One thing you do get if you start earlier though is the implementation of the suspension of enrichment related activities agreed with the EU3, and how Iran’s restarting of some of those activities in August 2005 appeared to directly contribute to the formalising of non-compliance.

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Iran restarting those activities contributed to the United States pushing a non-compliance finding through a Board of Governors vote – for political/strategic reasons. When you write this, to me it gives off a sense, even though you don’t say it directly, that you believe there is a legal/technical connection between a suspension and the non-compliance finding.

I have two points about this: 1) The US’ goal of protecting Israel is shared by enough of the Board of Governors, either directly or because many countries are heavily susceptible to US influence, that the US can get any BOG finding it ever wants or needs that it believes will contribute to protecting Israel’s regional strategic situation. Because of that I don’t look at the Board of Governors as a neutral body. I’m sure Iran shares that perception.

You obviously dispute that perception. You claim that over time Iran can reverse that. It seems to me that you believe that because you want to believe it, not because there is any real-world indication of it. Which specific countries do you think are going to change their vote and allow Iran to become as nuclear-capable as Japan – which Israel considers a threat with or without an actual weapon – after what specific actions by Iran after what specific length of time?

You vaguely hope that Iran can change the minds of the Board, and I vaguely hope so too, but it seems to me that you rest a tremendous part of your analysis on that hope, so much that there should be tangible facts upon which you base your hope.

2) I’m interested in your perception of the suspension demand. If Iran actually did have a stock of fissile material that was somehow undetectable, suspending its safeguarded program would not help make that stock any less dangerous. I don’t see any connection at all between this idea that Iran should suspend enrichment. Suspending enrichment does not, to me, advance any legal or technical objective – but it does advance the political/strategic objective of maintaining an Israeli nuclear monopoly in its region.

You’re far more inclined than I am to seek justifications for US policy. Barack Obama and many other administration officials have said Iran must submit to its “obligation” to suspend enrichment. Do you disagree with me and believe there is a legal or technical basis for this demand? If so, what is that basis?

I’m going to duplicate this on the most recent thread if you don’t mind. Please respond there if that’s OK.

I agree completely with what you say and how you characterise my views. As I think I alluded to earlier, it’s my belief that Obama has been desperate to talk the big issues with Iran, but simply has not been able to for the reason El Baradei mentions in his interview in the latest post, and because everybody has got hung up on the TRR issue. It’s my hope that they can now kick all that into touch and get on to the real business.

Regarding the IAEA Reports, November 2003 I think is the best starting point, but September 2005 may be OK because it summarises what has gone before. One thing you do get if you start earlier though is the implementation of the suspension of enrichment related activities agreed with the EU3, and how Iran’s restarting of some of those activities in August 2005 appeared to directly contribute to the formalising of non-compliance.

I forgot to ask: Can you tell me how far I should go back to read the IAEA reports on Iran?

I’ve noticed you take a lot of heat from some others for your remarks on this issue, which I think is unfair – and surprising, since you’re always polite. I find your patient and (I think) impartial approach very useful, and probably the only approach that has any hope of resolving this.

I think the US and the IAEA misstate – and probably misunderstand – their authority for demanding of Iran what they do. But if one sets all that legal stuff aside (hard for we lawyers), it seems that the US and the IAEA have legitimate reasons to doubt Iran, based mostly on its past behavior, which “colors” its less than fully cooperative present behavior. Iran created those doubts and so Iran should make an extra effort to overcome them.

Many say the bar would just keep getting raised, that the US will never OK enrichment – and Hillary Clinton recently did say just that. Nevertheless, with an extra measure of cooperation from Iran to whittle away at the IAEA’s legitimate concerns, the continued gradual weakening of US power, the louder voices of new countries like Turkey and Brazil (and Iran), and the probably louder voice of China over a longer time frame (I don’t count on Russia for much), the US eventually may have to stand down on the enrichment issue. I do think, and I gather you do too, that anything short of a clear recognition of Iran’s right to enrich would not be an acceptable outcome for Iran.

Whatever the future brings, though, it seems to me that it wouldn’t hurt Iran now to take some voluntary steps. I recognize it got nothing last time for following the AP, but, on the other hand, did it really “cost” it that much to follow it? I’ve never read through the whole AP, since it’s too technical for a non-scientist like me. I do now it’s quite long. But is it really that burdensome once both sides get past the “setup” phase?

What concerns me considerably is that I see a divergence of opinion (including among commenters on this website) on what Iran’s nuclear objectives ought to be. For me, a transparent pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is all that is warranted. All this talk of playing “hide the ball” to achieve a “nuclear option” is not appropriate, in my view. I think that’s dangerous for Iran, and that it neither needs nor deserves that. I think we’ve got enough nuclear-armed states as it is, and I don’t think the usefulness of “nuclear capability” to accomplish some political objective, worthy or not, is reason enough to add another one to that list. If that desire, in the end, is the only reason Iran resists being more transparent, I think it’s time it dropped that objective and started focusing on what it needs to do to achieve its “peaceful purposes” objective.

Don’t let me put words in your mouth, but it sounds like you agree that that should be Iran’s objective, and that you also feel that (1) it means Iran should be more cooperative; and (2) there’s at least a reasonable prospect that Iran will get where it wants to get if it is.

There was also a clear sequence to how steps by both sides contributed to the diminishing confidence each had in the other. I felt the inspectors themselves were isolated from the political shenanigans and while their story remained clear, it was also apparent how the politics made their job more difficult.

So, I didn’t necessarily see it as the US incessantly looking to block Iran’s rights, although the belligerent attitude of Bush contributed greatly to Iran withdrawing into its shell and exacerbating the confidence issues, which most likely suited his purposes. But he’s gone, and now I think there is every chance it can all be resolved with Iran retaining the full fuel cycle. I think that was precisely what Obama was seeking last year, but was stymied by the political crisis in Iran, and the thoroughly bizarre negotiating tactics Iran employed, possibly because of the crisis.

I don’t know how quickly it could all be done, it will take a while for Iran to answer the various questions I suppose, but I don’t think it should be too difficult to set out a path to compliance and the acceptance of their programme, with each step along it building confidence. That process in itself would do much to assist with public opinion in the West and make Obama’s job much easier. But the Iranians have to play the game too or it will go nowhere.

Thank you for your very thoughtful response.

You place a great deal of weight on Iran’s past sins, as if they are an indelible stain that Iran may never be able to remove. Whether or not that’s fair to Iran, you’re probably right, since indelible stainedness is in the eye of the beholder, the IAEA here.

I’ve independently persuaded myself that it makes little sense to lay out a “legal case” that Iran is living up to its NPT and Safeguards Agreement obligations, since the US and the IAEA have a much different view, and no one will ever talk them out of it.

It seems to me that the only important question is what, if anything, Iran could do that would satisfy the US enough for it to OK Iran’s enrichment up to 5%.

You feel Iran could get back in “compliance” by adopting the AP (possibly with even less, if Iran handles it correctly). I don’t know whether that’s true, but I don’t think it matters. Getting back into “compliance” probably won’t count for much with the US as long as the IAEA continues to say it’s not able to verify that Iran’s nuclear materials are not being used for military purposes. Until the IAEA is prepared to do that, the US probably won’t OK enrichment, even if Iran is technically in “compliance.” Frankly, even if the IAEA is prepared to verify that, the US might not OK enrichment, but at least Iran would have a strong case that it has done all that can fairly be asked of it.

So, bottom line: Do you think it’s feasible for Iran to do enough for the IAEA to issue that verification, or do you think the IAEA will just keep raising the bar so that Iran will sooner or later be forced to stop complying in order to protect its conventional military secrets, or just because the demands become much too burdensome for Iran to satisfy?

Thanks, Alan.

Now I see your point. However in a conflict with Iran I think it is a safe bet they will get the blame regardless!! To victor goes the spoils including the propoganda!! :)

Thx
Bill

Thanks for your citation to the article. I’ll take a look.

On Scott Ritter’s book: I thought it was very illuminating, but I must add that I was amazed that it seemed to have been released without anything approaching proper editing. I may sound finicky, but when I read a book with one or two misspellings, and a grammatical error or two, on nearly every page, it detracts considerably from the force of the message.

It’s also a shame (for many reasons) that Ritter’s personal troubles have silenced him.

My point is that, if the Straits of Hormuz are shut down – or even if shippers worry that that will happen and thus don’t send their oil tankers through the Straits – all shippers will temporarily be affected. The only question will be what happens when the Straits re-open. When that happens, if Iran was not responsible for having shut down the Straits, world opinion is more likely to be on its side when it comes time to answer that question. If, on the other hand, it was Iran that shut down the Straits, rest assured that the US will see to it that Iran is not allowed to ship oil from its Abadan refinery through the Straits. The US may block Iran regardless, of course, but the likelihood of that is much greater if it can pin its decision on Iran’s responsibility for blocking the Straits.