I was one of the skeptics that believed from the start that Obama’s move regarding Iran was simply tactical – there was never any intent for real engagement. Obama was buying time in order to create the “right atmosphere”. Dealing with any middle eastern state (except Israel) on a “mutual respect” footing is a foreign policy risk that the US does not have a plan for – I’m sure the Leverrett’s can comment on this. For reasons of energy and resources, it is an axiom of US foreign policy to deal from a position of complete control. This is even more crucial as China has entered the scene as a serious player.

This is where the administration miscalculated. The thinking was that Iran, after these months of internal struggle, is in a weak negotiating position – press hard and they will relent. This last weekend was planned to be the big show. A large demonstration, clashes, and a further weakening of the Iran’s position. The US then would pile up the pressure and Iran would relent. It turned out to be a disappointment for the green movement. Iranian security forces forcefully (and at time brutally) suppressed the green movement. In other words, the green movement became the unfortunate victim of the our foreign policy objectives. The more unfortunate part of this for the administration was that they also became the victim of their own flat thinking. More hype was generated by AP, NYT, WashPo and the rest of the establishment papers, but it is useless. We are left without a real option. Iran has moved forward and established a new reality on the ground. Iran has established alternate channels for refined fuel for the next year. Iran will replace 22% of its current refined fuel needs within a short time frame. Broad financial sanctions will not be supported by China and even Russia. The US has left itself with little leverage! Thus, the hand wringing combined with the tough language from Washington.

One would hope that Obama and his team are watching out for US interest and they should begin to slowly (and probably privately) backtrack.

But Mousavi, as far as I can tell, and even Rafsanjani are no longer important parts of Iran’s decision-making process. If they had been opposed, it basically wouldn’t matter.

I’m not sure, Obama just might be willing to give hostility with Iran a try for some period of time. There certainly are people in his administration who favor that.

There are positive signs on that score at the moment (the strength of which will probably be determined by/in the aftermath of Feb 11), and there are also clear signs that negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran have recommenced, but how much is bluster and how much is hopeful remains to be seen. At the end of the day, I believe both sides need a deal.

1) The opposition was not important in Iran’s rejection of the Oct 19 terms. Iran did not accept the deal at the Oct meeting, and expressed its reservations immediately when the terms were presented. The opposition by the time it expressed the same reservations Iran’s government had expressed, was just jumping onto an already rolling bandwagon.

2) Iran did not ever accept the deal presented on Oct 19, or anything equivalent to that. The terms of the Oct 19 deal are onerous. Iran has to ship almost all of its uranium up front and after that has no leverage to force the West to return fuel. Iran would be in the same situation it currently faces unable to force Russia to fulfill its Bushehr contract or its S-300 air defense missile contract.

3) Iran did not ever reject the idea of a swap in the abstract. Iran did express support for a swap around the beginning of October. It’s rejection of the specific terms of the October 19 proposal was not a rejection of a swap. Nor was it going back on a previous acceptance. It was a rejection of a specific set of onerous conditions. Iran always said that with changes to ensure the Bushehr experience would not be repeated with the reactor fuel the swap deal would be acceptable.

4) One side has been inflexible, the West. The position of the West, expressed by now dozens of times, is that the terms of the Oct 19 deal cannot be altered. The point of the deal is not only to remove uranium from Iran’s domestic stock – that’s something Iran can accept – the point for the West is also to have the reactor fuel as a piece of leverage that the West can use during negotiations to force Iran to make the further concession of giving up domestic enrichment.

I don’t think they agreed to anything in Geneva either, but the public statements of Ahmadinejad in the lead up certainly showed a willingness to do things differently to how they want to do them now, and I think they DID need the avalanche of criticism at home because it is quite possible they saw a deal with the US as a big political coup in troubled times. A bad deal was thus averted. It has been the only mistake I have seen Iran make in the nuclear negotiation since 2003, and so uncharacteristic that it lends credence to the view that it arose out of uniquely troubled times at home.

But they still need a deal; I think the “decision” to fabricate their own plates is little more than a threat because it is unlikely they can do it within the required timeframe. This will be known to the West as well of course, but Iran will not permit “us” to rub their noses in it. I think “we” have made huge mistakes since it was clear the deal was a non-starter, at least as represented by the on-record statements.

But there are so many contradictory things being said that surely it can only mean there’s something going on. I still think a deal will be done here, not least because Obama badly needs one.

Iran is still prepared to do something similar to what was proposed in Vienna. Iran has always been prepared to do something similar. Iran was never prepared to do exactly what was proposed in Vienna. Iran is prepared to make a swap. Iran is not prepared to export 1200kgs of uranium at once before it has any assurances that fuel will be returned.

The US position is not that Iran has to do something similar to what was proposed in Vienna, the US position is that Iran must do exactly what was proposed in Vienna, despite the fact that what was proposed in Vienna exposes Iran to an amount of risk that the US will not fulfill its obligations that Iran reasonably finds unacceptable.

Iran’s opposition does not like the deal presented in Vienna, but what matters is Iran’s leadership also does not like what was presented. The opposition didn’t have to tell Iran’s leadership that it was a bad deal presented in Vienna. At least what is publicly known about it.

We agree that Iran indicated that it would accept something similar to what was proposed. I say Iran has not gone back on that acceptance, but what was actually proposed is something Iran will not and should not accept.

You seem to be saying Iran agreed to the terms offered in Vienna, so that when it rejected those terms it was going back. I don’t see that.

Arnold – I don’t necessarily disagree, but nothing was formalised at Geneva because that was not the purpose. It does seem clear though that, at Geneva, the Iranians were prepared to do something similar to what was eventually proposed at Vienna.

My point is that this was not a delaying tactic or misleading; it was simply an error by the Iranian leadership that they had to correct in the face of vehement domestic opposition. Sadly, the West has so far chosen to characterise it as Iranian duplicity. It would be immeasurably more sensible if the West acknowledged the real circumstances and worked with them to get the best outcome.

It seems that there is a genuine possibility that three birds can be killed with one stone here. A resolution between the warring factions of the Iranian elite, a TRR deal, and a comprehensive nuclear deal can all be brought about if this issue is dealt with sensibly.

What happened in Geneva around Oct 1 is different from what happened in Vienna around Oct 19.

The idea that it has to be 1200kg at once, with no leverage or recourse if for one reason or another the fuel isn’t delivered, was not formalized until Vienna.

What happened in Geneva is not inconsistent with a simultaneous swap or a swap in small amounts at a time or fuel storage on Iranian territory. What happened in Vienna is inconsistent with that.

The Western position that the terms of the swap are not subject to alteration and the onerous terms offered were never accepted.

Iran has consistently been willing to do a swap under some conditions. But not the conditions insisted upon by the West. Iran has never accepted a deal presented and then gone back on that acceptance.

http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2450556.ece/Live-saving_isotopes_running_out_in_Iran

You don’t supposed it could have something to do with the $85 million of assets frozen in Feb 2008? Or the Billion pounds sterling frozen by Britain? Or maybe the $12 billion the US froze in 1979?

Would you trust these government with anything of value?