Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said earlier this week, that the Islamic Republic is prepared to stop enriching uranium to the nearly-20 percent level required to fabricate fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), if others agree to provide new, finished fuel for the TRR, in line with the Joint Declaration that Iran negotiated with Brazil and Turkey in May. Speaking at a press conference in Berlin with his German counterpart, Davutoğlu said that “another important message given by [Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr] Mottaki during his visit to Turkey [this past weekend, to meet with Davutoğlu and Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim] was that if the Tehran deal is signed and Iran is provided with the necessary fuel for its research activities, then they will not continue enriching uranium to 20 percent”.
Predictably enough, Western media outlets report that “U.S. and European diplomats said they believe the rash of new economic sanctions imposed on Tehran over the past two months has rattled the Iranian leadership”, prompting Iran’s renewed interest in talks and willingness to consider ceasing enrichment at the near-20 percent level. In coming days, we will be elaborating our own view on the connections between sanctions, the Iran-Turkey-Brazil Joint Declaration, and prospects for the next round of nuclear talks with Iran, which are likely to take place in September, after the end of Ramadan. For now, suffice it to say that, in our view, the assessment attributed to “U.S. and European diplomats” reflects another (seemingly willful) misreading of the Iranian position, for two reasons:
–First, the Iranians have always—since they first proposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency last June to buy new fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)—linked their pursuit of enrichment to the near-20 percent level to the international community’s failure to come through, in a credible and timely way, to cooperation with Tehran to refuel the TRR. There is nothing new in Mottaki’s position, also expressed recently in a television interview by Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organziation, and which can hardly be attributed to sanctions.
–Second, the Iranian position, as described by Davutoğlu, stipulates international acceptance of the Joint Declaration—which includes an explicit acknowledgement of the Islamic Republic’s right to enrich uranium on its own territory. In our conversations with them, Iranian officials have consistently indicated that acceptance of (safeguarded) enrichment in Iran would open up possibilities for cooperative solutions to a range of contentious issues in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear diplomacy with the world’s major powers. The United States and its European partners have yet to come to terms with this in a serious way.
On these points, we want to share the perspective of Kayhan Barzegar, an outstanding scholar and foreign policy analyst who is currently on the faculty at Iran’s Islamic Azad University and is also a senior research fellow at the Center for Strategic Research and the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies (both in Tehran) and an associate of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. We have highlighted some of Kayhan’s work on www.TheRaceForIran.com, on Iran-Russia relations, see here, Iran’s foreign policy strategy, see here, and the TRR issue’s significance in the wider context of multilateral diplomacy regarding Iran’s nuclear program, see here.
Last week, the Belfer Center published an English translation of an Op Ed by Kayhan, “Sanctions to Spur Negotiations: Mostly a Bad Strategy”, see here, which had been published in Persian by ISNA and reprinted in Tabnak. We present here some important passages from the Op Ed:
“From recent events, it is clear that United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1929 was adopted in order to force Iran to sit down at the negotiating table and accept the West’s conditions pertaining to Iran’s nuclear policy. From the West’s perspective, Iran will only change its nuclear position when it is confronted by meaningful international pressure. Such a view shows the West’s—and especially the United States’—lack of understanding of the role and importance of Iran’s nuclear program in its domestic and international politics. Contrary to what this misguided policy believes, more international pressure will compound Iran’s assertiveness and unwillingness to relent vis-à-vis its nuclear policy.”
Kayhan notes that there are three perspectives regarding the West’s aims in adopting the latest round of sanctions against Iran. One holds that the main goal of the new sanctions “is to prepare global public opinion for conflict with Iran”. Against this, Kayhan argues that, because the Security Council is extremely unlikely to authorize military action against Iran and because of continuing U.S. commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama Administration will probably not judge itself to be in a suitable position to initiate war with Iran. He goes on to note that
“there exists of course the issue of an Israeli military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Observers inside Iran believe that because of the existing domestic crises such as the inability to adequately deal with Hamas and the sentiments of global public opinion with respect to its disproportionate response to the Gaza flotilla crisis, Israel is not in the position to conduct a military operation against Iran. As in the past Israel prefers to pressure the United States behind the scenes and plead with the latter to conduct a military operation against Iran.”
Another perspective on the new sanctions, according to Kayhan, holds that they have been adopted “to contain Iran’s successful efforts in establishing regional and global” coalitions:
“Because Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities are in accord with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) rules and regulations and have international legitimacy, Iran can participate in new coalitions with rising powers and the critics of the dominant Western trends in the NPT in order to enhance its nuclear policy. In this respect, the Tehran Nuclear Declaration (May 17, 2010) and Brazil and Turkey’s acceptance of Iran’s right to continue enriching uranium on its soil, supported subsequently by other countries, afford Iran the upper hand in future negotiations. It is thus necessary from the West’s perspective to contain Iran’s power. The new sanctions were rapidly adopted, drawing a fault-line in the sand and allowing the opponents and proponents to take their positions and be identified. And because the West has many economic and political levers of pressure and influence, many countries were forced to accept the West’s new policy vis-à-vis Iran (emphasis added).”
Interestingly, Kayhan expounded this particular argument in greater detail last month, shortly after the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, see here, in a piece published in Iran Diplomacy. As he wrote then,
“The Tehran Agreement was a massive step taken by Iran towards trust-building with the international community especially the United States. While the above-mentioned initiatives taken by Tehran were an opportunity to create a new wave in the international political atmosphere, they also turned into a challenge and moved the once friendly Russia and China closer to other Western powers. They realized that continued support for Iran at this level will undermine their long-held political clout and traditional authority at the United Nations Security Council.
Meanwhile, Iran’s new nuclear policy harbored the potential to challenge President Obama’s efforts to forge a global consensus against Iran. This, amongst other reasons, led the United States to quickly pass another sanction resolution so as to gain the upper hand vis-à-vis Iran. This may explain why immediately after the adoption of the Resolution, Washington announced that diplomacy remains on the table and the EU has asked Iran for a new round of negotiation…
Russia and China’s recent position has shown to what extent these countries are ready to support Iran, as well as connect their global strategic issues with their short-term lucrative economic relations to Iran. It has also shown that upon entering global strategic issues such as global nuclear disarmament, nuclear monopoly, etc., the Islamic Republic of Iran will face serious challenges, even from rival great powers like Russia and China. By contrast, Turkey and Brazil admirably stood firm on their position and cast a negative vote against the 1929 resolution. This could be a turning point for Iran in reassessing the role and place of new rising powers in its regional and international strategic affairs.”
Finally, Kayhan argues that a third perspective on the new sanctions holds that they are necessary for Western powers to be able to negotiate “from a position of strength and thus ought to be considered diplomacy by other means”. As he elaborates, this perspective reflects a belief that
“coercive and meaningful sanctions will change Iran’s nuclear policy. They are also essential for preventing a possible war, especially on the Israeli side. Being more effective, the current multilateral sanctions should be advanced further by the unilateral sanctions of states. Accordingly, President Obama signed the gasoline sanctions adopted by the U.S. Congress and a few other Western and European countries did or are currently doing the same.
Challenging the latter perspective, one should argue that no political faction or wing in Iran claims that new sanctions will not impact Iran’s economy and as even noted by Dr. Ali-Akbar Salehi, the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, sanctions will slow the pace of Iran’s nuclear activities. But the fact of the matter is that sanctions will not change Iran’s nuclear position. Because beyond the issue of energy and technological advancement, this program is an identity-value issue and relates to Iran’s regional and global roles and status. Meanwhile, since sanctions and economic constraints will directly impact ordinary Iranians, they will intensify the current sense of distrust towards the West and especially the United States in all political trends and people, subsequently resulting in national mobilization and unity, thereby strengthening the hand of the Iranian government to resist the sanctions. This is the complete opposite of the result desired by the West. Here even unilateral sanctions by the United States and European countries will have a more destructive effect on the two sides’ relations.”
Kayhan concludes that, while the “sanctions for negotiations” policy may, on the surface, seem to be a diplomatic success for the United States and its allies,
“in practice it will have paradoxical consequences for containing Iran or changing its nuclear policy. Undoubtedly, the new sanctions will deepen the existing distrust between Iran and the West and have the potential of leading both sides to a dead-end and lose-lose game over nuclear negotiations and related issues. The West must find a sustainable solution based on a win-win strategy and relative satisfaction of both sides.”
The West will have another opportunity to find a “sustainable solution based on a win-win strategy and relative satisfaction of both sides” when nuclear talks reconvene in September or so. But realizing this opportunity will require, among other things, that the United States and its European partners be prepared to accept the reality of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil as an indispensable element in a sustainable, win-win solution.
More on this important topic later.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Persian Gulf:
I respectfully disagree.
You only need to drive in Tehran to see how much Iranians repect the law.
The way you write, if crimes are also the faults of the government since it has failed to properly train the people.
That is nonsense, of course. Go to Italy and watch how people change in their behavior from North to South. Same government, different behavior; say in Naples – they drive just like Tehran – not so in Milan.
fyi:
the high number of annual deaths in driving accidents in Iran should indeed be attributed to the incompetence of the Islamic Repubic’s officials. basically, there is no difference between people here and there in terms of respecting the law. it’s the system that should be blamed the most for not training people in a proper manner;e.g from the very beginning in the elementary schools. or implementing the law equally for all. for so long, I, like you, was blaming ordinary Iranians for not following the rules. but that’s just one third of the big picture. the driving accidents have three main elements:
1-safty of the vehicles: which is pretty low and that causes a lot of damages, often death. this is the incompetence of Iranian officials. for more than 3 decades, Iran was producing Peykan in the same way! I am sure the system has the statistic of the death for different vehicles and it’s pretty obvious the good ones caused less deaths.
2-non-standard roads. this is very important. for example, consider a very important road like Haraz,that connects Tehran to the northern part of the country,. you would never find a road of that importance to be just two ways even in the developing countries. when you have to drive more than 4-5 hours a just 200 km road (in the busy days, it goes up), you really go crazy. when there is a lack of option, negligence and carelessness is inevitable.
3-human errors. for this also there are psychological reasons involved which is beyond the scope of this discussion. but generally, Iranians have shown a great degree of respect for the rule of law. for example, seat belt got popular in a matter of few years in Iran just bc of advertisement. and don’t forget Iran is a warm country; I mean with cars that don’t have air conditioners, naturally there is a less tendency for the seat belts. there is no reason not to see the implementation of other rules to every one. your claim is a sort of disrespect for the general understanding of Iranians. actually, there are many ways that you can neglect the driving rules, and I have seen many of them on the part of those family members that had connections. can you really suspend the driving license of a mid rank official? the answer is a big Noch.
and the story goes. is this really nagging?
Persian Gulf:
I am in agreementg with your last statements.
I do not have any issue with criticism.
I do disagree with what I would consider nagging: like when US, under George Herbert Walker Bush, send troops there to help UN get food to the Somali people and many Arabs were saying that US is ought there to get to Sudan’s oil.
Or when the 22,000 annual deaths in driving accidents in Iran is attributed to the incompetence of the Islamic Repubic’s officials rather than the absolute disregard of Iranian drivers to following driving rules.
fyi:
it seems, you forgot that I voted for Ahmadinejad. if anything, Islamic Republic is the main part of my identity. that doesn’t mean whatever he does is acceptable. for exactly the same reason I ask for accountability and responsibility of Iranian government and political system to Iranian citizens. he has to be criticized constantly so as not to go down to the illusion of doing everything right.
and I don’t see anything wrong in voting for Moin, Mouasvi…. what is wrong with that? that is election is all about.
I have no passion for Khamenei though. he did what was required of him as the one holding absolute power. being ready to defend the country against an aggression is the job of any leader.
Persian Gulf:
“Happiness” is for children.
A real man lives on this side of “Happiness”, facing death, despair, and madness.
I am satisifed with the leadership of Mr. Khamenei in certain areas.
In 2006, when US-Iran War seemed imminent, he bravely maintained his position and told the Americans that he is ready for war.
Moreover, in the manufactured crisis of 2009 elections, he stuck to the Law.
Mr. Ahmadinejad broke with the mullahs on permitting women in the sports stadiums, in nominating 3 women ministers (with one approved), and in opposing the actions of the morality police.
He has wanted to reach a deal with US since his elections.
He did reach out to the Iranians living abroad.
And he has visited every Iranian province at least twice.
In 2005, 20 million people voted for him and a similar number voted for him in 2009.
If you do not like him, then vote for someone else – like Moin who did not get the vote back in 2005.
James Canning:
“…You make an important point, that the senior managers in vital Iranian industries are in their slots not because of managerial or technical ability, but for other reasons.”
this is a well known fact in today’s Iran, unfortunately. I didn’t make that. over the past 3 decades, loyalty has always sidestepped professionalism. I would say, this is one of the main reasons of migration for my generation. indeed, by now most of those guys in the high ranking posts could also manage to get the required degrees, thanks to IR’s massive expansion on the education level. the recent fissures are small part of a big problem.
fyi:
you seem to be very good at diverting from one issue to another. we are talking about Iran’s situation and our birthright of managerial growth over there. as for here, that’s a different story for a different kind of debate.
as for “What is the heart-burn here?”: nothing really, at least as yet; rest assured.
as I said before, you look things on the prism of Iran-West (the U.S) confrontation all the time. I understand the root cause of this development. but this is not gonna silence people inside the country to what something they really deserve. If you are happy with people like Khamenei, Larijani, Daneshjo, Namjo, Ahmadinejad, Bazrpash, Tavakoli,Shariatmadari,Mirkazemi,… and almost every body on the top, we are NOT.
Nasser,
Thanks. I think Italy, Greece and Iran would all be better off today if their monarchies had been retained.
Persian Gulf:
I made a statement rebutting Nasser’s statement about where real Third World begins.
That was based on my information and judgement.
You and Nasser are entitled to your opinions where you wish to put that line.
You may wish to put it in the middle of Turkey which is an interesting view point.
My point was that the brain-drain has been a very common problem among many countries. Not just Iran and not just Islamic Iran.
Tunisia has been the most successful country in reducing brain-drain.
I guess I do not understand your complain. You get educated for free in Iran, you work a bit in Iran and gain some experience, and then you leave to work in an English speaking country where you make more money and you are free to do what you wish – all the time knowing that your chances for professional growth are limited in those countries as you are a recent immigrant.
What is the heart-burn here?
Persian Gulf,
You make an imporant point, that the senior managers in vital Iranian industries are in their slots not because of managerial or technical ability, but for other reasons.
The underinvestment in oil and gas facilities partly resulted from this situation. Another aspect was obviously the gigantic investment in nuclear power, and its attendant santions. The current size of the Iranian economy is much less today than it would have been with better management over the past decade.
fyi:
your approach is really interesting. first you raised the issue of better infrastructures in Turkey, then when confronted by me, you diverted to Pakistan and Egypt with almost no gas, oil…. You seem to be so impressed about IR’s job in terms of education. let me tell you a very harsh reality. IR, like a typical Mullah job, was successful in terms of quantity, but FOR SURE NOT for quality. that’s the core of the issue. the best get out or are practically depressed. this is not sustainable.
as for the number of Iranian professionals getting out. first you said something about that number in the U.S, tried to downgrade its significance, then when I confronted that claim, with your obvious negligence of places like Canada with a huge number of Iranian professionals, you moved to India…. I have already questioned the validity of your comparison with India and don’t want to repeat it here again. I have no clue about South Korea.
it’s not just about students my friend, neither it is about economy purely. most of those who migrated are not students. they were professional workers that got out of the country. many of them think, rightly so, that the ones on the top positions in every single office are not suitable for those posts. when you put somebody like Bazrpash as the manager of Siaypa, it’s quite natural for the capable ones in the lower ranks to be totally disappointed and try to get out. what would be the motivation? I personally can’t tolerate a bunch of fools are managing and I have to just listen. look at our ministers for example. I told you before. you can’t run a system with fools on the top. this is waste of time and energy.
let me tell you a real story. last time I was in Iran, I went to a well known industrial complex to see a couple of long time friends. one of them said, there are more than 1000 people working here (people with at least a bachelor degree, from high ranking universities). and he showed me their desks. do you know what he said? he said, look at their screens closely. most of these guys are preparing themselves for the English test. this is really depressing.
it’s obvious to me that you have not lived in Iran for quite a while and as a result are so detached from the reality and the sentiments. seeing everything based on the duality of Iran-the U.S confrontation is not productive.
Castellio:
I am tired of Iranians nagging about this.
As I have tried to demonstrate.
And it predates the Islamic Republic by decades.
If you think Americans are insular people who have no clue about what is going on in the world, you are mistaken.
The man is complaining about Iran allowing students to study fields for which the Iranian economy does not have that many opennings and fruthermore, permits them to go abroad and seek greener pastures.
Frankly, I do not know why that is an issue.
Indians and South Koreans (just go to Chile or Brazil and find the Korean small shop keepers) do not seem to make any fuss about this.
Richard Steven Hack:
I cannot prove a negative.
As far as I can tell, the genesis of this idea goes to the procurement of the 3 Dolphin submarines that Germany gave to Israel. [Another instance of US-EU subsidizing her wars, making war cheap and peace expensive for Israel.]
There have been numerous claims that the subs have been modified to launch cruise missiles.
And I always ask: in which shipyards where they so modified?
What were the range of those missiles?
When and where these submarines were tested for underwater launch capability.
“Israel does not have a second-strike capability.
Not even the Chinese currently have a credible second strike capability.”
- US Congress apparently even credits Pakistan with having a second strike capability!
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/11-pakistan-enhances-second-strike-n-capability–us-report–il–12
James Canning,
“Japan has a monarchy and a representative government, as do the UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Spain and numerous other countries.
I think Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece would all benefit from a restoration of their monarchies. Putin was interested in the possibility of a restoration of the Romanovs, a number of years ago.
The current would-be crown prince (or heir to the throne if one existed) of Italy says he wishes his country could have done what the Windsors have achieved in the UK.
I think the overthrow of the shah of Iran was unfortunate, everything considered. (This does not mean I think Iran should or could again be a monarchy.)”
- I thought it worth repeating. Thanks for stating a very unpopular truth.
Castellio:
No, I don’t say that. but currently, less than 10% go back, probably less than 5% (personal experience, I have seen 5 cases to get back out of hundreds that I know over the past few years of staying abroad. it’s just my personal experience though). the point is this; the time lag. if they don’t go back within few years of their graduation, then, latter on they would prefer to stay, if they could, rather than going back and start from the very beginning (the visa difficulty ,that Iranians have almost wherever they go, has also exacerbated the issue forcing people to stay longer, and by the time the visa isn’t the obstacle, your priorities change totally). once you established a life somewhere, it’s very hard to get back in your middle age when you already paid tax, bought retirement, mortgages, your kids start to go to school etc, etc, etc.
frankly speaking,and regrettably, getting back there now makes a big surprise and people are gonna ask you, why do you really want to get back? is there anything wrong with you over there?…right or wrong, this is a sort of common sense there now. that needs attention seriously. and that’s the reason I say IR doesn’t care at all. at least, IRIB should be more force-coming in exploring it. they seem to have other priorities like spreading a backward ideology, showing junks…
Fyi: Checking on China’s second strike capability, I find this:
China’s Subs Getting Quieter
www dot defensenews dot com/story.php?i=4396071
So, yes, they don’t much have one now, but they’re getting there.
As for Israeli’s nuclear cruise missiles, here you go:
Popeye Turbo
www dot fas dot org/nuke/guide/israel/missile/popeye-t.htm
Israel stations nuclear missile subs off Iran
www dot timesonline dot co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7140282.ece
Fyi: “Israel does not have a second-strike capability.”
Can you cite evidence? Most articles I’ve read assume that Israel has modified its modern German subs to launch cruise missiles, which should be well within Israel’s technological and industrial capability. And no one has proven that Israel has not modified its nuclear warheads to be launched from such missiles. That would depend on detailed knowledge of Israel’s nuclear weapons proficiency, which I don’t think anyone outside the CIA has.
Certainly Israel thinks it has that capability, or it would not have sent one or more of its subs into the Persian Gulf.
“Not even the Chinese currently have a credible second strike capability.”
Again, it is not the NUMBERS of missiles that counts, it’s the technology. And by all accounts, Israel has the technology to launch nuclear cruise missiles.
pmr9 says: “Mullen’s statement that “military options remain on the table” shouldn’t be taken too seriously – what else could he say? The US military is well aware that it has no good options for an attack on Iran”
This is completely untrue. The fact that the US will inevitably LOSE a war with Iran over the course of time does NOT mean that the US cannot ATTACK Iran. That is a ridiculous notion, proven false completely by the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq.
The US Air Force can and will beat the crap out of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, the Iranian economic infrastructure, and the Iranian conventional military forces in more or less exposed positions anywhere in Iran.
In any conventional conflict – I stress CONVENTIONAL – between US and Iranian CONVENTIONAL ground forces, the US forces are likely to win handily, just as they do in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“most important of all, it has no effective defence against Iran’s anti-ship missiles and no means of destroying the launch platforms (trucks, widely dispersed along the coast and well camouflaged).”
This is partly true. The US has defenses against known Iranian anti-ship missiles. Exactly WHAT missiles Iran has is not perfectly clear. However, it is also not clear whether US defenses will be SUFFICIENT in any given attack.
More importantly, although the US has defenses against Iranian small boats, it is also not clear whether the US Navy can deal with specific swarm tactics. While the cost to the IRGC naval forces will be high, it is quite possible that they could severely damage one or several US Navy ships in the process.
NONE of this should be taken to mean that the US has any real problem ATTACKING Iran. The only question at issue is how much damage the US forces will take in the process, especially by attrition using guerrilla tactics in Iraq and in Iran proper.
Do not make the mistake of assuming that the US CANNOT attack Iran. The US is more than capable of doing so from the air and from naval forces for weeks in advance of any ground troops being committed (other than probably Marine and SEAL forces taking outlying Gulf islands and similar attacks on coastal facilities.)
And if the US wishes to pour troops into Iraq, it can conduct cross-border attacks on Iran with massive air support that will probably seriously damage Iranian conventional forces. While William Lind’s scenario that Iran could seriously damage US forces in Iraq IF those forces were to continue to be dispersed around Iraq and not reinforced in advance of an attack on Iran is theoretically possible, it is not entirely likely to occur. That would depend on whether the US decides on a “surprise” attack on Iran limited to Iran’s nuclear facilities, or whether the US decides to do a full-on Iraq buildup of forces as part of a direct threat to Iran.
This latter point is important. If the US just wants to damage Iran’s nuclear facilities to “send a message”, then such an attack could occur at any time. But it is just as possible, due to the considerations I mention, that the US will follow Bush’s procedure of loading up troops in Kuwait and Iraq, then merely making the timetable for the actual attack a matter of security. Iran has said that in such a situation, it would not wait to be attacked, but this is likely hyperbole. Certainly Iran could initiate Iraqi Shia sabotage actions early on with some deniability. But in the end, if the US follows the second approach, one can expect a major war with considerable advance notice.
The question is whether such an approach is domestically and geopolitically feasible, which would depend on things like UN sanction, the reactions of the EU, and much less so on the reactions of the US public (since the Congress couldn’t care less about them), etc. Since the Bush Iraq debacle, this MIGHT (NOT certainly) be difficult to achieve. Then the question would revert back to the “surprise attack” option, with the question being: Can the US launch a surprise attack on Iran from the air, and do so without putting its more limited Iraqi forces at risk? I don’t know the answer to that question, but I’m sure the Pentagon planners are working on it. Relying on massive US air power to contain Iranian forces is very likely feasible in the short term at least. Then the question would be how fast can the US reinforce the troops in Iraq to provide better security.
Just keep in mind that one of the primary Pentagon planners for the war on Iran is Lani Davis – a former Israeli military officer. That should tell you all you need to know.
Mr. Canning: “Steve Niva has a good piece on this issue in the Middle East Report, Summer 2010: “Drawing the Wrong Lessons from Israel’s 2006 War”.”
Unfortunately that appears only in the print edition, not online. I agree Krauthammer is an idiot, but we knew that.
Persian Gulf: Are you saying that all the Iranian students throughout the world have abandoned ship (so to speak) and will not go back? When Korean and Chinese students are in diverse universities one thinks of this as a good thing…
Richard Steven Hack:
Israel does not have a second-strike capability.
Not even the Chinese currently have a credible second strike capability.
Mr. Canning: “Israel’s nuclear arsenal is expensive and essentially useless.”
I disagree. Israel has already used the threat of the arsenal in 1973 to compel the US to replenish its military supplies. While that situation may not ever repeat, Israel has also made indirect threats to use its nuclear arsenal in other contexts. Israel has promoted the “Samson Option” in contexts where it was not a question of being militarily destroyed, but in contexts where the mere suggestion that the Jewish state would be eliminated by political or demographic events.
“Iran has no need to “neutralize” Israel’s nuclear capabilities.”
More importantly, Iran could never do so short of having a second-strike capability that would neutralize Israel’s second-strike capability.
“Israel’s nuclear programme was developed decades ago when it was conceivable that Arab armies could attempt to destroy Israel by military means. That threat has not existed for 20 years.”
This is true, but not relevant to why Israel now maintains its arsenal. Israel really is a threat to the entire Middle East region, and its nukes are what make it so. Israel could never conquer the Middle East using conventional military forces, no matter how capable those forces have been in the past or with what US equipment they might have. But the threat of nuclear attack does enable Israel to hold the final cards in any aggressive move they make. Israel’s supporters have said it could take out fifty major Arab cities in all the nations around it. This is a real threat that the Arab world has to take into account.
If it were not for that threat, Israel could indeed abandon its nuclear arsenal and rely on its conventional forces to defend itself from any combination of its neighbors. While Israel cannot conquer the Middle East with conventional forces, the IDF is quite capable of DEFENDING Israel from its conventional forces. Therefore the existence of the nuclear arsenal is SOLELY for the purpose of threatening the region.
This is WHY Israel must be forced to abandon its arsenal. And this is why Obama is NECESSARILY acting in bad faith and with an ulterior agenda when he EXPLICITLY says Israel is allowed to keep that arsenal while at the same time denouncing a perfectly peaceful Iranian nuclear energy policy. Obama KNOWS that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program, and Obama KNOWS that Israel does not NEED nuclear weapons at all save to threaten its neighbors with to get its way with impunity.
Arnold: “Richard, half a million troops to Iraq are expensive. Half a million troops to Iraq means the US is making a Vietnam-level commitment. I don’t think the US can maintain a prolonged half million troop active presence without a draft.”
Do you really think the military-industrial complex cares about whether a draft is necessary? Do you really think that if a major war erupts the US Congress wouldn’t authorize a draft if it was that or give up the economic benefits to the MIC of the war? Do you really think the US Congress cares whether the US electorate will not like a draft?
I will perhaps agree that the US leaders who are trying to start a war are perhaps concerned about whether it would last long enough to require a draft. Given how they treated US troops in Iraq, rotating them in four and five times, I don’t think they really are that concerned. It’s also quite possible that they expect the war to last a long time, but perhaps they think that it will be more on the lines of the Iraq insurgency (which it probably will be), and thus the initial flood of troops into Iraq may not be permanent. We could go through the same old, same old process of slowly drawing down troops as the war drags on.
Remember, it’s not the troops that are the critical component for the MIC. The troops get their money. It’s the expenditure of equipment, especially high-tech equipment such as aerial bombs, missiles, etc. that the MIC wants to be paid for. So they don’t necessarily need half a million troops in Iraq for the next ten years. I threw that figure out as what they might need to deal with the Iraqi Shia as well as conduct conventional military operations against Iran. The figure could be more or less than that. It could be done without a draft if the US were willing to pressure the troops as much or more than they have already done. It’s not unfeasible.
“I don’t think the US has calculated that preventing Iran from having technology that could make a nuclear weapon in an emergency is worth a Vietnam-level commitment.”
Again, I don’t think the US has made that calculation AT ALL because I don’t think the US cares about Iran having nuclear weapons, since the US KNOWS Iran does not have such a program. Nice try slipping that in there, but that’s a fundamental disagreement we have: you think the US is concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, and I don’t. Further, you think Iran has actually calculated about having technology allowing a Japan option, and I don’t think Iran cares about that either (absent some of the military leadership, perhaps).
“Iran’s nuclear program will reach the point that it takes invasion off of the table long before it reaches the point where it neutralizes Israel’s current regional monopoly in nuclear capability.”
That’s probably true, but irrelevant.
“But both outcomes are just a matter of time, both are outcomes well within Iran’s rights as an NPT signatory.”
Yes and no. The first question is: how much time? Israel can crank out nukes faster than Iran can for probably the rest of time. At some point, of course, the numbers don’t matter. Again, the issue is at what point does Iran have a second-strike capability, which is not related to numbers at all, but to delivery systems and security for those systems. In other words, until Iran can either hide nuke-capable missiles OR acquires nuke-capable cruise missiles for submarines, Iran will not have second-strike capability. Israel already has it, by most accounts.
“The question is how much is the US willing to prevent those outcomes. We’re talking about a significant disruption of the US economy on Israel’s behalf.”
No. We’re talking a significant improvement in the economy of the military-industrial complex. And those are the people who control the US government, not the guys who make McDonald’s hamburgers. And those people don’t give a rat’s ass about the guys at McDonald’s. There are perhaps limits to that, of course. But OTOH do YOU know WHERE those limits are? Are you sure the MIC guys know? I think the answer to both questions is clearly no. Do you really think the US Congress is capable of making rational, impersonal judgments on those issues? Given the history, I think we can safely say it is not.
The bottom line: ALL this stuff is being done for personal gain on the part of the people running this country. It’s not being done for your benefit or anyone else’ benefit except theirs. This is how the world works. This IS NO rational calculation except to the degree they calculate how they can get theirs at your expense.
“A Saudi government that was accountable to its citizens would be no more pro-American than an Iranian government accountable to its citizens. Today’s Saudi government is not accountable to its citizens. It is a ruling family that trades its position for personal rewards from the US, and US acquiescence and support, contrary to the US’ founding ideals, in its maintaining power.”
Exactly what I said.
“As a side issue, the US government is, to a much greater though imperfect degree, accountable to its citizens.”
Really? Only in the sense that the mouthpieces, the President, the Vice-President, and the members of Congress, can shift seats periodically only to be replaced with identical people with identical agendas. It is the SYSTEM that matters, and the SYSTEM is not in any remote way possible under the control of the citizens short of an insurgency or an actual revolution.
As I’ve said before, until the US electorate recognizes that this country is being run by the military-industrial complex, the oil companies, the banks, etc., etc. and changes the SYSTEM so that such control is not possible (if THAT’s possible, which I doubt), nothing will change. The system will lurch from war to war until something catastrophic happens. This is the history of most major nations. It may well be that a war with Iran will be that catastrophic event, but I can’t prove that.
“The resources the US has devoted to regime change in Iran would be sufficient to have the Saudi ruling family hung like Russia’s Romanovs in a relatively short time. This is an important consideration in Saudi Arabia’s policy process, and the people of Saudi Arabia do not have similar leverage.”
May well be true. Not really relevant to any of my points. Whoever is in charge of Saudi Arabia, even if not a Saudi, is likely to be a corrupt power seeker in charge of the oil. The US can rotate their puppets in and out as they like, the bottom line doesn’t change: The US needs the oil, the puppets need US money and protection. You’re never going to have a democracy in Saudi Arabia until the end of time, so why bother considering it?
“The Saudis have nowhere near that amount or type of leverage over the United States. I’m amused that you consider this a relationship of peers.”
I didn’t say that. I said it was unclear who was more dependent on whom. The US is dependent on Saudi oil. The Saudis and other Arabs at one point owned huge sections of the US economy. I don’t know if that’s still true, but they have enormous economic influence here, not just from the oil impact. Clearly the Saudis are also dependent on the US to maintain power in their own country – or at least somewhat dependent. In any event, the Saudis like US money and military hardware. That doesn’t mean they’re “peers” in any sense. It just means a mutual co-dependence.
“The Saudi rivalry with Iran, which didn’t exist when already Shiite Iran was also ruled by a leader who depended on US acquiescence to remain in power, is not due to religious differences.”
Again, I didn’t say it was. I said it was a factor in their worldview. It probably did exist when the Shah was in power, but due to the fact that both nations were influenced by US aid, the Saudis never had to mention it. Plus the Shah had no interest in expanding Shia influence vs Iranian influence. The current Iranian leadership does. And that is a direct threat to the Saudi leadership.
“It’s conventional wisdom. You’ve heard it a lot of times, but it’s wrong. The supposed Sunni/Shiite split is not what is motivating the Saudis to oppose Iran.”
Again, didn’t say it was. I said it was a factor. You can’t deny that the Salafist Saudis don’t like the Shia. It’s a known fact. Therefore it is part of the situation, if not the defining part.
“But if Iran was to amass the resources necessary to lean on the Saudi ruling family the way the US does, the Saudi ruling family (not the country or its people) would be in a very difficult position. The Saudi ruling family has an interest in preventing or delaying it as does the US. But what is being defended is not Saudi Arabia, but the colonial relationship that exists now and that benefits Israel and the Saudi ruling family personally.”
Of course. That’s what I said. But Iran is unlikely to ever get that ability to lean on the Saudis, either with or without nuclear weapons. If Iran had nuclear weapons, the US could conceivably allow the Saudis to get them. More likely, the US would extend a “nuclear umbrella” to the Saudis, just as Clinton offered that to the Israelis. That would erase Iran’s leverage. And Iran cannot replace US patronage of the Saudis with its own money.
Therefore, the bottom line again is that your point that Iran might want a Japan option in order to increase its influence over the region, including Saudi Arabia making accommodations with Iran, is highly unlikely to occur. And I think Iran knows that.
Finally, you can’t point to Iran’s leadership ever saying anything like this anyhow, so it’s all speculative. Which is precisely my point. Your notion that Iran wants a Japan option is speculative. That Iran will HAVE a Japan option – to some degree, which I doubt is significant or useful in Iran’s case for the reasons stated above and elsewhere – is a given since Iran has the full fuel cycle. But that doesn’t mean Iran WANTS a Japan option. Iran might be aware of the option, but I don’t think the Iranian leadership cares. And you can’t point to any evidence that they do.
James Canning:
No argument but that train has long left the station. There is no chance of constitutional monarchy (excepting perhaps Malaysia) among Muslims. There are only 2 viable choices for Muslim majority states: (Military) Dictatorship (sogft or hard) OR Islamic Republic (a la Khomeini).
Persian Gulf:
The issue of brain drain, so to speak, has been common to many countires.
For decades many many people left South Korea.
Likewise for Israel, Lebeanon, Uruguay, China, and India.
Iran is not any different.
And I completely disagree about Modernity etc.
Israel is another example were a religion, in this case Judaism, has failed to come up with an adequate response to Modernity – one aspect of which is Universality that is against any particularity.
Ideas do matter. They take hold of people’s minds and causes them to take action. Iran is an example of thsi as well: Islamic Republic as the (Shia) response to Modernity.
fyi:
I forgot to mention a massive flow to Australia in recent years. just go and see Universities in Singapore and Malaysia…; full of Iranians.
The Turkish derision of Iran and Iranians is not really laughable when the Godless West is in big trouble itself, unable to figure out the problems of Modernity (post modernity or anything for that matter. btw, I am no believer of post-modernity; it doesn’t make that sense for me). this is a purely intellectual debate not suitable for a practical guy like you who is looking for policy recommendations!.
It works for Turkey right now and probably will work for her for the foreseeable future. by the time Turkey reaches where you intellectually predict, my generation and the generation after me is gone, so it doesn’t really matter for me whether Islam is fully compatible to modernity. probably at that time, with the current trajectory of demography, the theme of the discussion is gonna change completely, if not getting reverse. in any case, it won’t be the same discussion as today, and I don’t really care what it would be. leave it for future human species to work on.
fyi:
This is not number generated by me. I saw it few months ago. don’t remember where exactly.
what you said is questionable. if we consider 5 years for the U.S citizenship, and a few more years to get green card, the bulk of those who left Iran in the past few years are yet to be U.S citizen. it’s far easier in the Canadian case though and the numbers do match in the terms of recent professionals migrating to Canada.
however, your conservative number of 1 million does matter to me. it’s the top 5% or 10% that matters the most in terms of real progress. in scientific perspective, it goes down to 2% probably. the rest are mostly imitators. I assume you are a prof. yourself and would know these facts exactly.
you have brought Turkey’s infrastructures into the debate not me. and why not discussing it? I saw it better in Turkey in a few trips. I could be wrong, but to remove it all and then jump to another country is not productive. comparing Iran with Egypt or Pakistan is not called progress then. yes, you can even go further down to Afghanistan and come up with a big praise for IR!
James: Supporting constitutional monarchies and calling oneself a monarchist are really two different things.
There is something to be said that the constitutional monarchies using a parliamentary system are better structured than the presidential republican systems, if only because one can actually get rid of a ruling government from one day to the next, which is only an impossible dream in the republics.
Shimon Peres has claimed that Britain’s elite do not understand the “onslaught of terror” that Israel has endured. Actually, they do understand it, and the causes of it, and that is why they want Israel to end the blockade of Gaza and get out of the West Bank and the Golan Heights.
pmr9,
Admiral Mullen should have mentioned that Iran’s policy is to keep the shipping lanes of the Gulf open to all countries, absent war. But this would have sent the neocon warmongers into a frenzy.
Let’s remember that the CIA warned Condoleezza Rice twice during the first week of October 2002 that claims Iraq had sought uranium from Niger were spurious. G W Bush then repeated the idiotic assertion in his State of the Union address. To set up the insane invasion of Iraq.
Mullen should be speaking frankly, that any attack on Iran would likely be catastrophic for the entire region.
fyi,
The Ottoman Empire was in the process of becoming a constitional monarchy, but the disastrous decision to join the Central Powers in the First World War ruined the effort.
Gradual evolution is the process by which constitutional monarchies are best created or brought into being. Japan’s was imposed by the US.
Mullen’s statement that “military options remain on the table” shouldn’t be taken too seriously – what else could he say? The US military is well aware that it has no good options for an attack on Iran: most important of all, it has no effective defence against Iran’s anti-ship missiles and no means of destroying the launch platforms (trucks, widely dispersed along the coast and well camouflaged).
Nasser & Persian Gulf:
What Turkey has an imitation West. It is the best that any Muslim states has been able to achieve and it certainly is quite respectable what her leaders – since Turgut Ozal’s visionary policies, have achieved.
However, I think that Turkey, just like Iran or any other Muslim polity – has not been able to resolve the fundamental problems of Islam’s encounter with Western (Godless) Modernity.
It is for this reason that I find Turkish derision of Iran and Iranians laughable; the kettle calling the pot black.
Persian Gulf:
The number of Iranian passport holders in US is less than 350,000 people.
I will assume the same number for EU and a similar number for South America and Oceania.
This is at most 1 million people over many decades.
Numbers still do not support your assertions.
In regards to Turkey’s infrastrcuture vs. Iran – let us not debate.
If you and others think Iran is a Third World country I suggest you take a trip to Egypt or Pakistan.
James Canning:
It is true that constitutional monarchies are politically more stable.
However, none of the ME states had that in reality.
Fiorangela:
The Marines in Beirut were attacked – together with the French soldiers – because their respective governments had takne side in the Lebeanese Civil War. Italian soldiers were not attcjed. This had nothing to do with Sbara and Shatila.
Ronald Reagan was the man under whose watch much of the current situation was created: Hezbullah in Lebeanon, War in Afghanistan, the Cult of Secrecy in US, the gutting of the rgulatroy agencies, the cancerous growth of the Financial sector in US, and the dismantling of the American Dream.
Other than those, he was a great president for US.
paul,
Did Admiral Mullen mention that the CIA has ZERO intelligence that the government of Iran has decided to build nukes? Zero. Or was he helping the neocons warmongers set up their argument that there is so much uncertainly, the US needs to set off yet another insane war in the Middle East?
Fiorangela,
George Shultz told fellow attendants at the Bohemian Grove gathering in 1981 that the Reagan administration was going to engage in a gigantic arms build-up. Shultz’s role in part was to help dupe the American people into tolerating the squandering of hundreds of billions of dollars on useless or unnecessary weapons. When it was already quite clear the Soviet Union was fast approaching terminal collapse.
paul,
Let’s remember that the neocons and other warmongers forced Mullen’s predecessor to resign (as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) after Fallon made clear he regarded any attack on Iran, by Israel or the US, as insane.
What Mullen said today …
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100801/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_us_iran
“The U.S. military has a plan to attack Iran, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said Sunday, although he thinks a military strike is probably a bad idea.
…
Mullen, the highest ranking U.S. military officer, often has warned that a strike on Iran would have serious and unpredictable ripple effects around the Middle East. At the same time, Mullen said the risk of Iran’s developing a nuclear weapon is unacceptable, although he would not say which risk he thinks is worse.
“I think the military options have been on the table and remain on the table,” Mullen said on “Meet the Press” on NBC. “It’s one of the options that the president has. Again, I hope we don’t get to that, but it’s an important option and it’s one that’s well understood.”"
… should be understood for what it is: a threat. A very, very strong and nearly unveiled threat. Alternapundits will, as usual, make much of Mullen saying that war wasn’t a good idea. They will willfully ignore the fact that every aggressor about to make war claims that they prefer peace. This is a threat.
“Shultz said that Saudi Arabia shows best possibility of becoming a strong democracy.”
Odd? Yes, and funny, too.
Arnold Evans wrote: (@ 1:09 )
“A Saudi government that was accountable to its citizens would be no more pro-American than an Iranian government accountable to its citizens. Today’s Saudi government is not accountable to its citizens. It is a ruling family that trades its position for personal rewards from the US, and US acquiescence and support, contrary to the US’ founding ideals, in its maintaining power.”
George Shultz and Madeleine Albright were guests of Commonwealth Club of CA on July 14. Shultz said that Saudi Arabia shows best possibility of becoming a strong democracy. That struck me as a very odd assessment: Saudi Arabia is a monarchy; it grants NO governing rights to its ‘citizens.’ Iran has a very imperfect system of government but Iran’s people do have some voice in their leaders, and have governing institutions in place. As Stephen Kinzer points out, the protest of Iranians to the 2009 election results would be incomprehensible in Egypt or Saudi Arabia.
After his Saudi Arabia comment, Shultz stated the numerous ways he really, really hates Iran, and he elaborated on the US or Israeli acts vis a vis Iran that he supports: sink Iranian speedboats that harry US ships in (presumably US-territorial) Persian Gulf; surgical strikes on Iranian lands, facilities; punish, kill, humiliate, whatever it takes to get all the hate out of Shultz’s system.
Then I listened to a 1982 interview given by I F Stone, who was asked his opinion of Shultz vs Casper Weinberger. Stone said Shultz had a better grasp of realities in the Middle East of any of the addled, uninformed non-thinkers surrounding Reagan.
Apparently, it is the case that Shultz was more moderate, against the tide of Reaganites, regarding Israel, but in 1983, he became Mr. Israel, and is deemed responsible for initiating AIPAC’s tremendous access to US foreign policy decision making that AIPAC has enjoyed and expanded, to the present state of affairs.
I speculate that the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut radicalized Shultz; he was a Marine, and may have known Marines who were killed in Beirut. Shultz does not seem to place in context his visceral response to the Marine barracks deaths with the fact that that bombing was in retaliation for the Sabra and Shatila massacres, perpetrated under the vigilance of Ariel Sharon, and contrary to the assurances that US had given to Lebanese leaders.
One wonders if Shultz’s thinking might have been any different if he had been a Naval officer rather than a Marine, and known any of the sailors aboard the SS Liberty.
FWIW, “near-20% U235 means, Iran is deliberately producing LEU with HEU beginning at 20%.
Arnold,
I think Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece would all benefit from a restoration of their monarchies. Putin was interested in the possibility of a restoration of the Romanovs, a number of years ago.
The current would-be crown prince (or heir to the throne if one existed) of Italy says he wishes his country could have done what the Windsors have achieved in the UK.
I think the overthrow of the shah of Iran was unfortunate, everything considered. (This does not mean I think Iran should or could again be a monarchy.)
Arnold,
Japan has a monarchy and a representative government, as do the UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Spain and numerous other countries.
Arnold,
In order to express an opinion on the foreign policy of Jordan, one is not obliged to be a voter in Jordan.
Come on James. In some countries you prefer monarchy and in some you prefer a representative government. What determines which category you put a country in?
Arnold,
Japan has a representative government. So does the UK. And Spain. Norway. Denmark. etc etc. I think France would have been better off, if the monarchy had been restored back in the 1870s.
I might add that the foolishness of Henry Kissinger in 1970 led directly to the overthrow of the monarchy in Cambodia and the subsequent deaths of millions of Cambodians.
Japan was ready to surrender in late May 1945, but the US would not give assurances the Emperor could be retained. The war went on for months, needlessly.
So in general, what countries, according to you, should be monarchies and which should have representative governments?
Decades of study lead me to believe that the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq was a disaster for the Iraqi people. The overthrow of the monarchy in Afghanistan helped to set up further disasters for the people of that country. I regret the overtrhow of the monarchies in Libya and Egypt too.
So a whole bunch of Muslim nations in the Middle East should have maintained their monarchies and the relationships those monarchies had with Britain then and the United States now. Every monarchy you’ve mentioned that you support or whose passing you regret has been in Israel’s region. Is that a coincidence or do you think there is a reason for that?
Do you regret the overthrow of the Shah?
King Hussein labored for decades in his effort to end the occupation of the West Bank and achieve justice for the Palestinians. King Abdullah II is following in his footsteps. What do you think he should be doing differently?
Who am I? I wouldn’t be able to vote.
If the people of Jordan want Jordan to support Hamas rather than Dayton’s army that targets Hamas, Jordan should be able to do that. If Israel would not be viable with a hostile Jordan, then Israel shouldn’t be viable rather than political representation denied to everyone in the region except about 5 million Jewish people.
Israel would go the way of Apartheid South Africa much faster if the US did not or could not maintain the dictatorships you support in the region.
Arnold,
I might add that the foolishness of Henry Kissinger in 1970 led directly to the overthrow of the monarchy in Cambodia and the subsequent deaths of millions of Cambodians.
Japan was ready to surrender in late May 1945, but the US would not give assurances the Emperor could be retained. The war went on for months, needlessly.
Arnold,
Decades of study lead me to believe that the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq was a disaster for the Iraqi people. The overthrow of the monarchy in Afghanistan helped to set up further disasters for the people of that country. I regret the overtrhow of the monarchies in Libya and Egypt too.
King Hussein labored for decades in his effort to end the occupation of the West Bank and achieve justice for the Palestinians. King Abdullah II is following in his footsteps. What do you think he should be doing differently?
Israel does not need nuclear weapons to ensure its safety. Israel’s primary security threat is internal, thanks to short-term decision-making by Israeli politicians. And short-term thinking is the norm for politicians.
Richard Steven Hack,
There seems little reason to view Hezbollah as anything other than a defensive force needed by Lebanon to deter another smashing by Israel, as you observe.
Did you happen to see Charles Krauthammer’s latest bit of neocon propagnda? Krauthammer asserts that “[t]he idea that Israel, let alone the U.S., has the slightest interest in starting a war on Israel’s north is crazy.” Surely Krauthammer is aware that the US colluded with Israel to set up the murderous Israeli rampage in 2006. Steve Niva has a good piece on this issue in the Middle East Report, Summer 2010: “Drawing the Wrong Lessons from Israel’s 2006 War”.
Israel’s nuclear programme was developed decades ago when it was conceivable that Arab armies could attempt to destroy Israel by military means. That threat has not existed for 20 years.
That threat could return. The United States has put itself, regarding the Middle East, into the position of Imperial Great Britain to ensure that it does not return, but that position was to expensive too be maintained by Great Britain itself and looks to be becoming too expensive for the US to maintain. The United States cannot afford another Vietnam, and it looks increasingly like short of that, it will not be possible for the US to keep its string of puppet governments in the region, including Jordan’s that you’re so fond of yourself, in power indefinitely.
I interpreted what you wrote earlier to be that you’re a monarchist only in the Middle East. You’re not a monarchist for the United States but these colonies that the US maintains its hold on to make sure its people can’t vote to fully support Hezbollah or Hamas are laudable to you. What’s your explanation for why you support monarchism in some cases?
Arnold,
Israel’s nuclear arsenal is expensive and essentially useless. Iran has no need to “neutralize” Israel’s nuclear capabilities.
Israel’s nuclear programme was developed decades ago when it was conceivable that Arab armies could attempt to destroy Israel by military means. That threat has not existed for 20 years.
Eric,
Turkey is the obvious escrow holder for the proposed deal. I think Israel wants to block the deal altogether, on grounds it does not want a diplomatic resolution of the dispute. Anything that tends to foster a negotiated resolution is almost certain to be targeted by Israel and the neocons.
Richard, half a million troops to Iraq are expensive. Half a million troops to Iraq means the US is making a Vietnam-level commitment. I don’t think the US can maintain a prolonged half million troop active presence without a draft.
I don’t think the US has calculated that preventing Iran from having technology that could make a nuclear weapon in an emergency is worth a Vietnam-level commitment.
Iran’s nuclear program will reach the point that it takes invasion off of the table long before it reaches the point where it neutralizes Israel’s current regional monopoly in nuclear capability. But both outcomes are just a matter of time, both are outcomes well within Iran’s rights as an NPT signatory. The question is how much is the US willing to prevent those outcomes. We’re talking about a significant disruption of the US economy on Israel’s behalf.
A Saudi government that was accountable to its citizens would be no more pro-American than an Iranian government accountable to its citizens. Today’s Saudi government is not accountable to its citizens. It is a ruling family that trades its position for personal rewards from the US, and US acquiescence and support, contrary to the US’ founding ideals, in its maintaining power.
As a side issue, the US government is, to a much greater though imperfect degree, accountable to its citizens.
The resources the US has devoted to regime change in Iran would be sufficient to have the Saudi ruling family hung like Russia’s Romanovs in a relatively short time. This is an important consideration in Saudi Arabia’s policy process, and the people of Saudi Arabia do not have similar leverage.
The Saudis have nowhere near that amount or type of leverage over the United States. I’m amused that you consider this a relationship of peers. The Saudi rivalry with Iran, which didn’t exist when already Shiite Iran was also ruled by a leader who depended on US acquiescence to remain in power, is not due to religious differences.
It’s conventional wisdom. You’ve heard it a lot of times, but it’s wrong. The supposed Sunni/Shiite split is not what is motivating the Saudis to oppose Iran.
But if Iran was to amass the resources necessary to lean on the Saudi ruling family the way the US does, the Saudi ruling family (not the country or its people) would be in a very difficult position. The Saudi ruling family has an interest in preventing or delaying it as does the US. But what is being defended is not Saudi Arabia, but the colonial relationship that exists now and that benefits Israel and the Saudi ruling family personally.
it seems, IR is willing to accommodate the demand of every other outsiders, but not its own people, especially the young ones.
وقتی مملکت اینقدر قحط الرجال شده که آدمهایی مثل احمد توکلی و علی لاریجانی شدند جزو عقلای قوم دیگه واقعا باید فاتحه این مملکت رو خوند. آقای لاریجای جدیدا تناول فرموند که “فرمایه گان” نباید تو سیستم باشند. آقا مثل اینکه یادش رفته خودش و داداشهاشو تو آینه ببینه.
fyi:
“In regards to expats: I will assume every year 1000 Iranian leaving for a 100 years. That 100,000 people. I assume further that their education will have cost Iran 100,000 US dollars for each person. This amounts to 10 billion dollars over a hundred years. I must conclude that you are just talking and there is no substance around your statements.”
I understand that Nasser intimated you, but you have gone far unfairly in your judgment. I think the number for those who leave the country is around 180,000-200,000 annually. and actually the best leave, that doesn’t meant everybody who leaves is the best, probably including myself! when I was at Sharif few years ago, Sharif had around 8000 students in overall. it was quite common for few depts to see up to 70% of the students eventually leave. now, in almost every other major university, the situation is like that. and lest not forget, those who can’t leave are mostly depressed, dissatisfied of their current situation (this is not a healthy, productive,…situation). I was talking to one of my friends who is a prof at AmirKabir Univ. he said, the top ten leave in his dept., and frankly the rest are not comparable to them to conduct projects effectively (this was what another prof. and friend told me in response to my question of why not being able to do a certain kind of jobs there). those of my friends who stayed in Iran are NOW struggling to leave. this a major problem and I am really sorry for you to take it a minor issue. this is the approach taken by IR so far. I am kind of getting the impression that IR is actually happy to see these people leave (no need to provide them jobs, fulfill their other expectation, tolerate their genuinity when we have a superman like Ahmadinejad! who has a REAL Ph.D!, as he constantly says, and understand to the hilt every major scientific fields). let’s not forget, most of the agitation we had seen in the election aftermath was due to a segment of those who left. instead of downgrading them, IR would be wise not to take the advise of people like you and instead accommodate these young professionals.
as per Turkey, I think Nasser’s views are closer to reality. I visited Turkey few times on 2004 (I assume it’s much better now). and I went there with buses for couple of times, the quality of infrastructures are not comparable at all in Iran and Turkey. You need to get out of northern Tehran whenever you go there. regarding Turks view of Iranians, I can assure you the what Nasser said is the reality on the ground for the YOUNG Turks. I am not sure of their elder people. and I have many young Turk friends and we discuss these issues pretty frankly. just go to Ankara and talk to people there and introduce yourself as Iranians for example, you will get the feelings within few days.
Nasser:
“Iran has had a nuclear program since the early 50s. Since the fucking 50s! It has had help in one form or another from the US, Israel, Germany, France, Russia, Argentina, Pakistan and North Korea. Maybe the US thinks that if they couldn’t come up with a bomb by now, they must be so incompetent that they never will.”
This is completely ridiculous. The US has pressured all the countries involved over the Iran nuclear program since the Shah was overthrown. Blaming the Iranians for being incompetent because they don’t have a bomb they’ve said they don’t want is just bizarre.
“I guess you people are just itching for Israel to implement its genocidal Dahiya Doctrine huh? But Israel doesn’t need to take such drastic measures. The threat of it seems to be enough to dissuade Hezbollah from any adventurism while Israel continues to violate Lebanese airspace with impunity.”
Equally ridiculous. Hizballah has gained mightily in Lebanon and on the Arab street outside Lebanon from its defeat of Israel in 2006. Given that they are now a significant part of the government, it is in Hizballah’s interest not to provoke Israel into another massive deliberate attack on Lebanese civilians. That is why Hizballah has not done anything major to invite such an attack. Not to mention that Hizballah’s existence is intended to keep Israel out of Lebanon, not to destroy Israel per se, regardless of whatever rhetoric they might spout from time to time.
Also not to mention that Hizballah seems no reason to waste its new antiaircraft missiles on Israeli surveillance aircraft. What would be the point? Your grasp of strategic and tactical matters is clearly deficient.
“While the 2006 war might have resulted in a loss of face for Israel I would hardly call it a loss. The affair might have been embarrassing, but Israel still managed to lessen Hezbollah’s presence in Southern Lebanon and the Israelis are now enjoying the kind of quiet to its North they haven’t had for decades.”
This is complete nonsense. Israel did nothing to lessen Hizballah’s presence in southern Lebanon. And the “quiet” you seem to perceive in Lebanon at the moment is due to be shattered at any time. You obviously haven’t been keeping up with events such as the fact that Israel is running simulations involving moving troops into Lebanon in the next war, nor the re-working of Israeli strategy and tactics in an attempt to deal with their 2006 failure, or that Hizballah, knowing Israel will never rest until it has destroyed Hizballah, has thoroughly re-armed itself.
Your notion that somehow the conflict between Israel and Hizballah is “over” and that Israel has somehow “won” is simply ridiculous. Hizballah came out way ahead in that conflict.
You’re simply obsessed with demonizing Iran on all counts, with little evidence to show for it. As an anarchist and atheist, I’m hardly a supporter of the Iranian regime, and like all governments they are undoubtedly both incompetent and malicious in equal measures, but Iran is not the problem here. Israel and the US are.
Arnold: “This article by Ariel Ilan Roth of the CFR explains as well as anything I’ve seen the Israeli strategic need for a regional monopoly on nuclear capability.”
Certainly Israel needs a regional monopoly. However, are we talking about one vs 200 nuclear weapons, or parity? Obviously if Iran, Saudi Arabia or any combination of Arab states reached parity – or even just second-strike capability (which is really all that matters in the case of Israel because Israel cannot survive even one or two nuclear hits on major cities) – than Israel’s nuclear arsenal would be essentially rendered neuter or MAD’d.
This really has nothing to do with whether Iran would benefit from one or a few undeliverable nuclear weapons – which is where Iran will be for at least another ten years even if they started now to actually develop nuclear weapons.
“Israel’s nuclear monopoly means that Egypt’s larger population can always be trumped, which means it would be pointless for Egypt to use its population and larger military potential to amass a force capable of defeating Israel.”
Irrelevant. Israel’s superior conventional military superiority is sufficient to deter Egypt and Jordan and Syria combined. This is not 1973 when Israel had a serious problem when it was taken by surprise. And the rest of the Arab world is not capable of an existential hit on Israel. Without overwhelming conventional forces or nukes, no Arab country can destroy Israel without being right next to Israel – which means Egypt and Syria in practical terms. Saudi Arabia can’t do it. Neither can Iran. There simply is no existential threat to Israel anywhere in the Middle East without nuclear second-strike capability.
“Tomorrow one of two things can happen. 1 – Iran can say if you destroy any Muslim country, we will leave the NPT and may destroy you in retaliation. or 2 – Egypt and the other US colonies can build their own nuclear capabilities and then no longer be subject to the Israel threat, because unlike today, there could be an Egyptian retaliation.”
Two problems with both scenarios: On the first, if Iran threatened Israel directly, Iran would be wasted by Israel and/or the US immediately – and with UN permission. On the second, the US isn’t going to allow Egypt or Saudi Arabia to build nuclear weapons, either, so the probability of either of those countries getting nukes, even over a time span of the next decade or two, is virtually nil.
And Iran knows all this, too. Therefore, once again, nukes will do Iran absolutely no good, because all these hypothetical scenarios are too unlikely to actually occur to justify the negative effects of developing them.
“I’ll note that Iran is on record offering nuclear technology to any Muslim country that asks. The idea that the Sunni/Shiite rivalry is some overpowering phenomenon, or even nearly as strong as the Muslim/Christian rivalry is wrong.”
I disagree completely. The Muslim religion is fairly respectful of the Christian religion, in theory at least. Whereas the worst religious hate is between sects of the same religion. The Sunni/Shiite rivalry is very serious, especially for the Salafists, as you well know. I don’t think Egypt is all that concerned about Iran, and the smaller states are not relevant. But Saudi Arabia very clearly does not want Iran developing into a regional power capable of overshadowing Saudi influence. Everywhere you look, Saudi Arabia is confronting Iran in the geopolitical sphere – in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in alliances with Pakistan, and I suspect even with under the table deals with Israel.
Iran has no problem offering peaceful nuclear technology to other countries because that is not a religious issue. But you don’t see Saudi Arabia leaping to accept, either. And that’s not just because Saudi Arabia is afraid of the US reaction to a native nuclear program. The Saudis can’t afford to get in bed with Iran because it would be a total affront to their entire worldview.
“The US colonies are subservient to the US because they have subject leaders, not because they are Sunni.”
I never said they were. And I wouldn’t call the Saudis “subservient” to the US. I would call them well-paid shills for the US. They know full well they have the power to strangle the US economy if they had to, but it lines their pockets not to do so. They know a good thing when they see it and they milk it for all they’re worth, but not so much as to ruin it. It’s difficult to say who is more subservient: the US or the Saudis.
“Shiite Iran was also a colony and an ally of the US and Saudi Arabia under the Shah, but that’s a different subject.”
And I pointed out that the issue is not the populations involved, but the leaders involved. The leaders, regardless of religious orientation, are there because they want power. Power trumps religion, always. This is why Iran will be a rational actor regardless of its religious beliefs. And so will the Saudis. But because power is the goal, neither will ever get in bed with an enemy of their worldview unless there is overwhelming benefit to be gained. The Shah is not comparable to the Supreme Leader, obviously, so Iran’s status at that time is irrelevant to the reality now and for the foreseeable future.
“Anyway, a nuclear capable Iran does not threaten a nuclear capable Saudi Arabia, but them both being nuclear capable reduces the value of Israel’s nuclear weapon to near zero. Israel no longer has a credible threat to use it.”
Not unless either or both Iran and Saudi Arabia have a second strike capability that neuters Israel’s second strike capability. In nuclear war, what matters is not how many nukes you have for an initial strike, but whether you have a nuclear retaliatory capability. Israel has it. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia could possibly get it in less than a decade, probably two, even if they started now, unless they spent billions and had a source for the technology. Therefore Israel can be confident of being almost completely safe from a nuclear Iran or Saudi Arabia or any combination of Arab nuclear states until one develops the ability to deliver a second strike.
“In an important way, all nuclear weapons are virtual. They are not intended to be used, even the US’.”
Actually, they’re intended to be paid for, nothing more.
“Preventing Iran from being nuclear capable is an important strategic objective of Israel, even though you’re right that in most plausible foreseeable scenarios, Iran would not use a nuclear weapon and neither would Israel.”
As I’ve argued before, the sole reason Iran could possibly want nuclear weapons – aside from the fact that somebody in Iran might profit financially from making them – is that it could plausibly be argued that it would take regime change by Israel or the US off the table. BUT this is ONLY plausible if the weapon can be delivered and can be delivered as a second strike capability.
Iran is many years away from that capability, if not decades away. Saudi Arabia would have to spent scores of billions and take a decade at least to get where Iran is now.
Israel knows this. Israel knows, just as well as the US knows, that Iran is a ZERO existentialist threat to Israel. Israel couldn’t care less about Iran’s nuclear program, and some of the comments from Israel’s own leaders in private have said so. Israel wants the US to destroy Iran for reasons of regional influence unrelated to Iran’s possible possession of nuclear weapons years down the road.
“The question is how much can Israel get the US to pay to prevent Iran from being nuclear capable. Iran is working to ensure that any attack on its soil will lead to the US being involved in a war and defeat on the scale of Vietnam if it wants to avoid an immediate full retreat from both Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Agreed on Iran’s intentions.
“The US so far has given no indication that it would trade Iraq and Afghanistan for preventing Iran from getting a Japan option. That’s the right decision, especially since attacking Iran wouldn’t actually work over the medium term to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option.”
But once again, the US KNOWS that Iran does not have and can not use a Japan option in the same way that Japan possibly could. Also, the US KNOWS that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. The US also KNOWS that whatever the cost Iran can make the US pay for an attack, that cost WILL NOT BE BORNE BY THE INSTIGATORS OF THAT ATTACK.
You really have to grasp the depth of corruption in the US. You’re arguing as if the US is a “rational actor”. In one sense it is, because the leaders of the US and the military-industrial complex will not pay ANY price for an attack on Iran, and therefore it is in their rational interest to go ahead with such an attack to gain the economic benefit from war profiteering. In another sense it is NOT a rational actor, because it WILL act for its own benefit which is quite different from any benefit to be realized by the US electorate and the US taxpayer and the portion of the economy not buoyed by war.
This calculation is essentially the same in Iran, EXCEPT that Iran is the weaker party in this conflict, and therefore would never subject itself to a nuclear or non-nuclear conflict with the US or Israel if it could avoid it. The US has no such concerns. The US leadership DOES NOT CARE how much it will cost the US in military lives, civilian lives even in the US, or the cost in billions of dollars – all of which will go to the military-industrial complex that controls this country – to attack Iran. There is NO DOWN SIDE to an attack on Iran from their viewpoint.
The ONLY risk the US leaders have is their personal political chances. And those are very minor. Look at George Bush. What price has he paid for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? NO PRICE. NONE. NADA. How about Dick Cheney? What price has he paid? NONE. NADA. What price will Obama pay if he starts a war with Iran in his second term? NONE. NADA.
It’s simply false to believe that the US is making some sort of rational calculation about an attack on Iran would cause them to lose Iraq and Afghanistan. Those two are already lost in terms of being able to be maintained for much longer without being politically ridiculous.
The US would GAIN in Iraq if it could destroy Iran’s infrastructure and economy, While Iran could fight back in Iraq using the Iraqi Shia – and possibly devastatingly so – the US would still be able to control the Iraq government and prevent further Iranian influence in Iraq by dint of the massive military presence that would be required to prosecute the Iran war in Iraq. It would be the same thing as if the US had flooded Iraq with half a million troops at the start of the Iraq war. That would have delayed the effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency for at least a while. In the current situation, a massive US military presence in Iraq on a war footing with Iran would be much harder to attack effectively than the spread-out, pacifying organization of US forces in Iraq that made it so vulnerable to the Iraqi insurgency.
I don’t mean to imply that the US would win at this situation. I am saying that it’s not such an easy calculation to say that the US is willing to sacrifice the benefits of an attack on Iran just because Iraq would become a greater problem. It is precisely because the US intended to attack Iran next that the US is IN Iraq in the first place. Bush and Cheney and the neocons fully intended to attack Iran after Iraq. It was only when that became untenable due to the Iraqi insurgency AND the Afghanistan problems that the attack on Iran was put on hold. Had Iraq been pacified in 2003 and 2004, the ramp up to a war with Iran would have started six years ago.
Now, if the US were to attack Iran, the US would have to flood Iraq with half a million troops, including pulling them out of Afghanistan. They would be put in the huge military bases which the US HAS ALREADY BUILT FOR THIS PURPOSE, and they would not be spending time patrolling Baghdad. The US forces would be conducting conventional military strikes at Iran. The only unconventional fighting the US would be doing in Iraq is to protect its supply lines from Kuwait from attacks by Iranian IRGC infiltrators and Iraqi Shia fighting in support of Iran. Granted, that would be a royal mess. But it’s quite different from the sort of insurgency the US has fought in Iraq up to recently. The US would be treating the Iraqis as even more of a threat than the US did during the insurgency, and the gloves would be off even more than they have been. The Iraqi government would be locked down and totally controlled. And therefore the Iraqi oil would be locked down and totally controlled (assuming any of it wasn’t blown up by the insurgents). The US wouldn’t have to bother any more maintaining the fiction that Iraq was to be some sort of pro-US “democracy”. It could just treat Iraq as another colonial possession.
The point is that the US wouldn’t be losing Iraq any sooner than it lost the Iran war in general. And while that point would come, it might not come for several years. Meanwhile, the people who ORDERED the war with Iran would be making their profits.
In the case of Afghanistan, as I’ve said, the primary purpose of that attack was 1) a pipeline, 2) regaining control of the heroin market, and of course 3) profits for the MIC. Also as I’ve said, right now none of that is working out except for the cost of the war, and is clearly not going to work out. The Afghan war has been so long and so much a failure that it begins to surpass Vietnam in ridiculousness. The MIC can’t keep such a war going forever. So it needs to “trade up.”
A war with Iran is the perfect excuse for Obama to up the ante for the oil companies and the MIC, and pull out of Afghanistan without the political repercussions of admitting defeat there. The MIC make even bigger profits from a war with Iran for an even longer period than the Afghan war, currently the longest war in US history, apparently. There is no down side to that for the MIC, and thus not for Obama, so long as he starts the war in such a way that his re-election in 2012 is not compromised. And even if it is, he still doesn’t pay any more significant price than any other one term US President.
People need to stop thinking of the situation as one with honorable actors. The US government is not and never has been an honorable actor, and from the standpoint of the US taxpayer, has never been a rational actor. It’s just cognitive dissonance to believe that.
Nasser:
I will address your remarks that are largely rhetorical.
India and Pakistan are both far far more corrupt than Iran, yet they have not collapsed yet and they never will.
Last I looked, Saudi production capacity was 12 mbpd. They are already pumping more than 9.3 mbpd. Note that this is the entire capacity that world oil has. They cannot cover the Iranian oil production and certainly not when demand has recovered or others have also been taken out of production. Moreover, oil is currently being sold on long-term contract as well as short tem contracts. I just do not see Saudis being able to address the long-term contracts.
In regards to expats: I will assume every year 1000 Iranian leaving for a 100 years. That 100,000 people. I assume further that their education will have cost Iran 100,000 US dollars for each person. This amounts to 10 billion dollars over a hundred years. I must conclude that you are just talking and there is no substance around your statements.
The difference between Palestinians in occupied countries and Chechen, Uighurs, and others that you have enumerated is that these others are citizens of the states that they live in with all the rights, privileges and obligations. They can participate in the national life of their countries, if they so choose. That does not obtain for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
Furthermore, Iranian President invoked the Cause of Palestinians because it is the weak point of the United States. And he did so when his country was being threatened by US. If you have some other idea please state it.
In regards to Turkey, so if you leave the glitz of Istanbul and Ankara, you are back in the same situation as generally obtains in Iran in terms of infrastructure, quality of food etc. So now you have changed your mind and state that Third World begins in Eastern Turkey. Hmmmm…. I guess you are entitled to your opinion.
Iranians are quite justified in their high opinion of themselves. They have historically been the source of whatever goes by the name of Culture and Civilization in that part of the world. The pride of Turks, as far as I can tell, boils down to how well they have immitated Europe.
There is no doubt a lot of gas in the world. But that gas has to be delivered to where it is consumed. Iranian gas is much closer to where it could potentially be consumed: Pakistan, India, Burma, and China. Shales and geological formations usch as those are uneconomical for decades. And they are too far away to be a threat to Iranian gas. Wait a few years until black-outs become even more common in India and Pakistan and they will be there begging for any gas from any where.
fyi,
Continued…
Shale gas in North America:
http://www.media.rice.edu/media/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=12557
Australian natural gas:
bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-27/lng-demand-may-turn-australia-into-qatar-of-the-pacific-bernstein-says.html
Flyntt Leverett suggests a G-3:
saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2009/ioi/090515-ussa-leverett.html
fyi,
“I had previously stated examples of countries with large number of expats; Malaysia, and India. I will add to them China, Israel, and Lebanon. Israel is particularly interesting since at least 30% of her passport holders live abroad. And these are Sabras. I think your point demonstrates nothing.”
- Yes, but Chinese or Indian or Malaysian expats don’t have net worths that exceed the entire GDP of their native country! You might have raised the issue of expats from these countries before but you didn’t point out the uniqueness of the Iranian expats among these in their revulsion for their native land and its form of government. Most of these other expats usually bear a fondness for their native country (which includes a tolerance for its form of governance) and they seek to contribute to it economically via remittance or investments. My point demonstrates the enormous amount of brain drain and capital flight that Iran suffers from. And can you go through one post without talking about Israel? Israel is a unique case; it is a young settler country, so the issue of expats is almost an oxymoron.
“You asked what was to defeat: what was there to defeat was the Iranian nuclear developments. Iran has not been defeated in that.”
- Iran has had a nuclear program since the early 50s. Since the fucking 50s! It has had help in one form or another from the US, Israel, Germany, France, Russia, Argentina, Pakistan and North Korea. Maybe the US thinks that if they couldn’t come up with a bomb by now, they must be so incompetent that they never will.
“Iran was not defeated in 2006 during Hezbollah-Israel War.”
- I guess you people are just itching for Israel to implement its genocidal Dahiya Doctrine huh? But Israel doesn’t need to take such drastic measures. The threat of it seems to be enough to dissuade Hezbollah from any adventurism while Israel continues to violate Lebanese airspace with impunity. While the 2006 war might have resulted in a loss of face for Israel I would hardly call it a loss. The affair might have been embarrassing, but Israel still managed to lessen Hezbollah’s presence in Southern Lebanon and the Israelis are now enjoying the kind of quiet to its North they haven’t had for decades.
“And Iran certainly has not been defeated in Iraq; very far from it indeed.”
- The only part of your post I agree with. I have stated this numerous times myself. But Iran hardly deserves credit for this, it has largely been America’s own doing. However, the Iranians continue to underestimate Iraqi nationalism and Arab ajam and so the situation can change.
“I do not know how concerned Arab Leaders are about Iran hijacking the Arab-Israeli War. Since it is a pan-Islamic War against Israel, it follows that your premise is wrong – it is not an exclusively Arab issue.”
- I wonder why then it is called the Arab-Israeli conflict?! Arab leaders noticed that while Iran never failed to voice their hostility towards Israel, it didn’t hesitate to take help from it during its war with Iraq. While Iran seems so supportive of the Palestinians they never seem to say much about other suffering muslims like those in Chechnya or Xinjiang or Kashmir. It also helped a Christian Armenia against the Shia Azeris. So the Arabs view Iran as nothing more than an opportunistic country trying to exploit the Palestinian issue.
“Then, I am forced to conclude that you have neither visited Iran, nor Turkey, nor Pakistan at any time during the past 12 years. I think you are making statements that are just wrong.”
- Actually I’ve been to all three countries and I would say the third world seems to begin when you step into Eastern Turkey. I know that the Iranians have an inflated sense of their self worth but as far as the economic comparison between Turkey and Iran goes, there really is no comparison. Turkey’s nominal GDP ($710 billion) and per capita income is almost double that of Iran (nominal GDP of $ 360 billion). The Turks themselves seem to find it very offensive to be compared in any way to Iran (or any Middle Eastern country for that matter). They view Iran as a complete backwater with a pretty stupid population ruled by an even stupider and fanatical government. How Iran can possibly think of itself as being in the same league as Turkey is beyond me.
“Yes, Saudi Arabia has some spare capacity. What of it?”
- What of it? It means that even if Iran’s production of 4 million barrels a day were to stop completely, Saudi Arabia has enough spare capacity to make up for it. So if Iranian oil were taken off the world markets there wouldn’t be an impact because Saudi Arabia can make up for it. Add to that Iraq’s comeback to the oil market. This means Iran is not nearly as important to the world economy as Saudi Arabia is and it should stop pretending otherwise. Which is why Saudi Arabia gets a seat at the G-20 and Iran doesn’t.
“The Saudi GDP is based on selling oil – that is it. There is very little non-oil production behind it. Iran has a diversified economy.”
- Pistachios vs dates. Both are oil based economies, let’s not pretend otherwise. One just happens to have more of it. In fact much more. When you compare Saudi Arabia’s 267 billion barrels of oil to Iran’s 130 billion barrels, you begin to realize why the Americans consider Saudi Arabia to be the “important country in the region” and the real geopolitical asset. Flynt Leverett underscored Saudi Arabia’s importance when he called for a G-3, lumping that country with US and China.
- Saudi Arabia’s nominal GDP is much higher than that of Iran and its per capita income is nearly four times higher. And you suggest that Saudi Arabia’s economy is “not even on the same radar screen” as Iran’s?!
“Jean-François Seznec is basically saying that Iranian leaders are stupid keeping a floor under the standard of living of the Iranian population while, at the same time, are slow in finishing their projects. It is clear to me that projects in Iran eventually get completed.”
- No those projects never do get completed. Be they in refineries, gas fields, oil fields, or petrochemical plants. Let’s look at Iran’s crude production capacity for example. Before the revolution, Iran’s production capacity was 6 million barrels a day. Despite repeated attempts, Iran hasn’t been able to restore production capacity to pre revolution levels. Today its production capacity stands at merely 4 million barrels a day. Another example. Despite repeated investments, Iran still hasn’t managed to sufficiently expand their refining capacity and is still reliant on gasoline imports. Before you start blaming the sanctions, need I remind you of Iran’s habit of scaring off foreign investors; like how the Revolutionary Guard literally rolled out the tanks at a Turkish built airport?
“And the under-development of the Iranian oil and gas resources, however much one attribute them to the incompetence of the Iranians, still is not a big deal as the resources are kept undeveloped while prices soar for existing production.”
-You fail to point out the discoveries of new supplies such as shale gas in North America or natural gas in Australia that can drive down prices and further lessen Iran’s importance in the hydrocarbon sector.
Lastly, “If Seznec is correct then Iran will collapse in a matter of time and we all can go home.”
- Hey, with rampant corruption, high unemployment, inflation, prostitution, drug addiction, not to mention the human rights abuses; here’s to hoping.
Richard,
This article by Ariel Ilan Roth of the CFR explains as well as anything I’ve seen the Israeli strategic need for a regional monopoly on nuclear capability.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65692/ariel-ilan-roth/the-root-of-all-fears?page=show
Israel’s weapons don’t have to be actually used to be useful. Israel benefits from how they impact Egyptian (especially) and also Jordanian and Saudi strategic calculations. Israel’s nuclear monopoly means that Egypts larger population can always be trumped, which means it would be pointless for Egypt to use its population and larger military potential to amass a force capable of defeating Israel.
Iran doesn’t have to actually have a weapon to break that. Today Israel can say to its neighbors that if you develop military postures that threaten Israel, we may destroy your country. Tomorrow one of two things can happen. 1 – Iran can say if you destroy any Muslim country, we will leave the NPT and may destroy you in retaliation. or 2 – Egypt and the other US colonies can build their own nuclear capabilities and then no longer be subject to the Israel threat, because unlike today, there could be an Egyptian retaliation.
I’ll note that Iran is on record offering nuclear technology to any Muslim country that asks. The idea that the Sunni/Shiite rivalry is some overpowering phenomenon, or even nearly as strong as the Muslim/Christian rivalry is wrong. The US colonies are subservient to the US because they have subject leaders, not because they are Sunni. Shiite Iran was also a colony and an ally of the US and Saudi Arabia under the Shah, but that’s a different subject.
Anyway, a nuclear capable Iran does not threaten a nuclear capable Saudi Arabia, but them both being nuclear capable reduces the value of Israel’s nuclear weapon to near zero. Israel no longer has a credible threat to use it.
In an important way, all nuclear weapons are virtual. They are not intended to be used, even the US’. They are intended to demonstrate an ability to cause destruction that deters or coerces behavior without being used. Israel’s nuclear monopoly gives it a lot more coercive power today than it would if many countries in the Middle East were even where Iran is today, much less where Iran will be in two years or where Japan or Brazil are today.
Preventing Iran from being nuclear capable is an important strategic objective of Israel, even though you’re right that in most plausible foreseeable scenarios, Iran would not use a nuclear weapon and neither would Israel.
The question is how much can Israel get the US to pay to prevent Iran from being nuclear capable. Iran is working to ensure that any attack on its soil will lead to the US being involved in a war and defeat on the scale of Vietnam if it wants to avoid an immediate full retreat from both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The US so far has given no indication that it would trade Iraq and Afghanistan for preventing Iran from getting a Japan option. That’s the right decision, especially since attacking Iran wouldn’t actually work over the medium term to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option.
And you completely ignore the point that your whole argument for Iran to disclose ignores the fact that Iran did once disclose. But here you claim that even if Iran entered a “time-limited” full disclosure program, it would be forgotten once Iran stopped disclosing. This is a precise contradiction which illustrates my point exactly. Iran DID disclose fully at one point and got nothing for it. Regardless of whether Iran decides to re-implement the AP on a time limited or unlimited basis, it will get nothing for it, precisely as you acknowledged in your comment that the US would merely resume ratcheting up the argument against Iran.
You skip over that fact by claiming the whole thing is merely for the benefit of the US public and it is the US public that would forget. But that’s not what you said below. You said and I quote:
“How did the US government spin that? How many casual observers understood that Iran was merely doing what it had said years earlier it would do if certain Western countries didn’t follow through with the promised quid pro quo, and that those Western countries had failed to follow through?
That would happen again, and the US would ratchet up the tension just as it did when Iran terminated those earlier good faith gestures of cooperation. Whatever Iran might gain in the short term from a time-limited deal, it probably would lose most or all of it once the time limit expired and Iran reverted to the status quo ante.”
This is EXACTLY what I’ve been saying all along – that Iran gets NOTHING from cooperation from the US.
Your whole point is once again exposed as based on nothing but your speculation that SOMEHOW the US public could restrain the US from continuing to ratchet up tensions. Yet you admit right here that no matter what Iran did on a short term basis, it would be exactly the same result.
You’ve argued over and over that if Iran disclosed more it could hold back US progress along the war track. But here you admit that if Iran did disclose more, the US would simply continue along that same track.
You can’t even keep track of your own claims. You’re so busy arguing to read yourself arguing that you’ve painted yourself into a ridiculous corner.
I can’t imagine anyone taking your arguments seriously after this nonsense.
Richard,
You’ve misunderstood my point. Iran should resist accepting restrictions, or making commitments, that are time-limited. Once the restricted period ends and Iran it reclaims its rights, or stops observing its commitment, most people will forget (if they ever knew) that that had been the arrangement all along.
Mr. Brill: “Whatever Iran might gain in the short term from a time-limited deal, it probably would lose most or all of it once the time limit expired and Iran reverted to the status quo ante.”
And yet you say Iran needs to “disclose more” in order to get a short term benefit supposedly by mollifying the US electorate.
You don’t see ANY contradictions in these two positions, do you?
Thought not.
Arnold,
“I’d say a deal [in September] is plausible that gets the AP, gets time-limited restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program…”
Two comments. First, a deal with “time-limited restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program” is dangerous for Iran. When the time limits end and Iran renews enrichment, it will be entirely within its rights. Just as Iran was a few years back when it announced it was terminating its voluntary suspension of enrichment activities, its voluntary observance of the Additional Protocols, and its voluntary suspension of compliance with new Code 3.1. How did the US government spin that? How many casual observers understood that Iran was merely doing what it had said years earlier it would do if certain Western countries didn’t follow through with the promised quid pro quo, and that those Western countries had failed to follow through?
That would happen again, and the US would ratchet up the tension just as it did when Iran terminated those earlier good faith gestures of cooperation. Whatever Iran might gain in the short term from a time-limited deal, it probably would lose most or all of it once the time limit expired and Iran reverted to the status quo ante.
Second, the prospect of the US government striking a near-term deal with Iran – any deal at all, except for a deal that Iran would find so ridiculous that it would have trouble even responding politely to the US’ offer – strikes me as remote. First-term US presidents nearly always lose ground in mid-term elections (recall Bill Clinton after the 1994 election, after which he spent several months just persuading the US press he was still “relevant”). The Democrats appear especially vulnerable this time, and many American voters suspect Obama even eats watercress and quiche when no one is watching. The very last thing he needs is to announce some deal with a charter member of the Axis of Evil – unless the deal is so heavily stacked against Iran’s interests that Iran would be insane to accept it.
This is not to say that talks in September will be utterly pointless. September will give way to October, and then to November and December, and the elections will be over. Some useful groundwork may be laid, under the radar, before the election, and maybe it will be turned into some mutually beneficial agreement. Maybe, and I hope so. But before the November election? Not a chance.
Mr. Brill:
“My point is not that Iran’s decision to observe the Additional Protocols, and generally be more open in its nuclear-program disclosures, would immediately affect the behavior of the US government. It would simply reduce support for the US government’s misbehavior by the American public and by some US allies – maybe just a bit, possibly more, but certainly to some extent.”
I see you’re shrinking the value of your “disclosure” argument bit by bit. Like the US population even SEES the US stance as “misbehavior”, which you admit below it does not.
“The US government will swagger a bit less if it can no longer argue that Iran must be hiding something.”
But the US can ALWAYS make that argument. Do you really totally forget Iraq? The IAEA CERTIFIED that Iraq DID NOT have a nuclear weapons program! Did that stop the “mushroom cloud” argument for one instance?
It’s amazing the solipsist arguments you’re making here. As long as it eases YOUR mind about Iran’s program, as Arnold points out, it’s worth any damage to Iran’s interests, even if it does nothing to stop the US from proceeding on its intended course.
“Maybe not enough to stop the US from attacking Iran, but probably so – and enough to slow it down for a good long while in any event. All for little or no cost to Iran.”
That’s already been discredited. It WILL cost Iran because Iran will get NOTHING in return.
“The “bargain chip” value of Iran’s withheld AP-commitment is nil as long as no attractive deal (for Iran) can be struck anyway in the present environment,”
I actually can agree with you on THAT point. But MY point is that it works BOTH WAYS. Iran gets no benefit from committing to the AP, so why bother? Your only suggestion is that it might mollify the US public – who don’t hold the reins of the US military anyway any more than they did on Iraq. Your notion that it will restrain the US government “for a good long while” is pure speculation unsupported by Iraq and Afghanistan history.
“and is possibly “negative” since Iran’s current stubbornness works against it with the American public. The US government needs the American public behind it in order to go to war. Right now it’s got that.”
And it will keep that because no matter Iran does, the US government and the AIPAC-controlled US press will continue to mislead the US public.
Your argument has really petered out to be absolutely worthless.
Lysander,
“Here is why. The US control over Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf Arab states is tenuous and cannot tolerate an example of successful resistance. The Gulf states will not so much fear a nuclear Iran as they will seek an accommodation with it, at American expense. Europe, for its part, once it realizes the decision of going fully nuclear rests entirely with Iran, will have little patience for the US-Israeli brinkmanship that will push Iran in that direction.”
I can’t agree fully with any of those predictions (though I wouldn’t rule any out), but my more important observation is this: Suppose you’re right about all of them, and that the US government makes the very same predictions. Wouldn’t this merely add to the US’ already numerous reasons for making sure that Iran never attains nuclear weapons status?
“Other than that, I agree. The US will do everything it can to pile on sanctions after sanctions. If an opportunity for war presents itself, they would grab it with both hands (but that’s a big if). Neither of those things would change if Iran halted its nuclear program today.”
My point is not that Iran’s decision to observe the Additional Protocols, and generally be more open in its nuclear-program disclosures, would immediately affect the behavior of the US government. It would simply reduce support for the US government’s misbehavior by the American public and by some US allies – maybe just a bit, possibly more, but certainly to some extent. The US government will swagger a bit less if it can no longer argue that Iran must be hiding something. Maybe not enough to stop the US from attacking Iran, but probably so – and enough to slow it down for a good long while in any event. All for little or no cost to Iran. The “bargain chip” value of Iran’s withheld AP-commitment is nil as long as no attractive deal (for Iran) can be struck anyway in the present environment, and is possibly “negative” since Iran’s current stubbornness works against it with the American public. The US government needs the American public behind it in order to go to war. Right now it’s got that.
Lysander: “I do think a nuclear weapons capability will help Iran to overcome the threat. Here is why. The US control over Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf Arab states is tenuous and cannot tolerate an example of successful resistance.”
I’m not so sure of that. Does the US “control” those countries, or do those countries control the US, or both? The issue is money and power in all those countries. As long as the US offers them billions in aid, which is going directly in the pockets of the leadership, I’d say the US has a pretty strong grip on them that Iran is not in a position to break.
Remember – never think of those countries as “countries”. They are small groups of corrupt men who use state power to maintain their grip on their populations and use US military aid and money – and the US need for oil – to maintain that state power. In return, the US economy is held hostage to OPEC and the US oil companies.
Reminds me of the line Marlon Brando used in a movie, playing an oil company CEO. His assistant suggests that “the Arabs” wouldn’t like a certain event to occur. Brando replies, “We ARE ‘the Arabs’!”
“The Gulf states will not so much fear a nuclear Iran as they will seek an accommodation with it, at American expense.”
They will have to whether or not Iran acquires nuclear weapons. It’s just the turn of the cards. Iran has too much strategic importance and a growing economy and population not to be influential in the reason, as well as it’s influence over the Shia populations in Arab nations, which are a direct threat to the Sunni rulers.
But Iran cannot replace the US as the supporters of those regimes, partly because it doesn’t have the money and military threat – even with a hypothetical nuclear capability which is decades away at best even if Iran wanted them – and partly because Iran, as a Shia state, is fundamentally at odds with the Sunni Arab states. The Sunni Arab states will never have as close a relationship with Iran as they do the US. The only thing keeping the Arab states from an even closer relationship with the US is the US support for Israel, which plays very badly in the Arab street, which makes it a threat to the Arab leaders.
“Europe, for its part, once it realizes the decision of going fully nuclear rests entirely with Iran, will have little patience for the US-Israeli brinkmanship that will push Iran in that direction.”
I think Europe probably wants the Palestinian issue AND the Iran issue to go away. But there’s really nothing the EU can do about either Iran or the US or Israel. They can bluster, but the US is calling the shots on the Iran “crisis” and Israel is calling the shots on the Palestinian issue. Short of the EU deciding to diplomatically break with the US on the Palestinian issue and condemn Israel and perhaps demand Israel disarm its nuclear arsenal, there is nothing the EU can do but follow the US lead on the Iran issue, as it has been doing.
Eric Brill is right about one thing and one thing only. The US will not allow Iran to have a nuclear energy program. Or more precisely, the US will use the nonexistent Iranian nuclear weapons program as an excuse to beat down Iran for the benefit of the MIC, the oil companies, Israel and US hegemony in the Middle East. The EU can’t stop that, and because the EU also has its own “military-industrial complex”, it will either go along as it did with Iraq, or at least it will remain neutral, even if it publicly condemns another Middle East war in general terms.
As I’ve argued, if Iran acquires one or a dozen undeliverable nuclear weapons, nothing much will change except to ramp up the US war against it. And I believe Iran understands this. If I’m wrong and Iran does develop a nuclear weapon either during or after a US military campaign against it, I don’t see the EU changing its stance one iota. After North Korea conducted a couple dud tests of its nuclear weapons, I didn’t see any change in the stance of Japan, South Korea or the US toward it. The US is continuing to ramp up pressure on NK, now using the suspicious Cheonan sinking as the excuse, despite the fact that the US is in no position to militarily challenge NK. The same will happen with Iran, except that Iran will begin to assume more of a “pariah” status in the Middle East, at least in the eyes of the West and probably in the eyes of the Arab state leaders.
It’s not clear that if Iran actually makes a nuclear weapon that this would be considered “successful resistance” against the US. It might be by many of the Non-Aligned Nations, but not Iran’s immediate neighbors or by the West.
I think it’s clear from some of the remarks put out by the UAE, and from the repeated propaganda notices about Saudi Arabia cooperation with Israel over Iran, that the Arab states don’t want Iran to have any more influence than it does. They probably do not want an Iran-US war in their backyard, but if Iran actually had a nuclear weapons I don’t think they would be much more accommodating to Iran than they are now. Certainly, whatever the Arab states reaction, it would not make Iran more powerful in the Middle East than the US is.
I think Iran has a very clear understanding of this. Iranian observers have said that an Iranian bomb would damage Iranian influence in the region, and I’m convinced that is a correct assessment.
Arnold: Vis-a-vis a deal in the fall, I don’t see it happening. Iran will no doubt put a very good offer on the table, as they have done in the past. Obama, in contrast, will bluster and refuse it, just like George Bush. The EU, Russia, China, they’ll all be in favor of the deal to one degree or another. The US will not. Israel will be going ballistic and the US press will be filled with AIPAC-generated crap about Iran’s “existential threat to Israel”.
We’re seen all this before. The US – and I explicitly mean Obama is included in that – has ZERO interest in reducing this “crisis” in any significant way. It might just be possible that Obama would make some sort of effort due to this year being elections for Democrats in Congress, so he can have some talking points about his “engagement strategy” (which as you’ve realized now was complete BS) but immediately after the elections it will be “business as usual” trying to impose more sanctions and ratcheting up the rhetoric.
It did take quite a long while after 9/11 to get a war started with Iraq, after all. And Iraq was a country that had ALREADY invaded Iran AND Kuwait, and a country that the US had ALREADY attacked in 1991, and that the UN had ALREADY sanctioned seriously for a decade. And it still took Bush more than two years to get a war started with Iraq, to the point where Bush and Cheney were considering having a U-2 spy plane shot down over Iraq to justify it.
So I’m not surprised that it may perhaps take even longer to get the Iran war started. Nonetheless I am completely convinced that is the ultimate goal.
Everyone must remember that the basis of this is complete nonsense. There IS NO Iranian nuclear weapons program. Getting drawn into nuances of whether Iran wants a Japan option just muddies the water. It’s the influence of the constant harping from the media about Iran’s “nuclear weapons program”. It’s brainwashing. And it’s worked fine on the US public, most of whom believe Iran has one and most of whom believe the US should stop it – if not necessarily by military means RIGHT NOW.
But it’s ruminant evacuation. We have to keep out minds clear about that. It’s about war for the military-industrial complex, the oil companies, Israel and the neocons. Nothing more. Lose that perspective and you drift into a state of un-reality.
RSH,
“1) Iran does not now have and there is little evidence Iran ever did have a nuclear weapons development and deployment program.
2) Even if Iran DID have such, it would be useless to them.
3) Iran’s leaders have made it clear that they understand point 2).
4) Therefore the real reason for the “crisis” is identical to that of Iraq.”
I agree with points one and four. Two and three are a different matter. Yes, the US will move heaven and earth to topple Iran’s government or break Iran into smaller pieces. But I do not think it will succeed and I do think a nuclear weapons capability will help Iran to overcome the threat. Here is why. The US control over Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf Arab states is tenuous and cannot tolerate an example of successful resistance. The Gulf states will not so much fear a nuclear Iran as they will seek an accommodation with it, at American expense. Europe, for its part, once it realizes the decision of going fully nuclear rests entirely with Iran, will have little patience for the US-Israeli brinkmanship that will push Iran in that direction.
Other than that, I agree. The US will do everything it can to pile on sanctions after sanctions. If an opportunity for war presents itself, they would grab it with both hands (but that’s a big if). Neither of those things would change if Iran halted its nuclear program today.
Arnold: BTW, thanks for the compliment on my writing. I do try. :-)
Mr. Canning: ” The arrogant ignoramus, G W Bush, is no longer in the White House. Nor is the warmonger and facilitator of war profiteering, Dick Cheney.”
No – the war monger and facilitator of war profiteering Barack Obama is in the White House. If you think this guy is any different, I suggest you notice that he has continued the expansion and cost of the US military, and doubled down on an insane policy in Afghanistan. If you think Obama is anything more than “Bush Lite”, you are delusional.
“Iran has a good opening before it, and by keeping the moral high ground Iran can enhance its own security and have a good chance at getting the sanctions reduced or eliminated.”
Iran has no chance of achieving this. The reaction of Obama to the Turkey-Brazil deal is proof.
“Sanctions have bought time for Obama – there will no war until 2012 when US troops have left both Iraq and Afghanistan.”
I’ll both agree and disagree.
I agree with Arnold that the US will NEVER leave both countries until the military-industrial complex can replace the profits they are making from both wars with a NEW WAR.
And I will disagree because Iran is that new war which will pay off for the MIC for the next ten years.
I also disagree about the timing. While Obama has to allow this round of sanctions to fail, and perhaps even another round or two to fail, the bottom line is that either he has to start the war with Iran in this term, or he has to wait until his second term (or his successor if he fails to be re-elected). They cannot spin this out another ten years like Iraq. Even though the US has been accusing Iran of actually HAVING nuclear weapons for over twenty years, Israel is pushing. And Israel as well as the MIC control the US Congress.
The previous accusations of Iran having nuclear weapons have been random propaganda during flareups of diplomatic angst. The current push is directed at a resolution, just as the pushes against Iraq and Afghanistan were directed at resolution – war. You cannot just keep spinning and spinning and imposing sanctions that don’t work indefinitely. First, the people who want to see real monetary or geopolitical benefit from a war with Iran WANT THAT BENEFIT. They don’t get that benefit from dragging it out over decades. Second, the longer you spin it out, the more ridiculous it gets. It’s astounding that more people don’t realize that Iran has been accused of actually HAVING nuclear weapons for over twenty years, all the way back to the 1980’s! This really proves how ridiculous the entire “crisis” actually is. But most people aren’t aware of this, since they only absorb what they see in the current media.
So the bottom line again is: this has to be resolved, and it has to be resolved within a reasonable time frame.
And as I’ve said, if you want to attack Iran, NOT leaving Iraq is an excellent idea, and in addition if you WANT to leave Afghanistan, attacking Iran is Obama’s best excuse as well as the means to ratchet up the “war economy”.
Arnold: I wouldn’t go so far as to say the US is “uncomfortable” with Iran having a Japan option. I would go way past that and say the US doesn’t care one way or the other, because the US’s primary goal is regime change for the benefit of Israel and the US oil companies and a war for the benefit of the military-industrial complex, just like Iraq.
The reality, as I’ve argued, is that Iran wouldn’t benefit one iota from having a nuclear weapon, and Iran has made it clear they understand that (at least some of the leadership, if not all). Therefore Iran hopefully understands that the US has no real interest in its nuclear energy program and this whole business is just a casus belli for regime change.
The whole discussion over whether Iran could or should change its behavior in any way is laughably irrelevant. As you’ve correctly pointed out, Brill and the US have different motivations than any reasonable person, although I wouldn’t necessarily accuse Brill – in the absence of any revelations from him – of being desirous of another US war. Whether he believes regime change is warranted is something I don’t think he’s made clear. But there’s absolutely no doubt whatsoever that the US wants regime change, is working overtly and covertly to achieve that, and is laying the groundwork via sanctions for war with Iran precisely as it did with Afghanistan and then Iraq.
Anyone who can’t see that has an ulterior agenda favorable to war with Iran. There is no room for “splitting hairs” and “nuance” in this matter.
This is especially true if one recognizes, as I do, that even if Iran HAD a nuclear weapons program, or even HAD nuclear weapons in fact right now (as, note, it has been accused of having for over TWENTY YEARS now!), it still wouldn’t be interesting. Iran is not North Korea. And even North Korea, under pressure as it is from the US for decades more than Iran even has been, hasn’t done anything with its alleged nuclear weapons. The assumption is NK has up to six or more actual nuclear weapons (despite the fact that it’s one or two tests were essentially duds). Yet no one is shaking in their boots about it, not even Japan or South Korea, the two countries most directly threatened.
So anybody claiming that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable” is obviously either an idiot or lying. Because a nuclear armed Korea is clearly very tolerable, as is a nuclear armed China, a nuclear armed India, and a nuclear armed Pakistan (assuming the US isn’t trying to overthrow Pakistan, which is possible).
Since an Iran with one or half a dozen nuclear weapons without a delivery system other than smuggling is essentially harmless to everyone, especially faced with the nuclear cruise missiles of Israel and the US nuclear arsenal, the whole subject is just ridiculous.
The worst effect of Iran having actual nuclear weapons would be if other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia or Syria decided to get nuclear weapons as well. Yet clearly the only negative effect of that race would be if they all got them and then used them on each other. They STILL wouldn’t dare threaten Israel or the US! And it would take them even more decades than it has Iran to actually produce a deliverable weapons system.
The whole discussion is patently absurd. It’s promoted only by idiots going under the rubric of “Very Serious People” for their own career benefit – and the people who will benefit by conflict in the Middle East, i.e., the military-industrial complex, the oil companies, Israel, and the neocons.
This should be the focus of the discussion:
1) Iran does not now have and there is little evidence Iran ever did have a nuclear weapons development and deployment program.
2) Even if Iran DID have such, it would be useless to them.
3) Iran’s leaders have made it clear that they understand point 2).
4) Therefore the real reason for the “crisis” is identical to that of Iraq.
Full stop. Turn the argument back on the war-mongers at that point and accuse them of wanting war for their own benefit and the benefit of Israel. Systematically deny that there is any Iran “crisis” and the whole thing is on a par with “WMDs in Iraq”.
All this other stuff about whether Iran actually wants or has a “Japan option” is speculative and irrelevant. The reality is Japan is probably the only country that could or has pulled off a “Japan option” and then only if it were directly threatened by North Korea or China. So it’s not even relevant to Iran.
Whatever Iran’s “legal” or “moral” rights may be, I believe the US has decided that it is not going to let Iran have what Japan has.
The cost of preventing that is high, and I don’t think a decision has been made that it’s worth it. I should say the cost of forestalling that for a few years is high.
I don’t think there is anything the US can do that will see 2020 arrive with Iran not in possession of at least a secure stock of uranium that it believes it could fairly reliably make into a weapon in an emergency.
I don’t think war would prevent that, I think war would make it, actually more likely.
Eric, good point about not being rosy on a deal being made in September.
If a deal was to be reached, I think the US press would go along with it, but I don’t expect a deal to be reached in September.
Iran will put on the table the status quo plus the AP and I’d lean toward guessing it will offer the old international participation in its program deal it offered years ago. Which would, for as long as Iran sustained it, give the US good information about Iran’s program and clarity that without breaking the agreement and leaving the NPT it would not be able to make a weapon.
The US will put on the table the same one ton limit. How that works is that if Iran does commit to a one ton maximum, then its enrichment works against it since it has a large (for weapons purposes 30 or so bombs worth) but finite stock of raw uranium. Iran will want to compensate for that by being able to import uranium.
This actually could be made into a deal I’d suggest Iran take. Very importantly, it would have to expire without a long-term commitment so that Iran would not handcuff future generations of Iranian leadership. If that could be worked out, Iran might be willing, pure speculation and only based on my thoughts, Iran doesn’t need to be nuclear capable over the next 5 years or so – it just can’t permanently give up that right.
The question becomes how much could the US give up for that. Meaning most of the US sanctions are in place for supporting anti-Israel groups and the US doesn’t want to trade them for the nuclear issue while leaving the opposition to Israel in place. The US has offered airplane parts and TRR fuel. Bushehr, the s-300s, India in the gas pipeline are all kind of at least implicitly on the table.
I’d say a deal is plausible that gets the AP, gets time-limited restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program but does not stop it and releases some US opposition to Iran’s economic development.
Israel would oppose that and Israel operates directly in Iran without US knowledge or oversight and is very likely to blow something up to prevent a deal. That is the kind of test of Obama’s leadership that by now he consistently fails. To Iran, if Obama is unwilling or unable to reign in Israel which is a US dependency, then that means Israeli policy is US policy and the US blew something up to prevent a deal.
Hezbollah, for example, isn’t going to blow something up to manipulate any of Iran’s negotiations.
My best prediction for September: Fundamentally a deal is possible. Israel has a veto that it will use. No deal will be made. This is very similar to what I think happened last October. Another year of increased hostility, even new sanctions, unnecessary deaths of US servicepeople. Next late summer or fall we’ll see if we can get a deal that is only a little more favorable to Iran than what’s on the table now.
Barack Obama builds on his record as the most undeserving Nobel Peace prize recipient of all time. But no war breaks out.
Kooshy: I believe I read somewhere that Gordon Prather has been ill, and that’s why he hasn’t been published in a while.
And another piece:
Iran Under Siege
www dot counterpunch dot org/dimaggio07302010.html
Quote:
“Republicans in the House of Representatives have introduced a new bill that would grant “support for the State of Israel’s right to defend Israeli sovereignty, to protect the lives and safety of the Israeli people, and to use all means necessary to confront and eliminate nuclear threats posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the use of military force if no other peaceful solution can be found within reasonable time.” Those who are unsure about a looming attack will no doubt remind Americans that speculation over U.S. or Israeli attacks on Iran have been commonplace for years. This is no doubt true, although it ignores the fact that a Congressional bill represents a new precedent – it’s a radical, yet formal step, toward making war with Iran a reality. Also, war may be one step closer in light of comments from Democratic Vice President Joe Biden, who announced this month that “Israel won’t attack Iran before sanctions [are] allowed to work.”
As Haaretz reports, the former CIA chief, Michael Hayden, is also now warning that “military action against Iran now seems more likely because no matter what the U.S. does diplomatically, Tehran keeps pushing ahead with its suspected nuclear program.” In his own words, Hayden explained that during the Bush years, “a strike was way down on the list of options,” but now such an attack “seems inexorable….In my personal thinking, I have begun to consider that that [a military strike] may not be the worst of all possible outcomes.”"
Arnold,
“But given that, the idea that Iran’s position that it has the right to the same nuclear capabilities Japan has is not a fantasy, it is something you concede.”
Yes, a thousand times yes. I concede that Iran has that right. Anyone who reads the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement would reach the same conclusion (with some disagreement, as you and I and Alan discussed several months back, on whether the IAEA’s recent orders exceed the scope of its authority). All I’m telling you is to consider real life here. Whatever Iran’s “legal” or “moral” rights may be, I believe the US has decided that it is not going to let Iran have what Japan has. To use the example you usually cite, the US is not going to allow Iran to accumulate enough plutonium to make “thousands of bombs.” The US can barely see its way clear to let Iran enrich enough LEU for one bomb, much less thousands. What makes you think that will ever change?
I’m saying Iran should deal with the US government as it is and is likely to remain. You and many others are saying that someone should sit down with the US government, maybe read through the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with it, and explain to the US government that it’s just not being fair to Iran and should try to be nicer. I don’t think that’s terribly useful to Iran, because I’m confident that the US government understands this well enough already. I just think it cares a lot less about that than you think it should.
New Gareth Porter on the role the neocons are playing in the run up to the Iran war:
Neocon Nutballs Ramp Up Campaign
Bomb Iran?
www dot counterpunch dot org/porter07302010.html
Quote:
“The idea of waging a U.S. war of destruction against Iran is obvious lunacy, which is why U.S. military leaders have strongly resisted it both during the Bush and Obama administrations. But Gerecht makes it clear that Israel believes it can use its control of Congress to pound Obama into submission. Democrats in Congress, he boasts, “are mentally in a different galaxy than they were under President Bush.” Even though Israel has increasingly been regarded around the world as a rogue state after its Gaza atrocities and the commando killings of unarmed civilians on board the Mavi Marmara, its grip on the U.S. Congress appears as strong as ever.
Moreover, polling data for 2010 show that a majority of Americans have already been manipulated into supporting war against Iran – in large part because more than two-thirds of those polled have gotten the impression that Iran already has nuclear weapons. The Israelis are apparently hoping to exploit that advantage. “If the Israelis bomb now, American public opinion will probably be with them,” writes Gerecht. “Perhaps decisively so.”
Netanyahu must be feeling good about the prospects for pressuring Barack Obama to join an Israeli war of aggression against Iran. It was Netanyahu, after all, who declared in 2001, “I know what America is. America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction. They won’t get in the way.”
About whether Japan’s plutonium stockpile is accidental, I found this supposedly from a secret Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs report produced in 1969.
“The policy for the time being is not to have nuclear weapons, but the economic and technical potential to produce nuclear weapons will always be retained and care will be taken not to accept any restrictions on this.”
I’d rather something more recent but 1) nothing fundamental would have changed in favor of relinquishing nuclear flexibility by Japan 2) I’m not sure I expect Japanese leaders to say explicitly that they are maintaining a nuclear weapons option, beyond what some leaders have already said.
It strikes me as a reasonable position that does not violate the letter or the spirit of the NPT. As I always say, the US should begin the good faith negotiations for full disarmament it committed to. If the US commits to being nuclear capable as Japan is, that would be a tremendous step forward. If the United States withholds support from Israel until Israel adopts Japan’s nuclear posture, that would cause a huge reduction in the risk of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East.
Eric A. Brill & Erid:
Yes you are both missing something.
That something is called Iraq.
Arnold,
“The level of one ton is probably no longer acceptable to Iran, but if it was and other comparatively minor details were worked out, the US and Iran could probably reach a deal that allows enrichment.”
Why forecast rosy prospects for a deal that you’ve just said would not be acceptable to Iran?
My understanding, like yours, is that Iran would not a accept a one-ton limit. This means either (1) there won’t be a deal at all; or (2) Iran will change its mind and accept a one-ton limit after all; or (3) the US will agree to a higher limit, but probably not much higher.
If such a deal is struck, then, sooner or later – such as when Iran actually wants to operate nuclear power plants (the whole point of the exercise, after all) and doesn’t want to depend indefinitely on foreign sources of nuclear fuel – Iran will inevitably become dissatisfied with the low limit. When that happens, will Iran be better off:
(1) having an agreement in place that it now must either breach or ask to be renegotiated; or
(2) not having entered into such an agreement in the first place?
I don’t know what the answer would be. But when you consider this question, recall the strongly negative reaction to Iran’s decisions to resume enrichment and to stop observing the Additional Protocols and new Code 3.1. Might Iran be better off today if it had not made commitments that it was not prepared to live with indefinitely – even if it did make clear that it was reserving the right to change its mind? Might no agreement at all be the best alternative for the time being, if Iran can realistically hope for no more than you’re describing?
Why this strong urge to strike a deal with the US? Do you really believe the US is in enough of a dealing mood that it would accept both meaningful Iranian enrichment rights and the termination or substantial reduction of sanctions? What, exactly, would Iran offer in return that the US would care about enough to give all that?
You might answer: agreement to the Additional Protocols, and obviously we can argue forever about what that might really be worth to the US. But I can assure you, at least, that Israel and John Bolton won’t think much of such a deal. I can just imagine Bolton saying: “Let me get this straight. You OK’d Iran’s enrichment of uranium, you terminated the sanctions, and Iran agreed to much more open disclosures so that we can no longer strike fear into the heart of the American public with our “What’s Iran trying to hide argument?” Is that it, or am I missing something?”
Eric A. Brill:
The Princeton thesis was on a fission bomb.
The Brazilian one is on a fusion bomb.
James,
“I assume Turkey would enter into an escrow agreement with Iran, holding the Iranian LEU pending delivery of the fuel for the TRR (from France, probalby). Then the LEU would be sent to Russia. No room for input from Israel.”
Thanks. I still wonder, though, whether Israel might influence the US and other Western countries not to approve of Turkey acting as the escrow holder.
Arnold,
“The US press hardly cares about Iran. I have no idea what makes you think there would be particularly hostile press at any deal a US president makes that he honestly believes, and that his administration believes, is the best the US can get.”
Just a hunch.
Arnold,
“My understanding is that 50,000 “non combat” troops are to remain in Iraq indefinitely. Do you have a source for the idea that there will be a full evacuation?”
I haven’t read the whole US-Iraq SOFA agreement and certainly haven’t studied it, but here is the relevant portion.
Article 24 of the SOFA states:
Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, the assumption of full security responsibility by those Forces, and based upon the strong relationship between the Parties, an agreement on the following has been reached:
1. All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.
2. All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later than June 30, 2009.
3. United States combat forces withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 2 above shall be stationed in the agreed facilities and areas outside cities, villages, and localities to be designated by the JMOCC before the date established in paragraph 2 above.
4. The United States recognizes the sovereign right of the Government of Iraq to request the departure of the United States Forces from Iraq at any time. The Government of Iraq recognizes the sovereign right of the United States to withdraw the United States Forces from Iraq at any time.
5. The Parties agree to establish mechanisms and arrangements to reduce the number of the United States Forces during the periods of time that have been determined, and they shall agree on the locations where the United States Forces will be present.
Now since they make a distinction between All US forces in section one and and All combat forces in section two, it seems to me the agreement is that all US forces combat or otherwise, are supposed to leave by the end of 2011.
Of course, that does not meant it is certain to happen. The US can use any excuse it wants to stay past that date and can contrive some legalistic basis out of the SOFA language. But as of this moment, the US publicly remains committed to leaving entirely before Jan 1 2012. And there is a risk of a Shiite insurgency if they don’t.
Once the withdrawal happens, the US will have even less means to counter Iranian influence in Iraq. Saudi hostility towards a Shiite dominated government will keep Iraq’s interests in line with Iran’s. Saudi fear of Shiite insurrection in her own territory will make them wish to avoid any serious disagreement with Iran and direct land communication between Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon will be available.
In certain ways, Iranian deterrence will increase after a complete US withdrawal from Iraq. (If it actually happens)
“I don’t think it’s worth it for Obama to attack Iran over Iran’s getting a Japan option.”
I don’t either. John Bolton does.
Ok. I’ve asked you this before. How do you feel about Iran attaining the same technological capabilities Japan has? Are you saying that you, personally, are indifferent? Are you saying its something you’d rather not see, but not worth the costs of a US attack? You’re clearly not in agreement with me that it would be a good thing for Iran to reach Japan’s status.
And what do you think the costs to the US of an attack would be? You’ve never spelled out what John Bolton would be sacrificing in terms of US interests to attack Iran to prevent it from getting a Japan option.
kooshy,
See my previous comment to Eric. I see no room whatever for any input from Israel regarding the proposed arrangements.
Shimon Peres has called England “deeply pro-Arab. . .and anti-Israel”. Not true, to be sure, but fortunately, the UK is not under the thumb of the Israel lobby. In fact, the UK is serving the best interests of Israel by not knuckling under to Zionist pressure. Peres obviously did not like Hague’s reference to Israel’s effort to convert the Gaza Strip into a giant outdoor prison.
James,
“I do not see how Israel would have any influence over the terms of Turkey’s escrow holding of Iranian LEU.”
Eric
“Coming from you, I consider that a remarkable statement. You usually find the hand of Israel in just about everything. Can you elaborate?”
I second that
How’d that work out?
Since you put it that way, to be completely honest, my best guess is that Iran pulled out of the deal after Balochistan and that the US did not directly aid in the Balochistan attack and would have prevented it if it could.
This is pure speculation, but the US proliferation community, from what I read would gladly, at this point, trade allowing continued Iranian enrichment for an Iranian commitment to export before it reaches a ton in its domestic stock.
The level of one ton is probably no longer acceptable to Iran, but if it was and other comparatively minor details were worked out, the US and Iran could probably reach a deal that allows enrichment.
The US press hardly cares about Iran. I have no idea what makes you think there would be particularly hostile press at any deal a US president makes that he honestly believes, and that his administration believes, is the best the US can get.
Eric,
I assume Turkey would enter into an escrow agreement with Iran, holding the Iranian LEU pending delivery of the fuel for the TRR (from France, probalby). Then the LEU would be sent to Russia. No room for input from Israel.
Arnold,
“I don’t think it’s worth it for Obama to attack Iran over Iran’s getting a Japan option.”
I don’t either. John Bolton does.
Arnold,
“Prove me wrong. Find somewhere in the NPT that denies Japan the right to the nuclear program it has. Find somewhere in the NPT that denies Iran the right to the same program Japan has.”
Will you please stop beating this to death? I’ve said many times that I agree with you, and not once that I disagree.
Arnold,
“You’re almost, but not saying a Japan option is not useful. To say that would be to say that the strategists in both Japan and Iran are not as gifted at determining the use of their nuclear program as you are. You’re not quite saying that, because it would be stupid, but you’re almost saying it.”
Arnold, you’re being much too polite here. That’s exactly what I’m saying.
Incidentally, before we draw conclusions about what Japanese strategists are thinking, can you address Richard’s observation that Japan’s stockpile of plutonium may have resulted from nothing more than the difficulty of disposing of it?
Pirouz,
“Eric, your analogy is flawed by its simplicity. For if it were really that it easy, rest assured that an attack would have been launched already in 2007 during the height of Bush/Cheney belligerency.”
In 2007, the US was probably not concerned that Iran was anywhere close to the “too late” point, and probably quite unsure of the US military’s ability to launch a successful military attack. I think both concerns still exist, but that (1) the US now worries that Iran may be closer to the “too late” point; and (2) the US military in the meantime has been working to reduce the uncertainty about its ability to launch a successful military attack. That uncertainty will never be entirely eliminated, of course, and the US government may well conclude (I hope so) that an attack would be a disaster in the long run, the medium run, and perhaps even the short run.
If so, the US government may or may not continue to reach the same conclusion as more time passes. It may become willing to accept a greater degree of uncertainty about the prospects of a military attack if it concludes (correctly or not) that a prompt military attack is necessary to eliminate what it considers to be an even greater uncertainty: the possibility that Iran has a nuclear weapon, or is far enough along that it can’t be stopped.
usefulness to Iran of achieving the coveted “Japan option.”
You’re almost, but not saying a Japan option is not useful. To say that would be to say that the strategists in both Japan and Iran are not as gifted at determining the use of their nuclear program as you are.
You’re not quite saying that, because it would be stupid, but you’re almost saying it.
If the usefulness is a fantasy of mine, then that fantasy is – unlike your fantasy that the US can recreate the 1991 air attack on Iraq and force Iran to submit – true according to both the words and the deeds of the professionals in their fields.
Whether Iran has “legal” or “moral” rights, or any other kind of rights
Scroll down and you’ll see where you conceded that Iran’s position is morally and legally right, your response there was that life isn’t fair. But given that, the idea that Iran’s position that it has the right to the same nuclear capabilities Japan has is not a fantasy, it is something you concede.
Prove me wrong. Find somewhere in the NPT that denies Japan the right to the nuclear program it has. Find somewhere in the NPT that denies Iran the right to the same program Japan has.
Please don’t indulge my fantasy. Please demonstrate that my fantasy is wrong.
to get what Japan has – enough fuel to make “thousands of bombs”
OK. Iran fully replicating Japan’s nuclear program is generations away. But Iran does have a right to get there at whatever pace it can. Iran having a stockpile that could make a half dozen or a dozen weapons if it was to leave the NPT will probably arrive before Barack Obama is out of office.
When you quote that, you do realize you’re quoting Japanese Liberal Party president at the time Ichiro Ozawa, not me. Correct?
leaves the US guessing whether Iran either has nuclear weapons or could finish one up before the US can stop it, the US is not going to let Iran get to that position. Period.
Oooh, period. I guess you must win that point since you put a period there.
How much is it worth to the US? The fact of the matter is that Japan unambiguously does not have a weapon and unambiguously does not intend to launch or to be able to launch a surprise first strike against any of its rivals unless provoked in a very serious and unexpected way.
You want to prevent Iran from being in the same position? How many US soldiers are you willing to sacrifice to prevent Iran from reaching that position.
I’ve asked you this question a lot of times and you’ve never answered it Eric. I can’t think of one question you’ve asked me, or one substantive point you’ve made about Iran’s nuclear issue that I have not addressed. Anything I have not addressed, you can consider me to have conceded, but I am arguing from a much stronger position than you are. It is less a reflection on you than on the fact that the position you’re trying to argue is very difficult to keep coherent.
Then he pulled out his pistol and shot the guy in the chest.
Well if it happened in the movies it must be true.
But in real life, what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan after Obama/Harrison Ford shoots Iran?
Also, Iran, unlike the sword-fighter, doesn’t want a confrontation. Obama can leave Iran to develop its nuclear program and tell Israel that its regional nuclear monopoly was just not sustainable as technology improved. The US commitment that Israel has to be more powerful than every regional Muslim country put together was always overly ambitious even for a super-power. It was nice while it lasted, but shouldn’t have even lasted this long.
I don’t think it’s worth it for Obama to attack Iran over Iran’s getting a Japan option.
You disagree? Please indulge me with an argument as to why. All kinds of periods and things. “Ambiguous intentions” for countries with unambiguous nuclear weapons statuses. Please sit down and explain, in as persuasive terms as you can, your opposition to Iran and even Japan having the ability, if they were to leave the treaty to make weapons.
And if it is important to rid Japan and Iran of that ability, does it have to be free? Do you suggest that the country for whose leaders you actually vote make a tangible commitment to also give up its nuclear abilities in exchange?
Arnold,
“We just disagree on [whether an Iran/US deal acknowledging Iran's enrichment rights is feasible]. I was pretty optimistic, in early October 2009 before Balochistan, that a deal involving Iranian exports of LEU to a fuel bank, continued enrichment at its rate at the time without US opposition, lifting enrichment sanctions and the AP was in store with Obama positioning himself to present it as the best anyone could do and better than the alternatives.”
How’d that work out?
Eric, your analogy is flawed by its simplicity. For if it were really that it easy, rest assured that an attack would have been launched already in 2007 during the height of Bush/Cheney belligerency.
fyi,
“According to an article in Sunday’s edition of Rio’s daily Jornal do Brasil, Brazil has the necessary knowledge to build an atomic bomb . The statement is based on a doctoral thesis presented recently at the Military Institute of Engineering IME..”
In the course of his research, I wonder whether this Brazilian doctoral student happened to come upon the senior thesis of the Princeton student who accomplished the very same feat about 15 or 20 years ago.
Arnold,
“The only way the AP can be of use to the US or to you is if the US can use it, contrary to its purpose, to prevent Iran from achieving a Japan option…”
I’m not sure how much longer I can indulge your fantasies about the usefulness to Iran of achieving the coveted “Japan option.” Whether Iran has “legal” or “moral” rights, or any other kind of rights, to get what Japan has – enough fuel to make “thousands of bombs” – or anything else that leaves the US guessing whether Iran either has nuclear weapons or could finish one up before the US can stop it, the US is not going to let Iran get to that position. Period.
It might help to recall a scene from Raiders of the Lost Ark. Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) was running through the Cairo bazaar when suddenly he was confronted by a very fearsome and colorfully dressed Arab warrior, who planted himself squarely in front of Jones, snarled out a challenge, and attempted to intimidate Jones in advance with a highly ritualized display of razor-sharp swords.
Jones watched for a short while, amused and bemused. Then he pulled out his pistol and shot the guy in the chest.
http://www.brazzilmag.com/news/76/11176-brazil-knows-everything-there-is-to-build-an-a-bomb.html
Brazil Knows Everything There Is to Build an A-Bomb
Monday, 07 September 2009 18:06
According to an article in Sunday’s edition of Rio’s daily Jornal do Brasil, Brazil has the necessary knowledge to build an atomic bomb . The statement is based on a doctoral thesis presented recently at the Military Institute of Engineering IME.
There has been no official comment on the news but the United Nations International Atomic Energy, IAEA, has expressed an interest in the publication, according to the Brazilian press.
In the thesis “Numerical simulation of thermonuclear detonations in fusion-fission hybrid environments operated with radiation”, physicist Dalton Ellery Girão Barroso interprets physics and mathematical models of the W-87 warhead developed by the United States.
“You don’t need to make the bomb,” says Barroso. “You just have to show that you know how to do it.”
Part of the thesis was recently published in Brazil in a book with several contributions, “Physics of nuclear explosions”, although the hard core of the academic work remains in the dark well protected by IME, according to Jornal do Brasil.
A Brazilian Foreign Ministry spokesman quoted by Agence France Presse said that there was “no secret” around this thesis, as it has “apparently already been published in a book”. But Brazil is a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and it respects the agreement,” he said
According to Jornal do Brasil, the publication of the book last April triggered the interest of the IAEA, which allegedly requested additional information about the book to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense
Apparently IAEA concluded that the models described in the academic thesis and the book could have been practiced in a lab and this would support suspicions that Brazil has been advancing investigations on how to build a nuclear bomb.
In July 2007, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced the revival of the nuclear program in Brazil, with the completion of its first submarine nuclear propulsion and recovery, after 20 years of interruption, the construction of its third plant.
However, last week in a long interview with France Press, President Lula da Silva recalled that Brazil “is the only country in the world which specifically bans nuclear weapons in its Constitution, so it’s not the will of the president, it’s in the Constitution.”
This Monday, September 7, Brazil’s Independence Day, Lula hosted his French counterpart, Nicholas Sarkozy and signed a US$ 9 billion military cooperation agreement with Paris that includes among other things, Brazil’s first nuclear submersible and four conventional ones.
Naseer:
I had previously stated examples of countries with large number of expats; Malaysia, and India. I will add to them China, Israel, and Lebanon. Israel is particularly interesting since at least 30% of her passport holders live abroad. And these are Sabras. I think your point demonstrates nothing.
You asked what was to defeat: what was there to defeat was the Iranian nuclear developments. Iran has not been defeated in that.
Iran was not defeated in 2006 during Hezbollah-Israel War.
And Iran certainly has not been defeated in Iraq; very far from it indeed
I do not know how concerned Arab Leaders are about Iran hijacking the Arab-Israeli War. Since it is a pan-Islamic War against Israel, it follows that your premise is wrong – it is not an exclusively Arab issue.
You stated: “No the third world begins when you cross the border from Turkey to Iran, not from Iran to Pakistan.” Then, I am forced to conclude that you have neither visited Iran, nor Turkey, nor Pakistan at any time during the past 12 years. I think you are making statements that are just wrong.
Yes, Saudi Arabia has some spare capacity. What of it?
The Saudi GDP is based on selling oil – that is it. There is very little non-oil production behind it. Iran has a diversified economy.
Jean-François Seznec is basically saying that Iranian leaders are stupid keeping a floor under the standard of living of the Iranian population while, at the same time, are slow in finishing their projects. It is clear to me that projects in Iran eventually get completed. And the under-development of the Iranian oil and gas resources, however much one attribute them to the incompetence of the Iranians, still is not a big deal as the resources are kept undeveloped while prices soar for existing production.
If Saudis do not like the Iranian nuclear development they need not initiate one themselves. Let them sell their oil.
If Seznec is correct then Iran will collapse in a matter of time and we all can go home.
Iran has to have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons for the reasons of state cohesion and security due to the 1998 nuclear explosions in India and Pakistan. US can bomb as much as she likes, Arabs and Israelis can huff and puff even more. But the salient geostrategic calculus is 80,000 dead Iranians in US-Iran War against 800,00 dead Iranians just in the first nuclear bomb dropped on a defenseless Iran.
Ray McGovern says that according to his intelligence community sources, Iran did in fact have a “nuclear weapons program” prior to 2003. But what neither he nor anyone else has specified is whether the intelligence was good enough to distinguish between what I have called a “nuclear weapons research database program” – i.e., an attempt by the Iranian military or IRGC to learn how to build a nuclear weapon with or without authorization by the leadership – and a nuclear weapons development AND deployment program authorized by the leadership. Those are two very different programs. I submit that the intelligence assets and capabilities inside Iran available to the CIA are inadequate for them to distinguish between those two very different programs at a distance.
And since 16 US intelligence agencies all agreed that WHATEVER that program was, it stopped in 2003 and there is ZERO evidence that it has been restarted, I find it hard to comprehend why people like Alan and Brill are so concerned about what Iran is “hiding” or “not disclosing” or whatever the spin is this week – except of course that they just don’t like Iran for whatever reason they seem unwilling to “disclose” themselves.
I have to say Richard, that’s pretty well written.
I can barely imagine, for example, how savagely the US press would respond to the report of an Iran/US deal in which the US acknowledged Iran’s enrichment rights, even to a very limited extent, in exchange for Iran’s agreement to observe the Additional Protocols.
We just disagree on this. I was pretty optimistic, in early October 2009 before Balochistan, that a deal involving Iranian exports of LEU to a fuel bank, continued enrichment at its rate at the time without US opposition, lifting enrichment sanctions and the AP was in store with Obama positioning himself to present it as the best anyone could do and better than the alternatives.
There’s not much the press could say. US generals say that a military strike would not be a long term solution to the problem, but would make it worse after a few years. Sanely, no military person has adopted your unique idea that the type of campaign the US pursued against Iraq in 1991 would in a matter of weeks cause Iran to submit to whatever demands the US sees fit to impose.
The press would accept a resolution just fine. People who like Obama would support it, people who do not would oppose it.
Alas, it looks like those days are over. Obama turned out not to be the president I hoped he was back then.
Nor, as I’ve argued earlier, do I think it’s wise for Iran’s supporters to assume that Iran’s worst enemies want Iran to agree to the Additional Protocols in the first place. To the contrary, I am confident that Iran’s worst enemies strongly prefer that Iran stick to its guns. It plays right into their hands.
As I said earlier,
The only way the AP can be of use to the US or to you is if the US can use it, contrary to its purpose, to prevent Iran from achieving a Japan option, to make Iran’s nuclear program more vulnerable to US efforts to prevent it from reaching a legally and morally acceptable destination.
The only reason the AP could be detrimental to Iran is if the US can use it, contrary to its purpose, to prevent Iran from reaching a Japan option. As long as the US’ goal is to prevent Iran from attaining those capabilities, the AP would only give the US new tools to pursue its legally and morally indefensible objective but will not change US or your attitudes toward Iran’s program at all.
fyi,
“If US and Iranian power were unmatched, Iran would have already been defeated.
You can cross the border from Iran into Pakistan and immediately the Third World begins.
Economically, Iran is comparable to Turkey – Saud Arabia is not even on the radar screen.”
- What is there to defeat? No Seriously? We are talking about a country with no Air Force! It couldn’t even go to war with the Taliban! We are talking about a country whose net worth of its expatriates are higher than the country’s GDP. As far as “other parameters” goes, Arabs aren’t very impressed with Iran trying to hijack the Arab cause and their leaders would probably welcome an attack on Iran and everyone except the Iranians seem to realize this.
No the third world begins when you cross the border from Turkey to Iran, not from Iran to Pakistan. As far as Saudi Arabia “not even being on the radar screen” goes, it has a nominal GDP of $ 438 billion as compared to Iran’s $ 360 billion with per capita income being about four times as much as Iran’s. Saudi Arabia also has enough spare production capacity to completely make up for Iranian oil to be totally taken off the market. It’s significantly higher oil reserves also make it geopolitically more valuable than Iran and China seems to have realized this.
Jean-François Seznec summed it up best: “The Saudis see an Iranian elite that is siphoning billions of dollars to Dubai every year. They see Iran’s inability to complete any of its energy investments, whether refineries, gas fields, oil fields, or ambitious petrochemical plants. They see the enormous waste in subsidies to the population. They see that access to the Western technology essential for the large-scale development of Iran’s energy resources is being sacrificed by the Islamic Republic on the altar of locally-grown nuclear technology. In other words, the Saudis may have concluded that the Iranians are their own worst enemies and will not be able to create a credible nuclear deterrent without at the same time making themselves irrelevant on the world stage—in effect, a Middle Eastern North Korea.”
James,
“I do not see how Israel would have any influence over the terms of Turkey’s escrow holding of Iranian LEU.”
Coming from you, I consider that a remarkable statement. You usually find the hand of Israel in just about everything. Can you elaborate?
fyi,
My understanding is that 50,000 “non combat” troops are to remain in Iraq indefinitely. Do you have a source for the idea that there will be a full evacuation?
Arnold Evans:
US will be out if Iraq completely by 2012. This is a done deal.
The schedule for departure from Afghanistan is a bit fuzzy now, I agree.
Castellio,
Very interesting post.
“To the Christians who believe in social justice, Israel must be constrained. To the Christians who are waiting for salvation, Israel is sacred, it’s all God’s plan, bring on Armageddon. And in that scenario, the US military is the hand of God… (don’t laugh, that belief makes Cheney and cohorts, including Palin, very attractive to a wide band of Americans who could care less about the NPT). To them, Newt Gingrich’s call for war makes perfect sense.”
Few of the serious “waiting for salvation” Christians are among the nevertheless large segment of the US population that I think can be persuaded not to support an attack on Iran. Many “social justice” Christians probably are. More important, though, most Americans who label themselves as “Christians” in quotation marks aren’t really members of either sub-group. Members of this vast residual mass of “Christians” rarely reach conclusions on the advisability of war with Iran based on their religious beliefs. To the extent they think about Iran at all (5%?) – and especially if they don’t (95%?) – they take their views on Iran largely from “non-religious” conservative figures (Rush Limbaugh, just to pick an example), who occasionally weave religious elements into their arguments but usually do not – principally because such commentators typically desire that their political influence extend well beyond born-again Christians. While this doesn’t diminish the difficulty of overcoming the powerful influence of such commentators, it means at least that the effort will not inevitably hit the brick wall of Biblical arguments. For this reason, depriving a Rush Limbaugh of his ace-in-the-hole “What’s Iran trying to hide?” argument will count for something – perhaps not as much as I suggest, but certainly for something – even with this very large group of “Christians” who are thought to have nothing but Armageddon on their minds.
And if such an effort may affect the views even of many “Christians,” it is likely to be even more effective with the bulk of the “swayable” group – people who don’t think of themselves first and foremost as “Christians” at all (even though most of them probably are at least nominally Christians). For the most part, this group includes many millions of educated urban and suburban professionals who don’t spend much time in churches or synagogues other than at weddings, funerals and baptism ceremonies. This allegedly “Godless” group nevertheless has a disproportionate influence on public opinion – as Rush Limbaugh and others of his ilk tell their listeners and readers hundreds of times every day.
Nonetheless, while this large group of Americans – including many “Christians,” as explained above – is out there and “swayable,” remarkably few of them have actually been “swayed” so far, and the sharpest Iran-bashers are doing their best to keep it that way. Iran’s behavior often makes their job easier. When that behavior consists merely of Iran exercising rights that it must exercise to pursue its peaceful nuclear program without Western interference – notably, its enrichment of uranium – Iran should keep on exercising those rights and let the chips fall where they may. But when Iran is exercising other rights that it unquestionably possesses but nevertheless need not insist upon in order to pursue its nuclear program, Iran ought to consider whether relinquishing those rights might do more good for its nuclear program, and for the security of its people, than it achieves by jealously insisting on them.
Needless to say, I consider Iran’s refusal to observe the Additional Protocols and new Code 3.1, and its recent caginess on other disclosure issues as Alan has noted, to be in this latter category of rights. The argument that hanging tough leaves Iran with a valuable “bargaining chip” is nearly absurd, in my view. I can barely imagine, for example, how savagely the US press would respond to the report of an Iran/US deal in which the US acknowledged Iran’s enrichment rights, even to a very limited extent, in exchange for Iran’s agreement to observe the Additional Protocols. Nor, as I’ve argued earlier, do I think it’s wise for Iran’s supporters to assume that Iran’s worst enemies want Iran to agree to the Additional Protocols in the first place. To the contrary, I am confident that Iran’s worst enemies strongly prefer that Iran stick to its guns. It plays right into their hands.
Castellio:
In fact I once heard of a rabbi who stated that there is no such thing as a Judeo-Christian Tradition; that there is a Judaic Tradition and then there is Christian Tradition.
Islam, like Christianity, takes Judaism and extends it to all of mankind. It is, however, a revolt against the revolt and thus its Christianity is closer to the Gnostic one that Nycean one.
The future of Protestant Christianity then is at stake in US and UK.
James,
Yes it’s true the sanctions trend to raise the price of oil of course if they prohibit Iran’s oil formal and informal and also this mark up is not about Iran.
But now Iran has to sell its oil more inexpensive to China, Russia and others in black market but the pressures of this depreciation just on the Iranian peoples…
James; FYI: I think it’s useful to note that the Evangelical Christian movement while “Protestant” is quite independent of many ‘traditional’ Protestant movements.
Not irrelevant, is/was Blair’s espoused (how sincere is/was it?) Christian credentials and Catholic turn, as part of his utter commitment to going to war against his nation’s interests and desires.
George Bush the younger was leading his family business in a well established tradition, what was Blair doing?
fyi and Castellio,
I think fyi was referring to the “low church” Evangelical Protestants who are Christian Zionists, as part of the problem in the US. As Castellio noted, the Presbyterians are strong supporters of the Palestinians. Episcoplains and Presbyterians tend to be much better educated than most of the Christian Zionists.
One of the worst trends in contemporary American, in my view, is the decline of the old-line Wasps (White “Anglo -Saxon Protestants), which do not include the Christian Zionists.
Eric,
I do not see how Israel would have any influence over the terms of Turkey’s escrow holding of Iranian LEU.
Fasihe,
The sanctions tend to raise the price of oil and gas, not to lower them.
Iranian,
Iran’s signing of the AP would be very far removed from an indication of weakness that would only incite the US to be more aggressive. Keep in mind that the UK, Russia and China want a negotiated settlement, and that the US cannot run roughshod over their wishes. The arrogant ignoramus, G W Bush, is no longer in the White House. Nor is the warmonger and facilitator of war profiteering, Dick Cheney.
Iran has a good opening before it, and by keeping the moral high ground Iran can enhance its own security and have a good chance at getting the sanctions reduced or eliminated.
Iran’s government pursues its aims with or without these sanctions and obviously the sanctions just pressure the Iranian peoples and something is more obvious, in every issues USA attends its interests and these resolutions only is the way for acquiring Iran’s oil more inexpensive.
The best solution is directly negotiation, negotiation and negotiation…
I agree. Signing the AP isn’t going to change anything. The US will continue to move towards confrontation. In fact, things will probably get worse, because the US will interpret Iran’s action merely as a sign of weakness. Iran has no option but to stand firm.
FYI: Protestant Christianity is not one thing. The Presbyterian Church in the US (one strand of it) is the most progressive in the BDS movement. The Mennonite Church is also extremely progressive on international social justice issues. The United Church in Canada (important elements within) have worked for years on Palestinian justice issues.
The challenge, and its real, is how “social justice” versus “exceptionalism through faith” plays out. When Christianity is a universalist revolt against the tribal based monotheism (it’s your faith that separates you, not your bloodlines… and that faith is a reflection of your belief in social justice – as in sermon on the mount, etc.) then it has many positive aspects. But when Christianity is a faith based extension of the tribal culture (we’re going to heaven because we are God’s chosen), then… well, we have what we have.
To speak of Christianity as a revolt within/against Judaism – that is, to speak of its historical formation – is now perceived as anti-Semitic. So, its the commonality of ‘Judeo-Christian’ exceptionalism which is maintained as ‘proper’, ‘appropriate’, reflecting ‘our religious heritage’.
This ties in directly to perceptions of Israel and the Middle East. To the Christians who believe in social justice, Israel must be constrained. To the Christians who are waiting for salvation, Israel is sacred, it’s all God’s plan, bring on Armageddon. And in that scenario, the US military is the hand of God… (don’t laugh, that belief makes Cheney and cohorts, including Palin, very attractive to a wide band of Americans who could care less about the NPT). To them, Newt Gingrich’s call for war makes perfect sense.
I apologize for not saying anything new. It’s just that the future of Christianity in North America is very much in play right now, and its not looking good for the social progressives.
Sanctions have bought time for Obama – there will no war until 2012 when US troops have left both Iraq and Afghanistan.
I agree, except I don’t see US troops out of either Iraq or Afghanistan by 2012, or even 2016.
The US effort in Afghanistan is in shambles, but I’m not hearing any indication of an impulse to evacuate – which makes sense because if the US evacuates now, it will have achieved exactly nothing in the 9 year occupation. We would get a full return to the status quo ante.
Iraq is about the same. When the US pulls all the way out, it becomes a full-fledged ally of Iran, much closer than Syria – with a bigger population, more money and a more strategic location. The US is hesitant to do that.
By the time the US is out of both, Iran will have at least 5 of 6 tons of LEU and will be able to suspend enrichment unilaterally if it wants. If it has 100 or 200 kgs of 20% LEU, preferably in a location far from Natanz, that would be a nice bonus. By then its primary deterrent would have to be something else, for example the threat of attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi installations its own territory and from Iraq.
But Iran has some time to think about its post-US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan deterrence structure.
Eric:
My point is that Iran is helping the US to “keep it alive.” Arnold and others firmly believe this is a risk worth taking, to accomplish some objective – justice, uncertainty, respect, whatever – that I think either is not ever going to be accomplished or isn’t worth taking such a serious risk to accomplish.
Once again, this is backwards in the way your reasoning has switched the pretext and the consequence for a while now.
1) Iran has a legal and moral right to the same nuclear capabilities Japan has.
2) Japan has a legal and moral right to the nuclear configuration it has now, which is that it is unambiguously free of nuclear weapons.
3) The United States and most importantly for this discussion, you are uncomfortable with Japan’s nuclear configuration and even more uncomfortable with Iran achieving that configuration.
The discomfort you feel is not legally or morally justifiable, but you still feel it, and it expresses itself in your sympathy with the US program and its claims.
You claim that Iran is making the US claims justifiable. You feel sympathy with US claims not because of anything Iran does but because you are not comfortable with Iran reaching the goal it seems to be approaching.
No Iranian behavior, no set of questions Iran could answer, no agreement Iran could sign would make you comfortable with Iran having a Japan option and with you feeling uncomfortable, you will always feel sympathy with parties critical of Iran’s nuclear program. And your feeling of sympathy will always express itself in support of US arguments against Iran’s nuclear program.
You may honestly think it is Iran’s fault. That if Iran acted more reasonably, the US’ arguments would not be valid. The US’ arguments are fundamentally legally and morally indefensible, which you certainly don’t deny now if you ever did.
If Iran submitted to all of your demands, and all of the US’ demands, and continued towards a Japan option, you would still be uncomfortable, the US would still be uncomfortable. The US would invent more questions as part of its effort to stall or reverse Iran’s efforts and you would consider those questions reasonable.
You say Iran should take that risk. There is no risk. Iran ratifying the AP won’t turn you into a robot. You’re going to feel tomorrow the way you feel today, uncomfortable with progress in Iran’s nuclear program toward what you cannot deny is its legal and moral right to have reach the capabilities Japan’s program has reached.
Feeling as you do, you are going to oppose Iran’s nuclear program after it implements the AP just as you oppose it now. Your opposition to Iran’s nuclear program has nothing to do with the AP, you admit you’re glancingly familiar with the AP yourself. You don’t want Iran to have a Japan option, but the AP does not address that.
The only way the AP can be of use to the US or to you is if the US can use it, contrary to its purpose, to prevent Iran from achieving a Japan option, to make Iran’s nuclear program more vulnerable to US efforts to prevent it from reaching a legally and morally acceptable destination.
The only reason the AP would be detrimental to Iran is if the US can use it, contrary to its purpose, to prevent Iran from reaching a Japan option. As long as the US’ goal is to prevent Iran from attaining those capabilities, the AP will only give the US new tools to pursue its legally and morally indefensible objective but will not change US attitudes toward Iran’s program at all.
Kooshy,
“I don’t think [a deal to sell TRR fuel to Iran will happen], what’s in it for US, that wouldn’t solve the problem with 5% enrichment will stop the 20% alright, but I suspect the enrichment is the problem…”
Of course enrichment is the problem, but I’m not optimistic about a meaningful deal on that – at least one that restricts Iran’s enrichment rights for any more than a short period (and even a short-term suspension would enable the US to paint Iran as the bad guy once Iran resumes enrichment, just as it did when Iran stopped observing the Additional Protocols and new Code 3.1). In the meantime, cancer patients might start to suffer if the TRR fuel runs out – assuming, as we must here in our ignorance, that TRR fuel really is running low.
If a simple TRR-fuel sale were approved, the US would avoid the public relations black eye of holding cancer patients hostage to its spat with Iran. Possibly the US would persuade everyone that Iran is to blame, or simply won’t care about public relations. It seems more likely, though, that if talks reach an impasse, the parties will just kick the can down the road. Arranging for the sale of a small amount of TRR would accomplish that.
Richard
Thank you for posting Gordon Prather’s great articles on Iran’s nuclear issues, I hope everyone who is interested in legality of Iran’s case read them.
I wonder why he stopped writing since the early last year, do you know.
masoud and Eric:
US has to gather all her air assets from all over the world for a serious air-war against Iran.
Your discussion, at any rate, is premature.
Sanctions have bought time for Obama – there will no war until 2012 when US troops have left both Iraq and Afghansitan.
Richard Steven Hack:
Yes, I agree.
US is abusing international institutions and damages them without regard to harm that those activities are going to cause her own interests in medium to long term.
The US Leaders at Washington DC are still in the world of 1950s. Their mindset, pretty much, resembles that of General Motors leadership – that they thought they have unlimited margin of error. As an American once made the infantile statement to me: “It is our country and we can ruin it if we want to.”
Nasser:
What you have written is not factually correct.
Power has many paramters.
If US and Iranian power were unmatched, Iran would have already been defeated.
You can cross the border from Iran into Pakistan and immediately the Third World begins.
Economically, Iran is comparable to Turkey – Saud Arabia is not even on the radar screen.
Fiorangela:
It is Protestant Christianity in US & UK that must come to its senses.
Catholic America can watch what is transpiring with frustration and cannot do anything about Protestant America taking US to a war with Islam.
800 years ago the Church realized that there is no margin in fighting Islam; Protestants must discover that by themselves.
In the meantime, they willdrag US and her honor through blood and mud.
And on the illegality of the UNSC being involved:
King George and Iran’s Inalienable Rights
www dot antiwar dot com/prather/?articleid=12681
Quote:
“Great Zot! After first “Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”, on March 3, 2008, the UN Security Council – allegedly “Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” – perversely proceeded to “reaffirm” its “decision” of 23 December 2006 that Iran “shall, without further delay, suspend”
“a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
“(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA”
The blatant irrationality boggles the mind. And it’s barely conceivable that the reason the mainstream media didn’t report on the irrationality of that resolution to you was that their minds got boggled, long ago, early in the reign of King George.
UNSC Resolution 1803 also imposed on Iran new sanctions and the MSM did manage to report that.
However, most of the sanctions were unrelated to Iran’s nuclear programs – all of which have long been “verifiably” subject to a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as required by the NPT. The MSM didn’t report that to you, either.
Which brings us to the official reaction – a Note Verbale, dated March 26, 2008 – sent by the Iranians to the IAEA Secretariat, to be forwarded to the Secretary General of the United Nations and all Member States.
It is an absolutely brilliant expose of King George’s efforts to not only corrupt the IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council, but to undermine the IAEA Statute, the NPT and UN Charter, itself.
In particular, Iran correctly notes that
“Involvement of the Security Council in the Iranian peaceful nuclear program is in full contravention with the organizational, Statutory and safeguards requirements governing the IAEA practices and procedures. Furthermore, the substantive and procedural legal requirements, that are necessary for engaging the Security Council in the issues raised by the Agency, have been totally ignored in this regard.”
In particular –
“The Security Council has never determined Iran’s Nuclear Program as a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter and, thus, it could not adopt any measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”
Furthermore –
“The Security Council, as a UN organ created by Member States, is subject to legal requirements, and is obliged to comply with the same international normative rules that the Member States are bound to. The Council shall observe all international norms, in particular the UN Charter and the peremptory norms of international law, in the process of its decision making and in its taking actions. Needless to say that any measure adopted in contradiction to such rules and principles will be void of any legally binding effects.”
IAEA Director-General ElBaradei declared in his oral report to the IAEA Board of Governors on March 3, 2008 that the “reason” the Iranian IAEA dossier had originally been forwarded to the Security Council “was ambiguities related to its enrichment program in the past” and that “this issue is no longer considered outstanding.” Therefore, the Iranians argue, “no pretext or justification remains either for the engagement of the Security Council in this regard or any request for suspension.”
Prior to their dossier being forwarded to the Security Council, Iran had voluntarily implemented for more than two and a half years an Additional Protocol to their Safeguards Agreement. ElBaradei has just reported that the additional information continues to voluntarily provide is “similar” to that which would be required by a ratified Additional Protocol.
However, Iran is only legally bound to accept and implement the basic Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Requiring Iran to implement an Additional Protocol – which recent Security Council Resolutions have done – to which Iran has not formally expressed its consent “contradicts the established principles of international law of treaties.”
Now, according to the IAEA Statute, the Director-General and his designated inspectors “shall have access at all times to all places” in an IAEA member state as necessary “to account for [Safeguarded] source and special fissionable materials” and “to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose.”
When IAEA inspectors do determine that safeguarded materials have been used “in furtherance of any military purpose,” they “shall” report such “non-compliance” to the Director-General who “shall” thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors.
As the Iranian Note Verbale argues, IAEA inspectors have never made such report to ElBaradei about Iran.
In fact, ElBaradei has repeatedly reported to the Board that “all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”
Furthermore, on August 21, 2007, ElBaradei had come to an “understanding” with Iran on a “Work Plan” for resolving outstanding “issues” – some of them actually none of IAEA’s beeswax, and many of them originally raised in the summer of 2005, by King George’s munchkins, based upon “studies” allegedly contained on an stolen laptop computer, said to belong to an Iranian engineer (by then supposedly deceased) tangentially related to the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
According to the Iranians, ElBaradei has just reported to the IAEA Board that the Work Plan has been ‘fully implemented and nothing more remains to be done in this regard.’”
So what is left to be “disclosed” – and where is the legality of sanctions? There can be only one answer – it’s all a farce intended to lead to war under false pretensions, precisely like Iraq.
And a major reminder from another article:
Iran’s Ever Imminent Nukes: A History of Hysteria
original dot antiwar dot com/sahimi/2010/05/04/irans-ever-imminent-nukes/
Quote:
“Iran’s initial transparency was, in fact, even deeper than trying to convince Germany to finish the two reactors. In 1983, Iran asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide it with technical assistance in setting up a pilot plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for uranium enrichment. During the shah’s reign, work had begun on converting one type of uranium oxide, U3O8, into another type, UO2 (used in the production of uranium hexafluoride), and with France’s help, ENTEC, an Iranian nuclear establishment, had been set up to work on the complete nuclear fuel cycle. According to item A, Article XI of the IAEA Statute, helping a member state with such a project is one of its main functions.
The IAEA did dispatch a team of experts to Iran, who recommended that the Agency help ENTEC scientists gain practical experience with the matter and provide expert services in a number of areas, including the fuel cycle. The report stated clearly the IAEA’s intention to “Contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious program in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology.” But, as Mark Hibbs wrote in Nuclear Fuel (August 4, 2003), the technical assistance never materialized, because “Sources said that when in 1983 the recommendation of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA technical cooperation program, the U.S. government ‘directly intervened’ to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of uranium oxide and uranium hexafluoride.” According to Hibbs, a former U.S. official said, “We stopped that in its track.” Therefore, as early as 1983 the IAEA and the U.S. knew about Iran’s plans for setting up a uranium enrichment program. It was the U.S. that forced Iran to construct the Natanz facility for uranium enrichment in secret, although even that was not illegal.”
My comment: Read the whole piece. Iran was accused of HAVING TWO TO FOUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVER TWENTY YEARS AGO! It’s hilarious.
This quote is particularly interesting:
“A CIA assessment of Iran’s nuclear capabilities publicized on Jan. 17, 2000, said that the Agency could not rule out the possibility that Iran possessed nuclear weapons. The assessment was based on the CIA’s admission that it could not monitor Iran’s nuclear activities with any precision.”
But now they’re capable THREE YEARS LATER (or six in 2006) of assessing the difference between a nuclear weapons research database and a nuclear weapons DEPLOYMENT program? I think not.
And another interesting quote:
“Right after the Obama administration took over, Greg Miller of the Los Angeles Times reported on Feb. 12, 2009, that the Obama administration had made it clear that it believed there was no question that Tehran was seeking the bomb.
And just the other day, Hillary Clinton claimed that Iran has violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Apparently, the secretary of state does not know that there is a vast difference – technically and legally – between violating the NPT and being in non-compliance with some provisions of the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. An NPT violation happens when a member state develops a nuclear bomb, helps another state to do so, or transfers its nuclear technology to a non-member state.”
Read that again! Obama believes THERE IS NO QUESTION that Iran is seeking a bomb!
Oh, really? NO QUESTION? Tell me again that Obama is not either: a) an unmitigated IDIOT, or b) a frickin’ LIAR! Trust me, I vote for option b – although option a is not unreasonable.
More proof of the politicizing of the IAEA:
Politicizing the IAEA against Iran
original dot antiwar dot com/sahimi/2010/03/12/politicizing-the-iaea-against-iran/
Quote:
“Another dispute between Iran and the IAEA is about modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, signed in 1974 and ratified in 1976. Code 3.1 of the Arrangements stipulated that Iran must declare to the IAEA the existence of any nuclear facility no later than 180 days before introducing any nuclear materials into the facility. That is why, despite all the rhetoric, the construction of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility without it being declared to the IAEA was perfectly legal.
In 1992, the Board of Governors of the IAEA replaced the original Code 3.1 with the modified Code 3.1, which requires a member state to notify the IAEA, “As soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction has been taken, whichever is earlier” (emphasis mine). It also developed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement that empowers the IAEA with the authority for intrusive inspection of any site in any signatory state.
After the Natanz facility was officially declared to the IAEA in February 2003, Iran agreed on February 26, 2003 to the modified Code 3.1. More precisely, Iran agreed to voluntarily implement the modified Code 3.1 until the Majles [the Iranian parliament] ratifies the modification to the Agreement. But while the Majles refused to ratify the modification to the Safeguards Agreement covering the modified Code 3.1, Iran continued to observe it from February 2003 to March 2007.
But, in February 2007 the Board of Governors of the IAEA sent Iran’s nuclear dossier to the United Nations Security Council. Iran contends that the IAEA had acted illegally, and, therefore, in retaliation, it notified the IAEA on 29 March 2007 that it would no longer voluntarily abide by the modified Code 3.1, and would revert to the original Code 3.1 (that required 180 days notification).
Despite this clear history, the IAEA latest report insists in article 29 that,
In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of a provision agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force for Iran.
This statement is correct only if the Majles had ratified the change covering the modified Code 3.1. But, given that it did not, Iran has no obligation toward the modified Code 3.1. No country is obligated to carry out the provisions of any international agreement that it has signed, if the country’s parliament has not ratified the treaty. The United States has signed some international agreements, such as the nuclear test ban treaty, that have not been ratified by the Senate.
In article 31 of the report, the IAEA complains again about the modified Code 3.1: “Both in the case of the Darkhovin facility [a mid-size nuclear reactor that Iran intends to construct] and FFEP [Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant], Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facilities, as required in the modified Code 3.1….” But, once again, Iran has withdrawn from modified Code 3.1, and has no obligation other than Code 3.1 [that requires only 180 days advanced notification].
In article 40, the report once again makes a political statement against all the relevant international laws:
Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran, including, inter alia, that Iran implement the Additional Protocol…
And again in article 50
The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional Protocol.
These statements are even contrary to what the report says in article 6, where the Agency states that, “Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007.” Such unannounced visits are covered only by the Additional Protocol (AP). So, while Iran is still carrying out this aspect of the AP, the IAEA still complains about it and, at the same time, it considers implementation of the AP an obligation for Iran! What is the truth?
Beginning on December 18, 2003, Iran did begin to carry out the provisions of the AP on a voluntary basis, until the Majles ratifies it. Even the European Union that had negotiated the implementation of the AP by Iran recognized its volunteer nature. Iran continued doing so until October 2005, when it declared to the IAEA that it would no longer abide by the AP. The reason was that the proposal that the European Union had presented to Iran in August 2005, according to which Iran was to receive significant economic concessions and security guarantees, was deemed by Iran to be totally inadequate.
At the same time, angered by the European Union attitude toward Iran, the Majles never ratified the AP. Thus, unlike what the IAEA claim, Iran cannot be required to implement the AP. No sovereign nation has any obligation to sign and implement any international agreement that it does not deem it to be in its national interests.
Articles 42 and 43 of the report have to do with the alleged documents that were supposedly in a laptop that had been purportedly stolen in Iran, taken out of the country, and made available to Western intelligence agencies in Turkey. Most experts have cast doubt on the authenticity of the laptop’s documents. A senior European diplomat was quoted by the New York Times in a Nov. 13, 2005, article as saying, “I can fabricate that data. It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt.” Another European official said, “Yeah, so what? How do you know what you’re shown on a slide is true, given past experience?”
But, the IAEA, led by Olli Heinonen, the IAEA’s deputy Director General of safeguards – a man who has a reputation inconsistent with impartiality and objectivity, continues insisting that Iran explain the document, while also refusing to present Iran with the original document, or check the laptop for its digital chain of custody that would show when the alleged document were up loaded in the laptop.
Then, in article 46 of the report, the IAEA makes the most outrageous statement:
While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
Thus, what the report seems to be implying is that, there are undeclared nuclear materials in Iran, whereas there has never been a shred of evidence that such materials exist.
Finally, the report prominently mentions the Security Council Resolutions against Iran. As I have explained elsewhere, sending Iran’s nuclear dossier to the Security Council, which was the basis for approving resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835 against Iran, was completely illegal and against the IAEA Status. Thus, even the legality of the Security Council resolutions is questionable.
Thus, the IAEA is being totally politicized by the U.S. and its allies to advance their agenda against Iran. This is being done while Iran is by and large abiding by its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and its Safeguards Agreement, while the U.S. allies – South Korea, Taiwan, and Egypt – have grossly violated their nuclear obligations. Not only has the IAEA not taken any action against these countries, there is hardly any official IAEA report about their illegal nuclear activities.”
A little history from an article in 2009 about how and why Iran was treated to double standards regarding the AP and “disclosure”:
Double Standards for Iran’s Nuclear Program
original dot antiwar dot com/sahimi/2009/12/01/double-standards-for-irans-nuclear-program/
Quote:
“In issuing the new resolution, the BOG of the IAEA has continued the questionable actions against Iran that began in the fall of 2006, after Iran ended the voluntary suspension of its uranium enrichment program. The BOG demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear program. However, the demand was illegal, because the IAEA Statute does not give the BOG or the director-general the authority to demand the suspension of a peaceful nuclear program.
Then, after Iran refused to comply with the illegal demand, the BOG voted on Feb. 4, 2006, to send Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC. The two main reasons given for the referral were that the BOG had found Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement obligations and, second, that Iran had resumed enriching uranium after suspending enrichment voluntarily for nearly two years. Was the BOG’s action legal? The answer is an emphatic no. Let me explain.
It has been argued that Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute empowers it to send Iran’s dossier to the UNSC. This article states that the Agency shall
“Submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of Article XII.”
And what does Article XII.C state?
“[T]he inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the director general who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient state or states to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.”
Thus, there are at least three points in the two articles worth noting:
1. Contrary to what has been argued, the responsibility for identifying non-compliance rests not with the BOG, but with the inspectors and the director-general, none of whom have ever reported Iran to be in non-compliance with the NPT (i.e., making nuclear weapons in secret, helping another member state to do so, or transferring nuclear technology to a non-member state).
2. The dossier should be referred to the UNSC only if the NPT has been violated by the member state (in the above sense), or if nuclear materials have been diverted to non-peaceful applications (bomb-making), or if a breach has occurred to “further any military purpose.” But the IAEA has certified time and again that none has occurred in Iran’s case.
3. The resolution adopted for sending Iran’s dossier to the UNSC also made illegal demands on Iran beyond the authority of the BOG and the IAEA. Among other things, it “deemed necessary” for Iran to
“Implement transparency measures, as requested by the director-general, including in GOV/2005/67, which extends beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol, which include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops, and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.” (Item 5 of article 1; emphasis mine.)
But there is not a single word in the UN Charter, the NPT, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, or the IAEA Statute that indicates that the BOG or the director-general need to satisfy themselves that a country’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, or that it even has the authority to make such demands.
According to the BOG of the IAEA, one main reason that Iran’s dossier was sent to the UNSC was that the IAEA could not verify that Iran does not have a secret, parallel nuclear program and, hence, cannot verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s program. In addition to demanding proof of a negative (namely, that Iran does not have a secret, parallel nuclear program), the issue is dealt with by the Additional Protocol, not by the Safeguards Agreement. Regarding the Protocol, the following facts are well-established.
One is that according to the Sa’d Abaad Agreement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 between Iran and the EU3 (Britain, France, and Germany), Iran agreed voluntarily to abide by the provisions of the Additional Protocol and provide the IAEA with expanded access to its nuclear facilities, well beyond its obligations (which Iran did). As the Paris Agreement stipulated,
“The EU3/EU recognize that this suspension [of enrichment-related activities] is a voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation. … In the context of this suspension, the EU3/EU and Iran have agreed to begin negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.”
But even if implementation of the Additional Protocol had been mandatory, it had nothing to do with the IAEA. The Sa’d Abaad and Paris Agreements were between Iran and the EU3. The IAEA was not a party to the agreements. Therefore, it could not use them against Iran. In fact, it was the EU3 that violated the Paris Agreement by insisting that Iran give up its inalienable right under Article IV of the NPT to the complete uranium enrichment cycle.
Since Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol, it has no legal obligation to follow it. This puts Iran in the same category as 36 other nations, none of which have been referred to the UNSC. Moreover, according to the IAEA’s own reports, of the 61 states that have signed both the NPT safeguards and the Additional Protocol, the IAEA can certify the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities in only 21 nations. This puts Iran in the same category as 40 other nations, including Canada, the Czech Republic, and South Africa, none of which have been referred to the UNSC, another manifestation of the West’s double standards.
In its latest resolution against Iran, issued on Nov. 27, the IAEA once again made illegal demands by ordering Iran to stop construction of the Fordow facility. To give its demands “legal” cover, the resolution refers to the UNSC resolutions against Iran. But those resolutions too are illegal, because not only were they issued after Iran’s nuclear dossier was sent illegally to the UNSC, but the UNSC also did not follow the correct procedure for filing its resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as I have described in detail elsewhere.”
Another excellent piece on developments:
A Persian message for Obama
www dot atimes dot com/atimes/South_Asia/LG31Df01.html
Quote:
“In sum, there is enormous scope for American and Iranian strategies in Afghanistan complementing each other. The effort at the forthcoming negotiations should be to bridge the trust deficit that exists between the two sides. Tehran perceives Washington as hostile to its interests and would, therefore, do its utmost to ensure the US doesn’t use its military presence in Afghanistan to attack it, to undermine its government and political system through covert operations or to strengthen Iran’s regional rivals.
Needless to say, after a promising start, the Obama administration systematically abandoned its own new thinking on Iran. Under current circumstances, therefore, the US needs to go the extra mile to persuade Iran to cooperate once again with the United States in Afghanistan. There is no alternative to addressing Tehran’s longstanding concerns about the Taliban, the regional balance of power, and US intentions towards Iran.”
My comment: Of course, the problem is whether the US actually INTENDS to persuade Iran of anything. In other words, the Obama “new thinking on Iran” never really WAS “new thinking”, but merely some speeches immediately replaced by the cited “systematic abandonment”.
Why, then, should we assume anything better is in the offing?
Masoud: You might also point out to Alan that the Iranians have never seen original documents of the “alleged studies” but only photocopies.
The entire laptop material at this point has been almost totally discredited since it originated from the M.E.K. clowns and they admitted they got it from the intelligence agency of “another country” which everyone pretty much admits had to be Israel. The laptop, as Scott Ritter has repeatedly pointed out, has never been given a forensic examination by the CIA or NSA, or if it has, the provenance has never been admitted or disclosed publicly.
In short, the entire “alleged studies” is complete crap. It’s a on a par with the “aluminum tubes” and the “uranium purchase” from Africa in the Iraq case. Nobody but the hard-line anti-Iran spinners take it seriously. And yet it is the basis for almost ALL of the Iran “crisis”, along with some unspecified SIGINT intercepts.
Ray McGovern says that according to his intelligence community sources, Iran did in fact have a “nuclear weapons program” prior to 2003. But what neither he nor anyone else has specified is whether the intelligence was good enough to distinguish between what I have called a “nuclear weapons research database program” – i.e., an attempt by the Iranian military or IRGC to learn how to build a nuclear weapon with or without authorization by the leadership – and a nuclear weapons development AND deployment program authorized by the leadership. Those are two very different programs. I submit that the intelligence assets and capabilities inside Iran available to the CIA are inadequate for them to distinguish between those two very different programs at a distance.
And since 16 US intelligence agencies all agreed that WHATEVER that program was, it stopped in 2003 and there is ZERO evidence that it has been restarted, I find it hard to comprehend why people like Alan and Brill are so concerned about what Iran is “hiding” or “not disclosing” or whatever the spin is this week – except of course that they just don’t like Iran for whatever reason they seem unwilling to “disclose” themselves.
Somebody serious finally addresses Ahmadinejad’s remarks on an upcoming Middle East war:
Ahmadinejad makes a call to arms
www dot atimes dot com/atimes/Middle_East/LG31Ak01.html
Quote:
“Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s statement this week that “they have decided to attack at least two countries in the region in the next three months”, has sparked intense debate in Iran. Even some hardline supporters of the president, such as the conservative daily Kayhan, have taken issue with his statement by discounting the possibility of another US invasion at a time when the Afghanistan war is going badly for Washington and Iraq remains highly unstable.
While the United States may have its hands full with two wars, the same cannot be said about Israel, especially if backed by regional states concerned about the prospect of a possible Iranian nuclear bomb.”
Quote:
“”Iran will not let itself become another Iraq scenario in slow motion,” says a Tehran University political science professor, referring to the long period of economic sanctions that preceded the US’s invasion in March 2003.
In that scenario, economic warfare that substantially weakened the central government in Baghdad preceded the invasion. Similarly, if Western governments have their way, the same fate may be awaiting Iran – except that the Iranians have learnt from the Iraq war and are intent on doing everything humanly possible to keep an invasion at bay.”
In other words, Afrasiabi is suggesting that Iran, given “the Devil’s name”, may decide to “play the Devil’s game” and take action against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan in advance of a US attack on Iran. If the US is going to run covert ops against Iran inside Iran and support terrorist groups inside Iran, perhaps Iran should do the same in Iraq and Afghanistan, since it has already been accused of doing so.
While I personally am not convinced of the wisdom of that move, it would be understandable if Iran did.
Also, I find it interesting that if everybody REALLY BELIEVES that the US CANNOT attack Iran, then Iran clearly has no downside in doing so since the US will be unable to retaliate as effectively as Iran can in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So what DO you believe? Can Iran act freely because the US CANNOT attack – or is Iran so vulnerable that it must simply bow down to all US demands>
This also applies to the entire nuclear crisis. If you REALLY BELIEVE that a war against Iran is “impossible”, then why should Iran cooperate at all with the US, given that sanctions aren’t really going to be effective against the Iranian leadership?
My opinion is that Iran should continue as it is, neither justifying nor refuting US claims. It is always better to play your own game than be drawn into the enemy’s game.
[The point about the P2 centrifuges is Iran denied their existence for 4 years before unveiling them. If Iran also denies the existence of other things, should we believe them?
The new centrifuges don’t appear to work, I agree, but is that for our benefit? Are there some good ones squirrelled away under a haystack somewhere? Probably not, but how can I now be sure?
Iran HAS been shown documents about the Alleged Studies, although not all of them. Iran says those they have seen are forgeries. The IAEA has asked them specific questions about those they have seen to enable the IAEA to discount them as evidence. Iran refuses to answer them.
The Alleged Studies have been around for 5 years. They didn’t just crop up at the end of the Work Plan, they cropped up during Iran’s AP period. One Study DOES pertain to fissile material. But is a fissile material link so important under the AP? Doesn’t matter, because within weeks, Iran withdrew from the AP.
Of those questions Iran has answered since the start of this process in 2003, the key ones took them 5 years to answer, which included the 2.5 years they were in the AP. It is not as though the questions have been piled on by the IAEA; it just takes so long to get an answer to each one. The AP period was not the picture of unparalleled Iranian co-operation some would have us believe.
Looking on the bright side though, as the going rate seems to be 5 years, we might just about be due an answer on the Alleged Studies.
The point is Iran’s behaviour does not help their cause; it seriously impairs trust in what they do end up saying which unnecessarily complicates the process. For observers to blame the US for all Iran’s problems with the IAEA does not take account of how much they contribute to their own difficulties.
I suppose the point may come where Iran judges the ephemeral kudos they think their obstinacy gets them round the place has peaked and the cost in lost support becomes greater than the cost of doing a deal. I just hope it’s soon.]
Alan, you are a perfect illustration of why trying to win over the American public with reasonableness is impossible. Work on P2 centrifuges did stop. Iran’s current generation of centrifuges in development looks nothing like the P2, which requires with galvanized steel that Iran doesn’t have. The fact that Iran has at some point resumed trying to design better centrifuges doesn’t mean they were working on the P2 centrifuge in 2006.
“Of those questions Iran has answered since the start of this process in 2003, the key ones took them 5 years to answer, which included the 2.5 years they were in the AP. It is not as though the questions have been piled on by the IAEA; it just takes so long to get an answer to each one. The AP period was not the picture of unparalleled Iranian co-operation some would have us believe.”
You should apply for a job at the Washington post. It didn’t take Iran 5 years to answer the questions, it took the IAEA five years to accept Iran’s answers. There was for example an obsession with the high enriched plutonium that were on equipment purchased on the black market. Iran’s answer to the question of the Plutonium was always the same, that the equipment was bought from AQ Khan and they don’t know what was done with the equipment before then. The only thing that changed in 2008, was that Iran got the IAEA to admit that the plutonium found on Iran’s equipment had the same signature as the plutonium found on Pakistan’s euquipment, and that Iran’s story had been perfectly consistent for the past five years. Cite one specific case of Iran declining, without cause, to answer a legitimate question the IAEA put to Iran. You simply won’t be able to.
“The Alleged Studies have been around for 5 years. They didn’t just crop up at the end of the Work Plan, they cropped up during Iran’s AP period. One Study DOES pertain to fissile material. But is a fissile material link so important under the AP? Doesn’t matter, because within weeks, Iran withdrew from the AP.”
No, the Alleged Studies had cropped up before the Work Plan, but the IAEA was too embarrassed to bring it up in a serious way with Iran, or even put it on the original Work Plan as an outstanding issue. When the Work Plan was being successfully brought to a close the Alleged studies were tacked on very goffily for the benefit of people like yourself. The Alleged Studies, are, in a word laughable. A laptop with autocad mock ups of a reentry vehicle smuggled out of the country by an unnamed supposed former employee of Iran’s nuclear program who is conveniently dead is in your view some kind of serious issue. The CIA would disagree, as they intelligence reports they compiled disregard the idea that Iran has an active Nuclear Weapons program, if it ever had one at all. The work plan only called for Iran to ‘comment’ on the Alleged Studies, after they are ‘provided with all materials’. Iran was never provided with the materials, they were only allowed to see the materials briefly in the presence of IAEA officials. Iran provided I believe over a hundred pages of ‘commentary’ to the IAEA debunking these materials anyway. Of course this is completely irrelevant. As long as someone in the oval office says Iran has been acting naughty, patriotic Americans will find a way to believe him.
Masoud: You’re wasting your time. Nothing Iran does will satisfy the US or people like Brill.
People simply refuse to admit that the entire Iran “crisis” was made up from day one, and that it has absolutely nothing to do with any Iranian “nuclear weapons program” just like the Iraq war had absolutely nothing to do with any Iraqi “WMDs”.
It’s all a lie and the ENTIRE point of the exercise is to start another war for the benefit of the people who will profit from it. Corruption in the US is BONE-DEEP and will never be excised without the complete collapse of the government and probably the economy as well, if then.
Brill is arguing to hear himself talk, nothing more. He’ll nit pick you to death with a series of circular, vague arguments, evading any request for specifics, dodging any unanswerable questions, and so forth, forever. A complete waste of time.
Kooshy: The Simon/Takeyh piece is just more of the same. It’s the same-old, same-old notion that we must always assume that the President of the United States is an honorable man engaged in deep reflection before engaging in any action.
Didn’t the Nixon White House tapes put this crap to rest?
Obama does not give a rat’s ass about UN permission. Obama does not give a rat’s ass about what the Gulf states care about. Obama does not give a rat’s ass about “engaging the US electorate”.
What Obama cares about is political and state power and his re-election chances. And that depends on what Israel and the AIPAC crowd do to him. Right now, Obama is back tracking on his civil rights promises by expanding the FBI access to the Internet. Obama is back tracking on his promises not to fund the existing wars with supplementals. Obama has back tracked on MANY other promises.
Worse, Obama has NEVER had ANY other intentions toward Iran than what he has stated and done so far. Everything he has done in Iraq, Afghanistan and towards Iran is consistent with his campaign statements on foreign policy – which I argued THEN proved he was either a clueless idiot on foreign policy – or a liar indebted to the military-industrial complex and the AIPAC crowd.
Look, it boils down to this: Either Obama AND the entire US intelligence community is TOO STUPID and INCOMPETENT to see that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program and that Iran has a legal right to uranium enrichment, OR they are LYING about this entire affair. There is no third option.
We’ve just had the experience of President George W. Bush who very clearly was LYING about the entire Iraq affair. Now we’re supposed to believe that this new guy is somehow “different”. Based on what? His fancy speeches? Nobody remembers Bush and his “humble foreign policy” speeches? What part of “SUCKERS” don’t people get?
Events have proven me correct. And further events will prove me correct when Obama initiates a military attack on Iran – or supports an Israeli strike on Iran. If he does not, it will only be because he intends to kick the can down the road to his successor – and as I’ve repeatedly said, that cannot go on forever.
Barzegar’s views on the likelihood of an Iran war are the result of the same-old, same-old cognitive dissonance that afflicts most observers of this issue. He simply doesn’t want to admit how corrupt the US government is and how damaging a war with Iran would be. He can’t comprehend how the US government is controlled UTTERLY by the military-industrial complex in the United States, and that this complex is DEEPLY involved with Israel.
I recently read a review of a book (but not the book itself as yet) about Israel and its economy which among other things purports to demonstrate the connections between the US military-industrial complex, the petro-industrial complex, Israel, and the wars in the Middle East over the last few decades.
Global Capitalism and Israel
by Adam Hanieh
monthlyreview dot org/0103hanieh.htm
Quote:
In a remarkable series of graphs, the authors plot the rate of return of the major oil companies (dubbed the petro-core) in comparison with dominant capital as a whole. They then show that each sustained period of negative differential accumulation for this sector (i.e., where dominant capital has outpaced the petro-core in terms of differential profits) has been immediately followed by an “energy-conflict” such as the 1967 and 1973 wars, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 1990–1991 Gulf War.
Turning once more to an analysis of the concrete, the authors take each of these conflicts in turn and trace an increasing interaction between arms exporters and the oil companies over time. Around the 1973 War, the arms business became more commercialized (expressed by the Nixon Doctrine) and in conjunction with the petro-core began to exert a greater influence on U.S foreign policy.
The increasing confluence between the interests of the oil-arms coalition and foreign policy continued until just after the 1990–1991 Gulf War. At this point, the global regime of accumulation moved from depth back towards one of breadth. Dominant capital was able to take advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union, reduction of tariffs and dismantling of barriers to capital mobility, and the opening up of “green-field” investments in the South. This new stage of breadth marked the onset of globalization, characterized by the rise of a new section of dominant capital, the technodollar-mergerdollar coalition. This group sought differential accumulation through absorbing technological innovation through mergers and acquisitions, expanding into new areas that became known as “emerging markets” and benefiting from the privatization of government-owned enterprises.
It is this shift towards a breadth regime, according to Nitzan and Bichler, that explains the so-called peace process in the Middle East. Profits were to come from open markets in both goods and people instead of war and conflict. One of the consequences of this process for Israel was the increasing transnational ownership of the Israeli economy—the key conglomerates that had dominated the economy under the shelter of the state were taken over by capital from the core, particularly the United States.
Although the reason underlying the shifts between different regimes of breadth and depth is somewhat unsatisfactorily dealt with by the authors, they stress that these shifts should not be understood mechanically but rather as an outcome of the interactions of real people with real choices in front of them. In a certain sense they argue that the economy tends to follow a path of least resistance, with different sections of dominant capital taking advantage of different regimes of accumulation (although all sections of dominant capital benefit relative to capital as a whole).
A New Regime of Depth?
The 1990s shift to breadth had important implications for both the Middle East and the global economy. Globalization, marked by an expansion of markets and investment, set in train a process of excess capacity and this began to eat into the large differential profits. At first this hit the periphery of the global economy—precipitating a series of financial crises in Asia, Russia, Mexico, and Argentina. But it increasingly seems to be attacking the very core of global capitalism.
The authors end with a speculation that has perhaps been answered as this review goes to press. They raise the open question of whether we are now seeing a shift back towards a global regime of accumulation through depth, with its attendant features of war and conflict. The analysis offered by Nitzan and Bichler offers a powerful conceptual framework for understanding this latest crisis in the global political economy. It also points to a way out of the crisis by asking the simple question: Who really gains?”
The book goes into the history of Israel’s economy, apparently, which was mostly controlled by the state, leading to people thinking that Israel was somehow a “socialist” country, when in fact it was not. Clearly, Israel is deeply involved in weapons exporting of its own production, as well as most of the US foreign aid goes to military equipment which in turn is purchased from the US, thus benefiting the US military-industrial complex. And also Israel is clearly interested in oil – both for its own needs and with the clear intention of someday controlling Middle East oil producers as part of its grand plan for “Eretz Israel”.
The point is that Barzegar simply doesn’t comprehend any of this. He can’t comprehend how the US could deliberately start totally pointless wars (pointless from the viewpoint of the rest of the US economy other than the military-industrial complex, or the US taxpayer) with such aplomb. He never bothers to ask HOW the Iraq war started, or what part pipelines played in the planning for the Afghanistan war, or how Dick Cheney’s Energy Commission had maps of Iraqi oil fields, or how much influence the oil companies had in PREVENTING the neocons fantasy of “cheap Iraqi oil” and “breaking the back of OPEC” (see Greg Palast’s writings on this).
Therefore he can’t understand how an Iran war is most DEFINITELY NOT pointless or in any way prohibited by the current US economy, or the US position in Iraq and Afghanistan, or anything else. In fact, as I’ve said, the US position in Iraq is AND WAS PRECISELY intended as a jumping off point for a war on Iran – that is exactly what the neocons told Israel in 2002. And as I’ve said, a war on Iran is PRECISELY what would take the US public’s mind off the OBVIOUS failure in Afghanistan, and allow Obama to withdraw troops from Afghanistan without ever having to say he’s sorry.
So Barzegar’s comments on that are completely wrong.
As for his argument that “sanctions will not compel diplomacy”, well – that has a rather large amount of “Duh!” ring to it. No sh*t, Dick Tracy… The only valid reason for making the argument is the fact that a lot of anti-Iran spinners are trying to say that sanctions are working. In the long run, this is basically irrelevant. Because, once again, as I’ve said over and over, once time goes by and sanctions have not stopped Iran from enriching, and yet Iran has STILL not made a bomb, there is going to have to be a resolution: either the US blinks and accepts enrichment (AND stops Israel from attacking Iran), or there has to be war. Once again, THERE IS NO THIRD ALTERNATIVE, absent a “grand bargain” which Obama quite clearly WILL NOT MAKE.
Eric,
So I guess a large part of our disagreement centers around our differing perceptions of the US military’s capabilities vis-a-vis Iran’s. Maybe I will address this in a later post. Also, when I was talking about country’s ‘backing ‘ Iran, I meant diplomatically before a war ever starts, as Turkey and Brazil have boldly have done, and as no country ever did with Iraq, despite Iraq’s capitulation not with military aid as you seem to be talking about. However, while important, these are kind of peripheral issues.
The core of what your advocating seems that Iran concentrate all or the bulk it’s efforts on wooing American public opinion. For some reason, you believe the Additional Protocol to the NPT has some kind of special place or resonance for Americans, and that if Iran ratified this specific instrument, it would then gain enough credibility with Americans to be able to use them as kind of a shield against the Obama Administration’s hawks. The trouble is most(and likely far more than most) American’s don’t know what the AP or even the NPT is. Most Americans still think Saddam Hussein was behind 911. So I think the idea that most Americans would find ratification of the AP to be convincing silly. But either one of us could be right: what matters is the methodology we are using to come to our conclusions: I say we could just look at the historical data on this very issue: when the AP was being implemented in Iran, there was a much more zealous push for war with Iran. How are you determining that for most American’s the AP is some important pacifying milestone, or for that matter Ban Ki Moon is someone they would recognize?
Also, Eric, you seem to be under the impression that Iran has the option to sign the same AP that is in force in Belgium. Iran’s choice is between not signing the AP, or signing the AP that was in force in Iraq during the nineties and was in force in Iran in the last decade. Which is to say, as soon as Iran signs the NPT it will be effectively in violation of it, and will not ever be able to be in compliance with it. The day Iran signs that treaty, the IAEA will demand to know all the details relating to Iran’s ballistic missile systems and installlations, and then it’s anti-air defenses, then the details of it’s air force,(all of which will be shared with the CIA) and the it will insist on interrogating Iranian scientists outside the country, and then it will also insist on taking the scientist’s family outside the country as well, so that it can ‘ensure’ that the scientist in question is ‘not being pressuered’ to answer question a certain way, and if Iran balks at any one of these demands it will be deemed in violation of the AP. And once Iran has signed the AP, the demand that Iran comply with it’s ‘obligations’ on these issues will seem much more legitimate and impressive than the demand that Iran ratify some obscure annex to some antiquated international treaty.
You seem to acknowledged these realities to some extent:
[I don’t deny these are risks. As I’ve written earlier, I don’t think Iran should respond to every “laptop of death” allegation or trumped-up US claim about disclosures made (or not) by some defector. Iran indeed should be watchful, and might well have to trim its disclosures if this gets out of hand. But I don’t think these concerns warrant refusing to observe the Additional Protocols.]
My question to you is: what if it does get out of hand? What if Amano’s demands will clearly compromise Iran’s defense network, and Amano is able to find Iran in violation of the AP, and direct the BOG to pass resolutions “ordering” Iran to fulfill it’s “obligations”, and say, “suspend” it’s space and missile programs and “disclose” “all relevant information” relating to them? Would you suggest Iran again bite the bullet and comply in order to win over the US public? Would Iran do well to leave the AP at this point? Do you think it’s public image will have been rehabilitated by it’s reimplementation of the AP? Do you believe that careful arguments about the scope of the AP in a situation like this will have more resonance than the argument that at the moment Iran is in compliance by the NPT but not bound by the AP at all, just as tens of other countries aren’t? Or do you think this is all just an unlikely hypothetical?
Masoud
Arnold: Brill’s notions about “ambiguity” are hilarious.
Just because Japan has plutonium lying around because it has no useful way to get rid of it, and because the plutonium COULD be used to make a bomb BY DEFINITION, therefore Japan is “ambiguous” about wanting a nuclear weapon.
And THEN he has the gall to say, “well, it’s OK for the US to ignore Japan for whatever reason, but not Iran.”
I suppose I am “ambiguous” about whether I want to, for instance, sleep with Angelina Jolie, since I haven’t said (here, anyway) whether I want to or not, and I happen to have the equipment built in BY DEFINITION for doing so.
Bizarre. The bias is so strong a skunk would be knocked over.
Nasser
“So please point out to me which part of my writings you found so “anti-Persian” and so pro Arab?!”
This part
“How can anyone possibly suspect these idiots of being capable of mastering nuclear technology is beyond me hahaha.”
Clearly that indicates you are not only anti IRI you somewhat despise the Persians achievement when not suitable to your agenda. Search and see what this same people have they mastered throughout the history, FYI the nuclear technology that Israel currently posses was given to them by the French, Iranians have mastered the technology ingeniously against all odds.
Good luck and good night
Castellio,
“Nasser: I don’t know, but when an “Arab” is so “anti-Persian” I smell something… what’s the word, off kilter.”
- I don’t know what made you think I was an Arab lol but did you bother to see which post I was responding to before you make such bizarre accusations? Some poster directed a comment towards me that read: “The only ass you should be worried about Nasser is the Ass of the Arabs which seems to be getting pretty pounded by their good old friend the US of A.” So, I merely replied to that person that American Arab allies such as the Hashemite Kingdom (I made no mention of Arab public) were well taken care of. I never made secret of the fact that I despise the present Islamic government and feel that it is harming Iran’s national interests by foolishly engaging in hostility with Israel so as to win over those Arabs. So please point out to me which part of my writings you found so “anti-Persian” and so pro Arab?!
Castellio
Nasser is not necessary only an Arab’s name, since I am familiar with his writings I feel like me and him are old friends.
Nasser – is English form of a common biblical name (meaning ‘who is like God?’ in Hebrew) borne by one of the archangels, the protector of the ancient Hebrews, who is also regarded as a saint of the Catholic Church.
Fiorangela: “When Christianity comes back to its senses… ” Don’t hold your breath.
Nasser: I don’t know, but when an “Arab” is so “anti-Persian” I smell something… what’s the word, off kilter. Do you really relish the humiliation of Iran? And do you really think Mubarak or the Hashemites or the decadence of the Gulf city states adds anything but the most transient of glows to the Arab cause?
Hahahaha “An Iranian official says cigarettes smuggled into Iran have been tainted with pig blood and nuclear material as part of a Western conspiracy.” How can anyone possibly suspect these idiots of being capable of mastering nuclear technology is beyond me hahaha.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2010/07/30/international/i032146D19.DTL#ixzz0vEbdkenY
“Power is mostly local.
Iranian power clearly is matching US power.”
What?!!!! Please tell me that was a joke. Such delusions can get a lot of civilians killed. Even locally Israel, Turkey and Pakistan is wayyy more powerful than Iran. And Iran is not economically as significant as Saudi Arabia. Alan said it best, Iran needs to stop pretending like “it is some heavyweight on the world stage” and stop making a fool out of themselves before something really bad happens.
Fiorangela
I am glad you know of one the most respected and knowledgeable professor of Iranian studies. I know him since I was ten years old in Cambridge. He is the only American
Recipient of my family’s Iranian studies foundation in Iran. I am much honored to know him and see him whenever he is invited to LA.
kooshy, Dr. Richard Frye’s brother was in the group I traveled with in Iran. He went to see the mausoleum the Iranian government has prepared for Richard, a sign of their affection for him. It’s on the banks of the Zayanderud in a very peaceful and verdant site.
fyi wrote:
“If one reads the speeches and interviews of Mr. Ahmadinejad over the last few years one can clearly see that he is trying to sketch out a persuasive vision of the future of mankind based on Justice, Mutual Respect, Peaceful Cooperation, and Friendship.
To my knowledge, no other leader has done anything like him.”
It is extremely painful that the Catholic church/hierarchy has not spoken out more forcefully on foreign policy issues. The issue of pedophilia has been used masterfully to marginalize one institution that could have and should have had the heft and moral clout to be a stabilizing influence.
I remain in awe of several Catholic women writers, such as Sr. Joan Chitester, but she is just one voice.
Christian zionism should be associated with Elmer Gantry, not with Jesus. When Christianity comes back to its senses, I hope it will recognize that Zoroaster was the prototypical Moral Man who prefigured the wise men of the Axial Age (not to be confused with the axis of evil).
Speaking of axis of evil, Is Newt Gingrich insane?
Fyi
What I meant was, up until before the coming September talks with Iranians expect a lot of this scary articles like this, some are written to put the pressure on Iranian side, some are written to scare the Iranians and send a scary message home “escape to the mountains the Gringos are coming” and some are written for the American consumers, if you read them carefully after a while you will recognize what group was the target.
fyi
I agree, one will come to get use to these articles, as per that Old Iranian saying “it talks to the door so the wall hears”. But I don’t believe Ray Takeh has enough knowledge of Persian language to understand the proverbs. Professor Richard Frye says what will be usefulness of knowing Persian, if you don’t understand the proverbs. But again Ray must be a trusted approved writer for the security community to write in WP.
kooshy:
I read the articke and I disagree with several points.
Iran will almost certainly retaliate with all that she has; she is not Syria. For reasons of legitimacy and state power that is the path Iran has to take.
Moreover, the Southern Persian Gulf satets have already been warned by Iranians that they would be targets in the event of a war.
A short war, in my opinion, is not in the cards. The war between Israel and Hezbullah has been going on for 26 years – on and off.
In nuclear case, Iran will not accept any Iran-specific restrictions. They almost went to war with US ins 2006 and those types of deals are no longer available.
The flaw of all these various war scenaria by these think-thankers is the infantile disregard for the day-after. What will be the shape of peace that would follow this war?
Fiorangela:
One must pity all these people who, for a piece of land, or for a misguided sense of tribalist identification, are willing to go to war with Islam.
It is doubly regrettable that America, a country that has indubitably been good to Jews, will no longer be so once the dust settles after US-Iran War.
It seems like Ray and Simon were copying Eric’s Iran script from RFI, or perhaps Fred Hyatt asked them to slightly reword it to avoid getting sued for copyright.
I wished they would have printed his comprehensive election analysis instead. Well is just another wish.
If Iran came close to getting a nuclear weapon, would Obama use force?
By Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh
Sunday, August 1, 2010
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073002672.html?hpid=topnews
On an earlier discussion, Jill posted a link to a Huffington Post article by Fernando Espuelas and asked for help in refuting the it. Espuelas wrote that US must attack Iran, right now if not sooner.
Some of you may be aware that Fernando Espuelas is a talk jock on LosAngeles 1020 AM radio, said to be the most popular Spanish language talk show in LosAngeles. It’s a Univision radio station, owned by Haim Saban.
If one reads the speeches and interviews of Mr. Ahmadinejad over the last few years one can clearly see that he is trying to sketch out a persuasive vision of the future of mankind based on Justice, Mutual Respect, Peaceful Cooperation, and Friendship.
To my knowledge, no other leader has done anything like him.
In fact, US and EU leaders have been, in my opinion, abject failures is supplying a positive vision of the future.
Alan:
Power is mostly local.
Iranian power clearly is matching US power.
That is why there is this stalemate.
Else US would have crushed Iran by now.
I think Mr Obama and EU should take this chance to climb down from their perch.
I personally do not think that they will, they have invested too much in Iranian containment to change tack now.
“It would probably also help to stuff a handkerchief in Ahmadinejad’s mouth and lock him in the basement. No ham-fisted PR nonsense required, no need to poke the tiger with a stick. Do it before the veil lifts on this charade that Iran is some heavyweight on the world stage. The little guy can prevail, but not by pretending to be something he isn’t.”
- Haha I guess like Eric, I too felt like this deserved repeating once more. The Iranians really have such an EXTREMELY inflated sense of their self worth.
“The only ass you should be worried about Nasser is the Ass of the Arabs which seems to be getting pretty pounded by their good old friend the US of A. You troll you.”
America’s Arab allies, the Mubarak regime, the Hashemite Kingdom, and the Sunni Gulf Monarchies have never been better. I’d say America has been pretty good to its friends. The only ones who got “pounded” are the old Baathists, the Syrians and the Iraqis and the Palestinians, all of whom the US never supported.
Eric
“A sale of TRR fuel strikes me as the only face-saving way out (in other words, exactly what Iran requested a year ago, and the US blocked).”
I don’t think so, what’s in it for US, that wouldn’t solve the problem with 5% enrichment will stop the 20% alright, but I suspect the enrichment is the problem and I suspect the point of talk for the US is OK we will sell/give you the fuel for TRR stop all enrichments obviously Tehran will refuse and the US tries to win a useless PR campaign “WE even tried to even give the fuel but they refused since they have other intentions.” You see even Alan was today suggesting a “comprehensive” nuclear and all other associated issues deal which part of that could be the fuel for TRR, he means stop or limit enrichment to get fuel for TRR. That’s why I think the talks will fail again.
Kooshy,
And if (1) the odds of a Turkey escrow are near zero (as you and I agree), and (2) the odds of US/Israel OK’ing any other third-party escrow are not much higher (can you think of any other country they’d find acceptable and that would want to get involved?); and (3) one would have to question the sanity of Iran’s leaders if they agreed to send Iran’s LEU off for an extended Russia/France vacation, the chance of any meaningful TRR deal (unless it’s merely part of some comprehensive deal, which can’t be ruled out entirely), is somewhere between very slim and none.
A sale of TRR fuel strikes me as the only face-saving way out (in other words, exactly what Iran requested a year ago, and the US blocked).
Maybe I’m simply overlooking a promising opportunity for Iran and the US to bury the hatchet on this and many other issues during these upcoming talks, but I just don’t expect much to come from them – other than, of course, another hand-wringing “goodness knows we tried” recap of the unsuccessful effort by some US government spokesman, after which the pressure for war will be ratcheted up another notch as yet another avenue will have been closed off by the hell-bent-on-nuclear-weapons Iranians.
Eric
“I’d say so. Given (1) that fact; (2) Israel’s currently warm feelings for Turkey; and (3) Israel’s likely influence over the terms of a “fuel swap” deal (if any), how would you assess the odds that any LEU will ever be escrowed in Turkey?”
None, if it ever did, both of us may be needing crouches
Kooshy,
“Would it be fair to [expect] that reconciliation between Iran and the US/west would be at expense of Israel…?”
I’d say so. Given (1) that fact; (2) Israel’s currently warm feelings for Turkey; and (3) Israel’s likely influence over the terms of a “fuel swap” deal (if any), how would you assess the odds that any LEU will ever be escrowed in Turkey?
James,
“Sadly, Colin Powell was a willing dupe or stooge of the neocon warmongers, and he allowed the word of the US to be regarded as just so much rubbish.”
Not to mention his own integrity. That was a day of shame for Colin Powell.
kooshy,
Neocon warmongers in the US and elsewhere do not want normal US-Iran relations even though that obviously is in the best interests of both countries.
Those who remember David Wurmser’s efforts to start a US war with Iran, when Wurmser was chief Middle East adviser to Dick Cheney (warmonger and promoter of war profiteering), should read Gareth Porter’s article (link below).
Can it be true that two-thirds of Americans think Iran already has nukes? Given their gross ignorance, and the relentless effort of the Israel lobby to deceive the American public, this quite possibly is true.
Would it be fair to ask that reconciliation between Iran and the US/west would be at expense of Israel, due to a possible new regional security architecture that this reconciliation will provide? Isn’t this the reason Israel feel threaten from a potential reconciliation between Iran and US.
If so would it be possible that informed and educated non Jewish citizen of the western countries who would want to relive their political system from hegemony of Israel lobby somewhat feel that reconciliation with Iran even at Iran’s national rights and sovereignty would pave the way for their ultimate goal?
Eric,
Thanks. Sadly, Colin Powell was a willing dupe or stooge of the neocon warmongers, and he allowed the word of the US to be regarded as just so much rubbish.
I recommend Gareth Porter’s warning today on the neocon conspiracy to involve the US in war with Iran: “Zombie Neocon Strategy Behind Israel’s ‘Bomb Iran’ Campaign”
http://www.truth-out.org/the-real-aim-israels-bomb-iran-campaign61866
Because beyond the issue of energy and technological advancement, this program is an identity-value issue and relates to Iran’s regional and global roles and status.
Kayhan declared that “technological advancement,” that is, Iran’s orientation toward the future, is, for Iran, an “identity value.”
Compare this “identity value” with Natan Sharansky’s* and Tzipi Livini’s** argument that Israel’s identity is contained in the Hebrew Scripture’s account of the Exodus, situating Israeli identity in the mythological past, a backward-looking orientation.
In a recent discussion about his meeting with Hezbollah, Norman Finkelstein made this astonishing statement: “Jews never forgive; Jews never forget.” In other words, the past must be always present; like the monkey with its hand in a gourd, grasp on the nut of hurt must never be released, even at the cost of freeing the hand for a more productive future. Livni listed in her UN speech the “pillars of modern society … democracy, tolerance, and education.” Jonathan Cook, British journalist resident in Nazareth, reports that the history that Jewish Israeli school children are taught is taught from Hebrew scriptures; and in the recent round of sanctions imposed on Iran, the ability of Iranian students to study abroad was severely constrained by sanctioning TOEFL certification programs. (That sanction has been reversed, but there is still concern that Iranian students in the United States are granted only ‘one-entry’ visas: if an Iranian student in the US returns to Iran at any time before his studies are concluded, he will not be permitted to re-enter the US.) Livni’s “pillars” are a bit shaky.
In “Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession,” Haggai Ram first lays groundwork to inform the reader of the deep hostility between Mizrahi (Oriental, including Iranian) Jews and Ashkenazi (European) Jews: Ashkenazi consider Mizrahi “second class citizens;” many Mizrahi were coerced into migrating to Israel, where they were assigned the lower-class work that Ashkenazi did not wish to perform.
Ram then develops the thesis that:
“Israel, since its foundation in 1948, has been keen to project the image of being the beacon of Western rationality and civility in an increasingly volatile, hostile, irrational, and fanatical region. . .
Many Israelis feel that present-day Iranian realities are in effect actualizations of Israel’s future.
In other words (and in Ian Lustick’s words), Israel’s Ashkenazi Jewish elite is galled to observe that Iran, home to ‘Oriental’ Jews, is achieving the vision that Ashkenazi had assigned to itself to accomplish.
Choseness is another essential concept in Jewish identity. Rabbi Ken Spiro explains it on the AISH.org website’s History of Judaism:
“Humanity returns to God with the Jewish people leading the way.
If we understand this concept of the Jewish people leading the way then what happens to the Jewish people in history begins to make sense. . . . the Jewish people’s special role in history is to lead humanity to its goal.” (www dot aish dot com/jl/h/cc/48930047.html)
Throughout its long history, Jews have contended with other Jews for primacy, for inheritance, for favor. When one pairs this contentiousness with Judaism’s fundamental notion of choseness, it’s hard to escape the realization that the conflict between Iran and Israel is a Jewish civil war-by-proxy.
*Defending Identity: Its Indispensable Role in Protecting Democracy, Natan Sharansky, with Shira Weiss
** Tzipi Livni, speech at United Nations, NYC, Oct. 1, 2007 www dot c-spanvideo dot org/program/201284-1
James,
Thanks. I’d forgotten that Germany and France were laboring under the same mistaken impression that they could rely on the US’ word.
Hooshang nayebi,
Does any Arab country support an attack on Iran? Russia has told Israel not to attack Iran.
Alan,
As you will recall, no centrifuges had been installed in the so-called Qom enrichment facility, at the time its existence was made public, and in fact there was no plumbing or electricity. Is it operational even now? I agree it gave an opening to those who seek to play up a supposed deviousness on the part of Iran.
Eric,
Germany and France would not have voted for the 2002 UN resolution on Iraq without the express assurance from the Bush administration that the resolution was not adequate to authorize an invasion of Iraq, and that no such attack would be launched without a further resolution. When the rabid warmongers saw that they could not get the further resolution, they arranged for the US to double-cross France and Germany, and proceed with the invasion on the false pretense no further resolution was necessary.
Cyrus,
“It won’t, precisely because the US has no interest in resolving the nuclear issue and instead needs to keep it alive, because like I keep saying, the nuclear issue is a convenient pretext.”
I agree. And as long as the US can “keep it alive,” it can keep Iran weak (and thus less of a threat to Israel, which I gather is what you would say is the US’ real objective here) – either by sanctions or by an actual attack if Iran continues to play hardball for an inning too long.
My point is that Iran is helping the US to “keep it alive.” Arnold and others firmly believe this is a risk worth taking, to accomplish some objective – justice, uncertainty, respect, whatever – that I think either is not ever going to be accomplished or isn’t worth taking such a serious risk to accomplish.
The irony here is that the rabid Iran-haters almost certainly prefer to have Iran behave exactly as Arnold recommends, knowing that its doing so will help the US to “keep it alive.”
Yes, the IAEA did say they would show Iran all the evidence, and they haven’t done so. They have shown some evidence though, and Iran will not respond to questions asked about what has been shown.
That’s a big concession there.
Why would anyone in the West, who votes for the government of the United States or one of its allies in its campaign against Iran, now criticize Iran for not going beyond that agreement as written without criticizing the US for preventing the actual terms of the agreement from being implemented?
I know. Iran is a tiny third world country that has to do whatever the US says. Shame Iran isn’t still run by the Shah, monarch who would be more accountable to the US than to the people of Iran the way Jordan, Kuwait and the rest of the US colonial structure in the region are.
Paul,
From your July 30, 1:02 AM post (excellent, by the way):
“However, I think the claim that possible UN (in)Security Council unwillingness to formally call for a military attack on Iran will prevent a shooting war are just plain silly, at best. Does it really have to be repeated over and over that the Iraq War demonstrated that the US will go ahead, if it chooses to, whether or not the UNSC gives the ok? ”
You go on to point out that the US might find one of several ways to start a war without the need for UNSC authorization, and I agree with you about that risk. But I don’t think the US will get to war against Iran in the same way it got to war against Iraq. China and Russia aren’t about to let that happen again.
The UNSC adopted a resolution against Iraq in 2002 under Article 39 of the UN Charter. That required a declaration that Iraq was a threat to the peace. An Article 39 resolution authorizes the use of military force under Article 42. The UNSC had in mind that it would sit down again and talk about the actual military remedies that ought to be ordered to carry out its resolution, depending on how the situation looked then. But the US decided on its own that the resolution already adopted was good enough. So the US went ahead without asking for any further resolution from the UNSC (at least not publicly), claiming as it did so that it was merely carrying out the already-sufficiently-expressed will of the UNSC.
China and Russia (among many other countries) felt the US had stretched the UNSC resolution farther than it could fairly be stretched, but that was water under the bridge at that point. They apparently decided, however, not to hand the US the same convenient pretext next time. That is why China and Russia have approved resolutions against Iran based only on Articles 40 and 41, not on Article 39. Goodness knows the US has pressed for Article 39 resolutions or, absent a specific citation of Article 39, at least for textual equivalents such as “threat to the peace” or “threat to security,” but the Chinese and Russians have been very watchful and such efforts have failed.
Here is the text of Articles 39-42:
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Of course Japan is “ambiguous.”
Japan has, by your estimate, enough plutonium lying around to make “thousands of bombs,” and you assure us that there is no other purpose for that plutonium other than to make bombs. But that information isn’t sufficient for us to determine whether Japan intends to make bombs with that plutonium. As long as it has the capability to do so, but makes no effort actually to begin doing so, Japan’s intentions are “ambiguous.” The US has decided to accept this ambiguity (for Japan, at least), but the US’ acquiescence doesn’t make Japan’s intentions unambiguous.
Eric, I had overlooked your response about whether or not Japan’s nuclear program is ambiguous. Now that I see it, I was wrong to say you had not addressed it.
Japan’s nuclear program and it’s intentions, though are separate issues. The NPT does not mention intentions. What the NPT does is offer a unilateral way for a non-weapons state to release all of its disclosure obligations. There is no way to imagine that the NPT requires unambiguous intentions.
I don’t think you disagree on this. Your and Alan’s positions are evolving into an open advocacy for Iran so submit to what Iran describes as US bullying. Your arguments are looking more and more like Iran is too small to fight the US even if the US is wrong.
But I still have to point out that if Japan’s intentions are ambiguous to your understanding, intentions exist inside the minds of Japan’s leaders. They are inherently ambiguous. The status of Japan’s program today is not ambiguous at all. Japan does not have a weapon.
I don’t think you disagree with that either.
Now, Japan could build a weapon, has materials in its domestic stock that it would use if it made that decision, and has not just shipped that material to the United States for example.
You say that makes Japan’s intentions ambiguous. First I say that if that’s ambiguous, I sure with Israel was ambiguous. I wish the United States was ambiguous.
Second though, Japan has the flexibility that if provoked in an outrageous fashion, it could respond. I do not consider that ambiguous either. As long as North Korea does not attack Tokyo, North Korea is completely clear that Japan will not strike it. That is not of little value.
NPT non-weapons states, Brazil and Japan as much as Egypt and UAE are not going to launch surprise nuclear first strikes. They cannot because to use a weapon would require visible preparations that Israel, for example would not have to make. If we could get every country in the world to agree to just that, in practical terms it would end the threat of a nuclear attack universally.
So first, your shift from Japan’s program to Japan’s intentions is not reasonable. Second, your assertion that Japan’s intentions are ambiguous just is not true. Japan’s intentions are clear. Japan does not intend to launch or be able to launch a surprise first strike on anyone. Japan intends that if provoked, it will be able to retaliate.
That’s the NPT. Before you claim Japan should offer more, the US, whose leaders you vote for, might consider their obligation to enter good faith negotiations to even reach that state.
Our main remaining difference is over how intimidated you think Iran should be by the US’ military power. That question resolves to 1) how much you think the US is, or should be willing to spend, especially in the form of lost lives of US soldiers but also in terms of damage to its and global economies you think the US should spend to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option. 2) how sure you are that the sacrifice in lives the US would have to make to attack Iran would actually prevent Iran, over the medium term, from attaining a Japan option or an actual weapon.
And Iran’s concealment of the centrifuge development is not surprising considering that the US consistently denied Iran’s efforts to openly acquire the technology that it was entitled to have. Nonetheless, regardless of that point, the fact remains that Iran’s enrichment program as a whole was never a secret. Iran announced plans to enrich uranium, and the discovery of uranium resources, on national radio in the 1980s. It invited IAEA officials to visit its uranium mines in the 1990s. It declared the completion of its uranium conversion facility to the iAEA in 2000 — three years before the over-hyped “disclosure” of the facilities at Natanz. To say that there’s a “lack of confidence” under these circumstances is ridiculous.
Alan — the claim that Iran as “failed” or “refused” to answer the questions regarding the laptop of death is false. Iran filed specific responses to specific information, and a general response to the rest where there was a lack of documentation to reply to. The burden is not on Iran to deny, the burden is on the US to produce the documents that it expects Iran to answer. It won’t, precisely because the US has no interest in resolving the nuclear issue and instead needs to keep it alive, because like I keep saying, the nuclear issue is a convenient pretext.
@ Paul:
I really enjoy Dr. Barzegar’s articles.
I think Kayhan Barzegar is quite correct when he takes into account the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as two major obstacles that prevent US from invading Iran.
In the past couple of years we all have read a lot about the consequences of a war with Iran and there would be no entities, with the exception of the Israel lobby and some Arab kingdoms and Russia to some extent if the war is not a fully-fledged one, that would suggest a war with Iran is a safe option for the U.S. in the Middle East.
1. global economic crisis
2. the oil flow to the global markets
3. Hizbullah and Hamas reaction
4. Iraninas turning into an anti-American population (they are not now)
5. Anti-Americanism on Arab streets
6. More casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan
7. immediate unexpected changes in the internal politics of Iraq
8. Anti-Americanism worldwide
9. Russian-China convergence politically and security-wise
A few to name, as we do not know what Iranians have as possible agendas on their table in case of a war. This war might even increase the degree of multipolarity in the international system providing some Middle Powers with enough pretext to enter into alliances in order to decrease U.S. political power at the international level.
You take all that into account and if you are asking me, the Obama administration prepares to contain a nuclear Iran rather than getting invoved in a mess that might turn out to be a second Vietnam or even worse.
And I still think the Hegemon theory, global hegemon containing and weakening the regional hegemon, is the most appropriate theory to elucidate and demystify the conflict in U.S.-Iran relations, though I am working on another theory in this regard.
Arnold,
“Do you think Iran should disclose its centrifuge construction facilities and materials? If it does not, it cannot implement the AP.”
I’ll confess to not having a strong opinion on the question, but I don’t see anything in the AP that appears to require this. If I’m reading the AP correctly, I don’t understand how you draw your conclusion in the second sentence.
Alan,
“Do it before the veil lifts on this charade that Iran is some heavyweight on the world stage. The little guy can prevail, but not by pretending to be something he isn’t.”
No comment – just thought it worth repeating.
Arnold – yes, Iran did answer the Work Plan questions in six months, but they were 4 years old by the time they were put into the Work Plan.
Yes, the IAEA did say they would show Iran all the evidence, and they haven’t done so. They have shown some evidence though, and Iran will not respond to questions asked about what has been shown.
Should they disclose centrifuge making facilities? Not necessarily. I think they should open comprehensive negotiations with the P5+1 over the entire nuclear issue, with the aim of settling sanctions, resolutions, enrichment, APs, Alleged Studies, and the TRR once and for all. It would probably also help to stuff a handkerchief in Ahmadinejad’s mouth and lock him in the basement.
If the US blocks it, let it be known, and better still, let it be seen. No ham-fisted PR nonsense required, no need to poke the tiger with a stick. Do it before the veil lifts on this charade that Iran is some heavyweight on the world stage. The little guy can prevail, but not by pretending to be something he isn’t.
James:
“The Financial Times reported on July 23rd that as of May 24th, Iran had 3,936 operational centrifuges and 4,592 that were idle. An average of more than 4000 were idle over the past year. What would be the point of hiding centrifuges?
All true. I suppose hiding them would support a secret parallel program. There was the Qom plant-to-be of course, which would have required disclosure had Iran been adhering to the AP. For all that, I don’t think there is a parallel program, but others do. My point about the centrifuges was that the development had been concealed from the IAEA, and that impacts negatively on trust (and your advocacy of taking the high moral ground).
The Leveretts write:
“[T]he Iranian position, as described by Davutoğlu, stipulates international acceptance of the Joint Declaration—which includes an explicit acknowledgement of the Islamic Republic’s right to enrich uranium on its own territory.”
I’ll go out a limb here – a 3-foot thick limb, I think – and predict that, if any deal emerges from these talks, it will not include any explicit acknowledgement of Iran’s right to enrich uranium.
Cyrus,
I agree with you too.
Cyrus:
Yes, I agree with you.
This was the same as back in 2003 that US-EU would not accept even 300 centrifuges in Iran.
Containment is the name of the game.
Let us see how bad Irak and Afghanistan are going to get before US-EU climb-down.
Eric:
Do you think Iran should disclose its centrifuge construction facilities and materials? If it does not, it cannot implement the AP.
This is one of the things I meant this as a serious question for you, but if Alan can answer it I’d welcome that also.
We know enough about the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program that we can talk about specifics and not generalities such as “Iran should do more.”
The US tried to be clever by using the TRR fuel as a leverage point, but was hoisted by its own petard.
In fact, the blocking of the TRR fuel also only proved Iran’s point that it has to have its own uranium enrichment capability because it can’t rely on allegedly “guaranteed” fuel nuclear supplies from abroad.
And had Iran been allowed to simply purchase the fuel for the TRR in the first place, as it had in the past in full compliance with all international rules and laws that permit such a deal, then Iran would not have been enriching to 20% now.
Note that the TRR is a perfectly legal, overt and well-safeguarded reactor that has zero weapons proliferation potential. In fact, it was given by the US to IRan, along with 6 kilos of weapons-grade plutonium to power it but the Iranians converted the reactor in the 1980s to use non-weapons grade 20% enriched uranium, which they acquired from Argentina.
So what did this cute ploy by the US actually accomplish? We now have the Turkey-Brazil-Iran Joint Declaration explicitly states in its very first article that uranium enrichment is a sovereign right of all nations. THis is directly contradictory to the US position which has been to try to restrict uranium enrichment under various theories, ie: that Article IV of the NPT which would recognize uranium enrichment is merely a “loophole” and to be disregarded.
So in the end, not only is Iran enriching more — and apparently justifiably so — but other countries have explicitly recognize Iran’s right to do so too. The Obama administration’s refusal to take a “yes” to its own uranium swap proposal also proved that the entire nuclear issue is pretextual.
Who ever decided to use the TRR fuel as a leverage should be given a medal as a f-up.
Eric, first, is that what you’re going to respond to?
No definition of ambiguity? No estimate or acknowledgment of the costs to the US of militarily striking Iran, and how that compares to the benefit to the of preventing an Iranian Japan option?
But if that’s what you want to focus on,
I’m not sure “Iran’s leadership” feels quite as strongly about this as you and some other Iran “supporters” feel about it.
What do you know about Iran’s leadership that gives you any idea how strongly it feels about anything? What has Iran done that demonstrates that it does not want a Japan option.
Which goes back to the question of why you, unlike me, think Japan’s nuclear program is ambiguous, what reason, other than fear of the US, could you present for Iran to not get the same level of nuclear capabilities Japan has?
Arnold,
“I applaud Iran’s leadership for putting the deterrent in place and with it in place, Iran does not have to play along with the games the US is presenting in its campaign to prevent Iran from having a Japan option.”
I’m not sure “Iran’s leadership” feels quite as strongly about this as you and some other Iran “supporters” feel about it.
James
“The UK, China and Russia do not want another war in the Middle East. They want a negotiated resolution of the dispute. What matters is what the countries are saying now, not what happened seven years ago.”
James for havens sake don’t try continually to wrap the UK’s policies in the ME with China and Russia’s, you wouldn’t be able to sugar coat UK’s past and present lapdog ME polices even if it was made in a C&H factory. For your information UK has the worst image among all the Middle Eastern nations, only second to Israel and just one above US.
James Canning:
I am not joking.
A war in the Persian Gulf that damages, to varying degrees, oil installations of that region, will enormously enhance the position and power of non-Persian Gulf oil producers, including Russia’s.
Assuming damage that is serious enough to take months to repair, the absence of sufficient quantities of oil will only add to Russia’s material gain. Moreover, it will wreck any chance of US-Iran conciliation for another 50 years. It will diminish US power globally (and not just locally in the Middle East). It will destroy any possibility of collusion among the Middle Eastern oil-producers to wreck Russian ecomomy by bankrupting her oil companies. It will position Russia as the country that can do business with Iran while US & EU will take – some would say righful – place along the side of permanent enemies of Islam and Iran.
The US-Iran War will be a gift to Russia that will keep on giving for decades.
fyi,
Surely you must be joking. A prosperous, secure Iran would benefit Russia, China, the UK, Germany, France, and of course the US. But the ability of the US to act intelligently in the best interests of the American people, is virtually non-existent due to power of Israel lobby (and allied power centers).
Also Eric, so what specific questions? You say you’ve read the IAEA reports, then you want Iran to vaguely “Do more.”
Do you think Iran should disclose its centrifuge construction facilities and materials? If it does not, it cannot implement the AP.
Eric,
Good points about the importance of global PR. The entire world is now aware that the neocons conspired to set up an illegal invasion of Iraq, by lying outrageously about a supposed “threat” that needed immediate attention. The entire world is aware of the complicity of US news media in the conspiracy and the covering up of the conspiracy. Many of the liars who inflicted a catastrophe on the people of Iraq and on the US and UK taxpayers, have been rewarded and protected by a complicit US news media.
James Canning:
Why they want to keep Iran down?
Because they do not want to see rise of potentially rival powers.
This is a zero-sum game.
Eric, then you say Iran should make more disclosures to reduce US hostility to Iran’s program. Or even that Iran should “take that risk”.
Iran believes it has the right to the same nuclear posture as Japan, and that answering the questions posed by the US will not lessen the US determination to prevent that.
That’s what you’re agreeing with. Answering the supposed questions will not lessen the US’ opposition to Iran’s nuclear program.
I don’t think we have a debate any more.
Oh, you’ve seen here that “thousands of weapons” is not my estimate but a Japanese politician confirmed by Western analysts. I’ll dig the link up again if you need it.
I’ve asked you to define ambiguity. I’ll make a further request, don’t include a phrase like “has or could develop a weapon” because on the opposite side of that “or” are two very different concepts. Having a weapon is prohibited by the NPT more importantly, having a weapon means that neighbors or rivals could be caught by an unexpected Hiroshima, which is exactly what the NPT was designed to prevent.
“could develop” is something that every technologically developed nation has unless specific steps are taken beyond the NPT or the AP are taken, that many countries have not taken and that cannot be fairly asked of Iran, especially by the US which, as you know, has not met its own NPT obligations.
It’s like saying someone “either broke up with or murdered” his girlfriend what’s on the different sides of the “or” are different in such important ways that grouping them is an example of misleading argumentation.
So explain to me how you think Japan’s nuclear program is ambiguous.
You say “life isn’t fair”. I’m sure Iran’s leadership is well aware of this sentiment you so condescendingly express. But on the other hand, if the US wants to attack Iran’s nuclear program it will pay a heavy price. A price I think greatly outweighs any benefit the US could get from preventing any nation in Israel’s region from attaining a Japan option.
I applaud Iran’s leadership for putting the deterrent in place and with it in place, Iran does not have to play along with the games the US is presenting in its campaign to prevent Iran from having a Japan option.
James Canning:
If they do not want war, they best strengthen Iran even more to make war even less attractive to US.
And quite frankly, aUS-Iran War is definitely in the national interest of Russia.
At any rate, you do not need to convince me, you need to convince the decision- makers in Iran.
As f
fyi,
Why would the UK, Russia and China want to “keep Iran down”? What sense can this make? And German companies would be doing a huge business in Iran today, if the sanctions did not exist.
Arnold,
“Now the real extreme case, that space aliens or magic elves give a country a nuclear weapon that cannot be detected by either the AP or the CSA, confidence in the purely peaceful intent of a country’s nuclear program requires the US to invade every country that it thinks may develop weapons …”
I’ve pointed out that Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols will never enable Iran to “prove a negative.” A few “space aliens or magic elves” may slip through the cracks. My only point is that a country’s sincere and diligent effort to comply with its Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols will get the country considerably closer to proving the “negative” that nevertheless cannot be entirely proven. Close enough, I feel, that most of the world would consider it entirely unwarranted for the US to attack that country merely because the country’s disclosures are not sufficient to detect every last space alien and magic elf. The US might ignore all that and attack anyway, but the odds of that happening will at least be reduced if Iran’s sincere and diligent effort to comply with its Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocols have left many other countries, and a significant chunk of the informed American public, more sympathetic to Iran’s position than they would be absent such an effort.
fyi,
The UK, China and Russia do not want another war in the Middle East. They want a negotiated resolution of the dispute. What matters is what the countries are saying now, not what happened seven years ago.
Ehud Barak, the Israeli defence minister, was on MSNBC today, spouting anti-Iranian militarist propaganda. Iran is “determined to get nukes”, he claimed. That the CIA has ZERO intelligence the Iranian goverment wants nukes, means nothing to Barak.
James Canning:
You are wrong about the intentions of UK, China, and Russia.
Moreover, as far as I could tell, “surrender” is the only reasonable option that UK envisages.
UK (toegther with US) was the state that made sure that the Iranian complaint about use of WMD against her by Iraq did not make it to UNSC. I cannot expect anything positive from them.
If UK, Russia, and China were looking for reasonable solutions they would have accepted the 2003 Iranian offer of 300 centrifues.
If they were looking for solutions, thyey would not have dragged Iran into UNSC.
No my friend, Iranian leaders are correct in their assessment: all these states want to keep Iran down.
The burden is no on US, UK, China, and Russia to demonstrate in concrete terms that they are not trying to keep Iran down.
Iranians will go their way, as they have for the past 33 years and will pay any price – as Mr. Khameneie has stated: “Do not try us…”.
From Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/30/newt-gingrich-suggests-at_n_665063.html
“Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich twice called on the United States to attack North Korea and Iran Thursday because the United States has only attacked “one out of three” of so-called “Axis of Evil” members by invading Iraq. He also claimed that Muslims are trying to install Sharia law on America and said that the “War on Terror” should have been a war on “radical Islamists” instead.”
Who said this isn’t a Christian jihad?
Arnold,
“You and Eric read what I write and think ambiguity which mystifies me. I have no idea what you’re talking about. Japan is not ambiguous. Neither is Brazil.”
Of course Japan is “ambiguous.”
Japan has, by your estimate, enough plutonium lying around to make “thousands of bombs,” and you assure us that there is no other purpose for that plutonium other than to make bombs. But that information isn’t sufficient for us to determine whether Japan intends to make bombs with that plutonium. As long as it has the capability to do so, but makes no effort actually to begin doing so, Japan’s intentions are “ambiguous.” The US has decided to accept this ambiguity (for Japan, at least), but the US’ acquiescence doesn’t make Japan’s intentions unambiguous.
Arnold,
I think the monarchy in Jordan has served the interests of the Jordanian people quite well. I also think the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq was a disaster for the Iraqi people. The Gulf monarchies in my view serve the best interests of the people of the various states.
There is little noise, globally, about the risk Japan could leave the NPT and develop nukes. By contrast, Iran is faced with hostile stories, from all over the world but especially in North America, that it harbors ambitions to be able to build nukes quickly. Iran’s position is that nukes are immoral and that it does not want them, period, full stop. This is the most moral, and safest strategy.
Arnold,
“Eric, if you think answering these questions will cause the US to accept Iran having Japan’s nuclear capabilities…then you have the situation exactly backwards. It is not the case that the questions make the US not want Iran to have Japan’s nuclear capabilities. The fact that the US does not want Iran to have Japan’s nuclear capabilities is what generates the questions.”
If “Japan’s nuclear capabilities” include having certain materials or conducting certain activities that leave it ambiguous whether Iran has, or may be working on, nuclear weapons, then I agree entirely with you: the US will not find this acceptable for Iran, regardless of the fact that it finds this acceptable for Japan. For reasons it considers sufficient, the US apparently has decided it can allow Japan to stockpile enough plutonium to make “thousands of bombs” (your estimate). For reasons it also considers sufficient, the US is very unlikely ever to find that acceptable for Iran.
I’ve said this clearly several times. Whenever I do, you predictably respond “Unfair!” I then acknowledge the unfairness but point out, in essence – just as Jimmy Carter liked to say – “life is not fair.” I’m just telling you the way the US looks at this, not whether I think it’s fair. Then our back and forth on the Japan option usually ends for a while, until you raise it once again, days or weeks later, as if we’ve never before had this conversation.
fyi,
The US is not a global dictator, and Russia and China, and the UK, want a reasonable resolution of the nuclear dispute. Iran needs to keep the moral high ground, and taking this course offers the greatest degree of security as well.
James
I’ve never ever talked about Iran having nuclear ambiguity. Iran does not have or need or want nuclear ambiguity, as I understand the term ambiguity.
Every NPT nation does not have a weapon. No NPT non weapons state could destroy Hiroshima without visibly and completely unambiguously breaking its monitoring process or leaving the NPT.
You and Eric read what I write and think ambiguity which mystifies me. I have no idea what you’re talking about. Japan is not ambiguous. Neither is Brazil. Argentina is not planning seriously what happens if Brazil launches a surprise first nuclear strike. Zero ambiguity. North Korea is completely certain that Japan does not have a weapon.
Also since I’m here and you said before that you’re a monarchist.
What states do you think should be monarchies? The US or which states?
Monarchism in 2010 is tremendously distasteful to me so I can just ask a limited amount of questions before my patience runs out.
Alan and Eric,
re: Alan’s July 30th, 12:54pm – - The Financial Times reported on July 23rd that as of May 24th, Iran had 3,936 operational centrifuges and 4,592 that were idle. An average of more than 4000 were idle over the past year. What would be the point of hiding centrifuges?
James Canning:
Arnold Evans is correct.
Furthermore, IAEA is not a disarmament agency nor NPT an instrument of suc effort.
Iran nuclear file/crisis will never be ended by US no matter what Iran does.
Arnold,
I continue to be astonished at your encouragement of Iranian nuclear ambiguity that is then used by the warmongers and fellow travellers, to frighten the ignorant American public. Iran has said time and again nuclear weapons are immoral, and Iran leads the effort to rid the Middle East of nukes.
Alan:
The United States opposed the work plan. And to this day the US proliferation community is angry at Baradei for agreeing with Iran on the work plan. Not because the US is concerned that the work plan will allow Iran to hide fissile material, but because the work plan took issues off of the table that the US has been using to pressure Iran to suspend enrichment.
The work plan did take every issue off of the table except the alleged studies. Why was El Baradei not able to get the alleged studies issues off of the table? Because even he hasn’t seen the extent of this supposed evidence.
The alleged studies. Evidence that the US has that it releases to the IAEA as needed to increase political pressure on Iran, is not designed as questions to be answered, but as a tool in a US campaign to prevent Iran from legally reaching Japan’s nuclear posture.
In general, Iran should not cooperate with a US effort, supported by you and apparently by Eric, to prevent it from attaining Japan’s nuclear posture.
Specifically, every question Iran does not answer strikes me as unreasonable. What do you, Alan, think are the most reasonable questions the IAEA is asking that Iran is not answering?
Eric, if you think answering these questions will cause the US to accept Iran having Japan’s nuclear capabilities (and you’ve written more than once earlier that the US will bomb Iran before it accepts it being in the same position Japan is in) then you have the situation exactly backwards.
It is not the case that the questions make the US not want Iran to have Japan’s nuclear capabilities. The fact that the US does not want Iran to have Japan’s nuclear capabilities is what generates the questions.
The point about the P2 centrifuges is Iran denied their existence for 4 years before unveiling them. If Iran also denies the existence of other things, should we believe them?
Alan. You said earlier that Iran denied that they worked on them after 2003. That’s what you wrote, not that they denied their existence. What are you doing?
The questions other than the alleged studies were answered in the six months after the work plan was agreed. The work plan included assurances acceptable to Iran that these questions were not just the beginning of a fishing expedition, which is how they seemed to me before the workplan, and probably also to Iran.
Iran cannot destroy a city. That’s the point of the NPT that you, Eric and the US nuclear policy community lose track of. Iran has a right under the NPT to reach Japan’s nuclear posture and the US has a strategic desire, contrary to the NPT to prevent Iran from reaching that posture.
I say, and Iran seems to believe that the questions are not concerns about Iran’s ability to destroy a city, which is as sure as for any other member of the NPT, but part of a US campaign to pressure Iran to, the US hopes, give up the right to reach Japan’s posture.
I’ll ask you, Alan, which of the questions posed to Iran that Iran is not cooperating with, do you think Iran should cooperate with.
The work plan questions did not plausibly indicate an Iranian ability to build a weapon, and required disclosure beyond that required by the CSA or AP but unlike the alleged studies at least were based on evidence that the IAEA found itself and that could be fairly presented to Iran to address.
The IAEA in the work plan agreed to show Iran the entire basis of the alleged studies questions before Iran makes a statement about them. The IAEA has not lived up to that bargain.
I encourage everyone to read Alan’s post of July 30 at 12:54 PM.
I should mention that I didn’t always feel that Iran should be more cooperative with its disclosures. Alan (and others) eventually persuaded me that that position has considerable merit. Like very many others on this board, I used to think that Iran should disclose only what its Safeguards Agreement specifically required, nothing more, and that the US and everyone else should stop demanding more.
Iran will never “prove a negative,” as many point out, and many Iran critics will never stop insisting that Iran disclose more and more and more. Nevertheless, while neither Iran’s Safeguards Agreement nor the Additional Protocols are capable of enabling Iran to “prove a negative,” they are carefully structured disclosure schemes that enable Iran to get a lot closer to doing that than Iran could ever hope to do without such a structured disclosure scheme in place.
If I were Iran, I’d take advantage of that structured disclosure scheme, especially if I knew that my critics were exploiting my failure to do so to encourage the US to attack me.
I expect Lady Ashton and William Hague to foster fair negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 powers, in the interests of resolving the nuclear dispute.
Nasser,
Iran would have defeated Iraq entirely, if the US had not wrecked the Iranian navy.
Stability in the Gulf is in the best interests of the entire Middle East.
The point about the P2 centrifuges is Iran denied their existence for 4 years before unveiling them. If Iran also denies the existence of other things, should we believe them?
The new centrifuges don’t appear to work, I agree, but is that for our benefit? Are there some good ones squirrelled away under a haystack somewhere? Probably not, but how can I now be sure?
Iran HAS been shown documents about the Alleged Studies, although not all of them. Iran says those they have seen are forgeries. The IAEA has asked them specific questions about those they have seen to enable the IAEA to discount them as evidence. Iran refuses to answer them.
The Alleged Studies have been around for 5 years. They didn’t just crop up at the end of the Work Plan, they cropped up during Iran’s AP period. One Study DOES pertain to fissile material. But is a fissile material link so important under the AP? Doesn’t matter, because within weeks, Iran withdrew from the AP.
Of those questions Iran has answered since the start of this process in 2003, the key ones took them 5 years to answer, which included the 2.5 years they were in the AP. It is not as though the questions have been piled on by the IAEA; it just takes so long to get an answer to each one. The AP period was not the picture of unparalleled Iranian co-operation some would have us believe.
Looking on the bright side though, as the going rate seems to be 5 years, we might just about be due an answer on the Alleged Studies.
The point is Iran’s behaviour does not help their cause; it seriously impairs trust in what they do end up saying which unnecessarily complicates the process. For observers to blame the US for all Iran’s problems with the IAEA does not take account of how much they contribute to their own difficulties.
I suppose the point may come where Iran judges the ephemeral kudos they think their obstinacy gets them round the place has peaked and the cost in lost support becomes greater than the cost of doing a deal. I just hope it’s soon.
Russia, Iran and Turkey have all made clear the way forward is open, for a negotiated resolution of the dispute. Let’s hope the neocons and other other elements of the Israel lobby do not manage to sabotage this opportunity.
If the IAEA asks Iran for a disclosure about Zircon tubes and for the locations of its centrifuge construction facilities, and Iran gives the Zircon tubes but not the locations of its centrifuge construction facilities, it is reported as not implementing the AP.
Iran is right not to disclose the extent and details about its centrifuge production facilities while the US says it has a covert program in Iran to destroy centrifuge production facilities it finds out about, and to harm or subject to espionage workers and people knowledgable about such facilities.
This is why instead of “Iran should do more.” a useful statement would be of the type “Iran should answer this specific question presented in the IAEA report.”
In every case I can think of, Iran’s refusal to answer a question demanded of it has a specific reasonable justification. If you can think of a contrary case, please present it.
“Iran should do more.” Is not a reasonable position when there are specific details available that you now say you’ve read.
What I would expect, in the unlikely event that the US ever attacks Iran, is that the US would just pummel Iran from the air, pausing now and then to ask Iran whether it had had enough. If Iran held out for longer than I anticipate, the US would just keep expanding the permissible target list until Iran changes its mind.
What do you think is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan while the US is doing this bombing? What do you think is happening with shipping in the Persian Gulf and possibly with US-allied oil facilities?
You’re not mentioning any costs at all to your bomb Iran scenario. How much is it worth to the US to keep Iran from having a Japan option?
To carry this argument to its extreme, if a country were entirely successful in hiding an illegal nuclear weapons program, thus giving the IAEA no objective basis on which to accuse the country of doing this, the country could simply refuse to disclose anything at all. If the IAEA accused the country anyway, the country could reply that the accusation was entirely baseless and, therefore, the country was not obligated to comply with any disclosure request. The whole point of the NPT disclosure scheme is to enable the IAEA to make an informed judgment on whether a country may be engaged in prohibited nuclear activities. It shouldn’t be expected to accuse a country of specific wrongdoing before the country is required to make disclosures.
This is the type of thing you’ve been writing these days Eric.
Now the real extreme case, that space aliens or magic elves give a country a nuclear weapon that cannot be detected by either the AP or the CSA, confidence in the purely peaceful intent of a country’s nuclear program requires the US to invade every country that it thinks may develop weapons and install someone like Hosni Mubarak or King Abdullah of Jordan who is accountable to the US and not his own people.
The reasonable case is that reporting requirements were negotiated and agreed upon that would strike a reasonable balance between national sovereignty and the assurance that a country does not have a nuclear weapon.
So far, the regular old CSA has never, never, not once failed to monitor a critical amount of fissile material, enough fissile material to make a weapon. It has never failed to detect half or any significant fraction of that amount. Nations applying the CSA do not have weapons. They cannot destroy a city unless they visibly dismantle the IAEA observation or leave the NPT.
Iran does not have a weapon. Iran cannot destroy a city unless it visibly dismantles the IAEA observation processes or leaves the NPT.
So what are the grounds for demanding Iran go beyond the CSA agreement it negotiated? Real evidence that Iran has an opportunity to refute without going beyond its agreement, for example by demonstrating that it’s forged. Also, if there is evidence that requires going beyond what Iran agreed to, Iran has a right to see it all. Not excerpts so that more “evidence” can be crafted by what Iran discloses.
Arnold
“Iran will try, and I believe succeed in putting the US into a position where to prevent Iranian attacks and replenishment, it has to hold Iranian territory.”
As an old Persian/Yazdi saying all flying birds (I suppose including Based-Balls) will eventually have to land somewhere. Is interesting to know that the Parthian technique of warfare was to draw the adversaries inside the Iranian plateau where they were surrounded by mountains from all sides.
“The battle was furious: war cries and kettledrums resounded from all sides, setting fear in enemy ranks; mounted on the light horse the archers showered the enemy with volley after volley, and then retreated but again turned back to shoot while the charger was at full gallop-an ancient art which came to be known as “the Parthian shot”. Then the shock cavalry (cataphracts) moved in, still avoiding hand-to-hand combat but picking up the enemy with their missiles and piercing them with the heavy lance. Charging on large and trained war horses, of which some were brought as reserves (Basiij), the Parthians avoided the deficiency of the Achaemenid cavalry by carrying camel-loads of arrows for use in the field as soon as their archers ran out of their own; this enabled sustained and effective long-range engagements and reduced the number of the enemy rapidly.”
Arnold,
“No Eric. According to the Feb IAEA report, the heavy water requirement was custom-made for Iran by the security council resolutions.”
I’ve read all the IAEA reports on this issue, though I’ll confess it’s been a while since I read the February report and that I certainly don’t recall what it said about heavy water. But your comment is missing the point entirely. I’m recommending that Iran sign up for the Additional Protocols, which includes specific provisions about heavy water (and many other items) that are not presently covered by Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. The very fact that they’re not presently covered by Iran’s Safeguards Agreement is precisely why the IAEA felt the need to add those “requirements” to Iran’s disclosure obligations in its February report. I put “requirements” in quotation marks to acknowledge that I understand and agree that Iran presently has no obligation whatsoever under its Safeguards Agreement to talk about heavy water. I’m merely suggesting that it ought to undertake an obligation to talk about heavy water so that the IAEA no longer finds it necessary to issue over-reaching reports to the UNSC in an effort to require Iran to do so.
Arnold,
“There is a US consensus, that you seem unaware of, (and wonder if it’s willfully unaware) that there is not a viable military option for the US to shut down Iran’s nuclear program.”
I don’t think for a moment that the US could uncover every secret nuclear facility in Iran if the US were to attack Iran. Frankly, I don’t even think the US would try.
What I would expect, in the unlikely event that the US ever attacks Iran, is that the US would just pummel Iran from the air, pausing now and then to ask Iran whether it had had enough. If Iran held out for longer than I anticipate, the US would just keep expanding the permissible target list until Iran changes its mind.
Then the US would see to it that some Iraq-1990s intrusive inspection scheme was put in place in Iran, and soon UN or IAEA inspectors would be crawling all over Iran, ferreting out most or all of those underground labs. Possibly some determined scientists – working feverishly deep underground in facilities powered by gasoline generators so that inspectors cannot detect high-wattage electrical lines running inexplicably into some hole in the ground in the middle of the desert – would finish up a nuclear bomb, attach it some ballistic missile, and wheel the whole contraption out of the cave one starry night to fire at some US base in Afghanistan.
I doubt it, but if that happened, I don’t think it would count for much in the grand scheme of things. And by then, I’m not sure that many Iranian people would consider the valiant effort of those determined scientists to have been at all worthwhile.
No Eric. According to the Feb IAEA report, the heavy water requirement was custom-made for Iran by the security council resolutions.
You really refuse to read the documents? They’re available. You care enough to write a lot. You’re deliberately keeping yourself unable to write about specifics.
Consider the question of P2 centrifuges, evidence for which dated from 2003 and before. Iran maintained no work was done on these centrifuges after 2003, despite incessant IAEA questioning. They continued to maintain this position throughout the AP period, but immediately after withdrawing from the AP Iran began talking in whispers about “new generation centrifuges” (April 2006). When challenged by the IAEA, they still refused to answer questions about it. Then, in December 2007, they unveiled their new centrifuge.
The obvious question is what if the same were true about the Alleged Studies? What are the grounds for the IAEA to trust Iran’s consistent denials over US “question manufacture”?
1) I’m not sure what your point is about the p2 centrifuges. P2 centrifuges have not been put into mass operation to this day. Do you have an indication that p2 centrifuges were or had to be worked on before April 2006 for a prototype to be ready by December 2007? Seriously, you have to really want to think badly of Iran to see what you wrote as something wrong that Iran did. Assuming all you write is true.
2) The alleged studies do not involve fissile material and certainly were not prohibited by any obligation in force when they occurred, to the degree they occurred. The US could invent alleged studies against Japan or Canada or Brazil or anyone. The right answer is, show the IAEA valid evidence that there has been a violation of our actual obligations, and the IAEA will use the tools agreed upon to investigate them. Not to start a process by which the US is free to concoct an unlimited amount of questions that can never be answered and that can always produce new “shocking” revelations that actually have no bearing on Iran’s agreed-upon inability, as long as it is in the treaty, to refrain from developing a weapon that can do what the US did to Hiroshima.
I agree with the Iranian position on the alleged studies. They were guaranteed in writing that they would be shown the evidence before they are asked to respond to it. They have not been shown the evidence. They have no obligation to respond to it.
Arnold (and Alan),
I think Arnold asks some good questions, somewhat similar to those I was about to pose to Alan anyway. Alan, you’re much better informed than most of us about the actual give-and-take going on between Iran and IAEA on this. Can you give us some details – where is the IAEA asking for too much; where is Iran being too stubborn, etc.?
Arnold, I don’t agree that you or I should be second-guessing every category of information specified in the Additional Protocols. Maybe you’re right that the IAEA has no need to ask questions about heavy water, but that provision was placed in the AP long before this dispute arose, and so it’s hard to imagine it was put there just to oppress Iran. Nor do I think you or I have enough technical knowledge to know whether a ton of water is more than the IAEA needs. Maybe, as you say, a “few liters” would be enough. I really have no idea, and I doubt you do either. (A ton of water fits in roughly four 55-gallon drums, by the way.) Alan, any thoughts on this?
Though you didn’t raise the following point, Arnold, others have, and here seems as good a place as any to address it. It’s not valid to argue that the IAEA – much less technically-challenged I – must specify what Iran has that it would be required to disclose under the Additional Protocols. The AP (in annexes) include a long and detailed list of items to be disclosed. How in the world can the IAEA, or I, or anyone except Iran itself, possibly know what Iran has, if anything, that appears on that long list? That’s the whole point of asking Iran to disclose. If Iran has, for example, “irradiated fuel element chopping machines,” or “zirconium tubes,” whatever those are, it should just say so – or else it should say that it doesn’t have those things, which would also be useful, comforting information. Until Iran makes such disclosures (and setting aside whatever spies might turn up from time to time), nobody but Iran knows what it has that it would be required to disclose under the AP.
Nor is it valid to argue, as several have, that Iran need not disclose anything unless the IAEA has first accused Iran specifically of engaging in some prohibited nuclear activity. There was recently some back and forth on this board about that – some insisting that such accusations have been made, others denying this. I don’t think it matters either way. To carry this argument to its extreme, if a country were entirely successful in hiding an illegal nuclear weapons program, thus giving the IAEA no objective basis on which to accuse the country of doing this, the country could simply refuse to disclose anything at all. If the IAEA accused the country anyway, the country could reply that the accusation was entirely baseless and, therefore, the country was not obligated to comply with any disclosure request. The whole point of the NPT disclosure scheme is to enable the IAEA to make an informed judgment on whether a country may be engaged in prohibited nuclear activities. It shouldn’t be expected to accuse a country of specific wrongdoing before the country is required to make disclosures.
Arnold:
“The IAEA wants information about alleged explosive research that did not involve fissile material from 2003 and before. Iran says no. I agree. If true, this information could only be used to provide political pressure against Iran’s program.
More likely, if this source of the IAEA’s questions is forged and partially true but embellished, as a principle no nation just answers arbitrary questions beyond its requirements based on forged evidence provided by its rivals.”
and:
“There aren’t valid or strong “what’s Iran trying to hide” arguments today, except among people who haven’t read the specifics of the issue, which is a category that seems to include you, Eric.
“The US will always be able to be able to claim there are questions Iran is not answering because the US manufactures questions.”
Consider the question of P2 centrifuges, evidence for which dated from 2003 and before. Iran maintained no work was done on these centrifuges after 2003, despite incessant IAEA questioning. They continued to maintain this position throughout the AP period, but immediately after withdrawing from the AP Iran began talking in whispers about “new generation centrifuges” (April 2006). When challenged by the IAEA, they still refused to answer questions about it. Then, in December 2007, they unveiled their new centrifuge.
The obvious question is what if the same were true about the Alleged Studies? What are the grounds for the IAEA to trust Iran’s consistent denials over US “question manufacture”?
It’s a two way street. Both sides should cut out the politics and hit the re-set button.
It will be sufficient just to blunt the “What’s Iran trying to hide?” arguments, just to slow down the march to war.
There aren’t valid or strong “what’s Iran trying to hide” arguments today, except among people who haven’t read the specifics of the issue, which is a category that seems to include you, Eric.
The US will always be able to be able to claim there are questions Iran is not answering because the US manufactures questions.
About the march to war you think is happening, an air war that would accomplish US objectives easily at great cost to Iran and little cost to the US, this also seems to be fundamentally an argument out of ignorance – meaning the type of argument you can make as long as you don’t read what military professionals say about a war scenario with Iran.
There is a US consensus, that you seem unaware of, (and wonder if it’s willfully unaware) that there is not a viable military option for the US to shut down Iran’s nuclear program.
Nasser,
“But I would wager that ’smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US’ are against another war anyway despite their suspicions and perhaps deep displeasure with Iran’s “stubbornness”.”
I’ll bet you would have made the very same wager shortly before the Iraq war began. I did. Lost my money on that one.
Quite a number of such “smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US” indeed were against the Iraq war. Much to my surprise back then, however, not as many as I’d imagined. You’d never know that from cocktail party conversation after the Iraq war went bad, of course. Finding someone who’d supported the Iraq war then was about as tough as finding someone who’d smoked marijuana in college.
Don’t underestimate the need to provide some backbone to the ’smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US’ you’re counting on to resist the current march toward war. Consider whether some help from Iran – in the form of greater cooperation on disclosures, to undercut the “What’s Iran trying to hide?” argument that sells so well over here – might be very helpful to those Americans who are making that effort.
Eric, you write about Iran’s disclosure policy enough I think it would be worth it for you to read the IAEA report from February, which contains all of the questions the IAEA is putting to Iran, and telling us which of the questions Iran should answer and which it should not.
Your position is “More.”
Iran’s leaders do not deal with this question in the abstract. Iran’s leaders make choices to answer specific questions that I don’t see any indication that you are aware of, though you easily could be.
The IAEA wants Iran to give it a large quantity of heavy water. Iran says no. I agree. Heavy water is not a fissile material, does not indicate any secret source of fissile material. I’m not sure what the IAEA wants to ascertain with tests, but any reasonable tests could be done on a few liters, not the tons the IAEA is asking for.
The IAEA wants Iran to tell it what locations are considered for backup enrichment facilities of the US bombs Natanz. Absolutely not. Iran does not have to tell the US about them until it introduces uranium which it has not. This information would feed directly into US targeting programs.
The IAEA wants Iran to tell it about its manufacture of centrifuges. Absolutely not. This would feed directly into US targeting programs as well as US covert efforts to hamper Iran’s program by destroying these manufacturing facilities.
The IAEA wants information about alleged explosive research that did not involve fissile material from 2003 and before. Iran says no. I agree. If true, this information could only be used to provide political pressure against Iran’s program.
More likely, if this source of the IAEA’s questions is forged and partially true but embellished, as a principle no nation just answers arbitrary questions beyond its requirements based on forged evidence provided by its rivals. This would be an endless process because the US and Israel are well equipped to produce laptops of death at will. If Iran has to go beyond its reporting requirements in response to laptops of death, then there is no limit to its reporting requirements, despite what Iran and every NPT non-weapons state negotiated.
Eric/Paul – Air wars v ground wars etc.
I wonder whether an Obama-esque response would be to say “we’re going to blow up Natanz tomorrow at 5pm. You have until then to get everybody out.”
No air war, no ground war, one target. More similar to the bombings of Osirak and more recently in Syria, but with a warning attached. It’s not something I’ve given great thought to mind – I just don’t see a war, ground or air, as likely.
Paul,
Eric has shown us a scenario he considers plausible that you’ll find in the last thread or the one before that. The US destroys Iranian industrial targets, pauses and tells Iran that if it does not surrender, it will destroy more industrial targets. Iran surrenders in a few weeks at the most.
What is your scenario regarding a US war with Iran?
US military officials speak about war with Iran, none speaks in eager tones.
What do you think Iran would do if it was attacked?
I think Iran would activate weapons and personnel already in place in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack (as guerrillas) US assets in those countries. It would also increase the rate of transfer of material and personnel from Iran to replenish stocks that are used or destroyed. I would also attack US positions and assets from Iranian territory by missiles.
The US was not able to stop Hussein’s SCUD missiles from the air in 1991. Iran will try, and I believe succeed in putting the US into a position where to prevent Iranian attacks and replenishment, it has to hold Iranian territory.
Once the US holds Iranian territory, it is in the situation Israel is in when it tries to hold Lebanese territory, it is just a matter of time before the cost is too much and the US is forced off in defeat – with a government remaining in place and hostile to the US.
In the mean time, Iran will leave the NPT and probably build a weapon. Not that it certainly will use that weapon during this conflict, but this conflict will end with the Iranian regime still in place. If it ends with the Iranian regime in place without the NPT and with a weapon, it is worse for the US than if no attack had happened at all.
I think Eric misses that if the US attacks and proves how militarily powerful it is, but does not accomplish any strategic objectives, it would have been better off not attacking.
I also don’t see the US widening the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts by multiples of intensity, expense and casualties in order to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option as either worth it for the US or a reasonable prediction.
Paul,
“I think that many in the US military and political establishment would view an Iran war the way a Power Hitter in baseball views a fastball down the middle after a steady diet of curveballs and changeups.”
Well put.
“Regime change” wars are the curveballs and changeups – time-consuming, expensive, messy, full of unexpected twists and turns, really tough to hit out of the park. A good old-fashioned air war is the fastball down the middle – a “turn me loose” war where some politician isn’t constantly telling you that you can’t knock out bridges, power grids, pipelines, railway switching stations, telling you to steer clear of residential neighborhoods just because civilians live there. A war in which, once and for all, you can show all those air-war doubters just how effective a savage bombing campaign can be when some wimpering bureaucrat isn’t looking over your shoulder every time you think about opening the bomb bay.
The US hasn’t done well in ground wars lately, and neither the American pocketbook or will is up for another one. That means “air war,” and that dovetails nicely with the preferences of many US military leaders. If the get the chance, I’m sure they’ll do their very best to convince people that air wars can work.
Nasser,
“If I understand your argument correctly, your main reason for advocating that Iran implements the additional protocol is to win over those “smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US” who have some lingering suspicions about what Iran is actually up to.”
You understand my argument correctly.
“But I would wager that such people are against another war anyway despite their suspicions and perhaps deep displeasure with Iran’s “stubbornness”.”
That wager would cost you (not you, actually – it’s the security of the Iranian people you’re offering to gamble here) quite a bit if your hunch is wrong. Wagering the opposite way (more cooperation in disclosures) would cost a lot less – just some additional compliance burden, and the relinquishment of a worthless “bargaining chip” that’s ironically more valuable to US war-mongers the longer you decline to play it.
“So it would seem that following your advice, Iran would be expected to no real benefit for a pretty serious concession.”
Three problems with this sentence. First, you neglect to mention that your conclusion depends entirely on your assumption – your hunch – that nothing Iran does would have any effect on “smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US”); I’ve made clear I think you’re not correct – my “hunch” is different and, I believe, more soundly based. Second, if I am correct on that and you are not, reducing the risk of a US attack on Iran can hardly be called “no real benefit.” Third, I don’t consider an agreement to the Additional Protocols, observed already by 100 other countries, to be a “really serious concession.” It’s just hopping on the same bus that most everyone else has been riding for a long time. I consider it to be a minor concession in exchange for a possible (likely, I think) reduction of a significant risk.
Leveretts:
This is a correct assessment.
There will be a lose-lose situation obtaining between US-EU on the one side and Iran on the other.
But EU will lose the most.
Iranians can live with sanction; overtime sanctions will erode and their effectiveness diminished. Give it 5 years – at the most.
US, on the other hand, can tell Israel and the Arabs that she is doing something.
All in all, this is a tolerable course of action for all concerned except EU & Israel – for different reasons.
May be there will be some activity after 2012 elections.
How did Iran get its “ass kicked”? Saddam invaded Iran, he didn’t gain anything from that. Logic concludes that the only ass that could have been kicked was that of Saddam’s.
The only ass you should be worried about Nasser is the Ass of the Arabs which seems to be getting pretty pounded by their good old friend the US of A.
You troll you.
“The West must find a sustainable solution based on a win-win strategy and relative satisfaction of both sides.”
So must Iran.
Eric,
If I understand your argument correctly, your main reason for advocating that Iran implements the additional protocol is to win over those “smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US” who have some lingering suspicions about what Iran is actually up to. But I would wager that such people are against another war anyway despite their suspicions and perhaps deep displeasure with Iran’s “stubbornness”. So it would seem that following your advice, Iran would be expected to no real benefit for a pretty serious concession.
Paul,
“That is the kind of war that beckons in Iran. I think that many in the US military and political establishment would view an Iran war the way a Power Hitter in baseball views a fastball down the middle after a steady diet of curveballs and changeups.”
- Haha very well said. It boggles my mind why some Iranians actually seem so eager for a conflict after actually watching what happened to the guy that kicked their ass for eight years.
And Brzezinski has been very vocal about opposing military actions against Iran. He is the one that recommended shooting down Israeli jets in the event of an attack! I think Brzezinski is too often the victim of demonization and caricatures much like how you Iran is.
Masoud – as promised, my response to your post of several days ago
You wrote:
“But you started it off by saying Iran has neither a moral or legal obligation ‘to disclose’ in which case you should have no trouble ‘Defending Iran’.”
What I try to “defend” Iran against is not some charge that Iran is acting “illegally” or “immorally.” I’m trying to “defend” Iran against arguments that the US should attack it. Few Americans are impressed when told that Iran is not breaking any laws, treaties or agreements. I have argued that in the past, and it appears to have become so unpersuasive that I rarely even mention it any more. Uneducated Americans wouldn’t believe me, and most educated Americans who might accept my arguments would nevertheless wonder why Iran is unwilling to disclose what 100 other countries have agreed to disclose by adopting the Additional Protocols. None of those countries was any more legally or morally obligated than Iran to sign up for the additional disclosures that I think Iran should agree to make.
You wrote:
“In any case, would it be accurate to say that every place you write ‘Iran should…’, you mean ‘If I were leading Iran, I would…’? I think there are important differences in how these sentences can be interpreted.”
I don’t see any difference – certainly none worth quibbling over.
You wrote:
“What you say is that Iraq ‘opened up’ too late to make a difference [before the second Iraq war], you don’t even assert there would have been a different outcome if Iraq had given inspectors free rein over the last two decades, but you urge a kind of a muddled logical jump to that effect, and recommend that Iran proceed by taking it on faith that such a solution exists for its particular case.”
You make a valid point, though a limited one. The comparison with Iraq may be unfair. Even if Saddam had “opened up” much earlier, it might not have made much difference – depending, of course, on how far back in time one cares to go. If he’d immediately acceded to demands in the late 1990s that the inspectors be allowed to return, that probably would have made a difference. But that would have required someone less than a full man to agree to (I would not have agreed), given that the only reason the inspectors had left was to avoid being struck by bombs that the US had decided in advance to drop on Iraq. What I’m recommending for Iran would not result in the humiliation that Saddam would have suffered by allowing the inspectors to return – or any humiliation at all. It would amount to nothing more than an undertaking to do what is being done by 100 other countries – none of whose leaders, I’ll wager, felt humiliated by agreeing to the Additional Protocols.
You wrote:
“I believe there was no serious international opposition to the war with Iraq because everyone knew Saddam was isolated, weak, and defenseless, that he would ultimately lose, and that backing a lost cause is a waste of any state’s resources, and that on the other hand the US could make things very complicated for any country that wanted a post-war relationship with Iraq but opposed the US’ conquest.”
As I emphasized recently to Kooshy, I agree that Iran would undoubtedly regroup and, in the long term, would be the “winner,” as it ought to be if it were unjustifiably attacked by the US. Not in the short term, though. US military planners undoubtedly would take Iran’s military far more seriously than they did Iraq’s sanctions-crippled forces. But I doubt seriously that US military planners are worried about how the war would play out in the short run. And I strongly suspect they have plans to pick up the pace and ferocity of the air war substantially if Iran’s initial resistance proves stronger than anticipated – not only because upping the ante may appear necessary to overcome that resistance, but also because the US will want to minimize the immediate impact of the war on the world economy, particularly the flow of oil through the Gulf, by getting the initial fighting over with ASAP.
Unlike many, I don’t think the US would get bogged down in another ground war if it ever attacked Iran. Ground wars haven’t gone well for the US lately, and I think US leaders finally recognize the pattern. They’ll take what they can get from a successful outcome of an extremely ferocious air campaign. I’m well aware of the argument that wars can’t be won without ground fighting, but that argument strikes me as not necessarily valid if one’s objectives are carefully limited. If the US can get at least the most important element of what it got after the first Iraq war – an Iranian acquiescence to very intrusive inspections of its real or imagined WMD activities – I think the US would settle for that and let its ground troops continue to muddle around in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand this would not accomplish what many believe would be the US’ real objective in Iran – regime change to remove the last remaining obstacle to US and Israeli control of the Middle East – but I think US leaders recognize that the US lacks both the wherewithal and the will to press the war that long and far.
You wrote:
“I believe the crucial question any state that is considering taking Iran’s side in the current dispute must ask itself is “Do I want to back a loser?””
If the US decides to attack Iran (which, by the way, I consider very unlikely, despite all my hand-wringing), I am confident that no country would overtly assist Iran until the war dust had cleared, and that very few if any countries would give Iran meaningful secret assistance (the US would be watching carefully). After that, a country’s decision wouldn’t be based on whether Iran was a “loser,” since that is unquestionably what Iran would be in the short run, and the “long run” would still be far away and uncertain. As time passed, many countries would gradually creep back to Iran, but that would take a while. Nobody would help Iran in any way in the actual war – other than guerillas and terrorists, who certainly could and would harm the US but would not have much effect on the principal war effort.
You wrote:
“And consequently Iran’s only hope of gaining international support is by projecting strength (in a principled, controlled, and responsible fashion), and that obeying the various arbitrary dictates of the US and its lackeys (UR enrichment suspension, AP ratification etc…) projects weakness and increases Iran’s isolation.”
Take a close look at what you’ve put in parentheses. You may consider both to be examples of capitulation to unfair US demands. I consider the first one to be that – possibly even more strongly than you do. But not the second. I don’t understand how agreeing to the Additional Protocols, and generally making a sincere effort to assure the world that its fears of an Iranian nuclear weapons program are baseless, makes Iran look weak.
Incidentally, though I haven’t raised this (Alan has), let’s not forget that, though Iran may well be as clean as a hound’s tooth today, it was indisputably in violation of its NPT obligations some time back. I felt then, and still feel, that Iran’s non-compliance back then was largely warranted, since the US and other Western countries had ignored their own NPT obligations to assist Iran. The fact remains that Iran was in violation, and many Americans and others feel that this historical fact justifies present-day insistence that Iran disclose more than it is disclosing. I don’t agree that Iran should be punished for decades-ago non-compliance, but I consider it fair to ask that Iran sign up for the Additional Protocols – just like 100 other countries, most of which have either no NPT violations or only minor violations in their past.
You wrote:
“I believe that the US did not invade Iraq because of concern over its WMD program.”
I agree with you. Whatever the real reasons for the second Iraq war might have been, however, the WMD claims made the war very much easier to sell to the American people. And obviously it made no difference whatsoever that those WMD claims were false – just as that may make no difference whatsoever if the US ever attacks Iran. That is precisely what I fear could happen if Iran lends support to those false WMD claims by refusing to “open up” disclosures about its nuclear program.
You wrote:
“Furthermore I think US and UK domestic opinion can’t be the focus of any Iranian strategy, because it’s too easy for the elites of those countries to shape opinion about Iran, and that in general those electorates are a dumb as f€*k anyway.”
There are a lot more smart, informed and fair-minded people in the US than you probably believe. But many even in that large group are suspicious of Iran because of its perceived stubbornness on this nuclear disclosure issue. Iran’s “opening up” may affect fewer Americans than I predict, but unquestionably it would improve Iran’s image among Americans. Complying with the Additional Protocols wouldn’t be much of a burden on Iran, and holding onto its AP “chip” would not leave Iran with any realistic prospect of striking a deal with the US on any significant issue (such as a US acknowledgement of Iran’s enrichment rights).
I can assure you, nonetheless, that at least some Americans agree with you wholeheartedly that Iran should refuse to disclose more: I am confident that John Bolton and Rush Limbaugh would be annoyed and frustrated to learn that Iran had agreed to the Additional Protocols. Their “What is Iran trying to hide?” arguments would pack a lot less punch.
You wrote:
“What is your response to the forged documentation and the ‘question creep’ and the phantom issues that go hand in hand with such measures. When Iran had increased cooperation, it had to deal with an incredible amount of this nonsense; when it decreased cooperation, it was able to control it. Do you deny a causal link? What about the espionage, sabotage and assassination that this level of cooperation enables? Have you decided that these are relatively unimportant nuances?”
I don’t deny these are risks. As I’ve written earlier, I don’t think Iran should respond to every “laptop of death” allegation or trumped-up US claim about disclosures made (or not) by some defector. Iran indeed should be watchful, and might well have to trim its disclosures if this gets out of hand. But I don’t think these concerns warrant refusing to observe the Additional Protocols.
You wrote:
“Lastly if Iran agrees to everything the US demands …, won’t the US simply move the goalposts yet again?”
Almost certainly. I’d be amazed if this didn’t occur. And when it does, most Americans indeed will feel that Iran should jump through yet another hoop. I’m nevertheless confident that a sizable group of Americans will feel Iran has done enough. That, I hope and expect, will be all Iran needs.
Don’t misunderstand me: I’m not suggesting that Americans, even those enlightened ones I assure you can be found here, are going to be moving to Iran or protesting on its behalf in front of the White House. It will be sufficient just to blunt the “What’s Iran trying to hide?” arguments, just to slow down the march to war. Time will work to Iran’s advantage, unless it makes the only mistake that I fear could hand victory to the bomb-Iran crowd: leave the bulk of the American public wondering whether Iran is hiding a nuclear weapons program, rendering them vulnerable to arguments that the American people should not accept any uncertainty and that uncertainty will be here very soon if we don’t act now.
This is exactly what many Americans already think. Whether they have good reason to think that doesn’t really matter – any more than it mattered just before the second Iraq war. All that matters is that they think it – and write letters to Congressmen, call in to radio talk shows, post comments on blogs, and vote for candidates who pound the table and shout that it’s time for Americans to stand up and put Iran in its place once and for all.
If I were running Iran, I’d be confident that I could keep the US at bay for decades, more than long enough for the issue to die down and for the US to lose enough power that it could no longer threaten Iran. I would perceive only one big risk: a near-term last-gasp attack by the US, whipped once again into a WMD frenzy that Iran had passed up an opportunity to dampen.
Eric
Paul
Instead of asking why, why, why if the American people in a real way mentally, economically, politically and above all socially are tired of “WARS” one big and easy chance is coming up this November to show their disapproval of the steps and directions hat are taken on their behalf, that is to vote only for candidates that are not running by any of the two major parties even if their votes does not elect their choices to the congress, that is enough to send the message to the world as what the mode of the country is, that message surly will also eliminate the current wars as well as eliminating chance for any future ones. And will eliminate any chance of getting approved every couple of months sixty billion supplemental of the money that the middle class earns sweating.
I know it’s been said many times, but you guys deserve a lot of credit for the wonderful pictures you choose for your articles. The pictures alone put us more in touch with the reality and the humanity of those on the other sides of the news stories.
And Kudos to you, Big Kudos, for cutting right through the propaganda depiction of Iran’s position re. enriching to 20%, the same position they have had all along, as a ‘new’ position, ‘forced by sanctions’.
I’d like to see you write something about a topic I think has been almost entirely neglected; Iran’s sometimes very impressive self-possession in the face of international pressure and demonization. The way Western Media and politicos seek constantly to portray the government of Iran as something like a band of smoke-blowing, back-stabbing dervishes verges on racism. In fact, Iran has been resilient and resourceful, and has stuck to its principles, which relate uranium enrichment credibly to issues of national sovereignty.
However, I think the claim that possible UN (in)Security Council unwillingness to formally call for a military attack on Iran will prevent a shooting war are just plain silly, at best. Does it really have to be repeated over and over that the Iraq War demonstrated that the US will go ahead, if it chooses to, whether or not the UNSC gives the ok? While it’s true that Obama is more of a consensus builder than Bush was, it’s also true that he already has succeeded in creating international consensus for a war on Iran. That war is an economic war. Sanctions. Economic war is war. Ask Iraq if you doubt that. But even IF Obama gave a flipping flapjack about UNSC approval for war, there are sooo many other ways to get a war going. Why do we have to talk like we don’t understand this basic fact? Israel can go ahead and start the war. If that happens, the US will be in on it the next day. Or, alternatively, the US can goad Iran into an escalated confrontation. The UN sanctions contain a provision clearly geared to give the US a way to do exactly that, at will, by stopping and searching Iran’s shipping. And of course, there is always the possibility of the false flag incident or the manipulated pretext. We’ve already seen Obama’s willingness to do this in the Cheonan incident. It doesn’t matter how the Cheonan came to grief. Maybe NK did it. Maybe an accident did it. Maybe the US did it in order to get that base in Japan. Maybe it happened in some other way. What matters is that the US and South Korea ginned up a bogus investigation, clearly biased, clearly slipshod at best, and thereby got up a dandy pretext for war. There may be no war on the Korean peninsula, but the wargames there certainly walk right up to the edge of war, and the same or much more could happen with Iran. The recent tanker incident, for example, could be ginned up into a war pretext if Obama so chooses. There will surely be some kind of investigation; gin up the investigation a bit and voila.
Kayhan notes that the US is ‘bogged’ down in Afghanistan and Iraq. What he ignores, most commentators seem to ignore: the US military is not designed for counterinsurgency wars. It is designed for Shock and Awe type wars. That is the kind of war that beckons in Iran. I think that many in the US military and political establishment would view an Iran war the way a Power Hitter in baseball views a fastball down the middle after a steady diet of curveballs and changeups. Also, isn’t it rather hard to miss that the US political and military elite have been deliberately trying to change the narrative of the Afghan and Iraq wars towards blaming Iran? What this clearly signals is a growing interest in viewing the Central Asian wars as ONE WAR; one war with Iran right at the center.
We continue to avoid the real question: why do the US and Israeli political elites want war with Iran so darn badly? Already they have an economic war. It appears almost certain that a shooting war is going to break out anytime. Could be tomorrow. Could be in the fall. Could be next year. Why? No one, except those blinded by their own propaganda, believes the crap about Iran being a threat to Israel, or – even more laughably – to the US. So why? Is it oil? Is it geopolitical control (ala Brzezinski)? Is it the care and feeding of the Military Industrial Complex? Is it to make example of anyone opposing the Hegemon? Is it all this and more?