(Photo Credit: Arash_rk’s Photostream)
On Tuesday, the Atlantic Council hosted a public forum featuring Race for Iran Publisher Flynt Leverett, Congressional Research Service Middle East Specialist Kenneth Katzman, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Vice President of Studies George Perkovich and National Defense University Professor Judith Yaphe.
The purpose of the forum was to that roll out a comprehensive compendium of policies, laws, and regulations pertaining to Iran.
Atlantic Council Managing Editor James Joyner provides a concise, informative roundup of the event at the New Atlanticist. He concludes that:
With rare exception, then, sanctions regimes are ineffective, unwieldy, blunt, and unresponsive to rapid changes in real world conditions. But, because of a lack of better apparent options and a pressure to “do something,” we’re likely to see an increase in their use.
A podcast of the event is available here.
– Ben Katcher
Eric and Pirouz
Thanks, here is the link to this article in Persian that was published in Asre-e-Iran news site
http://www.asriran.com/fa/news/103903/10928-روز-از-محاصره-اقتصادی-ایران-گذشت
Pirouz, you have a blog? Please post a link or email arnold.r.evans@gmail.com
I also read the transcript and one point that I like to focus on and hope to see everybodys comments is what GEORGE PERKOVICH twice pointed to on his passage.
As a reference to this same line of policy/ thinking, Alahyar Saleh Iran’s ambassador to US, appointed by PM Mossadegh during the oil nationalizations of 1950’s, writes in his memoirs, that during his negotiations with Dean Acheson US secretary of state at the time, this same logic of preventing precedence for other states was directly brought up.
Here are comments by George Perkovich on this regard from the transcripts
“Ideally, sanctions would change behavior. But in the case of Iran, they’re not. But there’s another reason to sanction states, which is to punish them. And it may not change your behavior; but there is a cost for this action. And in part, we want to communicate to other states, potential other actors who may be looking at what you’re doing as a model – maybe contemplating acquiring fuel cycle capabilities, hedging their bets, doing other things and looking at Iran and saying, well, you can get away with it. The price isn’t very high. The risk is relatively low, so let’s do it. And for that reason, you could do sanctions to punish, even though you don’t have an expectation that there is going to be regime change. And I think we need to deconflate those arguments.”
“last point I would say is that we really need to think long term, because I don’t think there’s a short-term solution to any problem in Iran. And so, the long term, it seems to me, is mostly to contain the damage of what Iran might be doing. That’s not just contain Iran, but also to be thinking about steps that we can take or that internationally can be taken to make it harder for other states to follow in Iran’s footsteps. And those can be both kind of restrictive things on nonproliferation but reassurance measures in terms of security. There are other steps, I think, but all with the mindset of containing the potential damage if you can’t change Iran’s behavior.”
James,
Thanks for the correction on the Ledeen transcript. My oversight. The transcripts are extremely useful.
Eric
Ben: Thanks for the link.
Eric: There was indeed a transcript made of the Ledeen-Leverett debate. It’s linked from the event page directly below the program description and directly above the video.
http://acus.org/event/iran-engagement-or-regime-change
Kooshy, thanks for that translation. I’m going to refine it a bit and post on my blog.
Thanks again.
Kooshy,
Thanks very much for taking the time to make this translation. Very interesting. I hope you’ll do it again if you come upon another interesting article like this one.
Obama should asks Flynt and a few more “realists” like him to join his administration
Flynt made a good point about the secondary sanction:
“The biggest new contracts for investments in the Iranian upstream, the development of Iranian hydrocarbons right now, are coming from the Chinese and from other non-Western companies.And if you want to talk about a policy that is detached from reality, what do you think the odds are that the United States is going to impose secondary sanctions on a Chinese energy company for doing business in Iran right now?”
It is a joke.
Flynt also raised a few other good points:
“If we want to project large amounts of conventional military power into the Persian Gulf or anywhere else, we’re going to have to do it on borrowed money. We won’t be paying for it ourselves. We will be relying on Chinese, Saudis, and other major creditors of the United States to loan us the money to do it.
Our Iran policy, especially the sanctions part of that policy, is designed for some other planet than the one I just described, a planet in which the United States is this uniquely hegemonic power and can, through largely unilateral actions and initiatives, shape the world and shape in a determinative way the strategic choices that other countries make. That world may indeed have existed for a while in the 1990s. I would contend it doesn’t exist today. Our Iran policy is increasingly at odds with the reality of the world we live in today”
With regards to sanctions, and to get familiar with commentators opinion who are residing inside Iran I translated this article that was published yesterday on the an Iranian independent news site Asr-e- Iran
Sorry if this translation is not up to par I had to do it in between my regular job.
10928 Days of Economic Sanctions on Iran
by Syed Javad Syedpor
Asre Iran; Sydjvad Sydpvr –Today once again President Obama signed and renewed the Iran Sanctions Act for one additional year. Every time that the topic of Iran sanctions is raised, we ask our self a very pointed question, when was that we were not sanctioned?
More than eleven thousand days have elapsed since the Iran’s revolution of Feb 11 1979. During this period, the only time Iran was not under US sanctions is just less than a year time; the time between the revolution’s day in Feb 11 1979 and the occupation of the spy nest (US Embassy in Tehran) on Nov. 4 1979. Since then the sanctions on Iran is been continually expanded.
.
In other words, the Iranian nation is been under sanctions by the US and its like-minded allies for 10 thousand and 928 days. One can count this calendar for every 24 hours as a full day.
However, political realism or rationalism tells us, if in 10 thousand and 928 days this policy continually did not produce the intended results, the evidence is this policy’s failure that the United States and its western allies would not comprehend or accept.
In other words, and without any intention to hide, if these sanctions caused some suffering for the Iranians, at the same time they did not also produce the intended results for the installers of these said sanctions.
The calendar of U.S. sanctions against Iran can be measure in six general periods
First- The spy nest occupation (US Embassy) period (from 1979 to 1981)
Second – The sacred defense (Iran – Iraq War) Period (from 1981 to 1988)
Third – The reconstruction period (from 1989 to 1992)
Fourth – The Clinton era of and dual containment (from 1993 to 2001)
Fifth – After the event of September 11, 2001
Sixth – Started the of Security Council resolutions since 2006.
During these periods, sanctions although were introduced and applied in different forms and shapes they did not produce their intended goals of overthrowing the regime and or to give up its nuclear program.
From the Second World War until now, especially after decades of 70’s sanctions success has continually decreased, this issue has been more evident in current times.
Between World War I until 1990,for nearly 75 years a total of 115 economic sanctions were placed and carried out against different countries, which is equivalent to an average of 1.5 sanctions per year.
However, since 1990 the number of economic sanctions has increasingly intensified. For example, between 1990 and 1999, 66 countries experienced economic sanctions. In other words, the average annual number of sanctions has increased nearly five times from 1.5 sanctions per year for the period of 1918 to 1999 to 6.6 sanctions per year for the 1990 to1999 respectively.
In fact, in the contemporary word one of the reasons for reduction in success of sanctions is due to this increased number of sanctions. Because when sanctions range becomes extensive and covers many countries, appropriate structures against the sanctions will form whiten the formal and informal international economy.
Many experts believe with the downfall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war and the rise of a single polar world lead by the United States as the main reason for this incredible increase in the sanction regimes. Because the U.S. government has always considered a greater, share in the placement of economic sanction policies. From 1918 to 1990, the US government is responsible for 77 of 115 total sanction regimes in the world that is 67% of total sanctions placed during that period; however, their share of the responsibility for sanctions increases to 92% for the period of 1990 to 1999.
Just only during the first term of the of President Clinton, 61 U.S. government economic sanctions were implemented against 35 countries with the population of over 2.3 billion people, meaning about 42 percent of the whole world population was under US sanctions.
During the past 30 years, some of the sanctions implemented by United States were against Iran. From Nov.14 1979, which is 10 days after the occupation of the spy nest (US Embassy), Jimmy Carter’s presidential directive 12170 ordered the blockade of $12 billion of Iranian nation’s assets. Few months later in April 1980, Carter ordered prohibition of all trade and travels to Iran. In March 15 1995 during the Clinton administration, the National Emergency Act of March 15 1995 passed which increased the range of the sanctions. In last 30 years, this process has continued with 34 similar enactments
No doubt during this past 30 years the U.S. government has done all it could do against Iran, and if it was possible to do more they had it done by now.
Now besides extending the National Emergency act for one more year, they also are trying for a new round of sanctions at the UN Security Council. Considering, what happened during the past 30 years, this will be the “seventh period” of sanctions perhaps with newer approaches, and more pressure imposed on Iran. However, if the sanctions in the past three decades in these six past periods have not produced the results for US and its allies what makes them hope this time will.
One of the best points that Flynt made was that if there was a war, U.S. would have to borrow money to fight it. Are China or SA ready to make that loan? That’s really the crux of it. Isn’t it? Or, is U.S. going to print more useless paper, like the bail-out plan.
I just read the transcript (thank God there was one made, unlike the Ledeen debate). A few comments:
Flynt was clearly the star, and it’s well worth your time to read what he had to say — principally for a reason he may not even appreciate since he arrived late: everyone else seemed to be, as Flynt put it, on a “different planet” to attach so much importance to sanctions, and the fact that he got that without even having heard all of what they’d had to say before he arrived made the observation even more impressive. (With respect to George Perkovich, however, Flynt understated the point: another “solar system” would have been correct.) Even some questions that weren’t directed at Flynt found their way to him, and a number were directed to him — both good measures, obviously, of whom the audience wanted to hear.
Many of these panelists seem to believe that sanctions matter a great deal, and so more sanctions would matter even more. Several of them really seem to believe the Revolutionary Guards are running Iran. At least Nelson believed that regime change is “extremely likely.” Several believe Iran’s economy is on the brink. Perkovich seemed to believe a lot of different things, none of them terribly clear in his head or consistent with one another (to think that this guy used to advise someone who is now the Vice President of the United States is a little frightening). And so on and so on and so on. All of them seemed to have a rather grander view of the US’ influence than Flynt did.
What I found interesting is that Katzman’s exclusion of UNSC Resolution 1696 from the Compendium reflects, I now see, his genuine belief that what mattered about all those UNSC resolutions were the sanctions they imposed on Iran. Since 1696 imposed no sanctions, why include it? Fair point, if one assumes that the sanctions imposed by the follow-on resolutions (1737, 1747 and 1803) are of any great importance. Frankly, the only thing I find interesting (worrisome) about those UNSC resolutions is the possibility that the US might claim they justify military action against Iran and, on that point, the only resolution that matters is the one that Katzman left out: 1696. I don’t really think that is a great risk (after all: what’s it been – almost 7 years since the US overstated the scope of a UNSC resolution to make war against a Middle Eastern country whose name has 4 letters and starts with “I”), the risk is nevertheless sufficient that I think the real focus on those resolutions should be – not on their ho-hum sanctions – but on the Article 40 (NOT Article 39) basis on which they rest. That’s where 1696 is important. Katzman and the others (except Flynt) care more about sanctions.
Ben,
Actually, adding just Iran’s Safeguards Agreement would satisfy the NPT part of my request to supplement the Compendium.
For those interested in this “timing of disclosure” issue, I just found the language that led me to my conclusion about Code 3.1 (not as hard to find as I’d mistakenly recalled) – the last sentence of Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (not to be confused with Article 39 of the UN Charter, relevant instead to UNSC Resolution 1696):
“The Subsidiary Arrangements [which include Code 3.1] may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.”
While this begs the important question of HOW the Government of Iran can give its binding approval of such a “change,” nothing in the Safeguards Agreement suggests that this approval can be given by a mere “exchange of letters” between the Agency and Iran’s IAEA representative, as some have argued (e.g. James Acton, at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23884).
The only other provision in the Safeguards Agreement which sheds any light on this question is Article 24(b), which governs amendments of the Safeguards Agreement itself: “All amendments shall require the agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency.”
If one assumes, as seems reasonable and likely, that (A) “agreement of the Government of Iran and the Agency” in Article 24(b) means the same thing as “agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency” in Article 39; and (B) no one would seriously argue that the Safeguards Agreement itself can be amended upon a mere “exchange of letters” between the Agency and Iran’s IAEA representative, it appears to follow that a “change” to a Subsidiary Arrangement under Article 39 cannot be adopted upon a mere “exchange of letters,” but instead requires approval by the Government of Iran given in the same way that is required for an amendment of the Safeguards Agreement itself under Article 24(b).
Thanks, Ben. The “Compendium” is very useful. I am more than a little puzzled, though, by some surprising omissions (though I’m going only from a review of the Table of Contents). If you agree, Ben, you might mention this to Mr. Katzmann so he can make his Compendium even more useful:
1. Why no UNSC Resolution 1696?
1696 was the first resolution, and especially important because it’s the only one that states the substantive basis for itself and the ones that followed (1737, 1747 and 1803 — all of which are included in the Compendium). Only 1696 states that it was adopted under Article 40 – rather than Article 39, which would have meant that the SC had found (which it never has) that Iran’s nuclear program constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Article 40, by contrast, is a “baby step” provision that enables the SC simply to “prevent an aggravation of the situation.” Article 41, stated as the basis for 1737, 1747 and 1803, is essentially only “procedural”: it merely spells out ways the SC can put some (non-military) teeth in resolutions it’s previously (or simultaneously) adopted under Article 39 or Article 40.
A reference only to Article 41 in the later resolutions leaves the reader to wonder which of those two Articles (39 or 40) the underlying resolution (1696) was based upon. The answer to that question matters quite a bit, since military action can’t be justified for violation of an Article 40 resolution – only for violation of an Article 39 resolution (though Alan Kuperman (among others) argued strongly to the contrary in his infamous Christmas Eve 2009 NYT op-ed).
2. Why nothing on the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
Something on the NPT would be useful too. (One can argue that this isn’t a deal between the US and Iran, but the same point could be made about a number of documents that are included.) Some editing would be necessary, given the length of the key documents, but how about, at least:
A. The “old” and the “new” versions of Code 3.1 (governing the timing of disclosure of nuclear facilities).
B. The sections of the Safeguards Agreement that state how the Safeguards Agreement can be approved (initially) by a signatory country, and how it can later be amended.
C. The sections of the Safeguards Agreement, and of the Subsidiary Arrangement (or whatever the document is called that deals with the adoption or amendment of Code 3.1), that state how Code 3.1 can be approved (initially) by a signatory country, and how it can later be amended.
My clear recollection is that, when one wends his way through it all, one concludes that a new version of Code 3.1 can only be adopted in exactly the same way as the Safeguards Agreement can be formally amended – i.e. upon approval by the government of the country to be bound, not merely upon the say-so of its IAEA representative (as the IAEA has nonetheless vehemently insisted). The language that provides all that is very hard to find on the Internet, however (or at least it was for me), and so it would be very useful if Mr. Katzmann could include all of the treaty provisions (including those in the ancillary documents) necessary to make a thorough analysis of this issue. (I’m not sure it matters any longer, though, if I’m right in my guess that Iran is tacitly accepting the “new” version of Code 3.1, as evidenced by its recent disclosure of several nuclear sites that clearly did not need to be disclosed yet under the “old” Code 3.1).
I see something rather pathetic in Hillary Clinton’s chasing after support for more sanctions against Iran. And Bob Gates’ pursuit of the same. Are they afraid Israel will launch an insane attack on Iran, if the US does not push hard for sanctions?