The Race for Iran

Our January 6 Op Ed in The New York Times, “Another Iranian Revolution? Not Likely” , has generated a considerable amount of commentary, on this site and others.  We are grateful to all who have responded, written in, extended positive comments, and offered criticism.  We were particularly struck by one piece of commentary, which we are re-publishing here with permission from the author. 

The piece is by Farid Marjai, an Iranian-Canadian who, among other things, has published several pieces in reformist newspapers in Iran over the years.  As his writing about the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Republic’s June 12, 2009 presidential election attests , Farid is someone deeply sympathetic to the Green Movement, but who is also concerned about the risk that “émigré circles, neoconservatives, and elements of Iranian opposition linked with the neoconservative cliques” would hijack the movement as a “strategic vehicle for this regime change”.  From this perspective, he offered what we judged were exceptionally thoughtful comments about our Op Ed.  We are pleased to present them to our readers, and grateful to Farid for granting his permission for us to do so.   

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett 

Because the op-ed piece written by the Leveretts in The New York Times departs from the official line in Washington, it has elicited a chorus of response from many different individuals and quarters.  However, often, it is precisely this kind of critical, bold and courageous analysis that unlocks diplomatic deadlocks, and that eventually may lead to political developments. So in that sense, the Leveretts’ overall analysis and critique of policy have quite a bit of significance, and is a welcome departure from the usual.

The central themes of the OpEd piece are somewhat lost on many observers—the two dominant subjects—that the US can consider engaging the Iranian government despite domestic difficulties, and that the Iranian regime is not about to implode.

It seems to me that the assessment and the exact magnitude of the Green anti-government and pro-government street demonstrations (Dec. 27, and Dec. 30 respectively) became the dominant themes of the critics of this OpEd piece.  But those comparisons are not critical to the above mentioned conclusions.  One can only take issue with the Leveretts’ opinion piece if one is against “engagement,” or if one firmly believes that the State in Iran is about to fall; and, lastly, if one hopes (plans) to encourage an affirmative US policy so the crisis is deepened, to eventually help bring about that collapse of the system.  In other words, there are policy preferences (and critics of the OpEd piece) that have “implosion” in mind as a strategic objective and not an eventuality. So, this background may provide a prism and a framework to decode some—only some—of the responses to the Leveretts’ piece.

On the other hand, understandably, a number of Iranian scholars and journalists feel personally very connected to the Green movement.  And to a varying degree each identifies with the more radical or more moderate demands of the Green wave, depending on his/her political orientation.

But, is it fair to expect the Leveretts to act as mere Green activist partisans for our benefit, with no objective policy analysis of their own?

Ironically, some academics criticized the Leveretts for their quantitative/qualitative assessment of the pro-government demonstrations, as if they themselves could provide any verifiable numbers and tangible evidence of their own. These critics consider their own data as “terra firma,” and the Leveretts’ quantitative analysis as arbitrary!

Some in the Green movement may be against “engagement,” (and pursue the overthrow of the State) but many don’t see engagement at the international level and dialogue domestically as hurtful to the overall objectives of the Green movement. There should not be any assumptions about that.

When it comes to “engagement” and those who recommend serious engagement, the neoconservatives have an ax to grind.  Clearly, they have certain agenda and strategic objectives for the region—the example of Condoleezza Rice mentioned in the Leveretts’ response comes to mind with respect to dialogue with President Khatami.  However, neoconservatives cloak their attacks with criticism that the Leveretts don’t care about “Iranian democracy” and that they are apologists, and that they are accommodating!

President Ronald Reagan’s administration was not too long ago.  The neoconservatives in that government were not anti-apartheid activists.  As a matter of fact, they came up with the policy of “Constructive Engagement” with the South African Apartheid regime.  In terms of Latin America (Gene Kirkpatrick, Elliot Abrams, State Dept.) they were supporting military juntas and, consequently, the death squads that were devastating the civil societies of Central America.  Neoconservatives have a selective view of “engagement”, democracy and idealism.

In their op-ed, the Leveretts make the point that there are those who prefer a military strike against Iran. Many observers don’t think this is good for Iran or the Green civil movement.  Those who follow the insider discussions of the Green wave may concur with the Leveretts’ observation that the ones who advocate regime change receive considerably more Western press coverage. As with the Leveretts, many Iranian activists caution us that the events of today are not necessarily analogous to the events of the 1978-79 period (i.e. the leading voice, Ezzat Sahabi cautioned against this “shabih-sazi“).

–Farid Marjai