do you really think there is no US response to Iran adapting the strategy you recommend?Without putting too much thought into it, my first response if I was the US to Iran seeking arbitration would be to add six or so easy questions that will be found in the US’ favor.”
MY REPLY: I’m curious to know what questions you would pick.
Eric,
I join with you in challenging Paul’s contention that nothing can be done to influence American public opinion. Relentless exposure of the liars and cheats who conspired to set up an illegal invasion of Iraq, and were rewarded for their crime, is obviously part of the way forward. This means exposing the powerful financiers, mostly Jewish, who arranged for rewards for war criminals.
Arnold,
I also recommend highly the Financial Times and the Spectator, and the Economist has good things too. In my view, someone who follows world affairs, and speaks English, but does not read the FT, is making a major mistake.
Paul,
Thanks for your comments. Some replies:
YOU WROTE: “But I think the last paragraph here is nonsense. Nothing Iran can do will affect US public opinion. US public opinion is controlled by propaganda, all of which runs hard against Iran no matter what.”
MY REPLY: I’m less naive than it might appear from my ending. To be candid, it’s hard to write a long article, reach the end, and conclude blandly that maybe what you’ve just written will make a dime’s worth of difference at best. And so there’s a strong temptation to close with a more hopeful flourish.
Nonetheless, a dime’s worth of difference is better than no difference at all – which is exactly what we can expect from what many others recommend Iran should do: for example, complain because nobody’s doing anything about Israel’s nuclear program, or argue that the US violates the NPT by not formally acknowledging Iran’s enrichment rights, or insist that the US’ true purpose is regime change and so there’s no point in resisting any challenges to Iran’s nuclear program. Correct or not, those observations – which some absurdly elevate to the status of “strategies” – accomplish nothing at all. They are pointless observations, not strategies – the functional equivalents of doing nothing at all. A dime’s worth of difference shines by comparison.
I harbor no illusion that the UNSC is going to say “My goodness, it’s true. The Iran Resolutions are invalid. Let’s formally cancel them so that everyone understands we recognize our mistake.” But the next time the UNSC considers action, if more people understand the legal issues better than they do now, the UNSC may find it at least somewhat more difficult to rely on the defective hybrid authority on which it has conveniently relied so far: purporting to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter so that no one will question its authority, yet also purporting merely to be enforcing Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, which does not include the annoying requirement that the UNSC first determine that Iran’s nuclear program amounts to a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”
YOU WROTE: “Iran is doing a surprisingly good job of trying to enhance its international ties outside the US-associated cartel of ‘Superpowers’ aligned against it, and of trying to appeal to the UN pro-actively against US threats.”
MY REPLY: “A surprisingly good job” — do you really think so? If we emphasize the words “trying” and “surprisingly” in what you’ve written, you might have a point. But if “good job” is what you really mean here — if you’re speaking of actual results, I’d say they are awfully meager so far.
YOU WROTE: “If Iran DID appeal to the UN for arbitration, or perhaps to some other international body, which also would most likely be largely controlled by the US, what are the real chances that there would be a fair decision?”
MY REPLY: You set aside here the question of what use could be made of a fair decision, instead expressing doubt that a fair decision can even be reached. On this point, I disagree strongly with you. One reason for demanding arbitration is to get people actually to read Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. If you do (or reread it, in your case: I don’t mean to suggest you haven’t read it), you’ll almost certainly conclude that the questions I’ve posed (other than Question 4, the Code 3.1 question) are slam-dunk winners for Iran. (You might also find it useful to reread the portion of Part 3 of my article where I explain why I would choose each of these four questions.)
You’ll also note that Iran wouldn’t be “appealing to the UN” in this arbitration. It would be demanding the creation of an ad hoc independent arbitration panel, entirely separate from the UN, the IAEA or any other existing international body. I don’t think the US could or would materially influence the arbitration panel’s makeup or the conduct of its proceeding. Even if it did, it would require a nearly complete lack of integrity, self-respect and intelligence for any arbitration panel not to rule in Iran’s favor on Questions 1 through 3. I picked them, and phrased them the way I did, because (1) it would be very difficult for any panel not to rule for Iran; and (2) the nearly inevitable ruling in favor of Iran would be very likely to surprise many people who mistakenly believe that the US’ interpretation of Iran’s compliance status is correct. So, setting aside what use can be made of a panel’s decision – as you did in this comment — I am highly confident that the panel would rule for Iran.
YOU WROTE: “I think [arbitration] would be a huge risk for Iran, a very foolish one. ”
MY REPLY: A huge risk? I certainly don’t see that. I can understand one concluding that there may be little or no benefit, but I fail to see any material risk – not even an opportunity cost since, as best I can tell, Iran is otherwise not spending its time doing much of anything to improve its situation. What will Iran do in the meantime if it doesn’t seek arbitration? Continue to complain about the unfairness of life? Delude itself to believe that things will get better if it continues to do nothing? Are things getting better lately? Are the sanctions getting looser? Is the US getting closer to acknowledging Iran’s right to enrich uranium? How about Russia and China – are they expressing stronger and stronger support for Iran? What, exactly, is the “huge risk” you foresee – that the US will be upset at Iran’s audacity, and thereafter stop being so nice to Iran?
YOU WROTE: “A fair arbitration, sure, that would be great, but how can that be a solution when the likelihood is that no fair arbitration would be available for Iran?”
MY REPLY: I’ve answered this above: I’m confident Iran would get a fair panel and a fair (and favorable) decision. One can disagree as to how useful that favorable decision might be, but I am very confident on those two points: fair panel, fair and favorable decision.
“Basically, Iran is doing the best it can. It’s trying to outlast US persecution.”
MY REPLY: That indeed appears to be Iran’s strategy, and I think “outlast” is the right strategy in the long run (see especially the last paragraph of my October 26, 11:41 AM post). But I think the “outlast” strategy sometimes needs some help – by throwing a few roadblocks in front of the US every now and then, for example, such as an arbitration proceeding that, at the very least, diverts attention from the current “non-legal” confrontation for several months, and probably ends up establishing at least a little (and, I think, a lot of) doubt as to whether truth and justice really lie on the side of the US in this dispute.
YOU WROTE: “So why must supposed “moderates” continue to harp on variations of the theme that the solution to this conflict, between the US and Iran, is up to Iran? This is a situation where the US has 95% of the control, which is being 95% driven by the US and Israel, and it’s just a copout, I think, to suggest that resolving the conflict is up to Iran. It’s up to the US …”
MY REPLY: Implicit in your comment is an assumption that any action Iran might take amounts to an expression of weakness. Demanding arbitration is not an expression of weakness. It may not have as much effect as I’d like and I predict (though I think I’ll be closer to correct than you anticipate), but it certainly wouldn’t be an expression of weakness. An implicit acknowledgement that Iran has fewer weapons than the US has in this dispute – that characterization I could accept. But demanding arbitration strikes me as far less an expression of weakness than doing nothing, thereby acknowledging that Iran has no weapons at all.
You implicitly suggest that sitting back and complaining about being unfairly singled out, or about Israel’s “free pass,” or about the US’ ulterior “regime change” motives, is comparatively a show of strength. Is it, or is it exactly what I label it: “stubborn passivity?” Do you really think it would be an expression of strength for Iran simply to agree with you — that “it’s up to the US” – and then to demand merely that the US do the right thing here? To say “Our fate is entirely in the hands of our enemy; we are helpless” — that’s a show of strength? Frankly, that conclusion is precisely what the US would like Iran to think, and so far Iran appears to be accommodating it.
Perhaps you believe, as others clearly do, that Iran shows its toughness simply by saying “The US will regret attacking Iran; Iran will fight back and punish the US very severely.” I don’t. That – to use your word – strikes me as a “copout.” Real courage would cause Iran to take a much more sober look at the situation – long before “Napoleon’s troops reach the gates of Moscow,” to quote from my earlier post mentioned above (October 26, 11:41 AM).
Your pessimistic view may be mostly correct (and I’ll confess I reluctantly share it more than may appear here to be the case), but it’s certainly not entirely correct. Iran should look for and exploit every chink in the US armor it can find. Proactively.
YOU WROTE: “The sanctions are a form of economic war, and it’s an economic war that US officials increasingly claim is causing real devastation in Iran, which makes it a crime against humanity, of course, though no one seems to care about that in this ‘enlightened’ and evolved day and age.”
MY REPLY: You’re exactly right in one part of this observation: “No one seems to care.” If arguing that the sanctions are a “crime against humanity” is an important part of Iran’s “strategy” here, all I can say is: Good luck with that.
YOU WROTE: “Even so, Russia’s feverish crawling to US/NATO/Israel’s tune, in particular, has apparently not been missed by smaller nations around the world, as Chavez’ mildly but pointedly implied rebuke to Russia [indicates].”
MY REPLY: Perceptive observation, but how much effect do you think Chavez’s mild rebuke is going to have? Or any other “smaller nation’s’ mild rebuke? How much effect has Turkey’s and Brazil’s bold intervention had so far? Two aspiring near-powers risked a substantial amount of their prestige to back Iran, and they haven’t even succeeded in getting it fuel for a nuclear reactor whose only purpose is to help 800,000+ people who are dying of cancer.
YOU WROTE: “Basically, Iran is a very small nation facing overwhelming forces, rather bravely.”
MY REPLY: I agree. It’s quite brave. If the combatants’ comparative levels of bravery will determine the outcome, Iran’s prospects are very bright.
YOU WROTE: “If the US had a particle of Iran’s courage, we would stop warmongering against Iran and accept the notion of living in a multi-polar world, the world Putin called for, back when he had a backbone.”
MY REPLY: What’s the first word of your sentence?
YOU WROTE: “It would take a bit of courage for an Empire to agree that maybe Global Domination isn’t the best way to a better future for humanity.”
MY REPLY: It would take that, wouldn’t it? Can you think of any empire that’s ever reached that conclusion? That’s said to itself “You know, this ‘global domination’ thing isn’t really the best thing for humanity. It’s high time we changed our ways.”
YOU WROTE: “But, man, that would be a courage worth having.”
MY REPLY: Yes, that would be nice, wouldn’t it? In the meantime, Iran has itself a real world to live in. And it should try to do whatever it can, however limited its options may be, to improve its situation in that real world.
Arnold,
I read the Guardian, the Observer, The Times (London), The Sunday Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Sunday Telegraph, and other British newspapers and journals. American newspapers filter out much of what is most important, in statements by foreign ministers of China, Russia, Iran, and even European allies of the US. The explanation for this filtering is: ISRAEL LOBBY and armaments manufacturers (and attendant power apparatus).
Arnold,
I recommend checking Russia Today (rt.com) and PressTV daily if you can. I will see if I have some good links. Russia and China are vehement in their support of Iran’s domestic nuclear power programme, and openly hostile to the stupid “extra” sanctions imposed by the US and the EU after the UN vote this past summer. And they both want the Iranian IAEA application to go through.
If the Israel lobby in the US wants to do even more to inflict major damage on US national security, it will continue its efforts to block Iran’s IAEA application. This subverting of the national interests of the American people needs the greatest possible publicity.
The Italian secretary of state, Stefania Craxi, said yesterday: “Iran has the right to possess and use nuclear energy to secure its welfare and development.” Hear, hear!
Craxi noted that Italy strongly opposes the foolish US “carrot and stick” approach to Iran. And, of course, we all know this obviously stupid approach can be laid at the door of Hillary Clinton! Yet another bungling US secretary of state, captive to the Israel lobby and her own political ambitions.
James:
I recommend careful reading of the numerous statements Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, has made about the situation.
Do you have a link or source?
Eric:
Do you really think there is no US response to Iran adapting the strategy you recommend?
Without putting too much thought into it, my first response if I was the US to Iran seeking arbitration would be to add six or so easy questions that will be found in the US’ favor. Then claiming the overall arbitration results are more evidence of the danger of Iran’s nuclear program.
US officials happen not to say that Iran is in violation of its safeguards agreement. They say it is not upholding its “international obligations”.
I think it is very naive of you to think Iran has some magic tactic that will allow it to win a PR battle against the government of the United States fought over the US population.
Worse, there is an implication that if Iran does not follow this magic tactic you’ve come up with, then it’s Iran’s fault it is losing that PR battle and not the fault of the side that is deliberately distorting the fact that Iran, as you point out after much research, is essentially right on the issues.
Also IAEA director Amano, in his reports frames the issues exactly the way the US nuclear policy community does over at armscontrolwonk. I read the reports and thought Gary Samore must have written this and given it to Amano to sign. There is a significant chance he and the ICJ president will appoint judges disposed to frame and interpret the issues the way the US does. If that happens, Iran loses, and whether or not that happens is not under Iranian control.
Unilaterally implementing the AP 1) will not necessarily or likely result in a finding that there has been no diversion. The US has the motivation and ability to concoct evidence to produce unanswered questions from now on. 2) will give the US information that it can use in its current and ongoing efforts to sabotage Iran’s nuclear industry from the inside. 3) will give the US more confidence that it has a full list of targets, and in that way remove one argument against bombing Iran’s program which is that some of the targets are unknown – which means it would make an attack more likely.
Your analysis of the legal issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear issue strikes me as strong. Your prescriptions for Iran – put the issue before arbitration and implement the AP would be counterproductive for Iran.
Iran has officials who study the issues closely. It is also extremely presumptuous for you to claim, after relatively little familiarity with the case, that you’ve figured out a better way to manage Iran’s strategic policy than the people who’ve worked on the issue professionally for decades.
You must admit there are risks to your suggestions – clearly it is at least possible (and I think most likely) that your suggestions would leave Iran worse off rather than better. But Iran’s people have not authorized you to evaluate and weigh the risks on their behalves.
Arnold,
I recommend careful reading of the numerous statements Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, has made about the situation.
The Russians and the Chinese believe the TRR deal can go through, with Turkey serving as excrow agent for Iranian LEU pending delivery of the TRR fuel. And Iran has given a number of signals the suspension of enrichment to 20% would be part of the arrangements.
The stupidity of American officials, in failing to push the Iranian IAEA application through, sadly is just all too typical. But now it can go through, in part because Obama’s close advisers have acknowledged they tried to do too much one year ago.
James:
This [20% enrichment] was the tipping point, that figured largley in the decision of Russia and China to back the resolution.
What makes you think that? I don’t think I’ve read any Russian or Chinese officials express any view on the 20% enrichment. What have you read?
I think the decision was based, in Russia’s case, on support for a new resolution being part of the Obama “reset” that included removing the Poland missile interceptors. In China’s case I think it was based on US treasury officials going to China and linking an Iran resolution to US opposition to China’s currency policy.
paul,
The poverty of Cuba today is partly a product of the US embargo, but far and away more important was the desire of the Cuban leadership to retain power even if doing so meant continuing poverty for most Cubans. This is the crux of the matter.
Iran’s government wants to cut down the degree of state control over industrial enterprises because it is clear the economy suffers from such control.
Alan:
It’s not impossible because the questions are answerable.
The questions are answerable in the manner agreed to by the IAEA in the work plan – the IAEA presents the basis for the questions, Iran is given a chance to see and evaluate that supposed evidence and then respond.
Except the US, not Iran, prevents the agreed upon procedure from being implemented.
Which means that because Iran will never see the full amount of evidence against it, if the US wants, laptops of death can be the basis for an infinite set of questions – and the US would want that.
Somehow you’re projecting the US’ desire for the IAEA’s investigation to never close onto Iran. Not because of evidence though, because it fits better with what you want to believe about the US and about Iran.
paul,
You are quite wrong to say Russia and China agreed to war (against Iran) when they voted in favor of the latest round of sanctions. The Iranian government blundered, in my view, by enriching to 20%. This was the tipping point, that figured largley in the decision of Russia and China to back the resolution. BUT THEY WANT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, AND SAY SO TIME AND TIME AGAIN.
Alan:
Ahamdinejad saying Iran has a laser enrichment capability when the IAEA had closed the file on it. Iran pulling out of the AP with the P2 question unresolved, then leaking to the press weeks later that they had a P2 centrifuge under development (then stonewalling the IAEA on it). Iran revealing the IR2 centrifuge 18 months later, 3 days after the IAEA eventually “closed” the file on the P2. Iran pulling out of the modified 3.1 in order to build Fordow in secret.
Look, Iran may be justified for doing these things, but the IAEA still has to deal with it.
All of the behaviors you point to, in my opinion, have more plausible explanations than that Iran has a desire for the IAEA to continue asserting that there are unanswered questions.
Also none of the behaviors would prevent a neutral IAEA from ending that assertion. So that if there was a neutral IAEA and Iran wanted to keep questions open, the behaviors you point to would not be sufficient to do that.
Your claim that Iran wants the dispute to linger strikes me as weakly supported by any evidence. More of something you’d like to believe so you do the best you can to rationalize it with what you can get.
paul,
You say the US has “freedom to act” so that a resolution of the Iranian nuclear dispute can be achieved. The brain tumour on the US body politic, that is of course the Israel lobby, short-circuits the system. And in Iran, a year ago the government was forced to back off the TRR deal because of pressure from the so-called “reformers”!
Part of the way forward must be to educate European leaders regarding the near-total incapacity of the US to act in its own best best interests, in matters pertaining to the Middle East, due to interference from powerful Jewish financiers. Why do you think Hillary Clinton went out of her way to praise Netanyahu, after he in effect spat in Obama’s face?
Rehmat,
I am very well aware Tariq Aziz is a Christian, and that the Christian community in Iraq did not want “liberation” via the insane US/UK invasion – - which of course has been a catastrophe for the Christian community in Iraq.
Executing Aziz would be a travesty.
Sakineh,
A US attack on Iran is very unlikely, if dedicated and wll-informed opponents of foolish military adventures in the greater Middle East, by the US, keep exposing the truth. The vicious liars who set up the Iraq War by deceiving both the UK and the American public, will fail in their effort to facilitate ever more oppression of the Palestinians in the West Bank, by fanatical Jews illegally living there, by attacking Iran.
Richard:
First, the IAEA knows perfectly well WHAT Iran concealed, WHEN it concealed it, WHENn the concealment ended, and has closed the books on that officially.
They do know what they concealed yes, but they are still not convinced they know about everything that has been concealed. The reasons they are not convinced is because of unanswered questions about the now unconcealed program that was previously concealed.
For example, the books have NOT been officially closed on centrifuges or laser enrichment. They WERE closed on laser enrichment, but Ahmadinejad re-opened it as an issue in February. The centrifuge issue has morphed from P2 to IR2/3/4, but it is still basically the same issue, and there are still outstanding questions on it.
What you’re saying is that because Iran concealed something in the PAST, the IAEA is justified in suspecting that Iran is concealing something NOW. This is purely and simply a request to prove a negative.
I think there is an element of that, but it is not simply that. I think Iran’s pattern of concealing certainly impacts heavily on trust and to that extent the proving a negative problem is genuine, but as I said above there are still questions outstanding pertaining directly to the now unconcealed program.
How the hell can Iran prove it’s NOT concealing something? It’s utterly impossible because it depends entirely on how paranoid the questioner is.
It’s not impossible because the questions are answerable.
It is true that not all current issues arose from the original non-compliance findings (the Alleged Studies came a couple of years later). And it is true that the Alleged Studies all arise from third party info. However, much of what the IAEA has found out about Iran originated from investigations kicked off from third party information.
When Iran was operating under the unratified Additional Protocol for over two years, the IAEA went everywhere, looked at everything and found nothing. Subsequently all unanswered questions the IAEA had were answered and the books closed on those questions EXCEPT the nonsense about “weapons studies” which are not in any way the purview of the IAEA in the first place.
Not true. Several questions, including the Alleged Studies, remained unresolved at the end of the AP period. They were addressed, and some resolved, under the Work Plan in 2007.
The statement that the IAEA has been “unable to verify that concealment has ended” is pure bullshit. The IAEA has never said this to my knowledge.
They say it all the time. In one way or another, it appears in nearly every report.
Second, you suggest that Iran’s behavior indicates that they want to keep the question of whether they are concealing something alive. Why? What behavior leads you to believe that? What evidence has anyone provided to even suggest that?
Why? I don’t really know, but strategic ambiguity must be a possibility.
What behaviour? Ahamdinejad saying Iran has a laser enrichment capability when the IAEA had closed the file on it. Iran pulling out of the AP with the P2 question unresolved, then leaking to the press weeks later that they had a P2 centrifuge under development (then stonewalling the IAEA on it). Iran revealing the IR2 centrifuge 18 months later, 3 days after the IAEA eventually “closed” the file on the P2. Iran pulling out of the modified 3.1 in order to build Fordow in secret.
Look, Iran may be justified for doing these things, but the IAEA still has to deal with it.
More tomorrow.
Masoud,
Thank you for your detailed comments, which I’ll respond to later.
Eric
Closer to my own views (that no agreement is possible).
Note that this person, a reasonable person as far as Western analysts go, uses the word “allow” in regards to enrichment in Iran. This is an indication of the arrogance of the West which has so seeped into its body-politic that they are not even aware of it. (Why not use the word “accept” instead?).
This is not the only example. I once heard a French analyst, in response to a Russian analysts view on Iran, referring to the EU 2005 Offer, stating that “…it is good-enough for them”.
Of course, if you recall, the gist of EU offer was to help Iran in treating the human excrement of the Iranians into something suitable for agriculture – all the while giving the Iranians the privilege of buying light-water reactotrs from Russians.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/23256/irans_nuclear_program_beyond_bushehr.html
From, the july “Weather clears for a US strike on Iran
By Victor Kotsev
War drums are beating in the Middle East. In a short time, the United States has increased the number of its carrier strike”
to the “Guns of august…”
and now the october surprise.. oh no, october is alsmost over.. to election and
“AMERICA VOTES, THE WORLD WAITS Iran will be back in the frame
By Victor Kotsev ”
http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LJ29Ak03.html
atleast they are consistent in their hasbara while the foundation is slowly crumbling. keep at it, the austerity measures will be showing up in the neighborhood near you.
Hi Eric,
(pleae ignore my earlier posts)
I’ve done an initial pass through of the article, but I haven’t had the chance to put much in writing. I do agree with substatial parts of what you have to say but disagree with almost as much, and a proper response to some your analysis is going to be timeconsuming, but here are some initial reactions:
1. You should have brought up Mossadegh’s legal victory over Britain in the Hague in your report. The parallels are striking. Over all I don’t think this course is advisable, not because of some arcane shi’ite history, but because there is a lot to lose, and very little to gain. In the best case, none of the sanctions resolutions will be affected, because, as you say, such a panel will not have ability to strike those down. If the panel does find that the SC resolutions don’t create any obligation under the NPT instruments for Iran, this won’t necessarily mean such obligations don’t exist by virtue of other instruments, ie the UN charter. Moreover, the world is a different place than it was in the 1950’s. I don’t know how the ICJ is composed or who appoints it’s judges or president, but I am sure that Western influence over that institution has increased dramatically over the last couple of decades. There is no telling how impartial the third panelist will be. I wish I could believe that the ICJ would not have to get involved and that the arbitrators chosen by Iran and the IAEA (BOG? Directorate? anyone know?)will be fair and impartial, somehow i just don’t. The decision to seek an arbitration hearing should be made with at least as much attention to the politics of the situation as is given to the legal merits of the arguments.
2. Your arguments rejecting the ‘implicit article 39′ line of reasoning did not strike me as waterproof, more on that later.
3. This I am much less sure about, but what is the justification for believing that that articles 40 and 41 authorize the SC to issue legally binding directives to any member state? To ‘call upon’ a country to take certain measures strikes me as very weak language, and to me it seems to me it is used throughout chapter 6 and 7 as a euphemism for ‘communicate with’. Article 40 is the only article that directly addresses the ’states concerned’, and it is explicitly to be invoked before any article 39 ‘decisions’.
It would seem that articles 40-42 sole purpose is to legally indemnify third countries for measures taken to ‘restore peace and security’ and the only ‘acceptance’ of security council ‘decisions’ member states have acceded to in article 25 is specified in article 39(which is the only article that talks about ‘decisions’ rather than ‘complying with provisional measures’).
3. I think you reject Iran’s approach to the matter too hastily. Per the UN Charter, the SC can only intervene
a. In order to resolve a ‘dispute’or
b. If it has made a ‘peace threat’ determination.
Since, as you note, there is no peace threat determination, the idea that there is a dispute becomes central the legitimacy of all the resolutions issued thus far. If Iran can close that hole, I think it would stand a much improved chance of challenging the resolutions(in the proper settings). A general understanding that El-Baradei’s finding of non-compliance and subsequent report or referral to the SC was in error would go a long way towards that end. I think you are severely mistaken when you assert that the IAEA can report ‘anything it wants to, at anytime’ to the SC, thought I don’t have time to talk about that now.
4. As for the picture you paint of an eventual rapprochement between the US and Iran, I find it quite ‘rose-colored’ to say the least. There is no historical evidence to suggest that the US is concerned by nuclear proliferation rather than projecting power, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. The US’s stated goals of restricting proliferation are nothing but pretexts to isolate and weaken Iran so as to demonstrate it’s power to the rest of the world. A stunning admission of this would be the reaction Flynt Leverett was able to solicit from a bureaucrat from Obama’s sanctions implementation organ just over a week ago. The last country to prevail over the US in the Hague was Nicaragua, how did that turn out for it?
5. Iran’s best bet to make itself unsanctioned doesn’t rest with hopes of coming to some kind of understanding with it’s antagonists, but in pursuing substantive free trade, banking, customs, and visa arrangements with it’s near neighbors. Talks about dramatically lowered trade barriers are already underway between Syria, Turkey and Iran, I believe Iraq will join these discussions as soon as it forms a government. If a common market is formed between these countries, we should have every expectation that Afghanistan, Azerbijan and Armenia would enthusiastically seek membership. Erdogan has even floated the idea of Pakistan joining in his recent visit to that country. This needs to be the main focus of Iran’s nuclear diplomacy and foreign policy generally over the next five years.
6. I do like the idea of taking the initiative and putting questions to Adjudication panel, if only to deny the US led cabal the opportunity to frame the questions such a panel would address. But these questions should be much simpler than those you have laid out. I.E. “Does Iran have the right to enrich Uranium”, “What provisions of the instruments executed between Iran in the IAEA allow for the DG or BOG to find that Iran must cease enrichment, provide information on conventional military programs etc…”, “Does the DG have the power to compel Iran to sign and ratify arbitrary treaties” etc…
Masoud
Hi Eric,
(pleae ignore my earlier post)
I’ve done an initial pass through of the article, but I haven’t had the chance to put much in writing. I do agree with substatial parts of what you have to say but disagree with almost as much, and a proper response to some your analysis is going to be timeconsuming, but here are some initial reactions:
1. You should have brought up Mossadegh’s legal victory over Britain in the Hague in your report. The parallels are striking. Over all I don’t think this course is advisable, not because of some arcane shi’ite history, but because there is a lot to lose, and very little to gain. In the best case, none of the sanctions resolutions will be affected, because, as you say, such a panel will have ability to strike those down. If the panel does find that the SC resolutions don’t create any obligation under the NPT instruments for Iran, this won’t necessarily mean such obligations don’t exist by virtue of other instruments, ie the IAEA charter. Moreover, the world is a different place than it was in the 1950’s. I don’t know how the ICJ is composed or who appoints it’s judges or president, but i doubt I am sure that western influence over that institution has increased dramatically over the last couple of decades there is no telling who impartial the third panelist will be. I wish I could believe that the ICJ would not have to get involved and that the arbitrators chosen by Iran and the IAEA (BOG? Directorate? anyone know?)will be fair and impartial, somehow i just don’t. The decision to seek an arbitration hearing should be made with at least as much attention to the politics of the situation as is given to the legal merits of the arguments.
2. Your arguments rejecting the ‘implicit article 39′ line of reasoning did not strike me as waterproof, more on that later.
3. This I am much less sure about, but what is the justification for believing that that articles 40 and 41 authorize the SC to issue legally binding directives to any member state? To ‘call upon’ a country to take certain measures strikes me as very weak language, and to me it seems to me it is used throughout chapter 6 and 7 as a euphemism for ‘communicate with’. Article 40 is the only article that directly addresses the ‘states concerned’, and it is explicitly to be invoked before any article 39 decisions.
It would seem that articles’ 40-42 sole purpose is to legally indemnify third countries for measures taken to ‘restore peace and security’ and the only ‘acceptance’ of security council ‘decisions’ member states have acceded to in article 25 is specified in article 39(which is the only article that talks about ‘decisions’ rather than ‘complying with provisional measures’).
3. I think you reject Iran’s approach to the matter too hastily. Per the UN Charter, the SC can only intervene
a. In order to resolve a ‘dispute’or
b. If it has made a ‘peace threat’ determination.
Since, as you note, there is no peace threat determination, the idea that there is a dispute becomes central the legitimacy of all the resolutions issued thus far. If Iran can close that hole, I think it would stand a much improved chance of challenging the resolutions(in the proper settings). A general understanding that El-Baradei’s finding of non-compliance and subsequent report or referral to the SC was in error would go a long way towards that end. I think you are severely mistaken when you assert that the IAEA can report ‘anything it wants to, at anytime’ to the SC, thought I don’t have time to talk about that now.
4. As for your picture you paint of an eventual rapprochement between the US and Iran is quite ‘rose-colored’ to say the least. There is no historical evidence to suggest that the US is concerned by nuclear proliferation rather than projecting power, and plenty of evidence to the contrary. The US’s stated goals of restricting proliferation are nothing but pretexts to isolate and weaken Iran so as to demonstrate it’s power to the rest of the world. A stunning admission of this would be the reaction Flynt Leverett was able to solicit from a bureaucrat from Obama’s sanctions implementation organ just over a week ago. The last country to prevail over the US in the Hague was Nicaragua, how did that turn out for it?
5. Iran’s best bet to make itself unsanctionable doesn’t rest with hopes of coming to some kind of understanding with it’s antagonists, but in pursuing substantive free trade, banking, customs, and visa arrangements with it’s near neighbors. Talks about dramatically lowered trade barriers are already underway between Syria, Turkey and Iran, I believe Iraq will join these discussions as soon as it forms a government. If a common market is formed between these countries there we should have every expectation that Afghanistan, Azerbijan and Armenia would enthusiastically seek membership. Erdogan has even floated the idea of Pakistan joining in his recent visit to that country. This needs to be the main focus of Iran’s nuclear diplomacy and foreign policy generally over the next five years.
6. I do like the idea of taking the initiative and putting questions to Adjucation panel, if only to deny the US led cabal the opprotunity to frame the questions such a panel would adjucate. But these questions should be much simpler than those you have laid out. I.E. “Does Iran have the right to enrich Uranium”, “What provisions of the instruments excecuted between Iran in the IAEA allow for the DG find that Iran must cease enrichment, provide information on conventional military programs etc…”, “Does the DG have the power to force Iran to sign and ratify arbitrary treaties” etc…
Masoud
Hi Eric,
I’ve done an initial pass through of the article, but I haven’t had the chance to put much in writing. I do agree with substatial parts of what you have to say but disagree with almost as much, and a proper response to some your analysis is going to be timeconsuming, but here are some initial reactions:
1. You should have brought up Mossadegh’s legal victory over Britain in the Hague in your report. The paralels are striking. Over all I don’t think this course is advisable, not because of some arcane shi’ite history, but because there is a lot to lose, and very little to gain. In the best case, none of the sanctions resolutions will be affected, because, as you say, such a panel will have ability to strike those down. If the panel does find that the SC resolutions don’t create any obligation under the NPT instruments for Iran, this won’t necesarily mean such obligations don’t exist by virtue of other instruments, ie the IAEA charter. Moreover, the world is a different place than it was in the 1950′s. I don’t know how the ICJ is composed or who appoints it’s judges or president, but i doubt I am sure that western influence over that institution has increased dramatically over the last couple of decades there is no telling who impartial the third panelist will be. I wish I could beleive that the ICJ would not have to get involved and that the arbitrators chosen by Iran and the IAEA (BOG? Directorate? anyone know?)will be fair and impartial, somehow i just don’t.
2. Your arguments rejecting the ‘implicit article 39′ line of reasoning didn’t strike me as waterproof, more on that later.
3. This I am much less sure about, but what is the justification for beleiving that that articles 40 and 41 authorize the SC to issue legally binding directives to any member state? To ‘call upon’ a country to take certain measures strikes me as very weak language, and to me it seems to me it is used throughout chapter 6 and 7 as a euphimism for ‘comunicate with’. Article It would that article’s 40-42 sole purpose is to legally indemnify third countries for measures taken to ‘restore peace and security’ and the only ‘acceptance’ of security council ‘decisions’ member states have acceded to in article 25 is specified in article 39(which is the only article that talks about ‘decisions’ rather than ‘complying with provisional measures’).
3. I think you reject Iran’s approach to the matter too hastily. Per the UN Charter, the SC can only intervene
I am glad to see Brill bring a spotlight to the UN Security Council’s actual authority, as regards Iran’s nuclear program. Many more questions can be raised about this – I think it’s quite clear that the Security Council is breaking both the letter and the spirit of its own mandate in several ways in the Iran matter, and not just in the Iran matter: in essence, it has changed from a mechanism for defusing conflict into a mechanism for fomenting it.
But I think the last paragraph here is nonsense. Nothing Iran can do will affect US public opinion. US public opinion is controlled by propaganda, all of which runs hard against Iran no matter what. Iran is doing a surprisingly good job of trying to enhance its international ties outside the US-associated cartel of ‘Superpowers’ aligned against it, and of trying to appeal to the UN pro-actively against US threats. But the deck is stacked against Iran at the UN, where the US controls the Security Council and seems to largely control the ‘executive branch’ as well; if Iran DID appeal to the UN for arbitration, or perhaps to some other international body, which also would most likely be largely controlled by the US, what are the real chances that there would be a fair decision? I think it would be a huge risk for Iran, a very foolish one. A fair arbitration, sure, that would be great, but how can that be a solution when the likelihood is that no fair arbitration would be available for Iran? It can’t be.
Basically, Iran is doing the best it can. It’s trying to outlast US persecution, same as Cuba, Venezuela, Syria and other countries that have refused to bend to the will of the Hegemon. It cannot win any decisive victory in a world dominated by US power, but it may be able to hang on, knowing that hegemony sometimes appears to peak just as it begins to weaken. So why must supposed “moderates” continue to harp on variations of the theme that the solution to this conflict, between the US and Iran, is up to Iran? This is a situation where the US has 95% of the control, which is being 95% driven by the US and Israel, and it’s just a copout, I think, to suggest that resolving the conflict is up to Iran. It’s up to the US and that means, on some level, it is up to us.
As regards China and Russia, if they think weasel-wording of the resolutions against Iran will prevent war, they are being far too clever. The sanctions are a form of economic war, and it’s an economic war that US officials increasingly claim is causing real devastation in Iran, which makes it a crime against humanity, of course, though no one seems to care about that in this ‘enlightened’ and evolved day and age. By agreeing to the sanctions, Russia and China agreed to war. In fact, I’m sure they were well aware that the provision for stopping Iranian shipping is a built-in trigger for war, so I would regard weasel-wording to avoid any automatic verbal war-trigger as mere face-saving. Even so, Russia’s feverish crawling to US/NATO/Israel’s tune, in particular, has apparently not been missed by smaller nations around the world, as Chavez’ mildly but pointedly implied rebuke to Russia during his visits to Moscow and Iran made clear.
Meanwhile, as Obama drives his ‘AfPak’ war deeper into Pakistan, the logic for a unified war that incorporates Iran emerges more and more brazenly, barring a political change in Iran that installs a ‘pro-western’ government (Mousavi/Rafsanjani). Basically, Iran is a very small nation facing overwhelming forces, rather bravely. If the US had a particle of Iran’s courage, we would stop warmongering against Iran and accept the notion of living in a multi-polar world, the world Putin called for, back when he had a backbone. And no, Clinton’s notion of a world where every nation is either our ‘partner’ or in our gunsights is not a multipolar world. It would take a bit of courage for an Empire to agree that maybe Global Domination isn’t the best way to a better future for humanity. But, man, that would be a courage worth having.
United States to Iran: “Step Aside, Please
Malou Innocent
|
October 26, 2010
Those pesky Iranians are at it again:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/step-aside-4304
The US is not shaping world-power public opinion. The US controls six nations, itself plus Canada, Israel, UK, France and Germany.
The balance of the two hundred-odd nations in the world support Iran. This includes the 118-member NAM. Also major nations support Iran: Russia, China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the other -stans, Iraq, Syria– the list goes on.
Richard Steven Hack:
“..short of insurrection…” – no you just need to reconvene the Continental Congress.
Rehmat:
There might be war with Iran but not in the next 2 years.
However, there very likely be another war between Israel/Lebanon/Syria/Iran and Israel.
James Canning:
Persbyterians and Episcopalians are not the dominant Protestant churches in US.
And excepting those, just look at the role the Dutch Reformed Church play in US on the subject of Israel.
I did not know the he was a Catholic (A. H.) – must have been a lapsed one.
Nevertheless, I must stand by my statements but in a more precise way: Evangelical Christians, Baptists, Methodists, Dispensationist, etc. are staunch supporters of Israel.
In a way, it is sad to see these well-meaning people who are rather decent dragging their country into a fight that is not hers and harming her in that process.
What business does a small blonde housewife from some suburban American city have with the war in Palestine?
The United Nations Day was celebrated on October 24, 2010 – around the world by the members of the world organization.
On the occasion of United Nations Day on October 24th, different representatives of the world body held a press conference in the Iranian capital, Tehran. They praised the help the Islamic Republic provides to the refugees and admired the country’s role in combating narcotics.
The UN High Commission for Rufugees (UNHCR) representative in the Islamic Republic, Carlos Zaccagnini, said on Sunday that “the works, efforts and resources” that the Iranian government and people provide in assistance to the refugees is exemplary.
“This (Iran’s help) is exemplary and it is the best practice compared to any other refugee related situation in the world today. This is something that, in my view, Iranians should be proud of,” Zaccagnini added.
Antonio De Leo, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) representative in Iran, said in the meeting that the Islamic Republic is in the vanguard of fight against drug trafficking and abuse.
“There are a lot of efforts being done also in the areas of treatment which deserves the acknowledgment and recognition of the international community,” De Leo pointed out.
According to UNODC report 2010 – In Europe about 19% of men purchase sexual services from sex workers. About 1 in 7 of these sex workers are victims of trafficking by organized criminal groups. These groups, in turn, gross over $32 billion (in 2006)annually. Each of these cases are individual tragedies. But taken together this data shows how public policy is failing to protect hundreds of thousands of women from exploitation and abuse.
Like in the previous reports, UNODC, has named Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Moldova, Nigeria, Thailand and Ukraine among the countries that are the greatest sources of trafficked persons. Belgium, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Thailand, Turkey and the United States are cited as the most common destinations.
Since Islamic Revolution (1979), Iran has suffered Asia’s highest brain-drain to the US and other western countries. On the other hand, the country has topped the list of the world nations in looking after the refugees from various foreign countries. According to UNHCR, Islamic Republic has been host to world’s one-third largest refugee population of 716,000 refugees. However, it reched its peak in 1991 when Islamic Republic looked after over four million refugees, consisting of three million refugees from neighboring Afghanistan.
Interestingly, UN Human Rights Watch (October 8, 2010), singled out Islamic Republic for the only one execution in 2010 – of Molla Gol Hassan, a 21 year-old Afghan citizen who at age 17 killed a fellow Afghan, Fakhr al’din, in Iran while trying to steal money from him. However, its lips were sealed on plight of Canadian youth, Omar Khadr, now turned 23, has been rottening at America’s concentration camp, the Guantánamo Bay, since he was 15-year-old. His crime, still to be proven in a court, is that he shot one of the US soldiers terrorizing villagers in Afghanistan.
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/iran-gets-%e2%80%98thumbs-up%e2%80%99-from-un-agencies/
From London to Qom for Islam
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/from-london-to-qom-for-islam/
James Canning – Tariq Aziz the former vice-president of Iraq is still a Christian, so were other five of Saddam Hussein’s cabinet ministers.
One of Tariq Aziz’s distant nephew, Qais, got converted to Islam at the age of 16. He is 48 now and leads daily five prayers at a Toronto mosque, which I attend sometimes.
Christian minorities are not persecuted in most Muslim majority countries on religious basis. It’s an Israeli and pro-Israeli Evangelist propaganda. Christian communities are treated worse in Israel. One just have to study late Professor Israel shahak’s book ‘Jewish Religion, Jewish History’.
Last week, finally Vatican picked up the courage to criticize Israel for its mistreatment of Bible and Christians.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/10/25/vatican-bible-doesnt-promise-palestine-to-jews/
I recommend Pepe Escobar’s “Aziz’s story will remain untold” on AsiaTimes site.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LJ28Ak01.html
Tariq Aziz’s original name was Mikhael Yuhann, and he was of course a Chaldean Christian from Mosul (and still is, until he gets executed – - if Maliki gets his way).
Eric,
In this thread, we are celebrating your work/writings, and I have already congratulated you for a job well done. I remember you writing that after the Iraq debacle/insanity you promised yourself that you’d do everything in your power to not ever let it happen again. But, I hate to tell you; RSH has just confirmed it’s all in vain. No arbitration! No Hague! No diplomacy! There WILL be war with Iran.
“ The reality is that nothing Iran does – short of complete capitulation to US demands – is going to change the outcome of this confrontation. Similarly, nothing the US public does, short of insurrection, is going to change the outcome of this confrontation. The US political elite, in concert with the military-industrial complex and the Israel Lobby, are intent on beating Iran down. End of story. “
Alan,
Iran occupies the moral high ground, in that it opposes nuclear weapons and wants the Middle East free of nukes. Your encouragement of a change of policy would be disastrous for Iran (were it to be so ill-advised as to decide to seek nuclear wepaons).
Eric/Arnold/Richard
I’m not going to have time to reply to your comments for at least 36 hours. I will do so eventually, but there’s a bit to go through.
“Lying my ass off” is a bit naughty though, Richard old son. What would be the point? I’m on record as saying I think Iran should be given enough nukes in order to make them feel safe and the whole issue to go away. What I was “uncomfortable” about was a presentation of the facts that didn’t account for the conduct of Iran since 2003. Iran may still be 100% justified in acting the way they do, but there’s always two sides to every story.
That’s what really interests me you see – dispersing the fog around the real issues and plotting a way through them. That may be arcane, but hey, I’m a boring old fart so it comes with the territory.
fyi,
Upper class Muslims mingle freely at the highest levels of British society, as they have for many generations. I would expect to see a great deal of intermarriage in the years ahead. Mainstreaming the poorly educated Muslims is more difficult, but the Prince of Wales is helping to show the way forward. He raises hundreds of millions of pounds for charitable purposes, and this is one of his primary interests.
In the US, the spurious “threat” supposedly posed by “Islam” is in large part a giant scam, perpetrated against the ignorant mass of the American public (who frankly are too stupid to bother finding out what really is going on). On the one hand, the armaments manufacturers need a replacement for the Communist threat, and on the other there are the idiot Christian Zionists who for reasons of religious delusion support and encourage Israeli oppression of the Palestinians.
fyi,
The hundreds of schools, colleges, hospitals, etc., set up in the Middle East by Americans during the 19th C and well into the 20th C, were the result of Protestant efforts. Not Catholic. As a result, many (if not most) Presbyterian and Episcopalian (Anglican) leaders opposed Jewish immigration into Palestine and opposed the creation of Israel.
More recently, the Catholic Alexander Haig, Jr., in 1982, conspired with Israel to set up the invasion of Lebanon, and he concealed from the defence secretary, Casper Weinberger (an Episcopalian) ,the fact Israel was planning the invasion! Haig was secretary of state at the time.
R S Hack,
Thanks. Duplicity by the US is just routine, in matters pertaining to Israel and Iran. Turkey made clear the LEU would be returned if Iran did not receive the TRR fuel. Most Americans, of course, have no understanding whatever of the vicious game-playing American leaders engage in.
Mr. Canning: “US found fault with the Tehran declaration because it would have allowed Turkey to return the LEU to Iran without IAEA and UNSC approval. Presumably, since Turkey would only return the LEU if France (or another country) failed to deliver the TRR fuel, it seems the WSJ was in effect endorsing treachery by the US.”
Precisely. And this is why Iran wanted the deal structured that way – so the US could not simply refuse to return the LEU if they reneged on the deal. Whereas the US tries to claim that having the LEU in Turkey under Turkish, Iranian AND IAEA observation would allow Iran to swoop down with ninjas and seize the stuff and bring it back to Iran after they got the TRR fuel from the West – which is a stupid fantasy. Or that Turkey would just hand it over on Iranian demand once Iran got the TRR fuel. It’s ridiculous.
Why anyone takes US diplomacy seriously when they come up with this stuff is just amazing. The sheer obviousness of US duplicity is just stunning. And yet some people wonder why Iran is unwilling to “cooperate”. It’s because the US is fundamentally untrustworthy and always has been. Iran operates by Reagan’s dictum: “Trust, but verify.” The Tehran Declaration was structured that way for that very reason.
People need to remember that the US (and Israel) is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to have foreign agents operating inside Iran to disrupt Iran’s infrastructure, disrupt its nuclear energy program, foment discord in the society in an attempt to overthrow the regime and outright murder certain Iranians. If Iran were doing the same in the US and Israel, all hell would break loose here. The screaming would be deafening and the US would be nuking Iran.
The US government cannot and should not be trusted by anyone for any reason.
Alan: The IAEA then has to verify their declarations are accurate (i.e. that said conduct/concealment ended). So far they have still not been able to do so. Thus, the circumstances remain.
Many believe they remain because the US and Israel want them to remain. That may be so, but it also appears as though Iran wants them to remain as well.”
See – this is why I suspect you. The above is bullshit.
First, the IAEA knows perfectly well WHAT Iran concealed, WHEN it concealed it, WHENn the concealment ended, and has closed the books on that officially.
What you’re saying is that because Iran concealed something in the PAST, the IAEA is justified in suspecting that Iran is concealing something NOW. This is purely and simply a request to prove a negative. How the hell can Iran prove it’s NOT concealing something? It’s utterly impossible because it depends entirely on how paranoid the questioner is. We can always suspect Iran is hiding a nuclear program in the north of Pakistan with cooperation by the Taliban, for Christ’s sakes.
When Iran was operating under the unratified Additional Protocol for over two years, the IAEA went everywhere, looked at everything and found nothing. Subsequently all unanswered questions the IAEA had were answered and the books closed on those questions EXCEPT the nonsense about “weapons studies” which are not in any way the purview of the IAEA in the first place.
The statement that the IAEA has been “unable to verify that concealment has ended” is pure bullshit. The IAEA has never said this to my knowledge.
Second, you suggest that Iran’s behavior indicates that they want to keep the question of whether they are concealing something alive. Why? What behavior leads you to believe that? What evidence has anyone provided to even suggest that?
This is spin, not facts.
Alan: “Don’t get me wrong; I don’t give a rat’s arse whether Iran has nukes or not”
Contributions like that make you indispensable around here.
Pardon me, but frankly I think you’re lying your ass off about that. You were the one who used the word “uncomfortable”.
Eric: “In the end, “nuclear experts” questions are going to fall within the purview of the IAEA’s nuclear experts, not some judge who wouldn’t know a nuclear reactor from a donut-making machine.”
Well, the questions I have in mind are the sort that get argued by nuclear experts in the journals, namely, whether some technical aspect of Iran’s program really represents any kind of indication that Iran is engaging in a nuclear weapons program, or whether it is a technical issue that, while falling under the purview of the IAEA, is not really relevant to the bottom line of confirming non-diversion.
Because that sort of thing can be politicized and IS being politicized by people by David Albright. And trusting the IAEA “nuclear experts” is not the point – the point is that their experts conclusions are interpreted by their bosses, who are perhaps NOT nuclear experts in the same sense. Having a panel of non-biased nuclear experts who can issue unbiased judgements on the technology might be helpful in some of these issues.
An arbitration panel could, for instance, be able to call upon a panel of nuclear experts who would produce a report for the arbitration panel so that neither side needs to be concerned about the IAEA or Iran’s experts fudging the technical facts.
I agree that most of the questions about Iran’s program which would be qualified for arbitration don’t fit in this category. But it would nice to have that additional capability.
Just saying.
Alan: Re Olli Heinonen
Heinonen Pushed Dubious Iran Nuclear Weapons Intel
dissidentvoice dot org/2010/07/heinonen-pushed-dubious-iran-nuclear-weapons-intel-2/
His attitude is clear here:
Former UN inspector: Iran will have breakout capacity by late 2011 or early 2012. Maybe
israelmatzav dot blogspot.com/2010/10/former-un-inspector-iran-will-have.html
And from Scott Ritter:
Acts of War
www dot zcommunications dot org/acts-of-war-by-scott-ritter
Quote
A key question that must be asked is why, then, does the IAEA continue to permit Olli Heinonen, the agency’s Finnish deputy director for safeguards and the IAEA official responsible for the ongoing technical inspections in Iran, to wage his one-man campaign on behalf of the United States, Britain and (indirectly) Israel regarding allegations derived from sources of such questionable veracity (the MEK-supplied laptop computer)? Moreover, why is such an official given free rein to discuss such sensitive data with the press, or with politically motivated outside agencies, in a manner that results in questionable allegations appearing in the public arena as unquestioned fact? Under normal circumstances, leaks of the sort that have occurred regarding the ongoing investigation into Iran’s alleged past studies on nuclear weapons would be subjected to a thorough investigation to det! ermine the source and to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to end them. And yet, in Vienna, Heinonen’s repeated transgressions are treated as a giant “non-event,” the 800-pound gorilla in the room that everyone pretends isn’t really there.
Heinonen has become the pro-war yin to the anti-confrontation yang of his boss, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Every time ElBaradei releases the results of the IAEA probe of Iran, pointing out that the IAEA can find no evidence of any past or present nuclear weapons program, and that there is a full understanding of Iran’s controversial centrifuge-based enrichment program, Heinonen throws a monkey wrench into the works. Well-publicized briefings are given to IAEA-based diplomats. Mysteriously, leaks from undisclosed sources occur. Heinonen’s Finnish nationality serves as a flimsy cover for neutrality that long ago disappeared. He is no longer serving in the role as unbiased inspector, but rather a front for the active pursuit of an American- and Israeli-inspired disinformation campaign designed to keep alive the flimsy allegations of a nonexistent Iranian nuc! lear weapons program in order to justify the continued warlike stance taken by the U.S. and Israel against Iran.
End Quote
FYI :Thanks for your clarification. I need to get offline. I will reply when possible.
Eric: I deeply appreciate your work. I am thankful to you for it. My cynicism is not meant to be a hindrance to your activities. I worry about Iran being sandbagged (again). But I do believe your six points need to be widely diffused, and that you can (and did) back them up, and that the dissemination of that information should not be solely linked to a committment to arbitration.
Castellio:
When Ayatollah Khomeini issued his fatwa against Mr. Rushdie no leader of a Muslim state nor any Doctor of Religion went against it.
Think of it as a form of propaganda that could be used.
In regards to Egypt, Jordan, and other Sunni states I agree with you. The scholars of Sunni Islam, 1000 years ago, decided that Tyranny is preferrable to disorder. They have not changed since. And they have been in the state’s pocket as well since then.
I am not counting on the Arab street, Muslim street, or any such thing. I am saying that once you enter a religious war, all bets are off.
I am curious in what sense do you think I am misjudging the Catholic-Protestant dicholtomy in US? As far as I can tell, support for the Jewish state is a Protestant project. Furthermore, that the Vatican has not been supportive of this project and my sense has been that neither is Catholic America.
Are you suggesting that American Christians, regardless of affiliation, are supportive of Israel?
In fact, Eric, a paper by you specifically supporting your six points might prove as useful to those trying to slow the rush for war as your paper on the elections in Iran. You make the six points, you defend them. Anyone arguing otherwise would be forwarded to your paper. They might not go… they might go and respond, or go and hurl abuse at you… but your flag would be planted.
Eventually, the paper on the elctions and the defense of your six points should be bundled as a publication of importance. Try Verso.
Castellio,
“Will arbitration get that information out? Will the push for arbitration get that information out? I’m not sure.”
Arbitration may or may not produce the full beneficial results I predict can come from it (if exploited correctly, as I explain in Part 4 of my article). In any case, however, I have no doubt that the results of an arbitration would be very widely disseminated and very widely discussed. As some believe, that wide dissemination might make no difference, but it certainly would occur.
I think it would make a considerable difference for Iran to obtain an independent confirmation that what it has been saying all this time is essentially correct. Consider, for example, the opening portion of Part 3 of my article:
EXCERPT FROM ARTICLE:
Part 3. A New Approach: Arbitration Under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement
Preliminary Note:
Some skeptical readers may conclude in advance that arbitration would be an ineffective solution to what is ultimately a political dispute. But firming up one’s legal position can be helpful even in a political dispute. Some readers also may note that the answers to most questions recommended below for arbitration are already well-known to the parties directly concerned – Iran, the IAEA, and the Security Council. As the example below will make clear, an arbitration ruling may nevertheless be useful so that the public can hear these answers from an independent authoritative source, rather than merely from a protesting Iran.
Each Iran Resolution includes at least one statement – sometimes several – that Iran has violated an IAEA directive, and at least several assertions suggesting to all but the most careful and well-informed readers that Iran is thwarting the IAEA’s efforts to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. This Part 3 explains how Iran can obtain an independent arbitration ruling that such assertions often are incorrect and misleading.
The Iran nuclear dispute is often presented less than clearly in the lengthy preambles to the Iran Resolutions. A good example began with the IAEA Board resolution that formally “referred” Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council in early 2006 (GOV/2006/14). The IAEA Board stated that, in order for “confidence [to be] built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme,” the Board “deems it necessary” for Iran to take several “confidence building measures:” suspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider whether to build a heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and take various “transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals [and] documentation … as the Agency may request….” The Board expressly acknowledged that each of these “confidence building measures” would be “voluntary and non-legally binding.” For this reason, it could not and did not require Iran to take any of them. But the Board instructed the Director General to tell the Security Council just the opposite: “The Director General [shall] report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board….” (Emphasis added.) The dutiful Director General’s misstatement to the Security Council was soon reflected in Security Council Resolution 1696: “The Security Council … calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14….[and] demands that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities….” (Emphasis added.)
Since then, as the Iran nuclear dispute has moved up and down the imaginary chain of command (see Part 1 of this article), Iran’s failure to take these voluntary steps has been repeatedly cited by both the Security Council and the IAEA as a serious violation of the resolutions adopted by both bodies. By the time the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 four years later, its displeasure had ballooned to this:
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/15), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,…. (Emphasis in original.)
A casual reader may be forgiven for not noticing that neither the preceding paragraph, nor any of the IAEA reports or Security Council resolutions it cites, states that Iran is breaching any obligation under its Safeguards Agreement. If Iran were to point this out, the reader might ignore its protest. An independent arbitration ruling making this fact clear might be more persuasive.
END OF EXCERPT FROM ARTICLE.
FYI: overestimating the street and its relationship to the Muslim clergy is an on-going mistake in Egypt, at least. (I can’t speak for Jordan). One, because the majority of Egyptians don’t want a relgious state. Two, because the clergy are dependent on the regime and not the other way around. Three, because there are a million security police committed to the regime who aren’t going to pay any attention to an Iranian (or other) fatwa.
I believe a fatwa would be extremely counter-productive in the Muslim communities. It will isolate the movement…
I think you consistently get the American Protestant- Catholic relationship wrong in terms of the Middle East, and I think you’re getting the religious-secular wrong in Egypt.
James Canning:
There is a social problem in the United Kingdom between Muslims and the larger polity that engirths it.
For some reasons, Hindu do not seem to be exhibiting the same issues (some would call it pathologies).
I certainly respect the efforts of the Prince of Wales to steer UK away from a stupid religious war metaphor currently imbibed by the trailer trash in the United States and approach the issues in their specificity.
But US is a very different polity with people who are pinning for a religious war with Islam. The less insane ones, still think that US can make Middle East safe for Israel; i.e. make Muslims accept the Jewish fantasy project in Palestine.
My point was just a warning.
There are many people who are educated to discount the power of emotions (and religious emotion) in the affairs of men. I am not one of them.
Eric: you’re most recent comment at 3.02 is very much to the point. Will arbitration get that information out? Will the push for arbitration get that information out? I’m not sure.
When written with such clarity and precision, your comment at 3.02 can be picked up and spread and discussed. Get that information out. And repeat it. Call for arbitration if you want, but argue for it on or the basis of your six points.
In some ways the heated exchanges between yourself and Arnold (in particular) have, partly in frustration, partly through deepening insight, led to that list. It is a valuable list, a valuable persepctive, and an accomplishment of clarity.
(I would, however, want to get the negative in each of the six points, rather than a lead in to the six points that has a general negative.)
Arnold Evans:
What you are saying obtains if the fatwa did not have any basis in the reality of the situation on the ground.
The fatwa will not proceed the events, it will proceed to shape their consequences.
FYI:
Once the Supreme Jurisprudent of Iran makes that determination, Egypt and Jordan will be forced to break diplomatic relationships with Israel – at the pain of apostacy. This fatwa is always under Mr. Khamenei’s turban – ready to be broadcast.
I’ve disagreed with things you’ve written, though usually not. This though is absurd and I laughed when I read it.
It is true that most Westerners exaggerate the tension between Shiites and Sunnis, but Egypt and Jordan wouldn’t break relationships with Israel if their own clerics called Israel an enemy of Islam, much less the United States.
If arbitration accomplishes nothing else, it will dispel many mistaken beliefs that I now recognize are held even by well-informed observers. For example, how many understand that none of the following statements is correct?
1. The IAEA has found that Iran failed to disclose that it engaged in activities prohibited under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
2. The IAEA has found that Iran failed to declare a nuclear facility at Natanz when required under its Safeguards Agreement.
3. The IAEA has found that Iran failed to declare a nuclear facility at Arak when required under its Safeguards Agreement.
4. When the IAEA referred Iran to the Security Council, it reported that Iran was not complying with its Safeguards Agreement.
5. Iran’s Safeguards Agreement grants the UN Security Council authority to enforce it under certain circumstances.
6. The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions on Iran because Iran is not complying with its Safeguards Agreement.
fyi,
Muslims in the UK outnumber Jews by about five to one. I do not see any “war” with Islam. I recommend the article on the Prince of Wales in this month’s (November) Vanity Fair. (It might be accessible at vf.com) The Prince works continously at fostering better relations among all the religious groups in the UK.
Warmongering neocons and fanatical Jews, and idiot lower class Christian leaders, promote the notion of a “war” with Islam. It is preposterous and should be dumped into the rubbish bin.
Faram,
The chances Saudi Arabia would attack Iran are essentially zero. The proposed purchase of a further $60 billion of armaments may pose questions of judgement etc, but does not present any threat to Iran. Other Persian Gulf countries are buying an additional $60 billion of armaments. Here again, no threat to Iran results.
James Canning:
Jews and Christians in US (and EU) have not yet grasped that, willy-nilly, they are entering a war with Islam. A war that they cannot win.
During 1980s, there were fringe (Sunni Muslim) elements who thought USSR and US are bent on destroying Islam. (Even Iranians, at that time, did not characterize their confronation with US as a war of Islam with Kufr.)
Now, that is no longer the case: the perception that Jews & Christians are ought to destroy Islam is common althought not yet the majority – say around 35%.
A war with Iran will make Shia and Sunni both at war with Jews and Christians – that is how the war will be preceieved.
If I were a leader in these various Jewish and Protestant organizations I would take full-page advertisements in popular newspapers and state – in Arabic, Malay, Persian, Punjabi, Turkish, and Urdu – over many months – that Jews/Christians are not trying to destory Islam or at war with Islam.
I think Israel is 3 or 4 fatwas away from being chracterized as the enemy of Islam. Once the Supreme Jurisprudent of Iran makes that determination, Egypt and Jordan will be forced to break diplomatic relationships with Israel – at the pain of apostacy. This fatwa is always under Mr. Khamenei’s turban – ready to be broadcast.
I think US is a few more fatwas away yet from being accepted as the enemy of Islam. It makes sense, in my opinion, for US to climb down from the “Devil’s Donkey” – as is said in Persian – and re-evaluate her position vis a vis the world of Islam.
fyi,
Jimmy Carter was badly shocked when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and his advisers told him the purpose of the invasion was to move toward control of the Gulf. This in fact was total rubbish, because the Soviet Union invaded in response to the foolish rejection of the SALT II treaty by the US Senate, and the purpose of the invasion was to stop the spread of Islamic militancy that was regarded as a threat to the territorial integrity of the USSR.
One reason Carter was so badly shocked is that Leonid Brezhnev had told him the USSR was not going to invade, even though a very large store of equipment etc was massed at the border. Apparently Brezhnev himself did not know the invasion was going ahead.
Mikhail Gorbachev has once again this week reminded the US and Nato the military effort in Afghanistan will not succeed.
Friedman does have some good insights, but his advice to Obama to attack Iran in order to gain politcal advantage in the 2012 election really is wild.
Alan,
“They were found out, so they said OK, we’ll come clean and declare it all. The IAEA then has to verify their declarations are accurate (i.e. that said conduct/concealment ended). So far they have still not been able to do so.”
In your last sentence, are you referring to the pre-October 2003 violations? If so, which ones? My understanding is that the last two were (1) contamination; and (2) questions concerning the P1/P2 centrifuges. Both were resolved the IAEA’s satisfaction a very long time ago.
Far more important, it is simply not the case that “the IAEA then has to verify their declarations are accurate.” That’s important enough to warrant repeating and expanding: the IAEA does not have any duty to verify that Iran’s declarations are accurate and, since it has no such duty, it has no corresponding right to insist that Iran assist it to perform this non-existent duty.
The IAEA has a duty to TRY to verify non-diversion – that is certainly true. And Iran has a duty to assist the IAEA in this effort — to the extent of Iran’s stated obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. With that information in hand, along with whatever else Iran may choose to add, the IAEA is required to determine whether or not it can verify non-diversion, and to verify non-diversion if it can. If it cannot verify non-diversion, it is required only to declare that it cannot verify non-diversion – just as it has declared for very many countries over the years.
Sometimes the IAEA determines it cannot verify non-diversion because a country has not adequately performed its disclosure obligations. At other times, the IAEA determines it cannot verify non-diversion even though it does not claim the country has failed to perform its disclosure obligations. In either case, the IAEA is required to give the country “every reasonable opportunity to furnish the [IAEA] with any necessary reassurance” that might help to change the IAEA’s mind.
Most countries will gladly seize the opportunity, as Iran has done on many occasions, since few if any countries will want the IAEA to believe mistakenly that the country is hiding nuclear material. At some point, though, a country may instead say “Sorry, we appreciate your having offered us yet another opportunity to provide you with a ‘necessary reassurance,’ but we think we’ve disclosed enough. We sincerely hope you conclude you have enough information to verify non-diversion. If you nevertheless conclude you cannot verify non-diversion, we will be disappointed to hear that but we will graciously accept your conclusion, just as many other countries do.”
When that point of “enough” is reached is entirely up to the country – provided, of course, that the country is at least satisfying its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. If the country’s response upsets the IAEA, the IAEA nevertheless has no authority to compel the country to disclose more than the country wants to disclose or its Safeguards Agreement requires. If the country’s response makes the IAEA suspicious that the country may be involved in some activity that constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” the IAEA may so inform the UNSC, whose job it is to determine whether this is in fact the case.
The IAEA once did “so inform” the UNSC about Iran, of course, in early 2006, when it reported that Iran had failed to make required disclosures for an extended period of time ending in October 2003. At that point, the UNSC was authorized to determine whether Iran’s reported non-compliance was or was not a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (problematic in the circumstances, of course, since the IAEA’s “referral” explicitly stated that Iran’s non-compliance had continued only until October 2003, several years before the “referral”). Whatever decision the UNSC might make in response, however, that decision would necessarily be based on Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter – not on the Safeguards Agreement, over which the UNSC has no enforcement authority whatsoever. Before and after that “referral,” all enforcement authority under the Safeguards Agreement lay only in the hands of the IAEA. And that authority remained exactly the same after the “referral” as it had been before the “referral.” It did not include any right to require Iran to disclose more information than its Safeguards Agreement requires, merely to help the IAEA to perform a “duty” that does not even exist.
I recommend Daniel Dombey’s report in the Financial Times today: “Washington pushes prospect of partial peace in the Middle East”. In it, the FT mentions the contention of Dennis Ross that the US, as an intermediary, “need not be neutral”! Remarkable rubbish from a man the FT says is pushing George Mitchell aside in his own effort to control the US policy position on Israel/Palestine!
Dennis Ross is the man who arranged for Bill Clinton to assure Arafat that if he came to Camp David in an effort to resolve the Israel/Palestine problem, he would not be blamed if the talks failed. Then, of course, Clinton went ahead and blamed Arafat! Remarkable stupidity and duplicity on the part of Bill Clinton. Thank you, Dennis Ross!
James Canning:
I have found Dr. Friedman to be an insightful individual.
Castellio:
Look at the bright side of the war:
1 – NPT finsihed once and for all.
2 – The increased cost of maintaining Israel’s security disabusing US of her current policies forcing a settlement
3 – Wrecked Iran, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Israel, Lebanon with ample opportunity for rebuilding
4 – Wrecked world economy
5 – Wrecked US financially that will cause her to maintain a much lower profile in the Middle East (end of the Carter Doctrine)
Fupi Matata,
You need to look at the powerful Jewish financiers in the US who have undertaken to control American foreign policy toward the Middle East, with the object of “protecting” Israel. Haim Saban. Sheldon Adelson. And a number of others powerful Jews, openly manipulating the levers of foreign policy making in the US.
RHS writes: “The Pentagon is not full of smart people, it’s full of morons. They will do what they’re told. Especially if they’re told by the companies the generals expect to sit on the boards of once they’re retired with the medals they got in the Iran war.”
Well yes, there is an established relationship between the military and the ruling oligarchy, and it is the oligarchy which rules.
Let’s see what Lester Crown, past Chairman of the Board of General Dynamics (one of the largest of America’s military corporations – read war profiteers) wrote to his constituency about Obama: “While my involvement in politics is motivated by a variety of issues, there is one issue that is fundamental: My deep commitment to Israel and to a strong U.S.-Israel relationship that strengthens both Israel’s security and its efforts to seek peace. I am writing to share with you my confidence that Senator Barack Obama’s stellar record on Israel gives me great comfort that, as President, he will be the friend to Israel that we all want to see in the White House – stalwart in his defense of Israel’s security, and committed to helping Israel achieve peace with its neighbors.”
If we are to be honest with ourselves, it perhaps needs to be said that Obama can only hold his support from such families if they believe the sanctions are weakening Iran sufficiently for an easier and more ‘successful’ war later. Right now the Democrats are arguing, via Stuart Levy et al, that this is the case. If the families, listening to Israeli analysts, believe that is not the case, then the hot war will be earlier. (The economic and propaganda wars are in full swing currently.)
The issue delaying the war is (justified) distrust of pro war analysts in terms of the possible outcome (this is where Arnold’s analysis is particularly relevant). However, if the oligarchy decides the war must be sooner, and the price must be paid, it will be. Arbitration, public opinion, all that is pretty well procedural froth that a good management is paid to handle.
So, what is delaying/postponing the war is the current lack of faith of the American oligarchy in the Israeli analysts and the Israeli government, all predicated on two issues: knowing what might be the possible outcome of the hot war; and understanding what the true effects of the sanctions might yet be.
What can deter the American (Israel first) oligarchy from going hot? At the end of the day it won’t be American military analysis.
fyi,
I welcomed the article by Friedman that you posted, and I agree with you the US cannot change the politics of Iraq. Continuing to squander hundreds of billions of dollars on the idiotic military adventure in Iraq is to me extremely foolish.
Admiral Fallon saw that attacking Iran would be counter-productive to the effort to achieve stability in the Middle East. He said it would be insane. So of course he was sacked.
Arnold,
I think the US has made it clear it accepts Iranian operation of nuclear power plants, provided Russia or another third party controls the nuclear fuel.
The WSJ article today said France continues to object to Iranian enrichment of LEU. Possibly, France is providing cover for the US.
The Wall Street Journal has a story today on the forthcoming P5+1 meeting with Iran, in which Hillary Clinton’s stupidity is underlined, albeit unintentionally. The article states that the US found fault with the Tehran declaration because it would have allowed Turkey to return the LEU to Iran without IAEA and UNSC approval. Presumably, since Turkey would only return the LEU if France (or another country) failed to deliver the TRR fuel, it seems the WSJ was in effect endorsing treachery by the US.
Alan:
That may be so, but it also appears as though Iran wants them to remain as well.
Why do you think Iran wants the circumstances to remain? What do you think Iran gets out of it or thinks it gets out of it?
It seems to me that it is very clear what the US and Israel get out of the IAEA presenting a non-ending set of questions so that Iran’s nuclear program will eternally be subject to suspicion.
The US and Israel want there to be pressure on Iran to abandon its program. They are open about that to the degree an Iranian nuclear program could give it the capability, even if Iran does not exercise that capability, to make a weapon.
That is a tangible benefit for the US and Israel that US and Israeli leaders openly admit matches their objective for Iran.
There is no tangible benefit you can point to for Iran, unless I’m mistaken in which case please correct me.
Instead, the US foreign policy community has gotten into its collective head the idea that Iran defines itself in opposition to the US for some unexplainable reason. With that idea as an “explanation” US hostility towards Iran gets projected onto Iran.
Japan does not define itself in opposition to the United States. If the US decided that Japan must not have the capability to make a nuclear weapon, and that the IAEA should be used as a tool to pressure Japan to abandon its capability, Japan would respond nearly identically to what we are seeing from Iran.
This is not a “both sides are wrong” situation. Iran is doing exactly what any country in its position would do. No independent nation (this excludes countries accountable to the US embassy and not their populations such as the colonies of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc.) would quietly tolerate being singled out for limitations on its access to technology the way the US is attempting to do to Iran.
Jay,
Thank you for the reference to Reese Erlich’s book, mentioned in the quote from Mr. Erlich below:
““My new book, Conversations with Terrorists, has a chapter on Iran in which I discuss the issue of fraud. The Iranian government manipulated votes by closing polling stations early, stuffing ballot boxes and failing to count ballots from pro-reformist areas, among other tactics. Details are in the book.”
Each of these allegations has been made by many others many times, of course. Mr. Erlich promises that “details are in the book.” I’m very curious to see those details. So many others have promised details but failed to deliver that I’ll confess I’m a bit skeptical at this point. Nevertheless open-minded, though: if they appear in Mr. Erlich’s book, I’ll certainly report that here.
Eric,
Reese Erlich has published a recent book, and in a response to my question he has suggested (and I quote):
“My new book, Conversations with Terrorists, has a chapter on Iran in which I discuss the issue of fraud. The Iranian government maniuplated votes by closing polling stations early, stuffing ballot boxes and failing to count ballots from pro-reformist areas, among other tactics. Deatils are in the book.”
I have not had a chance to pick up and read Reese’s material in the book, but knowing your work on the subject and the press Reese’s book appears to be getting, I thought you might be interested in looking into it.
Sorry Eric, must have got confused with one of Richard’s posts. I think the point I’m trying to make is separate to that though, which I hope is clear in the comment.
Looking at it from a slightly different angle, take your recent reply to Richard:
This background practically shouts out the question: How could a “Peace Threat” possibly be discerned in conduct that had ended several years ago?
I assume the conduct you are speaking of is the policy of concealment, i.e. failure to declare material, facilities, activities.
Iran certainly followed that policy for however many years it was (perfectly justifiably in my opinion, but still contrary to their CSA). They were found out, so they said OK, we’ll come clean and declare it all. The IAEA then has to verify their declarations are accurate (i.e. that said conduct/concealment ended). So far they have still not been able to do so. Thus, the circumstances remain.
Many believe they remain because the US and Israel want them to remain. That may be so, but it also appears as though Iran wants them to remain as well.
Iran has constantly stated it is developing nuclear energy for electricity as Lithuania is doing and exporting it to its neighbours.
zionist Israel possesses Nuclear weapons ar Desdemona and invaded occupied Palestine,Invaded,occupoied and kicked out of lebanon,ehere it still holds sheba Farms.
For Middle East to be free of Nuclear weapons Israel should be forced to heel by its Western supporters
Fupi Matata:
How did you get this Polynesian name?
Iran has constantly said it is developing Nuclear energy for electricity.It has in recent history not invaded or occupied any other people’s lands.Lithuania is known to have nuclear energy for its electricity and exporting it to its neighbours,Other countries including brazil,possibly UK are following suit
Bycontrast Israel with Us armed Nuclear weapons and military might has invaded Palestine,occupied it,invaded Lebanon ,occupied and kicked out of Lebanon,it has occupied Golan hieights of Syria,Sheba farms of Lebanon.
Why is the West kept in the dark grovelling before International Zionists.It will harm it economically,policitally and human lives in the long run.Has Jesus christ message of Peace been forgotten
Alan,
I haven’t read through your whole comment yet, so this may be premature, but I do note you’re starting off with the wrong premise concerning our disagreement:
“I agree that a large part of the argument about all this revolves round whether safeguards apply to declared and undeclared activities. The IAEA have made it clear since 1992 that they think it applies to both, so I don’t think it arose from the Iran issue.”
I agree entirely — always have — that the Safeguards Agreement applies to both “declared” and “undeclared” material. Though others argue to the contrary, I don’t think there can be any rational dispute on that. The real point of disagreement is whether or not that agreed fact entitles the IAEA to demand more information than the Safeguards Agreement specifies in an effort to come closer to verifying that diversion has not occurred.
The inescapable fact is that the IAEA can never verify that undeclared material has not been diverted. It tries in good faith to get closer to doing that by pressing countries to observe the Additional Protocol and make other disclosures not called for under the basic SA. But the IAEA’s effort to “get closer” does not entitle it to force Iran, or any other country, to participate in that effort to get closer. Iran, or any other country, is entitled to say: “We certainly understand why you would want a great deal more information than our Safeguards Agreement calls for, and we applaud your effort to “get closer” to verifying non-diversion of nuclear material. Nonetheless, we don’t share your enthusiasm, and we neither want or are required to participate in your quest for more complete knowledge. We signed up to disclose what we signed up to disclose, and that’s it.”
I don’t think Iran should take this position in the end, because I think it should recognize that the existing NPT/SA monitoring scheme isn’t sufficient to provide the world with the assurance it needs and deserves that countries aren’t running around developing nuclear weapons. But I believe Iran also deserves a frank recognition that it’s not doing anything wrong under its SA to take that position. The IAEA is over-reaching; Iran is not violating.
Richard,
“Still, it would be nice if a state under investigation by a possibly politically subverted IAEA had the option to dispute the IAEA by, say, a panel of nuclear experts, as opposed to an arbitration panel.”
The questions I have in mind wouldn’t be questions for “nuclear experts.” In the end, “nuclear experts” questions are going to fall within the purview of the IAEA’s nuclear experts, not some judge who wouldn’t know a nuclear reactor from a donut-making machine.
It appears to me that most observers, including you, think it matters a great deal whether or not the IAEA is justified in concluding that cannot verify non-diversion. The reason it appears to matter is that you assume such a finding could lead to a dreaded “referral” to the UNSC, and that Iran does not want that to happen. But once one recognizes that there is no such thing as a “referral” process — the very simple-to-establish point I make in Part 1 of my article — one should fear “referral” very much less.
True, the UNSC has other important powers under Chapter VII, but it must first find that a “Peace Threat” exists before it may properly exercise those Chapter VII powers. When the IAEA “referred” Iran to the UNSC in February 2006, Iran’s non-compliance on which that “referral” was explicitly based had ended (by the IAEA’s own account) in October 2003. The referral was not based at all on any conduct that had occurred since October 2003.
This background practically shouts out the question: How could a “Peace Threat” possibly be discerned in conduct that had ended several years ago? The obvious answer to that question may explain why one looks in vain for any finding of a “Peace Threat” in any of the Iran Resolutions. As I point out in Part 2 of my article, the UNSC simply adopted what purport to be Chapter VII resolutions without satisfying the extremely important condition that must be satisfied before the UNSC has any authority to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII.
Eric – I agree that a large part of the argument about all this revolves round whether safeguards apply to declared and undeclared activities. The IAEA have made it clear since 1992 that they think it applies to both, so I don’t think it arose from the Iran issue.
I suppose Iran is a test case for them really. In ordinary circumstances, everything is out in the open from day one, the IAEA sets up its procedures and the game kicks off. In Iran’s case however, the cart came before the horse. They had a rather advanced nuclear program that the IAEA knew nothing about.
As a result, the IAEA never had the procedures in place to monitor the thing from the ground up, so never had the complete picture of the program they normally rely on when making their judgements/declarations. They still haven’t got that picture, so they haven’t been able to implement the CSA in the customary way.
But I think that is a different point to the CSA simply being designed for declared facilities only. I agree that Iran doing so much of their development in secret is not a breach of the CSA. But because Iran did that, the cart has been put before the horse, and aspects of the CSA that would normally only really come into play down the line, probably only in extreme circumstances, are front dead centre from the outset. In particular, I’m thinking about the provision for special inspections, which the way I read it, has so far been treated as voluntary/confidence building measures by the IAEA.
I remember seeing somewhere that the formal role of special inspections was not something the IAEA liked to implement – do you know anything more about that? It strikes me that access to additional sites, which is basically what special inspections are, may well be an arbitration issue as well.
Richard – Precisely – you are “uncomfortable”. And the reason you are “uncomfortable” is that you suspect Iran has a hidden or future nuclear weapons development and deployment program and therefore any advance Iran makes, openly or secretly, threatens you because you believe it is part of that deliberate intention to develop and deploy actual nuclear weapons. (We’ll leave aside why you should care since you’re never going to be hit with an Iranian nuclear weapon anyway.)
Don’t get me wrong; I don’t give a rat’s arse whether Iran has nukes or not. All I’m setting out is the other side of the argument and how it may look from the IAEA’s perpsective. From their standpoint, Iran’s actions over the centrifuges were akin to a slap round the face with a very big, very wet fish.
Richard – on Olli Heinonen, can you give me a link that explains his crimes? Thanks.
Richard –
The Japanese ninjas say that the best way to secure one’s life is to behave so that one never has any enemies. But if circumstances cause someone to be your enemy regardless, you should become his friend – then poison him to diminish the risk.
Contributions like that make you indispensible round here.
Richard and Arnold,
A few technical points:
– Without speculating on who might be politically influenced (if at all) by whom, bear in mind that the actual parties would be the IAEA and Iran. Neither the US nor any other country (except Iran) would be a party.
– This might strike you both as naive, but I’m confident the IAEA would go out of its way to pick an arbitrator who was not perceived as being in the camp of either side in this dispute. I think Iran would do the same, but I’m less certain.
– As I speculate in my article, I’m fairly confident the panel would end up consisting of three highly respected jurists from countries not directly involved in the dispute.
– Every judge or arbitrator nonetheless is irreducibly “political,” to some extent or other, of course, but one would limit the opportunity for mischief by carefully phrasing questions. For example, Iran would not ask “Does the United Nations Security Council have any right to take action on disputes arising under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement?” Instead, it would ask “Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement grant the UN Security Council any authority to enforce the Agreement?” Such a simple, straightforward question that I have little doubt many lawyers would tell me the answer is so obvious that it’s hardly worth bothering to arbitrate. The reasons for presenting the question for arbitration would be highly political, of course: simple or not, many people around the world don’t understand this simple fact, and would need to acknowledge that Iran is correct on this point.
An aside to Richard:
In one of your comments, you identified an important reason for seeking arbitration. It would end up being a process that (1) takes a very long time; and (2) focuses attention, at least for that fairly long period, on what Iran’s Safeguards Agreement actually provides — a question that very few observers of this dispute really ever stop to think about.
Both results would at least slow down the US’ relentless march toward a military confrontation, giving history time to take its inevitable course as I explained at the end of my post yesterday (October 26 at 11:41 AM).
Eric: Ah, I see the difference in disputes. Still, it would be nice if a state under investigation by a possibly politically subverted IAEA had the option to dispute the IAEA by, say, a panel of nuclear experts, as opposed to an arbitration panel. Of course, that could conceivably be used to subvert the IAEA as well, so perhaps it’s just as well that’s not done. One has to draw the line somewhere, apparently.
To request again, can you cite when the IAEA ever reported an “inability to verify non-diversion”? I’d like to research those cases.
Arnold: I agree with many of your criticisms of this scenario:
1) Iran goes to arbitration
2) Iran wins arbitration and the arbitrators declare that Iran is not in violation of its safeguards agreement
3) Support for the sanctions decreases and pressure on Iran is reduced
4a) Iran can then accept the AP and if Iran does accept the AP, it benefits from being able to put the nuclear issue to some degree behind it.
4b) If Iran then chooses not to accept the AP, the US is likely to attack it
“I’m not sure of step 2. The Board of Governors, the UNSC and the IAEA director have all reached conclusions that I believe do not fit a strict legal interpretation of the relevant documents – which is why we are here. All are supposed to be objective and neutral. None is. The US is using all of the influence at its command to skew them and has been effective. The US will use arbitration to its advantage to every possible extent.”
I agree. But the Devil will be in the details. According to the provisions, each side nominates an arbitrator and the arbitrators nominate a third. Alternatively, higher authority nominates the third. Clearly the US would nominate someone with an attitude like Dennis Ross or Olli Heinonen. Iran would nominate someone from Turkey or Brazil. It’s not clear how far two such arbitrators would get in nominating the third arbitrator. Which mean the decision would fall to a higher authority possibly subject to pressure from the US or someone predisposed against Iran.
So there are definitely risks to Iran in engaging in this process.
“I’m not sure given step 2, step 3 follows.”
Agreed. I think certain countries already favorable to Iran, such as Turkey, would use a favorable arbitration ruling to justify not following UN sanctions. Possibly even Russia would. Countries like the UK and EU probably would not. Nonetheless, a net reduction in those adhering to the sanctions regime would be beneficial to Iran, especially if Russia were to use the excuse to increase its revenue by selling the S-300 system.
“An arbitration ruling has no impact at all on the US’ agenda for Iran”
Correct.
“It stems from a US perception that Israel’s security requires Israel to have a monopoly on nuclear technology in its region and the US commitment to ensuring that.”
While correct, I don’t think that is the ONLY reason. But certainly it is a major reason, perhaps as much as fifty percent of the reason. The other fifty percent I believe is US hegemony.
Or one could argue that Israeli and US regional hegemony constitutes fifty percent of the reason, and war profiteering constitutes the other fifty percent. Dividing up the percentages is almost moot, since hegemony is for the benefit of war profiteers and war profiteers require hegemony, so everyone is happy. Especially since Israel relies on arms and military/security technology exports for much of its revenue and much of its US aid comes back to the US military-industrial complex. So Zionists and war profiteers are all one big happy family.
“4b) The US would attack Iran immediately if it could do so at a low cost whether or not Iran implemented the AP.”
Correct. Where we disagree is where the “low cost” boundary exists.
“Eric, you severely overestimate both the importance and difficulty of convincing the US population to support an attack on Iran, if such an attack is seen, by the US informed consensus, as relatively cheap and painless the way the US consensus believed an occupation of Iraq would be in 2002 and early 2003.”
Correct. And that’s exactly how it is being sold. It’s always amusing to see how the warmongers always manage to argue that the enemy is a “serious threat” while at the same time a “cakewalk”. It’s clear how stupid the US public is when they don’t notice the discrepancy. A little “what’s wrong with this picture” would be expected.
“What deters a US attack on Iran is the fact that Iran can retaliate in ways that are even more painful to the US than accepting Iran with a Japan option.”
I’m not sure that’s the main reason at the moment. On the other hand, I have difficulty articulating exactly why and how wars take a certain amount of time to come to fruition. At the moment, I really can only suggest that the US government, while basically out of control by its electorate, nonetheless has the superstitious worry that it needs to maintain its “Emperor’s clothes” and thus not be seen TOO obviously to be TOO much of an aggressor. There IS a certain amount of international “smarting” being done after GWB violated this “protocol” by attacking Iraq so obviously illegally. I suspect the Democratic administration doesn’t wish to be compared TOO directly to Bush, despite the fact that it has been fairly naked about its desire for more power and more surveillance over US citizens.
Obama inherited two wars, I suspect he is a bit wary about starting a third without at least some evidence of improvement in the first two. I think this is why Bush never attacked Iran, despite Cheney’s insistence on doing so. Bush is basically a coward and a blowhard with low self-esteem, a failure by any measure. So once he came under pressure with the Iraq disaster, despite his bluster, I don’t think he was in a hurry to start a third war. I think he hoped McCain would replace him and start the Iran war. Not that he had any misgivings about an Iran war, he just didn’t want to be blamed for it.
I think this is why Israel hasn’t attacked Iran yet, despite being offered $30 billion in aid by Cheney to do so. They simply don’t want any more opprobrium than they already have. That said, they’ll do it if they think the US won’t.
These people in power are paranoids by definition. They’re always afraid they might lose power by some misstep. Which is why they over-react to every threat, but at the same time want assurances that whatever action they take will not blow back on them.
“You still seem to be missing the point that the US has an incentive to prolong a determination finding of non-diversion forever. That’s how long the US, for Israel, hopes to prevent Iran from being nuclear capable. Forever.”
This is an interesting point. If the goal of the US is NOT to attack Iran, but MERELY to prevent Iran from being “nuclear capable” for the benefit of Israel, then indeed we can say that the likelihood of a war with Iran is unlikely PROVIDED that the US can actually achieve that goal.
But there are several problems with this notion.
First, there is no way the US can prevent Iran from becoming “nuclear capable” short of war. To hold that notion, you have to believe that the US really believes that sanctions can compel Iran to cease enrichment. I don’t see any evidence that the US really believes that. Just about every US official, while simultaneously claiming that the sanctions are “biting” Iran, always admit that they don’t expect sanctions to actually BE SUCCESSFUL in getting Iran to suspend enrichment.
Second, if sanctions and “aggressive diplomacy” can NOT prevent Iran from continuing to enrich, then how is the US expected to insure Israel’s security short of war with Iran? Containment in that scenario is not an option. Israel does not accept containment and Israel will not accept Iranian enrichment forever – IF in fact that is Israel’s real concern.
So once again, we are back to the bottom line: sooner or later, either Iran has to stop enrichment – or the US OR Israel has to militarily COMPEL Iran to stop enrichment.
If the whole point of this confrontation is merely to protect Israel by preventing Iran from being “nuclear capable”, then clearly the instant Iran has tons of enriched uranium lying around, the entire US and Israeli concept has failed miserably.
What then?
And this is precisely what all the US and Israeli rhetoric is saying every day: that Iran is continuing to enrich and we can’t allow this to continue – and Israel and the Israel Lobby is loudly saying that sanctions aren’t working and we need to ATTACK NOW. And the US government is saying that sanctions, while “biting”, have a time limit, without specifying exactly what that limit is, suggesting that the limit has more to do with commitments in Afghanistan than anything else.
Third, to hold this view, you have to really believe that the US really believes that Iran being “nuclear capable” is a real issue. If in fact, the issue for the US is 1) regional hegemony – remembering the PNAC document that said the US cannot allow ANY country to be even regionally influential, let alone globally influential, and 2) war profiteering, then the entire argument falls apart. All of the US rhetoric about the Iran program becomes simply lies on a par with Iraq WMDs.
You have to decide whether the real movers and shakers in the US state REALLY BELIEVE that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. If they do, then you can believe that the US is “sincere” in its approach, regardless of whether it is to protect Israel or not. If they don’t, then the notion that the sole reason is to protect Israel goes out the window – because an Iran which is “nuclear capable” is not and never will be a threat to Israel or even a deterrent against Iranian “regime change”.
As I’ve said before, having a few tons of enriched uranium around does Iran no good if it can only manufacture a few nukes within the space of a year, given that its enemies have hundreds (Israel) and thousands (the US) of nukes. It simply isn’t a regime change deterrent, any more than North Korea’s six or so nukes are a regime change deterrent. North Korea’s regime change deterrent is its massive conventional military, not its almost useless nukes.
“A complete misunderstanding of my position and that of every Iran supporter I’ve seen here or anywhere else.”
Correct, although I think one or two people here may have made similar statements concerning Iran actually going ahead and developing nuclear weapons.
“And we’ve gone over this many many times.”
Oh, yeah.
“Nuclear capability has strategic advantages. You’ve seen John Bolton say if Serbia had nuclear capability regime change would not have been possible. You’ve seen Ray Takeyh say that Iran attaining nuclear capability would *only* make regime change impossible. Maybe they are wrong, but Israel does not want Iran to have nuclear capability for a real reason.”
We need to be precise here. An Iran with actual deliverable nuclear weapons in sufficient quantity to enable a second strike capability clearly would be a threat to Israel. An Iran with enough actual deliverable nuclear weapons to have a credible first strike capability would be a threat to Israel. In both cases, regime change would be off the table. If Iran had ANY interest at all in nuclear weapons, it would be for that reason – taking regime change off the table – and that reason only.
An Iran with tons of enriched uranium and the plans for a nuke and the industrial capacity to produce six nukes a year is ZERO threat to Israel because Israel would have the initiative – and I don’t doubt it would take the initiative – to prevent Iran from actually producing those weapons by conducting its own first strike. Such an Iran would be completely unable to take regime change off the table. And I believe the Iranians know this, which is why many Iranian officials have denied the need for nuclear weapons.
“Israel does have the strategic flexibility to attack Cairo, Mecca or Riyadh. Israel wants to continue having that flexibility regarding Iran and Iran wants to remove that flexibility by joining Brazil and Japan.”
I don’t think Iran has any such intention – nor could Iran achieve that flexibility with some tons of enriched uranium and the plans for a nuke. Not as long as Israel has 80-250 nuclear weapons and a probable second strike capability and definitely a first strike capability. Iran would need a credible first (pre-emptive) strike capability and/or a credible second strike capability. “Nuclear capable” does not give them that.
“Despite the absence of evidence, 7 in 10 Americans believe Iran already has nuclear weapons. Six in 10 agree that the US should bomb Iran if diplomacy and sanctions do not persuade it to give up its nuclear program – 25% would not even wait to find out.”
Eric is right about this.
“True, and if it was to happen, and US casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq rose again to the levels they reached in 2006 (and an openly hostile Iran would get them much higher) with no end in sight the US population will at least decide that they never wanted the war in the first place.”
But as in Iraq and Afghanistan, how exactly has that translated into electorate action? There have been several reports recently about how in this mid-term election season, almost NONE of the candidates have even bothered to mention Iraq or Afghanistan because it’s apparently “off the radar” of the electorate, who are more concerned with the economy – and apparently totally incapable of comprehending the relation between expensive wars and a bad economy.
“But will Palin still support Israel when it means the people who vote for her can’t afford to drive to work? The her supporters still be her supporters when there is an alternative party that says its all her fault?”
Never happen.
“If the US attacks Iran, there will be real costs to that action that the US has never paid before in its Middle East policy. A lot of American soldiers dying and surges that only result in more American soldiers dying.”
Correct.
“We saw an attack on Iraq most importantly because the US military honestly thought it was feasible at a reasonable cost. The US military does not think this about Iran.”
We need to be precise here, too. SOME in the Pentagon don’t think it’s a good idea – probably because of commitments in Afghanistan. The US Air Force I think doesn’t care so much. They’d be happy to bomb Iran any time if it means more medals and promotions.
And again, IF – I say IF – Obama is serious about getting out of Afghanistan, a war with Iran would be an excellent excuse. And I think the US military would dearly prefer bombing Iran from the Gulf rather than running around Afghanistan chasing ghosts – at least until they have to run around Iraq and Iran chasing ghosts.
And again, the US military follows the US political elite, not the other way around – despite the fact that Obama apparently can’t control his officers who (allegedly) harassed him into a surge he (allegedly) didn’t want in Afghanistan. (I say “allegedly” about all this spin about Obama because Obama made it quite clear during his presidential campaign that he intended to “finish the fight” in Afghanistan – by “finish” he meant “win” – and “take the fight to Al Qaeda in Pakistan”, which he has done by dramatically ramping up the number of drone attacks in Pakistan and even apparently is now considering cross-border raids. Some observers even suspect the US intends to invade Pakistan.)
“Left unchallenged, the United States is unlikely to change direction or even to slow down. Pressure is building for military action, and may become irresistible once most Americans conclude – as inevitably they will – that “sanctions have not worked.” The 2012 presidential campaign (which will begin in 2011) undoubtedly will feature candidates vowing to respond more forcefully than their opponents to the “Iranian threat.” After the election, the winner will be pressed hard to follow through. The window may soon be closing.”
I agree with Eric on this part.
“The course of action recommended here would be preferable to a continuation of Iran’s stubborn passivity, which enables the United States to shape world-power public opinion with little effective resistance and heightens the risk of war each day it continues.”
I DISAGREE with Eric on this part. I don’t think Iran has any capability to produce effective resistance to the US. The arbitration Eric recommends may have more benefits than risk in the cost-benefit analysis, but I don’t see the benefits affecting the overall dynamic of the confrontation in any meaningful way.
“The US government might find itself unable to marshal sufficient support from the American public and other countries to launch an attack on Iran – just as support for the Iraq war might have fallen short if the baseless WMD claims had been exposed earlier.”
I disagree with Eric here. He is assuming that an arbitration ruling would be disseminated widely enough and accurately enough to counter the spin and distortion the MSM in the West would put on it. That’s highly unlikely.
“I don’t see a clear and present danger of a US attack on Iran. If your analysis depends on that, then it suffers for not being more detailed about this clear and present danger. Are you willing to say that if Iran does not implement the AP there will be a US attack on Iran in the next 5 years?”
Whatever Eric believes, I would say that a war with Iran is extremely probable within ten years, and like you said earlier, less so in five, and less so in 2 – but possible at any time nonetheless.
“The US does not need support from the US public or anyone internationally to attack Iran. The attack on Iraq was exactly no more illegal than an attack on Iran would be.”
Correct.
“The fact that there has been no finding of a threat to peace is a guideline that Barack Obama explicitly reserves the right to ignore. The UN Charter prohibition on attacks? A guideline. The Geneva conventions? Guidelines. This is Barack Hussein Obama, the liberal President of the United States.”
Yup. And I’m amazed at how the entire electorate blithely ignores this simple fact.
“The US will attack Iran to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option”
Careful, Arnold! You’re saying here that the US WILL attack Iran – because as I mentioned above, there is no way the US can PREVENT Iran from attaining the Japan option short of war.
“What is preventing a US attack is Iran’s ability to make an attack more costly for the US than it is worth.”
But can you have it both ways? The US will attack Iran to prevent it being “nuclear capable” – WHICH IT WILL ACHIEVE – and at the same time won’t attack because that will cost more than it’s worth?
If that’s true, then why is the US pursuing the course it’s pursuing? You really have to assume that the US REALLY BELIEVES it can stop Iran WITHOUT war. Do you commit to that belief?
“US military figures are asked about attacking Iran all the time and they always say Iran’s response would harm US interests to an extent that they are not sure it would be worth it. That never ever was said regarding Iraq.”
Well, actually Shinsheki almost said it when he said Iraq would need half a million troops. And there were other officers who were against the war.
And worrying about “harming US interests” isn’t quite the same as “No, sir, we won’t obey the order, SIR!” Especially since it’s already clear that both Iraq and Afghanistan have “harmed US interests”.
The Pentagon is not full of smart people, it’s full of morons. They will do what they’re told. Especially if they’re told by the companies the generals expect to sit on the boards of once they’re retired with the medals they got in the Iran war.
Arnold 12:36
That’s it. You have it down. Iran’s defense based on deterrence has worked up to this point.
One of the variables would be a new president willing to make a calculated gamble. Or an accidental military incident in the Gulf (or elsewhere) that escalates into a full-blown conflict.
It’s a dangerous situation.
My concern (and I’m sure Iran’s) is that the arbitration procedure is susceptible to US manipulation. The potential reward is not worth the potential risk of losing. And Arnold, you’ve pointed out well the ultimate contexts for the rather minimalist rewards should Iran actually win.
Richard,
I had written:
“Only one type of dispute is exempt from arbitration under Article 22: “a dispute with regard to a finding by the [IAEA] Board under Article 19 [that the IAEA is unable to verify Iran's non-diversion of nuclear material] or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding.” Several times the IAEA has reported such a finding to the Security Council.”
You replied:
“It would seem like such a dispute is precisely where one would like to see arbitration tried before referring it to the UNSC.”
As I explain in Part 1 of my article, there is no dispute that may be “referred” to the UNSC, except for the purpose of affording the UNSC an opportunity to determine whether the IAEA/Iran skirmish also amounts to a “Peace Threat” under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Many egregious violations of a country’s Safeguards Agreement may pose no “Peace Threat” at all (though undoubtedly there is likely to be some correlation in practice).
Iran’s SA essentially puts disputes into two categories: (1) what might be called “judicial” disputes — ones that are suitable for a court (or arbitrators acting in the same manner) to decide — interpretation of contract language, for example; and (2) disputes that can be resolved only by the IAEA’s exercise of administrative discretion. These would include disputes over whether the IAEA is warranted in concluding that it cannot verify non-diversion of nuclear material. That is something that is not appropriate for a court to decide, since it inevitably requires professional (non-judicial) judgment by the agency. These would also include discretionary exercises by the IAEA of its enforcement authority under the IAEA statute — which allows the IAEA, for example, to take away certain benefits otherwise enjoyed by Iran under the IAEA statute. Again, that is something that is not appropriate for a court to decide, since it inevitably requires discretionary (non-judicial) judgment by the agency.
Article 19 of Iran’s SA sensibly distinguishes between these two types of disputes. That is why I explain, at the beginning of Part 3 of my article, why and how Iran should eliminate the possibility that any question it might pose to an arbitration panel could be characterized as an “IAEA gets to decide” type of dispute. If Iran, for example, disputes the IAEA’s contention that the IAEA is unable to verify Iran’s “non-diversion,” Iran would (pointlessly) create an “IAEA gets to decide” type of dispute that would not be subject to arbitration. If Iran instead says, essentially, “We freely acknowledge that the IAEA has determined that it is unable to verify non-diversion, and further acknowledge that the IAEA has a right to so inform the UN Security Council,” Iran avoids creating such an “IAEA gets to decide” type of dispute.
The questions I’ve suggested for arbitration probably would be considered “judicial” questions, suitable for arbitration, even if this “clarification” is not made, but I nevertheless recommend it in my article to eliminate any doubt, and since there is no point in Iran creating this “dispute” in the first place.
Eric: Thanks for the explanation, as it confirms to me what I initially thought. I had initially thought that the purpose of that phrase was a “loophole” to allow the IAEA to do exactly what you say: be able to phrase its report in a bad light even though it is asking a state to prove a negative. Then I thought I had perhaps misread it and that it was actually a typo.
Your explanation clarifies that it is indeed a deliberate loophole through which the US can drive and has driven a truck in pursuit of supporting its war aims. It would be interesting to learn the history of how that got written into the language and which country pressed for its inclusion. I think we can guess.
Richard,
I had written:
“Question 2. Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement authorize the IAEA to impose additional obligations on Iran if the IAEA finds itself unable to verify Iran’s non-diversion of undeclared nuclear material but does not contend that its inability has occurred because Iran is failing to perform its obligations?”
You asked in reply:
“Did you mean “declared nuclear material” as opposed to “undeclared nuclear material”? How can the IAEA verify non-diversion of material it knows nothing about?”
An entirely sensible question — but not in the IAEA’s view, as I am confident you will understand when you reach the end of this comment.
The phrasing of Question 2 is correct, and it’s important to understand that “undeclared” is critical to the sentence. (An aside: The overall wording of Question 2 may seem a bit clumsy, but there’s a good reason, with which I won’t bore you here since it’s beside the immediate point, that I felt it needed to be worded this way.)
The “basis” for the IAEA’s extension of its question-asking authority under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement is its inability to verify the non-diversion of “undeclared” nuclear material. (Verifying non-diversion of “declared” material is pretty easy.) The IAEA will never actually be able, of course, to verify the non-diversion of undeclared material, for Iran or any other country, but it phrases its inevitable inability to do so in various ways that mask the utter futility of even trying. A typical formulation appears in paragraph 41 of the September 6, 2010 report:
“While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”
Makes Iran sound pretty bad, don’t you think?
But if you read it carefully, what the IAEA is really saying is this:
“We can verify non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but obviously we don’t have a clue whether Iran — or any other country, for that matter — has undeclared material since, after all, “undeclared” means we don’t know about it. No matter how many questions we might ask Iran, and no matter how many answers and other information Iran might give us, we’ll never honestly be able to say any more than what we’re saying here: “Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” But when we phrase it as we have in this sentence, nearly all readers will naturally interpret the sentence to mean that Iran is trying to hide something from us by not complying with its disclosure obligations, when in fact the sentence really reflects that we’re asking Iran to engage in a pointless effort to satisfy a non-existent obligation that it is impossible for any country ever to satisfy.”
Iran often points this out, of course, but it’s complicated and so few listeners understand.
The IAEA nevertheless recognizes that some observers do understand, and that others may eventually figure out, the inevitable futility of insisting that Iran try to prove it has no undeclared nuclear material. To be prepared for anyone who might press this point, the IAEA offers Iran (or any other country) a promise that it will “verify” non-diversion of the country’s nuclear material — without specifying “declared” or “undeclared, thus (intentionally) including both categories in its verification offer — if the country will agree to observe the Additional Protocol.
AP or not, of course, the IAEA will never actually learn enough to “prove the negative,” for Iran or any other country. Nevertheless, by offering to verify “non-diversion” generally if a country observes the AP (assuming that nothing suspicious turns up, of course), the IAEA appears to be acting in a very accommodating manner toward a country. After all, it’s enabling the country to “satisfy” an obligation even though the country is not really “satisfying” the obligation since the obligation is one that never can really be satisfied. How many regulatory bodies are so accommodating? A country should be quite grateful.
Indeed, the IAEA appears to be so reasonable in offering this accommodation that very few people notice that, in the process, it (1) creates an obligation that doesn’t actually exist under the country’s Safeguards Agreement: the country’s “obligation” to establish that it has no undeclared nuclear material; and (2) makes the country appear to be unreasonable if it declines the IAEA’s gracious offer to observe the AP it in order to satisfy this “obligation.”
Some countries other than Iran nevertheless do decline the IAEA’s gracious offer, without suffering unpleasant consequences: in other words, they decline to observe the AP, just like Iran does (Brazil, for example, does this). The IAEA thereupon informs the country that the IAEA, in that case, will be unable to verify the country’s “non-diversion” — whereupon the country replies: “We can live with that.”
The difference between other countries and Iran boils down to this: “We can live with that” is not deemed to be an acceptable response from Iran.
Complicated but, I hope, clear.
More quotes and responses.
While such a response might strike Iran as nothing but more lawless American aggression, the US might receive substantially stronger support than Iran predicts. Many people who are skeptical of US motives nevertheless share at least one of its goals: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Chapter VII of the UN Charter may be too blunt a tool to accomplish this. The IAEA’s remedies under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement may be ineffectual. The NPT may be toothless.[48] All this and more may be true, but Iran’s position will quickly erode if it fails to agree to a stronger monitoring scheme that promises to achieve the widely shared goal of nuclear non-proliferation.
So if I understand this scenario:
1) Iran goes to arbitration
2) Iran wins arbitration and the arbitrators declare that Iran is not in violation of its safeguards agreement
3) Support for the sanctions decreases and pressure on Iran is reduced
4a) Iran can then accept the AP and if Iran does accept the AP, it benefits from being able to put the nuclear issue to some degree behind it.
4b) If Iran then chooses not to accept the AP, the US is likely to attack it
I’m not sure of step 2. The Board of Governors, the UNSC and the IAEA director have all reached conclusions that I believe do not fit a strict legal interpretation of the relevant documents – which is why we are here. All are supposed to be objective and neutral. None is. The US is using all of the influence at its command to skew them and has been effective. The US will use arbitration to its advantage to every possible extent.
I’m not sure given step 2, step 3 follows. Support for the sanctions seems to me to be based more on pressure the US applies than on any perceived need by the countries supporting them to follow any rules. For example, India has been told explicitly that US cooperation with its nuclear program depends on its voting for and applying sanctions and further reducing its economic ties to Iran. This would not change because of an arbitration ruling.
The a large portion of the US public and a far greater element of the US political system still believes part of its duty to avoid charges of anti-Semitism is taking a hostile position against Iran, which “delegitimizes” Israel. No arbitration ruling would change that.
I don’t think if 3 is true, either step 4 follows.
4a) The US’ goal is preventing Iran from having nuclear capability. The US says this openly and repeatedly. A post about this has been on RFI over the past week. This is what the US has consistently said, including the President, from before he was elected until this year. Every level of the administration has said it on and off the record and it is the position that was in place with the previous administration and every US administration since the Iranian revolution.
An arbitration ruling has no impact at all on the US’ agenda for Iran, the US’ position that Iran must not be nuclear capable. Japan is nuclear capable and there is nobody who believes it is in violation of its safeguards agreement. Japan also implements the AP.
Clearly, if the US goal is to prevent Iran from having the capabilities Japan has, and Japan implements the AP, Iran implementing the AP will not satisfy the US. US hostility toward Iran does not stem from Iran’s refusal since the UNSC took on the Iran file to implement the AP. It stems from a US perception that Israel’s security requires Israel to have a monopoly on nuclear technology in its region and the US commitment to ensuring that.
4b) The US would attack Iran immediately if it could do so at a low cost whether or not Iran implemented the AP. Eric, you severely overestimate both the importance and difficulty of convincing the US population to support an attack on Iran, if such an attack is seen, by the US informed consensus, as relatively cheap and painless the way the US consensus believed an occupation of Iraq would be in 2002 and early 2003.
You present an arbitration ruling plus the AP as some major deterrent of a US attack on Iran. I need a lot more details about how this is supposed to work.
What deters a US attack on Iran is the fact that Iran can retaliate in ways that are even more painful to the US than accepting Iran with a Japan option. As long as that holds we will not see an attack. I clearly holds today and has held since at least the time in 2006 that Dick Cheney promised that the Bush term in office would not end without either an Iranian surrender or a US attack on Iran, and then backed down.
Required or not, Iran can exploit its predictable arbitration victory most effectively by agreeing to observe the Additional Protocol and revised Code 3.1. It will probably be rewarded promptly with greater cooperation from other countries, and soon will be entitled to insist that the IAEA verify non-diversion of all nuclear material – declared or undeclared – as the IAEA has promised to do within a reasonable time after Iran implements the Additional Protocol (provided, of course, that nothing suspicious has turned up).
What is a reasonable time? The US will make more laptops of death. You don’t write much about this, but Iran has a right, on paper in its workplan to see these supposed alleged studies before responding to them, which I understand is a fundamental part of legal fairness that the accused get to see the evidence against them. The US says Iran has to respond to the laptop, then the US gets to leak a little more out depending on how Iran responds. That’s the situation today. The US now has a IAEA director even more malleable to its agenda than El Baradei was.
You still seem to be missing the point that the US has an incentive to prolong a determination finding of non-diversion forever. That’s how long the US, for Israel, hopes to prevent Iran from being nuclear capable. Forever. More “evidence” will be shown, in parts to the IAEA but not to Iran and there will be further questions forever. You’ve said there will come a point that this looks unfair and other parties will stop cooperating. Other parties don’t cooperate because it’s fair. It already looks unfair.
Some Iran supporters oppose expanded disclosures for a different reason: Greater disclosure would reduce uncertainty about whether Iran has the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Such capability breeds respect, this group believes. Maintaining ambiguity about Iran’s nuclear program may oblige other countries to treat Iran as if it has such capability whether it does or not. Japan is the example most often cited: It has made no apparent decision to develop nuclear weapons, but is widely understood to possess this capability. Some proponents of this view argue further that Iran should use this “cover” actually to develop nuclear weapons capability. Sooner or later, they acknowledge, Iran would need to withdraw from the NPT to complete the effort, but they are confident that Iran could avoid taking this revealing step until it had become too late to prevent it from producing a deliverable nuclear bomb. They point out that a country can get far down the road without actually violating the NPT, and presume that the United States would accept this acknowledged shortcoming of the NPT and stand by patiently as long as Iran does not cross this line.
A complete misunderstanding of my position and that of every Iran supporter I’ve seen here or anywhere else. And we’ve gone over this many many times. Iran does not need uncertainty. Nuclear capability has strategic advantages. You’ve seen John Bolton say if Serbia had nuclear capability regime change would not have been possible. You’ve seen Ray Takeyh say that Iran attaining nuclear capability would *only* make regime change impossible. Maybe they are wrong, but Israel does not want Iran to have nuclear capability for a real reason. The US is expending more diplomatic resources on preventing an Iranian nuclear capability than it is on any other foreign policy objective by far. There is a real reason for this.
1) Nuclear capability is not about “respect” it is about deterrence. 2) Nuclear capability is not about uncertainty. There is no uncertainty regarding Japan or Brazil. Neither has a weapon today. If somehow Israel bombs Rio de Janeiro or Tokyo, Israel will no longer exist 30 days later. There is no uncertainty. The US would not be able to prevent it. Israel does not have the strategic flexibility to attack Japan or Brazil. Israel does have the strategic flexibility to attack Cairo, Mecca or Riyadh. Israel wants to continue having that flexibility regarding Iran and Iran wants to remove that flexibility by joining Brazil and Japan.
We’ve gone over this many times. Nobody has ever said Iran should aim for any form of uncertainty, and you continuously re-inject the concept of uncertainty.
Several years ago, those who warned that Iran could become the United States’ next Iraq were said to underestimate the depth of Americans’ skepticism toward trumped-up allegations that might be used to justify another Middle East war. Today, it is hard not to conclude that the American public’s guard is down once again. Despite the absence of evidence, 7 in 10 Americans believe Iran already has nuclear weapons. Six in 10 agree that the US should bomb Iran if diplomacy and sanctions do not persuade it to give up its nuclear program – 25% would not even wait to find out.
True, and if it was to happen, and US casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq rose again to the levels they reached in 2006 (and an openly hostile Iran would get them much higher) with no end in sight the US population will at least decide that they never wanted the war in the first place.
Sarah Palin loves Israel because Israel is Christians helping European Jews fight Arabs. The US has a strong colonial impulse and the US Arab and Muslim communities are not as formidable at impacting the US consciousness as the US Black community – which is why the US no longer supports Apartheid. (And of course the US Jewish communities is immeasurably more resourceful than any US Afrikaaner or White South African community could have hoped to be.)
But will Palin still support Israel when it means the people who vote for her can’t afford to drive to work? The her supporters still be her supporters when there is an alternative party that says its all her fault? If the US attacks Iran, there will be real costs to that action that the US has never paid before in its Middle East policy. A lot of American soldiers dying and surges that only result in more American soldiers dying.
The US population follows the US military, not the other way around. We saw an attack on Iraq most importantly because the US military honestly thought it was feasible at a reasonable cost. The US military does not think this about Iran. Correctly. We’ll know if the US consensus changes but for now it is stable.
Lastly:
Even if skepticism is warranted by the history of this dispute, it does not justify a head-in-the-sand response to this clear and present danger to Iran and its people.[49] Left unchallenged, the United States is unlikely to change direction or even to slow down. Pressure is building for military action, and may become irresistible once most Americans conclude – as inevitably they will – that “sanctions have not worked.” The 2012 presidential campaign (which will begin in 2011) undoubtedly will feature candidates vowing to respond more forcefully than their opponents to the “Iranian threat.” After the election, the winner will be pressed hard to follow through. The window may soon be closing.
The course of action recommended here would be preferable to a continuation of Iran’s stubborn passivity, which enables the United States to shape world-power public opinion with little effective resistance and heightens the risk of war each day it continues. Even if no broad resolution can be achieved, an arbitration ruling in Iran’s favor would at least highlight the United States’ ulterior purpose by exposing the weakness of its claim that Iran is violating its Safeguards Agreement. The US government might find itself unable to marshal sufficient support from the American public and other countries to launch an attack on Iran – just as support for the Iraq war might have fallen short if the baseless WMD claims had been exposed earlier.
I don’t see a clear and present danger of a US attack on Iran. If your analysis depends on that, then it suffers for not being more detailed about this clear and present danger. Are you willing to say that if Iran does not implement the AP there will be a US attack on Iran in the next 5 years? At least by setting a deadline it is possible for you to be wrong 5 years from now, instead of saying an attack is just around the corner from now on.
The US does not need support from the US public or anyone internationally to attack Iran. The attack on Iraq was exactly no more illegal than an attack on Iran would be. Barack Obama, in his Nobel Peace Prize speech (!) said that he reserves the right for the US to ignore “guidelines” in attacking countries he considers a threat. The fact that there has been no finding of a threat to peace is a guideline that Barack Obama explicitly reserves the right to ignore.
The UN Charter prohibition on attacks? A guideline. The Geneva conventions? Guidelines. This is Barack Hussein Obama, the liberal President of the United States.
The US will attack Iran to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option – in other words to prevent Iran from removing the strategic flexibility the US and Israel have to attack Iran if they deem it necessary. Iran getting an arbitration ruling will not change that. Iran ratifying the AP the way Japan has will not change that. The US public hearing a really good argument that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon will not change that. The international community being convinced that Iran is actually meeting its legal responsibilities will not change that.
What is preventing a US attack is Iran’s ability to make an attack more costly for the US than it is worth. US military figures are asked about attacking Iran all the time and they always say Iran’s response would harm US interests to an extent that they are not sure it would be worth it. That never ever was said regarding Iraq.
As long as that is the case, and Iran is willing to endure the economic warfare the US is attempting to impose on it, Iran has no reason to make concessions to the US on its nuclear issue.
First the sale of $60B weapons to SA was announced, and now a tension in the region is being developed. Is this really going to stabilize the PERSIAN gulf region?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamal-abdi/fueling-ethnic-tensions-i_b_773753.html
Eric, thanks for the reply.
Seeing as you thought the observations were interesting, and granted I have no way of knnowing, but let me persue the line of thought a little further.
Suppose for a moment Iran has completely given up on rapproachment. and, I mean completely, and utterly.
Iran now sees itself in for the long game. In such a time frame it just fine that realistically nothing “is going to be done about ‘Israel’s nuclear issue’ in the near (or fairly distant) future.” Iran could peg her own nuclear ‘disambiguation’ to whenever it is that Israel will give up her nukes. This can take as many decades as it needs to take, so long as it is advantagous for Iran the longer it takes.
Iran may be willing to take the sanctions hit on the chin, again thinking longterm it will be the winner. A glancing familiarity with fluid dynamics gives them reason to believe financial pressures will wind up creating a secondary plumbing — a parallel global financial system. Evolving from $1 million in paper bags to Karzai, to actual banking/insurance/re-insurance global operations.
Iran genuinley may not be worried about being attacked, regarding it as a suicidal move for the agressor. But, possibly, they see it as the West would lose the long game in a single attack move.
In the long run, chipping away at Western credibility is an incremental gain for Iran’s soft power politics in the region. There is much to be said for not resolving the nuclear issue quickly. The longer it takes, the angrier the West, the more eratic, the more outlandish media reports, the more displays of anti-Muslim rage, etc, will be welcome gifts to an Iran trying to consolidate her position in the region. The first batch of gifts likely will arrive in 2013 presidential race campaigns where much chest thumping by presidential hopefuls will be aired on al-Jazeera. where Western credibility goes, so do UNSC’s and IAEA’s credibility.
In short:
“Is it not possible that, whereas Iran may have started with a genuine and urgent desire to resolve the issue, she has acclimated to UNSC referal and moved its own goalposts. E.g. seeking vindication, yes, but now also demanding Israel’s nuclear issue be on the table, Western duplicity be outed, etc. In short, could there be a calculation that sees prolongation of the dispute as advantageous to Iran, and pleasing to Russia and China?… [Is Iran] opting instead to draw [its] adversaries into putting all their chips on the table which Iran figures she can withstand, but which they figure will destroy wetsern credibility?”
Eric: Same question, this paragraph:
Question 2 (whether the IAEA may impose additional obligations on Iran if the IAEA finds itself unable to verify Iran’s non-diversion of undeclared nuclear material but does not contend that its inability has occurred because Iran is failing to perform its obligations) would focus attention on the simple fact that nothing in Iran’s Safeguards Agreement authorizes the IAEA to do this, and on the IAEA’s flawed argument (discussed below) that its inability to verify non-diversion gives it “implied” authority to require Iran to make additional disclosures.
To clarify, shouldn’t that be “declared” material?
Eric: Is this paragraph correct?
“Question 2. Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement authorize the IAEA to impose additional obligations on Iran if the IAEA finds itself unable to verify Iran’s non-diversion of undeclared nuclear material but does not contend that its inability has occurred because Iran is failing to perform its obligations?”
Did you mean “declared nuclear material” as opposed to “undeclared nuclear material”? How can the IAEA verify non-diversion of material it knows nothing about?
I’m sorry, the previous question was addressed to Eric, not Alan!
Alan: I find this interesting:
“Only one type of dispute is exempt from arbitration under Article 22: “a dispute with regard to a finding by the [IAEA] Board under Article 19 [that the IAEA is unable to verify Iran's non-diversion of nuclear material] or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding.” Several times the IAEA has reported such a finding to the Security Council.”
It would seem like such a dispute is precisely where one would like to see arbitration tried before referring it to the UNSC.
Also, that “an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding” is not open to arbitration would seem to be a loophole which allows the Board to get away with almost anything related to an “unable to verify” finding.
Can you cite the specific cases where the IAEA reported such findings in Iran’s case? I was not aware that the IAEA has ever explicitly said it could not verify non-diversion of any nuclear material.
Richard Steven Hack:
Yes, Americans are destroying NPT.
I wonder if it was really worth it to them.
Alan: “I would still be uncomfortable using an argument that effectively maligns the IAEA while exonerating Iran on the basis that the non-compliance issues are limited to pre-2003, when aspects of those issues remain live today, and have even been exacerbated, possibly deliberately, by Iran.”
Precisely – you are “uncomfortable”. And the reason you are “uncomfortable” is that you suspect Iran has a hidden or future nuclear weapons development and deployment program and therefore any advance Iran makes, openly or secretly, threatens you because you believe it is part of that deliberate intention to develop and deploy actual nuclear weapons. (We’ll leave aside why you should care since you’re never going to be hit with an Iranian nuclear weapon anyway.)
Which has nothing whatever to do with the NPT – the purpose of which is to verify that at any given moment a state has NOT diverted any declared nuclear materials to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons.
Which has nothing whatever to do with centrifuge design. And even if the NPT were modified to make it do so, it would still be utterly irrelevant in actually determining if a state were intent on deploying actual nuclear weapons.
The same issue arises with all the technical disclosure requirements. The SOLE function of those requirements is to determine whether a state is actively engaged in developing and deploying nuclear weapons.
As Arnold has cogently argued here often enough, as long as the IAEA can verify that a state is not actively developing and deploying actual nuclear weapons, it has done its job.
The IAEA’s purpose is NOT to PREVENT “nuclear weapons proliferation”, it is to determine when it is taking place.
Whether a state has disclosed as soon as it has started building a nuclear enrichment plant or whether it discloses ninety days before inserting nuclear material really is irrelevant to that purpose. The only function of the time difference is to give the world more time to determine if that facility is for peaceful or military purposes. HOW it determines whether that facility is for peaceful or mililtary purposes is more important.
And centrifuge design does not tell you that, even if that centrifuge is so efficient as to make enriching to weapons grade level extremely easy. What matters is that the IAEA is able to determine WHEN those centrifuges actually ARE enriching to weapons grade level.
It’s important not to get bogged down in these sorts of technical details. It’s precisely the confusion over purpose and procedure that allows the war mongers to blow up a minor technical violation of a technical reporting requirement into a “failure to comply with the NPT”.
It’s bullshit.
An explosion that killed 18 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on October 12 was ordered by the Mossad, French newspaper Le Figaro suggested on Monday.
http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=192686
Alan: “The centrifuge issue was, and still is, separate to the Alleged Studies, but the link between the two exists because of the supposed military involvement.”
I would propose that any “military involvement” in the design or operation of uranium centrifuges is completely irrelevant to the overall issue of whether Iran has a military nuclear weapons development and deployment program.
Who funds or is involved in constructing and maintaining Iran’s nuclear facilities is irrelevant. Israel’s military funds a lot technology companies in Israel, not to mention the numerous contracts that the US DARPA issues every year. While many, including myself, question this process, the fact remains that this is what states do: fund technology initiatives that may or may not have future military applications.
It hardly constitutes “diverting nuclear materials for non-peaceful uses” and as such really is outside the IAEA’s purview, absent any actual evidence of undeclared military nuclear programs. Funding or working on centrifuge design does not rise to that level.
This is merely more of the IAEA’s “fishing expeditions” that are undertaken under US pressure by the US IAEA Board members and people like Olli Heinonen on the notion that if you fish long enough you can find something you can hang Iran with on some technicality. It’s a clear example of the fundamental subversion of the IAEA and the diversion of its primary mission in the service of political interests. The “alleged weapons studies” are all of a pace.
Eric A. Brill
Excellent article
I admire your appetite for details.
Eric: “Eliminating that misunderstanding could peel off a very large portion of the US’ support.”
Not an ounce of that support is relevant to the final outcome, however. Even if it managed to cause many of the countries currently bowing to the UN – and even the US unilateral – sanctions to reverse course, drop adherence to the sanctions and resume trade with Iran, a not inconsiderable benefit to Iran, this still wouldn’t affect the overall conflict between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other.
I agree that Iran should probably use arbitration as a tactic for whatever benefits it can provide, as long as any risks are properly dealt with. But I don’t see any overall benefit to Iran vis-a-vis the US and Israel, who are the only states really significant in this confrontation. The UK and EU are just “poodles”.
Even if Russia and China were prepared to use the arbitration results as a justification for absolutely refusing to impose any more sanctions on Iran and vetoing any such in the UNSC, this would just cause the US – and probably the UK and EU as well, under US pressure – to move ahead with unilateral sanctions.
And while the more informed members of the various electorates might be better informed about the real legal underpinnings of the Iran situation, they still would not be any position to really influence the prime movers in the US Congress.
And it’s not even clear that a favorable arbitration ruling for Iran would even convert many people to a better understanding of the issue. That would depend heavily on how the ruling was presented via the respective nations media. While the UK and EU probably would get some decent reporting, I can assure you that the US MSM would spin and distort the ruling to appear to be just another “bunch of foreigners siding with terrorists”. much like the “French fries” debacle.
So it’s not clear that the PR benefit would be significant to even that degree.
The main benefit of an favorable arbitration ruling would be its effect in the UNSC and its possible use by states already favorable to Iran looking for a way to evade the sanctions, such as Turkey, China, etc., most of whom already are. The biggest benefit would come if Russia would use the ruling to justify selling the S-300 system to Iran.
From WSJ:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303891804575576572706283194.html
Laughable.
Richard Steven Hack:
I think Iranian Leaders believe that they can cause sufficient damage to the oit installation of Southerin Persian Gulf to wreck the world economy and US with it. Mr. Khamenei once explicitly alluded to that.
My point, however, was that certain issues cannot be resolved and confronation becomes permanent.
Like the permanent war in Palestine.
But future would tell, won’t it.
Fyi: “US wants to make the Middle East safe for Israel.”
True.
“It cannot be achieved.”
Also true – but irrelevant. Both the US and Israel are still going to try.
Fyi: “the US/EU confrontation with Iran – across multiple issue – has now become a permanent feature of the international system; just like Cuba, Sudan, Syria, North Korea, Zimbabwe, and Burma.”
I think it’s useful to make distinctions between these countries, however.
Cuba really is no longer relevant except for a powerful Cuban-American lobby out of Florida. Basically, most people in the US couldn’t care less about the Cuban embargo any more.
Syria is important only because of its proximity with Israel and Lebanon and its involvement in the Palestinian issue.
Burma is not considered terribly important except for its human rights abuses. As far as I know, it’s not considered a “threat” to anybody.
Sudan is minimally important to the US because of its alleged “Al Qaeda” threat – which is mostly propaganda for keeping the “War on Terror” nonsense alive given that Afghanistan is going down the tubes.
Zimbabwe, hell, I don’t even know what’s going on there, which means it’s pretty unimportant if I haven’t seen anything. I assume it’s just another African black zoo state with assorted civil wars going on.
North Korea IS important, especially vis-a-vis Iran, since it is explicitly about nuclear weapons. Here the absolutely critical distinction from Iran is the presence of a massive, fairly competent military with thousands of tanks, scores of thousands of missiles and artillery pieces, and a Special Forces component estimated to be 120,000 REALLY tough soldiers, and a rugged, dug-in bunker defensive capability. North Korea has the capability to turn South Korea, a major US economic trading partner, into a sea of flame within 72 hours, and also inflicting an estimated 50,000 US casualties in the first ninety days of any war with the US.
All of which Iran doesn’t have. Which is precisely why the US can threaten Iran with impunity, while treading lightly around a much more aggressive and volatile militaristic state like North Korea.
Therefore the US-Iran confrontation is much more likely to be “less permanent” than any of the other states you mention, simply because it will be easier – and more profitable – for the US to attack Iran than any of the other states. The other states are either too small or irrelevant or weak to be profitable for the US to attack, whereas Iran has three main advantages: 1) it has oil; and 2) it opposes Israel; 3) it can mount enough opposition to make attacking it an exercise in real expense, to the benefit of the military-industrial complex, without actually being able to do any really serious damage to US military forces a la North Korea.
In short, Iran is more like Iraq and Afghanistan – a weak nation that the US can attack with (apparent and short-term) impunity for real geopolitical and economic purposes. None of the other states on your list, with the possible exception of Syria, qualify – and Syria basically is being left for Israel to deal with, probably in concert with an attack on Lebanon by Israel at some point.
Richard Steven Hack:
The context is actually larger than Iran.
US wants to make the Middle East safe for Israel.
It cannot be achieved.
Sakineh: “So, Richard, I ask you, no, I beg you, to put your smartest of the smart caps on and tell us how to avert an on-coming situation that you have predicted will be coming.”
It’s smart to know when you can’t avert a situation. You then spend your time figuring out how to survive it, or better, to take advantage of it.
You should read some American survivalist literature, I spend the weekend browsing, among others, a site called “zombiehunters.org”, whose motto is “We Make Dead Things Deader”. The site uses a metaphor of a “zombie outbreak” a la movies like “Resident Evil”, to represent disaster preparedness.
The Japanese ninjas say that the best way to secure one’s life is to behave so that one never has any enemies. But if circumstances cause someone to be your enemy regardless, you should become his friend – then poison him to diminish the risk.
The reality is that nothing Iran does – short of complete capitulation to US demands – is going to change the outcome of this confrontation. Similarly, nothing the US public does, short of insurrection, is going to change the outcome of this confrontation. The US political elite, in concert with the military-industrial complex and the Israel Lobby, are intent on beating Iran down. End of story.
As I’ve said, the US will ultimately lose that war, just as it lost the Vietnam war. But nothing is going to stop the ten year disaster that precedes that loss, just as nothing stopped the seven year disaster of Iraq, or the nine year and ongoing disaster of Afghanistan.
It’s that simple.
Richard Steven Hack:
I agree with you; winning any arbitration will not help Iran.
Legal Judgements for Iran in the Hague during the Nationalization of Oil Industry did not prevent the sitting government from being overthrown by US and UK.
This is just like war, Iran may be defeated still – just like 1953.
James Canning:
I respect Dr. Friedman and I think some of his description are correct.
In regards to EU, in my opinion, he is spot on. He and I seem to be in agreement that EU is essentially US-Lite (ready to distribute condomns to homosexuals and syringes to drug addicts when US bombs stop falling.)
He is also correct that US can do little to change the Iraqi situation.
I do disagree with him in that I do not think there is any margin in war against Iran by US.
If there were, it would have occured in 2006.
I posted this because of its relevance and because it suggested war with Iran to advance US President’s domestic agenda.
It is looney but not that much more crazy that the Republican Party becoming
the party of the trailer trash or the nutcases in the Tea Party.
Alan: Olli Heinonen is completely off the pale in the IAEA. His transgressions concerning the “alleged studies” are well known and documented. Such a person should never have been allowed in the IAEA. He’s little more than an Iran-basher.
Richard,
Thanks for catching that omission of the very important “not” (a word which often makes a big difference). I’ve corrected it in the on-line and PDF versions.
Eric
Eric: A very well-reasoned and illuminating document. Thank you also for putting it in PDF format.
I’ve just read through it entirely. I’ll respond once I’ve read the comments so far.
But my immediate response is that the discussion of Iran’s and the IAEA’s and the UN’s legal obligations was excellent. I also agree that Iran’s use of arbitration could not hurt its public relations and legal effort, and it probably should make use of that provision. If nothing else, it could conceivably delay the on rush to war as it would probably take many months for the arbitration panel to complete its deliberations.
I would, however, also continue to state unequivocally that pursuing an arbitration course would be unlikely to resolve the overall issue in Iran’s favor in terms of the behavior of either the US or Israel, and probably not the EU. Nor do I think it would cause the UN Security Council to rescind the sanctions imposed so far, although it would very likely complicate the imposition of any further UN sanctions which is something that would be beneficial.
And I explicitly continue to state that Iran would not benefit from doing any more disclosure than it does now, even if it pursues the arbitration provision, and should not disclose any more until the US responds in some specific positive way to the public facts already in evidence that 1) Iran has a legal right to uranium enrichment, and 2) there is NO evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons development and deployment program, whatever questions the US might have (legitimately or not) as to whether Iran ever desired the acquisition of the technical knowledge on nuclear weapons design.
Eric: Note that I haven’t read the comments through yet, so someone else may have pointed this out:
“It cannot be ignored that Iran has tried this approach before, though from a much weaker position: for limited periods, it previously suspended enrichment and complied with both the Additional Protocol and revised Code 3.1, but stopped because it had received the anticipated benefits in return.”
Should (presumably) read:
“It cannot be ignored that Iran has tried this approach before, though from a much weaker position: for limited periods, it previously suspended enrichment and complied with both the Additional Protocol and revised Code 3.1, but stopped because it had NOT received the anticipated benefits in return.”
Alan,
Thank you for the link to the Haaretz interview with Ollie Heinonen. One interesting point (among others) was the interviewer’s misstatement, not corrected by Heinonen, that the IAEA found that Iran had violated its Safeguards Agreement by not declaring Natanz and Arak earlier:
EXCERPT FROM HAARETZ STORY:
INTERVIEWER: There is a troubling impression that the IAEA failed in its inspections of Iran, that right behind the inspectors’ backs, Iran established secret nuclear facilities like the plant at Natanz and the reactor for plutonium production at Arak. Iran’s effort was exposed eight years ago by an Iranian opposition organization, perhaps with the help of information relayed by Western intelligence organizations.
HEINONEN: I don’t believe we failed on the Arak and Natanz matters. States that belong to the IAEA are obligated to report to us about nuclear facilities, equipment and materials in their possession. Should they not do that, we cannot discover things on our own, unless information comes to our attention. The moment information came to us, we launched an investigation that has proceeded since then.”
END OF EXCERPT FROM HAARETZ STORY.
Though I acknowledge Heinonen doesn’t explicitly say so, he essentially agrees with the interviewer’s suggestion that the IAEA (albeit belatedly) found that Iran violated its Safeguards Agreement by not declaring Natanz and Arak sooner than it did. As you probably know but I suspect few others do, that was not the case. Footnote 40 of my article covers this in more depth:
FOOTNOTE 40 FROM ARTICLE:
40 Natanz and Arak:
Natanz.
Many commentators have argued that Iran’s failure to declare its nuclear facility at Natanz earlier than it did was a violation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. See, for example, Goldschmidt, Pierre, and Perkovich, George, “Correcting Iran’s Nuclear Disinformation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 27, 2007). This is a complicated question on which the IAEA has never expressed agreement with those who make this charge. Nuclear material was introduced into the Natanz facility on June 25, 2003. See, IAEA Director General’s report dated November 10, 2003 (GOV/2003/75). This means that, under the original Code 3.1 indisputably in effect until late February 2003, Natanz should have been declared to the IAEA by late December 2002 (180 days before nuclear material was introduced). Natanz’s existence was first revealed by an Iranian rebel group four months before then, in August 2002. Iran confirmed this to the IAEA in September 2002, and arranged for the IAEA Director General to visit Natanz in October 2002. The planned visit was postponed for four months. The IAEA has never suggested that the postponement was Iran’s fault or that Iran otherwise had backtracked on its offer to host a visit in October 2002. The Director General finally visited Natanz in late February 2003, and Natanz was formally declared then. If the Director General had visited Natanz in October as Iran had offered, presumably Natanz would have been formally declared then instead, well before the December 2002 180-day deadline. No Code 3.1 violation occurred when Natanz was declared, since no nuclear material was then present at the facility and, obviously, it was impossible to know for certain when it would be introduced. If the IAEA had given Iran reason to believe it would be held to a February 2003 declaration date (in essence, that Iran would be blamed for the four-month postponement of the Director General’s visit), Iran could later have avoided a Code 3.1 violation simply by delaying introduction of nuclear material into the Natanz facility for an additional two months (August 2003 instead of June 2003). One speculates that Iran did not bother with this delay because the IAEA had never indicated it would blame Iran for the four-month postponement of the Director General’s visit. And the IAEA effectively never did: Notwithstanding the charge of a Code 3.1 violation by Messrs. Goldschmidt and Perkovich (and others), the IAEA has never expressed agreement with them in any report or resolution. See, for example, Bali, Asli U., “The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report, Vol. 241 (Winter 2006): “In its June 2003 report [GOV/2003/40] following initial inspections of both sites, the IAEA did not find violations of Iranian reporting obligations related to the construction of facilities at either Natanz or Arak.” Nor did the IAEA find such a reporting violation in any subsequent Board resolution or Director General’s report.
Arak.
During the IAEA Director General’s visit in late February 2003, Iran declared two facilities at Arak (see, paragraph 30 of IAEA Director General’s report dated June 6, 2003 (GOV/2003/40)) – a heavy water production plant then under construction (even though the IAEA acknowledged that heavy water production plants are not required to be declared under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement – see, paragraph 5 and footnote 1 of IAEA Director General’s report dated June 6, 2003 (GOV/2003/40)), and a heavy water research reactor (IR-40) on which construction was then scheduled to commence in 2004. The IAEA has never contended that either facility was declared later than required. (In several later reports, however, the IAEA did complain that Iran was improperly withholding updated design information on the IR-40 reactor – see, discussion of this issue in second paragraph of footnote 33).
END OF FOOTNOTE 40 FROM ARTICLE.
BiBiJon,
“Is it not possible that, whereas Iran may have started with a genuine and urgent desire to resolve the issue, she has acclimated to UNSC referal and moved its own goalposts. E.g. seeking vindication, yes, but now also demanding Israel’s nuclear issue be on the table, Western duplicity be outed, etc. In short, could there be a calculation that sees prolongation of the dispute as advantageous to Iran, and pleasing to Russia and China?… [Is Iran] opting instead to draw [its] adversaries into putting all their chips on the table which Iran figures she can withstand, but which they figure will destroy wetsern credibility?”
Interesting observations.
Certainly “Israel’s nuclear issue” ought to be on the table, and there is ample “Western duplicity” to be “outed.” But one would have to ignore a very great deal of history and current reality to imagine that anything is going to be done about “Israel’s nuclear issue” in the near (or fairly distant) future. One would have to be equally naive to predict that “outing” “Western duplicity” is going to change US behavior at all.
These facts being so, if it makes one feel better to put these matters “on the table,” by all means do so. Just don’t imagine that doing so will have any practical bearing whatsoever on Iran’s situation.
Skip Hop Studio Diaper Tote Tote is awesome.So numerous pockets – as well as not really these small, useless pockets, either. Almost all of the actual storage compartments are a good size and truly assist keep everything organized. The handles are a great length and fit nicely over the shoulder; the tackle straps additionally stay place on my own arm, which is critical when you’re transporting a infant. The bag appears fantastic, too. Not as well fancy, but not too casual. (I have it in black) The material is soft (can’t feel of a superior word) so it’s straightforward to squeeze in to tight spaces – but yet it’s sturdy. I’ve a Fleurville Lexi carrier and I really like it, too, but that handbag is actually kind of stiff. I feel this Skip*Hop can grow to be my everyday bag. It’s a bit big – so if you’re not in to huge bags this might be much better as an over-night baby diaper bag.
James and FYI:
George Friedman’s article indeed is alarming. Maybe not an inaccurate prediction, however. This may be the time for Iran to consider whether it might do something other than what it’s doing now: crossing its fingers and hoping for the best.
The unknown story of Cuba-Israel realtions.
When Cuba helped Israel
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/10/27/when-cuba-helped-israel/
Alan,
“…I would still be uncomfortable using an argument that effectively maligns the IAEA while exonerating Iran on the basis that the non-compliance issues are limited to pre-2003, when aspects of those issues remain live today, and have even been exacerbated, possibly deliberately, by Iran.”
I don’t intend to malign the IAEA. If I were the IAEA, I too would ask for whatever Iran would give me. No harm in asking.
Beyond that, before responding, I would need to understand what you mean by “aspects of those issues remain live today, and have even been exacerbated, possibly deliberately, by Iran.”
I have a hunch your response will highlight what has become a very blurred distinction between (1) the IAEA’s actual authority under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, which is to determine — if and only if it can — whether diversion of nuclear material has occurred, and (1) what the IAEA has persuaded itself (and the UNSC) is the much broader scope of its authority: to demand and evaluate whatever the IAEA believes it needs to verify that Iran has not diverted any declared or undeclared nuclear material.
To some, these alternate statements of authority scope may appear to be the same thing. As you know, however, they are not. Like it or not, if the IAEA concludes it cannot verify that a country is not diverting nuclear material, it is authorized merely to say this — not to keep demanding more information until it concludes instead that it can. Certainly the Additional Protocol gives the IAEA more information (and we both understand that the IAEA has essentially said that observing the AP will be “good enough” for it to verify non-diversion of all nuclear material), but even a country’s compliance with the AP will never actually enable the IAEA to “prove the negative.”
After the 2002/2003 revelations of Iran’s disclosure violations that had occurred during the last two decades of the twentieth century (ending in 2003, according to the IAEA — see footnote 10 of my article), the IAEA became accustomed to exercising much broader authority than it actually had — in part because Iran observed the AP and new Code 3.1 during some of that time, and in part because Iran voluntarily answered even more questions than either of those supplemental disclosure schemes requires. In effect, Iran found it politically necessary to wear a “hair shirt” for quite a while after the 2002/2003 revelations, and it claims it would have worn it even longer if it had received the promised quid pro quo. I see no need to get into that debate, since the key point is that Iran was entitled to take off that hair shirt whenever it felt like doing so, and it did in fact wear it for quite a long time. To be sure, during the several long years that Iran wore its hair shirt, it complained loudly and often about its itchiness, but it wore the shirt nonetheless.
In short, the IAEA got used to exercising much broader authority than it really has, and now it finds it very difficult to give up that extra authority and revert to the more limited scope it exercised — without complaint — before this controversy arose. Many people believe, and the IAEA seems almost to have convinced itself, that Iran’s pre-2003 disclosure violations permanently expanded the scope of Iran’s disclosure obligations. You know that is not true, and I know that is not true. I think few others will acknowledge it, however, unless some authoritative ruling to that effect is issued. I feel strongly, as you know, that Iran then should become much more cooperative in its disclosures. But it should first insist that a bright legal line be drawn where that line belongs, so that everyone understands that, when Iran steps beyond that line and discloses more, it is not grudgingly complying at long last with its Safeguards Agreement, but instead is voluntarily taking additional steps that it has no obligation to take.
The Iranian foreign minister, Mottaki, has once again made clear Iran wants to meet with the P5+1 to push through the IAEA application (TRR nuclear fuel exchange). Let’s hope Hillary Clinton doesn’t bungle this thing yet again.
One more quote from George Friedman’s article (posted by FYI):
“The only obvious way [for Obama] to achieve success that would have a positive effect on the U.S. strategic position is to attack Iran.”
Friedman is an idiot.
fyi,
George Friedman is bonkers! He thinks that “[T]he situation in Iraq would improve IF IRAN WERE NEUTRALIZED”? What an idiot! How would an insane war with Iran “improve” the situation in Iraq?
Those of us who think Condoleezza Rice has a second-rate intellect will not change their opinions very likely if they read the interview with her that appeared in The Times (London) on Oct. 16th. Quote: Tony Blair “was immensely committed to the proposition that no man, woman or child should have to live in tyranny.”
So this was the reason Blair supported the idiotic invasion of Iraq! To ensure that no child lived in “tyranny”! Blair of course is a first-rate politician with a second-rate intellect. (Was this an observation by Roy Jenkins?)
fyi,
Pledging (not pleading) (by Clinton at Camp David).
Friedman claims the EU would not mind a quick war with Iran. Rubbish! The UK is rather admantly opposed to any war with Iran.
Eric – with regard to the centrifuges, I don’t think the IAEA expanded anything from the original 2003 investigation. The only reason they were ever interested in the P2 was for the same reason they are still interested in it now.
If you are arguing that they should not have been interested in the first place, that is a different question to the point I’m making. However, don’t forget that the P2 investigation was launched when Iran signed the AP.
There is a specific, unique problem here – namely what does the IAEA do when a party withdraws from the AP mid-investigation? Do you mothball the investigation, or do you keep plugging away? The original questions haven’t gone away.
I think it’s fine to say that certain things, such as centrifuge R&D, are not covered by Safeguards, and that we’ve got to live with what we have in terms of enforcement etc. However, within that context, I would still be uncomfortable using an argument that effectively maligns the IAEA while exonerating Iran on the basis that the non-compliance issues are limited to pre-2003, when aspects of those issues remain live today, and have even been exacerbated, possibly deliberately, by Iran.
fyi,
I have some comments on the article by George Friedman that you posted.
Why is there “little to be done in Iraq at the moment EXCEPT DELAY THE WITHDRAWAL OF [US]FORCES”? Obama should have withdrawn all US forces by now.
Why would Hamas have “to change its position” for Obama to force Israel into getting out of the West Bank? Hamas also wants Israel out of the West Bank.
Friedman seems to have forgotten how Bill Clinton double-crossed Arafat at Camp David in 2000. After pleading he would not blame either side if the talks failed, he did just that! This was treacherous and stupid.
More pictures of the Futsal match
http://www.farsnews.net/plarg.php?nn=M670230.jpg
Link to Pictures and Persian text for a Futsal (indoor soccer) match between teams headed by president Ahmadinijad’ and President Evo Morales of Bolivia, game was won by President Ahmadinijad’s team 8-6
http://ayandenews.com/news/19633/
Thanks, Kooshy.
Eric,
Here is what you get for the work you did in this past few months, (you got some of us worried, when you went off the radar for a while)
Now, you get the privilege of, reading this whole new article in AT whiteout the need to use the link and see all spam ads on the AT site.
http://www.atimes.com
Covert ops sabotage US-Iran ties
By Rob Grace
For years, the United States and Israel have engaged in a covert effort to destabilize Iran’s government and sabotage its nuclear program. But these operations frequently escape mention in public discussions. By ignoring the covert effort, the current debate about the relative wisdom of diplomacy, sanctions, and preventive military action addresses an incomplete picture. To understand the challenges and potential of US-Iranian relations, the covert program must be factored into the equation.
Although sabotage may prove successful in slowing Iranian nuclear progress in the short term, it actually stands as a barrier to a long-term resolution.
The program
United States covert action in Iran has played a historically destructive role in US-Iranian relations. In 1953, when the United States was planning to overthrow Iran’s prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent Roger Goiran warned that the endeavor would harm long-term US interests and lead Iran to view the United States as a supporter of “Anglo-French colonialism”.
The CIA fired Goiran for his opposition and went forward with its plan, but his prediction came true. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 brought to power a leader who dubbed America “the Great Satan” and established a government legally founded on “the rejection of all forms of domination” and “non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers”, to quote Article 152 of Iran’s constitution.
During the Iran hostage crisis, Iran only agreed to free the 52 trapped Americans after the United States pledged non-intervention in Iranian affairs. As stated in the 1981 Algiers Accords, “it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.”
However, the United States has not lived up this commitment. In 1995, American news media revealed a US$18 million covert effort by the CIA to destabilize Iran, confirming Iranian suspicions of the “Great Satan”.
Iran’s foreign minister wrote to the United Nations Security Council, calling the US policy “nothing but a flagrant support of state terrorism”, and one member of Iran’s parliament called the United States “a renegade government whose logic was no different from Genghis Khan or Hitler”.
Covert efforts were also a factor in the breakdown of negotiations in 2005 between Iran and the E3/European Union, a group composed of representatives from Germany, France the United Kingdom and the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Only one year earlier, relations with Iran seemed promising. Iran had joined the E3/EU in signing the Paris Accord, in which Iran pledged that it would “not seek to acquire nuclear weapons”, voluntarily implement the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Additional Protocol, and voluntarily halt all uranium-enrichment activities. The accord’s signatories pledged to negotiate an agreement that would encompass not just nuclear and economic cooperation but also “firm commitments on security issues”.
Iran’s desired security commitments, as the British House of Commons’ report on the negotiations indicates, included a UN Security Council-backed commitment to prevent “any direct or indirect attack or sabotage or threat against Iranian nuclear facilities”.
United States actions in the mid-2000s gave credence to Iran’s concern. The US was collaborating with the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, a group devoted to overthrowing Iran’s government, in cross-border raids to gather intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program; supporting Jundallah, a Pakistani-based tribal terrorist group that has struck Iranian targets; and had established a “covert infrastructure” within Iran to reach out to Iranian dissidents.
And in 2005, the US Congress authorized $3 million to fund “the advancement of democracy and human rights” in Iran, a move the Iranian UN ambassador called a “clear violation of the Algiers accords”.
Ultimately, the E3/EU did not accept Iran’s security proposal and instead offered only to reaffirm existing security guarantees. Iran thus concluded that the E3/EU “did not have the intention or the ability” to make “firm commitments on security issues”, let alone progress on nuclear and economic cooperation, and Iran announced it would once again begin enriching uranium.
As the UN Security Council began passing sanctions against Iran, news reports indicate that covert efforts escalated. In 2007, CBS News reported on “covert efforts by US and other allied intelligence agencies to actively sabotage [Iran's] nuclear program”.
When Iranian nuclear scientist Ardeshire Hassanpour died under mysterious circumstances that same year, sources told The Times that Mossad, the Israeli secret service, had assassinated him. In 2008, president George W Bush signed a “non-lethal presidential finding” that, according to ABC News, initiated a CIA plan involving “a coordinated campaign of propaganda, disinformation and manipulation of Iran’s currency and international financial transactions”.
In early 2009, The New York Times reported that Bush had “stepped up intelligence-sharing” with Israel and had authorized a covert program “aimed at the entire industrial infrastructure that supports the Iranian nuclear program”.
The Bush administration handed off this program to President Barack Obama. In the first month of Obama’s presidency, the Telegraph reported that Israel was “using hitmen, sabotage, front companies and double agents to disrupt the regime’s illicit weapons project”.
Reuters reported that Israel “planned to target Iranian nuclear scientists with letter bombs and poisoned packages”, possibly as part of “a psychological warfare campaign”. And when Iran suffered a cyber-attack from the Stuxnet computer virus, The New York Times reported on possible US involvement, noting that Bush’s covert program “has been accelerated since President Obama took office”.
The problem
The sabotage effort has seemingly been successful in delaying Iranian progress on uranium enrichment. But sabotage also disrupts diplomatic progress.
The Obama administration has presented Iran with a “stark choice” – accede to Western demands and join the “community of nations” or “face even more pressure and isolation”. Iran scoffs at both options.
As for “pressure and isolation”, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has stated he doesn’t believe the United States or Israel will actually undertake preventive military action. This belief is most likely correct, as the Obama administration has successfully convinced Israel that the Iranian nuclear threat is not imminent.
Ahmadinejad has also said that sanctions are “of no concern to us” and “have, in fact, encouraged us to be firmer in the pursuit of our economic goals”. This claim is under debate, even within Iran. Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, for example, has urged Iranian officials to take the sanctions seriously. But the sanctions do seem to have benefited Ahmadinejad by giving “an excuse to the Iranian government to suppress the opposition”, according to Iranian reformist Mehdi Karroubi.
As for joining the “community of nations”, Iran does not perceive a community it wishes to join. Instead, it sees an “inhumane” and “discriminatory management of the world” in which “the very same goals of colonialists and the slave masters” are “pursued with a new facade”, and thus the global system “requires a major overhaul”, as Ahmadinejad stated in his recent UN address. For this reason, Iran strives for UN Security Council reform and global nuclear disarmament under the slogan, “nuclear energy for everyone, nuclear arms for no one”.
Still, there are signs that Iran and the West can reach an agreement. Both Iran and the United States have said they are open to more talks. And though the US would like Iran to halt enrichment entirely, a feasible middle ground exists. As former US secretary of state Colin Powell stated recently on Meet The Press:
… I think if you take them at their word, “trust, but verify,” [former US president Ronald] Reagan’s old line … then put in place a set of sanctions that would be devastating to them if they violate that agreement, and then put in place an IAEA inspection regime … you might be able to live with an Iran that has a nuclear power capability
Covert activities risk undermining this possibility. The United States needs to show Iran that a genuine settlement is possible. If Iran fears that US covert intervention will continue, Iran is unlikely to sign on to an agreement of the sort Powell described. Like in 1953, by pursuing the sabotage option, the US is sacrificing its long-term interests for short-term gains.
Rob Grace, a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, blogs for the Foreign Policy Association. He is also an award-winning playwright whose work has been produced around the world.
Alan,
Thanks.
“On the centrifuges, the P2 question was about to be closed following information provided by Iran on I think 5 Nov 2007. Then on 8 Nov Iran said they would be disclosing a new centrifuge. This was significant because the basic reason why the IAEA was interested in the P2 was because of the suspicion that there was a covert program somewhere using better centrifuges (which would be easier to conceal).”
I hesitate to respond to this, because it is both too easy and difficult. The easy answer is that the IAEA’s suspicions do not entitle it to expand Iran’s obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. I think you will agree with this. You believe it should not be that way, but I think you agree that it is — not only for Iran, but for other countries as well.
What makes it difficult is that this fact highlights what we and most observers recognize: the NPT and Safeguards Agreements (even with the Additional Protocol, though that helps) haven’t turned out be as effective enforcement schemes as may have been initially contemplated. There are two responses to that:
1. The IAEA knew when it drafted the first model Safeguards Agreement that it wasn’t designed to detect undeclared nuclear material.
2. The remedies called for under Safeguards Agreements and the IAEA Statute would be much more effective if countries other than Iran — notably, the nuclear states — had performed their own obligations under the NPT.
On Response 1, see this portion of my article (excerpted from Iran’s hypothetical argument to arbitrators):
EXCERPT:
“Although the IAEA now insists it is unacceptable, indefinite uncertainty about undeclared nuclear material is not only an acceptable outcome under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, but one that plainly was contemplated when the Agreement was drafted by the IAEA decades ago. Article 98(O), for example, explicitly excludes uranium “ore” from the definition of “nuclear material” that must be declared, and Article 33 states: “Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities.” Such exclusions would never appear in an agreement whose purpose was to detect undeclared nuclear material. Undoubtedly that is why the IAEA sought to remove them when detection of undeclared nuclear material became important to the IAEA many years later. Article 2(v) of the Additional Protocol, for example, requires extensive disclosures about uranium mines. …”
“Iran does not dispute that it must declare its nuclear material as required under its Safeguards Agreement, and it has declared all of it. If the IAEA is not persuaded, Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires it “to afford the Government of Iran every reasonable opportunity to furnish the [IAEA] with any necessary reassurance” that Iran has not diverted nuclear material to non-peaceful purposes. The IAEA has afforded many such opportunities to Iran since 2003, and Iran has availed itself of many of them. But Article 19 does not require Iran to continue accepting every opportunity the IAEA may choose to offer. At some point – and that point was reached long ago – Iran fairly may ask that the IAEA accept the same inescapable fact it has accepted for many other countries: No matter what more Iran might disclose, it can never prove that it has no undeclared nuclear material, just as no other country can ever prove this. For dozens of countries, the IAEA has concluded that it cannot determine whether undeclared nuclear material exists. It claims to have reached the same conclusion for Iran. Just as for other countries, such a determination does not mean that Iran has violated its Safeguards Agreement, nor does it give the IAEA a right to impose additional obligations on Iran.”
END OF EXCERPT.
On Response 2, see this portion of my article:
EXCERPT:
“Though it is not obvious, the fault lies with the several world powers who have failed for decades to perform their obligations under the NPT. Many consider the NPT and its associated Safeguards Agreements to be nothing more than an intrusive monitoring scheme aimed at restricting membership in the nuclear weapons club. But most countries that signed the NPT decades ago were focused on its loftier stated goals: a world in which all countries would be encouraged to produce peaceful nuclear energy with the assistance of experts from countries that already know how, in which rogue countries that have secretly developed nuclear weapons would be pressured to give them up and sign the NPT, in which even the five original nuclear-weapons states would take steps to disarm. These expectations, backed by clearly stated commitments from several world powers, are what induced countries like Iran to sign the NPT – not the prospect of filing detailed reports and answering numerous questions from nosy inspectors, though they were prepared to accept those burdens in exchange for the benefits they expected the NPT would bring.”
“Had the NPT produced these benefits, its early signers would want very much to retain them. The IAEA’s authority to take them away would be a powerful enforcement weapon. But so far the NPT has not brought these hoped-for benefits to Iran. Four decades ago, enthusiastic American and European nuclear salesmen descended upon Iran, urging it to prepare for the inevitable exhaustion of its oil and gas reserves before it was too late, offering to help in any way they could. But since the fall of the Shah in 1979, offers of help have dried up, many millions of dollars in down payments have been pocketed, and descendants of those same eager salesmen now ask in suspicious tones why such a petroleum-rich country as Iran needs to develop nuclear energy. More countries than before have nuclear weapons, and new members of the nuclear weapons club either decline to sign the NPT (India, Pakistan, Israel) or simply withdraw when it becomes inconvenient (North Korea. The original five nuclear states have many more nuclear warheads than before the NPT was adopted, and show no inclination to give them up. From Iran’s point of view, all that remains of the NPT is a burdensome enforcement scheme imposed upon it by countries that unapologetically ignore their own obligations. It is not surprising that the IAEA’s authority to take away Iran’s benefits does not frighten Iran very much – indeed, Iran might prefer that, since its burdens would end as well.”
“The anticipated benefits of the Non-Proliferation Treaty can still be achieved. The IAEA’s authority to take them away can still become the effective enforcement remedy it was intended to be. Iran can and should contribute to this welcome change, but it lies principally in the hands of the nuclear energy “haves,” who must reconfirm, and then carry out, their solemn commitments to help the “have nots” achieve a worthy goal for which the NPT was adopted – peaceful nuclear energy for every country that wants it.”
END OF EXCERPT.
Eric – I never criticise!
On Note 33, I’ve got nothing to add really. You’ve put more there than I knew about it, but we still don’t really know enough. Besides, even if the agreement to the 3.1 was legitimate, how do you deal with the Majlis then saying we’ve gotta get out? At that point, a government is in a tight spot, assuming said government hadn’t engineered it I suppose.
On the centrifuges, the P2 question was about to be closed following information provided by Iran on I think 5 Nov 2007. Then on 8 Nov Iran said they would be disclosing a new centrifuge. This was significant because the basic reason why the IAEA was interested in the P2 was because of the suspicion that there was a covert program somewhere using better centrifuges (which would be easier to conceal). It didn’t really matter whether it was a P2 or an IR2 or a SNAFU2.
So having finally concluded, after over 4 years, that a Something-2 centrifuge didn’t exist, it suddenly transpired that it did, so all the reasons why they wanted to know about it in the first place became relevant again, principal among them whether the IR2, now that its existence was confirmed, was for exclusively peaceful use. Hence the still open question of links between the IR2 R&D and military organisations.
I don’t think that was an insidious attempt by the IAEA to give legs to something, or to extend their authority. I think it was a logical step in an investigation started in 2002/03, which remains open. It is also indicative of why there is a trust deficit.
The centrifuge issue was, and still is, separate to the Alleged Studies, but the link between the two exists because of the supposed military involvement.
War as the Continuation of Domestic Policy – see below:
U.S. Midterm Elections, Obama and Iran
October 26, 2010 | 0851 GMT
George Friedman
We are a week away from the 2010 U.S. midterm elections. The outcome is already locked in. Whether the Republicans take the House or the Senate is close to immaterial. It is almost certain that the dynamics of American domestic politics will change. The Democrats will lose their ability to impose cloture in the Senate and thereby shut off debate. Whether they lose the House or not, the Democrats will lose the ability to pass legislation at the will of the House Democratic leadership. The large majority held by the Democrats will be gone, and party discipline will not be strong enough (it never is) to prevent some defections.
Should the Republicans win an overwhelming victory in both houses next week, they will still not have the votes to override presidential vetoes. Therefore they will not be able to legislate unilaterally, and if any legislation is to be passed it will have to be the result of negotiations between the president and the Republican Congressional leadership. Thus, whether the Democrats do better than expected or the Republicans win a massive victory, the practical result will be the same.
When we consider the difficulties President Barack Obama had passing his health care legislation, even with powerful majorities in both houses, it is clear that he will not be able to push through any significant legislation without Republican agreement. The result will either be gridlock or a very different legislative agenda than we have seen in the first two years.
These are not unique circumstances. Reversals in the first midterm election after a presidential election happened to Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. It does not mean that Obama is guaranteed to lose a re-election bid, although it does mean that, in order to win that election, he will have to operate in a very different way. It also means that the 2012 presidential campaign will begin next Wednesday on Nov. 3. Given his low approval ratings, Obama appears vulnerable and the Republican nomination has become extremely valuable. For his part, Obama does not have much time to lose in reshaping his presidency. With the Iowa caucuses about 15 months away and the Republicans holding momentum, the president will have to begin his campaign.
Obama now has two options in terms of domestic strategy. The first is to continue to press his agenda, knowing that it will be voted down. If the domestic situation improves, he takes credit for it. If it doesn’t, he runs against Republican partisanship. The second option is to abandon his agenda, cooperate with the Republicans and re-establish his image as a centrist. Both have political advantages and disadvantages and present an important strategic decision for Obama to make.
The Foreign Policy Option
Obama also has a third option, which is to shift his focus from domestic policy to foreign policy. The founders created a system in which the president is inherently weak in domestic policy and able to take action only when his position in Congress is extremely strong. This was how the founders sought to avoid the tyranny of narrow majorities. At the same time, they made the president quite powerful in foreign policy regardless of Congress, and the evolution of the presidency over the centuries has further strengthened this power. Historically, when the president has been weak domestically, one option he has had is to appear powerful by focusing on foreign policy.
For presidents like Clinton, this was not a particularly viable option in 1994-1996. The international system was quiet, and it was difficult to act meaningfully and decisively. It was easier for Reagan in 1982-1984. The Soviet Union was strong and threatening, and an aggressive anti-Soviet stance was popular and flowed from his 1980 campaign. Deploying the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile in Western Europe alienated his opponents, strengthened his position with his political base and allowed him to take the center (and ultimately pressured the Soviets into agreeing to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). By 1984, with the recession over, Reagan’s anti-Soviet stance helped him defeat Walter Mondale.
Obama does not have Clinton’s problem. The international environment allows him to take a much more assertive stance than he has over the past two years. The war in Afghanistan is reaching a delicate negotiating state as reports of ongoing talks circulate. The Iraq war is far from stable, with 50,000 U.S. troops still there, and the Iranian issue is wide open. Israeli-Palestinian talks are also faltering, and there are a host of other foreign issues, ranging from China’s increasing assertiveness to Russia’s resurgent power to the ongoing decline in military power of America’s European allies. There are a range of issues that need to be addressed at the presidential level, many of which would resonate with at least some voters and allow Obama to be presidential in spite of weak political support.
There are two problems with Obama becoming a foreign policy president. The first is that the country is focused on the economy and on domestic issues. If he focuses on foreign policy and the U.S. economy does not improve by 2012, it will cost him the election. His hope will be foreign policy successes, or at least the perception of being strong on national security, coupled with economic recovery or a plausible reason to blame the Republicans. This is a tricky maneuver, but his presidency no longer offers simple solutions.
The second problem is that his presidency and campaign have been based on the general principle of accommodation rather than confrontation in foreign affairs, with the sole exception of Afghanistan, where he chose to be substantially more aggressive than his predecessor had been. The place where he was assertive is unlikely to yield a major foreign policy success, unless that success is a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. A negotiated settlement will be portrayed by the Republicans as capitulation rather than triumph. If he continues on the current course in Afghanistan, he will seem to be plodding down an old path and not pioneering a new one.
Interestingly, if Obama’s goal is to appear strong on national security while regaining the center, Afghanistan offers the least attractive venue. His choices are negotiation, which would reinforce his image as an accommodationist in foreign policy, or continued war, which is not particularly new territory. He could deploy even more forces into Afghanistan, but then would risk looking like Lyndon Johnson in 1967, hurling troops at the enemy without a clear plan. He could, of course, create a massive crisis with Pakistan, but it would be extremely unlikely that such an effort would end well, given the situation in Afghanistan. Foreign policy presidents need to be successful.
There is little to be done in Iraq at the moment except delay the withdrawal of forces, which adds little to his political position. Moreover, the core problem in Iraq at the moment is Iran and its support of disruptive forces. Obama could attempt to force an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but that would require Hamas to change its position, which is unlikely, or that Israel make massive concessions, which it doesn’t think it has to do. The problem with Israel and the Palestinians is that peace talks, such as those under Clinton at Camp David, have a nasty tendency to end in chaos.
The European, Russian and Chinese situations are of great importance, but they are not conducive to dramatic acts. The United States is not going to blockade China over the yuan or hold a stunning set of meetings with the Europeans to get them to increase their defense budgets and commit to more support for U.S. wars. And the situation regarding North Korea does not have the pressing urgency to justify U.S. action. There are many actions that would satisfy Obama’s accomodationist inclinations, but those would not serve well in portraying him as decisive in foreign policy.
The Iranian Option
This leaves the obvious choice: Iran. Iran is the one issue on which the president could galvanize public opinion. The Republicans have portrayed Obama as weak on combating militant Islamism. Many of the Democrats see Iran as a repressive violator of human rights, particularly after the crackdown on the Green Movement. The Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia, is afraid of Iran and wants the United States to do something more than provide $60 billion-worth of weapons over the next 10 years. The Israelis, obviously, are hostile. The Europeans are hostile to Iran but want to avoid escalation, unless it ends quickly and successfully and without a disruption of oil supplies. The Russians like the Iranians are a thorn in the American side, as are the Chinese, but neither would have much choice should the United States deal with Iran quickly and effectively. Moreover, the situation in Iraq would improve if Iran were to be neutralized, and the psychology in Afghanistan could also shift.
If Obama were to use foreign policy to enhance his political standing through decisive action, and achieve some positive results in relations with foreign governments, the one place he could do it would be Iran. The issue is what he might have to do and what the risks would be. Nothing could, after all, hurt him more than an aggressive stance against Iran that failed to achieve its goals or turned into a military disaster for the United States.
So far, Obama’s policy toward Iran has been to incrementally increase sanctions by building a weak coalition and allow the sanctions to create shifts in Iran’s domestic political situation. The idea is to weaken President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and strengthen his enemies, who are assumed to be more moderate and less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons. Obama has avoided overt military action against Iran, so a confrontation with Iran would require a deliberate shift in the U.S. stance, which would require a justification.
The most obvious justification would be to claim that Iran is about to construct a nuclear device. Whether or not this is true would be immaterial. First, no one would be in a position to challenge the claim, and, second, Obama’s credibility in making the assertion would be much greater than George W. Bush’s, given that Obama does not have the 2003 weapons-of-mass-destruction debacle to deal with and has the advantage of not having made such a claim before. Coming from Obama, the claim would confirm the views of the Republicans, while the Democrats would be hard-pressed to challenge him. In the face of this assertion, Obama would be forced to take action. He could appear reluctant to his base, decisive to the rest. The Republicans could not easily attack him. Nor would the claim be a lie. Defining what it means to almost possess nuclear weapons is nearly a metaphysical discussion. It requires merely a shift in definitions and assumptions. This is cynical scenario, but it can be aligned with reasonable concerns.
As STRATFOR has argued in the past, destroying Iran’s nuclear capability does not involve a one-day raid, nor is Iran without the ability to retaliate. Its nuclear facilities are in a number of places and Iran has had years to harden those facilities. Destroying the facilities might take an extended air campaign and might even require the use of special operations units to verify battle damage and complete the mission. In addition, military action against Iran’s naval forces would be needed to protect the oil routes through the Persian Gulf from small boat swarms and mines, anti-ship missile launchers would have to be attacked and Iranian air force and air defenses taken out. This would not solve the problem of the rest of Iran’s conventional forces, which would represent a threat to the region, so these forces would have to be attacked and reduced as well.
An attack on Iran would not be an invasion, nor would it be a short war. Like Yugoslavia in 1999, it would be an extended air war lasting an unknown number of months. There would be American POWs from aircraft that were shot down or suffered mechanical failure over Iranian territory. There would be many civilian casualties, which the international media would focus on. It would not be an antiseptic campaign, but it would likely (though it is important to reiterate not certainly) destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and profoundly weaken its conventional forces. It would be a war based on American strengths in aerial warfare and technology, not on American weaknesses in counterinsurgency. It would strengthen the Iranian regime (as aerial bombing usually does) by rallying the Iranian public to its side against the aggression. If the campaign were successful, the Iranian regime would be stronger politically, at least for a while, but eviscerated militarily. A successful campaign would ease the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, calm the Saudis and demonstrate to the Europeans American capability and will. It would also cause the Russians and Chinese to become very thoughtful.
A campaign against Iran would have its risks. Iran could launch a terrorist campaign and attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, sending the global economy into a deep recession on soaring oil prices. It could also create a civil war in Iraq. U.S. intelligence could have missed the fact that the Iranians already have a deliverable nuclear weapon. All of these are possible risks, and, according to STRATFOR’s thinking, the risks outweigh the rewards. After all, the best laid military plan can end in a fiasco.
We have argued that a negotiation with Iran in the order of President Richard Nixon’s reversal on China would be a lower-risk solution to the nuclear problem than the military option. But for Obama, this is politically difficult to do. Had Bush done this, he would have had the ideological credentials to deal with Iran, as Nixon had the ideological credentials to deal with China. But Obama does not. Negotiating an agreement with Iran in the wake of an electoral rout would open the floodgates to condemnation of Obama as an appeaser. In losing power, he loses the option for negotiation unless he is content to be a one-term president.
I am arguing the following. First, Obama will be paralyzed on domestic policies by this election. He can craft a re-election campaign blaming the Republicans for gridlock. This has its advantages and disadvantages; the Republicans, charging that he refused to adjust to the electorate’s wishes, can blame him for the gridlock. It can go either way. The other option for Obama is to look for triumph in foreign policy where he has a weak hand. The only obvious way to achieve success that would have a positive effect on the U.S. strategic position is to attack Iran. Such an attack would have substantial advantages and very real dangers. It could change the dynamics of the Middle East and it could be a military failure.
I am not claiming that Obama will decide to do this based on politics, although no U.S. president has ever engaged in foreign involvement without political considerations, nor should he. I am saying that, at this moment in history, given the domestic gridlock that appears to be in the offing, a shift to a foreign policy emphasis makes sense, Obama needs to be seen as an effective commander in chief and Iran is the logical target.
This is not a prediction. Obama does not share his thoughts with me. It is merely speculation on the options Obama will have after the midterm elections, not what he will choose to do.
Arnold,
I’ll respond later to your other comments (much appreciated), but I will mention now that you may not have fully appreciated the purpose of my analyses of Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter. Perhaps only lawyers will care much about these issues, but I’ll repeat my analyses below for the lawyers who may be present.
BEGINNING OF EXCERPT:
“Though the Security Council has no authority to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, it has considerable authority, on certain conditions, to accomplish the same result under Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) of the UN Charter. The bulk of this Part 2 is devoted to Chapter VII, but Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter first deserve attention because they sometimes are mentioned in the Iran nuclear debate.”
“Article 25 of the UN Charter.”
“Article 25 states: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” Some argue this means that Iran must obey any Security Council decision, authorized or not – in other words, that UN Members must comply “in accordance with the present Charter” with Security Council decisions that may or may not have been made “in accordance with the present Charter.” But if that is what Article 25 means, it follows that every UN member signed away its sovereignty when it joined, a conclusion that would alarm every UN member – except for the five permanent members of the Security Council, of course, who can veto any action.”
“A country’s decision to join the UN is voluntary. It reflects the country’s determination that the benefits of UN membership are worth relinquishing some of the country’s sovereignty to obtain. The amount of sovereignty it must relinquish, and the conditions and terms on which it must do so, are spelled out in the UN Charter, which the country’s representatives presumably read carefully before signing. The country is not asked simply to sign a blank check relinquishing however much of its sovereignty the Security Council may some day decide to take away, on whatever conditions and terms may seem appropriate to the Security Council at the time. Article 25 can fairly be interpreted to require only that UN members obey Security Council decisions made in accordance with the UN Charter, which explicitly states (and thus implicitly limits) the Security Council’s powers in Article 24(2): “The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.” Each of those Chapters, in turn, sets forth specific conditions that must be satisfied and procedures that must be followed in order for a Security Council decision to be made “in accordance with the present Charter.” In the case of Chapter VII, for example, the Security Council must determine that a country poses a Peace Threat before the Security Council may take action against it. One must wonder why so much paper, ink, thought and discussion was devoted to spelling out these conditions and procedures if a Security Council decision is just as binding whether it complies with them or not.”
“If this “authorized or not” interpretation of Article 25 were applied internally in the United States (though it has no institution equivalent to the Security Council), it would mean essentially that any action taken by the executive branch of the government would be binding on all Americans, whether constitutional or not. One assumes that the proponents of this broad Article 25 interpretation would not find this acceptable in the United States and hopes, therefore, that they simply have not considered the question thoroughly enough to appreciate this analogy.”
“The narrower “constitutional” view of Article 25 does not, of course, justify a UN Member’s refusal to carry out a Security Council decision based on the Member’s own determination that the decision was not made “in accordance with the present Charter” – any more than an American citizen has authority to decide whether a policeman who breaks down his front door has violated his constitutional rights. An independent decision would be necessary to resolve a good faith dispute – most likely an advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice under UN Charter Article 96(2).”
“Article 103 of the UN Charter.”
“Article 103 provides that a UN member’s obligations under the UN Charter govern over its conflicting obligations “under any other international agreement.” But neither side contends that Iran has conflicting obligations under the UN Charter and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Quite the contrary: the Security Council contends Iran is violating essentially the same obligations under both documents (by enriching uranium, for example), while Iran insists it has no such obligations under either of them. The question here is not whether Iran has conflicting obligations, but whether Iran’s sovereign right to carry on a peaceful nuclear program, notably including enrichment – a right that was not granted by the NPT, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement or any other agreement, but instead exists separately from all of them – is restricted by authorized action taken under the UN Charter. If the answer is “yes,” then Iran is subject to those restrictions (in the form of the Iran Resolutions) under Article 25, not Article 103. If the answer is “no,” then neither Article 25 nor Article 103 restricts Iran.”
END OF EXCERPT.
Salam Kamran,
Wow! It is an honour to be noticed by such an objective and level-headed commentator as Mr. Shariatmadari. Thank you for bringing this to my attention.
S.
Pirouz,
“Arbitration is a throw of the dice.”
There may be reasons not to arbitrate (though none come to my mind, after very considerable thought on the subject), but I assure you that’s not one of them — not with the questions I’ve carefully chosen (with the possible exception of the Code 3.1 question, as I’ve noted). The IAEA could add questions of its own, of course, though I cannot think of any questions it might want to shine a bright light upon.
Despite my “legal” approach to this, incidentally, my suggestion is politically motivated, aimed simply at undercutting what appear to very many observers to be sound US grounds for complaining about Iran’s conduct of its nuclear program. An arbitration ruling in Iran’s favor is highly unlikely to change official US behavior. But a very large number of intelligent and educated people around the world (including in the US itself) presently support the US government on this for a reason that an arbitration proceeding would make them understand is not valid: They honestly but mistakenly believe Iran is flagrantly violating its Safeguards Agreement and that there can be only one reason it is doing so: It is secretly developing nuclear weapons. Eliminating that misunderstanding could peel off a very large portion of the US’ support.
Iran only needs to slow down the US. Seeking, getting and highlighting an independent confirmation of the correctness of its position on the Safeguards Agreement would enable Iran to do that. Time is on Iran’s side. On this point, please also see my post of October 26 at 11:41 AM.
James Canning:
I encourage hanging for him.
James Canning:
My point was that certain confronations have become a permamnet feature of the international system and the Iranain Nuclear case – after the latest sanctions – sdemosntrates all the elements of such a situation.
Needless to say, since Iran is bordering 15 other states, its population comes and goes across international borders, and she has trade with 80 other states, she will not become another North Korea.
Sakineh Bagoom:
Power is not constrained by international law.
Only the weak states without hydrogen bombs and the ability to deliver them can take such clap-trap seriously.
That does not mean that International Law is useless; it means that its instruments are based on mutual agreements that it is more beneficial to give up some powers in order to obtain some other useful things.
The benefit comes from the realization of the limitations of all states on this planet; none of them are hegemonic across the planet and none of them can hope to coerce every other state into ceding power to them.
Successful examples are Law of the Seas where gunboat diplomacy no longer is practical and the World Trade Organization.
But note that US/EU/China/USSR shredded the Chemical Weapons Treaty and they are in the process of doing the same thing with NPT. Their calculation, all the while, being that they can get away with it. And they are right in that estimation.
The polciy perscription the follows from these observations is that for a non-nuclear state, without strategic heft, alliance with a nuclear state is a nececcsity.
The other policy perscription is to sign as many of these worthless pieces of paper as possible to gain their marginal utility (if any) but to put no lasting trust on them.
James canning,
Who to date, has been brought up on charges regarding this illegal Iraq war?
I encourage support for Tariq Aziz, who has been sentenced to death by an Iraqi court.
Aziz tried to avoid the idiotic US war with Iraq and he risked his life to provide confirmation to the CIA that Iraq had destroyed all its WMD during the 1990s. A conspiracy within the White House, led by Dick Cheney (warmonger supreme), suppressed this intelligence and even kept it from the British!
Sakineh,
Now that a former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Sheldon, has confirmed in an interview broadcast on network TV in the US, that there in fact was a conspiracy within the White House, to set up the idiotic war with Iraq, the facts are really coming out.
The truth must be ascertained, and put out to the public worldwide, day in and day out. The same warmongering liars (including Paul Wolfowitz) are hard at it just now.
Eric,
Thanks. The duplicity of the US in its dealings with France and Germany, regarding resolution 1441, needs much greater attention. And we had idiots in the US Congress calling for “freedom fries” instead of “French fries”!
fyi,
I find it fascinating that you want Iran to isolate itself, and deliberately seek to occupy the pariah status in the world currently enjoyed by North Korea! Is there a religious dimension to this thinking?
fyi,
I am being very “real.” That is precisely why I ask the questions. Can a case be made out so that a “power” is bound by the international laws? Will it matter?
I am reminded of the Goldstone report and how it was shredded.
fyi,
Obama wants to end the foolish US embargo against Cuba. As you know, the Cuban lobby is of crucial importance in the “swing” state of Florida. This is the reason the embargo has not been ended. It may be on its last legs, however.
Sakineh,
“Nicely done Eric! Well thought out and well written.
So, can this be taken to the say, Hague in Iran vs. USA?”
Sakineh,
The procedure is laid out in detail in Iran’s Safeguards Agreement:
“The Article 22 procedure is straightforward. Each party designates an arbitrator, and those two designate a third, who chairs the arbitration panel. If a party fails to designate an arbitrator, or the first two fail to designate the third, before specified deadlines, the President of the International Court of Justice will do so on either party’s request. Though Article 22 does not require this, the arbitrators are likely to be three highly respected jurists from countries not involved in the dispute. Once constituted, the arbitration panel lays down procedural rules, hears the case, and decides by a two-thirds vote. Its decision is binding.”
Alan,
“Secondly, the separation of the 2003 “non-compliances” to the “alleged studies” investigation became somewhat indistinct following the unveiling of the IR-2/3/4 centrifuges. The IAEA then effectively rolled the about-to-be-closed P-2 centrifuge argument into the “Possible Military Dimensions” argument. In other words, the continuity remains from 2003.”
Alan,
As you well know, I have the highest respect for your deep and sharp analysis of Iran nuclear issues.
Nevertheless, I view this comment as a perfect example of the blurring of the critical distinction between (1) what Iran is required to do under its Safeguards Agreement; and (2) what the IAEA (and now the UNSC) insist Iran is required to do, without any basis for that insistence in Iran’s Safeguards Agreement — a blurring that I find to be a principal cause of the widespread and dangerous misunderstanding concerning Iran’s present compliance status under its Safeguards Agreement.
With that thought in mind, I will appreciate your telling me precisely the ground on which you rely to conclude that Iran must disclose anything at all about the IR-2/3/4 centrifuges (other than what little, if any, information about them that may be specifically required under its Safeguards Agreement). As you note, the P-2 centrifuges (and the P-1 centrifuges, you might have added) were included in the IAEA’s original investigation prompted by the 2002/2003 revelations of Iran’s pre-October 2003 undisclosed activities. As you note, the IAEA’s inquiry into the P-2 centrifuges was about to be completed when the “alleged studies” appeared, and, as you also know, that P-2 inquiry was soon thereafter closed. The “alleged studies” inquiry had begun in the meantime, of course, and, as you note, the IAEA chose to treat the two inquiries as if they were just one big happy investigation that might go on for many more years (as it indeed has).
I certainly don’t deny that the IAEA has argued there is “continuity,” but the fact remains that there is not continuity. Whether Iran should answer more questions about the “alleged studies” is a valid question to raise (and I think it should, as I write in my article). Whether, however, Iran is legally required to — or to cooperate with the IAEA at all in its ongoing inquiry into “Possible Military Dimensions” — is not, in my view, open to debate: Iran is not, and does not violate its Safeguards Agreement simply by taking that position.
I think you need to offer more than just the observation that the “IAEA then effectively rolled the about-to-be-closed P-2 centrifuge argument into the “Possible Military Dimensions” argument.” It certainly did do that. The question is whether it had any basis whatsoever for doing that under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
Sakineh Bagoom:
You must be joking.
US/EU have consistently abused international institutions, treaties, and instrumentalities.
Even if Iran prevails in such an arbitration case; US/EU will be very unlikely to honor it. Look no futher than the Algiers Accords that have been reinterpreted by US at will.
You guys have to come back to reality – which is that the US/EU confrontation with Iran – across multiple issue – has now become a permanent feature of the international system; just like Cuba, Sudan, Syria, North Korea, Zimbabwe, and Burma.
I expect the number of states belonging to this catergory of resistors to increase as global power devolves further.
RSH,
From the previous thread: “When the Iran war – or the US-Pakistan war, or the Yemen war or whatever – starts, trust me, I’ll be here to say, “I told you so.” And all the naysayers can then bow down and tell me I’m the smartest guy in the room.”
Slippery slopes Richard, slippery slopes!
I predict that a hurricane, earthquake, heart attack, sh*t will happen soon. That doesn’t make me smart. It doesn’t make me any smarter since I can’t tell you when it will occur. It certainly makes me less smart to say, “I told you so.” But, I can say what to do to perhaps avert those conditions or at least safeguard against them.
So, Richard, I ask you, no, I beg you, to put your smartest of the smart caps on and tell us how to avert an on-coming situation that you have predicted will be coming.
Nicely done Eric! Well thought out and well written.
So, can this be taken to the say, Hague in Iran vs. USA?
Kooshy,
“Thank you, I saw that but still, I meant and wished Iran’s own legal standing and opinion was inserted in a stronger way in the body of the article rather as a footnote, since as has been numerously pointed by Iran that this is the actual Iran’s legal argument regarding its nuclear case.”
That’s a fair point, but I gave a very great deal of thought to how much credit Iran deserved for having presented that argument. I concluded, and still would, that it deserved a long footnote, for the simple reason that Iran has not made this argument clearly enough to deserve a more prominent mention. I strongly recommend that you and others read the very lengthy Iran letter to the IAEA referred to in that footnote. I am confident you’ll agree that, with the exception of that well-put sentence I quoted in the footnote, Iran did not present well the essential argument I make: under no circumstances — none — is the UNSC authorized to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (as distinguished from acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, after making a Peace Threat determination). Like nearly all other commentators, Iran devoted most of that letter to arguing simply that the conditions for a proper “referral” had not been met.
Incidentally, you mentioned Gordon Prather. I’ve read and am impressed by much of his writing. I don’t remember whether I read anything of his when I researched this article, but I’m all but certain I did. I don’t recall why I decided not to cite him, and so I won’t venture a guess. But I’ll look back and see whether I can recall why I did not.
This debate is quite interesting. Apparently, the American guest was one of the people behind the war on Iraq.
http://rt.com/About_Us/Programmes/CrossTalk/2010-10-22/604657.html
James,
Good observations on Resolution 1441. Incidentally, I believe it is appropriate to give Resolution 1441 the emphasis I gave it, but I will note that a thoughtful comment from Jeremy Hammond prompted me to write a long footnote in which I remind the reader that the US very soon fell back on other grounds as well to justify its unauthorized March 2003 attack on Iraq.
FOOTNOTE 22:
22 US Justifications for 2003 Attack on Iraq. The US did not rely solely on Resolution 1441 to justify its 2003 attack on Iraq. It also cited two Security Council resolutions left over from the 1990-1991 Iraq conflict: Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991), which the US insisted were still effective despite their age and the much different purposes for which they had been adopted. See, for example, Bellinger, John B., III, “Authority for Use of Force by the United States Against Iraq under International Law,” Council on Foreign Relations (April 10, 2003). In addition, the United States’ assertion that another Security Council meeting was unnecessary had been challenged even by its normally dependable ally, Great Britain, which prompted the US (along with Great Britain and Spain) to draft a follow-up resolution to 1441 (never formally proposed) specifically authorizing an attack on Iraq. Ultimately, the United States also relied on a “self-defense” argument not based on any Security Council resolution: the US had a sovereign right to defend itself against the specific threat to the US posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
Under this closer analysis of the US’ justification for its 2003 attack on Iraq, however, the importance to Russia and China of avoiding a Peace Threat determination in all of the Iran Resolutions was equal to or greater than its importance under a “1441-only” analysis. Few will doubt that the US would be prepared to make the same “self defense” argument this time: Iran is considerably stronger militarily than Iraq was before the US attacked it in 2003, and many more US troops are stationed within missile range of Iran than was true for Iraq in March 2003. If and when the US decides to attack, even the earliest Iran Resolutions (1696 and 1737 (2006)) probably would be more recent, and certainly more on point, than the two Gulf War resolutions that the US dusted off and re-used as justifications in 2003 (678 (1990) and 687 (1991)). Those early Iran Resolutions would be much more useful to the US if they included a Peace Threat determination (as had 678 and 687) than if they did not. The same would be true for the Resolution 1441-equivalent resolution, whether that turned out to be Resolution 1929 or a later Iran Resolution that by then had been adopted.
Possibly Russia and China took some comfort in the greater specificity of the “next steps” language in the Iran Resolutions. Instead of a vague threat of “serious consequences” as in Resolution 1441, which the US soon sought to define to include “military attack by any UN member, without further authorization,” the Security Council in each of the Iran Resolutions specifically threatened “to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41″ if Iran did not comply – arguably precluding military action under Article 42 without specific Security Council authorization. It is difficult to believe, however, that Russia and China pinned their hopes on this fine distinction in the “next steps” language. Their insistence that each Iran Resolution carefully omit language that could be interpreted as a Peace Threat determination suggests they recalled clearly the US’ then-recent effort to exploit the Peace Threat determinations in Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441, and sought to ensure that the same arguments would not be available to the US again.
Eric
“See footnote 1:”
Thank you, I saw that but still, I meant and wished Iran’s own legal standing and opinion was inserted in a stronger way in the body of the article rather as a footnote, since as has been numerously pointed by Iran that this is the actual Iran’s legal argument regarding its nuclear case.
Alan,
“Question 4 may be a bit more complicated, but like you say, if it was excluded, the IAEA would probably include it.”
I’ll comment more later, but I’d appreciate your (and others’) thoughts now on footnote 33 (quoted below) on Question 4 (the Code 3.1 question) — and especially on what I predict would be be the parties’ respective arguments on that question. As I note and you know, a lot more relevant facts may change our analysis (notably Iran’s Feb. 26, 2003 letter to the IAEA, and records of oral discussions during El Baradei’s late February 2003 visit to Iran), but I think my analysis of those arguments is sound based on what I now can garner from the public record.
Note, by the way, that I do mention separately, in the second paragraph of footnote 33 and in another footnote, the different question of whether, once Iran has disclosed a facility, it thereupon becomes obligated to disclose design information about the facility, even if it declared the facility earlier than it was required to. Though I don’t take a position on that in the article, I tend to agree with you that, once a facility is declared, Code 3.1 become irrelevant.
FOOTNOTE 33:
33 Code 3.1 Dispute. The “revised” version of Code 3.1 essentially requires disclosure of a nuclear facility as soon as a country has decided to build it. The original (1976) version requires disclosure only 180 days before nuclear material is introduced into the facility. Iran voluntarily complied with the revised version for several years (February 2003 to March 2007), but ceased when Iran’s parliament (Majlis) formally rejected it. The IAEA insists that Iran may not revert to the original Code 3.1 without the IAEA’s consent.
It should be noted that the IAEA makes an additional argument – related to the Code 3.1 dispute but nevertheless based on the Safeguards Agreement itself. The IAEA complains that Iran is not cooperating fully with the IAEA’s efforts to verify design information for certain declared facilities, which the IAEA argues Iran must do whether or not Iran had been required to declare the facility as early as it did. See, for example, paragraphs 12-14 and 18 of IAEA Director General’s report dated May 23, 2007 (GOV/2007/22); paragraphs 8-9 of IAEA Director General’s report dated February 19, 2009 (GOV/2009/8); paragraphs 7, 13 and 20 of IAEA Director General’s report dated June 5, 2009 (GOV/2009/35); paragraphs 11 and 26 of IAEA Director General’s report dated August 28, 2009 (GOV/2009/55).
Iran and IAEA Arguments on Code 3.1 Dispute. Presented in more detail, the arguments of Iran and the IAEA on the Code 3.1 issue are likely to be essentially as follows. References are to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
Iran probably would argue that (1) there is no dispute that Iran’s Safeguards Agreement itself did not become effective until it was ratified by Iran’s parliament (Majlis), which occurred nearly a year after the Agreement had been signed by Iran’s representative to the IAEA (see, Article 25 and preliminary Note 2); (2) Articles 24(b) and 24(c) provide that any amendment to the Safeguards Agreement must also be approved by the “Government of Iran” and “shall enter into force on the same conditions as entry into force of the Agreement itself,” which means that an amendment becomes effective only when “written notification [has been given by the Government of Iran to the IAEA] that Iran’s statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met,” as required under Article 25; (3) no such notification was ever given with respect to revised Code 3.1 (and those “statutory and constitutional requirements” in fact were never met, as the IAEA knew); (4) although Article 39 provides that Subsidiary Arrangements may be amended without amending the Agreement itself, Article 39 also provides that amendments of Subsidiary Arrangements, just like amendments of the Agreement itself, require “agreement between the Government of Iran and the [IAEA];” (5) nothing in the Agreement provides that “Government of Iran” approval may be given for amendments of a Subsidiary Arrangement in a different way from how “Government of Iran” approval must be given for amendments of the Agreement; (6) since the “Government of Iran” never approved the revised version of Code 3.1 in the manner required for approval of Agreement amendments (as the IAEA knew), it never became binding on Iran, and so Iran’s voluntary compliance with revised Code 3.1 could be terminated at any time, which Iran did in March 2007 by notifying the IAEA that Iran’s Majlis had formally disapproved revised Code 3.1; and (7) Iran’s voluntary compliance with revised Code 3.1 for several years, approved only by Iran’s IAEA representative, did not “estop” Iran later from enforcing the Agreement’s requirement that amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements be approved by the “Government of Iran,” since Iran’s IAEA representative had no authority to modify this amendment-approval requirement and neither he nor the Government of Iran ever represented to the IAEA that he did.
The IAEA probably would argue that (1) unlike the Agreement itself and amendments to the Agreement, Subsidiary Arrangements and amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements customarily have been approved by a country without formal satisfaction of the country’s “statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force;” (2) Iran had acknowledged the validity of this “informal” approval process for Subsidiary Arrangements decades earlier by agreeing (through its IAEA representative) to Iran’s original Subsidiary Arrangements without seeking or receiving formal approval from Iran’s Majlis; (3) Iran again acknowledged the validity of this “informal” approval process for Subsidiary Arrangements by agreeing (through its IAEA representative) in February 2003 to observe revised Code 3.1 without seeking or receiving formal approval from Iran’s Majlis; (4) Iran yet again acknowledged the validity of this “informal” amendment process by failing to inform the IAEA (until Iran formally notified the IAEA in March 2007 that it would no longer observe revised Code 3.1) that Iran considered its observance of Code 3.1 to be voluntary and revocable unless and until revised Code 3.1 had been ratified by Iran’s Majlis; and (5) since the amendment to Code 3.1 had thus become effective, it could not be amended again (to revert to the original Code 3.1) absent an “agreement between the Government of Iran and the [IAEA],” as required under Article 39.
A key document in this Code 3.1 dispute is the February 26, 2003 letter from Iran to the IAEA in which Iran informed the IAEA that it would observe revised Code 3.1. To this writer’s knowledge, that letter remains non-public, and the IAEA lacks authority to publicize it without Iran’s consent. That letter, and other confidential information, undoubtedly would be reviewed by an arbitration panel.
We all should bear in mind that the US assured France and Germany that UN resolution 1441 WOULD NOT be a basis for invading Iraq, WITHOUT A FURTHER RESOLUTION. The lying and cheating engaged in by the neocons who set up the illegal invasion of Iraq, needs continuous exposure because many of the same liars and cheaters are currently trying to set up war with Iran. A principal liar and cheater, of course, is Paul Wolfowitz
(currently at the American Enterprise Institute).
Eric,
Arbitration is a non-starter in Iran. You should have checked with us- the real experts on Iran- before going through the trouble :-)
Scott Lucas
This article is about people like you. Have someone translate it for you.
http://www.jahannews.com/vdcao6n6a49nyw1.k5k4.html
Alan and Arnold,
Thanks. I will respond to your detailed comments later.
You will note on page 1, though, that i (properly) credited each of you with having helped me greatly to sharpen my thinking on this important issue. I had assumed that crediting someone meant that they were not allowed to say anything at all critical. Not so?
Kooshy,
“2- I didn’t see any concrete and explicit mentioning by you, that Iran’s governments also holds the same legal argument, that the referral of Iran’s case to UNSC by the agency is unjustified and the sanctions adopted by the UNSC to limit Iran’s sovereign rights are illegal.”
See footnote 1:
“A good example of Iran’s own acceptance of this non-existent “referral” process appears in its March 26, 2008 letter to the IAEA (INFCIRC/724): “Referring a country’s nuclear issue to the Security Council is only possible under certain conditions as described below:…” There follow three long paragraphs of conditions that Iran argues must be satisfied before the Security Council may properly be asked to intervene. Iran overstates one point and overlooks another. The IAEA need not satisfy any conditions to “report” whatever it may feel like reporting to the Security Council (see, footnote 4). On the other hand, the making of such a report confers no authority on the Security Council under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, regardless of what “conditions” the IAEA may have satisfied – notwithstanding Iran’s concession that such authority exists, on certain conditions, under Article 19 of its Safeguards Agreement and Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. Having forced the analysis into this too-narrow frame, Iran’s letter moves on to unpersuasive arguments based, for example, on the IAEA’s routine verifications that Iran has not diverted declared nuclear material (correct but insufficient, since Iran’s Safeguards Agreement applies to undeclared nuclear material as well), and the assertion that the IAEA must first determine that a “threat to international peace and security is involved” (a task for the Security Council, not the IAEA). Iran’s letter does include one ray of light – a well-put sentence that is the subject of Part 2 of this article: “The Security Council has never determined Iran’s nuclear program [is] a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter and, thus, it could not adopt any measures against … Iran under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” But the letter follows this promising sentence with an incorrect assertion that the Security Council “must have exhausted all required procedures under Chapter VI of the UN Charter” (a good idea discussed in Part 3 of this article, but not required) and then drops the argument entirely.”
Eric
Many congratulations, for the promised Publishing (with capital P) of your comprehensive legal opinion, on the Iran nuclear dossier, and Iran’s and Agency’s rights and obligations. I was glad to see that your opinion’s language was adopted for easy understanding by average and none trained readers, while the substance of the legal argument is not compromised in any way. At the end of the day I don’t believe considering the current world structure arbitration would benefit Iran, I also believe Iran’s government has drawn the same conclusion with regards to this issue. I am left with two quick observations, which might be my oversight since I was up and reading your article late last night.
1- if I remember correctly Gordon Prather wrote series of articles in the period of 2006-2009 arguing along the same legal opinion, I wonder if you did consider his opinions and read his articles or referenced his worked, if you did he deserved to be mentioned.
2- I didn’t see any concrete and explicit mentioning by you, that Iran’s governments also holds the same legal argument, that the referral of Iran’s case to UNSC by the agency is unjustified and the sanctions adopted by the UNSC to limit Iran’s sovereign rights are illegal.
I thank you
Worth reading:
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/iran_view_moscow.pdf
Eric A. Brill:
There is no other way.
Eric, this may be long. Italicized text is your writing, non-italicized is mine. This is my first pass of more to come. I don’t really like the format of responding directly to quoted passages because it can lead to nitpicking rather than responses to broader ideas, but it has the advantage of being fairer in that it is clearer what words I’m responding to.
My first criticism of the essay is that it does not ask the question why the US wants Iran to stop enriching. The motivation of the US and of the parties is very important here. You’ve acknowledged that the US is working to prevent Iran from attaining capabilities Japan has. You’ve also acknowledged that preventing that outcome is neither legally or morally defensible. The dispute, the US lobbying the IAEA board of governors and lobbying Russia, China and the UNSC and the actions of IAEA inspectors who are sympathetic with the US agenda are all means to an end, not the end itself. We’ll go back to that point.
My second criticism of the essay is that there is what appears to me to be a naive idea that if “many people” get a single additional argument in Iran’s defense, that will decrease international cooperation with the sanctions. The cooperation with the sanctions that the US gets it gets by threatening to cut off access to the US banking system or market, or through other coercive measures.
The narrower “constitutional” view of Article 25 does not, of course, justify a UN Member’s refusal to carry out a Security Council decision based on the Member’s own determination that the decision was not made “in accordance with the present Charter” – any more than an American citizen has authority to decide whether a policeman who breaks down his front door has violated his constitutional rights. An independent decision would be necessary to resolve a good faith dispute – most likely an advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice under UN Charter Article 96(2).
I don’t consider this a good faith dispute. The United States has an agenda of preventing Iran from having nuclear capabilities that other NPT non-weapons signatories clearly are allowed to access. The UNSC resolutions are US efforts to advance that agenda. But I’m also not sure the ICJ could or would be able to provide an independent decision on this dispute.
A flat refusal by Iran to disclose any information at all – even its formal withdrawal from the NPT – would leave Iran in no more “threatening” a position than India, Pakistan and Israel have occupied for many years. Those three states have refused for decades to sign the NPT or to disclose anything about their nuclear programs. Each is known to have actual nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. Each has had very strained relations and occasional wars with one or more of its neighbors – India and Pakistan with one another, Israel with several countries in the Middle East. Despite all of this, the Security Council has never adopted, or even considered, an Article 39 resolution aimed at the nuclear program of any of those three countries.
In this light, an Article 39 resolution based explicitly on Iran’s unwillingness to take voluntary “confidence building measures” – as distinguished from Iran’s violation of its Safeguards Agreement – would appear to much of the world as a high form of hypocrisy. For this reason, Iran’s position will be much stronger if it can obtain an authoritative confirmation that this is exactly what has happened so far. As discussed in Part 3, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement lays out a convenient procedure for accomplishing this.
The first part is an excellent point. It is clearly hypocrisy that Iran is singled out. The United States has an agenda regarding Iran that it does not have regarding India or Pakistan and of course does not have regarding Israel. But Iran’s breaking its safeguards agreement, if it had, without building weapons is also by any objective or fair standard less of a threat to peace than other countries actually building weapons.
I disagree that anyone unconvinced by the facts on their face would be convinced by some arbitration body agreeing with Iran. The US thinks it is doing the right thing, protecting Israel and defending the, for the US, nearly sacred notion that there must be a Jewish state in Palestine by being hypocritical and holding Iran to a different standard.
Those sympathetic with the US agenda will come up with a reason to disregard any contrary arbitration ruling and will continue, as they are now, to be comfortable with this clear example of hypocrisy. I almost get the feeling you think the problem is that it is not clear enough that the US position is hypocritical. That is not the problem.
The problem is that many people in the West think the ideal of Jewish majority control of a state is more important than the ideals of democracy for the Egyptians, Jordanians, Arabs or Iranians and more important than the ideal of a Palestinian right to independent statehood or the ideal of a right to return to territory fled during wartime or the ideal of opposition to ethnic cleansing. In this specific case the West thinks the ideal of safety for the majority Jewish state is more important than the ideal or fair and equal access to technology. Many people in Israel’s region think the other ideals are more important than the idea that there must be a politically Jewish majority state.
This is a fundamental dispute that will continue to be fought over with higher and lower levels of violence until one side is unable or unwilling to continue. This is not a misunderstanding or failure to be sufficiently clear about hypocrisy.
The Article 22 procedure is straightforward. Each party designates an arbitrator, and those two designate a third, who chairs the arbitration panel. If a party fails to designate an arbitrator, or the first two fail to designate the third, before specified deadlines, the President of the International Court of Justice will do so on either party’s request. Though Article 22 does not require this, the arbitrators are likely to be three highly respected jurists from countries not involved in the dispute. Once constituted, the arbitration panel lays down procedural rules, hears the case, and decides by a two-thirds vote. Its decision is binding.
So the United States picks an arbiter and if this was done today then ICJ president Hisashi Owada picks an arbiter. If the arbiters chosen by these two agree, the NPT can be permanently changed by their fiat so that the AP is no longer a voluntary instrument but a mandatory requirement for non-weapons signatories – despite the clear language of the NPT. I don’t see any benefit to Iran that compensates for even a small risk to the what few protections exist for the rights of Iran and every other NPT non-weapons signatory.
Question 1. Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement grant the UN Security Council any authority to enforce the Agreement?
Question 2. Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement authorize the IAEA to impose additional obligations on Iran if the IAEA finds itself unable to verify Iran’s non-diversion of undeclared nuclear material but does not contend that its inability has occurred because Iran is failing to perform its obligations?
Question 3. Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement authorize the IAEA to restrict Iran’s right to enrich or reprocess uranium?
Question 4. Does Iran’s Safeguards Agreement require Iran to comply with the revised version of Code 3.1?
My two disagreements are first that the United States has resources, advantages and tools it could use to get favorable decisions or at least prevent unfavorable decisions even if Iran’s case is stronger on the merits. The United States is the most powerful member of the international system and an active influence on it. Second that getting these rulings would not change the US agenda or the vigor with which it pursues that agenda.
Many people who now believe Iran is unjustifiably defying the IAEA and Security Council will wonder this: “If the IAEA does not claim that Iran’s nuclear program has ever been out of compliance with its Safeguards Agreement since 2003, and the Security Council has never said that its nuclear program is a Peace Threat, what, exactly, has Iran done to deserve sanctions?” Iran’s critics, stripped of their convenient reply that Iran is violating its Safeguards Agreement, may find this question difficult to answer. The Security Council, in turn, may find it difficult to justify sanctions against Iran for declining to take actions that independent arbitrators have declared it is not required to take.
They critics may find it difficult to answer the question, but they aren’t anti-Semites so they’ll do what they have to do to either evade the question or answer it in a misleading way. At least they aren’t being asked to jump into a ditch with a rifle to defend Israel.
The Security Council is an interesting topic. The United States told Russia this year that it is willing to postpone efforts to position its anti-missile defenses on Russia’s border in Poland in exchange for a reset of relations that would include Russian cooperation regarding Iran. The United States has, after discussions with China regarding Iran, put on hold criticism of China’s currency policies that depress US exports in favor of Chinese exports. The US has a huge amount of leverage and nobody expects Russia or China to put either the interests of Iran or the interests of justice or fairness ahead of their own national interests.
If this “enforcement gap” response were to carry the day, Iran might end up wishing the arbitrators had ruled against it. Instead of a tense but inconclusive stand-off between Iran on the one side and the IAEA and Security Council on the other, the IAEA and the Security Council might be pushed aside entirely, with the battle recast as a stark conflict between Iran and the United States – the latter unrestricted by Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, Chapter VII or anything else but easily inflamed American public opinion.
Do you think the US is restrained by Iran’s safeguards agreement, Chapter VII or American public opinion now? I disagree. The US is restrained, I think mostly right now, by the presence of 150,000 US soldiers in neighboring countries who need open supply lines and host populations firing a limited number rather than a maximal number of missiles at them. When those soldiers are gone, the US will be restrained to some degree by Iran’s potential to harm other US assets and objectives in the region. Iran will determine how much deterrence it has as the situation changes, but things like American public opinion play a very small part in any Iranian calculation of possible US actions.
******
I have four or five excerpts from the essay that I’d like to respond to, but have to come back later today.
BUSSED-IN BASIJI WROTE:
“I’m afraid you are going to have to focus your efforts at preventing a ‘catastrophe’ on the US end. Anyway, nice try.”
PIROUZ WROTE:
“For [the Iranians], they’re convinced they occupy the moral high ground and are willing to commit themselves to a potential Hussein at Karbala type stand, if need be.”
I greatly admire the pride and courage reflected in these remarks, and I certainly don’t disagree that Iran occupies the higher moral ground on this issue. But I’m not persuaded that your scorched-earth prescription (or prediction, in Pirouz’s case) would be the wisest course for Iran and its people.
A few decades back, a Yale professor, Paul Kennedy, wrote an impressive historical study, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, in which he made the point that world powers typically begin to decline long before the world notices, often before the country itself notices. Typically, he explained, a country becomes strong by building a large economic surplus which – people being the way they are – is eventually devoted to building the country’s military might so that it can extend its power beyond its borders.
Sooner or later, the country’s economic power declines, but all the military hardware it has accumulated takes a very long time to rust. Sometimes the country is tempted to exercise its military power long after it has begun its decline but either hasn’t noticed or would like to keep other countries from noticing. That’s the time period when a rising power, such as Iran, may be especially wise to keep in mind the old saying: “Let sleeping dogs lie.”
As usual, Hollywood offers a good example. You may recall this scene from the original King Kong movie. The giant ape has plucked his screaming blonde victim from her sacrificial perch at the edge of the jungle and is trudging back toward his mountain lair (no doubt contemplating grimly the long-term prospects of his new relationship with this human female, who is one-hundredth his size, has so far not been warmly responsive to his clumsy romantic approaches, and clearly is unaccustomed to the rigors of jungle life). Unbeknownst to King Kong, he is being followed by the girl’s would-be rescuers, who do not yet have a plan in mind but appear confident that they soon will think of one.
Along the way, King Kong sets down the girl for a moment to do battle with an ornery stegosaurus on whose territory they apparently have encroached. After a ground-shaking back-and-forth clash, King Kong kills the beast, picks up the girl, and continues on his way. A short while later, the rescuers emerge from their hiding place and resume their pursuit. They pass by the dying stegosaurus just as death throes cause its heavy spiked tail to curl up from the ground and then slap back down, very nearly crushing the startled men walking right next to it.
The point here for Iran is this: Your time will come, but first be sure that the fearsome dinosaur is really dead.
In the meantime, the risk to Iran and its people of a US attack should not be minimized, much less ignored. Those who respond to that risk with a George W. Bush-like “Bring it on!” swagger may not be recommending the wisest course for the Iranian people. Consider this passage from Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace:
“At the approach of danger there are always two voices that speak with equal power in the human soul: one very reasonably tells a man to consider the nature of the danger and the means of escaping it; the other, still more reasonably, says that it is too depressing and painful to think of the danger, since it is not in man’s power to foresee everything and avert the general course of events, and it is therefore better to disregard what is painful till it comes, and to think about what is pleasant. In solitude a man generally listens to the first voice, but in society to the second.”
Tolstoy was referring to the surprising lack of concern shown by Moscow residents at the approach of Napoleon’s army – which entered the city a few weeks later to find it had been abandoned in a near-panic by most civilians and all Russian soldiers. Four-fifths of the city soon burned to the ground. Although Napoleon and his men packed up and left for France a few weeks later, eventually hurried along by the hastily regrouped Russian army, Moscow remained in ashes and the winter was very cold.
Most members of the Russian elite relocated to warm, comfortable homes in other places – the nineteenth century equivalents of Los Angeles, perhaps – while Moscow was painstakingly rebuilt by those who could not afford to leave. Many Russians who had left eventually returned – some to visit, others to live, all extremely proud of the indomitable Russian spirit that had reclaimed their ancient capital from the charred rubble. A number of them were so moved that they wrote books about this indomitable Russian spirit. Russians being avid readers, the poor, weary, sad Russian people read these books, and many of them were less sad after they had finished. They were still just as poor and weary, however. One suspects that many of them had listened to the voice one’s soul hears in solitude, and had wondered whether things might have worked out better had their leaders considered how best to deal with Napoleon long before his troops had reached the gates of Moscow.
To deal best with the modern-day Napoleon, Iran should consider doing what it can to keep him at bay until his decline has become a bit more apparent to himself and others. We are not there yet. The approach I suggest would enable Iran to obtain an authoritative confirmation that it holds the high moral ground on this issue. That may mean little to the United States, but it will mean a great deal to many others in the world who now believe that Iran is flagrantly violating its Safeguards Agreement and, therefore, must be developing nuclear weapons. In this way, Iran can buy a considerable amount of additional time, avoiding the lethal tail of the thrashing but not yet dead dinosaur while history takes its slow but inevitable course.
All:
An interesting geopolitical perspective:
http://sandbox.blog-city.com/if_iran_gets_the_bomb.htm
Note that the fellow is wrong in ascribing to Southern Persian Gulf states’ leaders a desire for military action against Iran. Those states are interested in economic development and do not wish to rock the boat.
The ideas espoused by the writer, it seems to me, to be positing a major division of labor between US in the Persian Gulf and Israel in the Levant. I think it silly; the burden of Israel’s security is carried by US.
Note alos the observation that the Iran as a Nuclear Weapons State will cause Israel to hang on to the Occupied Territories. The logic makes sense to me and it will inevitably lead to the One-state solution. Which has been the Iranian solution all along.
I think the writer is accurate in describing Egypt. I add here that in 20 years, there will be 100 million people in Egypt. Wonder what could happen there.
Lastly, I would not under-estimate the Arab street’s anger. They cannot field armies but they can cause a lot of damage by supporting terrorism.
I read the whole piece, and found no holes. It is to your credit to untangle such an emotioanqally charged issue, and propose a perfectly doable course of action.
More, as a question than anything else:
You point to Iran’s “passivity”, while dark clouds get darker, etc. And, hence give arbiteration as a way of undermining UNSC past (and future) resolutions that self-referentially are darkening the clouds further.
This is a rather static view of Iran’s evolving calculations over the the last few years of impass and “moving goalposts”.
Is it not possible that, whereas Iran may have started with a genuine and urgent desire to resolve the issue, she has acclamated to UNSC referal and moved its own goalposts. E.g. seeking vindication, yes, but now also demanding Isael’s nuclear issue be on the table, Western duplicity be outed, etc. In short, could there be a calculation that sees prologation of the dispute as advantageous to Iran, and pleasing to Russia and China?
Assuming that people who respect law, and logic, would already agree with you that a future arbitration’s ruling would favor Iran, could they be discounting its utility? Are they opting instead to draw their adversaries into putting all their chips on the table which Iranfigures she can withstand, but which they figure will destroy wetsern credibility?
Eric A. Brill “One assumes that something is written, somewhere, authorizing the Security Council to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. In fact, nothing but baseless assumptions, wishes and imagination support this belief.”
On the contrary, all permanent members wished to promote that to further their own geo-political interest.
“Brzezinski warned that Iran should not be antagonized by America into a position where Tehran would ally itself with Russia and China.”
The terrible two’s syndrome often displayed as comments in RFI in regards to the so called elec fraud is rather entertaining. Perhaps this analysis by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya would provide some food for thought.
“Amid the descriptions of the Green Wave as a democratic struggle or a fight for greater civil liberties, however, is the fact that it reflects an element of in-fighting amongst the Iranian elites. This point is crucial. For all intents and purposes, this key feature of the Green Wave is what must be kept in mind when discussing it at the geo-political level.”
Nazemroaya’s analyses are intriguing. I had not seen his writings in a good while. If others have more info on him, would appreciate your thoughts.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21584
Eric A Brill:
The possibility of War has been accepted by the Iranian leaders.
They think they can endure it.
Arbitration will not be accepted by the leaders of the Islamic Repbliuc of Iran.
I think it will be a good idea if you could think through the ramifications of war for both sides and for the international system.
I myself estimated the duration, casualties, and damages.
Perhaps you can concentrate on the post-war period.
Nicely done Eric.
Question 1 seems a no-brainer. Questions 2 & 3 would be subject I imagine to arguments about what the IAEA can call for under Article 18, which looks on the face of it to be nothing more than “call upon”. Question 4 may be a bit more complicated, but like you say, if it was excluded, the IAEA would probably include it.
Two things – firstly, the Russia/China position may be less about preventing a US “end-run”, more about having a foot in each camp while keeping their nose clean and leaving the US to do the heavy lifting. In other words, they may accept the validity of an implied Peace Threat. In general, it seems much of what the UNSC does is uncharted territory, which makes its validity difficult to determine, or even creates its own validity.
Secondly, the separation of the 2003 “non-compliances” to the “alleged studies” investigation became somewhat indistinct following the unveiling of the IR-2/3/4 centrifuges. The IAEA then effectively rolled the about-to-be-closed P-2 centrifuge argument into the “Possible Military Dimensions” argument. In other words, the continuity remains from 2003. The more recent laser enrichment claims of Ahmadinejad had much the same effect, although unlike the P-2 line, that one was previously definitively closed I think.
Have you seen that interview with Olli Heinonen in Haaretz, referenced by Jeffrey Lewis at ACW?
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/behind-the-scenes-of-un-nuclear-inspection-of-iran-1.320599
There’s a good deal of cobblers spouted by the reporter between questions, but Heinonen’s replies do add a bit to the Alleged Studies stuff.
On balance though, I do agree with Arnold that arbitration is perhaps superfluous to the realities of the positions of the parties. Nonetheless it is very useful to see the argument presented in this way. It will be interesting to see if you get any articles in response in the blogosphere.
Yes, another excellent piece by Eric – forget Hillary and Flynt, it is Eric Brill that is the number 1 Iran expert (*just joking*) in the United States.
I have never understood why Iran has been found to be in “non-compliance” of the NPT. It has not been observed diverting any of its civilian program for military use and is still cooperating with the IAEA.
From what I can tell, just having an enrichment program makes Iran an “outlaw” state. If Iran suspended enrichment, it would be back in compliance.
Recently, there have been some smut-peddlers who’ve stepped up there ever present trolling on these forums. Although I think engaging them directly only makes the problem worse, the article below, dealing the media attention focused on Neda Agha-Soltan, and it’s followup, dealing with the media coverage of Iran’s elections debunk the type of propaganda exercised by these cretins quite nicely.
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/hp051010.html
Masoud
For years, the United States and Israel have engaged in a covert effort to destabilize Iran’s government and sabotage its nuclear program. But these operations frequently escape mention in public discussions. By ignoring the covert effort, the current debate about the relative wisdom of diplomacy, sanctions, and preventive military action addresses an incomplete picture. To understand the challenges and potential of US-Iranian relations, the covert program must be factored into the equation.
Although sabotage may prove successful in slowing Iranian nuclear progress in the short term, it actually stands as a barrier to a long-term resolution.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LJ27Ak02.html
Another highly important article:
A few days ago I received an email entitled “CounterPunch openly publishes blatant Israeli-CIA agitprop against Iran.” The email was in reference to a recent article in CounterPunch by an Iranian-American who had attended a dinner in New York hosted by President Ahmadinejad for American anti-war, social justice and peace activists, while Ahmadinejad was visiting the US to attend the United Nations General Assembly Annual Meeting. The author of the article, presumably a supporter of the “green movement” in Iran, was upset about the fact that the American activists attending the dinner did not challenge Ahmadinejad over Iran’s human rights violations, and, instead, mostly expressed outrage over the US foreign policy. The writer of the email, who forwarded the essay to me, found the article to be similar to Iran bashing by American-Israeli propagandists. He appeared to be troubled about the fact that such an essay was posted on a progressive website.
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http://www.counterpunch.org/sasan10222010.html
It seems that everytime I want to say something Arnold Evans has already said better than I could have. I haven’t read the entire article Eric, but I somehow did expect to take greater issue with some of your analysis based on our previous discussions. I’ll give it a read tonight and try and come up with something blast you with in the morning, that is unless someone else beats me to it.
Masoud
Eric,
You know its funny and a little telling how you have unwittingly tapped into one of the classic Shia tragedy stories. Please refer to the events surrounding Imam Ali (as) at the Battle of Siffin and you will see why it will be a freezing day in hell before any self-respecting Shia leader would agree to arbitration of any kind, much less arbitration by non-Muslims.
I’m afraid you are going to have to focus your efforts at preventing a “catastrophe” on the US end. Anyway, nice try.
Outstanding effort, Eric.
I have to believe the Iranians have considered arbitration, but view the risks not worth the reward. For them, they’re convinced they occupy the moral high ground and are willing to commit themselves to a potential Hussein at Karbala type stand, if need be.
Arbitration is a throw of the dice. If the jurists are influenced (not unlikely, in Iran’s view) and rule against Iran, it’s a disaster. And if Iran somehow wins, the US will simply work around the determination. So from the Iranian perspective, it’s not worth the risk of losing their self-perceived occupation of the moral high ground- an essential element of Shia warfighting.
Scott,
Thank you. You’ll notice in the credits the name of a distinguished scholar and website master with whom I don’t always agree.
Eric
Eric,
Arbitration the way you suggest is domestically a non-starter in Iran. Also there are very clear sharia prohibitions on referring one’s case to non-Muslim judges/arbitrators regardless of how distinguished they may be.
I respectfully suggest that you focus your excellent mind and sincere heart on saving whatever is left of the American republic. If the US attacks Iran, that republic will die even if its name continues to exist.
Eric,
An interesting and valuable proposal….
S.
Second the idea of shorter articles with links to the larger ones for more detail.
I’ll read the longer article tomorrow. For now I’ll note that the United States has an agenda that Iran not be allowed to be nuclear capable. Barack Obama sees this as part of protecting Israel, which he sees as the over-arching moral good in the Middle East.
We’ve seen earlier that Barack Obama doesn’t think authoritarian dictatorships are so bad, as long as they “maintain peace with Israel”.
Because it is for the over-arching good, Obama is perfectly comfortable exaggerating or lying to any number of audiences about Iran’s nuclear program if that would help pressure Iran to submit, for Israel’s sake, to the US demand that Iran relinquish nuclear capability.
(Bill Clinton actually would be willing to jump into a ditch with a rifle to protect Israel. Barack Obama just being willing to make misleading statements apply pressure on countries on areas that are unrelated and potentially harm other aspects of US policy objectives is a comparatively small sacrifice.)
Are we sure Iran would win, assuming it has the better arguments? Would the arbitrators risk being anti-Semitic by failing to creatively stretch logic and law when the alternative is exposing Israel to a threat? Assuming Iran would win, after Iran submits to arbitration and wins does the US just give up? Does Barack Obama change his mind about Israel’s security requirements? Does he change his mind about Israel’s importance in his own moral scheme? Does he change his mind about the importance of supporters of Israel in his political efforts?
There is a root cause to US efforts to prevent Iranian enrichment and unless that is addressed, there is no reasonable expectation to see any change in US policy toward Iran. Iran can either submit to the US agenda or not.
M. Ali and Castellio,
Thank you.
I hope you’ll both take the time to read the longer piece to which the Leveretts have linked. I think you’ll find it enjoyable.
To those who are very familiar with the issues — and especially to those who disagree with the principal conclusions I’ve reached (I suspect there will be many readers in this category) — the shorter piece above may appear to make some statements that are incorrect. Space limitations make it impossible here to lay out all the supporting arguments. I am confident that most readers’ views will change once they’ve taken the time to digest the more detailed arguments in the longer piece. For those who want to dig even more deeply, several of the footnotes include fairly long essays on the more arcane points, often with numerous citations.
Congratulations, Eric, and to the Leveretts, thanks.
I have only read what is posted here. If I understand correctly, Eric, you are actually pointing to a specific incidence (or incidences) of the misuse of Security Council powers, and that these misuses are now being used as a precedent for continuing the initial mistake. You suggest an ‘out’ to roll this back…. arbitration.
It deserves thought, although trying to save the moral integrity of the Security Council of the UN while actively ignoring Israeli depredations is, it should be noted, an impossibility. Obviously, the issue quickly becomes which jurists… (as in Hariri?) but you are to be commended for looking for actual paths forward.
As for the beliefs of the populace of the US and the American government’s march to war, there are two assumptions you have built into your argument that shouldn’t be there: that popular ignorance is related to Iranian actions, when it is far more determined by the American media grinding its pro-Israeli axe; and two, that the American government is ‘victim’ to popular will, and not a great shaper of it.
The American government is currently shaping the popular ignorance. It is actively warmongering. How is this to be addressed? Will arbitration perhaps help?
Lets use the ‘Elders” as jurists. How about that? They have earned the necessary international respect. If so, I am all for it.
Congratulations, Eric. I haven’t read it yet, but I am sure it is going to be as comprehensive and original as your Election paper.
Eric, I think you can be a significient voice in the anti-war crowd (or forget that, lets just call you the pro-truth crowd) and I hope you take a pro-active approach in having your materials published in the media, or you should at the very least, contribute shorter articles to online and offline papers (Foreign Policy, for example).