Until today, the Obama Administration and much of the foreign policy punditocracy in Washington have been overflowing with observations that recent statements by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki reiterating the Islamic Republic’s interest in a deal to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) were just another example of Iranian efforts to “buy time” and forestall new international sanctions. Today, however, Tehran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and President Ahmadinejad announced publicly yesterday—that Iran would begin working to enrich its own uranium to the near-20 percent level required to fabricate new fuel for the TRR.
In response to this announcement, the Obama Administration and its European partners have been flailing like the proverbial headless chicken. Even before the Iranian announcement, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking in Turkey last week, said portentously that the Iranians had “done nothing to reassure the international community that they are prepared to comply with the NPT or stop their progress toward a nuclear weapon” (sic). (Following the Iranian announcement, an AP story sought to be even more specific than Secretary Gates on this point, headlining that “Iran moves closer to nuke warhead capacity”.) Speaking today in Paris, Gates further intoned that “the only path that is left to us at this point, it seems to me, is that pressure track” —a view that was dutifully echoed by French officials.
But the Obama Administration and its partners did not stop with merely reaffirming a sanctions policy that, if it produces any results at all in the UN Security Council, will certainly not authorize sanctions that could generate strategic leverage over Iranian decision-making. Also, in a joint statement issued by the White House, the United States and the European Union condemned “the continuing human rights violations in Iran” since last year’s June 12 presidential election– just as the George W. Bush Administration issued a rare statement on Iran in July 2002 proclaiming support for the people of Iran in anticipation of a mass protest movement that never got off the ground .
What is particularly sad about this display of all-around diplomatic incompetence is that the Iranians were not “playing for time” with their continued expressions of interest in a deal to refuel the TRR, and their announcement about increasing their enrichment levels should not have come as a surprise. As Foreign Minister Mottaki said himself in Munich last week, Iran see itself as having three options for dealing with the need to refuel the TRR:
1) Iran could purchase new finished fuel for the TRR. This was the original Iranian proposal for dealing with the problem, communicated to the IAEA last summer. The Iranians believed that this could meet their need to refuel the TRR and also allow the international community to show its good faith in dealing with them. They also believed that, if they bought finished fuel, they would have no need to enrich to higher levels and provoke concern, especially in Washington—thereby providing the international community with a confidence-building measure.
2) Iran could enrich its own uranium to the 19%+ level required for TRR fuel. The IAEA, by the way, says that it does not consider uranium enriched to any point under 20 percent as highly enriched uranium.
3) Iran could swap some of its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for finished fuel. Currently, Iran has enriched uranium only to 3-4 percent, according to the IAEA.
It is important to consider these options through the prism of the negotiating history over refueling the TRR. After the Iranians originally proposed to buy finished fuel for the TRR, the Obama Administration and some international partners came back with a “swap” proposal, under which Iran would send 1200 kilograms of its current stockpile of LEU (about 75 percent of the total current stockpile) out of the country (the Obama Administration has insisted that this be done in one batch) and, at some future point, receive finished fuel. By advancing this proposal, the Obama Administration hoped to buy at least a year’s time in which Iran would not have a plausible nuclear “breakout” capability, and during which it could figure out for itself how it wanted to deal with bigger issues in the nuclear negotiations with Iran (like enrichment on Iranian soil) as well as with other U.S.-Iranian differences.
Since November, Mottaki has said in several interviews and public statements (mostly ignored by the Western press, but certainly covered on this blog) that Iran is open to a potential “swap” deal to refuel the TRR. According to the Foreign Minister, however, Iran cannot accept the “swap” deal proposed by the Obama Administration without some modifications. Specifically, Mottaki has indicated that the LEU would need to be swapped for finished fuel “up front” and on Iranian territory. Mottaki has also indicated that Iran would not be prepared to send the LEU out of the country in one batch, but would be willing to do it in three batches. This is what has been reported as a “rejection” by the Iranians of the swap deal, when in reality it was a rejection of the take-it-or-leave-it deal, without modifications, that was put on the table by the Obama Administration.
In this context, for Ahmadinejad to reiterate Iran’s interest in a “swap” deal in his interview last week was not really anything new. Ahmadinejad did not indicate whether Iran’s conditions for a “swap” had changed. Subsequently, though, Mottaki indicated at Munich that Iran’s underlying conditions still need to be addressed, albeit with some room for compromise. Specifically, Mottaki said three issues still need to be resolved—timing, place, and quantity.
So, while many observers interpreted Ahmadinejad’s recent comments as playing for time, in fact, the Iranians did not need to say anything further to get the Chinese to reiterate their reluctance to pursue sanctions. (The Chinese Foreign Minister reiterated his government’s opposition to new sanctions on Iran during his speech to the Munich security conference.) Moreover, the announcement that Iran will proceed with further enrichment also indicates that Tehran is not playing for time, but is instead trying to see if some sort of deal is feasible before pursuing other options.
Of course, the Obama Administration and its European partners have effectively rejected these Iranian positions—precisely because accepting them would mean that the Obama Administration would not have a year or more to sort through what it is prepared to do regarding the prospective substance of U.S.-Iranian engagement. Instead, the Administration would have to make strategic choices and develop real positions on important issues much sooner than it had contemplated. And, rather than do that, the Obama Administration is moving to embrace the same counterproductive and feckless policies aimed at isolating and pressing Tehran that the George W. Bush Administration employed.
It is in this context that Iran has now informed the IAEA that it will try to enrich some of its uranium to the near-20 percent level and asked for the IAEA’s supervision. And that, of course, is being portrayed in Washington and other Western capitals as a very provocative move.
So just which country really was “playing for time” in nuclear diplomacy with Iran?
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
There are several references in this blog and I don’t need to repeat them. Iran did not agree to any formal mechanism for the swap in Geneva. The only agreement reached was an agreement “in principal” to swap approximately 1200 Kg of material for processed plates. Iran continued to say that they still want the deal. If we think it is bluff, why don’t we call it?
I was one of the skeptics that believed from the start that Obama’s move regarding Iran was simply tactical – there was never any intent for real engagement. Obama was buying time in order to create the “right atmosphere”. Dealing with any middle eastern state (except Israel) on a “mutual respect” footing is a foreign policy risk that the US does not have a plan for – I’m sure the Leverrett’s can comment on this. For reasons of energy and resources, it is an axiom of US foreign policy to deal from a position of complete control. This is even more crucial as China has entered the scene as a serious player.
This is where the administration miscalculated. The thinking was that Iran, after these months of internal struggle, is in a weak negotiating position – press hard and they will relent. This last weekend was planned to be the big show. A large demonstration, clashes, and a further weakening of the Iran’s position. The US then would pile up the pressure and Iran would relent. It turned out to be a disappointment for the green movement. Iranian security forces forcefully (and at time brutally) suppressed the green movement. In other words, the green movement became the unfortunate victim of the our foreign policy objectives. The more unfortunate part of this for the administration was that they also became the victim of their own flat thinking. More hype was generated by AP, NYT, WashPo and the rest of the establishment papers, but it is useless. We are left without a real option. Iran has moved forward and established a new reality on the ground. Iran has established alternate channels for refined fuel for the next year. Iran will replace 22% of its current refined fuel needs within a short time frame. Broad financial sanctions will not be supported by China and even Russia. The US has left itself with little leverage! Thus, the hand wringing combined with the tough language from Washington.
One would hope that Obama and his team are watching out for US interest and they should begin to slowly (and probably privately) backtrack.
Alan, we agree on a lot. But there has always been a consensus broadly on the nuclear issue, on the swap idea in general and on the Oct 19 proposal in particular. There is an Iranian consensus favoring a swap and an Iranian consensus opposed to the Oct 19 proposal that 1200 kg of LEU leave the country at once without further guarantees.
But Mousavi, as far as I can tell, and even Rafsanjani are no longer important parts of Iran’s decision-making process. If they had been opposed, it basically wouldn’t matter.
I’m not sure, Obama just might be willing to give hostility with Iran a try for some period of time. There certainly are people in his administration who favor that.
Arnold, I wouldn’t underestimate the domestic opposition in Iran. I don’t think a new revolution is even remotely likely or ever was, but government in Iran has always been based on consensus, and that has gone for the moment. Until it returns, very little will be achieved.
There are positive signs on that score at the moment (the strength of which will probably be determined by/in the aftermath of Feb 11), and there are also clear signs that negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran have recommenced, but how much is bluster and how much is hopeful remains to be seen. At the end of the day, I believe both sides need a deal.
There are a lot of widely held misconceptions about how the reactor deal progressed.
1) The opposition was not important in Iran’s rejection of the Oct 19 terms. Iran did not accept the deal at the Oct meeting, and expressed its reservations immediately when the terms were presented. The opposition by the time it expressed the same reservations Iran’s government had expressed, was just jumping onto an already rolling bandwagon.
2) Iran did not ever accept the deal presented on Oct 19, or anything equivalent to that. The terms of the Oct 19 deal are onerous. Iran has to ship almost all of its uranium up front and after that has no leverage to force the West to return fuel. Iran would be in the same situation it currently faces unable to force Russia to fulfill its Bushehr contract or its S-300 air defense missile contract.
3) Iran did not ever reject the idea of a swap in the abstract. Iran did express support for a swap around the beginning of October. It’s rejection of the specific terms of the October 19 proposal was not a rejection of a swap. Nor was it going back on a previous acceptance. It was a rejection of a specific set of onerous conditions. Iran always said that with changes to ensure the Bushehr experience would not be repeated with the reactor fuel the swap deal would be acceptable.
4) One side has been inflexible, the West. The position of the West, expressed by now dozens of times, is that the terms of the Oct 19 deal cannot be altered. The point of the deal is not only to remove uranium from Iran’s domestic stock – that’s something Iran can accept – the point for the West is also to have the reactor fuel as a piece of leverage that the West can use during negotiations to force Iran to make the further concession of giving up domestic enrichment.
Arnold,
I don’t think they agreed to anything in Geneva either, but the public statements of Ahmadinejad in the lead up certainly showed a willingness to do things differently to how they want to do them now, and I think they DID need the avalanche of criticism at home because it is quite possible they saw a deal with the US as a big political coup in troubled times. A bad deal was thus averted. It has been the only mistake I have seen Iran make in the nuclear negotiation since 2003, and so uncharacteristic that it lends credence to the view that it arose out of uniquely troubled times at home.
But they still need a deal; I think the “decision” to fabricate their own plates is little more than a threat because it is unlikely they can do it within the required timeframe. This will be known to the West as well of course, but Iran will not permit “us” to rub their noses in it. I think “we” have made huge mistakes since it was clear the deal was a non-starter, at least as represented by the on-record statements.
But there are so many contradictory things being said that surely it can only mean there’s something going on. I still think a deal will be done here, not least because Obama badly needs one.
Alan:
Iran is still prepared to do something similar to what was proposed in Vienna. Iran has always been prepared to do something similar. Iran was never prepared to do exactly what was proposed in Vienna. Iran is prepared to make a swap. Iran is not prepared to export 1200kgs of uranium at once before it has any assurances that fuel will be returned.
The US position is not that Iran has to do something similar to what was proposed in Vienna, the US position is that Iran must do exactly what was proposed in Vienna, despite the fact that what was proposed in Vienna exposes Iran to an amount of risk that the US will not fulfill its obligations that Iran reasonably finds unacceptable.
Iran’s opposition does not like the deal presented in Vienna, but what matters is Iran’s leadership also does not like what was presented. The opposition didn’t have to tell Iran’s leadership that it was a bad deal presented in Vienna. At least what is publicly known about it.
We agree that Iran indicated that it would accept something similar to what was proposed. I say Iran has not gone back on that acceptance, but what was actually proposed is something Iran will not and should not accept.
You seem to be saying Iran agreed to the terms offered in Vienna, so that when it rejected those terms it was going back. I don’t see that.
John – not to mention the fact that the Shah invested $1bn in the French Eurodif enrichment plant in the 1970s in return for 10% of the output, which the French then refused to deliver once the plant was operational. Eventually the French repaid $1.6bn in the early 1990s, but it didn’t change the fact that the Iranians never got any enriched uranium from them.
Arnold – I don’t necessarily disagree, but nothing was formalised at Geneva because that was not the purpose. It does seem clear though that, at Geneva, the Iranians were prepared to do something similar to what was eventually proposed at Vienna.
My point is that this was not a delaying tactic or misleading; it was simply an error by the Iranian leadership that they had to correct in the face of vehement domestic opposition. Sadly, the West has so far chosen to characterise it as Iranian duplicity. It would be immeasurably more sensible if the West acknowledged the real circumstances and worked with them to get the best outcome.
It seems that there is a genuine possibility that three birds can be killed with one stone here. A resolution between the warring factions of the Iranian elite, a TRR deal, and a comprehensive nuclear deal can all be brought about if this issue is dealt with sensibly.
Alan:
What happened in Geneva around Oct 1 is different from what happened in Vienna around Oct 19.
The idea that it has to be 1200kg at once, with no leverage or recourse if for one reason or another the fuel isn’t delivered, was not formalized until Vienna.
What happened in Geneva is not inconsistent with a simultaneous swap or a swap in small amounts at a time or fuel storage on Iranian territory. What happened in Vienna is inconsistent with that.
The Western position that the terms of the swap are not subject to alteration and the onerous terms offered were never accepted.
Iran has consistently been willing to do a swap under some conditions. But not the conditions insisted upon by the West. Iran has never accepted a deal presented and then gone back on that acceptance.
Some more background info: “Live-saving isotopes running out in Iran”:
http://www.nrc.nl/international/Features/article2450556.ece/Live-saving_isotopes_running_out_in_Iran
I can’t imagine why Iran wouldn’t trust France with its uranium!
You don’t supposed it could have something to do with the $85 million of assets frozen in Feb 2008? Or the Billion pounds sterling frozen by Britain? Or maybe the $12 billion the US froze in 1979?
Would you trust these government with anything of value?
Mr. Safdari: Are you an ex-Toudehi??
Arnold,
On September 29, before Geneva, Ahmadinejad was quoted in Mehr News as publically saying “We have offered to whoever is prepared that we will buy the material from them. Of course, we are prepared to hand over 3.5 percent material, have them enrich it up to 19.75 or 20 percent and deliver it back to us.” In addition, on October 2, Keyhan, were lauding what happened in Geneva.
This is clearly at odds with the later insistence on simultaneity of exchange. Why they backtracked is analysed at length, from Persian sources, in the MERIP piece I referenced below. From the exchanges that took place it is also clear that the elite in Iran, both conservative and reformist, were very unhappy with Ahmadinejad and Khamenei.
Don’t get me wrong – the current Iranian position is still one that should be taken up without delay. My point here is that, while the Bush administration most certainly DID sabotage any prospect of a deal, the circumstances round this one are not quite so clear cut, partly due to domestic Iranian hassles, and partly because Obama may still be genuinely interested in working something out once things settle there. Another piece by the same author in antiwar.com in late January discussed signs that the elite were patching up their differences. There have since been significant developments, but whether it is linked or not I don’t know.
THis is what IAEA Director General ElBaradei himself said:
“I have seen the Iranians ready to accept putting a cap on their enrichment [program] in terms of tens of centrifuges, and then in terms of hundreds of centrifuges. But nobody even tried to engage them on these offers. Now Iran has 5,000 centrifuges. The line was, “Iran will buckle under pressure.” But this issue has become so ingrained in the Iranian soul as a matter of national pride.”
http://www.newsweek.com/id/199149
sorry, my last comment was intended for Arnold Evans.
I just glanced over at your blog.
You reminds me of our Iranian Toudehis, and here I thought you were a radical realist…How wrong I was.
On Oct 1, Iran and the West discussed an idea for a swap of fuel. Western diplomats claimed Iran agreed in principle to a swap – but no details had been presented yet. Details were to be negotiated in Vienna starting on Oct 19. Iranian officials did not make any public comment about the swap idea.
On Oct 18, a major separatist attack killed dozens of Iranian revolutionary guards and probably poisoned the atmosphere.
On Oct 19, the meeting began to discuss details. Exactly what happened during the meetings has not been released to the public, however. Iran did threaten to pull out of the deal if its conditions were not met during this meeting.
On Oct 22, El Baradei presented a plan that met the requirements of the West. Iran said it would examine the plan in Tehran and reply later.
At no point did Iran publicly say it accepted the deal. No deal was even presented until Oct 22. By that time it was clear that the Western conception of the deal contained conditions that Iran did not find acceptable – including that a huge amount of uranium would leave Iranian soil up front and that it would take a year for Iran to receive fuel in return.
Iran never agreed to this deal. Any analysis that says it did is simply wrong. The agreement in principle, assuming the Western diplomats who leaked it to the press on October 1 were both honest and didn’t misunderstand the Iranians whose views they were representing, did not apply to the terms presented later in October.
You can find links to articles from October on my website.
Alan there was no deal agreed to in Geneva here is the link from the Iranian side
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=107721§ionid=351020104
This is just another planted western governments planted media hype to show Iran can not be trusted, it’s just meant for this side’s population very basic childish technique they could have done better if they were more prepared
With Iran’s new step
It certainly does appear that “A comprehensive nuclear deal…is there for the taking.” Further indication that the nuclear issue is a red herring, made for TV.
The real issue is Iranian sovereignty vs. US hegemony.
Arnold/John:
Here is a good link:
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120809.html
According to this analysis, Ahmadinejad in late September had indicated his agreement in principle to ship out 75% and wait a year, which appeared to be the outcome of Geneva. The uproar at home over it made the Iranians change their position, which has been further complicated by the overall domestic situation.
It was a ludicrous deal for Iran; they almost certainly would have been stitched up and were therefore in my opinion right to change their mind. However, for once, I can see that “our” side has a right to be a bit frustrated by it.
Nonetheless, Iran has previously offered (in 2005) to never stockpile LEU beyond what was needed for power plants, to convert all LEU to fuel rods, to turn their entire program into an international joint venture, to never reprocess spent fuel, to give security guarantees to all and sundry provided they got them in return, and God knows what else, all of which “we” have turned down.
A comprehensive nuclear deal, not just a TRR deal, is there for the taking.
Thanks for the insights, Alan. For me the missing piece was France’s near monopoly on supply of enriched uranium for the reactor.
So the unreported story goes something like this. Iran needed to replace fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. It tried to buy the fuel, a standard procedure.
Instead of completing an ordinary commercial transaction, the West saw an opportunity to use its monopoly position to pressure Iran. The issue got escalated into highly publicized nuclear negotiations. The West demanded that Iran send all its enriched uranium abroad in a single shipment, probably never to be returned. The US would announce that a deal was achieved. Anything less than a total shipment meant that the West would blame Iran for the failure of negotiations. The West could then use Iran’s initial “agreement” and subsequent negotiation of details as “just another instance” of Iranian duplicity, exploit it to vilify Iran publicly, and make it part of its case for war, if needed.
The situation presented nothing but opportunity for the West. If Iran were stupid enough to agree to give away all its enriched uranium, great! In the more likely case that Iran would not agree, the West could reap a PR bonanza.
All in all, it makes a pretty good, short case study of the ways the US works to make other nations heel to its demands.
Here is Arms Control Wonk on October 9, 2009:
Not only is an agreement in principle not an acceptance of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, I’m not sure Iran, rather than Western diplomats claiming to speak for Iran, ever actually even accepted the deal in principle.
Alan: An agreement in principle, by my interpretation, is one subject to further modifications on details. Maybe I’ll go back and read exactly who said what, but I never understood Iran to mean it was accepting a take-it-or-leave-it proposal.
“In principle” and “not subject to modification” are antithetical concepts.
Anyway, it seems like the amount of uranium the West is asking Iran to export is enough for a thirty year supply of reactor fuel. That’s a lot of fuel. Iran, other things being equal, might only want one fifth of that amount and buy more, if necessary, five years from now.
The whole thing is largely a pretext to get Iran’s stock below the one ton threshold – which Iran has seemed it could agree to, if the US is willing to accept domestic enrichment. The US, as far as I can tell, has not made a commitment to accepting Iranian domestic enrichment which makes a deal like this impossible.
All I would say is that it appears the Iranians DID backtrack from their agreement in principle in Geneva in early October, as a result of domestic opposition. It was perhaps their first false move in the entire nuclear negotiation. What is needed on the US side is a bit of common sense in understanding how to address those political issues in order to get a deal done.
Furthermore, to refuse to supply the fuel for the TRR is a clear breach of the NPT by the West, on top of the blatant and ongoing breaches currently in force in denying Iran any form of help with their nuclear program.
However, Iran needs the fuel, probably within 24 months, so needs a solution. The West will not get sanctions, and Iran has played the China card very craftily so far. So the playing field may be something approaching level for a change. Obama’s strategic options may well become significantly easier if he gets a deal.