Photo from AFP/Getty Images
In recent days, a good deal of attention has been focused on Iran’s first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, still in its final stages of development. We believe that there are some important lessons to be learned from the Bushehr experiences that could help move U.S. policy on the Iranian nuclear issue in a much more positive and productive direction—if the Obama Administration is sufficiently interested in successful nuclear diplomacy with Tehran that it is willing to take these lessons on board.
Earlier this month, the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (ROSATOM) announced that fuel rods for the Bushehr reactor would be delivered to a “reactor storage facility” at the site, from which they would be installed in the reactor itself, on August 21. News reports over the weekend confirm that Iranian and Russian engineers began installing the fuel rods on Saturday. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that he hopes the reactor will be sufficiently operational to be connected to Iran’s national electricity grid by mid-September, adding that it will probably take 6-7 months for the plant to achieve full operational capacity.
Both Salehi and the head of ROSATOM stress that all of this will take place under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nevertheless, these developments prompted the irrepressible John Bolton to argue that Israel needed to strike Bushehr before August 21. In Bolton’s view, the facility represents a “major, major plus for the Iranian nuclear weapons program”, adding that “what this does is give Iran a second route to nuclear weapons in addition to enriched uranium. It’s a very huge, huge victory for Iran”. However, Bolton also worried that striking Bushehr after fuel rods begin to be inserted into the reactor “would almost certainly release the radiation into the atmosphere”—hence, his argument that Israel needed to strike before August 21.
We must admit that we are somewhat surprised by Bolton’s acknowledgment of environmental considerations as a constraint on potential military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets. But, more than that, we are struck by how marginal Bolton’s position on Bushehr—that an internationally-safeguarded nuclear power plant, the fuel for which will be provided and (after use) removed by Russia, is an unacceptably dangerous source for weapons-grade fissile material which should be destroyed through military action—has become.
Of course, assertions about the apocalyptically dangerous character of the Bushehr project were a staple of U.S. policy throughout the Clinton Administration and for much of the George W. Bush Administration. But, before he left office, even President George W. Bush had come to recognize the non-threatening character of Bushehr. For its part, the Obama Administration has never had a problem per se with Bushehr as a serious source of proliferation risk.
Earlier this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, see here, tried to get Russia to delay (once again) delivering the fuel rods, arguing that “we think it would be premature to go forward with any project at this time, because we want to send an unequivocal message to the Iranians”. However, earlier this month, the State Department’s chief spokesman, P.J. Crowley, said that “Bushehr is designed to provide electricity to Iran. It is not viewed as a proliferation risk because Russia is providing the needed fuel and taking back the spent nuclear fuel, which is the principal source of potential proliferation”. And, over the weekend, as the fuel rods were beginning to be installed at Bushehr, one of Crowley’s deputies confirmed that “we recognize that the Bushehr reactor is designed to provide civilian nuclear power and do not view it as a proliferation risk”.
According to the Washington Post, “Israeli officials also said they were not particularly worried about the fuel being loaded into Bushehr. Even the Netanyahu government’s hard-right minister of national infrastructure, Uzi Landau, said that “our problem is with the other facilities that they have, where they enrich uranium”.
So, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted about critics of Bushehr coming on line, “there will always be some, even regarding such an impeccable event from the standpoint of international law as the opening of Bushehr”. But, at this point, the overwhelming weight of international opinion does not contest Lavrov’s description of the deal as “an important anchor that keeps Iran within the non-proliferation regimen”. (And, while we are considering the international legal aspects of the matter, Salehi noted—correctly in our view—that a military strike against Bushehr would be a “crime”.)
Today, the United States and some of its Western partners—in particular, Britain and France, which have their own narrow interests in not having the strategic cachet of their small strategic arsenals “cheapened” by the emergence of more states (especially in the “developing” world) that have mastered the nuclear fuel cycle—focus on Iran’s work on uranium enrichment as apocalyptically dangerous. But we believe that there is an important lesson to be drawn from the Bushehr precedent about how the international community should approach the matter of Iranian enrichment.
It should be clear by now that the Islamic Republic is going to continue enriching uranium. From a non-proliferation standpoint, does the international community really want Iran pursuing enrichment under circumstances in which Tehran is progressively alienated from the non-proliferation regime’s “managers” because of the way the Iranian program is treated—with sanctions, talk about military strikes, and perhaps even the initiation of aggressive war against Iran by Israel or the United States? Or, would it be preferable for major players in the international community to work with the Islamic Republic to develop its uranium enrichment capabilities in ways that are fully compatible with the non-proliferation regime?
As we have written previously, see here, American/international “acceptance” of Iranian enrichment is critical if nuclear talks with Iran later this year are to have any chance of lasting success. In our conversations with Iranian officials over a number of years, we have received a consistent message that American/international acceptance of enrichment on Iranian soil would facilitate Iranian cooperation with a wide range of non-proliferation measures—e.g., ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iranian officials have also indicated their openness to multilateral cooperation on enrichment—so long as, under whatever cooperative arrangements might be established, uranium enrichment continues to take place inside Iran. Four years ago, Sir John Thomson and Geoff Forden of MIT described one way in which such an outcome might be achieved; they have continued to update and refine their ideas in this regard, see here. Just as the world has—John Bolton aside—learned to live with an Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr, it should learn to live with internationally-safeguarded enrichment inside the Islamic Republic.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Liz:
I think it’s time to ignore Scott Lucas.
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Scott Lucas,
What? did the US government just increase your share of the “regime change” budget? Congratulations!
Honorary Correspondent Liz,
Hugs and kisses!
Scott
Scott Lucas,
You have very little self-control. If you don’t want to show your anger, wait a bit before responding. It’s understandable, of course, after all you’ve made a fool of yourself for well over a year now with your silly Iran predictions. lol
Salam Iranian@Iran,
Your concern is touching but I actually find my Honorary Correspondent gives me the laughter I need to keep all the tension away….
Let me know when you’ve done some reading!
Peace,
Scott
Also, you should stop driving Scott Lucas up the wall. It looked as if he was on the verge of having a heart attack! If he does, you’ll be responsible!
Liz:
It seems to me that you and Alan are both right. The essays are significantly (and in my book unfairly) more negative than positive, but compared to other American websites and news outlets focusing on Iran (and there are many!) it is more moderate.
Liz – you should read it. The general theme is one of quiet admiration.
Alan,
It’s the general direction of the whole thing. It’s pretty clear that those who have a positive view of the Islamic Republic are excluded.
James – yes, I think she did say that. I wouldn’t characterise it as “invention”, although I don’t know of any proof of “manipulation” or “fraud”.
It is not the point of the article though, which is quite good and eerily prognostic of what eventually happened with the nuclear negotiation. Don’t underestimate her – she has posted a series of articles at antiwar.com which give a running commentary on events in Iran since the election, and most recently a couple at atimes.com, all well worth a read.
Alan,
I did not view her comment as implying Ahmadinejad would not have won the election if all votes were correctly counted. She seemed to say the vote tally was altered in order to enhance the Iranian president’s standing before negotiations with the US commenced.
Liz – what did they say in MER 250, The Islamic Republic at 30, that you object to?
Alan,
Ervand Abrahamian, Arang Keshavarzian, Shiva Balaghi, Ramin Karimian, Norma Claire Moruzzi, Kaveh Ehsani, Eric Hooglund, Azam Khatam, Fatemeh Sadeghi, and Homa Hoodfar all have one thing in common: They are opposed to (or at least they are sharp critics of) the Islamic Republic of Iran. Which is fine. However, there are many academics, researchers, and writers who would probably see things quite differently, but they are not represented here. Even the footnotes that they use come from one side of a very complex debate and within Iran there views are not considered to be mainstream. Hence, the US constantly makes wrong predictions about Iran and the Iranian people.
James – in general, she is quite circumspect about the election. She believes there were irregularities, but I wouldn’t interpret her view as believing Ahmadinejad lost. MERIP at the time of the election certainly did. They were unusually emotional about it, largely because a couple of their correspondents were detained, but their writings since the immediate aftermath have rowed back somewhat from that view.
You could always email Chris Toensing, the editor, and ask him.
Liz – I’ve got MER 250 in front of me. Let me know what you have a problem with in it so I can have a look. Thanks.
Alan,
Sorry for the delay. I had to prepare eftar for the family. :)
The articles are mostly one sided and when you look at what James Canning quotes from Farideh Farhi, you can see how sometimes she can be completely absurd as a result of her extreme hostility towards Iran.
Alan and Liz,
Farideh Farhi states (in “Ahmadinejad’s Nuclear Folly” at Middle East Report Online) that “Ahmadinejad’s government . . . manipulated the June [2009] election results in part to boost Iran’s leverage in the anticipated nuclear talks with the United States.” Is this complete invention?
Cyrus,
Re: Aug. 27th, 10:04am – - Yes, as you point out, acting with gross stupidity, the US blocked the TRR fuel exchange after Brazil and Turkey had worked hard to get it back on track. Obama of course was appeasing the rabidly “pro-Israel” Democrats, and pandering to neocon warmongers that the veteran journalist Taki sees as largely in control of US foreign policy, even under Obama and the Democrats.
Liz – why?
@Cyrus:
Thanks a lot for the information Cyrus. As I said before I don’t know much about the nuclear energy and its related industry, so your input is greatly appreciated.
My main point was that the security aspect of Iranian nuclear program -at least for me- is far more important (at least in the short-medium term) than its energy aspect.
Alan,
‘The Islamic Revolution at 30′ is, in fact, a good examply of how deeply biased they are. Many other western websites and texts are even more biased and that is why to some it seems to be more balanced.
Keep your money, you’ll need it. Most people don’t take money from someone who has gone down the same road taken by Christopher Hitchens.
Cyrus – I guess that you makes you an advocate of Option 1 then!
Only time will tell I suppose.
Scott – I agree, Farideh Farhi is one of the sharpest in the business, but I should also add that MERIP is in every way an outstanding source. Edition 250 of their journal, Middle East Report, entitled The Islamic Revolution at 30, is a case in point.
Scott Lucas,
I’ve read both of your material (more of hers than yours) and I must say that yours is inferior to hers. Her problem is that she is biased against the Islamic Republic of Iran and that hurts her work a great deal. However, you are both biased (for reasons that many have already explained in this as well as in previous threads) as well as very ill informed about Iran and Iranians.
Honorary Correspondent Liz,
Your first payment will be ready as soon as you read anything by Farideh Farhi so you can make a qualified judgement and read the Persian sources that I used in my own analysis.
See you on the next thread!
Scott
Scott Lucas,
I think there is no need for anyone to explain that you get funding for your contribution to American soft power. Your language explains itself. You’re the only person on this thread who writes in a language that can’t be called anything but propaganda.
The point made about MERIP is more than valid. Your weak analysis (and it’s not even yours) is based on material from an American website. How would you know if Farideh Farhi is an extremely sharp analyst? Do you have access to the Persian sources? Just repeating each others arguements and quoting one another doen’t make western sources more credible.
Honorary Correspondent Liz,
When you collect your first cheque from EA for all your fine contributions, you will discover who is paying for your work….
Scott
Salam Iranian,
Play the man/woman, not the ball: Farideh Farhi is an extremely sharp analyst of Iranian affairs — take on her information and interpretation, rather than hiding behind a denunciation of MERIP.
And do try, for the sake of discussion, to get to grips with my analysis. I have never said Jalili worked for Ahmadinejad, so that’s not a very good starting point for your challenge.
As Alan and Pirouz_2 have both added valuable interpretations, I look forward to a response which contributes to the discussion.
Scott
Pirouz_2 – regarding Iranian “independent” fuel sources: Iran has made it clear that it doesn’t envision running a totally self-sufficient nuclear fuel production program, but intends instead to have the capability to hedge against price increases and cutoffs by having a domestic capability to make some (not all) the fuel it would need. Iran’s immediate neighbors (Central Asia) are quite rich in natural Uranium. As Uranium prices and extraction technology develops down the road, Iran may prove to have more domestic resources as well. Down the road a few years, we could see Thorium reactors which can essentially run off of sea water.
Sorry Alan but these were not just “grave errors” by the VG — they were deliberate. The US never intended to allow Iran to obtain any fuel. The entire swap deal was a bait-and-switch. They deliberately imposed deal-killing “poison pills” into their proposal — such as requiring Iran to simply hand over its LEU and then just hope that one day, the US would deign fit to possibly give Iran some fuel…or not. Naturally, this was a concern amongst people in Iran — some still liked the deal yet others opposed it. But Iran had said it would consider the deal IN PRINCIPLE and never accepted it.
But when the Turks and Brazilians entered into an agreement which provided additional guarantees, thus gaining Iran’s acceptance of the swap, the US pulled the rug out from under them and killed the deal.
@Richard Steven Hack:
Re your post on August 26, 2010 at 10:39 pm.
Your opinion and mine are fairly close on this matter. However, what I would like to mention here is that with each war that the USA loses, the pillars of the US imperialism’s hegemony in the middle east are deeply cracked. And without that hegemony the US military-industrial complex will lose profit.
Therefore USA losing wars and as a result losing its imperialistic control over this region is a cost to the military-industrial complex too. There is a difference between a proxy war which would increase the profit of the military-industry complex and a war which USA will lose and as a result will have less hegemony.
In my opinion, the war of 2006 between Israel and Lebanon had costs for the imperialism, which by far outweighted any economic profits that the US weapon manufacturers may have made.
RSH – thanks for your replies. I don’t like making long posts, but in response to your lengthy efforts, I will have one crack at setting out my interpretation of the TRR business.
In general, one of three things has happened.
1. The US has acted in bad faith, never intending to supply the fuel in an attempt to hold the Iranian nuclear program hostage.
2. Iran has acted in bad faith, dangling the carrot of an unreachable agreement in front of the US in order to create circumstances to justify 20% enrichment.
3. Neither has acted in bad faith, but both made a series of mistakes that led to the demise of a promising opening.
I believe the answer is 3.
The first mistake was Ahmadinejad’s. It seems clear that he was seeking a domestic PR coup in Iran following Geneva. If not, what was Hossein Shariatmadari writing about in Keyhan on October 2 when he declared that Jalili had gained an implicit acceptance of the Iranian enrichment program? What did he mean by a great victory for Iran? What did Ahmadinejad mean on Oct 29 when he said that no previous nuclear negotiator had been able to induce the West, effectively, to acknowledge Iran’s right to continue enrichment? What did he mean when he said on national television on Dec 1 that “some people fell for the line that the agreement is a conspiracy and deception …. These are the same people who were asking us to back down at the height of the nuclear pressures on us. Now they have become super-revolutionaries.”?
It seems clear that he was defending some kind of agreement.
The net result of this mistake was to raise the perception amongst the Vienna Group that a deal was done and all that needed sorting out were the technical details. However, the Iranians were unable to follow through because the derisory response in Iran made it politically impossible for them to complete the deal.
The Vienna Group threw them a bone. In November, they said we’ll do the exchange in Turkey. This arose partly from a concession, and partly because the Russians didn’t want to use Iranian UF6 (ref. is Jeffrey Lewis at ACW in response to a query from me). This in turn led to additional complications because the Iranian LEU was no longer strictly necessary in order to complete the deal, so could be left in Iran.
Iran rejected this too (although not officially) on November 18, whereupon the VG made things worse by pushing for IAEA censure, which duly followed at the end of November, and insisting on a take it or leave it response on the TRR deal by December 31 or there would be sanctions.
These were grave errors by the VG. They simply were not acknowledging the reasons for Iran’s inability to follow through at that point, and were not giving them enough time for the internal politics to settle on a formal response. The result was a poisoned atmosphere between the VG and Iran, ruining any chance of political unity in Iran over a favourable response.
There were signs I think Obama did learn that lesson at that time, because the Dec 31 deadline passed quietly and talk of sanctions became vague mumbo jumbo for a few weeks. It may also have been because he knew he couldn’t get a consensus for sanctions at that point. But the damage was done. Iran soon set their own deadline for the Vienna Group to accept a simultaneous exchange, or they would enrich to 20%. The deadline passed, and, unlike the Vienna Group, Iran actually followed through on their threat and commenced 20% enrichment on February 9.
The Vienna Group responded on February 12, reiterating their willingness to use escrow in a third party country. Iran filed their official TRR response on Feb 18, which insisted on a simultaneous exchange in Iran.
This required a diplomatic response, and the push for sanctions then started in earnest. The Russians and Chinese viewed the 20% as an escalation and were soon brought on board. This isolated Iran, and during April and May there were signs the required political unity within Iran was coalescing behind doing a deal. The Turks and Brazilians, with US endorsement, got to work on it.
Things came to a head in mid-May. The Brazilians and Turks appeared to be having a few problems, with Erdogan on May 14 cancelling a trip to Tehran “until they have something new to say”. Also on May 14, the sanctions draft was circulated to the Security Council. On May 15, Erdogan reinstated his trip to Tehran, and on May 17 the Tehran Declaration was announced. This was immediately followed on May 18 by the tabling of the sanctions draft at the UNSC, which was passed on June 9, immediately following the official response of the VG to the TD.
This looked like a cataclysmic act of nastiness by the US, trampling over friends and foes alike. However, the official response delineates how disagreeable the TD was to them. It was, effectively, an alternative agreement to the Geneva one that eliminated any reference to UNSC resolutions while endorsing Iranian enrichment. These issues were to have been addressed through the concurrent talks that were supposed to have taken place during implementation of the fuel swap, but were now totally excluded by the TD.
However, the TD has not been rejected out of hand. It may still be a very useful counteroffer to the original fuel swap plan, but it brings into sharp focus the centrality of the enrichment issue to both sides, and thus the linkage between a comprehensive nuclear deal and a TRR deal. It is very unlikely one can be completed without the other, but many aspects of the TD and the Geneva agreement in principle, as amended with the Turkey escrow, remain the same.
So, neither the US or the Iranians are to blame, or at least neither is more at fault than the other. The Iranians made a very un-Iranian mistake in Geneva, it seems in the interests of a domestic political PR coup. The US failed to recognise the dynamics and made mistakes in trying to enforce Geneva, the blood got bad again and both sides started winding each other up.
Perhaps both parties will have learnt from their mistakes, and once the dust settles they can have another go at it.
@Richard Steven Hack:
Richard you said: “I can’t remember exactly, but I believe the only reason Iran is getting its Bushehr fuel from Russia is, first, because Russia doesn’t believe Iran’s fuel is good enough, i.e. refined well enough, to run in their equipment, and second, when the project started, Iran didn’t have a fuel manufacturing plant.
I don’t think you can draw any conclusions about Iran’s capacity to be independent based on that fact alone.”
I don’t know much about nuclear energy and the related industry, however, I sort of remember that the impurity of the Iranian Uranium was mainly a problem in the process of enrichment and the fuel rods (made from Iranian Uranium Ore) did not create any particular problem for the reactors. But of course I may be wrong, I am not sure about this one.
Anyhow that is not directly related to my argument. What I am trying to say is that Iran does not have enough raw Uranium resources to have an independent nuclear energy program of its own. All of the proven Uranium depostes summed together could feed Bushehr for roughly 7 years! So this idea of Iran having 20 Bushehr like plants which would run on fuel from our OWN uranium does not make any sense to me. Heck even for Bushehr itself we can not rely on our Uranium ore. So even if the west agrees that Iran can have a full fuel cycle and 500, 000 of centrifuges, still we will end up importing the Uranium ore from outside sources: RUSSIA, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA, NIGER, NAMIBIA, UZBEKISTAN, USA, ETC.
This is what I meant when I said Iran cannot have an independent nuclear “energy” program.
Scott Lucas
The American MERIP is not exactly what one would call an informative or credible website when it comes to Iran or the Middle East. The only way for you to be able to understand the situation is for you to at least include Iranian sources in your research. Anyone who is aware of what Alef and others write would find MERIP’s “findings” to be (if I may say) ludicrous. The evidence that you provide us with would not be viewed as acceptable in any university student research paper if the topic was anything but Iran.
Scott Lucas and Liz
I think the problem lies with the fact that Scott Lucas doesn’t understand how the decision making process in Iran works. He doesn’t recognize that Dr. Jalili doesn’t work for President Ahmadinejad and that whatever happens in the negotiations has no effect on the president. Scott Lucas in his animosity towards Iran is basically repeating the propaganda that we regularly read in the western media. If Scott Lucas, despite his denials, is receiving funding for his work, it is no use arguing with him, because he is doing what he is supposed to do. However, if this is not the case, I suggest to him to rethink his research methodology, because as things stand he will not get anywhere with his writings which look like propaganda and sometimes include sudden bursts of anger.
Scott Lucas,
Your nonsense is in line with what is demanded of you by the US government. Your sources have as much credibility as you and other green mercinaries. Do you think that people don’t know how your work is funded? :)
Honorary Correspondent Liz,
You are sweet with your party-line defiance….
*[Khamenei and Ahmadinejad] miscalculated the intensity of elite reaction to the idea of transferring Iran’s LEU. That reaction came from all corners, and it was ferocious. Perhaps the fierceness is explained in part by the determination of rival factions that Ahmadinejad not don the mantle of peacemaker with the US after all he and his supporters have done to sabotage previous attempts to improve relations. But after four years of bluster averring Iran’s absolute rejection of any compromise on the issue of enrichment, the elite was naturally highly skeptical that a single quick meeting should bring about such a rapprochement. Those sections of the public that follow the nuclear issue closely were similarly quizzical. After the steep price in international isolation paid for provocative assertions of Iran’s sovereign prerogatives, what could account for the abrupt reversal? Agitated and rather sarcastic commentators on centrist to conservative news websites such as Tabnak, Ayande and Alef wondered whether Iran’s “absolute right to enrich” had suddenly morphed into an “absolute right to ship uranium out.”
There is evidence that the negotiators themselves were aware, at least partly, of how strong the objections might be. But they chose to deflect them with mendacity. In the initial news coverage of Geneva, spokesmen hence pretended that talks had only touched upon the nuclear program. An unidentified member of the negotiating team went so far as to tell one outlet that no agreement regarding LEU had been reached and that “the P5+1 were solely informed of Iran’s decision to participate in the October 18 meeting with the IAEA.”[3] This fib was consistent with Ahmadinejad’s line, throughout the election campaign, that the specifics of Iran’s nuclear program were no longer up for negotiation with the P5+1 and could only be addressed in technical discussions with the UN agency.
But the pretense could not be maintained for long. The stream of information from the international press and Persian-language media based in the West, particularly BBC Persian television, made it clear that Iran’s nuclear program had indeed been discussed in Geneva and, later, in Vienna….*
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120809.html
Best,
Scott
Scott Lucas,
No. As I said, you have very little knowledge of Iran. no person of significance opposed talks with the 5+1 which would include the US.
Salam Liz,
I fear you misunderstand my point: before Geneva, many conservatives/principlists opposed talks with the US as part of the 5+1….
Scott
Salam Iranian,
But presumably Iran is happy to talk to the US as one of the 5+1 Powers?
Scott
There has been no change on the Iranian position on enrichment (20%) and one should not link the 5+1 talks with talks with Americans. Independent talks with the US are out of the question after Grand Ayatollah Khamenei’s remarks the other day. It is generally believed that it is no use to agree with talks with the US, because of Obama’s inability to develop a rational approach to Iranian American relations.
Scott Lucas,
Before the start of October, none of the main players, whether conservatives, principlists, or reformists (real reformists not your 20 year old green buddies) discussed direct talks with the US, because it was not relavent to the issue. On the other hand there was no meaningful opposition to talks with the P5+1. I really don’t understand where you get these absurd ideas.
Scott Lucas,
Your latest update, which is based on discussions with so called “correspondents” in Iran, again shows that you have a very warped understanding of the country.
Iran is definitely not playing down its need to enrich uranium to 20%, in fact they are at this moment stressing that they will continue doing this as well as begin developing plates. Iran’s conditions for ending enrichment at 20% have not changed at all. I’m beginning to think that there is no hope of you learning anything about the country. Must be some sort of mental block. :)
Richard,
1. Before the start of October, many conservatives/principlists opposed any talks with the US, if not the P5+1. They opposed any talks, whatever the terms — including the swap concept.
2. But that is not the main query I have been raising. It is that, during October, many conservatives/principlists opposed the continuation of talks with the US over the swap concept. They did so for a variety of reasons, including the amount to be moved out of Iran and France as a participant.
3. Ahmadinejad as late as the end of October publicly called for a continuation of talks.
I accept points you have made, including that this should not be taken as the primary reason for the breakdown of the talks, but they do not address this question of the discussions and dynamics within the Iranian establishment.
Respectfully and on to the next thread,
Scott
Kooshy: “yes I accept US can attack and bomb for weeks but what will be the end result , would that create a new favorable regime, think Iraq Afghanistan Somalia with a larger more unified and a far tougher geography and regional influence.”
Kooshy, once again you’re thinking from the viewpoint of someone rationally considering an end goal that makes sense.
That’s not what is going on here.
What’s going on here is a bunch of people trying to MAKE MONEY FROM WAR. I don’t know how familiar you are with the US military-industrial complex, or the depth of corruption of the US Congress, or basically how US elites run the US, but I’m telling you there is no rational calculation going on in their minds whatsover.
And as I said in my earlier post, NONE of those people are going to be held accountable for ANY WAR no matter HOW disastrous the results are for the US military, the US taxpayer, the civilians of the other country, or anyone else, short of the US actually getting nuked by somebody. As long as the war stays in the other country or some other region than the continental United States, NOBODY is going to be held accountable by the US public.
So just forget about all these rational problems with attacking Iran, they are IRRELEVANT.
Pirouz_2: “To me the very fact that we have to obtain our fuel for Bushehr from Russia is a clear sign of that.”
I can’t remember exactly, but I believe the only reason Iran is getting its Bushehr fuel from Russia is, first, because Russia doesn’t believe Iran’s fuel is good enough, i.e. refined well enough, to run in their equipment, and second, when the project started, Iran didn’t have a fuel manufacturing plant.
I don’t think you can draw any conclusions about Iran’s capacity to be independent based on that fact alone.
Pirouz_2: I agree with your assessment of the “clinically insane”, although I wouldn’t necessarily use psychiatric terms.
I believe that money and power are the main motivators of these people, and no amount of “cost-benefit analysis” will work as long as THEY BEAR NO COSTS. It’s a simple matter that the costs of politicians’ wars are borne by other people. Therefore they see no reason not to start them.
Now, if you’re someone like Saddam Hussein, starting a war with the US is non-starter because you’re going to get killed. But if you’re George Bush or Barack Obama, you’re not going to get killed unless you start a war with Russia or maybe China. Nobody else is going to nuke Washington from a long distance, at least. So you’re free to attack anybody you want.
Look at Glenn Greenwald’s piece today in Salon, “An exciting new Muslim country to drone attack” about Obama’s intent to expand CIA and military attacks in Yemen, including drone attacks. Glenn lists the women and children killed in Yemen and elsewhere from such attacks. Obama doesn’t give a damn about them. He knows he won’t be held accountable – which is precisely why he didn’t hold Bush and Cheney accountable for Iraq and Afghanistan, and in fact he SUPPORTED Afghanistan and made it HIS war.
So it will be with Iran. Nobody’s going to be held accountable for Iran – certainly not Obama or his successor or Netanyahu or Joe “I’m a Zionist” Biden or Rahm “I Fought for the IDF” Emanuel or Hillary “Obliterate Iran” Clinton or General David “I’m Always Positioning Myself for 2012″ Petreaus or anybody else.
Alan: “The Tehran Declaration was fundamentally different to the original proposal. Iran was now enriching to 20% which was not addressed, it asserted a right to enrich without taking into account the UNSC Resolutions, and it made no proposal for meetings on the wider nuclear issue.”
The sequence is important here. Iran warned in December 2009 (and made reference to the possibility even earlier in general comments) that if they couldn’t get their TRR fuel under reasonable conditions, they would produce it themselves.
In February, they did what they said. By that time, the original swap deal was dead ON THE US SIDE in favor of increased sanctions. In fact, the US was threatening sanctions unless the original swap deal was completed by end December 2009 (a deadline Iran rejected with their own deadline.) Iran continued to state right up until now that they were willing to suspend the 20% enrichment and go back to the status quo if the US were willing to talk again about a swap with recognition of Iranian concerns about assurances.
Your representation of Iran’s position is overly simplistic and seems intended to paint Iran’s concerns in a bad light, which is unjustified. Saying the Tehran Declaration is “fundamentally different” is only correct if one assumes the original swap deal was done in good faith – which it wasn’t. More importantly, the Tehran Declaration CONCEPT was supported EXPLICITLY by Obama in his letter to Brazil, but he completely backtracked once it was a done deal.
Regardless of whether the Tehran Declaration is “different” from the original swap deal – and in terms of functional results, IT IS NOT – Obama’s behavior cannot be justified.
Alan: “It strikes me Ahmadinejad is himself confirming his misstep over the Geneva talks, but blaming the other side for his mistake”
I thinks that’s reaching considerably, given the quality of the translation.
The problem with Farhi’s report is precisely that she quotes that one September sentence of Ahmadinejad and then ASSUMES it means “without conditions” and there is NO evidence that Ahmadinejad wouldn’t have wanted assurances. However, he DID say at one point that Iran could afford to go ahead and do it WITHOUT assurances as a “test” of the West’s intentions. In short, he thought if Iran did the swap and the West reneged, it would prove the West’s bad intentions and then Iran would continue on as it was. That option apparently was a non-starter for the other Iranian leaders.
His March statement merely re-affirms that when it came to the METHOD by which the swap would be done, it raised red flags in Iran – as it should have, since it was clear the intent of the US was to seize control of Iran’s LEU.
When the ElBaradei proposal to use Turkey and the Iranian counteroffers on the technical details of the swap came out, the Vienna Group backed off immediately and started talking sanctions. And we have to remember Obama’s letter to Brazil after the Tehran Declaration. All this clearly shows that the Vienna Group, or at least the US (and almost certainly France as well), were negotiating in bad faith.
Alan: “RSH – on the TRR swap, the November Baradei proposal for third party escrow arose in part from Iranian concerns, but also from Russian concerns over using Iranian UF6 in their centrifuges. The Russians were never going to do it, so the Vienna Group were in support of the El Baradei proposal from the outset.”
I wasn’t aware of that, however, the deal AS STATED INITIALLY and emphasized in all reports since, including AFTER November, was that the stuff would go to Russia and then to France. In fact, France was adamant about being involved despite the Iranian desire to exclude them for unreliability. It was only in November that ElBaradei’s proposal was made and it was only Iran that basically agreed to that provision. The Vienna Group did not appear interested in ANY modifications to the original plan, such as how the swap would be made right up through December.
Do you have a cite for your claim?
Scott: “My initial query, to which kooshy offered a valuable response, was whether the Iranian conservative/principlist establishment is speaking with a unifed voice…on Iran’s position about talks with the P5+1, including the US.”
But why does that matter? Plus you kept talking about Ahmadinejad and Khamenei vs…who?
There was no “split” and even the Leveretts got that wrong. The only issue was over the DETAILS of the swap agreement. Clearly a number of Iranian leaders were upset that the deal MIGHT involve just “handing over” Iran’s LEU. But I saw no indication in ANY report about the swap deal that involved that notion. That’s WHY they had the second technical talks.
As I see it, some Iranian leaders merely wanted ASSURANCES from the negotiators that there would be ASSURANCES about the methodology of the swap so that Iran wouldn’t be left hanging.
This is not a “split”.
Unless you or the Leveretts or anyone can come up with 1) someone of significance in Iran who opposed the entire swap CONCEPT, or 2) someone of significance in Iran who explicitly accepted the deal as originally offered by the West, i.e. without any assurances, I can’t see where the notion of a “split” arises other than Farhi’s article which does NOT make the case.
Warning sign.
Israel Orders Massive Military Fuel Stocks Far in Excess of that Required for Normal Operations
surf6009 dot appspot dot com/u?purl=L21vYy50b3BzZ29sYi5uYWF0YWwvLzpwdHRo%0A
The primary threat to Israel is Hizbullah…..
Mohamad Bazzi, adjunct senior fellow with the powerful Jewish think tank, Council on Foreign Relations (headed by Obama’s senior adviser on ME, Zionist Jew Richard Haass) in an interview from Lebanon said that “the United States must eventually reach out to Hizbullah”, in order to save Israel from another bloody war. He stated that Washington would fail to create a rift between Dmascus and Tehran and that Hariri government has no muscle to control Hizbullah militia. He suggested that in order to control the power of Hizbullah, Washington must arm the Lebanese military, which now is seeking help from the Islamic Republic…..
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/08/27/hizbullah-changed-the-me-in-2006/
Thank you Alan
I meant no offence, and I have learned a lot in this forum
Pirouz_2
Thanks for your thoughtful reply and I do agree with your points that since the 79 based on this same chronology that you wrote there was an effective deterrence that prevented a direct attack and made other methods for a regime change more favorable, now we should focus to think what is or was the reason that in past thirty years it has made a direct attack’s cost benefit less favorable then a proxy war or a coup, as you see there always was a sort of deterrence for a direct attack that is a deterrence by itself and I think I know what it is, that really is demography and the geography , which has prevented the US military to attack Iran and that is not going anywhere soon, yes I accept US can attack and bomb for weeks but what will be the end result , would that create a new favorable regime, think Iraq Afghanistan Somalia with a larger more unified and a far tougher geography and regional influence.
pmr9:
I don’t know much about the nuclear energy, but “as far as I know” the Uranium supply of the world (which is worth mining given the current state of technology) is limited to a few countries pretty much all of which are under the control of the West or Russia.
And unless new Uranium mining sites are discovered in Iran, or that the state of technology in Iran advances to a level that we can extract Uranium from the sea, I have a hard time in seeing us having an independent nuclear “energy” program. To me the very fact that we have to obtain our fuel for Bushehr from Russia is a clear sign of that.
If you have any more information on this issue please do share it with us and educate me a bit more, because as I said before I don’t know much about the nuclear technology.
Pirouz_2,
William Hague has made clear the UK does not see Iran as an enemy. Therefore, there is no reason for the US to see Iran as an enemy. Neocons and other fanatical “supporters” of Israel, right or wrong, of course would not agree. Ahmadinejad correctly noted in his interview with Russia Today some time ago, that there were “strong differences in US ruling circles” regarding how best to deal with Iran.
Taki Theodoracopulos got it right Aug. 5th (in Takimag.com): “America is a blundering giant, its foreign policy determined by neo-cons out to wage non-stop war. Israeli Fifth Columnists are calling the tune.”
Alan and kooshy,
Surely the way forward is for the Vienna Group to approve the Iranian application to the IAEA for purchase of the TRR fuel, with escrow of LEU, and suspension of Iranian enrichment to 20%. Khamenei made a good point the other day, that the previous Iranian application for TRR fuel went through without a ruckus.
Kooshy,
You wrote:”but I believe and I also think Arnold’s point is that the current Iran’s deterrent is not based on a nuclear posture and has not been in past 30 years, therefore one begs to know why would an attack will come later and did not come sooner when it was much easier and regional and international conditions more prime.”
I think from day 1 after the revolution USA did its best to make a regime change in Iran and bring Iran back to its sphere of influencs (and they did get some really good opportunities in the late 80s but they let them go to waste).
The problem was the fresh memory of Vietnam, and the still existence of the USSR. As a result USA was mostly following the policy of making its colonies do its proxy wars. And hence we had Iraqi invasion of the Iranian territory and the Iran-Iraq war.
Throughout the 80’s way until 1991, USA tried to address Iranian problem by keeping a balance between Iran and Iraq.
After the first US-Iraq war, three major developments occured:
a)USSR fell and USA started to feel that it has the absolute power to do in the world anything it wants. I think that they felt that with USSR gone and China no longer being Mao’s China, in all likelihood they did not need to fear another “Vietnam”. Probably they thought that had it not been for the support of USSR and China, they would not have faced a debacle in Vietnam either.
b)This idea may have been even further strenghtened by the sweet and easy “victory” that they obtained against Saddam in 1991.
c)With Saddam having been practically put out of the equation, the balance of power in this region started to shift towards Iran, this bothered USA/Israel a great deal.
Right after the 9/11 the feeling of invincibility I think grew even more in the USA when with a crush of their fist they “seemed” to be able to throw Taliban.
This feeling of “invincibility” and a sense of “megalomania” I think reached its summit in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when it took the enitre US elite from doves (the sane) to the super hawks (ie. the clinically insane) under its influence.
The debacle of Iraq, the disaster in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the humiliation of Israel in Lebanon in 2006 have made the “sane” side come to its senses, but I am afraid the in order for the clinically insane to come to their senses they need medication and losing wars won’t help them.
Had it not been for the blood of the brave Iraqi fighters, and had it not been for the fierce resistence in Afghanistan, believe me right now we would have been fighting the American mercenaries on the streets of Tehran, Shiraz and Esfahan!
It is these debacles which has shattered the delussion of “invincibility” in the head of the “sane” in the US elite and making a cost-benefit analysis and considering the military power of Iran and its ability to inflict huge costs on USA “asymmetrically” together with the appaling state of their economy has made the “sane” see the bitter truth and want to avoid a war with Iran at all costs.
But these events do not have any significant effect on the clinically insane, and as far as I can see, the balance of decision making in the USA is shifting towards the clinically insane (unfortunately). For a while this trend “seemed” to slow down with Obama coming to power, but that is no longer the case. Therefore, it will not surprise me if in the next few years we see an attack on Iran by the USA. The gravest sign for this is this last round of sanctions DESPITE the Tehran declaration. Sanctions in my opinion are a prelude to the war.
kooshy – got me. What can I say? It’s true.
What I wasn’t considering before was the significance of the affirmation of enrichment in the Tehran Declaration. This was made clear in the official Vienna Group response.
Previously to the TD I had been posting comments about how the complex legal landscape around the deal complicated getting it done, without joining the dots. In essence, the Vienna Group had invested great importance in the “other” meeting, agreed in Geneva to be by the end of October 2009, over a comprehensive deal, which never materialised, and which would have addressed those legal issues.
But the idea of escrow was essentially no different; it was basically just a question of negotiating the small print. It still is.
Alan
“The Tehran Declaration was fundamentally different to the original proposal”
Ah Ha- I see
And Alan is the one that was arguing with me and others on this site that the Tehran declaration is the same deal as the one in October plus escrow, and why Iran refused to take it at the time.
Cyrus,
I think it is pretty clear, as you make out, that the US rather stupidly blocked the TRR fuel exchange. And the reason, of course, was opposition from Israel and the Israel lobby.
R. d.,
My understanding is that Iran proposed taking over the fuel supply for Bushehr #1 as of 2015. The proposed consortium could be the vehicle for providing the supply.
I think Russia and China have made clear they do not object to Iranian production of LEU, but the 20% enrichment was another matter.
My hunch is that the UK would accept Iranian LEU production.
Alan,
Iran has given strong indications it would suspend enriching to 20% as part of the TRR fuel exchange. To me, the P5+1 should take this in hand and put the deal through, as the obvious way forward.
Since Russia would prefer to control the fuel cycle for all Iranian nuclear power plants, the proposed consortium may offer a means of achieving that but in the context of continuing “Iranian” enrichment.
Scott – I suppose it could be a bid to chip Russia off the Vienna Group bloc, or it could be a demonstration of the type of thing Iran is prepared to do by way of a comprehensive political settlement; an invitation to negotiations if you like. It will be interesting to see whether the Russians hold it in abeyance, or defer to the Vienna Group over it. And surely the Iranians can’t have instantly forgotten all the grief they have had from the Russians over Bushehr?
It just all looks a bit hasty. No doubt other perceptions will emerge.
Cyrus – theoretically the deal is still alive. The Vienna Group responded to the Tehran Declaration, setting out their objections, and seeking further talks to discuss their differences.
The Tehran Declaration was fundamentally different to the original proposal. Iran was now enriching to 20% which was not addressed, it asserted a right to enrich without taking into account the UNSC Resolutions, and it made no proposal for meetings on the wider nuclear issue.
Thus it could not be acceptable to the VG, but it is useful as an official counteroffer to the original escrow proposal.
Latest update, based on discussion with correspondents in Iran….
*Some thoughts on the latest statement from Iran’s head of atomic energy, Ali Akbar Salehi, proposing a joint consortium with Russia for production of fuel for the Bushehr nuclear plant (see 0835 GMT):
With the possibility of talks with the “5+1″ (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China) this autumn, it appears Iran is playing down its need to enrich uranium to 20%, stressing instead the cooperation with Russia on low-level nuclear enrichment for power stations as well as finding domestic sources of uranium for an expanding system of nuclear energy production.
The presentation is that Iran is a responsible, low-enriching state, working under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and with the help of Russia. In essence, it is a proposal to the Western powers of what a nuclear Iran would look like if sanctions were eased and/or concessions were made.
Salehi’s statement is therefore much more than a proposed arrangement for Bushehr and other plants. It is a challenge to Russia to endorse this vision of Iran’s nuclear future, giving Moscow the opportunity to serve as a broker between Iran and the West.*
http://enduringamerica dot com/2010/08/26/the-latest-from-iran-26-august-family-protection/
a little war drum humor!!! they cut the tips of their own penises, imagine what they would do to yours……
http://www.lobelog.com/
now compare the goldberg and the like thinking to that of Dr Barzegar
wwwdotiranreview dot org/content/view/6004/1/
James Canning says:
August 26, 2010 at 1:07 pm
I understand the Russian contract for fueling the initial plant at Bushehr runs for 10 years.
—-
that part of agreement is voluntery and not required.
a fishing story.
after russians voted for the 1929, they had a turn around and launched bushehr?
iran plans to build more nuclear plants, russia wants to be sole source?
iran offers joint consortium with russia?
turkey and brazil are to join the talks?
iran is ready (may be not) for talks?
is there really a united international front against iran?
the discussions are no more about bringing the iranian nuclear activity to halt,
but rather neclear fuel production in iran.
bargening bazari style?
may be by the time we get around closing this dosier, the US will be
giving-up some of its minute man to the iranians? (pun intended).
Alan – I’m not sure how you concluded that Obama/US did not torpedoed the TRR deal and that Obama’s intentions are as yet untested. The US put forth a proposal for the exchange after having denied Iran the exercise of their right to legally and overly purchase IAEA-safeguarded fuel for an IAEA-safeguarded reactor which poses no weapons proliferation threat (that itself speaks volumes about intentions). Just a few days before this, Obama wrote a letter to the Brazilian president further endorsing the deal, and leading the Brazilians to believe that they had US support for reaching out to Iran. The Iranians, after some deliberation, accepted the deal. Then the US (under Obama) immediately changed tack and imposed additional requirements on the deal, namely that Iran “suspend” (=permanently giving up) enrichment too, thus also pulling the rug out from under the Brazilians and Turks who were then maligned by the media in the US.
I can’t think of a more classic display of moving goalposts, since as many writers noted that the suspension (=permanently giving up) of enrichment was never part of the original offer by the US
James – thanks, had a look. Very interesting. It potentially brings all kinds of scenarios into play. It’s also intriguing how it has come about hot on the heels of a diplomatic spat between Russia and Iran. It will be interesting to see how the Russians respond.
James Canning:
Everyone knows that the 2-state solution is dead.
By they are beating the dead horse since the alternative is even more unpalatable.
And without Al Haram Al Sharif being in Muslim hands, there will be no peace with Syria. The Allawaite Elders have also taken this position since the survival of that sect in a sea of Muslim Orthodoxy will be endangered otherwise.
fyi,
George F. Will seemed to be arguing between the lines that Israel need not make peace with Syria because Syria is controlled by a dictator. Most Americans are not aware Syria has offered peace to Israel for decades.
Did you see David Gardner’s piece in the Financial Times today (“A poisoned process holds little hope”)? Very fine assessment in my view.
The Quartet need to impose a peace deal on Israel, meaning Israel gets out of the West Bank. And the Golan Heights.
The continuing risk is that advocates of permanent oppression of the Palestinians, by the Israelis, will succeed in destroying Iran (in their insane effort to keep much of
the West Bank). Will says Israel since 1967 has been diligently weaving the West Bank into the fabric of coastal Israel. In other words, much of the West Bank is becoming a sprawling suburb of Tel Aviv.
James Canning:
George Will is correct.
Peace between Israel and Arabs (Muslims) is not possible.
Jews have to surrender Al Haram al Sharif for any peace.
And they won’t.
Or else they have to grant citizenship to all West Bank Arabs.
And they won’t.
Liz,
I agree with you the US bungled the Iranian proposal for a fuel exchange last fall. The reason, of course, is the Israel lobby in the US.
The other members of the P5+1 need to recognise the degree to which the Israel lobby has compromised the ability of the US to act intelligently in the Middle East.
George F. Will has served up a load of rubbish today in the Washington Post: “In the Middle East, the peace process is only a mirage.” Quote: “Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, a dictator buttressed by torture. . .” No mention that Assad has offered peace to Israel for the last ten years.
With friends like Will wielding too much influence over US policy, the future of Israel as a “Jewish” state, comes seriously into question.
Scott Lucas,
Everyone says that, except your friends in DC. However, the point is that regarding the nuclear issue and relations with the US, the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, with the Leader’s approval, makes the final decisions. Therefore, your claims about the October negotiations are completely untrue.
Alan,
Check PressTV.com today.
On salon.com today, Michael Adler writes: “So, 2010 marks the BEGINNING of a new phase, one of pressuring Iran with sanctions. But what next if sanctions DON’T WORK?”
[emphasis supplied]. (“The Obama White House’s Iran two-step”)
kooshy,
Sometimes when a fisherman puts out his line, he/she winds up with a most productive catch. So it is proving here….
I would be pleased to consider an analysis by Richard for EA.
Scott
Pirouz,
Thank you. I have been thinking the same thing all day — just as I think it is simplistic to view Iran’s decision-making as homogeneous, I would say that is also an essential observation about the US Government.
Scott
James – can you give a reference for that, I’d like to read it.
RSH – This is an interesting comparison. It strikes me Ahmadinejad is himself confirming his misstep over the Geneva talks, but blaming the other side for his mistake:
Ahmadinejad on September 29, 2009 (quoted by you from Farideh Farhi’s report):
We have offered to whoever is prepared that we will buy the material from them. Of course, we are prepared to hand over 3.5 percent material, have them enrich it up to 19.75 or 20 percent and deliver it back to us.
Ahmadinejad on May 5, 2010 (from your post, ref Charlie Rose):
And they came and said they want an exchange and fuel, and we said sure enough we can do that. But then later on they came and said we want Iran`s enriched uranium to be bought outside so that Iran moves farther from the ability to build a nuclear bomb.
“Once that statement was made the people in Iran felt there was insincerity involved and there is something not quite fair about the process. And they reacted and prevented the process from moving forward.
Alan,
Yes, all of the Iranian nuclear power plants would be supplied by the consortium.
R S Hack,
Re: Aug. 25th, 11:32pm – - So, Shimon Peres is at it again, lying about non-existent threats! A few months ago, he claimed with no support that Syria had supplied scuds to Hezbollah. A contention Hillary Clinton was quick to amplify, in an act of typical stupidity on her part.
Now, Peres claims Iran has nukes and threatens to use them against Israel!
The game plan is to keep pressure on Obama, so continuing effort to steal land and water in the West Bank, as part of insane effort to prevent emergence of a viable Palestine, is not impeded by the US.
James – that’s interesting. For ALL their FUTURE plants?
RSH – on the TRR swap, the November Baradei proposal for third party escrow arose in part from Iranian concerns, but also from Russian concerns over using Iranian UF6 in their centrifuges. The Russians were never going to do it, so the Vienna Group were in support of the El Baradei proposal from the outset.
Ali Akbar Salehi, speaking for Iran’s nuclear programme, says 1/3 of the fuel at Bushehr #1 will have to be replaced each year, and that Iran has proposed a joint consortium with Russia for providing all fuel to Iranian nuclear power plants.
I understand the Russian contract for fueling the initial plant at Bushehr runs for 10 years.
kooshy,
Whatever differences of opinion may exist in ruling circles in Iran, the Iranian position is clear, that it will meet with the P5+1 with a view toward implementing the nuclear exchange. Surely this is the best way forward.
Pirouz_2
I don’t agree that Iran doesn’t have the uranium resources for an independent nuclear energy program. At present, uranium is mined only in a few countries that have high-grade deposits. Most countries, including Iran, have lower-grade deposits that would be worth mining if the price were to rise. Japanese researchers have demonstrated a process for extracting uranium from seawater (hanging an ion-exchange mesh in the ocean currents) that could in principle supply enough uranium for the whole world. It’s just not worth developing this at the moment because mined uranium is cheap. Even if the price of raw uranium were to rise tenfold, this wouldn’t make much difference to the economics of nuclear power because the cost of uranium is only a small proportion of the total cost of generating electricity. One of the advantages of nuclear power is that there’s no need for countries to compete for scarce energy resources – the supply of raw material is practically unlimited.
RHS
“Arnold: I agree with you that I spend too much time digging into the details. I should be asleep now.”
You are very good with that and we all learn tremendously, if Scott really wants to do a service to his readers, he should post your long post with regard to TRR deal on his EA site.
How about that Scott?, instead of a fishing expedition how about dishing out some facts.
Pirouz_2
I generally agree with your conclusion to Arnold with regard what would be acceptable to Iran, like you I also enjoy Arnold’s strong logical arguments, but I believe and I also think Arnold’s point is that the current Iran’s deterrent is not based on a nuclear posture and has not been in past 30 years, therefore one begs to know why would an attack will come later and did not come sooner when it was much easier and regional and international conditions more prime.
With regard to Scott’s fishing trip in Iran’s muddy negotiation waters, you are absolutely right only people with deep cultural understanding of Iranian mentality can understand what is going on.
Payandeh Iran
Salamt Bashi
Scott, your query reminds me of observations made from the opposing camp, such as SL Khamenei’s comment a year or so, of trying to interpret American decision making through the seemingly contradictory public remarks made by Obama, Clinton, Jones, Berman, etc., not to mention McCain, Graham, Lieberman, etc.
Perhaps there’s some common tendencies after all, between these two differing representative systems.
Pirouz_2,
I fully agree with you on your noting of opposition from many quarters in Iran to a deal with the US and on your assessment of Ahmadinejad as leading proponent for deal.
In current situation, do you think Ahmadinejad is still out front (and possibly at odds with other conservatives/principlists) in looking towards discussions — with the Supreme Leader and Larijani sceptical — or is this a unified good cop/bad cop strategy in rhetoric about talks with the US?
Scott
@Scott Lucas:
You quoted the leveretts I think: “In Tehran, views are split, and it has nothing to do with reformists vs. hardliners, or the pro-Ahmadinejad camp vs. the anti-Ahmadinejad camp. It has to do with lack of confidence about U.S. and Israeli intentions toward the Islamic Republic as it is constituted.”
Well I don’t know about that. Actually Mousavi himself was against the nuclear swap deal in the autumn of 2009. And I believe (but I am not 100% sure) the minority group in the Majlis (ie. reformists) together with some Larijani supporters took a position against it too. The person who was most favourable to that deal, believe it or not, was that evil Ahmadinejad!
I think Kooshy has made a very good description of the situation. While this may seem like divisions within the system (and indeed there are divisions and multiple voices within the system, that is why it is defacto a “liberal democracy”) they always come out with a final answer.
Richard,
It is also reassuring to find that I have support from the Leveretts (or they have support from me) in the assessment of Tehran’s position last autumn: “In Tehran, views are split, and it has nothing to do with reformists vs. hardliners, or the pro-Ahmadinejad camp vs. the anti-Ahmadinejad camp. It has to do with lack of confidence about U.S. and Israeli intentions toward the Islamic Republic as it is constituted.”
Richard,
“I just can’t figure out where Scott is going with this.”
That’s because you’re creating an argument that I am not making. My concern is not with casting of blame for the breakdown of the October talks.
My initial query, to which kooshy offered a valuable response, was whether the Iranian conservative/principlist establishment is speaking with a unifed voice — given the Supreme Leader’s statement a week ago Wednesday, the President’s Thursday interview, and Ali Larijani’s statement — on Iran’s position about talks with the P5+1, including the US.
That led to consideration of whether the Iranian establishment was speaking with a unified voice last autumn before and after the Geneva talks.
One can put the hypothesis that there were differences of opinion in Tehran without blaming Iran for the failure to reach agreement.
Scott
@Arnold Evans:
Re your comment on August 26, 2010 at 7:57 am,
“I applaud Iran for taking those steps and hope they are enough to prevent a bombing”
And I applaud you for that whole comment. I just wish your answers to a bright and honest person such as Eric (and I dont include “some others” -mainly I am talking about Eric) were a bit gentler in tone.
Also I don’t think that the precautions that Iran has taken are enough to prevent USA from an attack necessarily -as a matter of fact I have a strong feeling that the attack will happen eventually. You see cost-benefit analysis and cost outweighting the benefits by far is an excellent deterent for the “sane”. For the clinically “insane” those analyses don’t work as a deterent necessarily and unfortunately the clinically insane have the stronger position in US decision making than the sane.
One of the most important aspects of your post is the fact that, the later the USA comes to realization that it has to live with a “nuclear capable” Iran, the more capable will be the Iran USA will have to live with: had they come to realize this fact 6 years ago, Iran’s “capabilities” would have been limited to an enrichment program for the R&D purposes and limited to 300-400 centrifuges. They didn’t, instead they persisted on their “insane” ways, Irans capabilities grew to 3000 centrifuges. Had they settled down with that, they would have got an Iran with a less-than-industrial-level enrichment program, they didn’t and still persisted in their ways. In October 2009, had they come to realize the Iranian reality and learned to live with it, they could have put a cap at Iran’s stockpile at around 1 ton, again they didn’t, as of Tehran declaration they had to deal with an Iran with close to two tones of LEU. Still they refused. If they continue on this way they will end up having to live with an Iran which has “Arak”!
If the insanity prevails and they bomb Iran, they won’t be facing with a “nuclear capable” Iran, they will be forced to live with a “nuclear weapon state” Iran!!
Now what is my position and what do I want (and I am pretty sure thats what the Irqanian government wants too):
Iran does not have the Uranium resources to maintain an “independent” nuclear “energy” program. Their nuclear “energy” will be always under the threat and control of the West and the Russia. The very fact that they have to completely rely on Russia for Bushehr’s fuel proves this fact (if it needed any proof). The West knows it and the Iranians know it too. Then why do Iranians “persist” on going down this road to have the full fuel cycle capability and a stockpile of LEU? Of course it is the stckpile of LEU (and the capability to enrich it at its will) that Iranians want. The Iranians know this and the West knows it too. In fact that is the whole argument!
The West can negotiate its way on the amount of this stockpile and they can make Iran to compromise on this “amount”; BUT THERE IS NO WAY ON EARTH OR IN THE HEAVENS that the West can make Iran compromise on the very existence of a stockpile of a few tons of LEU on its soil.
The sooner they realize this the better their chances will be to make this stockpile smaller rather than bigger.
Scott – regarding your comment about the Foreign Affairs contact you have, it is worth recalling that it is also Mohamed El Baradei’s view that the Iranians were unable to respond over the TRR deal because of internal difficulties.
Arnold – I don’t really care whether Iran has no nuclear bombs or 100 nuclear bombs. If anything, my view would be that we should give Iran a dozen or so in order to protect them from all the predatory beasts that perennially encircle them, and to slap down Israel.
This is not the question for me. The question for me is how to navigate the current impasse. It is a glorious diplomatic conundrum, and I see how both sides make a solution difficult. That aggravates you and RSH, because you disagree with my views on how Iran contributes to that problem, and you prefer to argue the toss on that to exhaustion.
I don’t prefer to do that. It’s not so important. It has its place, but it has been done to death. What I try to put across is a way I think the stand off could possibly be resolved. I see greater flexibility in the US position than you, and I see greater flexibility in the Iranian position than you. My interest is to explore how any extra flexibility, however small, can be capitalised upon to move this thing on.
The other big issue as I see it is how the UNSC Resolutions complicate the diplomatic process, and I think it is very important to understand their relationship to how the diplomacy can work, and how they are linked to the TRR deal. My understanding of this leads me to believe that a deal is possible without suspension, but only if a comprehensive deal is done alongside a TRR deal.
Scott Lucas:
I have read some of your writings in the past and they are not at all impressive. Your knowledge of Iran is superficial to say the least. In addition, you have a history of twisting the truth and I’m sorry to say, dishonesty, which makes you even less credible.
Arnold: I agree with you that I spend too much time digging into the details. I should be asleep now.
You’re also correct that the deal was in bad faith from the get-go.
I just can’t figure out where Scott is going with this. I was ignoring that portion of this thread, but eventually decided to look at what was being claimed since it didn’t sound right. On research (time-consuming research), it appears that there is nothing to Scott’s claims. The situation was quite simple: The US wanted all the LEU, Iran didn’t want to give it to them. End of story.
Farhi’s article spent most of her time arguing about the internal politics, and bashing the hardliners and talking about the election. Once I read it, it was clear that there was no case there that the internal politics were responsible or partly responsible for the talks failing, which appears to be Scott’s notion.
Scott: “It is whether Ahmadinejad wished 1) to start the talks in the autumn, despite resistance from other Iranian actors 2) to continue the talks amidst the surge in internal opposition in Iran in late October.”
It is quite clear that Ahmadinejad wish to continue the TALKS. That has NOTHING to do with whether or not the PROPOSAL was acceptable. I really don’t understand where you’re getting this notion that ANYBODY in Iran was completely in opposition to the swap concept or at least TALKING about such a swap. What the deal breaker was the idea of shipping most of Iran’s LEU out of the country without assurances.
The Leveretts wrote an article on October 30 for Foreign Policy called ‘Pragmatists in Iran” which makes the very clear statement:
Quote
In Tehran, views are split, and it has nothing to do with reformists vs. hardliners, or the pro-Ahmadinejad camp vs. the anti-Ahmadinejad camp. It has to do with lack of confidence about U.S. and Israeli intentions toward the Islamic Republic as it is constituted, rather than as we wish it to be. In this regard, action by two Congressional committees this week to pass legislation authorizing additional U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran and non-U.S. companies doing business there will only do further damage to Iranian perceptions of American intentions and President Obama’s seriousness about engaging Tehran.
Too often, Iran’s security concerns are dismissed in the United States and Israel as false or manufactured, re-enforcing the stereotype of Iranians as chronically duplicitous and unprepared to keep any commitment they enter into. These stereotypes are unfortunate for two reasons. First, they are wrong and simply not supported by the historical record. This is certainly not how Iran approached previous episodes of engagement with the United States – including two years of extremely constructive official talks between the United States and Iran over Afghanistan and al Qaida following the 9/11 attacks (talks in which I directly participated).
Second, these stereotypes are fundamentally racist. If someone were to criticize Israeli diplomacy by referring to rabbis lying and conspiring behind their beards — as far too many commentators accuse Iran’s “mullahs” as lying and conspiring behind their beards — we would rightly denounce that as an anti-Semitic stereotype.
End Quote
There really is no case concerning Ahmadinejad’s position with regard to the Tehran swap issue that has any relevance as to why the talks failed. The talks clearly failed because the US wanted all of Iran’s LEU out of the country and Iran didn’t. It’s that simple.
a more concise outline of what the thinking is in Iran..
in place of all this back an forth re what ahmadinejad said vs the S.L.
http://www.iranreview.org/content/view/6004/1/
Salam Iranian@Iran,
With respect, since you have never read any of my analysis on the issue, you have no idea about my criticism of the US Government’s position on Iran and the uranium enrichment talks.
See, as one of many examples, http://enduringamerica dot com/2009/09/30/irans-nuclear-programme-obama-backs-himself-into-a-corner/
Scott
Eric:
This comments section is not a suggestion board to the Iranian government. If this comment section can influence any government’s behavior it is the government that operates in the language nearly every post here is written in.
It turns out that Iran is very poorly understood in the United States and the Iranian nuclear issue likewise. If this board presents better arguments against attacking Iran than are easily available elsewhere, it has done more than enough.
Scott Lucas:
“(In January, I had an interesting off-the-record discussion with a former Foreign Affairs officials who is still in close touch with the Ministry. Publicly his line was that the post-Geneva breakdown was due solely to the “West”; privately he acknowledged that internal issues in Iran played a part.)”
You must accept that you are not exactly the most credible person on this thread to use an alleged private conversation to prove your point. It’s obvious that their are diverse voices in the Iranian political establishment. However, with regards to the breakdown of talks, that was solely because the US took a “take it or leave it position”. You try too hard to defend the US government, when there is no room for defence.
Eric:
What, exactly, do you think Iran should be doing, over and above what’s appropriate to carry out its its peaceful nuclear energy program, to prepare for that magic moment?
Now who decides what’s appropriate to carry out its peaceful nuclear program? Obama would say Iran does not need to enrich at all for a peaceful nuclear program. Alan says Iran can enrich but doesn’t need a stockpile of LEU that has not been converted to fuel rods that cannot be restored.
I say Iran, given the environment as I understand it, should hold at least two or three tons of LEU in enrichable form and should consider to build this stockpile until it reaches ten or so tons by which point it should open Arak which will give it a path to plutonium.
The sooner the US gives up on preventing Iran from having nuclear capability, the sooner a limit can be set that while retaining capability, is less that Iran would otherwise have reached. Meaning the US can get a two ton limit now maybe, but won’t be able to get that next year. There will come a point where delaying Arak is no longer on the table.
If the US is willing to bomb Iran over nuclear capability, then it is willing to bomb Iran over what I’ve described above. I don’t think it would be worth it for the US and Iran has taken steps to ensure that if it is bombed, the US will be hurt out of proportion to any benefit the US gains. I applaud Iran for taking those steps and hope they are enough to prevent a bombing.
Richard, I admire that you go and dig through articles where I lazily tend to focus on what seems to me the bigger point and don’t bother with details that in reality have a lot of persuasive and informative value.
About the TRR deal in October, when the US/France/Russia response to the Tehran declaration was released, and it said that it objected to Iran being able to get its LEU back if there was no delivery and it objected to there being a deadline for delivery of the fuel this was a closed case to me.
It was a bad deal. Do we really have to examine the internal politics of Iran to explain why Iran rejected what was, upon a moment’s skeptical reflection, a terrible deal? Or more specifically, a deal that would have resulted in Iran receiving nothing?
In early October, it seemed to me a deal was possible. Then and I’m not certain from memory of the sequence but 1) France released negotiating notes that said Iran had to export all of its uranium before the end of the year – which unnecessarily turned this into an exercise of Iran accepting orders from the West 2) France’s foreign minister said in Israel that France wanted Iran to stop enriching as part of this deal because France did not want to enrich on Iran’s behalf at the same time Iran was enriching itself fuel that could be used for a weapon 3) the Balochistan bombing.
By late October the deal was, to my mind clearly dead unless the West was willing to be substantially more concessionary. Balochistan would have been enough to turn Iran against the West by itself. The West did not become more concessionary, but presented the deal, whose details were not public, but that we later learned left plenty of space for the West not to deliver, as a take it or leave it offer.
Iran left it. We don’t need to tie this to supposed weakness Ahmadinejad felt over supposed fraudulent elections. I feel like that story is popular in the US because Western analysts just like thinking of Ahmadinejad as weakened and this is an excuse to believe that.
Richard,
Just a note to take in your latest post: the issue throughout my interpretation is NOT whether the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad, or any Iranian official ACCEPTED the US-led proposal. It is whether Ahmadinejad wished 1) to start the talks in the autumn, despite resistance from other Iranian actors 2) to continue the talks amidst the surge in internal opposition in Iran in late October.
The possibility of accepting a deal never occurs here because the talks had not reached that point.
Scott
Richard,
I don’t want to block up the thread, so I’ll just try to advance a few points from the exchange and add what may be a significant reference. I actually think we’re in agreement on key points, though important issues remain.
1. President Ahmadinejad, despite criticism by many within the Iranian establishment, pressed in the autumn for direct talks with the 5+1. Although the Supreme Leader’s position at this point is not clear, those talks took place in Geneva.
2. Up to 21 October, the possibility of a deal on 3rd-party enrichment — through Russia, though possibly not through France — is still very much alive.
3. However, between 21 October and the end of the month, there is sustained criticism of a deal in which Iran would ship much of its LEU outside the country. That criticism does not come from the President but from actors like Larijani and Boroujerdi, who return to their pre-Geneva line of No Talks.
4. Despite this criticism, Ahmadinejad continues to welcome the talks. On 29 October, he proclaimed that the West was seeking “nuclear cooperation with the Iranian nation”.
(see the analysis at http://enduringamerica dot com/2009/10/30/more-time-please-ahmadinejads-legitimacy-and-irans-nuclear-talks/)
5. However, in spite of the President’s proclamation of this cooperation, the criticism of his line continues and no further discussions with the P5+1 take place.
The point? Iran is not a homogeneous system, in which all actors speak with a single voice. There are differences of opinions, tensions, and rivalries. While the Supreme Leader carries the authority of the final word, he does not necessarily resolve those differences, tensions, and rivalries. That appears to be the case with Iran’s approach to the nuclear talks in October.
(In January, I had an interesting off-the-record discussion with a former Foreign Affairs officials who is still in close touch with the Ministry. Publicly his line was that the post-Geneva breakdown was due solely to the “West”; privately he acknowledged that internal issues in Iran played a part.)
I welcome continued discussion of this case because I think is important in the context of whether there can be a renewal of the discussions on uranium enrichment today.
Scott
I see we’ve cross-posted.
“Porter, whose work I admire, confuses the timing”
No, he doesn’t. If you read Farhi’s article, ALL of the people she is talking about complaining about the proposal are complaining after the second round of talks. There is no doubt of the sequence of events: The Geneva proposal is made, the Iranians think about it for a couple weeks raising concerns about assurances, then the second round of talks about ElBaradei’s specific proposals occur, whereupon the Iranians – ALL of them – decide the proposal is unacceptable. Within a few days of that, by October 29, they begin making counteroffers in public.
“The El Baradei plan is irrelevant here, because it came later.”
My original long post was concerned with some confusion about whether it was the Vienna Group who made the Turkey offer. That part is not important in this discussion.
” The interesting gap instead is that there was no clear expression of Ahmadinejad’s position after 21 October and before the scrapping of the technical talks.”
Well really, who cares what he said? Whatever he offers has to be approved by Khamenei in any event. There is NO evidence Khamenei accepted the initial Geneva offer OR made an offer that agreed with the Geneva offer without assurances. Ahmadinejad is quoted in Farhi’s article as speaking on October 29, but her quote gives no indication of his position other than as “pushing back” against the criticism. This is hardly evidence that his position was significantly different than the rest of the Iranians.
What is important is that BOTH the hardliners AND the opposition leaders were BOTH against the proposal because of lack of assurances.
“1. Larijani had been critical of the Government’s position on the nuclear talks well before this period, so it is not the case that he and Ahmadinejad had been in agreement running up to the Geneva talks.”
So what?
“2. There is no evidence that the Larijani and Boroujerdi statements came out of meetings to co-ordinate the Government’s position. That is why they appear, at face value and given their proximity to the 21 October statement by Soltanieh, as rebuffs to the line that Ahmadinejad had taken.”
I don’t see any “line” that Ahmadinejad is supposed to have taken. Can you cite one explicit quote where Ahmadinejad explicitly accepts sending LEU out of the country without assurances that Iran would get the rods back? I’ve not seen any such quote anywhere in articles on the Tehran discussions.
The Farhi quote does not count as I’ve indicated because no where in that single sentence does he say anything about assurances. This cannot be taken to mean he did not have reservations about the PROCESS the swap would entail. His statement is SOLELY that Iran agreed IN PRINCIPLE to some sort of swap. There is thus NO contradiction between that position and the later position by BOTH hardliners and opposition leaders that the proposal as offered was unacceptable.
It’s a weak argument.
Scott: I think it’s obvious what the situation was. Note the point in the Gareth Porter’s article where he states that the Iranian negotiators were under orders not to sabotage the talks because Iran didn’t want any further sanctions applied. This completely explains what happened in October in my view.
I repeat the quote:
“Yet the Iranian negotiators did not reject the western proposal [from October 1] outright: they were under orders to be cooperative, to avoid a breakdown that might lead to fresh economic sanctions. But then Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, the senior US representative in Geneva, told reporters that the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, had agreed that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of depleted uranium overseas. An empty promise: an Iranian negotiator, who asked to remain anonymous, told Reuters on 16 October that Iran had not agreed to the western plan, or even to its premises. Nor were the Iranian negotiators authorised to accept such a plan at the second round of talks scheduled for 19-21 October in Vienna, during a meeting of the IAEA.”
Clearly this means the original proposal was either unacceptable to Iran at the start OR that Iran wished to study the proposal.
Again Porter:
“The second round of talks revolved around a draft agreement prepared by the outgoing IAEA director general, Mohamed El Baradei, for 80% of Iran’s uranium stocks to be sent to Russia. A French diplomat confided to the Washington Post that this proposal was “not far” from the West’s ideal solution. On 21 October, the final day of the talks, the media claimed that Iran had agreed to the El Baradei plan. Iran’s IAEA representative, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, said the draft was “on the right track” but that his country would have to study the text carefully. El Baradei admitted it was necessary to wait for an answer from Tehran, where a public discussion swiftly began.”
It was at that point – at the end of October – that the talks broke down over Iran’s unwillingness to send its stock of LEU outside the country without assurances.
I don’t see what importance you attribute to any internal Iranian discussions in October. It seems clear that Iran was open at that time – and has been open since – to any discussions.
Iran began making counteroffers almost immediately as per:
“Mousavi’s denunciation of the western plan came on 29 October, the same day that Iran published its counterproposal that the uranium should be sent abroad in batches,”
Please note this point again: “But this analysis rests on the assumption that Ahmedinejad had accepted the El Baradei plan, when he was mainly concerned with preventing a breakdown in the negotiations.”
So I don’t see your point.
Update: All right, I’ve read the article you reference by Farideh Farhi.
I’m sorry, this is pure speculation on her part. Nothing in that article specified that Ahmadinejad OR Khamenei ACCEPTED the deal from the first Geneva meeting except “in principle”. As Porter reported, it was Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, the senior US representative in Geneva, who told reporters that the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, had agreed that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of depleted uranium overseas. But Iranian negotiators said explicitly that Iran had NOT accepted the agreement in Geneva, but merely thought it was on the “right track” and had to be studied further. Porter explicitly states that nobody at the Geneva talks had authority to accept the Geneva proposal.
The rest of her article is totally dependent on that misconception. There is no evidence that either Ahmadinejad or Khamenei “backtracked” on that “agreement” (really, proposal) in October. All of the people she cites complaining about the proposal are talking in later October, just as Porter cites.
She also states: ” It is often forgotten that on September 29, right before the Geneva meeting, Khamenei’s most visible lieutenant, Ahmadinejad, said publicly, “We have offered to whoever is prepared that we will buy the material from them. Of course, we are prepared to hand over 3.5 percent material, have them enrich it up to 19.75 or 20 percent and deliver it back to us.”[1] Thus it appears that P5+1 negotiators simply seized upon an opportunity offered by Tehran. If they were not tricked in Geneva and Vienna, it is clear that Khamenei and the hardliners reversed themselves later, and the question is why.”
Excuse me, but Ahmadinejad as quoted said nothing about JUST “handing over” without any assurances that Iran would get its rods. Clearly either the Iranian press or Farhi is spinning that notion, possibly as an attack on the hardliners. Certainly Farhi spends a lot of time in her article attacking the hardliners without any clear connection to the nuclear negotiations. Porter’s analysis is quite clear that the Iranian negotiators DID NOT accept the proposal in the first Geneva talks except in principle, and the second technical talks fell apart completely precisely because of the issue of assurances.
I don’t see anything there that detracts from the timeline I posted or the reasons cited by Gareth Porter and the Iranians themselves for how the talks evolved as they did. And I can’t see what you’re trying to establish by bringing it up.
Richard,
Re-reading your useful material, I would add that Tehran persisted with the talks at the IAEA in mid-October despite the reports that Assistant Secretary William Burns had (incorrectly) said Iran had agreed to the shipment of 80% of its LEU.
So the key period for my specific query is between 21 October, when Soltanieh still said there was not much distance between the US-led proposal and Iran’s position, and the failure to hold the technical talks at the end of the month.
What happens in the intervening period, both in Farhi’s explanation and in Porter’s in your post? Larijani and Boroujerdi (and others — but note, there is no statement from Ahmadinejad) say that the US-led deal is absolutely unacceptable.
Porter, whose work I admire, confuses the timing and goes astray with this paragraph: “Larijani and Boroujerdi’s positions have been widely misinterpreted as evidence of divisions within the Iranian leadership. The New York Times suggested that the Obama administration had scored a political point by dividing Iran’s political class. But this analysis rests on the assumption that Ahmedinejad had accepted the El Baradei plan, when he was mainly concerned with preventing a breakdown in the negotiations.”
The El Baradei plan is irrelevant here, because it came later. The interesting gap instead is that there was no clear expression of Ahmadinejad’s position after 21 October and before the scrapping of the technical talks.
Now it may well be that the President suddenly switched his position after Soltanieh’s 21 October statement and fully agreed with Larijani and Boroujerdi. However….
1. Larijani had been critical of the Government’s position on the nuclear talks well before this period, so it is not the case that he and Ahmadinejad had been in agreement running up to the Geneva talks.
2. There is no evidence that the Larijani and Boroujerdi statements came out of meetings to co-ordinate the Government’s position. That is why they appear, at face value and given their proximity to the 21 October statement by Soltanieh, as rebuffs to the line that Ahmadinejad had taken.
Thanks again for the opportunity to re-think all of this,
Scott
Boxed into a Corner on Iran
by Philip Giraldi, August 26, 2010
original dot antiwar dot com/giraldi/2010/08/25/boxed-into-a-corner-on-iran/
Quote:
The real problem is that the public utterances of the policy makers in Washington and Tel Aviv have backed them into a corner, reducing their options and committing them to a policy that has no real attainable objective and makes absolutely no sense. If Iran is a threat at all, which can be disputed, it can be easily contained by either Israel or the United States, both of which have large nuclear and conventional arsenals. Iran is a military midget compared to either country, though admittedly it has the capability to strike back hard in asymmetrical ways if it is attacked.
President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu both appreciate very clearly that Iran does not pose a serious threat and both know that the often cited claim that Tehran has called for wiping Israel off the map is bogus. Such knowledge is widespread even among hawks in Israel, though apparently less so among American neocons. In September 2009 former Israeli Prime Minister and current Minister of Defense Ehud Barak was quoted as saying that “I am not among those who believe Iran is an existential issue for Israel.” A few years earlier, Foreign Minister Livni argued against the idea that a nuclear Iran would be an existential threat. This summer, ex-Mossad chief Ephraim Halevi made the same point and added that speaking of Iran as an existential threat exaggerates Iran’s power and suggests instead the false and dangerous narrative that Israel might be vulnerable.
But in spite of their certain knowledge of the fragility of the Iranian threat, both Obama and Netanyahu have unfortunately let themselves wallow in rhetoric that hypes the danger. If it sounds and smells exactly like the lead up to Iraq, it should. And, like the case of Iraq, the fearmongering does not end with the intemperate comments made by the two leaders. The US Congress with its proposed House Resolution 1553 is engaged in giving the green light for an Israeli attack on Iran, indicating in advance its support for such an action. HR 1553 comes on top of harsh sanctions approved in early July, measures that could lead to US Navy vessels attempting to board Iranian flagged merchant ships. Even tougher sanctions, steps that would almost certainly lead to war are endorsed by many legislators, particularly those who are regarded as close to Israel. Congressman Brad Sherman of California explains “Critics [of the sanctions] argued that these measures will hurt the Iranian people. Quite frankly, we need to do just that.” At least Congress shows consistency when it is knee jerking spasmodically to demonstrate support for Israel. Sherman’s view of Iranians is somewhat similar to his punishing the Gazans for voting for Hamas or pillorying the Turks for trying to send aid to the Palestinians. Or, not so long ago, sending the 500,000 Iraqi children to their deaths à la Madeleine Albright.
Both the Israeli and American people have been prepared for war by all of the truculent noises coming out of Washington and the propaganda appearing in the media. The conversation on Iran, such as it is, has been expressly designed to bring about a war rather than avoid it. The mainstream media disinformation campaign orchestrated by AIPAC has worked just fine. Most Americans already believe incorrectly that Iran has a nuclear weapon and most also support attacking it, a product of the steady diet of hokum that they have been fed. The moral turpitude of America and Israel’s leaders combined with the popular consensus that they have willy-nilly allowed to develop grants the concept of war with Iran a certain inevitability. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden has described the process as “inexorable.”
So we have dodged the bullet on the war that might have begun on August 21st because our leaders really do know that Iran is not a threat and when it came to gut check time were ultimately unwilling to start World War III. But the bomb is still ticking because those selfsame politicians, lacking any sense of true leadership, have set the forces in play that will almost inevitably produce a war. It is somewhat reminiscent of Iraq surely, but it also recalls the 1914 European security environment in which an entangling web of alliances and arrangements virtually guaranteed that a war would take place. The only way to stop the rot is for President Obama to consider for a moment what is good for the United States rather than for his political party’s hold on power. He should act like a true statesman instead of a used car salesman. If he is uncertain how to do that there are a number of good nineteenth century political biographies that he can read up on to learn the ropes. He must stand up before the American people and state simply and unequivocally that Washington opposes any new military action in the Middle East and that the United States is not threatened by Iran and will take no part in any military action directed against it. He might add that the US will further consider anyone staging such an attack as an aggressor nation and will immediately break off relations before demanding a UN Security Council vote to condemn the action. Will that happen? Fat chance.
End Quote
Correction in penultimate paragraph:
*the internal discussions in Iran were not the only reason why the Geneva process stalled
Richard,
Thanks for re-posting the information, much of which we noted at the time. Indeed, I share your general criticism of the tactics adopted by the US Government and posted that as the talks broke down.
Still, my specific questions remain:
1. The proposal for third party enrichment via Russia and France, with 80% of Iran’s LEU taken out of country, was the offer that the US took to Geneva at the start of October. So Ahmadinejad, encouraging those talks, knew the situation.
Despite Tehran’s concerns over this starting point put by Washington, Iran agreed to further technical talks at the end of the month.
2. To my recollection, there were no substantive talks between Iran and the 5+1 after Geneva and before the scheduled technical discussions. So while Tehran was certainly not going to accept the US-led proposal over France and Russia, the issues were still on the table.
3. The El Baradei proposal to which you refer was made in November, after the failure to hold the technical talks.
So the query remains: why did Iran not with the 5+1 at the end of October?
Farhi’s material, as well as information we posted on EA and other news (including items from newspapers in Iran), point to rising criticism of Ahmadinejad during October — it simply is not true that all conservatives were backing the President’s position (unless you can come up with an elaborate version of kooshy’s good cop/bad cop theory that is supported by evidence).
I repeat my point that the internal discussions in Iran were not the only reason why the Geneva process started — had the US moved with an offer for enrichment via Turkey in October, Ahmadinejad might have had the traction he needed for discussions to proceed. Had the Obama Administration accepted the El Baradei initiative in November, instead of switching to or passively sitting before the sanctions track pushed by Congress, there may still have been a possibility.
Again, thanks for putting out all the useful information.
Scott
Scott: “One possible response is that the US and European powers had set impossible conditions on Iran. However, very little changes in the US-Europe position between the Geneva talks at the start of October and the failure to hold the scheduled technical talks at the end of the month. So why, if that position was unacceptable at the end of October, had the President pursued direct discussions at the start of the month?”
Apparently I have to re-post my absurdly long post on the Tehran Declaration again in order to clarify what happened.
Richard Steven Hack says:
August 4, 2010 at 5:49 am
On further research, I have learned that ElBaradei apparently did in fact propose the third party escrow country as part of the swap deal sometime in November 2009, sometime after Clinton had demanded that Iran accept the original deal involving shipping most of its LEU out of the country to Russia and hence to France for reprocessing and then delivering the fuel rods to Iran later. This proposal was from ElBaradei, NOT the Vienna Group, although the Vienna Group subsequently acknowledged it. However, the Vienna Group SINCE THEN has NOT re-iterated Turkey as an acceptable third part escrow source, but has insisted on Iran complying with the original draft proposal which specifies Russia, and then France, as the sequence for turning Iran’s LEU into fuel rods for the TRR. There has also been NO acceptance of Iran’s further offers and requests for guarantees that the deal would be honored by the West.
Iran naturally did not trust France and also did not like the idea of shipping 80% of its LEU out of the country at once. So Iran proposed instead two other possibilities: 1) buying the fuel rods and exchanging them for LEU, and 2) shipping the LEU under the original deal in stages.
The Vienna Group dismissed these suggestions, which is why ElBaradei came up with the third country escrow idea. Iran was initially hesitant because it seemed an even more complicated deal than the original. Nonetheless it was clear Iran would be in difficulty if either France, a known unreliable partner, or Russia (also unreliable if less so than France), were to renege on the delivery. So Iran was in principle willing to accept the third party escrow deal.
However, the issue then was HOW to make the fuel swap. The Vienna Group wanted Iran to ship out its LEU first, THEN take delivery of the fuel rods. This of course put Iran in exactly the same quandary as the original deal – its vulnerability to another country. Whereas the Vienna Group spun this request as a way for Iran to keep its LEU while getting fuel rods for the TRR.
This of course was complete nonsense. The IAEA had the LEU under seal in any event and would continue to do so until it was shipped out the country. Iran could not keep its LEU and receive the fuel rods without kicking out the IAEA and leaving the NPT, in essence, which clearly Iran is not prepared to do anytime soon, if at all. So the West’s spin on that was ridiculous.
Instead, the US used this breakdown in the process to push for more sanctions against Iran. ElBaradei specifically said on November 20, 2009, that Iran had not actually rejected the IAEA plan, as the news media had spun it, and that sanctions should not be applied.
On November 23, Iranian envoy Ali Ashgar Soltanieh explicitly said the issue was some sort of guarantees that the other governments would follow through on the deal and not renege, as France has done in the past.
By that time, however, as Kaveh L Afrasiabi reported in Asia Times Online on November 24, 2009, there was already a shift by the West to pushing for the fourth round of sanctions.
An interview with Soltanieh by Der Spiegel on November 25, 2009, included this exchange:
SPIEGEL: Ambassador Soltanieh, last Wednesday, your government announced that it would not transfer the enriched uranium stored at the nuclear facility in Natanz abroad so that it can be further refined there. In doing so, Iran backed out of an agreement that it had made at the nuclear talks held in Geneva in early October. Is this Tehran’s idea of building confidence?
Ali Asghar Soltanieh: I’m not sure how you arrived at this interpretation of the negotiations in Geneva. There, we stated that our research reactor in Tehran needed uranium that was 20 percent enriched in order to produce radioactive isotopes that could be used, for example, for radiation therapy in hospitals. We wanted to negotiate the concrete course of action in additional talks, and we still want that. But that’s up to the IAEA in Vienna, where I am the head of our delegation. We urgently need fresh supplies for our reactor — 200 hospitals are depending on it.
SPIEGEL: Turkey is trying to hammer out a compromise and is offering to store the uranium for Iran. But Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says that the leadership in Tehran is insisting that the uranium be exchanged for fuel within Iran.
Soltanieh: We need guarantees that we will get fuel in return for our uranium. Given the way we’ve been treated by the West over the last 30 years, we have plenty of reasons to be mistrustful.
At the same time, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a negative report about the Fordow plant that Iran had invited the IAEA to examine. ElBaradei dismissed concerns about the plant, indicating it was little more than “a hole in a mountain”, with some equipment in it, but no centrifuges and no nuclear material. However the US browbeat the IAEA BOG to issue a finding that this somehow “raised questions about other Iranian enrichment facilities”, despite the fact that no one knows if any exist. Iran warned at the time that if the Board took this step, Iran would be forced to reduce its cooperation with the IAEA to the minimum necessary under their Safeguards Agreement – which, note, did not REQUIRE them to disclose the Fordow facility until some time before nuclear materials were introduced in it. Since Iran is no longer under the AP, it was not required to reveal information about the facility.
Speculation about the “military purposes” of the facility were debunked by two physicists from The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Subsequent to that, David Albright, a well known expert in the field, apparently challenged that debunking. However, Albright’s own technical qualifications have been in some question for some time, as revealed by articles by former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter.
A recap of the situation as of November 27 was published by Sharmine Narwani in the Huffington Post.
As a result of the IAEA BOG action, Iran’s Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali-Akbar Salehi announced that Iran would build ten more potential enrichment sites.
On November 30, Nader Bagherzadeh and Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich asked the question: “Iran: Time to Leave the NPT?” pointing out the following:
Quote:
Since 2003, the IAEA has consistently failed its obligations towards Iran as defined by the 1974 Safeguards Agreement. It has failed to facilitate refueling of a small reactor in Tehran, used mostly for short-lived medical isotopes. It has cancelled several key technical assistance programs with Iran, some of them related to nuclear safety issues, under pressure from the US. At America’s behest, the IAEA has become a conventional weapon inspector agency, seeking information about national secrets of Iran related to missiles and conventional bomb making capabilities; which is completely outside of its jurisdiction, as spelled out in the 1974 agreement. In violation of Article 9 of the 1974 Agreement, the IAEA has shared Iran’s sensitive nuclear technology with member nations, as well as outside nuclear experts with dubious connections to Iran’s enemies. And most importantly, the Agency with tremendous pressure from US, has elevated a technical non-compliance matter to the level Chapter 7 UNSC sanctions, which should have been used when there is a clear indication of a nuclear weapons program.
The Agency’s clear violation of Iran’s rights under the NPT leads one to wonder if the IAEA is ever going to clear Iran’s file and revert it back to the normal status while the US is exerting pressure. It is unrealistic for Iran’s leadership to assume that by fully engaging the IAEA, sometime in the near future, this agency, working against the wishes of Obama’s administration, will clear Iran’s path to have nascent enrichment capability. After all, the so called “laptop” filled with mostly fabricated information against Iran’s nuclear programs did not show up until it was clear that the IAEA was going to declare 6 outstanding concerns on Iran’s past nuclear activities were no longer valid.
Although Obama has extended his hand towards Iran, the policy of “zero-enrichment” has not changed an iota from Bush’s policy. When Obama chose Gary Samore and Dennis Ross to handle Iran’s nuclear case, it was obvious that Obama did not have any major changes in mind, and the goal was to use a softer approach to gather more support for putting pressure, or as Ross calls it “bigger sticks.” Moreover, a recent trip by Ross to Beijing to convince Chinese leadership to sign up for more sanctions against Iran on behalf of Obama, shows that not only Ross was not marginalized after he was transferred from the State Department to the White House, but he is practically in the driver’s seat for Obama’s Iran policy.
In addition to the West’s shaping of IAEA’s illegitimate position on Iran’s nuclear file, relentless fabricated attacks by the western media has finally resulted in portraying Iran as an outlaw when it comes to the nuclear activities. The propaganda machine led by the likes of Fred Hiatt of Washington Post and Nicolas Goldberg of Los Angeles Times, have helped create such an environment that a recent Pew poll showed that more than 50% of Americans support a US military strike against Iran while the U.S. is in a quagmire in the graveyard of the empires – Afghanistan, and continues to be engaged in its sixth year war in Iraq.
The latest IAEA’s report which continued its demands from Iran to go beyond its obligations under the NPT safeguards and Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 is another misrepresentation of the truth by the Agency. Iran’s Majlis (parliament) never approved this code which requires reporting any nuclear project at the point of inception. It is ironic that a major NPT member (i.e. US) is allowed to threaten Iran’s nuclear facilities with military strikes, but when Iran rightfully wants to prevent that from happening by using passive defensive majors, she is censured by the Board.
End Quote
On December 9, 2009, Gareth Porter published a recap of the situation in Counterpunch:
Iran’s Fuel for Conflict: Washington-Tehran nuclear deal hasn’t worked out
www dot campaigniran dot org/casmii/index.php?q=node/9032
Quote:
Talks between Tehran and the West were stalled for months over the question of uranium enrichment: Iran was allowed to do this under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) but forbidden to do so by UN Security Council resolutions. Then a possible solution emerged from an unexpected quarter. More than 40 years ago, the US had built a nuclear reactor in Tehran to produce radioisotopes for medical research. After the 1979 revolution and the severance of diplomatic relations with Washington, Iran had to look elsewhere for the supply of uranium enriched to 20% that it needed to operate this reactor. It obtained 23 kilograms from Argentina under an agreement signed in 1988, enough to feed the reactor until 2010.
With this date approaching, Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 2009, asking for help in purchasing fuel, which would be allowed under the provisions of the NNPT but would require that international sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programme be lifted.
On hearing of this request, the Obama administration decided on a strategy that would force Iran to divest itself of its stock of low-enriched uranium (LEU), then estimated at 1,500 kilograms. During a visit to Moscow in July 2009, Gary Samore, President Obama’s chief adviser on the Iranian issue, put forward a proposal that he had formulated with Bruce Reidel for the Brookings Institution in December 2008 (1). This would require Iran to send most of its stock of LEU to Russia to be enriched to 20%, which would set Iran’s nuclear programme back at least 12 months.
Then, just one week after agreeing to talks with the G5+1 (the US, France, the UK, Russia and China + Germany), Tehran informed the IAEA that it was building a second uranium enrichment facility near Qom, in addition to the plant at Natanz. The US, Britain and France denounced this action, suggesting that Iran had only informed the IAEA because it knew that western intelligence services were about to reveal the plant’s existence.
Tehran said it had complied with the NNPT’s time limits for informing the IAEA and insisted that the site was intended as a backup in the event of an Israeli air strike on the Natanz site, threats that Tel Aviv regularly makes and which Washington uses to exert pressure on Tehran. (Samore has advocated making use of these threats in his arm-wrestling matches with Iran.) And on 6 July 2009, in an interview with ABC, Vice-President Joseph Biden declared: “Israel can determine for itself, it’s a sovereign nation, what’s in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran.” Many observers saw this as a green light for an Israeli strike.
‘Confidence-building measure’
Whatever the truth may be, the revelations about the Qom site, which Iran allowed the IAEA inspectors to visit, encouraged the Obama administration to take a tough line at the G5+1 talks in Geneva on 1 October. This resulted in a proposal that Iran should send 80% of its LEU to Russia, after which it would go to France to be turned into fuel rods for the research reactor in Tehran. Presented as a “confidence-building measure”, the offer was intended to deprive Iran of most of its uranium reserves immediately, for 12 months or so, which would delay any technological breakthrough. Obama would have been able to claim an agreement as a diplomatic victory.
Washington suggested that this timeframe would allow the two sides to reach a broader agreement that would eliminate the possibility of Iran developing a bomb. But the logic behind this offer was faulty: the US continues to deny Iran the right to enrich uranium (which would allow it to develop nuclear weapons), yet Iran insists that its right to enrich uranium is not negotiable. And the issue would have to be addressed again in a year’s time, when Iran would once more have accumulated a large quantity of LEU.
Yet the Iranian negotiators did not reject the western proposal outright: they were under orders to be cooperative, to avoid a breakdown that might lead to fresh economic sanctions. But then Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, the senior US representative in Geneva, told reporters that the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili, had agreed that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of depleted uranium overseas. An empty promise: an Iranian negotiator, who asked to remain anonymous, told Reuters on 16 October that Iran had not agreed to the western plan, or even to its premises. Nor were the Iranian negotiators authorised to accept such a plan at the second round of talks scheduled for 19-21 October in Vienna, during a meeting of the IAEA.
The second round of talks revolved around a draft agreement prepared by the outgoing IAEA director general, Mohamed El Baradei, for 80% of Iran’s uranium stocks to be sent to Russia. A French diplomat confided to the Washington Post that this proposal was “not far” from the West’s ideal solution. On 21 October, the final day of the talks, the media claimed that Iran had agreed to the El Baradei plan. Iran’s IAEA representative, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, said the draft was “on the right track” but that his country would have to study the text carefully. El Baradei admitted it was necessary to wait for an answer from Tehran, where a public discussion swiftly began.
Scott: PLEASE NOTE THIS SECTION BELOW WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR MIS-APPREHENSION OF THE SITUATION:
Cheaper to buy from abroad
The former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who is now the speaker of the parliament, and Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the parliamentary committee on national security and foreign affairs, both insisted that it would be far cheaper for Iran to buy enriched uranium from abroad. They also explained that producing the 116 kilograms required for the medical research reactor would only require 750 kilograms of depleted uranium, not 1,500 kilograms as stated in the agreement.
There were more fundamental objections. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rival in the June presidential elections and a principal opponent since then, said that, if the conditions demanded by the El Baradei plan were met, the efforts of thousands of scientists would “go up in smoke”. Conservative parliamentarian Hesmatollah Falahatpisheh felt that any deal should be conditional on the lifting of economic sanctions, particularly those on raw uranium imports. And Mohsen Rezai, the conservative secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council (2), declared that Iran should retain 1,100 of its 1,500 kilograms of LEU.
Beyond their often violent differences, all Iran’s political factions are against the western proposal. They all believe that the El Baradei plan would deprive Iran of the leverage it has gained over the last few years.
Senior national security officials under the presidencies of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (1989-97), Mohammed Khatami (1997-2005) and Ahmedinejad admit that the object of accumulating LEU was always to force the US to engage in serious and comprehensive talks on matters of common interest. They point out that before the enrichment programme began, the US showed no interest in talks. The accumulation of LEU put Iran in a stronger position to negotiate. How could Iran give up this trump card without getting something in return?
Larijani and Boroujerdi’s positions have been widely misinterpreted as evidence of divisions within the Iranian leadership. The New York Times suggested that the Obama administration had scored a political point by dividing Iran’s political class. But this analysis rests on the assumption that Ahmedinejad had accepted the El Baradei plan, when he was mainly concerned with preventing a breakdown in the negotiations.
SCOTT: PLEASE NOTE SENTENCE IMMEDIATELY ABOVE THIS LINE!
Call for guarantees
Behind the scenes, a new consensus was being formed between the government and the opposition. Mousavi’s denunciation of the western plan came on 29 October, the same day that Iran published its counterproposal that the uranium should be sent abroad in batches, the second only being shipped when the first was returned. The state news agency IRNA called the “simultaneous exchange” feature of the counterproposal a “red line” in the negotiating position, Iran fearing that any uranium it sent abroad would never be returned. This matches Boroujerdi’s insistence on 26 October that the LEU should be sent to Russia in batches and call for “guarantees” that it would be returned.
Ambassador Soltanieh confirmed, in an interview given to Press TV on 18 November, that Iran wanted a “100% guarantee” that the enriched uranium would be returned, pointing out that Iran had paid for fuel before the 1979 revolution. But after the revolution it had received neither the fuel nor a refund. Iran also insisted that part of the uranium for the medical research reactor should be obtained through commercial transactions. Rafsanjani, a powerful opposition figure, suggests that Iran could enrich uranium to 20% if the LEU sent abroad was not returned.
Although the Iranian counterproposal eliminated everything about the El Baradei plan that made it attractive to the Obama administration and its allies, the Iranian negotiators carefully avoided rejecting the plan outright. They reportedly expressed a “positive attitude” and a willingness to discuss it further. To avoid a breakdown in the talks, Ahmedinejad made yet another offer: to leave roughly a quarter of its LEU under IAEA seals on Iranian soil until the uranium for its medical research reactor is delivered. But Obama’s warning on 15 November that time for negotiations was running out suggests that a new cycle of sanctions is about to begin.
If the talks do break down, it will be because of the logic behind the proposals put forward by Washington. Russia and China have been ambiguous in their support. As Samore suggests, Washington wants an agreement that it can present as a diplomatic victory over Iran. Samore believed that the administration would have done better to try a broader discussion that took account of Iran’s political and economic interests. In the end, the Obama administration seems to have adopted a position that makes it impossible to achieve an agreement acceptable to Tehran and move towards a global settlement with the US. If this is the case, the US may have started down the long, dark corridor to confrontation.
End Quote
On December 13 or 14, 2009, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki offered that Iran would swap 400kg of LEU for fuel rods immediately. The US predictably slammed the offer, demanding that Iran agree to the original Vienna Group offer. By this time, ElBaradei’s suggestion of using Turkey as an escrow country was tossed by the wayside. NONE of the articles since ElBaradei made the suggestion have mentioned that offer, only the original offer to send LEU to Russia and then to France. The alternative offerings of Iran were totally dismissed by this time.
On December 19, 2009, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottak re-iterated Iran’s desire to consider the offered fuel swaps.
Before Christmas, 2009, the US demanded once again that Iran accept the offer or face sanctions. Iran rejected this deadline on December 14, 2009.
But on December 26, Iran offered to make the swap in Turkey.
On December 31, an Iranian official said Iran agreed to make the swap in Turkey, although Japan and Brazil were also considered possible locations (though hardly likely given their locations.)
On January 3, 2010, Iran issued an ultimatum to the West: accept the swap offer within one month or Iran would begin enrichment to 20% to produce its own fuel roads for the TRR.
On January 20, 2010, Iran issued a memo to the IAEA on the third party swap proposal, whose details were not made public, but supposedly was essentially the same as earlier statements. The US immediate condemned that response as not being a formal response and as “inadequate”.
On the 22nd, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki denied that Iran had rejected the swap proposal, which is how the Iran memo had been spun by the press.
Meanwhile Germany’s Merkel pressed for new sanctions, as did the US where Congress took up new US sanctions by the end of January.
On January 31, the Iranian Foreign Minister said that talks with Brazil at Davos had raised “new ideas”. This is presumably the start of what became the Turkey-Brazil deal.
On February 3, 2010, Ahmadinejad accepted the third party swap deal, saying it was “no big deal” and that the fuel swap would only take 4 or 5 months. The US State Department dismissed these comments as “not a formal response” and said the fuel swap “could take years”. The French and Germans also denounced his statements as “buying time”. In an interview, Ahmadinejad said the following:
“Some people at home made a noise and said they would take our fuel and not give us anything. And we responded, if they don’t, what happens? Whose words will be proven? If they do not fulfill their obligations, it will be proved that we were right and the hands of the atomic agency and the signatories of the contract will be exposed and then we will do our own things.”
In other words, Ahmadinejad was saying “Let’s call the West’s bluff.”
On February 7, 2010, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would begin 20% enrichment while at the same time remaining open to the fuel swap deal. This agrees with what Iran had said at the end of 2009 – that if the West did not accept Iran’s offer, Iran would begin enriching on its own. It was seen as a gamble to pressure the West into accepting the offer, a gamble which could backfire if it resulted in Iran being unable to enrich enough uranium to supply the TRR. The IAEA was invited to observe the process.
On February 10, Ali Akbar Salehi stated that Iran would cease enrichment to 20% if they could get the fuel elsewhere.
On February 90, 2010, the Leveretts recapped the situation on this site, under the title: Just which country Is “Playing for time” in nuclear diplomacy with Iran?
Quote: “Of course, the Obama Administration and its European partners have effectively rejected these Iranian positions—precisely because accepting them would mean that the Obama Administration would not have a year or more to sort through what it is prepared to do regarding the prospective substance of U.S.-Iranian engagement. Instead, the Administration would have to make strategic choices and develop real positions on important issues much sooner than it had contemplated. And, rather than do that, the Obama Administration is moving to embrace the same counterproductive and feckless policies aimed at isolating and pressing Tehran that the George W. Bush Administration employed.”
On February 24, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast was interviewed in which he said:
Quote:
“Tehran seems to be waiting for new offers from West. But Western powers are standing firm on the October 2009 proposal. Aren’t the chances of an agreement minimized?
There is no vague point about the nuclear fuel Tehran’s research reactor needs. The facility was constructed by Americans before the revolution and US itself supplied its fuel. We bought the material once after the revolution from Argentina. The reactor is used for humanitarian medical purposes. Eight-hundred fifty-thousand patients need the products of this reactor. Everything that revolves around this reactor is peaceful.
As an IAEA member, Iran has certain rights. One of them is that its peaceful nuclear demands should be met. So the IAEA has to supply the nuclear fuel for Tehran’s reactor. This is our right. Countries which do not possess the nuclear fuel cycle know-how should expect IAEA’s help. The agency should have paved the way for our access to the fuel, but with the unreasonable concerns of some powerful countries about our peaceful nuclear program, which is political driven of course, it turned into a nuclear swap deal.
Iran has basically accepted the exchange offer to create a better situation for interaction. But our country has its own terms and conditions since it doesn’t fully trust the other side. We had three ways to supply the fuel we need: to purchase it, to receive it in exchange of our low-enriched uranium or produce it inside.
Tehran’s nuclear fuel will be consumed within a year, so we are facing time limits. We spent several months on negotiations over the fuel and we didn’t gain any results. If we want to spend another several months with no achievements, how could we be accountable to those people? Unfortunately, Iran’s humanitarian and medical demands have become pawn to politics. So we have come to the decision that we should start 20 percent uranium enrichment inside so as not to lose more time. At this point, we are receiving different proposals from various countries. We will examine them all and if they serve our demands, they will definitely be welcome. Otherwise, we continue 20 percent uranium production.
Moreover, it is not only the Tehran reactor that needs fuel. In our development programs, we are going to construct nuclear facilities to meet our agricultural, medical and energy needs. These are all peaceful purposes and we will achieve them through cooperation with IAEA. These power plants naturally need fuel and we should plan for that. The more produced inside the better it is for us in terms of costs. The remaining should be purchased from other countries. We are ready for purchase and exchange.
End Quote
On February 25, Iran formally responded to the swap deal, re-iterating its requirements which were already dismissed by the West.
Also on the 25h, Ali Larijani explicitly said that Iran’s program would follow “the Japan model”, in that “Japan has nuclear technology but does not possess any nuclear weapons and Iran will follow the same path in its nuclear program.”
On March 1, 2010, Ali Asghar Soltanieh reminded the IAEA in a letter of three occasions in which the West did not live up to deals related to the Iranian nuclear energy program, in which the US, Germany and France all failed to live up to their agreements with Iran.
Also on March 1, 2010, Japan offered to supply 20% enriched uranium to Iran for use in the TRR, and Iran said it would that add that proposal to its agenda.
On March 2, 2010, Iran again offered the fuel swap deal in a letter to the new IAEA head Amano.
On March 18, Iran again offered to do a one-shot fuel swap inside Iran, saying “”What we are saying now is that we are ready to deliver the total amount of fuel in one go, on condition that the exchange take place inside Iran and simultaneously.”
On March 19, the Leveretts on this site discussed “Is the U.S. “Offer” to Iran on Medical Isotopes a Pretext for More Coercive Action?” which explains the Iranian isotope problem in some detail.
On April 5, 2010, Iran re-iterated AGAIN its willingness to do a fuel swap on Iranian soil.
On April 19, 2010, the Leveretts wrote on this site “Can the Obama Administration take a deal with Iran on the Tehran research reactor?”, saying:
Quote:
Although the Administration continues to depict Iran as having rejected the possibility of working with the international community to refuel the TRR, this is not an accurate representation of reality.
Since October 2009, the Islamic Republic has accepted “in principle” the idea of a “swap” deal for refueling the TRR—that is, a deal in which some part of Iran’s current stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) would be exchanged for new fuel assemblies for the TRR. Iranian officials—including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki—have reiterated this position on numerous occasions over the past six months.
That this remains Iran’s position on the TRR issue was confirmed yesterday in Washington by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, at a press conference at the Turkish Embassy (see Ben Katcher’s post) and at an invitation-only session at the Council on Foreign Relations. At the Council, Davotuğlu was adamant in his insistence that a diplomatic solution to the current nuclear impasse is “still possible—on the TRR especially”. Davutoğlu “has traveled to Iran five times since August and spoken for more than 14 hours with senior Iranian officials and politicians, including the Supreme Leader, in an effort to broker a compromise” on the issue. Thus, he speaks with both deep knowledge about and a nuanced appreciation of Iranian negotiating positions.
Davutoğlu recounts that, initially, the Iranians “were insisting on a simultaneous exchange in Iran, in installments”. But, while distrust of Western intentions and good faith prompted Tehran to insist on a simultaneous exchange of LEU for finished fuel, Davutoğlu firmly attests to the genuineness of the Iranians’ commitment to a “swap” deal: “If we had 116 kilograms [of finished fuel for the TRR] today, I assure you that tomorrow I will get you 1,200 [kilograms of LEU] from Iran”. And, according to the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Iranians have over time become “more flexible” on the precise terms they would accept for a deal on refueling the TRR. He declined, however, to provide particular details of the current Iranian position.
End Quote
On April 27, 2010, Brazil urged a revival of the swap deal.
On May 5, 2010, Ahmadinejad welcomed Brazil’s offer of assistance in mediating the issue, but Brazil said the President of Brazil had not made a formal offer.
On May 5, 2010, in an interview with Charlie Rose, Ahmadinejad said the following:
Quote:
MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD (via translator): Let me give you a short history of an issue on my mind here that also involves our discussion. According to the rules of IAEA, all member states must give other member states, those who possess the fuel and the technology for fuel production. This has to be done without any preconditions.
Now, we haven`t had a reactor in Tehran that develops medical isotopes that basically meets the needs of 800,000 patients in Iran. It meets to the grade level of 20 percent, a fission grade level of 20 percent.
Now our fuel is almost ending. And so we requested the IAEA to provide us with some more fuel. According to the regulations of the IAEA they have to provide that fuel to us and get paid by us. The IAEA instead of sending out requests to purchase the fuel to all countries decided to only send the request to two member states, the United States and Russia.
And acting against the spirit of the IAEA, they said that they will give the 20 percent fuel, but in return demand that Iran give a lower enriched grade fuel to countries abroad as an exchange. And we said very well.
And then negotiations happened and they were moving forward. But then some demands were set in place that were not right. We are the ones that want to buy the fuel. We have to have conditions, not those who want to sell it, because those who want to sell it have to provide the fuel basically within the framework of the NPT regulations without any preconditions.
And they came and said they want an exchange and fuel, and we said sure enough we can do that. But then later on they came and said we want Iran`s enriched uranium to be bought outside so that Iran moves farther from the ability to build a nuclear bomb.
Once that statement was made the people in Iran felt there was insincerity involved and there is something not quite fair about the process. And they reacted and prevented the process from moving forward.
Now today we wish to continue with talks but the agreement that is arrived at has to be mutual, based on mutual exchange. We are agreeing to have an exchange, and we had agreed to it beforehand as well, but, again, it has to be a mutual agreement in order to carry out an exchange, not for one group to say it`s my way or the –
End Quote
On May 7, 2010, Turkey said it was continuing talks with Brazil on the Iran issue.
On May 10, Iran re-iterated its desire for a fuel swap, with “concrete assurances”, and said the Brazil-Turkey fuel swap proposal was feasible.
On May 11, Iran announced that Turkey and Brazil had a new proposal, but Brazil said it was not yet formal.
On the weekend of May 15, Brazil’s President went to Tehran. The Leveretts commented here as “Lula and Erdogan go to Tehran”, pointing out the negative responses from the Washington Very Serious People. Among others, Hillary Clinton was quoted elsewhere as saying: ““We will not get any serious response out of the Iranians until after the Security Council acts.”
On that Saturday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman again re-iterated Iran’s need for guarantees.
After 18 hours of negotiations that Sunday, Turkey announced the deal was done.
The Joint Declaration is here:
Nuclear Swap Agreement between Iran, Turkey and Brazil
www dot campaigniran dot org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10032
The deal specifically says Iran will transfer 1200 kg of LEU to Turkey within one month of agreement by the Vienna Group, where it would be observed by Iranian and IAEA personnel, and then would receive 120kg of fuel within one year. If the conditions were not fulfilled, Turkey would return the LEU to Iran.
Almost immediately, Clinton dismissed the entire exercise as “meaningless” and announced new sanctions on Iran.
Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, said “We need to be clear; the TRR proposal had nothing do with Iran’s sanctioned activities to date, and its nuclear obligations.”
Cyrus Safdari on Iran Affairs quote Dr. Gary Sick on the overall US reaction:
Quote:
I now have approval to quote from Dr. Gary Sick’s post on the Gulf2000 Project members-only site (I should point out that at the time, I was hesitant about Gary Sick’s belief that the US uranium swap offer contained an implicit recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment. I think the issue is now clear: the US still insists on zero enrichment in Iran, a deliberately unachievable standard intended to prevent a resolution of the standoff.)
“Shortly after the initial announcement of the Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear deal, a G2K member with extensive diplomatic experience wrote to me privately, predicting that Washington would try to reject the deal by “raising the bar,” i.e. making demands that were not in the original proposal. He asked if I would bet against his prediction. I said No Way.
“G2K member Jim Lobe has helpfully provided the full transcript of yesterday’s press briefing by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley…. The text indicates that my friend was correct in his prediction and that I should be happy I did not accept his wager.
“The transcript is pretty opaque, with lots of diplomatese and tergiversations, but the essence of the US position seems to be captured in Crowley’s opening talking points: “. . .the United States continues to have concerns about the arrangement. The joint declaration does not address the core concerns of the international community. Iran remains in defiance of five UN Security Council resolutions, including its unwillingness to suspend enrichment operations.” Shortly thereafter he adds that “public statements today suggest that the TRR deal is unrelated to it ongoing enrichment activity. In fact, they are integrally linked.”
“If I understand him correctly (and it appears that he does not want to make the point too explicit), the problem with the Brazil-Turkey-Iran uranium swap deal is that it does not provide for Iran to suspend its enrichment activities, and that suspension is “integrally linked” to the TRR refueling.
“Just for the sake of simple honesty, it really should be pointed out that the original swap agreement, tentatively accepted in October, included no such linkage. If it had, Iran would never have accepted it even provisionally. In fact, that was the real surprise of the October offer, for it was widely interpreted as a tacit US acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich uranium. It was, after all, LEU produced at Natanz that was to be swapped for new fuel cells, and there was no provision in the agreement that Iran was required to cease such enrichment.
“So now the refueling of the research reactor is “integrally linked” with the suspension of enrichment activities. Near the end of the transcript, when he was being pressed about whether the US would be willing to sit down with Iran to discuss the swap, Crowley says: “Iran has to come forward ultimately and indicate that it is willing per U.N. Security Council resolutions to suspend its enrichment program while we work with Iran on how it can pursue its fundamental right to civilian nuclear energy.”
“In other words, Iran must agree to suspend enrichment before talks can begin. In the meantime, efforts would proceed to present a sanctions resolution in the UNSC. Why does that position remind me of a previous administration?
“As for Brazil and Turkey, Crowley is hard pressed to conceal his annoyance. When asked if perhaps they might be incorporated in any negotiations with Iran on the grounds that “They might be able to coax more out of Iran than you have been able to,” he ignores the suggestion and observes merely that these two countries “are on the Security Council and they’re going to be presented with a draft resolution at some point in the near future. They have assumed the responsibility to see if this situation can be resolved.” He reiterates that the US “respects” their efforts but makes it unmistakably clear that it does not support them in any way. According to Crowley, the US government has made no effort to contact Brazil and Turkey since the Tehran deal, and the US is continuing its effort on sanctions unabated.
“In short, my friend was prescient, and I would certainly have lost the bet.”
Or as another commentator points out:
“Just one week ago US officials reiterated that the fuel swap proposal is still on the table and that its terms cannot be altered. Now that Iran has accepted those terms, Clinton says it’s not enough.”
End Quote
Do I need to go on? I’ve just plowed through nearly 40 pages of links to articles. I think the above should make it clear that Iran has been quite reasonable concerning the fuel swap situation.
So I will re-iterate what I said at the beginning of this painfully long post:
ElBaradei apparently did in fact propose the third party escrow country as part of the swap deal sometime in November 2009, sometime after Clinton had demanded that Iran accept the original deal involving shipping most of its LEU out of the country to Russia and hence to France for reprocessing and then delivering the fuel rods to Iran later.
This proposal was from ElBaradei, NOT the Vienna Group, although the Vienna Group subsequently acknowledged it. However, the Vienna Group SINCE THEN has NOT re-iterated Turkey as an acceptable third part escrow source, but has insisted on Iran complying with the original draft proposal which specifies Russia, and then France, as the sequence for turning Iran’s LEU into fuel rods for the TRR. There has also been NO acceptance of Iran’s further offers and requests for guarantees that the deal would be honored by the West.
END EARLIER POST
Please note that highlighted points in the post with reference to who argued what on the Iranian side. There was NO fracture in the Iranian position. Everyone was on the same page, i.e., that there could be no exchange without assurances that Iran would get its fuel.
kooshy,
Re your theory of “Jang-e Akhondi” and statement: “You can be the good cup and the bad cup all at the same time, can you see if you can apply that to the current situation in Iran?”
I agree that this is a possibility in the current situation. What raises my scepticism is that the opposition of Larijani, leading conservatives, and the scepticism of the Supreme Leader — as Farideh Farhi detailed in her December 2009 review of events — pretty much blocked Ahmadinejad’s desire for advanced discusssions with the US.
One possible response is that the US and European powers had set impossible conditions on Iran. However, very little changes in the US-Europe position between the Geneva talks at the start of October and the failure to hold the scheduled technical talks at the end of the month. So why, if that position was unacceptable at the end of October, had the President pursued direct discussions at the start of the month?
The different points of view inside Iran were not the only reason for the stalling out of discussions, of course, but I think it is difficult — again, see Farhi’s article — to rule it out as a contributing factor.
And so that is why I keep a close eye on current position to see if this is good cop/bad cop (Jang-e Akhondi) or different views on the talks with the US.
Thanks for the discussion,
Scott
Brill: “Those are wishes. Prayers.”
And telling Iran to “disclose more” is what?
Hypocrite.
Neither Arnold not I believe the US is going to change its approach to Iran because Iran’s nuclear program is not the issue at all. Which makes your repeated nonsense about disclosing more to be not only ridiculous but insulting.
I have repeatedly said that I am fairly sure there will be a war with Iran. It’s the Pollyannas who think the US AND Israel both are going to back off and accept Iranian enrichment who are not realistic.
But it is important to be CORRECT about what the issues are and what is at stake. And that is why is it is important to point out that the US is wrong and WHY it is wrong and what the US hidden agenda is.
Putting the onus on Iran to “disclose more” as if that would accomplish anything at all is the height of hypocrisy.
You haven’t come up with ONE SINGLE ITEM that Iran could do to “disclose more” than it already has over the years. Neither have you come up with ONE SINGLE OPTION that would have any effect whatsoever on the US’ position towards Iran.
For you to now complain that we aren’t offering “solutions” is completely hypocritical.
Eric,
It is the US that must wake up to the reality of real life or suffer the same fate of previous world powers. The world is changing and the US simply doesn’t have the ability to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees. In fact, it’s the Americans who are facing catastrophic failure and who are being brought to their knees in Afghanistan and failure in Afghanistan will have extraordinary consequences for the US.
The Iranian government has learned a lesson from the Khatami era and that is that appeasing the US doesn’t get you anywhere. In fact, it only serves to makes the American government more arrogant and demanding. The events after the presidential election in Iran and the massive rallies held throughout the country in support of the Islamic Republic, show that the full force of US soft power along with the American and European backed attempt to overthrow the will of the people and to steal the election, has only strengthened the resolve of the Iranian people and has created more contempt for western powers. Sanctions and hard power will have the same results and it will force the Iranian government to pursue its own policies of subtle confrontation. Each step towards confrontation will only make thing more difficult for Washington at a time when people in the region are witnessing the dramatic decline of the US Empire and the rapid rise of new powers.
Kooshy,
“If I remember correctly, it was after the Tehran declaration that Eric started to understand what is the significance for having an stock pile of enriched U, therefore suspecting that deep down Iran would like to maintain a nuclear capability, from there on because of a bigger cause the morality and legality was out the window.”
My views have been much the same for a long time, Kooshy. I’m a great believer in morality and legality, as much or more than anyone who posts on this website. I wish the US government behaved as if it did too.
But that’s not the behavior I’m seeing, and I don’t think it does Iran any good whatsoever simply to insist that the US government must change its ways, or even to expect or hope that that will occur. I rarely see a reason to expect improvement; more often, I see reason to expect the opposite.
I’m amazed – frankly, appalled – at how often some commenters simply declare that the US ought to recognize Iran’s enrichment rights, or that Israel ought to give up its nuclear weapons and help to usher in a nuclear-free Middle East, or that the US and other Western countries ought to perform their NPT obligations by helping Iran get its nuclear reactors up and running as quickly and efficiently as possible – and then close their post with a self-satisfied flourish that suggests it’s enough simply to wish such wishes and they will come true.
Those are wishes. Prayers. They don’t solve anything at all. And to offer them to readers as if they are anything more than that is irresponsible and pointless. Everyone here agrees with those sentiments. But this is not a popularity contest. The fact that someone thinks it’s irresponsible and pointless to toss out wishes as if they were workable solutions does not mean that the person “hates Iran.” It means simply that he is limiting himself to solutions that might actually work, solutions that take into account, for example, that the US is not going to recognize Iran’s enrichment rights (at least not soon), that Israel is not going to give up its nuclear weapons, that the US is not going to ship nuclear engineers to Iran to help it work out the bugs in its nuclear reactors.
What is the point of all this? To tell Iran and its people how very, very right they are to feel mistreated by the US – maybe to add that they’re even more mistreated than they themselves recognize and that we don’t like it one little bit and aren’t we wonderful human beings to feel the way we do? To appeal to the US government’s better nature so that its mistreatment of Iran stops immediately if not sooner? To say, for perhaps the millionth time but as if it’s never been said before, that the US must stop marching to the beat of its Israeli drummers?
Or is the point to recognize, whether we like it or not, that the US government often behaves very badly toward Iran, in ways that may not reflect the true good nature of the American people but nevertheless is the way their government behaves and is likely to continue to behave – and then to suggest how Iran can most effectively deal with that behavior? In other words, to deal with real life?
It seems to me that that’s the point.
Brill: A ridiculous set of questions. I’m sure Arnold will answer as I do: Iran needs to do nothing at except what it is doing.
Once again BY DEFINITION Iran by mastering the full fuel cycle has the CAPABILITY – NOTE: NOT NECESSARILY INTENT! – to “break out” and construct a nuclear weapon (assuming it has the knowledge of the technology necessary to make a nuclear weapon.)
What part of this don’t you understand?
It has absolutely NOTHING to do with “stockpiling nuclear fuel far in excess of what it needs, so that it can be just like Japan” or “building dozens of bombs, missing only the fuel.”
Neither Arnold or I have ever said that Iran “needs” to do ANY of that. And your continual misrepresentation of our position is becoming irritating and stupid.
Arnold,
Sometimes I’m not sure we disagree.
I’ve very often said that whatever Iran learns while carrying out its peaceful nuclear energy program, it should keep careful notes of. I’m confident you agree.
This means we disagree, if at all, only when it comes to nuclear-related activities in which Iran might engage that are unrelated to its peaceful nuclear energy program – activities which, therefore, must have some other purpose – for example, stockpiling nuclear fuel far in excess of its needs, building fuel-free nuclear bombs, whatever.
If you don’t contemplate that Iran will engage in such “unrelated” activities, then we agree entirely. That would be nice indeed to learn.
But I’m not sure that’s what you have in mind. I can’t help but wonder whether you feel that Iran should strongly consider doing just a bit more – necessary or not – to be fully prepared for that magic moment – a moment we all hope will never come, of course – when Iran decides it’s time to build and use a nuclear bomb.
So the question ultimately is a simple one:
What, exactly, do you think Iran should be doing, over and above what’s appropriate to carry out its its peaceful nuclear energy program, to prepare for that magic moment?
Should it be stockpiling nuclear fuel far in excess of what it needs, so that it can be just like Japan? Should it be building dozens of bombs, missing only the fuel, since the IAEA must not care about that since Iran’s Safeguards Agreement doesn’t cover bomb-building? Should it continue to keep the IAEA guessing about what it’s up to by not disclosing what other countries disclose (including its role model: Japan)?
Or should it do nothing at all “extra” to fully prepare for that magic moment?
If the answer is “nothing at all,” then we’re in full agreement, and I’m sure you will be as pleased as I to recognize that. But if the answer is not “nothing at all,” what, exactly, is it? What should Iran be doing?
And whatever “extra” it is that you think Iran should be doing, do you think Ayatollah Khamenei and Iran’s other leaders agree with you that Iran should be doing those “extra” things? What has Ayatollah Khamenei said that makes you think that?
Funny
Ahmadinejad Was My Boyfriend!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUKHWnpsOL8&feature=player_embedded
Jordan presses ahead with energy programme despite US disapproval
en dot ammonnews dot net/article.aspx?articleNO=9423
This should be fun – can’t wait for the US to declare “all options are on the table” for Jordan.
Scott Horton Interviews Trita Parsi
antiwar dot com/radio/2010/08/24/trita-parsi-3/
MP3 Link: dissentradio dot com/radio/10_08_23_parsi_donate.mp3
By the way, for those interested in the nonsense being spewed by the media on Iran, check out the daily “Iran Talking Points” being posted from LobeLog by Ali Gharib on Antiwar.com.
Here’s Wednesday’s load of nonsense summarized:
www dot antiwar dot com/blog/2010/08/25/wednesday-iran-talking-points-3/
Take note that this stuff is coming out EVERY DAY in some major US newspapers and magazines.
Brill: Can’t seem to respond in any substantive fashion at all now, can you? Just random nonsense.
And I do mean nonsense because obviously Iran cares what the US thinks precisely because the US is threatening to bomb Iran. And THEREFORE Iran’s rights are an issue.
Meanwhile, here is what one gets from the scum in Israel:
Peres warns IAEA chief of Iran nuclear threat
www dot haaretz dot com/news/diplomacy-defense/peres-warns-iaea-chief-of-iran-nuclear-threat-1.310165?localLinksEnabled=false
Quote:
“Iran jeopardizes Israel and the rest of the world, as it threatens to use nuclear weapons,” said Peres told Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Jerusalem.
End Quote
Now, really, this is just asinine. Since when has Iran threatened to use nuclear weapons it doesn’t even have?
This is the sort of bovine excrement that is passing for Iranian issue discourse these days. The more Israel brays this nonsense, the more people are going to just roll their eyes. Just who IS more fanatical here? The “mad mullahs” or the “krazy kikes”? (Apologies for the Jewish slur, it was just too irresistible given the “mad mullah” nonsense.)
This sort of stuff is intended for the morons of the world who still believe Saddam Hussein was going to launch biological weapons from drones over New York City and who thought Iraq was sixty miles off the coast of Florida (yes, we have people like that in this country.)
Arnold,
“Iran’s rights are set by the documents it’s signed, not by what you generously or Obama slightly less generously decide Iran needs.”
You’re correct about that, as I’ve always said.
If Iran’s objective is only to prove to the US that Iran has truth and justice on its side (though I’m not sure why Iran cares what the US thinks), then our job is done. If we’re also concerned that the United States some day might bomb Iran because the US government thinks much the way I think it does, then maybe we may be kicking ourselves some day. We might conclude we’d been a bit naive to imagine that the US would care about Iran’s “rights” as much as we feel it should.
If that happens, I guess it won’t matter all that much. We’ll still be alive.
Kooshy: “If I remember correctly, it was after the Tehran declaration that Eric started to understand what is the significance for having an stock pile of enriched U, therefore suspecting that deep down Iran would like to maintain a nuclear capability, from there on because of a bigger cause the morality and legality was out the window.”
You may be correct, but I tend to think Eric came into the discussion with the intent to discriminate against Iran based on nothing more than his dislike of the country. The depth of his intellectual dishonesty in misrepresenting the positions of Arnold and myself and his complete inability to establish any rational argument as to how “disclosing more” would work to help Iran or WHAT Iran could disclose clearly show he had a hidden agenda which it took Arnold and I weeks to drag out of him.
Do not be fooled by his apparent “reasonableness”. There is nothing “reasonable” about his positions. Any statements he makes about how he supports Iran’s right to a “peaceful nuclear program” are just window dressing and red herrings. Arnold and I have established that he fundamentally believes Iran wants nuclear weapons despite all evidence to the contrary and therefore he wishes to discriminate against Iran without any legal or rational basis.
Everyone needs to keep in mind the fundamental facts about the NPT. Its purpose is NOT to certify that any given country’s nuclear program is “peaceful” or that any given country does not have the knowledge or technology to construct a nuclear weapon. Its purpose is solely to serve as an early warning system to detect WHEN a country is actively engaged in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Its procedures then allow for the IAEA to call in the UN Security Council which is supposed to take appropriate steps to dissuade the country involved from making those weapons. The UNSC in turn has specific protocols it must follow to do that, including establishing that the country in question is an immediate threat to regional peace. Following that, the UN may impose sanctions, and following the failure of those sanctions, the UN may authorize military attack AGAIN ONLY IF the country is an IMMEDIATE threat to regional peace.
The UN couldn’t do that in the case of Iraq. How much less can it justify this in the case of Iran?
NONE of this applies to Iran which has been CERTIFIED by the IAEA as NOT manufacturing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the IAEA has been unable to demonstrate despite years of effort that Iran HAS a nuclear weapons program even in the sense of accumulating the technical knowledge to build a weapon. The IAEA merely has “questions” based on evidence of a questionable provenance provided by the US (and to many person’s suspicions, Israel.)
People need to keep this stuff in mind and not allow the dissemblers like Brill to put the onus on Iran to prove its case. There IS NO case to prove! It is up to the US to provide evidence of the contrary.
Brill: “Iran’s already agreed that the spent Bushehr fuel will be returned to Russia – not quite the US, but close enough for our purposes.”
As Arnold noted, these are two entirely different situations. Bushehr is essentially a Russian project, not even an Iranian project. It is run by Russian technicians, and the deal Iran struck with Russia is that Russia will extract the spent fuel rods and reprocess them in Russia.
Of course, Russia delayed and delayed and delayed the implementation of Bushehr over and over again until the Iranians were apoplectic. Not to mention the numerous times the US, France and Germany screwed over Iran repeatedly in denying it technology for its nuclear energy program, in violation of the NPT which specifically states that the NWS MUST assist the Non-NWS in the implementation of peaceful nuclear energy programs.
Obviously, this is why Iran would not like to arbitrarily hand over its LEU stock to a hostile power – the US or a close US ally – without assurances it could get it back if said hostile power reneged on its agreements – as, for example, the US reneged on the Agreed Framework with North Korea, failing to deliver fuel oil shipments and dragging its feet on the construction of the light water reactors promised to North Korea (not to mention the famous “Axis of Evil” speech). And this reneging occurred under Clinton, not Bush.
Anyone who can’t understand why Iran has deep concerns over the independence of its nuclear energy program is an idiot.
Arnold
“If Iran does not want its stockpile, it will take the US up on its offer and commit to giving it away.”
Arnold-
If I remember correctly, it was after the Tehran declaration that Eric started to understand what is the significance for having an stock pile of enriched U, therefore suspecting that deep down Iran would like to maintain a nuclear capability, from there on because of a bigger cause the morality and legality was out the window.
But I wonder why would he think that US will never attack a non nuclear Iran, and if US did attack a non nuclear Iran (like for past seven years on daily bases US has threaten to attack Iran even with tactical NB) why he thinks Iran should remaine defenseless to such an attack.
Eric:
Iran does not have the option of powering Bushehr by itself. Iran accepted Russia’s terms to fuel Bushehr but has not given up its LEU stockpile which, unlike the Russian Bushehr fuel, Iran made itself.
If the US makes the offer, or asks Iran to commit to transforming its urnaium to a form that cannot be further enriched and Iran accepts, then you were right. I don’t expect Iran to accept because I expect that I’m right. Japan may by the same token give away its stock. Neither country has any more obligation to than the other. Both have the same rights to keep stocks and to have material and technology domestically that could be used to make a weapon.
I’ll go over this again. Japan’s leaders say they do not want to make nuclear weapons. They are not lying. Unless something stupid and unexpected happens, Japan will never build a weapon. But if somehow in the unpredictable future, some country provokes Japan, Japan has the option to respond. Japan does not have to relinquish this option and will not.
Iran’s leaders say they do not want to make a weapon. They are not lying. Unless something stupid and unexpected happens, Iran will never build a weapon. But if somehow in the unpredictable future, some country provokes Iran, for example the US arranges troops to occupy Khuzestan the way it occupied Iraq and Afghanistan or Israel attacks a civilian Muslim population with nuclear weapons, Iran has the option to respond. Iran has ratified nothing and can ratify the AP and still will have ratified nothing that requires it to relinquish this option and it will not relinquish this option.
Japan does not make you uncomfortable. Iran does. Iran’s rights are set by the documents its signed, not by what you generously or Obama slightly less generously decide Iran needs. You’re discriminating against Iran and your arguments that you are not are not worth making.
Arnold,
“If Iran does not want its stockpile, it will take the US up on its offer and commit to giving it away. If not, I’m right and you’re wrong.”
Iran’s already agreed that the spent Bushehr fuel will be returned to Russia – not quite the US, but close enough for our purposes. You must know this. Why do you make this argument?
RSH:
Once again, here you let slip your REAL belief: that Iran has a “strong desire to acquire nuclear weapons” – despite the fact that you JUST SAID that Khamenei DOES NOT have such a desire.
Well written. This probably bears emphasis.
Eric:
If you claim you aren’t discriminating against Iran, you’re just saying they should be treated differently, guess what, you’re still in agreement with the United States. Obama says the same thing. My statement that you share your position with the United States is accurate. You don’t have to believe that. I don’t think any reader of this exchange or any of the other exchanges is missing that.
About Khamenei not wanting nuclear capability – the US has graciously offered to take Iran’s stockpile of LEU off of its hands. Something you say nobody has offered to do for Japan’s plutonium stockpile. (Maybe they should ask China. I’m sure China would happily relieve Japan’s plutonium.) If Iran does not want its stockpile, it will take the US up on its offer and commit to giving it away. If not, I’m right and you’re wrong.
About disclosure – you say Khamenei would only fail to disclose more if he was stupid or naive like I am. Iran is not disclosing what you want it to and Khamenei is not stupid or naive. You’re wrong somewhere. I’ll let you figure out where.
Alan:
The link to the text of the Tehran declaration is there. I’ll wait for someone to read it and agree with you that it would have committed the US to accept Iranian enrichment and if such a person appears, I’ll go over the language of the text, and particularly what the US is to respond positively to and what a positive response to that would entail.
About domestic dissent. Iran rejected a bad deal. Iran would never have gotten TRR fuel without suspending enrichment under that deal. No party in Iran favors accepting those terms.
About fuel rods. You asked me a question directly and I answered as well as I could. The US believes it is being creative, as you seem to. Let’s get Iran to keep enriching but give up weapons capability. How about getting creative in this way – nothing Iran ratified requires it to give up nuclear weapons capability so Iran does not have to give up nuclear capability.
RSH
““This is PRECISELY the same concept that I believe Iran has engaged in – that development and deployment of nuclear weapons would DAMAGE Iran’s status in the region and hamper its efforts to become a regional influence.”
Richard- to give you an example of how this is calculated in Iranian regional strategy, a few days ago on one of the Persian language sites an excited Persian nationalist was questioning why all Iran’s new and old military hardware have this Islamic Arabic names, which as Scott may like it proves that this mullahs are Arabs and don’t care for Iran. The answer was obvious, could anyone imagine that the Shieh Persian Iran in an Arab Sunie dominated neighborhood, showing off her home made military hardware to its neighbors that have epically nationalistic Persian names, and provoke them further by not giving them the sense of being a part of this achievement. Does Iran need to increase the sense of insecurity among its neighbors, the answer is a big No.
Richard
“Interesting also that Japan in 1995 conducted a review of its nuclear policies and concluded: “This analysis reaffirmed previous studies, concluding that developing nuclear weapons would damage Japan’s national security and regional security.”
“This is PRECISELY the same concept that I believe Iran has engaged in – that development and deployment of nuclear weapons would DAMAGE Iran’s status in the region and hamper its efforts to become a regional influence.”
That is precisely correct US is not and will not be the reason for this decision the root is much deeper.
One wonder while the US, NATO, Israel and other Zionist-puppet regimes are busy collectively, tightening the noose around both Russia and China – what these two UNSC’s permanent members achieved by siding with the ZOGs in the US, France and Britain to pass fourth round of sanctions against the Islamic Republic? On the other hand, by voting against the new sanctions, Turkey and Brazil displayed that in addition to Iran, they’re the only countries independent of Zionist World Order.
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/08/26/zionists-in-china-russian-backyard/
Mr. Canning: “owes a great deal to Israeli efforts to distract attention from their wish to oppress the Palestinians without interference from Obama.”
I don’t believe that is Israel’s primary motivation, but I can agree that it certainly provides some bargaining points for Israel. There was some speculation last year I believe that Obama had made a deal to get harder on Iran in exchange for Israel slowing down settlement growth.
Of course, Israel had no such intention, they were merely lying as usual. Now the settlement freeze will be ended (not that it ever really existed), and the Palestinians have already said that is a red line for whether more talks would be held. Israel has said it is a done deal, so the talks will fail – and already Israel is claiming it is the PALESTINIANS who have torpedoed the talks by demanding Israel extend the settlement freeze.
Amazing. So Israel can continue to build settlements, claim there “is no negotiating partner”, and continue on with its ethnic cleansing and oppression exactly as before.
Meanwhile, Obama and the Palestinians get…what?
As for the Iran talks, they are almost certainly at a dead end. The US will insist on its original TRR offer, the Iranians will say no just like before, and the US will claim Iran is being “intransigent” and “belligerent”, etc., blah, blah.
So the US will continue to ramp up for war with Iran.
And Iran will get..what?
See a pattern? The US and Israel act in lockstep, always, furthering their hidden agendas while fools argue over the details of who did what first.
Alan: What’s “ho, ho” about it? This is the same position Iran has had forever.
Khamenei said there would be no talks unless the US acknowledged Iran’s right to enrichment and dropped sanctions.
The US has yet to do that OR to accept the talks referenced in that article.
Whether Khamenei has modified his position is not clear. The statements made merely re-iterate that Iran is ready for talks at any time which has always been the case.
Brill: “Arnold: “Eric you said, as your own opinion, that Iran should have fewer nuclear rights than Japan. That is in agreement with the US position.”
That’s misleading, Arnold.
I think both countries should be allowed to do what’s necessary to carry out a peaceful nuclear program. That is what their “rights” should be. How those equal rights get exercised may need to be different, depending on their circumstances, but the important point is that each of them is able to exercise its right to carry out a peaceful nuclear program.”
Oh, what sophistry. Arnold says you wish to discriminate against Iran differently than Japan. This is in effect the US position since the US does not threaten military action against Japan for having tons of LEU lying around and the technology and infrastructure to build a nuclear weapon any time Japan wants. Then you claim Arnold is “misleading”. Then you go on to say that both countries should have a “peaceful nuclear program” when in fact such a program BY DEFINITION as has been established dozens of times here allows such a program to have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. THEN you admit you want to discriminate between both countries on HOW they should achieve a “peaceful nuclear program”.
This is just bullshit intended to deceive people about your real position. It is YOU who are misleading everyone, not Arnold.
“Neither Iran nor Japan appears to want any more than that. I believe Ayatollah Khamenei, for example, when he says that that is all Iran wants and will ever want, just as I believe Japan’s leaders when they say the same thing. And I believe that pressing for greater rights than Iran needs, or even wants, pointlessly interferes with its ability to achieve what it does need and does want,”
IRAN IS NOT DOING THAT! And neither is Arnold, or myself. Once again, you are DELIBERATELY misleading the readers here as to our position, which we have made clear repeatedly here.
You are LYING about our position! And you are using bullshit claims about how Iran “agrees with you” about that.
“because I believe that limiting disclosures about a country’s nuclear program really is useful only if the country desires to create the illusion or reality that its nuclear program may be less peaceful than it claims, I also think that limiting Iran’s nuclear-program disclosures pointlessly interferes with its ability to achieve what it does need and does want.
It’s really that simple.”
Bullcrap. You now admit that you think Iran is purposefully limiting its disclosures in order to engage in some sort of “nuclear ambiguity” program. The Iranians have NEVER suggested this, and have explicitly repudiated the entire concept by calling on Israel to repudiate its policy in that regard. To suggest that Iran is engaged in this policy is pure speculation on your part.
“I wake up each day with a smile on my face to know that my position matches what Ayatollah Khamenei has said many times.”
Oh, please, give me a fucking break!
“But gloom soon descends upon my sunny countenance when I think of the uncomfortable situation you’ve placed yourself in. What must Ayatollah Khamenei think of someone who forcefully argues that Iran must insist on what Ayatollah Khamenei claims Iran has no desire to have, ever – someone whose position necessarily depends on his assumption that Ayatollah Khamenei is either a liar or very stupid and naive?”
Total bullshit. Neither Arnold nor I have suggested that Iran desires any such thing. What we have argued is that Iran BY DEFINITION has exactly the same status as Japan, South Korea or Brazil in that it COULD exercise a breakout option. We have never stated that Iran intends this as a deliberate policy.
Once again, you are LYING and DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTING our position.
“While my position on Iran may strike you as different from my position on Japan, it’s actually the same. Japan too should be allowed to do what’s necessary to carry out a peaceful nuclear energy program. And that’s all it appears to be doing. There’s no evidence I’ve found persuasive that Japan has any intention or desire to develop nuclear weapons, and its government has consistently said otherwise (notwithstanding the few unofficial pronouncements you’ve turned up by a few former government officials). If such evidence were to be found some day, I very well might change my views on Japan.”
And Iran is in EXACTLY the same position as Japan. Iran does not appear to be doing anything other than Japan is. There is NO EVIDENCE whatsoever that Iran has any intention of desire to develop nuclear weapons and its government has consistently said otherwise.
So that whole paragraph was a complete waste of your time typing it.
“As you note, I do not agree that Iran should be allowed to stockpile nuclear fuel beyond what it needs to carry out a peaceful nuclear program, even though Japan has done so.”
Again, discriminatory for no good reason.
“I won’t bore you and others with my detailed reasons for this, which I’ve laid out before, but the essential reason for my distinction is simple. The risk of nuclear proliferation differs among countries, and the status of nuclear programs varies significantly among countries.”
Ah, FINALLY! The admission once again that your real problem is: you don’t like Iran.
Once again, this was like doing dental work on Dracula! Arnold and I had to work for days to drag this admission out you before. Yet here you are again plowing through the same old bullcrap about “disclosing more” and “Khamenei agrees with me” and assorted other nonsense just to get to the heart of the matter: you don’t like Iran, you don’t trust Iran, you want to discriminate against Iran despite ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER that Iran is IN ANY WAY different from Japan, South Korea or Brazil.
You are a hypocritical LIAR.
“The answer is not the same for every country. If a country already has nuclear weapons – Israel, for example – I think it’s somewhere between highly unrealistic and utterly naive to expect that the country will give them up – unless, perhaps, the country is in such a secure situation that it concludes its nuclear weapons might safely be “traded away” for something else of value (the UK, for an example given recently by James). This does not mean I am happy that Israel, for example, has nuclear weapons. It means merely that I am realistic.”
I suspect otherwise. I suspect that you are partial to Israel and therefore the critical issue, which is that there should be a nuclear free Middle East – which, by the way, IRAN SUPPORTS – is not at all important to you if it requires Israel give up its nuclear arsenal.
“If Israel did not already have nuclear weapons, I would feel exactly the same about Israel as I feel about Iran. They both live in the same tinder-box area of the world, and each has an understandably strong desire to acquire or to keep nuclear weapons.”
Once again, here you let slip your REAL belief: that Iran has a “strong desire to acquire nuclear weapons” – despite the fact that you JUST SAID that Khamenei DOES NOT have such a desire.
Can’t you make up your mind?
“Japan does not.”
Oh, really? Japan has EXPLICITLY said that it recognizes that it has the “Japan option” and has considered using it.
From the Federation of American Scientists:
“During the Sato cabinet in the 1960’s, it is reported that Japan secretly studied the development of nuclear weapons. On 17 June 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata told reporters that “it’s certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons but has not made them.” This remark aroused widespread concern in the international media at that time.
Japan’s nuclear power program based on reprocessed plutonium has aroused widespread suspicion that Japan is secretly planning to develop nuclear weapons. Japan’s nuclear technology and ambiguous nuclear inclinations have provided a considerable nuclear potential, becoming a “paranuclear state.” Japan would not have material or technological difficulties in making nuclear weapons. Japan has the raw materials, technology, and capital for developing nuclear weapons. Japan could possibly produce functional nuclear weapons in as little as a year’s time. On the strength of its nuclear industry, and its stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium, Japan in some respects considers itself, and is treated by others as, as a virtual nuclear weapons state.”
In addition to which, Japan’s attitude toward nuclear weapons is intricately bound up with its treaties with the US which specify that Japan is under the US “nuclear umbrella”. In recent years, and with the modification of the US nuclear strategic posture, Japan has been concerned that the US umbrella might not be as reliable as in the past. This has encouraged some Japanese politicians to suggest that Japan might need to consider constructing its own nuclear weapons.
Interesting also that Japan in 1995 conducted a review of its nuclear policies and concluded: “This analysis reaffirmed previous studies, concluding that developing nuclear weapons would damage Japan’s national security and regional security.”
This is PRECISELY the same concept that I believe Iran has engaged in – that development and deployment of nuclear weapons would DAMAGE Iran’s status in the region and hamper its efforts to become a regional influence.
Also:
“On 06 April 2002 Liberal Party president Ichiro Ozawa created a furor claiming that Japan – to deter Chinese threats – could produce “thousands of nuclear warheads” from plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of its more than 50 commercial nuclear reactors. Ozawa said that “if [China] gets too inflated, Japanese people will get hysterical. It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear warheads—we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads….[I]f we get serious, we will never be beaten in terms of military power.”
So how do you see this sort of comment as being LESS inflammatory than the EXPLICIT statements from the Iranian Supreme Leader that Iran will never seek nuclear weapons?
“That is why I believe it is appropriate to treat Iran differently from Japan.”
Well, I’ve just demolished that argument completely.
“In short, it is possible for Iran to exercise all of its legitimate nuclear rights without doing the things you think it must insist on a right to do.”
NO IT IS NOT! It is NOT possible for Iran to master the full fuel cycle without being in the exact same position as Japan, South Korea and Brazil.
“Iran’s leaders consistently and emphatically disclaim any desire to do any of these things. If what you insist upon is of no interest to Iran itself, and provokes other countries, why continue to insist on these things?”
WE DO NOT AND NEVER HAVE! Once again, you are LYING and MISREPRESENTING our position!
Alan,
Yes, Iran is ready, and let’s hope Obama has the good sense to allow the fuel exchange to go through expeditiously.
R S Hack,
Agreed. And as David Kay has said in effect: the double-standard regarding Iran’s supposed desire for nuclear weapons when there is no intelligence showing this is the case, owes a great deal to Israeli efforts to distract attention from their wish to oppress the Palestinians without interference from Obama.
Mr. Canning: “I very much doubt SK would want nukes.”
As I said, IF ANY country would want nukes, it would be South Korea, followed by Japan which is threatened by a nuclear China.
The point is that Iran is precisely in the same position as South Korea geopolitically in the sense that it has nuclear armed enemies which repeatedly threaten it. But only Iran is suspected of wanting nuclear weapons despite having explicitly repudiated them. This is a double standard.
Ho ho:
Iran ready to resume nuclear talks but waiting for world powers
Iran Foreign Ministry spokesman says Iran is awaiting details of date and venue for technical and political talks with 5+1 group of world powers.
http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/iran-ready-to-resume-nuclear-talks-but-waiting-for-world-powers-1.309934
Arnold,
“Eric you said, as your own opinion, that Iran should have fewer nuclear rights than Japan. That is in agreement with the US position.”
That’s misleading, Arnold.
I think both countries should be allowed to do what’s necessary to carry out a peaceful nuclear program. That is what their “rights” should be. How those equal rights get exercised may need to be different, depending on their circumstances, but the important point is that each of them is able to exercise its right to carry out a peaceful nuclear program.
Neither Iran nor Japan appears to want any more than that. I believe Ayatollah Khamenei, for example, when he says that that is all Iran wants and will ever want, just as I believe Japan’s leaders when they say the same thing. And I believe that pressing for greater rights than Iran needs, or even wants, pointlessly interferes with its ability to achieve what it does need and does want, and puts Iran and its people at significant risk that can and should be avoided. In addition, because I believe that limiting disclosures about a country’s nuclear program really is useful only if the country desires to create the illusion or reality that its nuclear program may be less peaceful than it claims, I also think that limiting Iran’s nuclear-program disclosures pointlessly interferes with its ability to achieve what it does need and does want.
It’s really that simple.
I wake up each day with a smile on my face to know that my position matches what Ayatollah Khamenei has said many times. But gloom soon descends upon my sunny countenance when I think of the uncomfortable situation you’ve placed yourself in. What must Ayatollah Khamenei think of someone who forcefully argues that Iran must insist on what Ayatollah Khamenei claims Iran has no desire to have, ever – someone whose position necessarily depends on his assumption that Ayatollah Khamenei is either a liar or very stupid and naive? What must Ayatollah Khamenei think of someone who apparently believes that Iran is so lacking in self-assurance that it must demand something it neither wants nor needs simply because some other country has it? Finally, my cheerfulness returns when I recognize that Ayatollah Khamenei probably doesn’t care all that much whether others agree with him, or think he is a liar, or stupid, or naive.
While my position on Iran may strike you as different from my position on Japan, it’s actually the same. Japan too should be allowed to do what’s necessary to carry out a peaceful nuclear energy program. And that’s all it appears to be doing. There’s no evidence I’ve found persuasive that Japan has any intention or desire to develop nuclear weapons, and its government has consistently said otherwise (notwithstanding the few unofficial pronouncements you’ve turned up by a few former government officials). If such evidence were to be found some day, I very well might change my views on Japan.
Based on what you’ve written, it appears to me that Japan has done only one thing that might cause others to wonder whether its intentions go beyond a peaceful nuclear program: It has built up a large stockpile of plutonium. But Japan acquired that stockpile in the process of carrying out peaceful nuclear energy activities, not as some gratuitous provocative gesture to remind the world that Japan has a sovereign right to do this. And getting rid of Japan’s plutonium stockpile would not be a trivial task. What would you suggest Japan do – flush it all down the toilet? Load it on a barge and drop it in the middle of the Pacific Ocean? Ship it to the US for safekeeping? Sell it?
As you note, I do not agree that Iran should be allowed to stockpile nuclear fuel beyond what it needs to carry out a peaceful nuclear program, even though Japan has done so. I won’t bore you and others with my detailed reasons for this, which I’ve laid out before, but the essential reason for my distinction is simple. The risk of nuclear proliferation differs among countries, and the status of nuclear programs varies significantly among countries. All this matters when one assesses how a particular country can be enabled to exercise its legitimate nuclear rights – again, to carry out a peaceful nuclear program – without creating avoidable and undue risks for the rest of the world.
The answer is not the same for every country. If a country already has nuclear weapons – Israel, for example – I think it’s somewhere between highly unrealistic and utterly naive to expect that the country will give them up – unless, perhaps, the country is in such a secure situation that it concludes its nuclear weapons might safely be “traded away” for something else of value (the UK, for an example given recently by James). This does not mean I am happy that Israel, for example, has nuclear weapons. It means merely that I am realistic. If Israel did not already have nuclear weapons, I would feel exactly the same about Israel as I feel about Iran. They both live in the same tinder-box area of the world, and each has an understandably strong desire to acquire or to keep nuclear weapons. Japan does not. That is why I believe it is appropriate to treat Iran differently from Japan.
In short, it is possible for Iran to exercise all of its legitimate nuclear rights without doing the things you think it must insist on a right to do. Iran’s leaders consistently and emphatically disclaim any desire to do any of these things. If what you insist upon is of no interest to Iran itself, and provokes other countries, why continue to insist on these things?
Tony Blankley has an amazing piece of neocon propaganda on HuffingtonPost.com today: “Wishful Thinking on Iran”. “[O]nce [Iran] has [nukes], being fanatics, they may actually use them against Israel, AS THEY HAVE REPEATEDLY THREATENED.” [Emphasis supplied]
Iran has “repeatedly threatened” to attack Israel with nuclear weapons?
Scott Lucas,
It seems that you’re incapable of comprehending what the better informed have to say. Perhaps, the hand that feeds you prevents you from straying from the green path or greenback of the State department.
Arnold – does “acceptance” mean “positive response”? Call it a stretch if you like, but in practical terms it couldn’t mean much else.
And in a savage twist, I see you have linked to one of my own comments.
Anyway, on this, domestic dissent in Iran and the fuel rods thing, I think we’re talking past each other, and have been for a while. It was fun for a bit, but I kind of hoped for a few more imaginative ideas about where this could lead. That’s about the only thing that makes it interesting, otherwise it’s the same shit, different day.
Arnold,
My understanding is that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad were tacken aback by opposition from within Iran, emanating from some of the so-called “reformers”. So they backed off for a few weeks. Regrettably, then foolish politicians in the US tried to interfere, and US officials failed to push the deal through (or just allow it to go through, as normally obtains).
R S Hack,
I very much doubt SK would want nukes. That it would consider entering a significant industrial area, reprocessing spent fuel rods, would be understandable. I haven’t seen any figures indicating how much Russia will be charging Iran to reprocess the nuclear fuel from Bushehr #1. (I assume this will be a few years down the road.)
Liz and Scott,
I agree with Liz that the US bungled the Iranian fuel swap last fall. The reasons include foolish expectations on the part of some US officials, that by in effect interfering with a normal Iranian application before the IAEA, which had gone through without problems the last time, they could put pressure on the Iranian government.
Then there’s the question of what do you do with spent fuel rods.
Found an interesting article about South Korea wanting to develop the means the reprocess spent fuel rods. Since this is a proliferation risk, and is counter to the deal SK made with the US, it’s a problem that they’re negotiating with the US on.
South Korea pushes to recycle nuclear power plant fuel
www dot csmonitor dot com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0325/South-Korea-pushes-to-recycle-nuclear-power-plant-fuel
Obviously the clear issue is that if any country might harbor designs on having a nuclear weapon, South Korea is that country, situated as it is across a border with an extremely insular, hostile country which is presumed to have nuclear weapons and is constantly threatening war.
And no one can doubt that South Korea, with its economy and technological infrastructure, would be quite capable of producing nuclear weapons should it desire to.
So where’s the push for “military options to be on the table” for South Korea?
R S Hack,
If Turkey held the Iranian LEU pending Iran’s receipt of the TRR fuel, there would be no place for US to attempt to prevent the return of the LEU in the event the TRR fuel was not received by Iran. Clearly it was rather stupid for the US not to have been straighforward about the Iranian application to the IAEA for the TRR fuel purchase, so that it proceeded without delay.
Iran surely should go forward with the deal as set out in the Tehran Declaration, and suspend enriching to 20% as part of the arrangements.
My original long post on the TRR situation was posted in the thread: ENRICHMENT STILL THE KEY TO NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH IRAN.
Look it up. It details the events very well.
Alan: Conversion to reactor fuel rods? I assume you mean if that was done outside the country? Because Iran has only one fuel manufacturing plant, the one at Isfahan. Supposedly, according to an article I found, quote:
“FMP is to produce 10 tons of natural fuel each year used for 40 megawatts heavy-water reactors in Arak and 30 tons of five percent enriched uranium for light water reactors.”
However, some people are skeptical that Iran can do this at that plant. So we’re talking about Iran building the technology and the plants to convert tons of uranium into nuclear fuel rods for its reactors in the future, which will take years. Hardly a solution to the current problem. Also, the fact remains that the uranium remains in Iran, because that’s what you make fuel rods out of, which is precisely what the US claims to not want, i.e., uranium laying around in Iran which could be enriched beyond fuel needs.
So converting all of Iran’s uranium into fuel rods would have to be done outside the country (in the short term and probably in the long term until Iran builds enough plants to do it) and it requires enriched uranium to be present anyway.
Hardly a solution.
the Tehran Declaration required acceptance of its terms by the Vienna Group.
It certainly doesn’t clearly say that. Maybe you can stretch some of the terms to imply that but a normal reading of the terms does not lead there.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/may/17/iran-brazil-turkey-nuclear
what if their LEU was converted to reactor fuel rods
I’ve read conflicting statements about whether or not fuel rods can be turned back into uf6 for further enrichment. If it is true that they cannot, then fuel rods are the same thing as exports and Iran needs a two or so tons of uf6 in enrichable form. If fuel rods can, with reasonable effort be made enrichable, then fuel rods are fine.
Arnold/RSH – the Tehran Declaration required acceptance of its terms by the Vienna Group.
Arnold/RSH – what if their LEU was converted to reactor fuel rods?
As I said earlier, neither “Jange-e-zrgari” or “Jang-e Akhondi” explain the debates within the Iranian establishment last autumn over whether to enter and then persist in discussions with the P5+1, including the US.
But can you clarify your application of the tactics to the current situation?
Scott- as I explained before Jang-e-Akhondi is an advance version of Jang-e-Zargari, the way it works is that during the arguments they intensely muddy the water so the customer will not know who is holding what position, positions gets constantly changing back and forth, the advantage of this technique which requires a great deal of experience is that you can be the good cup and the bad cup all at the same time, can you see if you can apply that to the current situation in Iran?
There IS NO Iranian uranium enrichment system which would prevent Iran from potentially making nuclear weapons.
The notion of Iran holding its stock below a ton is a non-starter once Iran starts building another ten reactors. It’s goal is to generate 20,000 megawatts of power eventually. It will need at least ten more reactors for that. By definition the amount of LEU required will be considerably larger than one ton. The one ton offer would be, as Arnold suggested, for its current reactor and for a limited time. The US of course will NEVER accept Iran having ten reactors and tons of low enriched LEU hanging around EXACTLY LIKE JAPAN.
So that discussion is a waste of everyone’s time.
As for who said what during the TRR negotiations, I listed that whole timeline in a huge post in a previous thread. The issue over which the Iranian parliament disagreed was whether there would BE a swap, i.e., how could they be assured that they would receive the fuel rods once the LEU was out of their territory. The whole basis of the Tehran Declaration was that the LEU would be stored in Turkey, under IAEA and Iranian supervision, and that the swap would be done IN IRAN simultaneously with the handing over of the fuel rods.
As I noted earlier, it was a ridiculous quibble because the US acted like it thought Iran would swoop down with a bunch of Iranian ninjas and seize the LEU from Turkey as well as the fuel. There was no reason not to agree to the Iranian swap proposal like adults.
This exposed the entire US deal, as Arnold has noted, as a scam to get hold of Iran’s LEU and then hold it for ransom, demanding Iran suspend enrichment in exchange for getting the rods for its medical requirements. Basically, the US was holding up medical patients in order to gets its way.
Iran saw through this in a heartbeat, thus the demand for a simultaneous swap and storage in Turkey.
As for the Tehran Declaration requiring Iran’s right to enrich be acknowledged, that was a declaration of the signing parties, there was no requirement for the US to acknowledge it.
After the Tehran Declaraion, the US and the EU demanded Iran adhere ONLY to the original P5 offer because the US saw that the conditions of the swap would not allow it to hijack the LEU.
The excuse then became that Iran had subsequently enriched more LEU and therefore the amount would have to be increased in order to insure that Iran did not retain enough LEU to make it possible to produce a weapon.
And this was despite what Obama wrote to the Brazilian President. This further proved to the Iranians that the whole deal was negotiated in bad faith from the get-go.
Eric you said, as your own opinion, that Iran should have fewer nuclear rights than Japan. That is in agreement with the US position. You and the US share the opinion that Iran’s nuclear program should be limited in a way that Japan’s is not.
You and the US government do differ in some things. But your desire to discriminate against Iran is a jointly held one.
Alan:
My take is that Iran needs, as a minimum, ongoing enrichment, two or three tons of LEU, and flexibility that over time its program can become more expert at enriching uranium for it to effectively have a nuclear capability that would be a factor in the calculations of its adversaries.
As time goes on, I think, for example if Arak opens, Iran is going to want to keep it and my answer after that would probably include that also. For now, if you’re asking me alone, I’d say take away the domestic stock and Iran does not have a nuclear weapons capability even if it has ongoing enrichment.
Arnold,
“Japan signed the same NPT Iran signed. I understand that you and the United States want to discriminate against Iran and cannot support your desire to discriminate with any valid argument.”
Please do me this favor, which I’ve asked for several times: Do not assume that I agree with the US government.
I tell you what I think the US government will do. Unless I also tell you I agree with the US government on a specific matter (as I happen to, for example, on whether Iran should start disclosing more about its nuclear program), you should not assume that I agree with the US government. With few exceptions, I do not. Even when I do tell you I agree with the US government, you should not assume that I also agree on what ought to be done if Iran fails to behave as the US government and I believe it should. For example, the US government might (or might not) decide to bomb Iran someday if Iran continues to limit disclosures about its nuclear program. I never would, nor would I punish Iran in any other way. I would simply continue to hope that Iran, sooner or later, comes to understand why it would be in its own best interests to behave as I think it should.
If I present arguments that I believe the US government would advance to justify its actions toward Iran, and you think I present those arguments convincingly, I’m flattered. But don’t conclude that I must agree with an argument merely because I present it convincingly.
If your arguments have merit, aim them at my arguments. Personal attacks don’t make your arguments any stronger, nor mine any weaker.
I’m not reading the whole report, but skimming it while searching for “enrich”, she does not say that a demand for a US or western acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich was a significant aspect of Iranian dissent against the deal.
Alan, are you lying?
Honorary Correspondent Liz,
That’s the beauty of our arrangement: we don’t have to pay you, so we can all your fine information for free!
Scott
kooshy,
As I said earlier, neither “Jange-e-zrgari” or “Jang-e Akhondi” explain the debates within the Iranian establishment last autumn over whether to enter and then persist in discussions with the P5+1, including the US.
But can you clarify your application of the tactics to the current situation?
Are you saying that Ahmadinejad is NOT actually in favour of talks with the P5+1 and was just posing last week in his interview? Or are you saying that the Supreme Leader and Larijani are NOT opposed to discussions with the US, despite their rhetoric in recent days?
Scott
Arnold – I’m still not clear on what you’re telling me – not the bit about me being dishonest and making things up, that’s quite clear thanks – but the bit about what YOU would consider to be domestic Iranian enrichment that would preclude a nuclear weapon capability. Can you elaborate?
James Canning says:
August 25, 2010 at 1:17 pm
Liz,
Iran is making it very clear that it wishes to proceed with the TRR deal as set out in the Tehran Declaration.”
——–
James, one possibility to consider!!! perhaps they are giving the west/US enough rope to hang himself!!! knowing US/west has no intention of delivering.. yes they can talk the talk..
If I was a betting man, me thinks, at the of the day, TRR will be done in Iran down the road.. thanks to the juveniles sitting on the high chair and can’t see beyond their noses.
but for those who believe there are disagreements and the regime is breaking up, :-), just watch out for the curve ball. it might just come around and hit you in that prized human anatomy, we call the butt.
Arnold: “Are you making that up?”
No. She is:
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120809.html
“Anatomy of a Nuclear Breakthrough Gone Backwards”
Farideh Farhi
Middle East Report Online
Dec 8, 2009
Eric:
Japan signed the same NPT Iran signed. I understand that you and the United States want to discriminate against Iran and cannot support your desire to discriminate with any valid argument. This is not news. There are various tactics you and the US use to distract the discussion away from your inability to defend your position that I find offensive.
Arnold,
You wrote to James:
“The rest of the world is not irrelevant, but if the US is willing to trade missile defense with Russia and currency policy with China, then those countries will go along with US actions against Iran above what they consider legalities or justice.”
I have no comment here on the issue you’re discussing with James. I merely want to report how comforting it was to see you acknowledge – even to predict – that China and Russia might make decisions on Iran-related issues based on something other than “legalities” or “justice.”
Can the US be far behind in this lamentable trend among superpowers to ignore “legalities or justice?” One certainly hopes not. Nevertheless, I do fear the day when the US says to Iran:
“It took us a long while to get past your excellent arguments – fairness, legality, morality, that sort of stuff. I want to stress here just how moved we were by all that. But with the help of an excellent therapist, we’ve managed to move on and achieve inner peace once again – along with a new slogan: ‘Japan options are for Japanese!’ LIke it?”
““blimey, I didn’t realise Moussavi’s wife was a conservative. That must make for some interesting chats round the dinner table.
She is not that either, she is just another ordinary opportunist, not even smartly good at that, her adopted Hejab style for the last June elections”
——–
during the campaign and before the very ‘eye’ of the cameras, once she reached out for the hubby’s hand! the clip was shown, I think, on CNN.. that was quite a hollywood move bye the CON-servative wify.
Alan, I’m also pretty sure if Iran accepts a 5% enrichment limit, that limit could not be permanent and could not require US permission to change, but it could be for a set term of 5 or 10 years or something.
Would an enrichment limitation to 5% have a similar effect, in your opinion? Or an undertaking to convert all LEU, over a certain stockpile level, to fuel rods?
My guess from what I understand of Iranian statements to now and is that the 5% limit is fine and convert all LEU over a certain level to fuel rods depends on what that certain level is.
If fuel rods are physically difficult to revert to an enrichable form, then I doubt we’ll see an agreement that the level will be less than one ton. The level Iran will agree to today is likely more than it would have agreed last year.
Alan:
Its absence [a formal acknowledgment of Iran's right to enrich] was a significant aspect of the dissent in Iran following the meetings.
Are you making that up? I doubt you’ve seen a statement to that effect. What gives you that idea, or any idea of what was or was not a significant aspect of the dissent in Iran?
Arnold –
I don’t think Iran is going to agree to keep its domestic stock of LEU under one ton for any prolonged period. I guess that’s what the West was considering. The West has described that as a way to ensure confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s program.
Would an enrichment limitation to 5% have a similar effect, in your opinion? Or an undertaking to convert all LEU, over a certain stockpile level, to fuel rods?
Alan:
No. The Tehran Declaration required a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich, bypassing the UNSC resolutions. That is not a straightforward swap.
The UNSC resolutions are silent on the issue of Iran’s right to enrich, beyond that they call for a “suspension” (until a UNSC finding that confidence has been restored is not vetoed by the US, which effectively means a cessation, but still officially it is just a suspension).
The Tehran declaration was Iran, Turkey and Brazil’s acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich but did not require a US acknowledgment of that.
It does require Iran being able to get its uranium back if the terms are not met. And it requires a specific deadline for the delivery of the TRR fuel. These two requirements prevent the West from extracting the LEU and delaying delivery of the TRR fuel until Iran suspends enrichment. The West objects to both of these requirements and says neither had been available to Iran before.
The Tehran declaration was a straightforward swap. What the West was offering was nothing, unless Iran suspended enrichment.
When you now say the West is unwilling to separate the TRR deal from the rest of negotiations over its nuclear program, that’s what you’re saying.
Eric –
“That sounds great – can we, perhaps, “link” a few other problems while we’re at it – childhood obesity, perhaps?”
“Does it work the other way around too?”
Does your insight know no bounds, sir? Sadly, such questions are beyond my powers. I suggest Tony Blair be put on the case.
Scott
“But to be more precise on current situation, who is engaging in “Jange Zargari”? Larijani and Ahmadinejad? The Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad, and Larijani? And why no public comment — to my knowledge — from Jalili for some time?”
Scott a more sophisticated type of “Jange-e-zrgari” is “Jang-e Akhondi”, if you also find out, what that means, you will have the answer to this new question. Good luck to you and DOS.
There was no dissent in Iran following the meetings, because there was no agreement in the first place. There has always been a consensus in Iran that anything less than the Tehran Declaration would be unacceptable.
“A straightforward swap of LEU for TRR fuel is not objectionable to anybody in Iran. As demonstrated by the Brazil/Turkey declaration.”
No. The Tehran Declaration required a formal acknowledgment of Iran’s right to enrich, bypassing the UNSC resolutions. That is not a straightforward swap.
This acknowledgement was not sought in Geneva or Vienna. Its absence was a significant aspect of the dissent in Iran following the meetings.
Eric
Regarding your last post
I loved it I am still laughing, thank you for a good brake at work
Alan, I don’t think Iran is going to agree to keep its domestic stock of LEU under one ton for any prolonged period. I guess that’s what the West was considering. The West has described that as a way to ensure confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s program.
The term “West’s deal” was the FAS’ words that I mistakenly attributed to you. But the idea that the West is unwilling to separate the TRR from the other Western demands on Iran’s program which include suspension is seemingly correct, but I haven’t seen anyone notice it and put it in those terms but you.
Arnold – “the West’s deal” part of the quote you attribute to me was in the FAS quote I provided, not my opinion.
Regarding the hanging tale, I was actually interested in your view about what terms for domestic Iranian enrichment would fall short of a weapons capability. Do you have one?
For those who can read Farsi:
http://alef.ir/1388/content/view/81166/
Scott Lucas,
I don’t cooperate with the US government. I’ll leave that to mercenaries like you! :)
Scott
For the rest of readers to understand “Jang-e-Zargar-i” which Zargar means Goldsmith and Jang means war is a hot debate between two bazaar merchants and in front of a potential buyer (to convince he/she is getting a killer deal) one of the merchants (the bad cup) is having a hot argument with his partner (the good cup) that he shouldn’t give away such a valuable merchandise for a low losing price, a very convincing common technique for selling a rug. So in a way is the same game that the west has played all along the good cup bad cup to convince Iranians (among all other historic merchant nations) that they are getting away with the best deal possible. As Liz said there is no real rift and if it was you and I wouldn’t learn it from an Akhond.
Salam Liz,
Why, I consider you to be a very fine reporter — possibly even “honorary EA correspondent”!
Scott
Alan,
You wrote to Scott:
“Scott – there seems to be a push to get something going simultaneously on [Israel/Palestine] and Iran. That can be good or bad, depending on which way round the US wants to play it.”
Correct – good or bad, depending.
More so than usual (which is already too much), I’ve been reading lately about “linkage” between the Israel/Palestine and Iran issues. I can never remember whether the road to Tehran passes through Jerusalem, or the road to Jerusalem passes through Tehran. A few years back, I was able to keep it straight: the road passed first through Baghdad, but that particular Peacemobile appears to have blown a tire somewhere on the road between Baghdad and Jerusalem.
Somehow or other, though, I gather things are different now. If one problem gets solved, the other one will be solved too. That sounds great – can we, perhaps, “link” a few other problems while we’re at it – childhood obesity, perhaps?
Does it work the other way around too?
My understanding is that both Khamenei and Ahamdinejad supported the TRR nuclear exchange proposal, but they had to back off after so much noise erupted in the wake of the election.
That’s basically wrong. A straightforward swap of LEU for TRR fuel is not objectionable to anybody in Iran. As demonstrated by the Brazil/Turkey declaration.
The United States, as demonstrated in its response to the Brazil/Turkey declaration, had been intending all along for the swap offer to be part of an effort to pressuring Iran to suspend enrichment after which time Iran might actually get TRR fuel. That is not acceptable to anybody in Iran.
As US intentions became clear, Iran rejected the conditions the US offered while continuously being willing to make a straight forward exchange. The US still seems unwilling to make a straight forward exchange which means we are not likely to see a TRR deal unless the US position changes.
Scott Lucas,
This is how you get your updates? Pathetic.
Scott Lucas,
If you sit down and read the articles that the Leveretts have written over the past few months, you may actually be able to understand a thing or two about what is going on. :)
James,
Noise from which other actors in the Iranian system?
Scott
Salam Liz,
Thank you very much for the link to Sarvari’s statement — have added it to today’s updates.
Scott
Scott Lucas,
Don’t behave as a mouthpiece for both the US government and their green partners simultaniously. It makes you look even worse than usual. Iran did not stall out of the talks with the P5+1. It was the US and the EU that were unwilling to negotiate over the conditions for an exchange.
Scott,
My understanding is that both Khamenei and Ahamdinejad supported the TRR nuclear exchange proposal, but they had to back off after so much noise erupted in the wake of the election.
Liz,
As you proably have already seen today, a member of the Iranian parliament says direct US-Iran talks at this time are no possible due to blind support the US is giving to the Zionists.
Iran supports the P5+1, plus Turkey and Brazil, as method to proceed with TRR exchange.
As Khamenei observed the other day, the US needs to stop acting as a global dictator. Other countries have their points of view, and they may see a more intelligent way to proceed.
kooshy,
“Jange Zargari” is an interesting hypothesis but it appears there was a very real quarrel within the Iranian system last October. The pursuit of talks, up to the Geneva direct discussions, appeared genuine — President Ahmadinejad in particular was very receptive — but the technical discussions never followed.
Given that any discussions with the US had been criticised by Ali Larijani before the Geneva encounter, my perception is that internal opposition — which, following Liz’s line of argument, the Supreme Leader shared — may have been one key reason for the stalling out of the talks with the P5+1.
But to be more precise on current situation, who is engaging in “Jange Zargari”? Larijani and Ahmadinejad? The Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad, and Larijani? And why no public comment — to my knowledge — from Jalili for some time?
Scott
Scott Lucas,
Your hypocritical attempts to portray divisions within Iran over talks with the US will lead to nothing.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/140061.html
Alan,
Many thanks for the FAS info.
Scott
Scott Lucas,
Obviously, you know nothing about what’s going on in Iran. Ahmadinejad and Larijani have said nothing different from what the Leader has said. Perhaps you are trying to fabricate a story, as a part of a broader State Department strategy. Who knows? Ayatollah Khamenei spoke about direct talks with the US and he made no comment about any other talks. Hence, direct talks with the US will not take place under the current circumstances.
James:
The rest of the world is not irrelevant, but if the US is willing to trade missile defense with Russia and currency policy with China, then those countries will go along with US actions against Iran above what they consider legalities or justice.
The US is the leading party on the Western side. There is no TRR deal or resolution of the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program without the US.
I don’t think the P5+1 will want to get mixed up with a discussion over the TRR alone. The entire nuclear issue must be the subject. They have been pressing for this since October 2009. Iran originally said such a meeting would take place by the end of October 2009, and it has yet to happen. The P5+1 will not want to be sidetracked into a TRR discussion again.
If this is the case, the potential shortage of medical isotopes will not be enough to convince Tehran to accept the West’s deal since Iran would have enough time to master domestic TRR fuel production.
When you say “the West’s deal”, but then you say the West is not willing to separate the TRR swap from a resolution of the entire nuclear dispute and note that the US position has not changed from demanding Iran suspend enrichment, it all combines to a requirement that Iran suspend enrichment for the TRR fuel.
You’ve gathered this Western stance that it does not want to do the swap on its own merits from Western behavior after the Turkey, Brazil deal. This is not a publicly stated position.
Once again, I don’t have anything against talks. But the lack of talks is not the problem. The problem is the US position, publicly and privately stated and from all indications strongly held, that Iran must be prevented from having technologies and materials that could be used to make a weapon.
Unless that position changes, talks are a waste of time. If that position changes, the important place for it to change is not in a closed room with the Iranians but in public where it can be debated and endorsed by the US elites and/or the US public.
Arnold,
There is much to discuss behind closed doors, hinging of course on the fact the US is not the dictator of the world. If five countries of the P5+1 support the TRR fuel exchange, that Obama has reservations should be irrelevant.
Alan
“blimey, I didn’t realise Moussavi’s wife was a conservative. That must make for some interesting chats round the dinner table.
She is not that either, she is just another ordinary opportunist, not even smartly good at that, her adopted Hejab style for the last June elections reminds me of Karzai once he landed back in Afghanistan.
“Who’s this NYT reporter you’re talking about?”
Sorry I meant Fathi
Rehmat,
Robert E. Worth’s comment in the NYT Aug. 24th: “What American politicians often fail to understand is that even pro-Western Lebanese tend to regard Israel – - which has repeatedly invaded and bombed its northern neighbor – - as a hostile force.”
Salam Liz,
I suggest it’s President Ahmadinejad who needs to get your latest message, not me!
Scott
Hmmm. Thereby hangs a tale. What enrichment capacity would NOT preserve that?
If Obama can’t be convinced that there is an enrichment capacity that does not preserve weapons capacity, then Obama is clearly opposed to an Iranian enrichment capacity, as he and others in his administration have said directly.
In which case, there is nothing to talk about. Talks under those circumstances cannot produce anything.
But the idea of the TRR seemed to have been an Iranian commitment to export its LEU if its stock approached one ton. I doubt Iran is willing to commit to that now if it ever was.
Rehmat,
Regarding Lebanon’s seeking armaments from Tehran – - Did you see Robert Worth’s article in The New York Times yesterday? He mentions that many US politicians are not aware that most Lebanese view Israel as the primary security threat their country faces.
Alan,
I had seen that report in the FT, and I am among those who see Khamenei as acting somewhat as a mediator. Khamenei has made clear he objects to the nit-picking political opportunism in the west that caused Iran’s IAEA application to purchase additional fuel for the TRR, to be caught up in a complex dispute when the deal was straighforward and should have proceeded without interference.
Liz,
Iran is making it very clear that it wishes to proceed with the TRR deal as set out in the Tehran Declaration. The P5+1, and Turkey and Brazil, should work together to push the deal through quickly.
Alan,
Surely it is in the best interests of “the West” to achieve a workable TRR deal, that includes suspension of Iranian enrichment to 20%. Broadening the scope of an initial agreement increases exponentially the opportunities for interference by Israel and the Israel lobby.
Scott Lucas,
Again you show almost zero knowledge about Iran. No negotiations with the US means no negotiations with the US, not the P5+1 or anything else.
Scott
With regard to the debate inside Iran about the negotiations with US/West I give you a clue, which for you to find out what it means, you will need to have your Iranian green staff explain the Persian meaning of what that means and how is used and for what reason, it is actually a bazaar technique and is used for negotiations it is called “Jange Zargari” ask your staff what it means or call an “Akhond” like “Ashkevari” or “Kadivar” to explain the meaning to you.
Scott – regarding the point you make about differences between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, this is very important. It could well be that they are talking about different things, which could be a problem. I don’t think the P5+1 will want to get mixed up with a discussion over the TRR alone. The entire nuclear issue must be the subject. They have been pressing for this since October 2009. Iran originally said such a meeting would take place by the end of October 2009, and it has yet to happen. The P5+1 will not want to be sidetracked into a TRR discussion again.
Scott –
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/_docs/Twenty_Percent_Solution_FINAL-1.pdf
Starts on last paragraph of page 7.
Quote:
Based on the limited information publicly available, it is not possible to definitively determine when the reactor will run out of fuel, but very likely not in the immediate future. According to IAEA historical data as of 1998, the reactor has been operating at significantly less than maximum power. If the reactor has continued operation at moderate capacity, it may have enough remaining fuel for almost 9 years. If this is the case, the potential shortage of medical isotopes will not be enough to convince Tehran to accept the West’s deal since Iran would have enough time to master domestic TRR fuel production. Moreover, allowing Iran to manufacture its own fuel for the TRR would dramatically enhance the credibility of its rationale for an enrichment program. This would also mean that Tehran would continue with 20 percent enrichment, thus increasing the breakout threat.
Alan,
Do you have a link on that FAS estimate re TRR fuel?
Scott
Salam Liz,
Last Friday’s Yomiuri Shimbun:
“Iran is ready to resume talks with six major powers on nuclear issues as early as this month, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Thursday during an exclusive interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun.
Ahmadinejad indicated Iran would return to the negotiating table with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany without preconditions, saying, “We announced that we are ready for the talks…about Iran’s proposed package from around the end of August or the beginning of September.”
I had already noted on EA and in another RFI thread that Larijani is repeating the Supreme Leader’s scepticism, if not refusal, of talks with the US in the short-term. Therefore, the question — which is being debated at EA amongst readers — is whether there is a difference between the Khamenei and Ahmadinejad approaches or a more subtle explanation, e.g., a “tough cop/nice cop” strategy or the Supreme Leader drawing a line against discussion of Iran giving up right to enrichment while Ahmadinejad pursues narrower issue of a uranium swap.
Scott Lucas,
Iranian@Iran is correct. Also:
“Inside Iran, I was struck by Ali Larijani’s statement on Saturday or Sunday that Tehran would negotiate with anyone in world except US. That would seem to put him at odds — as he was last autumn — with the President.”
You aren’t a quick learner are you? Larijani is simply repeating what the Leader said and, in any case, Ahmadinejad never spoke about negotiations with the US beyond the scope of official Iranian policy. Ahmadinejad spoke about debating Obama in a Davos like situation (Erdogan/Perez).
Scott – I wouldn’t have thought so. The US has already offered this. Furthermore, there are some estimates (eg. FAS) that say Iran may still have up to 9 years worth of fuel for the TRR.
Alan,
Still looking for signals from Washington to the Russian and Iranian moves on TRR and enrichment.
Inside Iran, I was struck by Ali Larijani’s statement on Saturday or Sunday that Tehran would negotiate with anyone in world except US. That would seem to put him at odds — as he was last autumn — with the President.
Scott
Pirouz_2,
Thank you for clarification — so the Russian provision of iodine and molybdenum would not be enough, in your opinion, for Tehran to agree to temporary suspension of the 20% enrichment?
Scott
Scott – there seems to be a push to get something going simultaneously on I/P and Iran. That can be good or bad, depending on which way round the US wants to play it.
I don’t expect the Iranians to subordinate their interests to the Palestinian cause, but there is an opportunity for them to land a big one on Israel if they can do a deal with the US.
But are the Iranian factions willing to let Ahmadinejad score that win? Is the US?
@Scott Lucas:
I am not sure if I understand you correctly. Let me clarify what I said once more:
Iranian officials have said on many occasions that “if” they are given the nuclear FUEL (not the medical isotpes, but the nuclear fuel itself) for TRR that they may stop enriching to the 20% level. They didnt say that they would give up enrichment (enrichment to 4% would go ahead no matter what), and they DID NOT say that they would stop enriching to 20% level if they are given the medical isotopes. What they said was that they could stop enriching to 20% level “IF” the nuclear fuel for TRR is given to them.
Arnold – because they never say Iran doesn’t have the right. Everything refers back to the resolutions.
“to do so in a manner that preserves its capacity to make a weapon”
Hmmm. Thereby hangs a tale. What enrichment capacity would NOT preserve that?
Pirouz_2,
Absolutely. And as James pointed out, Salehi’s Russian counterpart said at the Bushehr ceremony that Moscow would supply isotopes. So my question is whether the Russian initiative was made with US knowledge. If so, the signals — combining the Salehi and Russian statements on Saturday — are that there may be discussion of a deal behind the scenes.
Scott
@Scott Lucas:
Iranian officials have said it on many occasions that they maybe willing to stop enriching to 20% if they are given the fuel for TRR.
Obama interviewed CBS and spoke on an Iranian nuclear capacity:
All the evidence indicates that the Iranians are trying to develop the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. They might decide that, once they have that capacity that they’d hold off right at the edge — in order not to incur — more sanctions. But, if they’ve got nuclear weapons-building capacity — and they are flouting international resolutions, that creates huge destabilizing effects in the region and will trigger an arms race in the Middle East that is bad for U.S. national security but is also bad for the entire world.
Ongoing enrichment along with a stockpile comprise the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Obama, along with consistent message of the rest of his administration is expressing here that he aims to stop Iran’s enrichment.
Given Obama’s statements as a candidate and as president, as well as the continuation of US policy from the previous administration we and Iran can be assured that Obama does intend to prevent Iran from exercising its right to enrich uranium, or at least to do so in a manner that preserves its capacity to make a weapon.
Salam Iranian@Iran,
Since there is no indication that you have ever read anything from EA or my other writing, you have no idea how I use information from Iranian websites.
Back to the thread: does the timing of Salehi’s statement, even if it has been made before, indicate that Tehran is willing to strike a deal suspending — at least temporarily — enrichment to 20%?
Happy reading,
Scott
Alan:
I think there is a recognition of this fact within the administration.
What makes you think this? What statement for attribution or not, coming from anywhere in the Obama administration makes you think it recognizes that Iran legally has a right to enrich uranium, at least in some practical sense more than the Bush administration did?
@Everyone:
By the way, yesterday there was a news on PressTV claiming that Michel Sleiman has officially asked Iran to equip Lebanon’s armed forces (keeping in consideration the limits that Lebanon has on its budget). Does anyone have any confirmation of this news from any other source? Is there any news from Lebanese media indicating that Mr. Sleiman himself has asked Iran for help, or is it just an idea proposed by Mr. Nasrallah?
@imho:
YOU SAID: “I’d say from my point of view (and I believe from the point of view of Iranian government too), ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING. You seem to forget that Iranians tried to compromise on multiple occasions. They even sent a letter to White House (that supposedly never arrived in the hands of Condy Rice) confirming they’re ready to cut founds and supports from Hamas, Hezballah, Palestine, they’re ready to abandon uranium enrichment, recognize Israel, everything; they just wanted the US recognize the Iranian regime and guarantee their security, survival and their role in the region.
The US and Israel are simply not interested to end this dispute for now in order to advance their own agenda.”
I believe that this was related to one of my previous comments? Well of course we are all entitled to our own views. However, first of all I didn’t say that Iran is not willing to “compromise”, I said Iran was not willing to compromise from its NPT rights! So a compromise on the support for Hamas or Hezballah was not part of what I said. Secondly, Iran was ready to make those compromises in 2003, when the position of USA “seemed” to be much stronger than what it is now.
Another important issue that some people disregard is that Iran never sought to enrich beyond the level of 4%. It was the refusal of the West to provide Iran with fuel for TRR which made Iran go down the road of enriching to 20%; and lo an behold, Mr. Salehi has explicitly said that Iran will not go beyond what it needs for Uranium enrichment, meaning that if we are given the TRR fuel we will stop the 20% enrichment (not that we will give up the right, we will just stop exercising that right).
As for putting a cap on the maximum level of enrichment by Iran:
I highly doubt that Iranians will agree to give up that “right”. I don’t think that Iranians will officially sign an agreement whereby Iran would acknowledge that it had no right in going beyond 4% enrichment. The maximum that can happen is that they will agree to voluntarily stop enriching beyond 4% without giving up the right.
Of course I can’t see the future so there is a possibility that like everyone else, my predictions don’t come true. In case that that happens and Iran agrees to officially pledge never to go beyond 4% enrichment, that will be a big mistake on the Iranian government’s part and it will be a move that I will not approve of. However, as I said before I highly doubt that that would happen.
Scott Lucas
This is not the first time that Dr. Salehi and other Iranian officials have said this.
Scott Lucas,
Since I can read Farsi, I can say with confidence that you have not used these sites in any meaningful way.
Talking about enriching uranium in ones own country, the following parag
I feel the following article gives a good background reading to the whole enriching uranium in ones own country (althoug its about Saudi Arabia). This paragraph really sums it up nicely:
“Back in 2004, Bush had proposed that we all ban the export of enrichment technology to any country that hadn’t already demonstrated that capability. Bush had his heart in the right place, but the result of his enthusiasm for global technology denial was a mini-stampede by a bunch of countries which concluded that, if they didn’t get cracking on setting up projects for uranium enrichment right away, then the US, Russia, Japan, and the Urenco triumvirate (Germany, Netherlands, U.K.) would make sure that they would never succeed”
http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/8/saudi-arabian-uranium-enrichment
Iran, I guess, is one of those countries
Dear All,
Another portion of the statement by Ali Akbar Salehi, at the Bushehr ceremony:
“We will go as far as our needs are met. So we have no intention to proceed forever for enriching [uranium] to 20%, although it is our right according to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] statute to enrich uranium to any percentage that is needed for peaceful uses in nuclear energy. But this does not mean that we shall do so. We only embarked on 20% because of the conditions that were imposed on us. I reiterate that we will go as far as our needs are met.”
Was this a signal of a possible deal on enrichment?
Scott
Salam Iranian@Iran,
Much of our information and analysis is drawn from Alef, Tabnak, Fars, Khabar, and other Iranian publications. I was suggesting that you might read and then comment on the material in the links I had provided for Alan, rather than making an uninformed judgement on what I have written.
Best,
Scott
RSH – yes, I agree enrichment is the core to the issue, and I also agree that the US has no legal basis or right to demand Iran gives up enrichment. There is a legal basis, however tenuous, based on UNSC Resolutions, however these by their very nature are transient.
I think there is a recognition of this fact within the administration. They have no basis to make the types of demands that were regularly made by Bush (who didn’t either of course). The Iranians also know it, thus the only way Obama could achieve it would be if the Iranians were to voluntarily negotiate it away. That isn’t going to happen.
There is an aspect of basic realism to this whole question that seems inescapable to me, and both sides are aware of it. There is an obvious solution, Iranian enrichment with certain limitations, the implementation of which appears to depend almost exclusively on the leadership in each country being able to convince their respective elites. In that context, it is interesting that McCain, the Neocon representative going into the last election, felt comfortable enough to state, in his campaign, that enrichment on Iranian soil was acceptable.
Scott Lucas,
What Ayatollah Khamenei said in his meeting with senior officials about unity was nothing new. In fact, that was probably the least significant thing about the speech. You are attempting to draw conclusions that suit your own agenda and you will get no where this way. That is probably the main reason why your predictions about Iran have all turned out to be false.
Scott Lucas
If you don’t know these things already, then you really don’t know much about Iran. There are loads of articles debating these issues on numerous Iranian websites such as Alef, tabnak,…
Salam Iranian@Iran,
Thank you for letting me clarify. The Supreme Leader’s about a call for unity was concerned both with reformists and, after his meeting with the heads of the three branches on Wednesday and before the Ahmadinejad-Majlis meeting/Ahmadinejad-Larijani press conference on Sunday, with the relations amongst conservatives and principlists in the Government.
Please let me know of any comments you have on the published information and analysis in the links.
Scott
Scott Lucas,
“Supreme Leader’s call for unity and the relationship between conservative MPs and Ahmadinejad Government”
As usual, you have an agenda. His call for unity had nothing to do with “conservative” MPs and Ahmadinejad. It was a general staement and it includes “reformist” MPs (who have nothing to do with your green buddies in the US and UK) just as much as anyone else.
It is amazing how most people are discussing every technical details on NPT or AP and how people are deceived to looking elsewhere while the facts on the ground speak for themselves.
US has a long term strategy in the ME whatever the Iranian politics or nuclear issue. They’re building military bases on Afghanistan while they say they’ll leave that country soon! absolutely amazing how we’re supposed to be that stupid.
http://presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=139876§ionid=351020403
Exactly the same is done in Irak and people still buy these BS. The world’s biggest embassy in Baghdad and 50K soldiers staying there for who knows how long, and still the MSM talk about the last combat troop leaving. Gimme a break. Can someone please tell me what was the number of soldiers just weeks or months before this withdrawal (cause I can’t find it on Internet news) ? Now that is what I call Mission Accomplished! Good deception.
“Now what is it that Iran can compromise? I tell you right now, from my point of view (and I believe from the point of view of Iranian government too), ABSOLUTELY NOTHING from our NPT rights”
I’d say from my point of view (and I believe from the point of view of Iranian government too), ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING. You seem to forget that Iranians tried to compromise on multiple occasions. They even sent a letter to White House (that supposedly never arrived in the hands of Condy Rice) confirming they’re ready to cut founds and supports from Hamas, Hezballah, Palestine, they’re ready to abandon uranium enrichment, recognize Israel, everything; they just wanted the US recognize the Iranian regime and guarantee their security, survival and their role in the region.
The US and Israel are simply not interested to end this dispute for now in order to advance their own agenda.
Alan: “Obama has not said this since being elected as far as I am aware.”
That is apparently true, and some people have said it indicates his position has become more flexible. However, what I have NOT seen is an actual repudiation of his position. And since the ENTIRE US project has been to get Iran to suspend enrichment, whether supposedly temporarily for purposes of negotiations or permanently, I’d say the onus is very much on Obama to clarify his intent.
The real problem, as I’ve said many times, is that by definition the US KNOWS that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons development, manufacturing and deployment program. And Obama’s clear bad faith in negotiating over the Tehran Declaration shows that he is not to be trusted.
Therefore I can’t give any credence to the notion that he is willing to allow Iran to continue enrichment if Iran does what the US wants. And the US hasn’t even SAID what Iran has to do to make clear Iran does not have a weapons program. As Arnold has pointed out, even ratifying the AP will not be sufficient.
The fact is, as I said earlier, there is NO WAY ANY inspection regime can confirm that a country does not want the knowledge or technology to build a nuclear weapons. The SOLE purpose of the NPT is to serve as an early warning system to detect when a country is actually trying to manufacture a functioning nuclear weapon using declared fissile material. And in this regard, Iran is in complete compliance with the NPT.
To even refer to this as “non-proliferation” is a misnomer. The only thing that happens when a country diverts nuclear material to a weapons program is that the UNSC then has to decide whether that constitutes a threat to peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Then the UN can authorize sanctions or military force. By definition this is not “non-proliferation”, i.e., the prevention of states from possessing nuclear weapons IN ADVANCE, it is merely the justification for the use of force against states which are ALREADY developing nuclear weapons. It’s not even clear how the Treaty can be justified on that basis, given that the NWS already have nuclear weapons and have been lax in adhering to the second part of the Treaty, the reduction of existing weapons stocks. And it says nothing about “rogue” nations such as Israel, India or Pakistan.
Since there is ZERO evidence that Iran has any sort of nuclear weapons program other than POSSIBLY acquiring the KNOWLEDGE to build a weapon, which is NOT under the purview of the NPT and is not even mentioned in the NPT, BY DEFINITION the entire “crisis” is invalid. And Obama must KNOW that. As the Leveretts have said, the entire rationale for threatening military action against Iran is based on the fact of Iran’s legal right to uranium enrichment.
Everything else is fundamentally irrelevant. It is precisely the recognition of Iran’s right to uranium enrichment which is at the core of the issue. If Obama cannot do that – and ALL his ACTIONS so far are indicative that he will not – then the US is incorrect in its behavior.
Again, this further implies a hidden agenda. And everyone should know what that agenda is.
Scott – thanks for link. This Rahim-Mashai chap seems to be at the centre of it all, but the swathe of Ahmadinejad appointees across the spectrum would appear to be the root of the problem. Not simply because of who they are, but because of their impact on the country, not least diplomatic issues.
The question for me is, does, or can, the IR speak with one voice? The desire of foreign interlocuters for a formal reply or statement on anything borders on desperation.
The Leveretts often say it is necessary to deal with the system as a whole, not just with an individual. I accept that, but the only way that can be achieved is through high level meetings and/or the receipt of official, formal communication. Iran just does not appear to be capable of communicating consistently in that way at the moment.
Kooshy – blimey, I didn’t realise Moussavi’s wife was a conservative. That must make for some interesting chats round the dinner table.
Who’s this NYT reporter you’re talking about?
Eric,
Regarding the nature of that deal you spelled out in response to my post, if such a deal were to take place whereby the US acknowledge Iranian enrichment rights and unpick the tangle of resolutions and sanctions, it would involve more than Iran signing on to the AP. It would include elements of previous Iranian offers, such as a limitation to 5% enrichment, or an undertaking to convert LEU stock to fuel rods, or a joint venture aspect. These are things that could sweeten the pill in the US.
RSH – Thanks for link about Obama campaign. I wasn’t aware of it, and it doesn’t help my fragile confidence. Interesting how McCain’s longer term view was much more sound.
Obama has not said this since being elected as far as I am aware. It is not uncommon of course for politicians once elected to adopt the better policies of their opponents. There is also the impact on his Iran perspective of being trampled over by Israel.
Have the talks, see what happens. Expose him if necessary.
(earlier post held up for moderatoin because of links, so trying again…)
Alan,
We have followed the political situation within the Iranian establishment for some time.
Latest updates on the Supreme Leader’s call for unity and the relationship between conservative MPs and Ahmadinejad Government….
http://enduringamerica dot com/2010/08/25/the-latest-from-iran-25-august-waiting-for-reactions/
Latest features….
“Have Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani Kissed and Made Up?”
(link in comment below)
One recent development is the claim that Presidential aide and former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, along with two judges, have been suspended from their posts because of alleged involvement with the post-election events in Kahrizak Prison.
Scott
Alan,
Apologies — wrong link on Ahmadinejad-Larijani feature….
http://enduringamerica dot com/2010/08/23/iran-special-have-ahmadinejad-and-ali-larijani-kissed-and-made-up/
Scott
kooshy,
Thanks very much for the update.
Scott
Scott
My understanding is that these are just specific advisory appointments and not a policy making appointments, none is a part of, or I even doubt if is allowed to attend SNSC meetings. I wouldn’t give it a lot of weight, frankly for the Greens purpose of claiming that he is playing factional politics or to keep them busy with side shows should work good. Very much like the position Tony the lap dog holds with regard to I&P, kind of a attraction for distraction.
Brill: The right of the full fuel cycle is established based on the following Article of the NPT:
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
Not to mention that it has been so recognized for all countries which have mastered the fuel cycle to date – except Iran.
And Article III contains this language:
“Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to … special fissionable material whether it is being produced [or used]…
Article III clearly envisions that Non-NWS will produce special fissionable material for peaceful purposes, under safeguards.
Also the standard Safeguards Agreement specifically states:
Quote:
6. The Agreement should provide that in implementing safeguards pursuant thereto the Agency shall take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum costeffectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. In order to ensure optimum costeffectiveness, use should be made, for example, of such means as:
(a) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes;
(b) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and
(c) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under the Agreement.
End Quote
Note the reference to the “nuclear fuel cycle” explicitly talks about those stages “from which nuclear weapons…could readily be made”, which presumably applies to both fuel rod extraction and enrichment.
To quote someone over at Armscontrolwonk:
“The fact that the full fuel cycle is inherently recognized by Article IV is obvious in the fact that many nations developed their enrichment capabilities without seeking anyone else’s approval or permission. They didn’t need it because it is an inherent sovereign right, predating the NPT.”
Alan: “I don’t believe Obama/US torpedoed the TRR deal.”
Oh, really? Did you not read the letter he sent to the Brazilian President – the contents of which he immediately backtracked from the very MINUTE the Tehran Declaration was made?
If there can be more proof that Obama is a LIAR on the issue of Iran, I can’t imagine what it is. That letter PROVED Obama is a LIAR.
Here is Obama’s position as of his presidential campaign, as reported by David Sanger in the New York Times, 10/23/2008:
www dot nytimes dot com/2008/10/23/us/politics/23policy.html?_r=2&oref=slogin
“Mr. Obama, the candidate who has expressed far more willingness to sit down and negotiate with the Iranians, said in an e-mail message passed on by an aide that in any final deal he would not allow Iran to produce uranium on Iranian soil, the same hard-line view enunciated by the Bush administration.”
And this:
“Mr. Obama’s position is closer to the zero-tolerance approach adopted by the Bush administration. “I do not believe Iran should be enriching uranium or keeping centrifuges,” he said in an e-mail message passed on by aides.”
And this:
“When pressed, Mr. Obama has said that “we will never take military options off the table” and that he would not give the United Nations “veto power” over deciding to strike nuclear facilities.”
And this:
“But Mr. Obama has also been more specific in describing the kind of sanctions he might reach for if the Iranians continue on the current path. “If we can prevent them from importing the gasoline that they need, and the refined petroleum products, that starts changing their cost-benefit analysis,” he said.
Some experts have counseled caution about such an approach, one that the Bush administration has stopped short of taking. A blockade, however, could constitute an act of war, and most experts believe Iran could respond in kind by cutting off oil exports, increasing prices and leading to shortages.”
Alan: “Obama’s real position on enrichment on Iranian soil is not clear. It should be brought into the open.”
He did. During his Presidential campaign, he explicitly said that Iran should not have ANY uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. Look it up. He even threatened a blockade of gasoline imports to Iran, which is just about where we are now, although no “ship inspections” have been done yet. I expect that to be the next step – which of course is an act of war that will probably produce an Iranian retaliation or naval incident Obama can use to justify a military attack.
Alan: “Or they withdrew so they did not have to declare their P2, soon to be IR-2 centrifuge, the development of which was duly leaked to the Iranian media the month following their withdrawal.”
And why would Iran care? Having better centrifuges is not illegal or an indication of an nuclear weapons program. Not to mention that, if I remember correctly, they still have very few of those in operation even now.
Nice to see a bit of movement on this, no matter how small.
UN nuke watchdog chief presses Israeli ministers
wire dot antiwar dot com/2010/08/24/un-nuke-watchdog-chief-presses-israeli-ministers/
Eric/fyi/kooshy,
Thank you for replies. Why, given the National Security Council’s role in decisionmaking, has Ahmadinejad appointed these special representatives now? What is their relationship to the NSC?
Looking for reaction to the appointment of the four representatives, especially Rahim-Mashai, but no word so far….
Scott
Somebody who gets it:
yes, American foreign policy is about oil
http://www.maxajl.com/?p=4026
And the military-industrial complex.
Quote
In any case, there are at least two other influences on American foreign policy: the military-industrial complex, and the interests of capital enterprises not affiliated with petroleum or petroleum-related interests, the broader armament industries, or the Israel Lobby..
Support for Israel, or Israeli belligerence, usually means constant conflict, or the constant potential for conflict, in the Middle East, and constant conflict in the Middle East usually leads to higher oil prices (during the Iran-Iraq War, both sides overproduced, busting OPEC quotas, in order to pay for their arms purchases). This system continued in one or another form through the early 1990s, when every time the average return for major petroleum companies dipped below the Fortune 500’s average return, there was an “energy conflict,” jolting up oil prices and arms sales. The Gulf War was the temporary break in this pattern: “During the 1990s, dominant capital as a whole was increasingly seeking cross-border expansion, a process which required tranquillity, not turmoil. Given that military conflict endangered such expansion, and that high energy prices threatened to choke the green-field potential of ‘emerging markets’, the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition found itself increasingly isolated.” What happened, as petroleum prices again plummeted in the late 1990s and early 2000? We went to war again, first in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq, whereupon profits for the petroleum companies, the weapons industries, and the Tel-Aviv stock market shot through the roof—just look at the figures—representing a confluence of interests between arms manufacturers, the oil industry, and the Israel Lobby. Is this a functionalist explanation? Yes, it is. Does it explain the political economy of the Middle East? Fairly compellingly. Does this mean there’s no Lobby, or that it has no power? Not at all: it has plenty of power, just not determinative influence vis-à-vis American foreign policy in the Middle East. Has Nitzan and Bichler’s book been studiously ignored by those writing on the Israel/Zionist/Jewish Lobby? Yes, it has. In the case of M-W, this ignorance makes a great deal of sense. In the case of leftist analysts, this ignorance is more confusing. It’s not our problem to explain that ignorance, but the repercussions of writing the petrodollar-weapondollar core out of our analyses is all of our problem, especially when those trying to root the Lobby in materialist analyses are dismissed as crypto-Zionists, Jewish apologists for Israel, or whatever term of abuse is hauled in to avoid real discussion.
End Quote
Eric
Not necessarily you have to visit an Aipac related site it is enough to visit some Middle east interest sites like Enduring America or even RFI if it allowed googol ads, once it profiles your computers IP it will trace you on similar sites and caters the ad to your interest or on this case to persuade you to be interested , for a while last year in my office on two different computers on same page on same site I was seeing two different advertisement one being about oil and Ahmadinijad which was the computer I read my Iran news. And the other I run my office business and no Ahmadinijad ad since I use it for my job.
Kooshy,
That makes sense, except that the last time I visited AIPAC’s website, or any other pro-Israeli site, was quite a long time ago. It also concerns me that someone like Rehmat, who, needless to say, is hardly a strong supporter of Israel, ends up with pro-Israel ads on his website, apparently whether he (or his visitors) want them or not.
I can’t think of anything Bush has said about Iran’s nuclear program that Obama has not said something equivalent to. I can’t think of anything any member of the Bush administration has said that has not been said by someone of equal or higher rank in the Obama administration.
I don’t consider the Obama administration untested. I don’t believe Iran considers the Obama administration untested.
I don’t oppose talks. Talks can be conducted, relatively easily, in a way that does not harm Iran’s interests. I also hope, against the prevailing evidence, that the Obama administration is able to be flexible enough in talks to reach an agreement with Iran that allows enrichment and some domestic stock of LEU greater than contemplated in October 2010 which was a long term limit of less than one ton.
On the other hand, Iran does not have to reach the negotiating table at all costs. If the agenda is going to be inducements for Iran to comply with the resolutions demanding Iran stop enrichment, Iran has no reason to show up because Iran is not going to comply with those resolutions by stopping enrichment.
But Obama does not say he accepts Iranian enrichment because he does not accept Iranian enrichment. Bush was no more or less vehement than Obama in rejecting the idea of Iranian enrichment.
To everyone:
I think we have the biggest news of the recent months for the middle east. Apparently Michel Sleiman has officially asked Iran to equip Lebanese army. The news was truly exhilarating for me as an Iranian, and just now I read from press TV that Hezballah has given its full support to the initiative by Mr. Sleiman and has pledged that it will also use its friendship with Iran to convince Iranians to equip Lebanese army.
www DOT presstv DOT ir/detail/139962.html
In my opinion Iran must do EVERYTHING in its power to equip the Lebanese army without holding anything back -be it the weapons or the technology to make those weapons!
To Eric A. Brill:
Eric, a while back you wrote a comment asking how the supporters of Japan option for Iran would react to other countries having the same option, so here is my answer:
Apparently Mr. Nasrallah has also suggested that Lebanon should try to make a nuclear reactor in Lebanon similar to that in Bushehr. In my opinion Iran must do its utmost, without holding back anything regarding nuclear technology (be it regarding reactor building or full fuel cycle capability), to transfer all of its know-how to the Lebanese.
Eric
I am not sure but I think Google caters the ad for the visitor and his/her interest and not necessarily by and for the site, so mostly the ads will show up once they know your interest, like recently when I priced a flight a few other sites that I was navigating they were inviting me to visit for the price on same flight.
Lebanon’s Christian President, Michel Suleiman, has officially requested Tehran to equip and modernize Lebanese Army, given the threats the country is receiving from the Zionist entity…….
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/08/25/iran-to-modernize-lebanese-army/
Rehmat,
“Eric A. Brill – Can you prove the AIPAC ads on my blog through Wikileaks – or I have to believe you are another Israeli Hasbara professional liars.”
That’s an odd comment, to say the least. I’m simply telling you that when I click on the link to your website (which you provide with every post you make here), and I scroll down to the bottom of your main website page, I usually see a link to an AIPAC ad.
Given your clear views, I thought – naively, it appears – that you would appreciate learning that, and would try to do something to stop it. How that makes me an “Israeli Hasbara professional liar” escapes me.
As James already mentioned, Tony Karon’s analysis of Goldberg’s article is quite good:
http://www.truth-out.org/two-minutes-midnight62627?print
“We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions, perhaps even at Rome (Vatican). Most European capitals are targets of our air force,” Professor Martin Van Crevel.
Israel Occupation Force was set up on May 25, 1948 on the orders of David Ben Gurion. It was created by merging the Jewish terrorist militias of Haganah, Irgun and Lehi. It’s only country in the region where military service is compulsory for its non-Arab citizens over the age of 18. Israel has the largest military budget (over $16 billion) as compared to Iran’s $6 billion. In addition, Israel also receives US annual military aid worth $3 billion. Since 1960s, Israel is the sole nuclear power in the Middle East. All this proves that it would be suicidal for Iran to attack the Zionist entity.
So the question is why Israel and its lobbyists in the West keep shouting on top of their lungs that “Islamic Iran is an existential threat to Israel?” The most appropriate answer comes from Trita Parsi PhD in his article published in Salon on August 13, 2010, in response to Jeffrey Goldberg’s article in Atlantic.
“Even an Iran that doesn’t have nuclear weapons but that can build them would damage Israel’s ability to deter militant Palestinian and Lebanese organizations. It would damage the image of Israel as the sole nuclear-armed state in the region and undercut the myth of its invincibility. Gone would be the days when Israel’s military supremacy would enable it to dictate the parameters of peace and pursue unilateral peace plans……..
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/08/25/why-israel-is-campaigning-for-us-iran-war/
Here is the best part from the FT article by Najmeh Bozorgmehr ( An equivlent of Farahi in NYT) you sited what else should wife of Mr. Moussavi think?
“Zahra Rahnavard, the wife of Mir-Hossein Moussavi, Iran’s opposition leader, said the possibility of the “collapse” of the government was “very high”.
I think for one reason or another ( call it lack of good memory or convenience) she forgot to mention that just two days ago when there was a Q&A between ayatollah Khamenie and university student when one of students directly asked a question about some of president’s close advisers ayatollah Khamine replied that he doesn’t want to interfere.
Eric A. Brill – Can you prove the AIPAC ads on my blog through Wikileaks – or I have to believe you are another Israeli Hasbara professional liars.
Rehmat,
I see those AIPAC ads are back on your website. Are you being paid for them?
Eric
Alan (and others):
Regarding the reported possibility that Khamenei will “remove” Ahmadinejad, I’m curious to know what others believe are Khamenei’s powers in this regard. It might interest some to consider Article 110(1)(10) of Iran’s constitution:
“Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:
…
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89. ”
Alan,
I should add that I actually do think the US probably will OK Iranian enrichment on its own soil – at least several years down the road, under some joint-ownership, joint-operation, heavily-monitored arrangement such as Geoff Norden has proposed. Not in the near future, though.
Alan,
“I realise you believe there is little or no likelihood of the US ever endorsing [Iran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil].”
Correct. More precisely, I feel there is little or no likelihood that the US will “endorse” Iran’s enrichment rights in any meaningful way. It would be easy enough for the US to say “We recognize your enrichment rights” in exchange for Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol. But why would Iran care about that? It’s already enriching uranium, after all, and it really doesn’t care what the US thinks about that unless the US also agrees to do something nice for Iran, or to stop doing something not nice.
What Iran presumably wants is for the US to say this:
1. We recognize your enrichment rights.
2. We’ll see to it that all sanctions presently imposed on Iran – by the UN, by the US, by the European Union, and anyone else – are promptly terminated.
In exchange, here is what Iran would say:
1. We’ll implement the AP.
I can see just about any US President going for that deal in a heartbeat – if only he can find at least a four-year stretch of time during which there won’t be any election involving him or any of the Congressional leaders he’ll need to approve that deal – or to vote against his impeachment if the Iran-haters in the US really get rolling.
James – there was an interesting piece in the FT today about a reported rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, and that there was even talk of a conservative ousting of Ahmadinejad.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3795d43e-aed6-11df-8e45-00144feabdc0.html
There is a bit of chatter about this on the air waves, has been for a week or two.
Persian Gulf/Kooshy et al – do you have a view on this?
I see your point, FYI.
My religion is a congregation of One. If Thomas Jefferson and Sen. Frank Church were alive, the congregation would number Three.
Frank Church’s family funded a project to deliver a copy of the so-called Jefferson Bible: “The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth,” to each senator as he/she took the oath of office and took his senate seat. That practice was discontinued about 10 years ago.
Eric – no, it doesn’t include an explicit acknowledgment of a right to enrich, so I suppose the Obama statement I alluded to would have more weight. I realise you believe there is little or no likelihood of the US ever endorsing it, but I think there is a chance. My interpretation so far of Obama’s approach is an attempt on his part to track back to the end game of the EU3 negotiation that was ultimately, as Cyrus says, torpedoed by the US.
In the article I linked, Tony Karon quotes David Kay saying in effect that Israel is employing the phoney or bogus issue of an Iranian bomb, to deflect or prevent Obama from forcing Israel to get out of the West Bank or face permanent injury to its relationship with the US.
The core issue is Israel’s determination to oppress the Palestinians into perpetuity, no matter how many hundreds of billions of dollars this insane programme costs the American taxpayers. The whores in the American newsmedia do their best to keep this core issue camouflaged.
Alan,
You wrote to Arnold:
“… if Obama was to say that he foresaw enrichment on Iranian soil once the nuclear issue was resolved in accordance with the IAEA and UNSC resolutions, it could be helpful. But as I said above, this is in reality nothing more than what is written in the preamble of the UNSC Resolutions anyway.”
I don’t disagree generally with anything in your post, but I do want to point out that the express acknowledgement of each NPT signatory country’s right to “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” in these UNSC resolutions in no case includes an express statement that these “peaceful purposes” nuclear rights include a right to enrich uranium.
Iran, of course, argues that the right to enrich is implicitly but undeniably included in a country’s right to “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” and I and most of us here agree entirely with that. Seemingly consistent with this (and what I mean by “seemingly” will become clear below), the UN Security Council’s denial of Iran’s enrichment rights has never been explicitly predicated on a contrary interpretation of the NPT that would apply generally to all NPT signatories. It is based instead on an Iran-specific remedy that the UNSC has fashioned (without authority to do so, in the view of most of us) as punishment for Iran’s past (pre-2003) violations of its Safeguards Agreement obligations.
It has long seemed to me that the absence, in the preambles of these UNSC resolutions, of any specific reference to the right of an NPT signatory country to enrich uranium on its own soil probably reflects the UNSC’s recognition that it has over-reached its authority by denying Iran’s enrichment rights based solely on Iran’s pre-2003 Safeguards agreement violations, and that its authority is likely to appear shakier and shakier to more and more people as more and more time passes since the transgressions of Iran (pre-2003) that allegedly underpin the UNSC’s authority. If, for example, the UNSC is still denying Iran’s enrichment rights in 2028 – 25 years after Iran was last found to have violated its Safeguards Agreement obligations – very many people will question whether those long-ago transgressions still justify such a denial (if they ever did).
Best, for that reason, the UNSC believes, that the UNSC maintain a “fall-back” claim to authority. I think it intends that that “fall-back” will consist of its explicit declaration – if and when necessary – that a country’s “peaceful purposes” nuclear rights do not necessarily include a right to enrich uranium on its own soil. No point in making that explicit declaration now, the UNSC believes, since much of the world seems to accept that the UNSC has authority to “punish” Iran for its pre-2003 violations. But there’s no point, the UNSC also believes, in including preamble language in resolutions (explicitly acknowledging Iran’s enrichment rights) that might make it difficult or impossible for the UNSC to assert its “fall-back” authority if and when it needs to do so down the road.
I recommend Tony Karon’s “Cutting Through the Media’s Bogus Bomb-Iran Debate”
http://www.truth-out.org/two-minutes-midnight62627
Fyi
“The Supreme National Security Council determines the Foreign Polciy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
Correct, especially over the spectrum policies of the state are debated for conscience in the SNSC, still it must get ratified by the supreme leader
Arnold,
The Iranians have stated they would prefer to have discussions regarding the nuclear dispute take place out of sight of the media, so behind closed doors to them is preferable.
Scott,
“Does anyone have a perspective on why President Ahmadinejad had apppointed special representatives for Asia, the Caspian Sea area, and Afghanistan, and the Near East (now overseen by Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai) and a Director-General for International Affairs? Who has the lead on Iran’s foreign policy — the Presidential staff or Iran’s Foreign Ministry?”
Here are some excerpts from Iran’s constitution, specifying relevant powers of the President and all powers of the Leader. As you’ll see, it’s pretty much up to the President to take all of the actions you’ve mentioned. He’s got authority, for example, to appoint all members of the Council of Ministers (including the Foreign Minister), subject to the legislature’s approval, and pretty much everyone else below that level if he chooses to micromanage.
I hope this helps.
RELEVANT PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
Article 124 — Presidential Deputies
(1) The President may have deputies for the performance of his constitutional duties.
(2) With the approval of the President, the first deputy of the President shall be vested with the responsibilities of administering the affairs of the Council of Ministers and coordination of functions of other deputies.
Article 127 — Special Representatives
In special circumstances, subject to approval of the Council of Ministers, the President may appoint one or more special representatives with specific powers. In such cases, the decisions of his representative(s) will be considered as the same as those of the President and the Council of Ministers.
Article 128 — Ambassadors
The ambassadors shall be appointed upon the recommendation of the foreign Minister and approval of the President. The President signs the credentials of ambassadors and receives the credentials presented by the ambassadors of the foreign countries.
Article 133 — Appointment of Ministers
Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. With the change of Assembly, a new vote of confidence will not be necessary. The number of Ministers and the jurisdiction of each will be determined by law.
Article 134 — Council of Ministers
(1) The President is the head of the Council of Ministers. He supervises the work of the Ministers and takes all necessary measures to coordinate the decisions of the government. With the cooperation of the Ministers, he determines the program and policies of the government and implements the laws.
(2) In the case of discrepancies or interferences in the constitutional duties of the government agencies, the decision of the Council of Ministers at the request of the President shall be binding provided it does not call for an interpretation of or modification in the laws.
(3) The President is responsible to the Assembly for the actions of the Council of Ministers.
Article 136 — Vote of Confidence
The President can dismiss the Ministers and in such a case he must obtain a vote of confidence for the new Minister(s) from the Assembly. In case half of the members of the Council of Ministers are changed after the government has received its vote of confidence from the Assembly, the government must seek a fresh vote of confidence from the Assembly.
LEADER’S POWERS
Article 110 — Leadership Duties and Powers
(1) Following are the duties and powers of the Leadership:
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation’s Exigency Council.
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda.
4. Assuming supreme command of the Armed Forces.
5. Declaration of war and peace and the mobilization of the Armed Forces.
6. Appointment, dismissal, and resignation of:
a. the religious men on the Guardian Council,
b. the supreme judicial authority of the country,
c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
d. the chief of the joint staff,
e. the chief commander of the Isalmic Revolution Guards Corps, and f. the supreme commanders of the Armed Forces.
7. Resolving differences between the three wings of the Armed Forces and regulation of their relations.
8. Resolving the problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods, through the Nation’s Exigency Council.
9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the case of the first term of a President, by the Leadership.
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89.
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, on a recommendation from the Head of judicial power.
(2) The Leader may delegate part of his duties and powers to another person.
Arnold – every UNSC Resolution opens by re-affirming Iran’s rights to a nuclear program. I don’t believe the various vague references you make amount to a denial of Iranian rights. I believe, as I said, that they are a reflex response to the outstanding UNSC demand for suspension.
Obama’s position on long term enrichment must be extracted. Why won’t the Iranians hear him out? Is it because Ahmadinejad has always said their nuclear program is non-negotiable, and has boxed himself into a corner over it? El Baradei has even said that he has seen the Iranians fighting amongst themselves over who will get the credit for bringing Iran in from the cold.
The US are not likely to reveal their bottom line, just as the Iranians are not likely to reveal their’s. I wouldn’t. I do agree in part with you though, that if Obama was to say that he foresaw enrichment on Iranian soil once the nuclear issue was resolved in accordance with the IAEA and UNSC resolutions, it could be helpful. But as I said above, this is in reality nothing more than what is written in the preamble of the UNSC Resolutions anyway.
In terms cold hard strategic logic, there is no country on earth as surrounded by enemies as Iran.
The US Imperial Armies are camped out on both Eastern (Afghanistan) & Western (Iraq) borders.
To the North are oligarchic US allies & to the South are the decadent, dynastic & despotic Arab regimes – ALL in utter dread of the very NOTION of an Islamic REPUBLIC & of course The Zionist-Apartheid Entity is a Nuclear Power of the First Order.
Seen in this context, one may intuit that the Iranians may hanker for the Dark Cold-War Logic of “Mutually Assured Destruction” by way of a deterrent – MAD as it may seem to others.
For over sixty years the Zionist-Apartheid Entity has been trying to entice Iran’s ~50,000+ strong Jewish community to decamp to Israel, but the loyal-to-Iran descendants of ancient Persian Jewry will have no truck with the Zionists & have consistently refused all entreaties.
Just another one of those uncomfortable facts-on-the-ground, that the Zionist Propaganda Machine would rather you did NOT know.
Regime change in (Hydro-carbon rich) Iran is being achieved by the democratic evolution of the Iranian body-politic, as has been happening ever since they got rid of that CIA-puppet known as “The Shah” & his brutal secret police, Savak.
Iran – which has not attacked another country in over 300 years – has had many elections since 1979 whereby the popular-will does find expression locally & nationally, whereas the Zionist-Apartheid Regimes have veered ever further to the “right” & towards becoming a Xenophobic, Racist, Hyper-Militarised, Super-Nationalistic, Fascist, Rogue State, whilst simultaneously purporting to be imbued with “Democracy & all its virtues”.
Now where exactly does the rest of the world need & want a “Regime Change” d’you think ?
The Ruling Elites of Zionist-Apartheid Entity will continue to commit crime after crime & get away with Terrorism, Murder & Spin in their insane zeal for land & hegemony, unless
they are faced with the HARDEST CONSEQUENCES of their Race-Based, Supremacist Ideology &
until an Unstoppable & Comprehensive International Campaign for an Academic, Cultural, Economic, Political & Sporting ; Boycott, Disengagement, Divestment, Embargo & Sanctions takes hold. Aided & Abetted by the USURPED STATES OF AMNESIACS,
they have been acting as a Hyper-Nationalist, Nuclear Armed Rogue State & should be treated as pariahs just as Apartheid South Africa (to whom Israel was keen to sell nuclear weapons in the 1970s!) was.
There is now no possibility, prospect or equity in any “Two-State (Non)Solution”.
The Palestinians, Agnostic, Moslem & Christian, while they have an absolute & inalienable right to resit invasion, occupation & oppression by any means they see fit – COULD renounce their demand for an unviable a separate “Statelet” & demand their FULL Democratic, Political, Civil & Moral rights in the land of their, their forefathers’ & their forefathers’ forefathers’ birth.
We, Worldwide Who Watch & Wait, say “NO” to Apartheid & Bantustans & to Empire !! The most just solution is a Truly Democratic Secular Nation, between the River Jordan & the Sea, based on ONE PERSON ; ONE VOTE ; ONE STATE. That way all of us – not just Iranians & Palestinians, will be safer. By Shads UK
Scott Lucas:
Neither.
The Supreme National Security Council determines the Foreign Polciy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
President executes it and he is also the chairman.
All,
Does anyone have a perspective on why President Ahmadinejad had apppointed special representatives for Asia, the Caspian Sea area, and Afghanistan, and the Near East (now overseen by Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai) and a Director-General for International Affairs? Who has the lead on Iran’s foreign policy — the Presidential staff or Iran’s Foreign Ministry?
Scott
Arnold Evans:
Quite right old chap!
Obama says Iran must not have the capability to make weapons, which means ongoing enrichment and a domestic stock of LEU.
Hillary Clinton says Iran does not have the right to enrichment under its control.
Gary Samore says the US must get Iran to give up enrichment
The secretary of defense and ranking commander in the region say Iran must be prevented from having the capability to make weapons.
Obama has been tested fine. The Obama administration is not different in its position towards Iran’s nuclear program than the Bush administration.
You don’t want to believe it and that’s fine but Obama’s position is perfectly clear.
The resolutions, passed by intense US pressure demand Iran ratify the additional protocols, while until now the ratification of treaties has been a sovereign right. They also demand Iran suspend enrichment for the duration of talks until the parties come to an agreement – which effectively gives the US a permanent veto on Iranian enrichment.
Obama’s position that Iran must satisfy the resolutions is effectively the position that Iran must subject its enrichment to a US veto.
This is all stuff you know Alan.
The US didn’t torpedo the TRR deal as presented in October because that deal was designed for the US, after Iran had exported its uranium, to be in a position to hold TRR delivery as leverage to force Iran to suspend enrichment.
I don’t see any necessary harm in coming to meetings with US officials but meetings are not what prevents the issue from being resolved. The issue cannot be resolved unless the US elites are sold on the idea that Iran be allowed to enrich uranium on its soil and hold an LEU stockpile.
Meetings behind closed doors contribute nothing to a resolution. The actions Obama could take to advance a resolution, such as telling the US public and elite audience that the Bush administration made a mistake trying to prevent Iranian domestic enrichment, the Obama administration is not taking. In fact, the Obama administration is doing the opposite.
Cyrus – I agree that resolution of the nuclear issue has been torpedoed by the US on a number of occasions, and that the nuclear “threat” was a pretext in the Bush years. I don’t believe that is the case with Obama though. I don’t believe Obama/US torpedoed the TRR deal. Obama’s intentions are as yet untested, and Iran needs to test them, but so far they have dodged the talks.
Michael Kerwick:
Yes, the aim was always to keep Iran down.
For US and EU and Canada and the Australia it was regime change – if they could achieve it.
During the Iran-Iraq War, it became the common viewpoint of the Iranian Leaders that the aim of US, USSR, EU, and China was the destruction of the Islamic Republic. And these states were willing to shred CWT to achieve that.
It seems to me that we are seeing the same thing again here: the aim is again regime change in Iran but this time NPT is being shredded.
There is no way forward as this has become a zero-sum game.
“If I was President Ahmadinejad’s National Security Advisor, and he asked me what do I do, I would tell him to acquire a nuclear deterrent.”
Professor J.J.Mearsheimer, July 7, 2010
He did say nuclear deterrent. Since North Korea has a nuclear deterrent none of the Neocon’s like Bolton have advocated attacking them.
James Canning:
My impression of EU is this:
The polities there are dominated by atheists and other post-Christians.
They have, in the absence of a vigorous Christian presence excepting the Catholic Church, have elevated Shoah to a semi-Religion.
Thus, for many many Europeans, as far as I have been able to discern, only Jews are entitled to any form of Religion – all others are just backward fools.
That is the reason that they support Israel and not the Israel lobby.
fyi,
I think you under-rate the imporance of the TRR deal, as a “confidence builder”.
I also think you concede Zionist control of EU foreign policy, when this is very far from being the case.
The Gulf countries do not want another war in the Gulf. Even if they would not come under attack directly.
James Canning:
I think more than 4 years ago the Southern states of Persian Gulf that host US bases, were warned by the Iranians that unlike Iran-Iraq War, they will be targeted by Iran in any US-Iran War.
Their statements must be understood in that light.
I really do not care about TRR – I do not think a (possible) deal on it will have much of an impact on the dynamics of the situation.
I can see that as time passes, sanctions will erode and that after years of Iranian enrichment without a nuclear bomb, UNSC resolutions will become irrelevant – just like UNSC Resolutions 241 and 242 regarding Palestine.
But the anti-Iran posture of US & EU will continue even after that – they have no other policy.
Sum total of US & EU policy in the Middle East is this: “You benighted Muslims you, learn to love the Jewish fantasy project in Palestine and may be we give you some money and technology.”
fyi,
Iran very likely would not have found itself subject to another round of sanctions voted by the UN Security Council, if it had suspended enriching to 20% as requested privately by Russia and China, from what I understand. Are you in effect saying the US will block the TRR deal from proceeding, even if Iran suspends enriching to 20%?
Your confidence the US can act as a global dictator is misplaced, in my view.
fyi,
Idiot neocons in the US still dream the foolish fantasies of seeing an “anti-Iran” government in control of Iraq. Not going to happen. Jacques Chirac told Tony Blair, before the idiotic US/UK invasion, that the result would be a government controlled by the Shia and friendly toward Iran.
Bahrain’s foreign minister is quoted today (PressTV): I have stated Bahrain’s opposition to any military attack against Iran.” I suppose John Bolton will tell us Bahrain secretly is urging the US to attack.
James Canning:
US is opposed to enrichment in Iran. That will not change.
US long range plans are to turn Iraq into an anti-Iran posture.
US supports Israel – an enemy of Islam – to the hilt.
US has put in place – with her EU allies and Japan and Korea – the ingredients for long-term containment of Iran.
These are not negogiating postures.
There is no chance for any forward movement as far as I can see.
May be in 2017.
Cyrus,
The US is not a global dictator, and Germany and France are well aware the US seems to have lost its way in Afghanistan. China and Russia support Iranian enrichment of LEU, and the UK may concur. The energy avaible, on the part of those who favor better US-Iran relations, should be directed toward exposing the cleavage between the US position, and the position of the other five powers (P5+1). The US simply is not in a position to say “screw you” to these other countries. Particularly when it is clear that US behavior is to a fair degree subject to malevolent influence of the Zionist lobby in the US. Taki calls this problem the Israeli Fifth Column.
Aln,
The Financial Times reported this past weekend that Ahmadinejad was quoted in a Japanese newspaper as saying Iran wanted to proceed with the Tehran Declaration (LEU exchange) and was willing to suspend enrichment to 20% as part of the deal.
To me, this offers a sensible way forward, and one hopes the P5+1 (plus Turkey and Brazil) can get the deal done readily once the meeting convenes.
Alan – “talking in a room” is a fine idea, but it is based on the assumption that both sides actually want to resolve a conflict peaceably. That’s just not the case right now between Iran and the US. The entire nuclear issue is pretextual, and cooked up and exaggerated specifically to PREVENT any peaceful resolution — otherwise there were a number of potential peaceful solutions to the standoff that were proposed and ignored or actively torpedoed by the US (the EU-3/Iran negotiations which the US explicitly denounced, and lately the TRR uranium swap deal which the Iranians indicated could have been a “confidence-building measure”) At each step, whenever Iran makes any compromises on the nuclear issue — including by signing and implementing the AP — the US simply moves the goalposts specifically in order to prevent a resolution to the matter. If one side to a conflict sees a benefit to deliberately provoking more conflict, then no amount of talks in rooms are going to resolve anything. Again, the entire nuclear conflict with Iran is pretextual, and no amount of Iranian nuclear compromises will ever suffice to resolve it.
James Canning:
No doubt bankers have a lot of influence in US elections.
But it cannot explain US policy, only the popular support for Israel in US can do so – in my opinion.
The so-called White people in US have taken side in the religious war in Palestine between Jews and Muslims. [You can see this in White suburban housewives showing up in Israel as part of a church trip, for example.]
They have steadily moved their country to a position in which America is perceived to be an enemy of Islam.
This is an untenable situation for America – only a fool would do so.
Russia, India, Thailand, Philippines, and China have all suffered major terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslims. Yet all these states have been very careful not to be perceived as enemies of Islam. And they have been successful in that.
fyi,
I agree with Fiorangela that your near-total pessimism regarding the possibility of US accord with Iran, is unwarranted. The liar warmongers, trying to demonise Iran to distract attention from Israel’s insane effort to crush Palestinian national spirit permanently, can and are being exposed as what they are: liar warmongers. The liar warmongers have numerous prostitutes in mainstream US newsmedia, who are handsomely rewarded for their assistance in continuing to deceive the American public about what the real situation is in the Middle East, and what would best serve the national interests of the US.
Arnold – I’m not being dishonest. You’re actually demonstrating the point I was trying to make. Iran making that announcement appears designed to leave us with exactly the uncertainty you’re complaining about. Could they have an operational P2? Could they have an undeclared parallel enrichment plant spinning P2s?
No doubt they had their reasons. Perhaps they thought they were about to be bombed and needed to sow uncertainty. I believe the risk of that had died down by April 2006. I hope it hadn’t, because otherwise it just looks like nonsense brinkmanship.
fyi,
Given that Jews provide more than half of campaign finance for Democratic candidates for US Congress (both houses), surely you would see the probability this would result in undue influence by the Israel lobby.
John F. Kennedy was astounded in 1960 that Jewish financiers in New York would ask for control over US foreign policy in the Middle East, as their price for supporting him in his race for the presidency. His successor, Lyndon Johnson, was in effect a stooge or captive of Jewish financiers, as their price for not wrecking his insane military adventure in Southeast Asia.
Arnold,
Re: Aug. 23, 9:45am – - Neocons in the Pentagon were the ones so aggressively promoting the notion Chalabi could emerge as the leader of Iraq, provided the US overthrew Saddam Hussein. The CIA thought otherwise.
Fiorangela:
Respectfully, I disagree; you and others cannot hide behind the mythical “Zionists” and “Israel Lobby”.
Protestant Americans and Jews support Israel.
Protestant Americans are raised with the ethos that there are no limits, that they can be whatever they want to be, that they can have a personal relationship with God, that their country is the best in the world (the City on the Hill, New Jerusalem, etc.).
Such people and their representaives in USG still live in the euphoria of 1989.
Only bitter experience will disabuse them of this.
In a way, the egalitarianism of US could be leading it to the same place that egalitarianism of Islam led the various Islamic polities: a rigid common triviality that imposes its mindless tyranny on all men of Intellect.
fyi, must confess I didn’t exhaustively (or exhaustingly) read all of the preceding comments to yours; my response is to this statement of yours:
“Americans, on the other hand, are in denial with respect to the realities on teh ground in the Middle East and their own power and position there.”
I don’t think it’s exactly the case that “America is in denial;” I think America is trapped by Israel. But for Israel and zionist influence on American electorate, I think that enough academics as well as military experts would be able to form a sufficient balance to successfully advocate for US rapprochement with Iran. Israeli influence on US electorate is extremely harmful; that’s where the battle has to be fought by ground forces such as we keyboard warriors, and a few good men and women in positions of power and influence.
The concept of antisemitism must be recast, in this way: Mr. and Ms. Legislator, given the choice to advocate for policies that are in the best interests of Americans, ie. pro-American, or in the best interests of Israel even if they adversely impact American interests, as Reuel Gerecht proposed and conceded, then we, taxpayers, expect you, Mr. and MS. Legislator, to take the anti-semitic rather than anti-American decision.
That’s not too much to ask.
Zionism maintains that its vision and goal and right is for a sovereign state for the Jewish people in their ancient homeland. That place is Israel, not the United States. The Jewish people nor zionism nor Benjamin Netanyahu have the right or claim to preferential treatment as sovereigns over American institutions.
Arnold – why would Iran have to suspend enrichment?
The US position is that the UNSC Resolutions should be abided by. It is not a denial of Iranian rights per se. Obama’s real position on enrichment on Iranian soil is not clear. It should be brought into the open.
There is an obvious solution, but it won’t be found without talking. The recent announcement of US and Israeli “convergence” on Iran being at least a year from a bomb seems to be a de-escalation. There are also growing reports of a split between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, and even rumblings of conservative moves to remove Ahmadinejad. You would think, if true, that kind of outcome might interest the US.
Alan, when you say Iran “denied the existence of the p2″, which would have been an Iranian lie, but you mean Iran “denied the existence of development work on the p2″ which you have no reason to believe is a lie, you’re being dishonest. People who are not as well informed as you will get the wrong impression that you deliberately gave them.
Please don’t do that.
Alan
Like I say, too complex for sound-bitey press releases.
Nope. Don’t buy that either. Details could be worked out in private but the outlines of the concessions the US would have to make can be at the very least hinted to in public.
John Kerry hinted during the summer of 2009 that the Bush position on enrichment was counter-productive. From there every single member of the Obama administration who has spoken, in public or private, whether unnamed officials or Obama himself, has endorsed the Bush position.
An Iran with ongoing enrichment and a stockpile of LEU even the size it has now has, by US calculations, a Japan option. The US is completely clear that it does not accept Iran having a Japan option. Unless the US changes its position, talks cannot be productive. Talks can be arranged that are not harmful, but the best talks can be is not harmful in themselves.
The US does have to sell a climbdown to its elites, but that cannot happen behind closed doors with the Iranians. If Iran intended to give up a Japan option it would have to convince its elites, and the venue for that also would not be behind closed doors with the Americans.
Talks is just your way of projecting the blame for the US’ unreasonable, and legally and morally unsupportable position onto Iran. If Obama does not intend to deprive Iran of the right to ongoing enrichment and a domestic stock of LEU under its own control, all he has to do is say so, or have any unnamed administration official say so.
Alan:
“Previously they have offered all kinds of compromises. Currently they are prepared to compromise over the AP under certain circumstances. They also appear to be saying they are prepared to compromise over 20% enrichment under certain circumstances.
Like I say, too complex for sound-bitey press releases.”
1) I said in MY VIEW. Although I think the Iranian government shares similar views.
2) I said compromise over our NPT rights and in specific our right to enrich Uranium.
3) Iran from the very begining wanted to BUY the nuclear fuel for TRR. It was only after it was denied that it went down the road of enriching to 20% and making its own fuel. So I dont see the “compromise” here. You see, under NPT we have a right to enrich Uranium even to 99%, but we dont do it because we dont need it, that is not a compromise is it?
However, if it makes the Westerners feel any better and gives them a case to claim that they have saved their faces, then I really don’t have a problem with that, it is between the Western governments and their people. By all means consider that as a compromise on Iran’s part.
By the way, Iran never said that it was willing to give up its right to enrich Uranium to 20% it only said it would stop enriching the Uranium to 20% if it were given the fuel for TRR.
Arnold – I’m referring to the existence of development work on the P2. Iran said there was none throughout the AP period. Maybe there wasn’t; maybe there was.
It was just an example of Iran upping the ante. Why mention it? If Iran was still in the AP, they would have been required to declare it. So they pull out of the AP, immediately announce they’re working on them, then blank the inspectors for 18 months.
As I’ve said to you all along, Iran plays its own games, just like the US does. Both are disingenuous when it suits them.
Alan:
The US cannot publically undermine UNSC resolutions
I don’t buy that. I doubt Iran buys that. These resolutions were designed and implemented by the US as a means to deprive Iran, as a special case, of sovereign rights. No less discriminatory or unfair than UN resolutions would be demanding under Chapter 7 that Israel disarm and sign and ratify the NPT.
If the US is going to pretend to be helpless before the discriminatory UN resolutions it expended more diplomatic effort to get than any other project on the planet in public, why would the US not take the same stance in private. If the US was to take a different stance in private, why would anyone believe it?
As hesitant as I am to speak for Iran, it seems that for now, suspension is not on the table. Talks about how to implement a suspension would be a waste of time at best, and would promote a narrative, when Iran refuses to suspend, that Iran is an unreasonable negotiating partner.
Iranians have been in the same room with Americans. I don’t consider that a big deal.
The thing with you, Alan, is that you really don’t want to believe the US intends to prevent Iran from enriching uranium. How many times does the US have to say it for that to be the US position? Yes, it is a thoroughly unreasonable position, but that does not mean the US would change that position behind closed doors. It means the US would advance a thoroughly unreasonable position behind closed doors.
“Now what is it that Iran can compromise? I tell you right now, from my point of view (and I believe from the point of view of Iranian government too), ABSOLUTELY NOTHING from our NPT rights”
I suspect a little more. Maybe even more than a lower case absolutely nothing.
Previously they have offered all kinds of compromises. Currently they are prepared to compromise over the AP under certain circumstances. They also appear to be saying they are prepared to compromise over 20% enrichment under certain circumstances.
Like I say, too complex for sound-bitey press releases.
You earlier said Iran denied doing research on the p2. Now you say Iran denied the P2 existed. That’s much different. Do you have a cite of Iran denying they exist?
Since it is a design that the IAEA and Iran agreed Iran had documents for, what do you mean “denied they exist”.
You’re working hard to present Iran as lying. It seems to me there was no lie.
“talks” by themselves are absolutely useless. Unless you are truly ready to make a compromise there is no point in “talking”. If they switch off the megaphones and start talking about their social life that will be “talking” too, will that help?
Now what is it that Iran can compromise? I tell you right now, from my point of view (and I believe from the point of view of Iranian government too), ABSOLUTELY NOTHING from our NPT rights (ie. full fuel cycle in the Iranian territory by the Iranian experts).
What is it that USA can compromise? They can of course publicly aknowledge Irans to enrich Uranium and a full fuel cycle in its own territory. But unfortunately USA has cornered itself to a box where accepting the only thing that could possibly satisfy Iran will mean “submission” and “humiliation” for them. There were MANY occasions where USA could have got out of the crisis with a face-saving solution but it didnt and instead pushed for the position of the “dictating colonial power”. Last opportunity was when Obama took the power, he could have said that this was a new administration and did not support the bankrupted ideas of the Bush administration. He could have publickly acknowledged Irans right to full fuel cycle and could have shown it as a REALLY extended hand to shake Iranians’. But it didnt, instead it went down the EXACT route as G. W. Bush and tried to demand its colonial rights.
Let me clarify the situation with a hypotetical example: Let’s assume some thing opposite, lets assume that Iran claimed that California was part of the Iranian territory, and that there was no way that it would let go of it. Could we then say “lets sit and talk about this, let BOTH sides make some compromise and get out of the crisis with a face-saving solution: lets say that some small parts of Californian coast will go under the Iranian rule and meanwhile Iran will acknowledge that the rest of california belongs to USA. We can decide on the details during the ‘talks’”? Could we suggest something like that? Can USA make a compromise in such a situation? Is it even right to expect USA to make a compromise in such a situation?
And whats worse lets assume that Iran corners itself by bringing sanctions over sanctions on USA, by constant sabre rattling and war threats and by screaming day and night over the Iranian media that Claifornia is an inseparable part of Iran. Can Iran really make a compromise after that by acknowledging the “minimum” which would satisfy the USA (ie. that California belongs to USA entirely)? Is there anyway for Iran to make a compromise without being abjectly humiliated?
Arnold – I disagree. The mere act of talking in the same room is a big step forward. The US cannot publically undermine UNSC resolutions, it is little more than reflex to say Iran should comply with them. What they can do in a formal meeting that includes other UNSC parties, is discuss modalities with Iran for removing the resolutions. It is far too complex to do by press briefing.
Arnold, there is nothing remotely scary about it to me. Why should there be? It’s just a fact.
Iran withdrew from the AP in Feb 2006, then leaked to the media in March 2006 that they would shortly be revealing a new generation centrifuge, the existence of which had been denied for years (despite repeated IAEA questioning throughout the AP period). It was eventually revealed, as you say, in December 2007.
Switch off the megaphones, and talk in the same room for a change. At the moment, as far as I can see, it is the US that is prepared to do that. Iran looked as though they were, but their position seems to change from week to week.
If the United States can’t say in public that Iran has a right to enrich uranium. If all it can say in public is the Iran does not have a right to enrich uranium, repeatedly, at all levels, then I don’t know if the US would have credibility saying it in secret.
What is important is the positions of the parties and these positions are known and the US position is not reasonable while the Iranian position is reasonable.
Demanding a suspension in line with the UNSC resolutions behind closed doors is in no way better than having Hillary Clinton make the same demand on a Sunday news program.
You guys do not seem to understand.
US and Iran are in strategic competition, at least in the Middle East.
US is using all tools to pressure Iran.
Iran fights back likewise.
There is no resolution possible; Iranians feel that they can live with that situation as they percieve no other immediate threats that would require accomodation with US.
Americans, on the other hand, are in denial with respect to the realities on teh ground in the Middle East and their own power and position there.
Alan:
Or they withdrew so they did not have to declare their P2, soon to be IR-2 centrifuge, the development of which was duly leaked to the Iranian media the month following their withdrawal.
Or maybe the Iranian Parliament passed a law the December before requiring the executive to withdraw its voluntary cooperation beyond the ratified agreements if Iran was referred to the UNSC. Which had been Iran’s publicly expressed policy before that and which was duly complied with immediately when Iran was referred.
What are you saying was leaked to the media the month after withdrawal? You said earlier that Iran declared to the IAEA that it had not done development work on the P2 while it was implementing the AP. About 18 months after withdrawing from the AP, Iran demonstrated a prototype P2.
I’m not sure what your charge is against Iran regarding the P2. Do you have reason to believe Iran was doing development work when it said it was not? What reason is this? It can’t be that Iran told its media what it had told the IAEA consistently before that the P2 design exists even if there was not active research on it.
P2, P2, P2. Ir2, Ir2, Ir2.
What exactly is scary about that to you?
to Eric A. Brill:
I don’t think signing the AP by Iran could reduce in anyway the anxiety of the west and Israel thus reducing the risk of an attack for the simple reason that the west and Israel have no reason to fear a nuclear Iran given their vast nuclear arsenal in the first place.
Second, agreeing UN inspectors to visit any site anywhere anytime at their will, let alone the sovereignty issue is a big security issue for Iran because as we saw in the Iraq case, the inspectors can easily pass sensitive information to CIA and other spy agencies and somehow prepare the attack having valuable information on different sites. I see this security issue a big obstacle why Iran would not sign the AP and why the west hasn’t yet launched the attack.
One thing is sure, the Iranian policies whether internal (with their own people) or external are mainly governed by what they though throughout years of the Shah regime (for internal politics and suppressing of the opposition), the war they had with Iraq during eight years and the two other Gulf wars as far as American attitude and strategies are concerned. One would hope the Americans would also learn some lessons of the past.
Also, the launch of the Bushehr reactor without serious opposition by the west prove once again that all these talks about enrichment and going nuclear are nothing but pure BS aimed at projecting panic among ordinary people under the MSM’ influence and a good pretext for beginning a war. You can’t launch a war for pure humanitarian reason (although I think human right abuses in Iran is a more legitimate concern; also enriching uranium can and will be a business with huge profit in the future provided very few countries have the knowledge to do it).
So what is the real motive ? I don’t think it is oil or gas although they can be the consequences (US has all the oil they want: Saoudi, Persian Gulf Arab principalities, Caucase and Azerbaijan, etc.). I thing the problem with Iran is more strategic/geopolitic. First, the west can’t afford letting Iran filling the power vacuum in the middle east; second, Iran is among the few last nations rejecting the “international order” in every aspect (political as well as financial) and that is why it must surrender or be conquered. Don’t forget that the Iranian central bank is still under government order (not the opposite as we currently see in the west) and economy and industries are mostly state managed. Privatizing them all is a source of huge profit for western bankers who run the world (remember what happened in Russia after Soviet collapse). Actually, the leaders of the Green movement opposing Ahmadinejad election negotiated with Americans in Iran-Contra affair, know them well and happen to be for a complete privatization of the Iranian economy. Although Iran has real economic problems, I don’t think looting the state owned industries can in any way help the people’s needs.
Lastly, I don’t know what are the immediate goals of the elites but it seems to me logical that having a country like Iran in a perpetual crisis situation is more interesting for the them than a quiet and obedient Iran (otherwise they had to invent other crisis). Why ? well, at least people will be diverted to fake problems than real ones, there would always be at hand a good reason to start a profitable war and god knows every other evil reasons out of greed, power and money. Also, for the same reason cited above, the west can’t afford a democratic Iran (as they proved in 1954 with their coup against Mossadegh), for they’ll have a too big weight in the region. So I wonder why at all would they want the end of the current Iranian government. The only consequence of the late “twitter uprising” was that the government have been able to purge where it couldn’t before because of lack of intelligence about their opponents. And every threat from US or Israel is a gift to the current Iranian regime, and in a way to themselves.
It’s not Iran’s non-existent nukes which frighten Israel-US, but Tehran’s strategic alliances with Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. Between Israel and its poodles in Washington, London and France – they have more than 14,000 nuclear bombs.
The failure of the US-UK-Israel Axis of Evil to reshape the Middle East for the dominance of the Zionist entity – has left the region open to a new alliance, the Ankara-Tehran-Damascus triangle.
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/ahmadinejad-to-visit-lebanon/
There is only one problem with the essay, a few hegemonic powers do not represent the international community.
Eric/Castellio
I don’t think the cart should be put before the horse here. Nobody needs to do anything other than talk. Certainly nobody needs to acknowledge enrichment rights, because Iran has that right. Equally, Iran does not have to offer adherence to the AP, as there is no requirement for them to do so.
What they need to do is talk. And what they both need to do is find a way to sell a deal, to their own electorates. In fact, it isn’t even their electorates they need to sell it to, it’s their opinion-formers, or “elites”.
Switch off the megaphones, and talk in the same room for a change. At the moment, as far as I can see, it is the US that is prepared to do that. Iran looked as though they were, but their position seems to change from week to week.
RSH:
Castellio: “Well, why did they quit unless they’re up to something?”
There’s a very explicit REASON why they quit and it’s well known to anyone who is following the situation, and should be explicitly stated whenever someone like Gerecht (or Brill) brings it up.
They stopped because they got nothing for it. They stopped because their file was referred to the UNSC for no good reason and in violation of the IAEA’s own policies and the NPT. They stopped because their cooperation was not only not recognized, it was used against them. They stopped because it became clear to them that the US was not negotiating in good faith, but was hell bent on ginning up a reason to attack Iran.
Or they withdrew so they did not have to declare their P2, soon to be IR-2 centrifuge, the development of which was duly leaked to the Iranian media the month following their withdrawal.
Arnold,
“Kooshy, … We should not over-blow the weapons of mass destruction stuff. The United States did not feel threatened by Iraq in 2003, even in the slightest. The uninformed masses in the United States believed it could punish some Muslims for 9/11 while the informed believed an anti-US leader could be replaced with a more reliably pro-US leadership at a reasonable military cost. I’ll say that Bush understood how Middle Easterners think less than I did because he really seems to have thought he could get a pro-American democracy – which boggles my mind.”
This is a very interesting comment to me, for two reasons.
First, it reminds me of a thought I had at the time: that despite all of the apparent agreement in the US that Saddam needed to be taken out because he had WMDs that might be used against the US (though I never believed that, and understand you didn’t either), it may be that very few Americans – whether “informed” or “uninformed” – actually believed that, or didn’t much care if they did believe it. The WMD story was a respectable reason that anyone could point to if asked why he supported an attack on Iraq – just as several high officials later reported was the story’s unifying purpose among the US decision-makers themselves – and it may be that most Americans assumed that everyone except themselves who professed to believe the WMD story really did believe it.
The real reason for the widespread American support of war on Iraq may instead have been a large and varied collection of reasons – many of them less “respectable” than fear of WMDs – that were far less often discussed or even revealed to others. You’ve identified a couple – the post-911 need felt by many Americans to whack some Muslims, wherever and whenever a plausible excuse for doing so could be found; the belief by some high officials that Saddam could be replaced by a pro-American democracy. One can easily add other reasons with which you’ll probably agree – to eliminate a threat to Israel, to safeguard US oil supplies, to replace Saddam with a pro-American government, democracy or not. But the point is that the actual reasons for Americans’ support of the Iraq war may have been quite numerous and, if one were to have administered a truth drug to all Americans and then polled them on their reasons, a genuine fear of Iraqi WMDs may have been very far down the list.
The second especially interesting point to me is your final sentence, and especially the word “really.” The Bush presidency years were dark years for US foreign policy, very sad years for most Americans who paid attention to it. I searched for something to feel good about, and toward the end found myself willing to settle for just about anything. What I finally found that made me a feel at least a bit better came to me partly before Bush left office and partly afterward. I concluded that maybe Bush really did believe the implausible “pro-American democracy” rationale his administration was offering in support of a war on Iraq – that maybe there was, after all, some space between him and his “dark side” advisers – the Cheneys and Perles and Boltons, who probably couldn’t have cared less who ruled Iraq so long as he knew his place. Whatever his reasons for making so many bad decisions, Bush made those bad decisions just the same, and he deserves full blame for them. It’s nevertheless a bit more comforting, to me at least, to think that he may have just been naive or stupid or both, but not necessarily as insincere and deceptive as, for nearly eight years, he appeared to be.
Oh, and I might add to the notion of a “cold war” with Iran – you can’t spend that kind of money on defense without frequently putting it to use, because a war expends military assets in a grand style – and those assets have to be replaced more quickly and more expensively than during a “cold war”.
You cam use a cold war to justify building up your military, but eventually you have to expend that military to justify building it up again. Building it up is where the money comes from, not just maintaining it (although maintenance contracts over time end up costing more than procurement, procurement is money RIGHT NOW which is always worth more than money later).
Also, as I said, you have to expend that military in order to beat up smaller states in order to maintain your OTHER economic priorities, such as oil.
The only time the US tries “containment” is when the cost of the war in real public relations terms or physical destruction is unacceptable, i.e., nuclear war or a “hot” war with a state such as North Korea where the military lives lost would be unacceptable to the public for the stated reasons for the war. Neither applies to Afghanistan, Iraq, or Iran.
Castellio: “Do you see any other possible narrative that holds up other than a rush to war to satisfy the cash flow requirements of the oligarchy?”
Frankly, no. Although I wouldn’t put in terms of “cash flow” – except in the sense that there has to BE a cash flow. The US operates on a “permanent war” economy. A massive amount of industrial capacity is devoted, in one way or the other, to the US military state. You can’t spend nearly a trillion dollars a year on the Department of Defense and related budgets without that being true. You can’t spend TWENTY TIMES what China spends on “defense” without that being true. You can’t spend an amount equal to the COMBINED defense spending of the WORLD without that being true. You can’t be in CONTINUOUS war for the last DECADE without that being true (absent having been attacked by a neighbor such as the Iran-Iraq war). The supplementary budget to pay for the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, NOT part of the official defense budget, is itself larger than the combined military budgets of Russia and China.
Add to that the notion of the US corporate elite that the US HAS to dominate the world in order to ensure its OTHER economic activities aside from military spending, and what’s left? Almost the ENTIRE US economy necessitates war.
This is the nature of empires. You can’t have 737 US military bases around the world without being an empire.
So, yes, this IS the reason for the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Iran. Self-interest rules, and the self-interest of the United States is funding the military-industrial complex, the oil companies, and their financial backers. Add to that the neocons who seek global US hegemony, i.e., empire, and the Israel Lobby which seeks to dominate the Middle East and manipulate the US empire for its own benefit.
No doubt there are various fools in the US government who are ignorant enough of the situation to believe Iran might actually have a nuclear weapons program. But they’re not relevant. What’s relevant is the deliberate falsification of the situation. That by definition can be explained by nothing other than a hidden agenda. What other agenda can there be but MONEY? Money and power is all there is to the political state. (In the case of George Bush, Israel and Iran, we might add religious fanaticism as a motivation, but invariably money and power are involved in that as well.)
Castellio
“Is there any other possible reason… ?? I’m not trying to challenge your statement rather wondering if there is any other justification that makes sense… are we missing something?”
The policy is designed to continue and make possible a continued on going cold war with Iran and not a “HOT” war or as I have written before to contain Iran, first politically (to prevent spread of independent thinking in the region) and for that matter economically (to prevent as much as possible the notion that an Islamic revolution has been a success). To obtain this goal various tools have been used at different junctures and by different US administrations including (proxy regional war, internal destabilization, coup, sanctions, UNSC resolutions, etc. etc.). Incidentally I believe a political containment of Iran to a degree is accepted by all P5, but a full economic containment is not.
However if one understands Iran’s geography and history will soon know that political, economic and cultural containment of Iran is totally impossible.
Is that true, RSH, when you write “There is no excuse for that except a hidden agenda to justify war!”
Is there any other possible reason… ?? I’m not trying to challenge your statement rather wondering if there is any other justification that makes sense… are we missing something?
Do you see any other possible narrative that holds up other than a rush to war to satisfy the cash flow requirements of the oligarchy?
“It is now viewed as a proliferation risk because Russia is providing the needed fuel and taking back the spent nuclear fuel, which is the principal source of potential proliferation.”
Should read:
“It is NOT viewed as a proliferation risk because Russia is providing the needed fuel and taking back the spent nuclear fuel, which is the principal source of potential proliferation.”
Brill: “US: Acknowledges Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its own soil, presses UN Security Council, European countries, and US Congress to eliminate or substantially reduce sanctions. Iran: Agrees to implement AP. That’s a deal you consider feasible? I sure don’t.”
See, this is where your logic is totally wrong. On the one hand, you say that if Iran unilaterally agreed to implement the AP, then it would help divert war, or at least make it easier for those who oppose war to maintain that there is no justification for it because Iran is cooperative and therefore not hiding anything.
On the other hand, you admit that if the US acknowledged Iran’s right to uranium enrichment – which is PRECISELY what the US is refusing to do in order to confuse the public over the difference between a “peaceful nuclear energy program” and a “nuclear weapons (aka Japan option) program” – that it would have no effect on the overall situation.
That makes no sense.
Iran needs to offer the AP as a bargaining point in order to get the US to admit that uranium enrichment is its legal right because BY DEFINITION if Iran is allowed to enrich uranium on its soil it is in PRECISELY the same situation as Japan, South Korea and Brazil. And being in that position, and being able to SAY it is in that position, would enable it to turn the onus back on to the US to prove that it has a REAL “nuclear weapons program” rather than just a program which theoretically could allow a “breakout”. Because the latter is ENTIRELY LEGAL! The US wishes to confuse the public on that point by referring to Iran’s uranium enrichment as a “weapons program” – which it is NOT.
Iran could not do much better for itself than to force the US to point out that it is objecting to something which is ENTIRELY LEGAL for Iran to do.
Not that I think the US would do that, so you are correct to say it isn’t going to happen. But because of that, AGAIN there is no advantage to Iran implementing the AP unilaterally. None whatsoever, despite your fanciful notion that somehow it would prevent the US from pursuing its war aims.
Nothing establishes the bad intentions of the US more than the fact that it refuses to acknowledge that Iran’s program is entirely LEGAL, and that it deliberately conflates uranium enrichment with a “weapons program.” The US thus KNOWS that Iran does not have a nuclear energy program any different from those of Japan, South Korea or Brazil and therefore does NOT have a nuclear weapons program.
This again is a point which MUST be kept in mind at all times: The US KNOWS that Iran does NOT have a nuclear weapons program. It KNOWS that! It is DELIBERATELY conflating the full fuel cycle with a nuclear weapons program. There is no EXCUSE for that except a hidden agenda to justify war!
Kooshy, thanks for the link. Grazie.
Eric, quite simply, I now see agreeing to the AP as a possible step “down” (away from tension) that both parties can acknowledge as useful, and yes, I think the exchange is in the lightening, or abandonment, of sanctions. That won’t be the ‘deal’, but it might be part of the package.
Is that unreasonable? Perhaps. Maybe you feel that the U.S. elites just can’t accept not having total global hegemony a la Wolfowitz, and so you think the issue is how to create that hegemony (although I haven’t felt that from you)? However, we should note that the American people – not that they count for much right now – would be happy to step back, which is why Obama was elected with control of both houses.
Eric, how is the US going to step away from this constant escalation with Iran? Is it possible? What steps can be taken by the US? Don’t tell me America ’should’ do what Arnold suggests… what can America do to step away from its on-going push to war? What are its obligations at this point in time?
In 2003, when I found myself outside the city of An Najaf, I wondered how I could take the city without inflicting excessive damage or casualties; how could I prove our honorable intentions without using too much force; and how could I help the people of Najaf while the Coalition dismantled Saddam’s regime to my north?
As I stared at Najaf through the night skies, I realized that Ayatollah Sistani, the Grand Ayatollah for all the Shi’a, lived on that ridge under house arrest—a man and a religion that had seen the bottom of Saddam’s boot for more than 15 years. Could he be the key to accomplishing my mission? If we could free the Ayatollah and seek a fatwa, a religious proclamation, maybe we could convince the Shi’a to stop fighting.
As the fighting in Najaf waged on, we managed to exchange emissaries between my headquarters and Sistani’s residence. Our eventual breakthrough came when we were able to fly Ayatollah Khoei, a senior Shi’a Ayatollah and friend of Sistani’s, into Iraq to discuss the requested fatwa. The meeting was set for April 3, 2003.
The meeting seemed simple enough until the emissaries presented Sistaini’s demands. First, he wanted U.S. security since his Iraqi guards had deserted their posts, leaving him unprotected. Second, he wanted to meet with Khoei and the American commander—me!
Despite my concerns, I agreed to the meeting. My only request was for him to tell the world we were invited. He did so by sending dozens of his students to the streets of Najaf to tell the crowd and the media that we were welcome.
The people of Najaf hadn’t publicly seen their Ayatollah for years, so news of his pending appearance spread like wildfire through the streets causing a small gathering to swell into an enormous and anxious crowd. Finally, the senior cleric from Sistani’s office came to tell me we were cleared to move to Sistani’s compound: “The people of Najaf know the Americans were invited.”
Upon my order, the patrol picked up and started to walk slowly down the Golden Road to the Mosque of Ali. As I made my way to my vehicle, there was suddenly a huge crash to my left rear. As I turned to see where the sound came from, something hit the lens of my sunglasses. As I staggered back, something else hit me in the back of the helmet.
“They’re throwing rocks!”
No, he invited us—I thought.
I looked back to the front of the column in time to witness a large vegetable cart being turned over in the street by the angry mob.
I headed to the front of the column, telling myself this is a mistake: these people don’t understand we were invited! I took my rifle off safe and prepared to shoot a couple of rounds into the air. How long will the pause last—will it be a pause or will it be an excuse for someone in the crowd to shoot back? I put my rifle back on safe as I neared the front of the column.
My men were already intermixed with the crowd, being pushed and shoved. Things were about to erupt into a full-blown riot. Someone was either going to accidentally shoot his weapon, or feel threatened and shoot into the crowd.
“Take a knee, everyone take a knee!” I screamed over the roar of the crowd. I needed the men to stop entering the mob, and “taking a knee” lowers a soldier’s profile. The moment my soldiers took a knee, the mood of the crowd softened, almost as if it became confused and curious. The crowd paused, a safer and surer pause than one that would have come if I had chosen to shoot warning shots.
“Point your weapons toward the ground—show no hostile intent,” I shouted. The crowd paused again and people in the front began to smile and sit down with my soldiers. “Ok,” I thought, “these people don’t understand what’s going on; someone is pushing and agitating them.”
“Smile men, they have to know we were invited – SMILE!” They were short, awkward and forced smiles as would be expected from young men facing down an angry crowd, but they smiled.
After about 20 minutes, I felt we had managed the situation well, but needed to depart. It didn’t make any sense to muscle through this crowd to meet Sistani. To do so would feed right into the hands of the bad guys. They wanted me to screw this up, not just for the people of Najaf, but for the entire world.
I walked back to my loudspeaker truck.
“No Slack (my battalion’s nickname), we’re going to pull back and let them sort this out…everyone pull back.” And with that, we stood up and began to walk backward.
“Just turn around and walk away, men,” I yelled across the column. My men turned their backs and walked away from an unstable crowd for the whole world to see.
As we cleared the crowd, I remembered something a friend of mine had taught me. He showed me how to place my right hand over my heart and slightly bow to the Iraqis as a gesture of respect meaning “Allah be praised”. As No Slack withdrew, I turned to the crowd, stopped, placed my right hand over my heart and slowly bowed, turned and walked away.
Later that evening, we got word from our informants that Ayatollah Sistani had issued a formal fatwa to the people of Najaf.
“Do not interfere with the American forces entering Iraq, Praised be to Allah, Grand Ayatollah Sistani of the Mosque of Ali.”
Col. Christopher P. Hughes
Army House Liaison Division
Considering what GHW did in 91 with the Shieh in the south and to an extend with Kurdish in north, anybody who would have thought that US can attain control of Iraq after the invasion of 03, didn’t have a clear vision on how the middle easterners think.
Kooshy, I have to say that’s me in 2003 and most of the United States. We should not over-blow the weapons of mass destruction stuff. The United States did not feel threatened by Iraq in 2003, even in the slightest. The uninformed masses in the United States believed it could punish some Muslims for 9/11 while the informed believed an anti-US leader could be replaced with a more reliably pro-US leadership at a reasonable military cost.
I’ll say that Bush understood how Middle Easterners think less than I did because he really seems to have thought he could get a pro-American democracy – which boggles my mind.
Castellio
“This is news to me. Did this really happen? Was it negotiated? Where can one learn more about this incident?”
If you want to read about that day’s events in Najaf in front of the street going to grand ayatollah sistani’s house which actually was the first US defeat in Iraq
http://www.bankingonbaghdad.com/chapter1.php
Castellio,
“‘Therefore Iran should in fact be using the AP as a bargaining tool to get the US to recognize its right to uranium enrichment.” {RSH]. I agree with that, as do the Leveretts. I didn’t start in that position but have moved to it.”
Can you elaborate a bit on what you mean? Suppose Iran were to agree to the AP and the US said, in return, “OK, we hereby acknowledge your right to enrich uranium on your own soil.” What, exactly, would that acknowledgement amount to, other than those words? An elimination or substantial reduction of sanctions?
If not, why would Iran care whether the US “acknowledges” its right to enrich uranium or not? And if “acknowledgement” does mean elimination or substantial reduction of sanctions, then wouldn’t the “deal” look something like this:
US: Acknowledges Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its own soil, presses UN Security Council, European countries, and US Congress to eliminate or substantially reduce sanctions.
Iran: Agrees to implement AP.
That’s a deal you consider feasible? I sure don’t.
Clearly we didn’t know that [Iraq didn't have undetected fissile material] before the 1991 war, when Iraq was observing only its original 1970’s-style Safeguards Agreement.
Not only is that not clear, it is exactly wrong. Actual fissile material is well accounted for by the CSA, which is what it was negotiated to do. Iraq had technologies that could be used to help turn fissile material to a weapon if any was ever diverted that were undeclared. Iraq could not have made a weapon in 1991 or any time after without leaving the NPT or very visibly breaching its CSA in a way that, as Gary Samore describes regarding Iran with implements its CSA, would be detected immediately.
About North Korea, if it had not left the NPT it could not have built a weapon ever because it could not have diverted fissile material to a nuclear program. The AP has nothing to do with that. If it had been observing the AP until it left the NPT, it would have had six years to build a weapon from that point. Every indication is that is plenty of time even for North Korea. Whether North Korea started from scratch or had some work that it would have disclosed if it had been observing the AP, would not have changed the six years it took before North Korea actually deployed a weapon after leaving the NPT and not even having to make CSA disclosures.
1991 in Iraq did not expose that the CSA is insufficient to detect fissile material. I’ve never read that there was a failure in detection of fissile material. Iraq did not have fissile material in 1991, as was guaranteed by its CSA. Iraq had technologies that the US did not know about that brought it closer to the point that it could have built a weapon if it had gotten fissile material and pulled out of the treaty than the US knew about, but did not and could not have had a weapon.
No fissile material means no weapon. People who agree with you that some countries do not have the right to even have Japan’s capability to make a weapon are alarmed that Iraq had undeclared programs that could have been used, if Iraq pulled out of the treaty to make a weapon but there still was no failure in detecting a weapon.
Implementing the AP is not a cost free object for Iran. There are US assets in Iran right now using every piece of information Iran discloses to sabotage its nuclear program. Iran has decided to disclose the legal minimum under these conditions. You present it as if there is no risk when it’s clear that there is risk.
But there, in my opinion, and I’m pretty sure the consensus in Iran agrees, is no benefit to implementing the AP since that would not stop the US program to harass its nuclear program. The US could and would use any information Iran discloses to advance its end – maybe by inventing more laptops of death, maybe by demanding strategically valuable information – but if the US does not change its objective and gets more information that it can use to achieve its goal, we can be certain it will use that information in a way that harms Iran.
“Therefore Iran should in fact be using the AP as a bargaining tool to get the US to recognize its right to uranium enrichment.” RSH
I agree with that, as do the Leveretts. I didn’t start in that position but have moved to it. I was just pointing out that in the world of simple lists, your #4 left an impression that was not what you intended. There was a shadow of a log. (see below)
“Maybe that would put a damper on the efforts of war-mongers in the US who exploit Iran’s disclosure refusals to persuade US decision makers that we are at the “point of no return.” Brill
Erc tries to minimize logs available for the war mongers to burn. Others say the crazies don’t need actual logs at all, virtual logs generate just as much heat – maybe more – in the public’s mind.
In fact, Eric relies upon (postulates) a rational cadre (somewhere) that would notice a log is missing. Arnold also postulates a rational cadre, his more explicitly in the military, that is doing cost-benefit analysis, and who will, most likely, “carry the day”. To that rational military cadre, Arnold contends, Eric’s differentiation between virtual and real logs is, to be kind, irrelevant. The cadre is interested in balance of force, not looking into the crazed minds of the war mongers.
“The objective is to start another war for the benefit of the military-industrial complex, the oil companies, the neocons, and the Israelis.” RSH
RSH also assumes a rational cadre doing cost-benefit analysis, but among the industrial-military-financial-Israeli elite that forms a good chunk of the American oligarchy. In light of their power, he contends, the rational actors that both Eric and Arnold rely upon are really quite secondary historical players.
“The outcome was obvious from the get go, especially when the US forces reached Najaf and were not allowed to get close to grand ayatollah Sistani’s house and security was left to Shieh Badr forces.” Kooshy
This is news to me. Did this really happen? Was it negotiated? Where can one learn more about this incident?
Brill: “Indeed, that is precisely what everyone hopes any disclosure and inspection scheme will establish: the absence of a nuclear weapons program. Such a scheme is effective if it permits us to answer, or at least get substantially closer to answering, that crucial question one way or the other.”
Totally wrong. The NPT was never established for the purpose of establishing “the absence of a nuclear weapons program.” It was established to enable the international community to determine WHEN a nuclear weapons program was put into effect, by detecting the diversion of any nuclear activities to a weapons program.
There is NO POSSIBLE WAY that an inspection program can determine the “absence of a program” simply because any country has at least the potential of concealing work on the design of a nuclear weapon, the collection of the information necessary to construct a nuclear weapon, and even the construction of a nuclear weapon without fissile material. All of that activity can be described as a “nuclear weapons program” – and virtually all states which are threatened by countries with nuclear weapons, such as Japan and South Korea (and Brazil is suspected), have undoubtedly done so.
What an inspection program can do is serve as an early warning system that a country has initiated, NOT a “nuclear weapons program”, but a nuclear weapons DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURING, AND DEPLOYMENT program.
And that is all the NPT or any inspection regime can hope to do.
Under the NPT, the IAEA has CERTIFIED that Iran does NOT have a nuclear weapons development, manufacturing, and deployment program. It has not certified AND CAN NOT CERTIFY that Iran does not have the KNOWLEDGE or is seeking the KNOWLEDGE to build a nuclear weapon. The IAEA also CAN NOT certify that Iran does no desire for nuclear weapons.
The same is true of Japan, North Korea, Brazil, and probably other countries.
Arnold,
“Neither case [North Korea, after leaving NPT, or Iraq, pre-1991] proves that the AP rectifies any failure of the CSA to prevent a state from building a weapon.”
I don’t understand how you reach this conclusion, about either North Korea or Iraq.
You mention it took North Korea six years after leaving the NPT to test a nuclear bomb. If North Korea had never left the NPT, do you think it would have found it equally easy to produce its nuclear bomb whether or not it observed the AP while it was working on it? You might be right, but I doubt that, and I see nothing in your post that supports such a conclusion.
“I have not read specifically what weapons program Iraq had, but what Iraq did not have in 1991 was undetected weapons-grade or even enriched fissile material in anything near a quantity that would be militarily significant. In other words, Iraq did not and could not have had a weapon.”
You are missing the key point, which is reflected in this question: When and how did we figure that out?
If the US hadn’t defeated Saddam in 1991 and thereafter sent in hundreds of inspectors, how would we have determined that Iraq had no “undetected weapons-grade or even enriched fissile material in anything near a quantity that would be militarily significant?” Clearly we didn’t know that before the 1991 war, when Iraq was observing only its original 1970’s-style Safeguards Agreement. Equally clearly, we did know that after we imposed a significantly more intrusive disclosure and inspection scheme on Iraq. I doubt you’d dispute the cause-and-effect relationship one can discern from that change in monitoring schemes. The only question, then, is whether a more intrusive disclosure and inspection scheme such as the AP, but short of the scheme imposed on Iraq against its will, would have enabled us to make the same determination. You insist it would not have, but I don’t understand what makes you so confident about that.
Bear in mind that one cannot fairly conclude that a disclosure and inspection scheme is ineffective merely because, when applied, it permits a country to establish that it does not have nuclear weapons or the practical ability to produce them – as occurred, for example, in the case of Iraq after the 1991 war. Indeed, that is precisely what everyone hopes any disclosure and inspection scheme will establish: the absence of a nuclear weapons program. Such a scheme is effective if it permits us to answer, or at least get substantially closer to answering, that crucial question one way or the other.
“I thought Iraq 2003 would result in Chalabi being Iraq’s Mubarak with Iraq being a very valuable part of the US colonial structure, that reinforced it and made the Middle East a more valuable strategic asset for the US to use in any competition with rivals such as Europe, Russia or China for a long time to come.”
“That’s what most US policy-makers believed as far as I could gather and to my surprise it turned out false. A lot of Iraqis of all religions and philosophies fought very hard, with assistance from Iran and Syria to prevent that outcome. The US was unable to install a client dictator and expand what Eric Margolis describes as the US Raj – or modern effectively colonial administration of the region.”
Considering what GHW did in 91 with the Shieh in the south and to an extend with Kurdish in north, anybody who would have thought that US can attain control of Iraq after the invasion of 03, didn’t have a clear vision on how the middle easterners think.
The outcome was obvious from the get go, especially when the US forces reached Najaf and were not allowed to get close to grand ayatollah Sistani’s house and security was left to Shieh Badr forces. Out of no other choice Americans hoped that the Shieh will accept the new masters.
Arnold: “If the US attacks Iran’s nuclear program, its only objective – openly stated in nearly every article about the subject – would be to delay Iran’s acquisition of capabilities like those Japan has.”
No, that’s the excuse, not the objective.
The objective is to start another war for the benefit of the military-industrial complex, the oil companies, the neocons, and the Israelis.
The reason they need another war is because Iraq is winding down, and Afghanistan is becoming such a loss leader to the public that a new war must be started up to replace it as the money generator.
People don’t seem able to understand the depth of corruption in the US. It’s pure cognitive dissonance not to see that the whole point of these conflicts is to generate money for certain sectors of US society. All the excuses about “democracy”, “war on terror”, “regional security”, blah, blah, blah, are all total ruminant evacuation.
Castellio: “Well, why did they quit unless they’re up to something?”
There’s a very explicit REASON why they quit and it’s well known to anyone who is following the situation, and should be explicitly stated whenever someone like Gerecht (or Brill) brings it up.
They stopped because they got nothing for it. They stopped because their file was referred to the UNSC for no good reason and in violation of the IAEA’s own policies and the NPT. They stopped because their cooperation was not only not recognized, it was used against them. They stopped because it became clear to them that the US was not negotiating in good faith, but was hell bent on ginning up a reason to attack Iran.
Granted, this was under the Bush administration, not the Obama administration. But given Obama’s attitudes since he took office (and before in his Presidential campaign), I see no reason why Iran should view the situation any differently now.
Therefore Iran should in fact be using the AP as a bargaining tool to get the US to recognize its right to uranium enrichment. Which I REMIND people is Iran’s complete legal right under the NPT.
Therefore, for those who say that Iran should just “give away” the ratification of the AP, I say the argument is EQUALLY TRUE that the US should “give away” the recognition of Iran’s right to uranium enrichment.
If the argument is good for Iran, it’s good for the US. It cuts both ways.
I don’t understand why it’s so hard for people to understand that Iran is not required to bow down to the United States – unless of course those people simply view Iran as untrustworthy by definition and therefore an enemy to be treated badly regardless of how cooperative they are.
Arnold,
“I see no reason to believe starting again [to observe the AP] would now change the volume [of accusations against Iran’s nuclear program] – because the US objective is not to get more disclosure from Iran, but to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option which is independent of disclosure.”
I don’t dispute – never have – that the US desires that Iran never attain the “Japan option.” This may or may not mean the US doesn’t really care how much Iran discloses. I suspect the US does care, but I agree with you that the US probably won’t give up its “no Japan option for Iran” efforts regardless of what Iran discloses.
But the question isn’t what it will take for the US to abandon its “no Japan option for Iran” efforts. Nor, for that matter, is the question whether Iran will be allowed to achieve the “Japan option” that you are so certain (but the Ayatollah Khamenei emphatically denies) Iran really seeks. The important question, in my opinion (and Khamenei’s too, I believe), is simply whether the US will succeed – not merely continue trying, but succeed – in preventing Iran from conducting the peaceful nuclear energy program that Iran claims it will be content with – not achieve a “Japan option,” with thousands of tons of excess refined uranium lying around, as you think Iran should insist on a right to achieve. Just a peaceful nuclear energy program, as Khamenei says Iran will be happy with.
Maybe you’re right that implementing the AP won’t matter. Maybe we can ignore the significant political and economic changes that have occurred since the last time Iran did so. But maybe it would make a difference. Whether the US is moved or not, other countries that now side with the US may be less inclined to do so if Iran can persuasively argue that it’s making all the same disclosures as every other country is making. Maybe that would put a damper on the efforts of war-mongers in the US who exploit Iran’s disclosure refusals to persuade US decision makers that we are at the “point of no return.”
I thought Iraq 2003 would result in Chalabi being Iraq’s Mubarak with Iraq being a very valuable part of the US colonial structure, that reinforced it and made the Middle East a more valuable strategic asset for the US to use in any competition with rivals such as Europe, Russia or China for a long time to come.
That’s what most US policy-makers believed as far as I could gather and to my surprise it turned out false. A lot of Iraqis of all religions and philosophies fought very hard, with assistance from Iran and Syria to prevent that outcome. The US was unable to install a client dictator and expand what Eric Margolis describes as the US Raj – or modern effectively colonial administration of the region.
US policy-makers do not have visions of installing even Mousavi with a military strike. The similarities between Iraq and Iran are only superficial. If the US attacks Iran’s nuclear program, its only objective – openly stated in nearly every article about the subject – would be to delay Iran’s acquisition of capabilities like those Japan has.
“In theory” means Japan does not have a weapon today, it not moving toward a weapon today, but there are circumstances that could occur (“in theory”) that could cause Japan to make a weapon and under those circumstances, China, the US or any outside party could not prevent Japan from building a weapon.
Iran does not need a weapon or to be working on a weapon to know that if the US was to make visible preparations to occupy Khuzestan after leaving Afghanistan in some indeterminate future, it could under those circumstances build a weapon and the US would not be able to stop it. Maybe in that case that means the US would bomb Iran before making visible preparations to occupy Khuzestan. But maybe it means US would be deterred from making those preparations when otherwise it may not have been.
Also, North Korea pulled out of the NPT in 2000 (if memory serves) and tested a weapon in 2006 (same). The AP had nothing to do with NK’s ability to build a weapon. Six years was plenty of time. I have not read specifically what weapons program Iraq had, but what Iraq did not have in 1991 was undetected weapons-grade or even enriched fissile material in anything near a quantity that would be militarily significant. In other words, Iraq did not and could not have had a weapon.
Neither case proves that the AP rectifies any failure of the CSA to prevent a state from building a weapon.
Arnold,
“Preventing Iran from having the ability in theory to make a weapon if it was to leave the NPT is not drastically valuable to the US. Less valuable to the US than it is to Israel. So the benefit side of the equation, to US decision makers such as Obama and even Bush has never been tremendously great.”
I won’t question here what you say in the first sentence (which probably would be pointless since I don’t really understand what “in theory” means), and I certainly agree with your second sentence. As for your third sentence, if you substitute “the US” for your “US decision makers such as Obama and even Bush,” I’ll agree too. Absent that substitution, though, I can’t agree with your third sentence. American politicians have a nasty habit of starting wars against Middle East countries for reasons other than the best interests of the US.
Cost benefit in the future:
If the US cost benefit ratio changes in the future, Iran I’m certain will adjust its policies to the degree it can.
Preventing Iran from having the ability in theory to make a weapon if it was to leave the NPT is not drastically valuable to the US. Less valuable to the US than it is to Israel. So the benefit side of the equation, to US decision makers such as Obama and even Bush has never been tremendously great.
Iran has to maintain enough deterrent power to prevent the US from aiming for a modest strategic advantage. How many US soldiers would a US president be willing to sacrifice to prevent Iran from having capabilities like Japan’s? It isn’t clear.
One indication though, is that even though preventing Iran from attaining a Japan option is the US’ objective as understood by every party that is informed in this issue, the US side routinely lies and attempts to mislead people into believing the US objective is to prevent Iran from building a weapon in some short term.
Also, Iran has both started and stopped implementing the AP as a matter of recent history. I noticed no change at all in the volume of accusations against Iran’s nuclear program either from Iran starting or stopping that implementation. I see no reason to believe starting again would now change the volume – because the US objective is not to get more disclosure from Iran, but to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option which is independent of disclosure.
Castellio,
“To be frank, in RHS’s post at August 22, 2010 at 4:18 pm on the previous thread, one gets to his point 4 and responds, as you do, and as many must, “Well, why did they quit unless they’re up to something?” I don’t believe they are, but it ‘tarnishes’ the picture.”
We agree completely on this. I don’t think Iran is up to something. I just think it “tarnishes the picture” for it to refuse to implement the “new and improved” disclosure scheme reflected in the AP. That disclosure scheme may be only “new,” not “improved” at all, as Arnold argues, but if much of the world thinks it’s improved, isn’t that really all that matters? Why resist it, thereby “tarnishing” your own picture? Is there really something important to be gained by this?
The Big Lie Technique Versus
The Reality Of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Scott Horton On Russia Today
Watch video
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article26218.htm
Pirouz… may all your dreams come true.
Arnold,
“What should the US, your country, do? What gesture that is “no big deal” should the people who represent you make?”
You make it easy to answer by using “should:” the people who represent me “should” do exactly what you recommend.
Arnold,
“If Iran’s decision makers do not give more information to the US about its nuclear program than it agreed to ensure that fissile materials are not diverted to military use, that’s a decision they are free to make and reasonable in doing so.”
Correct. I’ve never disputed this. But sometimes a decision that one is “free” to make, and is entirely “reasonable,” is not necessarily the wisest decision.
“The US will always be able to produce questions about Iran’s program. And people who agree with the US position that Iran must have less nuclear capability than Japan or Brazil, such as yourself, are always going to be sympathetic to the questions the US invents. If the process is “I’m worried about Iran’s nuclear program, how can I justify these worries” then whatever the US gives you will be enough. The AP, or fabricated laptops, a need to questions Iranian scientists outside of Iran, or the need to access this or that military base or whatever. … I don’t think the US would stop claiming Iran’s nuclear program is dangerous, and I don’t think people sympathetic to the US position would stop knowingly lying to exaggerate the degree of uncertainly in Iran’s nuclear program if Iran implemented the AP.”
You may be right, but if you’ll reread what you wrote here, you’ll note that it’s based to a very great extent on speculation. What you predict for me, for example, is very unlikely to be the case.
“There is no amount Iran can disclose that will make it impossible or even difficult to lie about Iran’s nuclear program.”
Possibly so. But if you are correct about this, it follows that the IAEA’s drafting of the AP in the 1990’s, in an effort to fill gaps in the original NPT disclosure scheme that had enabled Iraq and North Korea to conduct nuclear weapons development programs “under the radar,” was a complete waste of time. Maybe it wasn’t.
“As long as the US military is aware that Iran can impose costs on the US greater than preventing Iran from having nuclear capabilities like those of Japan is worth, the US will not attack Iran, nor will it allow Israel to.”
If, as you say, the US is already reluctant to attack Iran for this reason, must we not draw one or the other of two conclusions, depending on how the US’ cost-benefit analysis evolves going forward – either (1) the US’ cost-benefit analysis will stay the same or favor Iran even more as time passes (especially if the US waits so long that Iran does obtain nuclear weapons), which means that the US will have effectively decided already that it will never attack Iran; or (2) the US anticipates that the cost-benefit analysis may hereafter shift in the US’ favor, warranting an attack on Iran that is not warranted now. If the latter, what do you think makes the US believe that waiting around will improve the US’ position vis-à-vis Iran? Or does the US not necessarily predict that this will occur, but simply believes that Iran is presently so intimidating that the US has no choice but to sit back and pray for a miracle?
“But US complaints about Iran’s nuclear program will not decrease unless Iran submits to the US demand that it not have a nuclear program as capable as Japan’s.”
You may be right but, again, you’re speculating.
Arnold writes “As long as the US military is aware that Iran can impose costs on the US greater than preventing Iran from having nuclear capabilities like those of Japan is worth, the US will not attack Iran, nor will it allow Israel to. But US complaints about Iran’s nuclear program will not decrease unless Iran submits to the US demand that it not have a nuclear program as capable as Japan’s.”
But Arnold, at the end of the day, it’s not a military decision. It’s a civilian that tells the military what to do. The military might say “this is the cost we foresee and we don’t think it’s worth it”, but they don’t make the call, do they?
“Also Eric, you don’t participate or vote in the Iranian political system – for the people who make Iranian foreign policy or nuclear policy decisions. You vote in the US political system. What should the US, your country, do? What gesture that is “no big deal” should the people who represent you make?”
That’s a good point, Arnold. I actually vote within both political systems. In the US election, I voted for Obama with high hopes. His failure to seize upon the Tehran Declaration was disappointing.
In the Iran presidential election, the candidate I voted for lost. But I was encouraged by Ahmadinejad’s advocacy for the TRR fuel swap and, especially, the Tehran Declaration.
At this moment in time, I’m more satisfied with Iranian overtures, than American. And I don’t think there’s anyone more hopeful for a political rapprochement than I.
Also Eric, you don’t participate or vote in the Iranian political system – for the people who make Iranian foreign policy or nuclear policy decisions. You vote in the US political system. What should the US, your country, do? What gesture that is “no big deal” should the people who represent you make?
Eric:
The US has an active program in Iran to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian scientists are abducted and murdered by this program. If Iran’s decision makers do not give more information to the US about its nuclear program than it agreed to ensure that fissile materials are not diverted to military use that’s a decision they are free to make and reasonable in doing so.
The US will always be able to produce questions about Iran’s program. And people who agree with the US position that Iran must have less nuclear capability than Japan or Brazil, such as yourself, are always going to be sympathetic to the questions the US invents.
If the process is “I’m worried about Iran’s nuclear program, how can I justify these worries” then whatever the US gives you will be enough. The AP, or fabricated laptops, a need to questions Iranian scientists outside of Iran, or the need to access this or that military base or whatever. If you want to see the arguments the US presents as reasonable, you will see them as reasonable.
I don’t think the US would stop claiming Iran’s nuclear program is dangerous, and I don’t think people sympathetic to the US position would stop knowingly lying to exaggerate the degree of uncertainly in Iran’s nuclear program if Iran implemented the AP.
The issue Richard brought up is valid. When Gerecht says “weapon” when he means capability to make a weapon, he is lying. He is being intentionally dishonest. He is not bound by whether or not Iran discloses one standard of information or another. He is lying. People who are disposed to agree with him are going to agree. People who would question his claims are going to doubt his claims.
There is no amount Iran can disclose that will make it impossible or even difficult to lie about Iran’s nuclear program. Or for these lies to convince an audience that is uninformed and disposed the worry about Iran. The calls for attacking Iran’s program did not increase when Iran stopped implementing the AP. They did not decrease when Iran did begin implementing the AP.
As long as the US military is aware that Iran can impose costs on the US greater than preventing Iran from having nuclear capabilities like those of Japan is worth, the US will not attack Iran, nor will it allow Israel to. But US complaints about Iran’s nuclear program will not decrease unless Iran submits to the US demand that it not have a nuclear program as capable as Japan’s.
Castellio,
“Does that raise the risk for the Iranians? Probably not, for the sanctions, and any attack that might follow, are currently rooted in bad faith, misrepresentation and scare mongering, none of which are in the American people’s best interests, and none of which will materially change should Iran sign onto the AP now.”
You conclude that “the risk for the Iranians” is “probably not” raised for the reason that any US attack would be “rooted in bad faith, misrepresentation and scare mongering, none of which are in the American people’s best interests.” I’m not sure that follows, any more than it did in Iraq. Quite a number of wars have been “”rooted in bad faith, misrepresentation and scare mongering.”
As for whether this risk would “materially change should Iran sign onto the AP now,” you may be right. But you may not be. Implementing the AP strikes me as not such a big deal that Iran has any compelling reason to take a chance that you might be wrong. I’d do it in a heartbeat, claim bragging rights and press my case more forcefully.
Eric
“am fairly confident that an arrangement such as that proposed by Geoff Norden (and others) will be put in place: a jointly owned and operation enrichment facility on Iranian soil, subject to more stringent safeguards than Iran now accepts’
I agree with your assessment that an eventual outcome of this impasse will be a joint enrichment safeguarded regional fuel bank on Iranian soil, hopefully jointly with US, which will be far more beneficial for US’s long term ME policy then a joint operation with India that irks Pakistan and.
Castellio,
“However, low grade enrichment is not a nuclear weapons program, and that point shouldn’t be ceded by the Iranian side.”
I agree completely. Iran unquestionably has a right under the NPT to enrich uranium – to any percentage, not just LEU, though we’re really only concerned with LEU here. What I don’t understand is why Iran feels any need to ask for the US’ “blessing” of this right – especially since the US is highly unlikely to give its blessing.
“Better than staring down the Iranians for doing what is appropriate and legal, we should stare down those who call for great international crimes on no (or irrelevant) evidence.”
Better? Depends on your objective. If it’s truth, justice, fairness and that sort of thing, with absolutely no hope of accomplishing any of those objectives, then “staring down” the US is unquestionably the right approach.
But if the objective is to deny US war-mongers their one last chance to destroy Iran’s nuclear program (not to mention much of Iran itself) even though there’s no good reason for that to happen, then perhaps one would be better off nudging Iran just a bit on this “no big deal” issue.
Remember: we’re not talking here about Iran’s right to enrich uranium, which I consistently and strongly support. We’re talking only about the level of its disclosures.
Eric,
Bolton apparently was trying to hit below the belt, by linking Iran to Saddam Hussein.
Eric: You understand. I just felt that the Leverett’s position, very reasonably, also suggests that the AP be considered post the US acceptance of Iran’s right of enrichment.
To be frank, in RHS’s post at August 22, 2010 at 4:18 pm on the previous thread, one gets to his point 4 and responds, as you do, and as many must, “Well, why did they quit unless they’re up to something?” I don’t believe they are, but it ‘tarnishes’ the picture.
However, low grade enrichment is not a nuclear weapons program, and that point shouldn’t be ceded by the Iranian side.
On balance, then, I feel that the Iranian position is correct: enrichment is a right that comes with the NPT and Iran certainly deserves credit for signing and abiding by the treaty. Until that is acknowledged there is no point in negotiating in bad faith, for it is simply the US taking advantage of a situation it is willfully misrepresenting.
Does that raise the risk for the Iranians? Probably not, for the sanctions, and any attack that might follow, are currently rooted in bad faith, misrepresentation and scare mongering, none of which are in the American people’s best interests, and none of which will materially change should Iran sign onto the AP now.
Better than staring down the Iranians for doing what is appropriate and legal, we should stare down those who call for great international crimes on no (or irrelevant) evidence.
Humorous first sentence in Bolton’s NY Daily News article cited by the Leveretts:
“John Bolton, the former United States envoy to the United Nations, warns that Iran has gotten further in its nuclear goals than Saddam Hussein.”
That’s not saying much, is it?
In the long run, after Bushehr has been operating for several years without any suspicion of diversion (and who here doubts that that will be the case?), I am fairly confident that an arrangement such as that proposed by Geoff Norden (and others) will be put in place: a jointly owned and operation enrichment facility on Iranian soil, subject to more stringent safeguards than Iran now accepts under its existing Safeguards Agreement or would accept even if it implemented the AP tomorrow. I suspect most people who think about this issue with any degree of optimism expect that much the same thing will eventually occur.
If that indeed will be the long-term arrangement under which Iran acquires enriched uranium to run its nuclear power plants, is that day likely to arrive sooner if Iran has, by then, a long track record of detailed AP-level disclosure or if, instead, Iran has, up till then, refused to disclose a great deal of information but earnestly promises to do so as part of this grand bargain?
I don’t know the answer to that question, but I believe it’s the first of those two possible answers. If Iran continues to dig in its heels on what should be a “no big deal” issue, it can count on the US continuing to dig in its heels as well. The impasse will drag on far longer than it has any good reason to.
Castellio,
“And Eric, the last paragraph is an interesting strategic response to your push for the AP.”
I’m not sure I understand your comment. The last paragraph merely refers to Iran’s long-standing “offer” to trade AP compliance for US recognition of Iran’s in-country enrichment right, which I believe the US is highly unlikely to grant any time soon.
What I expect will result is hardly a bold prediction: more of the same. Iran will keep on enriching uranium while refusing to implement the AP, and the US will keep on citing Iran’s refusal to implement the AP as evidence that Iran is hiding a nuclear weapons program. Each side will emphasize what is most important to it – rarely if ever addressing the other side’s emphasized point – and the US will achieve a propaganda victory from this status quo:
Iran: The US must acknowledge Iran’s enrichment right. We can’t rely on foreign sources like other countries do. They might cut off our supply at any time.
US: Iran adamantly refuses to disclose many details about its nuclear program that most countries disclose without hesitation. Why?
I agree with Iran. Most people on this website agree with Iran. But that does not matter. What matters is that the US can and does relentlessly press its message, at considerable (and growing) risk to Iran. And most people in influential positions find the US’ message persuasive. They don’t find Iran’s message persuasive.
Iran should consider whether it’s worth exposing itself to a risk of attack merely to hold on to a “bargaining chip” that in fact is worthless because the US will never – at least in the foreseeable future – formally acknowledge Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its own soil. I think Iran would be wiser just to proceed on its merry way – continue to enrich uranium on its own soil whether the US likes it or not – while removing a powerful weapon from the US’ propaganda arsenal by implementing the AP voluntarily. Doing so won’t eliminate the risk of attack, but it will diminish it, and especially will undercut the recent insistence of the US and Israel that the situation has become “urgent.” All this at a very low cost: relinquishment of a worthless bargaining chip.
Some suggest that I make too big a deal out of the AP by recommending that Iran just start implementing it and move on. I think it’s quite the opposite: what really shouldn’t be such a big deal is being turned into a big deal by Iran’s enemies. Within the first ten minutes of the Leverett/Gerecht debate, for example, Gerecht mentioned at least three separate times the “clandestine” or “secret” or “hidden” Iran nuclear program, as if Iran’s secrecy itself were proof that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
Why leave otherwise weak opponents – such as Gerecht – armed with such persuasive arguments?
Considering the Tehran declaration of the three emerging powers with regards to TRR refueling, more and more It seems as a logical and face saving vehicle for the west as well as Iran to smoothly change their policy stands and declare victory by accepting the Tehran declaration in its entirety, claiming that it has made Iran to accept full cooperation with the IAEA, otherwise I think there wouldn’t be any new chances in coming future, and the rest is just more tiring BS poetry by likes of Bunker Bolton and various other analysts.
An intelligent way forward, I agree. US, UK and France need to accept Iranian enriching of LEU.
And John Bolton once again shows himself to be a warmongering idiot.
Yes!
And Eric, the last paragraph is an interesting strategic response to your push for the AP.
The weakness, of course, is that it assumes sanity in the US government, but such an assumption is worth trying.