In keeping with the thrust of yesterday’s post, which asked whether America’s traditional Arab allies might “strike their own deal with Iran”, we are publishing two posts, back-to-back, which present different perspectives on the implications of the Islamic Republic’s “rise” for America’s regional allies and the most appropriate U.S. policy response. The first of these posts, appended below, is by Dr. Christian Koch, Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. The second is by Hillary Mann Leverett. Both Christian and Hillary appeared at the 18th annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, held in Washington, DC on October 15-16, 2009. The texts of their posts are based on the remarks they offered at this conference.
From Dr. Koch: When it comes to the Iranian nuclear program, the GCC states find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, while the Arab Gulf States have voiced their support for a civilian program in Iran, they have been clear that they oppose any military application that might develop out of Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – are of the view that Iran as a military nuclear power would pose a direct threat to their internal as well as external security.
On the other hand, these states have also stated clearly that they do not want to see a military confrontation develop out of the current stand-off as this contains equally damaging consequences for their security. Yet, given the GCC’s own limited mechanisms to bring about an Iranian change of mind and to ensure that Tehran comes out clearly and verifiably with its peaceful stated intentions, the Arab Gulf finds itself at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere – in Washington, Paris, Moscow and Beijing.
This dilemma stems from the fact that the Iran-GCC relationship is defined by deep mistrust about the intentions and motivations of the other. While Iran wants to keep the issue of Gulf security within the region so that it can better play its dominating and powerful role in the Gulf, the Arab Gulf states seek to more or less internationalize regional security in an effort to bring about as broad a commitment as possible from external states to Gulf stability. In its efforts to suggest alternatives to the current Gulf security stalemate, Iran repeatedly asks for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region as a prerequisite. The GCC states, meanwhile, seek such foreign protection to compensate for their own deficit in self-defense capability and because they do not want to be thrown under any sort of Iranian mantle.
Without a doubt, there is the clear perception among Arab Gulf policymakers that Iran remains acutely oblivious to the security concerns of the GCC states, and that it solely seeks to measure up to the United States, even seeing itself in the same league as Washington. Viewed from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or Doha, Iran does not appear to have a serious policy towards the GCC which takes into account in any way the security perceptions of the Arab Gulf. The result is an Iranian approach to its neighbors that, in essence, borders on contempt and is framed within suggestions of superiority. Iran, in fact, displays a high degree of arrogance that does nothing more than perpetuate existing perceptions. This was highlighted recently when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad referred to the GCC states as “those little nations of the Gulf.”
There are numerous examples that display this Iranian attitude:
- The regular carrying out of offensive military maneuvers and exercises in Gulf waters. These exercises are not as much meant to scare off the United States as much as they are a clear attempt to intimidate Arab Gulf countries.
- The carrying out of missile launches and tests which have the same impact as military exercises. Not only does Iran repeatedly state that the GCC states are within easy range of these missiles but Tehran has in fact threatened to launch those missiles against US military installations in the region in the event of US attacks on Iranian nuclear installations. These bases are, of course, located on the territories of the GCC states.
- Iran has on numerous occasions threatened to intervene in the internal affairs of the GCC states, including stating that cells exist within these countries that can be called upon to carry out subversive activities or indicating that thousands of suicide bombers stand ready to carry out missions in the Gulf if necessary.
- Iran regularly threatens to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, through which almost one third of the world’s oil supply flows daily. This is in fact a direct threat to close the lifeline of the Gulf.
- Iran makes territorial claims on the GCC states, including repeated claims on the island state of Bahrain and it continues to occupy the three islands claimed by the UAE in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. On Bahrain, it was only in February 2009 that an Iranian Parliamentarian claimed that if Bahrainis were to vote in a referendum, they would choose to be part of Iran. There have also been calls of Bahrain as Iran’s 14th governorate. On the island issue, Iran has refused to engage in a substantive dialogue with the UAE including having the issue referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). What is particularly offensive for the UAE is that Iran regularly refers to the territorial dispute as a “misunderstanding”, implying that the UAE authorities are simply not sophisticated enough to understand the matter.
- In the same vein, Iran has repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of the Arab Gulf states and their system of rule. This was most recently demonstrated by the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mohammadi in 2008, when he stated that the Arab Gulf monarchies would soon be swept aside.
- Finally, there are instances of Iranian interference in other parts of the Middle East, for example, in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. In none of these places is Iran seen as playing a positive role towards conflict resolution but rather as a spoiler intent on keeping developments unbalanced so that Tehran can control the situation through deniable allies.
Equally relevant is the fact that Iran has missed numerous opportunities offered by the GCC states to build a more constructive regional relationship. The presence of President Ahmadinejad at the GCC summit meeting in Doha at the end of 2007 was one of those chances. The invitation for the Iranian president was issued in the spirit of a gesture to show that the GCC states continue to place the emphasis on dialogue and opportunities exist to resolve the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program. But, instead, the Iranian President’s speech before summit delegates was notable not for what he said but for what he did not say. No word on the intentions of the Iranian nuclear program and thus no words of reassurance for the Arab Gulf leadership, no mention of Iranian policy in Iraq and possibly Iranian efforts to help stabilize the situation there, and certainly no word on the issue of the three UAE islands. Instead, Ahmadinejad put forward ideas that were simply regurgitations of past proposals and therefore utterly failed to offer confidence about Iranian intentions. His reference to “our closeness and our common historic, social and cultural background” as the foundation for closer relations proved wholly insufficient. His continuous reference to the Persian Gulf at a summit of Arab Gulf States was perceived as a particular und unnecessary affront.
What Iran just does not seem to comprehend is that a little assurance can go a long way as far as the GCC states are concerned. There is already a broad consensus in the region that Iran, given its size and power, has a natural leading role to play when it comes to security issues. But with that role comes the responsibility to act and behave in a manner that promotes confidence and ensures greater regional stability. For the moment, Iran only pursues policies in the opposite direction.
It is in this context that Arab Gulf perceptions about the Iranian nuclear program must be seen. What is clear to GCC policy officials is that a potential Iranian nuclear program will not constitute a direct threat to the existence of the United States or even Israel (given Israel’s second strike capability and the fact that any Iranian program is certain to be a crude program with a limited number of devices at the outset). Rather, a nuclear weapon will provide Tehran an additional cover for it to institutionalize its interference and meddling in its immediate neighborhood. In those instances where Iran might be exposed or caught regarding such a policy, it would then simply thumb its nose and challenge anyone to do something about it.
In general, as far as the GCC states are concerned, no one is asking Tehran at the moment for a favor. The fact remains that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has certain obligations under its treaty provisions. Yet, Iran has violated those provisions and there are three legally binding UN Security Council Resolutions which demand that Iran stop its current enrichment activities. Those violations have in fact been acknowledged by all the permanent members of the UN Security Council including Russia and China. For the GCC states, if Iran is not forced to abide by its international treaty obligations, then what are their overall value? Israel, India and Pakistan are in a different category in this case as they never signed the NPT. The success/failure in making Iran abide by its obligations is seen as a litmus test for the way forward. Certainly, if Iran is allowed to get away with it, there will be a strong sentiment in the GCC states not to abide by those standards either. For the GCC, the priority is thus to see Iran stick to its original commitments.
Furthermore, there is a strategic dilemma that presents itself. Given the very real defense vulnerability of the Arab Gulf States in terms of limited self-defense and deterrence capabilities coupled to the absence of any trust regarding Iranian intentions, there is a growing recognition within the GCC leadership that it would be completely irresponsible to mortgage one’s future security by either relying on the United States to do the right thing or depend on Iran to come to its senses ultimately and become a good neighbor. Neither is it acceptable to just sit and wait until the day when the reality of an Iranian program becomes clear alongside Iranian nuclear hegemony.
As such, there is no option but for the GCC states to react. The first steps have already been taken with the announcement by the GCC, both collectively and individually, that they are pursuing the path towards civilian nuclear power technology. While there are logical arguments that can be made from an energy point of view for pursuing this option, there should be no doubt that Iran is in fact the cause for such decision. But to take this one step forward, given current Iranian intransigence, the GCC states also have to maintain their option to pursue military nuclear programs of their own given that possible US scenarios for protecting the GCC states would be insufficient. Can the Arab Gulf rely on a US defense or even a nuclear umbrella? Would this even be approved in the US Congress? Would such an umbrella be domestically acceptable in the GCC states since it would mean even greater reliance on the US? If a situation were to develop whereby Iran launches a nuclear missile on the Arab Gulf side, would such an umbrella even be useful given that retaliation by the United States would not undo the damage done by a nuclear warhead landing in a GCC capital? Or what would be the consequences if one day the United States and Iran bury their hatchet with the implicit agreement on Iran resuming its position as policeman of the Gulf?
In terms of all of these questions, protection is thus not really protection. It is also not an alternative to current efforts to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear. To say otherwise is to put the cart before the horse. The bottom line here is that Iran is the key to nuclear non-proliferation in the Gulf and wider Middle East. While the GCC states would accept a US umbrella as a temporary measure, it would simply be a cover until a state like Saudi Arabia can develop its own capability.
In light of these considerations, the GCC states have three choices: do nothing, seek protection or develop their own capability. The first means trusting Iran, while the second is insufficient. The only viable alternative is, therefore, to move towards an indigenous capability. There is, of course, no doubt that the outcome of such a strategy remains uncertain, but to ignore strategic realities would be irresponsible and an abdication of national interests.
So what is to be done? It should be clear that the focus has to be on preventing an Iranian nuclear program and ensuring Tehran’s fulfillment of its commitments and international obligations. As the GCC states cannot stop Iran on their own, they require the support of the international community to ensure Iranian compliance. At the same time, there need to be renewed efforts at coming up with creative solutions. One idea would be the revival of the Saudi initiative of creating an international consortium for nuclear fuel. A second would be the proposal put forth by the Gulf Research Center at the end of 2004 for the creation of a Gulf Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (GWMDFZ) as a precursor to a wider Middle East WMD Free Zone. But given that it is unlikely that the current government in Tehran will engage seriously on any of these proposals, there is also the need for a broader and more effective public diplomacy effort that enlarges the debate within Iran about the utility of pursuing a nuclear program. If change is to come about in the Iranian position, it has to come from within. In this context, inflammatory rhetoric should be avoided as this only gives the embattled government of President Ahmadinejad unintended legitimacy, which it can then utilize against its internal as well as external enemies. Here, further steps should also be taken to bring about a joint approach from the GCC within a multilateral context to highlight to Tehran both the opportunities and the potential consequences of a failure to resolve the nuclear issue.
In the end, there are clear options available for Iran to pursue and take advantage of. Unfortunately, Iran has a history of wrong timing and there is a sense that this will be the case once again this time around.
–Dr. Christian Koch