Flynt spoke to Antiwar Radio last week about the disturbing prospect that the United States could go to war with Iran over uranium enrichment and related issues. The audio and full transcript can be accessed here. Below are excerpts:
On the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran:
“My own view is that the Israelis are in all probability not gearing up to strike Iran in the near term, not tomorrow, not next week, not next month, and in fact the Israelis are constrained to some degree because their own unilateral options for attacking targets in Iran from a military standpoint are relatively limited. The amount of damage that they could do in Iran is just pretty circumscribed. And I tend to think that the Israelis are playing a much longer game here…
[W]e now have these new sanctions in place that we’re going to need to go through—six months, twelve months or so living with these sanctions until everyone is willing to acknowledge that they’re not having the desired effect. And I think the Israelis are playing a game, looking at a year down the road, 18 months, maybe two years down the road, when after more and more people come on board and say sanctions aren’t working, the Iranians are continuing to develop their fuel cycle capabilities, etc.—at that point, probably around the time that President Obama is gearing up for his own reelection campaign in a serious way, the Israelis can come back and say, “Okay, now we need to do something more coercive around the Iranian problem.”
On the United States striking Iran:
…[P]art of the long game that Netanyahu and the Israelis are playing [is that] [t]hey’re saying, in essence, “Yeah, we’ll let you [the U.S.] see what these sanctions do. You can have time to see how these sanctions play out.” But Netanyahu has also put down markers in public that he doesn’t think the sanctions are going to work, and he’s also put down markers that, as the way he put it, “The only thing that has ever caused the Iranians to stop their nuclear program has been the perceived threat of U.S. military action,” not Israeli military action, but U.S. military action. And he’s shifting the onus…if and when sanctions fail, and he thinks they probably will fail, the only thing that can really stop the Iranians is the threat of U.S. military action. And I think he’s putting all these pieces in place.
On the American pro-Israel Community’s Iran agenda:
[The pro-Israel community] were very, very focused on getting the sanctions in place and AIPAC’s stated position has been, “We’re focused on getting new sanctions. We’re not urging military action for now.” And they’ve always put in that language, “for now.” But I think the next step is going to be to start hyping the threat, supposedly, that Iran poses to Israel, to start using every channel available and create new channels to drum that message home to the American public that, “Iran is bad, Iran is dangerous, Iran needs to be stopped, and in the end it’s really only the United States that can stop it.” I think you’re going to see an escalation in the delivery of that message through multiple channels from the pro-Israel community here in the United States over the next one to two years.
On the lack of evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program:
[T]o the best of my knowledge…[there is no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.]…I haven’t been working in a classified environment for a number of years now and I certainly wouldn’t claim to know everything that the U.S. intelligence community might have, [but]…my very strong impression is that we know that the Iranians have been working on…a dedicated fuel cycle program focused on uranium enrichment for a long time. Could they have at some point…looked into other kinds of technical or engineering problems that you would need to solve if you were actually at some point going to build a nuclear weapon? Yeah, that’s possible, but I’ve never seen what I would consider clear and convincing evidence of it.
On repeating the Iraq mistake all over again:
[W]e have been through this once before, with regard to Iraq, where we relied on foreign intelligence services, where we didn’t have access to the primary sources, we relied on…defector information. I have a sneaking suspicion that this new NIE, when it comes out, may make use of a lot of information from both defectors and from foreign intelligence services, and I think there is a real risk that we may be going down the same road that we went down with regard to intelligence, anyway, before the war in Iraq.
And from a political standpoint, if we do go to war with Iran, we are basically going to be going to war with them because they’re enriching uranium. Not because they have, as…you posited earlier, withdrawn from the NPT and are building nuclear weapons. Not because they attacked someone. We’re going to go to war with them, if that’s the way things go, because they’re enriching uranium, and Israel is uncomfortable with that. And I think that’s a really disturbing scenario. I think it’s going to be quite bad for U.S. interests in the region if it plays out.
And while there were some critics who tried to argue that we basically went to war in Iraq for the benefit of Israel, as someone who was in government in the run-up to the war with Iraq, I have to say that was not my perception, that was not my experience. But if we go to war with Iran because Iran is enriching uranium, we will basically be doing that because of Israeli discomfort over it and because the pro-Israel community here has really pushed hard to get us to take a confrontational stance toward Iran because it’s enriching uranium. And I think that’s going to be quite bad for U.S. interests if things play out that way.
On a new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate:
I think Western intelligence services have been searching for years for that parallel program and there are many people who are convinced that it must exist, but to the best of my knowledge, no one has actually come up with hard evidence of a parallel program.
…it is striking that the appearance of this NIE is quite overdue at this point. It’s well past its due date, and that would seem to confirm to me the idea that there may be some disagreement.
—Hillary Mann Leverett
Lots of people are resorting to many different types of this, as conventional methods are getting more complicated and displaying more unwanted effects. your posting explores a few of these different sorts of methods and the way the benefit us, thanks! thanks
To study the issue of a military attack on Iran one should do a Google search of the following terms.
Iran irregular war
China’s quiet sale to Tehran of sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles
Richard Steven Hack,
If you view American policy toward Afghanistan, whatever that policy may be, as the product of a conspiracy to defraud the American taxpayer and “protect” Israel, I agree with you. The snouts are in the trough, and this is a scam to rank with the greatest in American history.
R.d.,
PBS should give much more attention to the Iranian foreign minister and his many sensible comments about regional political and economic issues.
What utter rubbish emitting from the mouths of the US senators regarding the so-called Lockerbie bomber, and BP! Complete cr*p!
Arnold,
First, a minor complaint:
I have not been “on the fence” on this issue, and so it’s inappropriate to insist that I must climb down and “take a side.”
We’ve previously discussed this “Japan option” issue at great length, most recently in a late-May thread. Indeed, it’s best that I start with a comment I posted then – for several reasons: (1) it will save me time here; (2) it will establish my point that we’ve walked this ground before; (3) I know the author of that comment well, and someone assured me (I think it was my bathroom mirror) that you may safely accept what he writes as being entirely correct; (4) if there are any gaps in what I wrote back then, my addition of quotation marks below should add just the extra patina of authority needed to cover them up.
YOU WROTE IN THAT EARLIER THREAD:
“You say Iran should give up any efforts to attain a Japan option. Why?”
I REPLIED:
“For several reasons. First, because it’s very dangerous for the Iranian people since the US is hell-bent on preventing this, and devoting gobs of money and personnel to detect it. Nor do I consider it necessary if Iran’s only objective really is to develop peaceful nuclear energy (and if that’s not Iran’s only objective, I feel strongly that it ought to be).”
“The only reason I can see for Iran to press its luck would be to attain not what Japan has, but rather what North Korea has. I don’t think that’s feasible, since the US (and the IAEA) now have a very watchful eye on Iran. I think it would be not worth the considerable risk to the Iranian people to make the effort.”
“Finally, I think that some or many countries and people who now support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy would withdraw support if they were to conclude that Iran also wants to develop nuclear-weapon capability as a useful tool for keeping the US at bay. That may be desirable for Iran, and the urge is entirely understandable given the shabby treatment Iran receives at the hands of the US, but for the rest of the world the bottom-line result would be yet another nuclear-armed state. One can probably justify India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea having taken the very same strategic approach in the past, after all, and look what that has left the world with today: four more nuclear-armed states. In addition, some states that back Iran in its defiance of the US might not feel quite so sympathetic once the dust clears and Iran has nuclear weapons but they don’t.”
[END OF MY EARLIER REPLY].
YOU THEN WROTE IN THAT EARLIER THREAD:
“Are you claiming such an option is illegal?”
I REPLIED:
“Possibly it’s illegal, under the argument I made in my [earlier] post that a “nuclear explosive device” without fuel is still a “nuclear explosive device,” but I acknowledge that that argument may not be a winner … Far more important to me, whether it is “legal” or “illegal,” I think it’s very ill-advised for the reasons stated in the preceding long [passage quoted above].”
[END OF MY EARLIER REPLY].
The phrase “an option” in your question above highlights another point I’ve made several times before: I’m not always sure what “Japan option” means to you, though I’ll concede you’ve defined it clearly enough in this current thread.
If you look back at our previous thread, you’ll recall that you’ve argued, at your most extreme, that Iran (or Japan), without violating the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement, could develop and build a deliverable nuclear bomb so long as it didn’t put any nuclear material in it. That argument prompted my observation that “a gun without bullets is still a gun,” which led to a brief “dual-use” skirmish since guns can also be used to shoot robbers and squirrels. As I recall, we got past that once I’d refined my metaphor to “a nuclear explosive device without fuel is still a nuclear explosive device,” and you conceded (I think) that a nuclear explosive device probably isn’t useful for shooting robbers and squirrels.
As my last-quoted reply mentioned in passing, my having established this point did not, despite what one might think, necessarily mean I’d also established that Iran (or Japan) would violate the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement by building such a fuel-free nuclear bomb. I don’t concede that, but I do recognize that your argument on that point is strong.
But far more important is the fact that we draw opposite conclusions from the strength of your argument on this point, as I explained in my long previous post on the current thread (July 19 at 4:19 PM). Your conclusion (paraphrased here) is:
“Iran is within its legal rights. Back off, US.”
My conclusion, by contrast (also paraphrased):
“The very fact that the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (arguably) would allow Iran to get this far without the US, the IAEA, or anyone else having a right to complain only highlights the insufficiency of the assurances provided by the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Treaty or not, “legally” or not, the US is going to find some way or other to assure itself that Iran is not building nuclear weapons – even ones that, as yet, have no nuclear material in them. Either Iran can cooperate by disclosing more of what it’s doing so that the US does not get trigger-happy, or Iran can insist on its legal rights until hell freezes over – or until a mushroom cloud rises over Tehran because the US gets tired of guessing about what Iran is up to.”
Next, the question of whether the US is discriminating against Iran because the US doesn’t complain when Japan does the same things as Iran is doing – or worse: maintains vast stockpiles of plutonium that can have no useful purpose other than to build bombs.
I believe I’ve answered this adequately before, but just in case:
First, the US indeed does discriminate between Japan and Iran, for reasons the US deems valid (regardless of whether you and I would) in light of the US’ overriding objective: to ensure that countries the US considers to be dangerous don’t get nuclear weapons.”
I don’t claim to know all of the US’ reasons, nor to agree with all of those I can think of, but I’ll mention a few possible reasons. First, Japan is not located in the Middle East or another “hot spot” part of the world. Second, Japan has been very peaceful, in both actions and words, ever since the end of World War II. Third, the US knows it probably can count on China to squelch any military ambitions that may creep back into the Japanese mind-set. Fourth, some US officials might not consider it such a bad thing that Japan point a few nukes in the direction of the Chinese mainland, and are confident the US wouldn’t get blamed for that if it had done nothing more than to loosen the Japanese leash. There probably are numerous other reasons – I haven’t given this narrow question a lot of thought – but at least none of those I’ve mentioned so far would apply to Iran. This may explain why the US treats Japan differently from Iran.
Finally, however you might define “nuclear option,” having a “nuclear option” strikes me as pointless, and extremely dangerous for one’s own country to pursue, unless it enables the country to create the real or enemy-imagined ability to drop a nuclear bomb on one’s enemy before the enemy can prevent that. In an earlier thread, you frankly acknowledged that Japan would need to leave the NPT in order to put the finishing touches on any nuclear weapon. You’ve made the very same observation regarding Iran, and you’ve provided various estimates as to how long this would take once Iran had left the NPT. Your estimates have generally been stated in “months,” and I remember even “a year” in one post.
Estimates with such time frames presume a US reaction so slow as to be entirely unrealistic – a phrase I choose only because I hesitate to upset you by using “absurd.” Bear in mind that the US’ number-one stated goal here is not to let Iran acquire deliverable nuclear weapons. Achieving that goal requires not allowing matters to drift so long that the US no longer is confident that it can prevent Iran from producing a deliverable bomb. Depending on how much the US is confident it knows about Iran’s nuclear program when Iran leaves the NPT, the US might estimate that Iran can produce a deliverable bomb in, say, a year, or three months, or perhaps three weeks.
The length of that estimate will be significant principally for bomber-scheduling purposes. If Iran were to leave the NPT, thus thumbing its nose at the IAEA, the US and everyone else – or, it is important to note, even if Iran does not leave the NPT but continues to resist demands for much greater disclosure – US bomber pilots probably would be strapping on their helmets no later than about one week before the end date of that estimate, possibly much earlier if the US’ carefully laid attack plans call for more lead time.
The notion, implicit in your “nuclear option” scenario, that the US would wait any longer than this is unrealistic. That is why I believe that Iran’s pursuit of a “nuclear option” – if that term has any practical meaning – would be both pointless and very dangerous.
“Hague is a sensible foreign secretary and that Iran should do what it can to establish good relations with him (or as good as circumstances presently allow).”
James, those circumstances “may be” changing even as we speak!!!! seems like, seems like, an entity is twisting the arm of BP, british pretty hard, re the pan am air liner! Is someone trying to make sure ALL brits are toeing the friends of israel line??
on another note, a bit odd to see pbs news hour showing and making mention of the IRI FM in the afghan conference! peculiar.
Arnold: I know what escalation dominance is, and I know the Pentagon knows.
That doesn’t mean Obama knows or the Congress knows – or cares, and the neocons OBVIOUSLY don’t know OR care, and Israel doesn’t give a damn at all.
Like I said, escalation dominance is not an overwhelming force against a war with Iran. Neither are Pentagon generals who will do what they’re told or be forced out like Admiral Fallon.
These idiots think they can win in Afghanistan. What part of “these idiots” don’t you get? In fact, it’s not a question even of them being idiots. It’s a question of THEY DON’T CARE as long as the taxpayer money goes to the right people – and the AIPAC crowd continues to contribute millions to their campaign funds.
Their only concern is that this be done in such a way as to not be TOO blatantly obvious to the morons in the US electorate or criminally prosecutable by their rivals for power in the state apparatus. That’s the extent of their rational calculation.
Eric thank you for your reply you wrote
“That does not mean I favor non-proliferation because I want the US/western powers to keep Iran down”
-and-“denying Iran the bomb will help them accomplish that. “
“It means simply that”
” my desire to prevent nuclear proliferation “
“outweighs my desire to see Iran take its much-deserved higher place in the world order”
Eric with all due respect I broke down your sentences so none continues tune will make it easier to digest each of your sentences. In this context what you mean and what you don’t mean are essentially the same thing, what I originally understood and expected.
Again I emphases I don’t believe Iran should pursue or have a military nuclear program since it is not necessary, but I do strongly believe
Iran should have an ingenious domestic full nuclear fuel cycle in line with its NPT sovereign rights at any cost, to maintain its hard earned independence.
After meeting with Obama at the White House, Cameron called on Tehran to resume negotiations regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. I think Hague is a sensible foreign secretary and that Iran should do what it can to establish good relations with him (or as good as circumstances presently allow).
Eric,
If you are saying that Iran can continue to enrich LEU, as provided by the NPT, and continue to allow IAEA supervision, and not be attacked by the US, I agree with you.
The risk, of course, is that the warmongers and fellow-travelers will develop such a thorough false narrative, that they may succeed in “boxing Obama in” so that he feels obliged to raise the ante. Even if that course of action would be foolish, stupid, etc.
Iran has a number of problems to deal with, and obviously getting attacked by Israel or the US would be a setback. I continue to think the US could achieve normal relations with Iran, but it seems to be the case that Obama cannot resist the demands of Democrats in the Senate and the House, that he be hostile toward Iran because Iran is unfriendly toward Israel.
Kooshy,
You wrote to James:
“Eric was willing and forthcoming to concede his bottom line which is, to maintain US’s/western power dominance he does not want nuclear proliferation by non nuclear states, shouldn’t you also?”
That’s not a fair characterization of what I said.
I frankly acknowledged that Iran might have a harder time resisting unfair US pressure without a bomb. That does not mean I favor non-proliferation because I want the US/western powers to keep Iran down and denying Iran the bomb will help them accomplish that. It means simply that my desire to prevent nuclear proliferation outweighs my desire to see Iran take its much-deserved higher place in the world order.
In the long run, I think Iran too will be better off with the approach I suggest. I am confident Iran can resist US pressure without a bomb – and I think the question is academic in any case because the US will never let Iran get the bomb. If the US should ever conclude that Iran is working on the bomb, or Iran withholds so much information that the US concludes it is too risky to keep guessing, the US might bomb Iran on short notice. If that should happen, while one can speculate until the cows come home about the medium-term and long-term consequences of that bombing on the comparative strength of the US and Iran, one thing will be certain: in the short run, Iran will move a notch or two down the totem pole.
So I caution you not to conclude that pursuing a “hide the ball” disclosure strategy – much less openly pursuing nuclear-weapon capability – would be the best way to end the “US’s/western power dominance.”
I’ll write more later in response to your and several others’ longer replies to my long post of July 19 at 4:19 PM.
US Foreign Policy Encyclopedia
“The ways in which U.S. foreign policy is made and conducted are influenced by the underlying assumptions that Americans hold about themselves and the rest of the world. Like most nations, the United States has a distinctive pattern of policymaking that is determined by unique aspects of its national culture. Each country’s historical and cultural heritage, its montage of national beliefs and experience—its national identity—has an influence, whether consciously or not, upon the way it practices politics. U.S. foreign policy is driven by a variety of causal factors including strategic, economic, political, and bureaucratic interests; international and domestic pressures; the personalities and agendas of policymakers; and the actions of other nations. However, the belief in exceptionalism, since it is a core element of American national identity, has an important underlying influence on foreign policy activity. This belief is one of the main ideas that, according to Michael Hunt, has “performed for generations of Americans that essential function of giving order to their vision of the world and defining their place in it.” Although such views are not “codified in formal, systemic terms,” Hunt shows that the evidence for their existence and influence can be found in the “private musings” of policymakers and, more importantly, “the public rhetoric by which they have justified their actions and communicated their opinions to one another and to the nation.” The belief in American exceptionalism provides an essential element of the cultural and intellectual framework for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.”………………………
“Conclusion
Americans are not unique in their belief that theirs is an exceptional nation. Many, if not all, countries have shared such national vanity at some time or another in their histories. The French mission civilisatrice, the British Empire, and the Third Reich, for example, were all accompanied by their own versions of exceptionalism. Americans are clearly not alone in holding exceptionalist beliefs. Neither are they unique in pursuing foreign policies that are informed by those cultural beliefs. In all countries policymaking is based to a certain extent on assumptions formed from unique elements of national culture.
The fact that other nations have their own forms of exceptionalism, however, does not diminish the effects that the belief in American exceptionalism has on the making of U.S. policy. As the United States remains arguably the most powerful nation in the world, it is important to recognize the consequences that the belief in American exceptionalism has on U.S. foreign policy. Political, economic, and strategic interests are the major determinants of U.S. foreign policy. But no matter what the root reasons for a foreign policy decision are, that policy is usually couched in terms consistent with American exceptionalism. Use of this rhetoric assures substantial public support for policy and has proved very effective throughout U.S. history.
This fact begs the question of whether the use of exceptionalist rhetoric is simply a manipulative tool designed to win public approval for policy. Do American policymakers formulate their desired policy, then cloak it in terms they believe will assure the greatest possible public and congressional support? Certainly officials within most U.S. administrations have acknowledged that couching policy in terms of exceptionalism would have positive effects on public opinion, but to suggest this is the only reason for such language being employed would be to ignore other evidence. Nowhere in the public or archive record, including declassified accounts of National Security Council meetings, is it even implied that once a particular course has been chosen, it will then be packaged in exceptionalist terms. In fact, exceptionalist language is not used only in public explanations of policy; it is also used by policymakers themselves in policymaking sessions behind closed doors. Presidents and their foreign policy advisers frequently use arguments couched in exceptionalist language during private meetings and in personal memoranda.” …………
James, thanks the same,
I did read Mr. Gideon’s remarks on F.T. last night, the question that comes to my mind is: what is it that you wouldn’t feel necessary to also include in your comments the rest of Mr. Gideon’s argument which is that he does see, a nuclear deterrence is justified and a right for the UK ignoring its NPT obligations,
“With the number of nuclear-armed states threatening to grow, Britain probably does need to maintain a nuclear deterrent. But the weapons involved are so horrific that any semi-rational adversary is likely to be as deterred by a 1 per cent chance of nuclear annihilation as by a 100 per cent certainty. Britain’s recent government white paper on nuclear weapons emphasized the need for a “credible” nuclear deterrent, such as Trident, but an all-but incredible one would be just as effective.”
The irony is that Mr. Gideon doesn’t even mentions the Nuclear States NPT obligations which we all know what it is.
Eric was willing and forthcoming to concede his bottom line which is, to maintain US’s/ western power dominance he does not want nuclear proliferation by non nuclear states, shouldn’t you also?
If you did read my comments yesterday there I wrote that there is an exceptionalism accepted in the western culture that is not anymore easy to maintain short of wars, is this what you are ultimately aiming for but perceiving it in a different format, or you think you are willing to share the world on an equal bases of laws and obligations.
Arnold,
If General Petraeus wanted to testify honestly and openly before the US Congress, about the Middle East in general and Iraq/Iran in particular, he would say that Iran wants stability in Iraq, and a strong central government able to keep the country intact. And that Iran wants all US forces out of Iraq. Which is in the best interests of the Iraqi people and the US taxpayer.
kooshy,
Re July 19th, 9:24pm – - Thanks. Iran consistently denies that it wants nukes. Yet many opponents of a US or Israeli attack on Iran argue in favor of having Iran be vague about whether it is seeking nukes. Or even encourage Iran to develop nukes.
One of the finest commentators on international affairs is Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times. Today, Gideon wrote: “The same need for a minimally credible deterrent is driving Iran’s apparently determined effort to secure just one or two nuclear weapons.” (See “Britain’s nuclear choice can be cheap and scary” in the FT July 20th.)
Correction: mondoweiss.net
Rose,
Obama has to contend with the many Democrats in the Senate and House who put the interests of the Israeli government higher than the interests of the American people, when the issue is what to do or not to do in the Middle East.
Bravo to R.d. for the link to mondoweiss.com today. Superb quick review of Israel lobby subversion of US foreign policy interests in the Middle East, back in the late 1940s.
Arnold,
And let’s keep in mind that Iran and Syria offered to help the US withdraw all of its forces from Iraq with minimum difficulty, but the arrogant ignoramus in the White House spurned the offer.
And Iran had offered to help the US to deal with any “threat” posed by Iraq, without any need for an invasion. This, too, was spurned by the fools in the Bush administration.
Realizing that the two articles are the same source. I remember seeing the term in an article in the Boston Globe used in the same context even earlier but cannot find it. Perhaps memory fails but the point remains that the US positions in the region impose a vulnerability on the US has been well understood by the US military for a long time.
“Escalation dominance” is a term the US military coined and applied to Iran. The US is completely aware of Iran’s retaliatory options if the US attacks its nuclear program.
ipsnews[dot]net/news.asp?idnews=42696 (June 2008)
At least some DoD and military officials suggested that Iran had more and better options for hitting back at the United States than the United States had for hitting Iran, according to one former Bush administration insider.
Former Bush speechwriter and senior policy adviser Michael Gerson, who had left the administration in 2006, wrote a column in the Washington Post Jul. 20, 2007 in which he gave no hint of Cheney’s proposal, but referred to “options” for striking Iranian targets based on the Cheney line that Iran “smuggles in the advanced explosive devices that kill and maim American soldiers”.
Gerson cited two possibilities: “Engaging in hot pursuit against weapon supply lines over the Iranian border or striking explosives factories and staging areas within Iran.” But the Pentagon and the military leadership were opposing such options, he reported, because of the fear that Iran has “escalation dominance” in its conflict with the United States.
That meant, according to Gerson that, “in a broadened conflict, the Iranians could complicate our lives in Iraq and the region more than we complicate theirs.”
washingtonpost[dot]com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071901958.html (July 2007)
Beyond Iraq’s borders, the options become difficult: engaging in hot pursuit against weapon supply lines over the Iranian border or striking explosives factories and staging areas within Iran. This sort of escalation is opposed by the Iraqi government and American military leaders. The Defense Department fears what is called “escalation dominance” — meaning that in a broadened conflict, the Iranians could complicate our lives in Iraq and the region more than we complicate theirs.
the lobby then and now…
“I said I thought it was a most disastrous and regrettable fact that the foreign policy of this country was determined by the contributions a particular bloc of special interests might make to the party funds…”
“…our failure to go along with the Zionists might lose the states of New York, Pennsylvania and California—that I thought it was about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lose the United States. …”
http://mondoweiss.net/2010/07/60-years-ago-first-defense-secy-said-zionist-pressure-endangered-us-security-all-the-way-to-afghanistan.html
Eric A. Brill and James Canning:
Anger is a motivator of human action.
One example was Oklahoma City/McVeigh and the other Race Riots so common in US.
The anger in Iran, against the shredding of an 80-year old international instrument of disarmament is real and justified.
From that anger follows the decision: “Never Again.”
Iran is a resourceful country and her leaders will build nuclear weapons if they believe that is what is needed.
US cannot do anything about it else they would have gone to war in 2006.
If you want to use diplomacy, you best be prepared to use all the arts of diplomacy including flattery.
Castellio: You’re absolutely correct. It is holding down or destroying the Iran regime which is at the bottom line of all this. The nuclear “crisis” is a make believe reason. It isn’t real. It’s just spin.
But it IS the main justification for a war with Iran. Other actions the US may take – sanctions, covert operations, etc. – they KNOW this will not destroy the Iranian regime. They are just weakening measures, the same ones they applied to Afghanistan before 9/11 and to Iraq before 2003.
War will destroy the regime – or so they believe (erroneously, in my view). In fact, it doesn’t even matter what they believe, because Israel doesn’t care whether the regime is destroyed as long as it is too damaged to do anything against Israel. But while they believe that, they will continue this so-called “crisis” until they are ready to do their war. And at some point, they will have to escalate the “crisis” TO war because they won’t have any other option because the “crisis” will no longer be viable and will have served its purpose – to justify the war.
War with Iran is absolutely inevitable.
Arnold: In your response to Mr. Brill, you said: “So my point overall is that the US did not attack Iran for good reasons [i.e., "escalation dominance"] in 2007 and 2008. At least until the US position clears up in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has demonstrated that it is willing to accept a nuclear capable Iran.”
There are problems with both sentences.
First, “escalation dominance”. While I do believe Iran is capable of ultimately winning a war with the US, in the same sense that Vietnam won, and that Iraq “won”, and that the Taliban in Afghanistan will “win” within the next five years or so, I can see easily see the United States ignoring that fact in the short term.
Now, George Bush was an idiot and believed idiots who said Iraq would be a cakewalk. Now that the US has had experience with how limited its ability is to fight Fourth Generation Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is undoubtedly true that the Pentagon and the politicians are perhaps SLIGHTLY less likely to be in a rush to start another war.
But really, if you look at the rhetoric from both the Pentagon and Congress, this isn’t the case. Both are perfectly happy to continue proclaiming that they can “win” both in Afghanistan and Iran. They are perfectly convinced they can do so.
Why? Because in the end, it’s not going to cost them a dime. It’s going to cost the US taxpayer and the US soldier, and neither the senior members of the Pentagon or the Congress give a rat’s ass about either of those two constituencies.
So they don’t really care that Iran can eventually kick the US’s ass. The only thing they care about is whether they personally may have problems – in the Pentagon, whether a black market on their record will hold up a promotion, in the Congress whether they will have re-election problems.
Now Iran is not Afghanistan. The meme is that Afghanistan is unwinnable because nobody has historically ever won there. Tough meme. Iran is more like Iraq. The US “won” in Iraq according to George Bush in 2003. Iran will be the same. Iran will get bombed into oblivion over ninety days or so of air and cruise missile bombardment. Then the US will proclaim it “won” by setting back the Iranian “bomb program” for several years. Plus the US will implement a naval blockade until Iran agrees to intrusive NPT inspections. Of course, Iran will not comply.
And only when Iran does not comply and retaliates will it become clear that the US in indeed involved in another Iraq war against an insurgency, and eventually an Afghanistan-like “un-winnable war.”
The problem for you, Arnold, is that by then it will be too late. “Escalation dominance” is not something the senior members of the Pentagon, or the Congress, let alone the Israel Lobby, the neocons or the general public have a CLUE about or give a damn about.
So going in reverse and arguing that escalation dominance has the power to PREVENT another war is just not reasonable. As someone once wrote, anybody who really looked at two countries and posited a war can see who is likely to win – but wars happen ANYWAY. Because the leaders in those countries have other priorities than actually figuring out the reality. And in the case of Iraq, I was practically the ONLY PERSON anywhere in April, 2003, who immediately predicted the insurgency (if you can find my posts on the old iraqwar dot com Web site) – although of course there were others who suggested it as a hypothetical in advance of the war.
The problem with your second sentence is the notion that “actions speak louder than words”. You think that BECAUSE the US has not attacked Iran, and because Iran now has a (theoretical) breakout capability, that therefore the US is de facto accepting the Iranian nuclear program.
This just doesn’t follow. First, it ignores the long term trend – which is precisely why I keep asking people to ask the next question. Second, it ignores the instability of the status quo – again, why I ask the next question. third, it argues backward in the same way as escalation dominance – because X might lead to Y, you argue Y means X is true. This is bad logic on the face of it. It’s arguing for a negative. It’s a sort of perverse reverse “Cui Bono” argument!
If for no other reason than in 2006 or 2008, Iran didn’t have enough material for a nuclear weapon and therefore was NOT “nuclear capable” at that time! That alone could plausibly argue for why Bush did not attack.
But the situation is not the same now – and it won’t be the same next year, the year after and five years from now. Which is precisely my point – you cannot predict what Obama will do based on what Bush did except in the general terms that Obama will do what every US President does – obey the Israel Lobby and the military-industrial complex. If they want war, a US President will give them one. Just about every President has in the last century.
Also, when you say “the US” has accepted an Iran nuclear capability. WHO is “the US”, paleface? Certainly the people surrounding Obama have not. Certainly the Israel lobby has not. Certainly Israel has not. Certainly the neocons have not. And they are all players in this game, with considerably ability to pressure the guy who ultimately will give the order – or the next guy if Obama loses re-election. And Obama himself has been increasingly hawkish on Iran. But whether or not he is, AGAIN one has to ask – where is he going to go when sanctions don’t work, Israel and the Israel Lobby and the Republicans are screaming about Iran and Iran is still enriching?
Basing a prediction that the status quo will continue for the next ten years or more on that is just not plausible.
Mr. Brill: “my priority is not to have another nuclear-weapons state, even if this restricts Iran’s ability to achieve its legitimate political goals.”
Then I think it’s time you specified precisely whether you believe Iran has an active nuclear weapons development AND deployment program, and whether you believe Iran has the right to learn HOW to build a nuclear weapon even if it does NOT have an active nuclear weapons development and deployment program. And of course, your reasons.
Mr. Brill: “The right to limit its disclosures sufficiently that the world is left to guess whether Iran is working on nuclear weapons?”
I wonder if you can establish that Iran is doing or has ever done that. If not, the issue is moot. Iran has been following the letter – and usually the spirit – of the NPT and has been very cooperative with the IAEA for some time now. Iran even followed the Additional Protocol for nearly three years despite not having ratified it in its parliament. In return, Iran got shafted by continued US demands.
Who is the one causing the world to guess about its intentions here? I submit it is not Iran, but the US and Israel who have ginned up a completely bogus “crisis” out of thin air.
Once again, there IS NO EVIDENCE Iran has or ever had a nuclear weapons program. Transparency is not the issue here and never was. That is just another spin the US has put on Iranian actions. You have to keep remembering that there IS NO program. Only then can you judge who is doing what here.
Mr Brill: “Are you assuming the IAEA would violate its obligation not to turn over confidential Iranian information to the US, or that confidential Iranian information would leak to the US, or that even non-confidential information would be good enough?”
I think any and all of those possibilities are not only feasible, they have been demonstrated by events so far in the public record. Not least of which is the IAEA attempt to determine what Iran’s missile program was about, which is out of the IAEA purview.
Keep in mind that the IAEA under ElBaradei made some efforts to follow the IAEA requirements. But the IAEA is composed of many nations, and the US and other diplomats there have pressured the IAEA considerably to go outside its boundaries on more than one occasion, as well as IAEA personnel pushing questionable US intelligence on the Board and ginning up reasons to refer the Iran case to the UNSC. ElBaradei bowed to this pressure on several occasions, while continuing to speak publicly mostly against any undue pressure on Iran. The current IAEA head is by all accounts not so even handed.
After the debacle of the UN inspectors in Iraq being revealed to include CIA spies, and operating on (mostly erroneous) CIA information about Iraq, Iran has every reason to be careful.
Mr. Canning: And pursuant to your response to Arnold, do note that Admiral Fallon was relieved of his command for saying so. And now the 2007 NIE is likely to be ginned up to justify a war with Iran. As Ray McGovern has said, the people in Fallon’s place and the Secretary of Defense are both very compliant individual to whatever the politicians want.
The bottom line again becomes what will Obama do once he has no place left to go because the sanctions aren’t working, Iran is still enriching, and both the Israel Lobby and the Republicans and even some Democrats want his head because he has done nothing with an election campaign coming up. Anyone who thinks he will just make another pretty speech and kick the can down the road is deluding themselves.
Arnold: You asked Mr. Brill: “why do you think Bush/Cheney did not attack Iran in 2007 or 2008?” Allow me to respond with my view.
Quite frankly, I’m not sure why it did not happen. HOWEVER, one CAN make a PLAUSIBLE hypothetical case that it involved two main reasons: 1) first, the Pentagon, concerned at the level of insurgency in Iraq at the time, did not want to shift its forces in Iraq into a direct confrontation with Iran in Iraq or at Iraq’s borders; that situation no longer holds and the surge in Afghanistan is not directly comparable; and b) I think Bush was uncertain what impact the Iran war would have on the 2008 elections, whether it would help or hurt Republican chances. I think Bush “chickened out” and “kicked the can down the road” to what he hoped would be a McCain Presidency. Also, I think Bush, as a lame duck President, really didn’t give a damn one way or the other – the man is notoriously self-regarding and doesn’t give a crap about anybody or anything else if there’s no immediate benefit to himself.
Cheney, on the other hand, DID want to the US to go to war with Iran, which is why he engineered another $30 billion in foreign aid to Israel – to bribe them to do it. But Israel, characteristically, took the money and stiffed Cheney, continuing to insist the US do it for them, just as they did in the run up to the Iraq war. But we cannot assume that situation will hold for the next ten or twenty years. Two years, maybe. Four, doubtful. Eight, more doubtful. Ten or twenty, never. I don’t even think eight is at all likely. This “crisis” has been going on since at least 2003 (ignoring the occasional complaints about Iran even prior to then), which is seven years. DOUBLING the time this “crisis” continues WITHOUT some sort of resolution just is implausible, let alone TRIPLING it.
Again, as far as I know, no insider in the Bush Administration has commented on WHY a war with Iran did not happen, other than general comments that the Pentagon was pushing back at the time. Therefore, we cannot say why it did not happen. Equally therefore, we can not say the reasons will continue to hold absent any solid evidence.
What we CAN say is that is implausible that the status quo can be maintained indefinitely without one of the four resolutions – the ONLY four resolutions – obtaining.
Mr. Brill: I agree with Arnold’s response to your points. In addition, I would point out that the referral of the Iran case from the IAEA to the UNSC is in fact ILLEGAL, as numerous observers have said. The IAEA has no brief to be examining Iranian missile facilities or missile construction or anything of that sort. It also has no brief to be DECIDING whether a country has an “intention” to build nuclear weapons. It’s brief is solely to verify that a country IS NOT diverting nuclear materials to weaponization – which was deemed sufficient both to insure that a country is NOT making nuclear weapons and also to protect the signatory countries from spying by other countries.
Arnold is correct that the intent of the US to call for a rewrite of the NPT is an intent to water down the US obligations under the NPT – which by the way calls for the US to ACTIVELY HELP the Iranian nuclear energy program – which the US has never done and in fact has actively opposed it – and allow the nuclear nations to hold down the non-nuclear nations.
Not to mention that it is even more egregious when Obama has just EXPLICITLY given Israel a pass on possessing nuclear weapons outside the NPT, which also makes hash of the notion that Obama was pressuring Israel in some way when the US agreed that there should be a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Obviously that was not even remotely considered serious by the US.
Again, Iran is not in charge here. NOTHING Iran can do short of complete and total obeisance to US demands will change anything. The goal here is to hold Iran down and keep Iran down for the benefit of the US and Israel – and primarily for the benefit of Israel at that. That is the bottom line of ANY US position towards Iran.
Serifo: “Obama`s knowledge on the negative consequences of an attack against Iran will weigh more than his re – election ambitions”
I can only laugh. Are you an American citizen? If so, you should know there IS NO such American President. Trust me, Obama is no “Great White Hope” (pun unintended!)
Mr. Brill: Your post on what Iran should do seems reasonable.
Unfortunately, what Iran does is not going to control the situation. What will determine how this plays out is how Israel, the Israel Lobby and the military-industrial complex and neocons in the US manipulate the situation.
And relying on that to continue the status quo for another ten, fifteen or twenty years, as Arnold suggests, is a sucker’s bet. It’s just not going to happen.
As I continue to repeat, you CANNOT continue the FICTION that Iran has a nuclear weapons program that is an imminent threat within one or two years FOR the next ten or fifteen years. It’s just not sustainable. And Israel simply cannot afford to allow it to continue that long. And neither can the US. IRAN can let it go forever – but as I say, they are not in charge here.
Mr. Brill: I agree with your point to Arnold that the US has options if contemplating a third war. I would go further than that. I think a more than reasonable case can be made that having troops in Iraq and Afghanistan is PRECISELY what a US bent on attacking Iran would WANT.
After all, as the Leveretts have made clear, Israel only supported the war in Iraq when they were assured by the neocons that Iran was next.
Well, Iran is STILL next. Clearly the neocons intended to have a puppet state in Iraq and thousands of US troops and large bases precisely in order to enable an attack on Iran “next”. And that is still the case.
It has been reported for months, indeed back to the Bush administration, that the US has been relocating weapons into the Gulf Region in advance of the need to attack Iran. Bunker-buster bombs, Air Force bombers, etc., all moved to Diego Garcia and other bases in the region. Having the huge military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan are part of that preparation and are vitally necessary for any war in Iran.
The notion that the Pentagon planners know that US troops in Iraq (at least, Afghanistan almost not at all) would be vulnerable to Iran retaliations is hardly a valid excuse for them to try to overrule the US civil military authority. It’s the U soldier’s job to die for the politicians. Also, the more intelligent (if any) Pentagon senior personnel may have had issues with trying to attack Iran at the height of the Iraqi insurgency in 2006-2008, but that has died down now. There’s really nothing stopping the US from starting another war, and as has been suggested below, using that as an excuse to leave Afghanistan. Afghanistan is an un-winnable war whereas attacks on Iran can initially be portrayed as a winnable war – just as Iraq was. The fact that eventually it will prove to not be winnable isn’t necessarily going to stop the war from starting.
So I can easily see Obama starting a war with Iran, hoping to keep it “minimal”, and when it doesn’t go that way, using it as an excuse to leave Afghanistan. The public thinks Afghanistan is unwinnable. The “logic” that Afghanistan is necessary to prevent Al Qaeda is also too complicated for the public to follow (because there is no such logic). But the public can easily accept the simplistic notion that “Iran has WMD’s” and “Iran is threatening Israel” – just like Iraq. So Obama can gain points by switching his war from Afghanistan to Iran, even if in fact a war with Iran is just an un-winnable in the long run as Afghanistan.
The bottom line is, as somebody said, just how much pressure Obama can withstand on Iran. EVERYBODY in his administration wants to attack Iran! Everybody who pulls his strings wants to attack Iran. He’s not a President that can resist pressure. None of the Presidents are. After all, it won’t cost him anything if he starts a war with Iran, just as it didn’t cost Bush and Cheney anything. Back in 2008 Iraq might have cost the Republicans, but now the shoe is on the other foot. BOTH Republicans and Democrats are in favor of attacking Iran, just as most “Big Dog” Democrats were in favor of attacking Iraq. There’s no difference. The US attacked Iraq despite no good reasons and a lot of warnings that it would be a disaster, and despite already being involved in Afghanistan (if minimally, initially). It’s pretty much the same situation now.
Arnold: “I see the one where Iran keeps enriching, sanctions continue and the United States does not bomb Iran as the most likely at least through 2012, or the end of this presidential term.”
Ah, but Arnold, 2012 is just two years away. I COULD see the status quo continuing that long, albeit fraying even further all along the way. That’s not my question.
“I’ll also say that possibility will continue to be the most likely as long as there are 50,000 troops in Iraq”
No – 50,000 troops in Iraq are an option to support the attack on Iran. Remember, those “troops” also run the airbases there and vital supply routes that would be needed in case of a conflict with Iran. Even though those troops might be in harms war without further preparation (an increase in their numbers) for an attack on Iran, I could easily the Pentagon not worrying too much about that, despite William Lind’s suggestion that the entire Iraqi US force could be lost under certain scenarios.
Now the “surge” in Afghanistan might well put a damper on Obama starting an Iran war. But sooner or later – and sooner would be 2012 – the US is going to be pressured to get out. Also, it is conceivable that the forces in Afghanistan could be “repurposed” against the eastern border of Iran (aircraft at least) and possible sorties to divert Iranian forces from the west of Iran) in things heated up.
ALSO, once again, ISRAEL could trigger something at any time and make it look like an “accident”. This would take the decision out of Obama’s hands, no matter how much he might not like it. Would YOU trust Netanyahu not to do something, given what we know of the man? I don’t think so.
I don’t see troops in Iraq or Afghanistan as any MAJOR impediment to starting a new war, especially if the Pentagon – particularly the Air Force – were to convince Obama that they could pull off a “limited attack” sufficient to disrupt the Iranian energy program for a couple years – thus enabling Obama to think he could “kick the can down the road” for a couple years. Of course, this wouldn’t be true, but if he’s stupid enough to think he can “win” in Afghanistan, he’s stupid enough to buy any argument the Pentagon – or Israel – makes.
We simply can’t assume Obama isn’t willing to take on further wars. Bush – and especially Cheney – certainly didn’t give a damn because Bush was stupid enough to believe Iraq would be a cakewalk – and Cheney simply didn’t care. As I’ve said before, while domestic political considerations play a part, especially with a first term President, the overriding considerations are who is pulling his strings. And Obama has Zionists on all sides of him pulling his strings – from Biden to Emanuel to Clinton to Ross and more. He’s a “dithering President” who can be easily manipulated, as Netanyahu said.
Fiorangela says: “The question, dear Richard Stephen Hack, is what can we do to derail the “inevitable” genocidal scheme?”
The answer is nothing – absolutely nothing. This is the fruit of decades of unquestioning obedience by the US public as the US government has become even more corrupt than it was, the fruit of uncomprehending acceptance of the military-industrial economy, and the fruit of the US educational system – and ultimately the fruit of the defects in human nature.
And none of those things are due to be redressed any time in the next few decades.
Elisa: “I have a hard time accepting that the U.S. will take an action which will bring about its own demize and plung the rest of the world in a long period of darkness both politically and economically.”
That is indeed your problem – and the same problem everyone else here faces.
Unfortunately events have their own logic. We just went through eight years of George Bush, so I fail to understand how one can not see what is in front of one’s face. And Obama is not significantly differently from George Bush in his foreign policy. He may have less neocons in his government, but he has even more Zionists.
It is wishful thinking to not see an inevitable Iran war.
There are many well considered posts, and I hesitate to add these word. However…
What does the US seek in Iran over the next decade? A degradation of its economic development, social turmoil within its borders, a weaker educational system, a bloody uprising if possible.
The intentions are not, and need not be, more defined than that. It is sufficient unto the day.
Do the American policy makers admit this, or even think it? No to the first, yes to the second.
A Lebanese from Bierut talked to me at length about which factories were targeted in the Lebanon wars and why, and who their competition was in Israel, etc.. It was highly detailed and well considered, and provided new lenses to look through. I lost a fair amount of naivite when finally focusing in on what he said.
Of the 10,000 locations chosen to be bombed in Iran, how many, do you think, are part of a broader economic warfare, the US being quite aware that there is no nuclear weapons program to be concerned about?
Economic stagnation and social turmoil are, in fact, more important than regime change, and regime change is but a part of that intention.
Eric:
The question of why the US did not attack Iran in 2007 or 2008 is very important. Another important question is what would actually happen if the US attacked Iran’s installations, or initiated a war with Iran.
From the last thread we’ve reached a consensus that the US is not able to hold Iranian territory. Holding Khuzestan or any part of Iran means fighting an insurgency better prepared in every way than the US has faced in Iraq or Afghanistan and it means holding that territory with no plausible and achievable end state.
So if the US is not going to hold Iranian territory, what will it do? Strike Iran from the air. Only.
Now, air strikes are not going to cause regime change. They will, according to public pronouncements of US calculations prevent Iran from building a weapon for several years, but after those several years have a high chance of leaving a nuclear armed Iran.
Air strikes will kill Iranians. Iran will distribute food to its people by mule and by people with backpacks if necessary. The US is unlikely to achieve from the air a famine or societal collapse. Neither was achieved, to the degree they were the goal, against Iraq. Is that the US’ goal? Even if it is, the air strikes will one day end, and Iran will eventually nuclearize. If the US even tries to starve Iran to death, it is more likely to face nuclear retaliation eventually than to succeed.
So the US will not benefit strategically from an attempt take and hold Iranian territory. The US will not have any long term strategic benefits from attacking Iran only from the air.
To some degree Israel’s calculations are different. Israel benefits from anti-Zionist countries being punished. It helps inspire the fear it needs to keep Mubarak and Jordan’s Abdullah in line.
OK, now how does Iran respond to a US attack? I don’t think Iran should attack Israel, from Lebanon (especially) or Gaza except perhaps with a token effort. Iran will attack Israel from Iran with long range missiles, but these will be more symbolic than practical.
What Iran will do is openly go to war against US positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Weapons are already in both countries, and more can be smuggled in gradually. The US will get some of the bigger shipments, but Iran can get weapons into both countries as well as soldiers.
Now your suggestion, that I’m reading for the first time, that the US bunker its troops down before attacking Iran means either giving up on any mission the US had hoped to achieve in either country of coming out of the bunkers and fighting Iran. It is not the case that the US can bomb Iran and go back to normal two months later. Once the US bombs Iran, it is at war with Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan from now on. If the US was willing to keep its troops permanently out of harms way in both countries, well, it would save a lot of money and bring all of the troops home today.
Is preventing Iran from reaching a Japan option for several years worth giving up both missions? If not, then either US has to not bomb Iran or it has to take more troop deaths, substantially more, and try to keep engaged in active combat, this time against a professional army in both countries. The US has not fought a professional army in either country but the US, even fighting irregulars, is reaching the limit of the amount of losses it is willing to accept and the amount of money it is willing to spend on the effort.
Iran will also probably use its territory on the shores of the Persian gulf to attack shipping. Here’s the thing, remember how the US cannot hold Iranian territory? The only way to ever stop Iran from attacking shipping through the gulf, and the US can only attack shipments from or to US allies if it wants, is to hold territory.
I’m not sure what capabilities Iran has in fighting US naval forces in the Persian Gulf, but if Iran inflicts losses there, that will be additional. Iran can certainly cause US troop losses on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So, Iran is not in a situation where the US is being nice or being patient by not attacking its installations. Iran has, according to reports I’ve read in US publications beginning in 2006 or 2007, reached a state of “escalation dominance”. If the US takes action against Iran, Iran has retaliatory actions that will harm the US more. I know somewhere along that ladder of escalation is attacking US forces. Iran also has not given many shoulder-fired surface to air missiles to its allies in Iraq or Afghanistan, of if it has, has not put them into use.
Iraq and Afganistan can look a lot worse for US troops than they do now. Iran can do a lot of the things Pakistan did to push the USSR out of Afghanistan.
Pakistan also does not need Iran to be hostile to any Pakistani cooperation with the United States.
So my point overall is that the US did not attack Iran for good reasons in 2007 and 2008. At least until the US position clears up in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has demonstrated that it is willing to accept a nuclear capable Iran. And nuclear capability means a Japan option, not any kind of ambiguity. But Iran has enough material today to make a weapon.
I’ve read that bombing LEU does not make it unrecoverable. I’m not sure to what degree that is true, but Iran is very likely to have its stock relatively secure by the time a US attack becomes plausible, if it ever does.
Iran has a stock of LEU that is enough to make a weapon and that is increasing. More importantly, Iran has passed all the red lines. Now Iran is never going to pass from less than one weapons worth to a weapons worth again.
The biggest threat to Israel at this point is that eventually most countries will accept that, yes, Iran has achieved a Japan option, and that passing from six to seven tons of LEU is not alarming. As Iran puts time under its belt being capable of building a weapon and not doing so, it becomes more and more rational to accept that Iran’s Japan option just has been reached and has to be accepted as a part of the regional environment as Israel’s actual nuclear weapons are.
It is very difficult to prevent that outcome from being reached, without replacing it with a worse outcome, at this point.
Eric:
Japan has the technology it would need and the material it would need to make a weapon but it not making a weapon.
Japan will not build a weapon unless it is provoked in a way that nobody anticipates it being provoked.
These are true statements regarding Japan and nobody even minimally informed challenges them unless they are being deliberately deceptive.
You have not said whether or not you would be comfortable with Iran being in Japan’s situation.
Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Admiral Mullen, Defense Secretary Gates, members of the US nuclear policy apparatus, on and off the record express a desire to prevent the two statements above that are true for Japan from being true for Iran.
Netanyahu and Israeli strategists believe those statements being true for Iran would pose a unique and new long term strategic threat to Israel.
Take a side. Be on Obama’s side, be on my side, right now you are changing the subject to Iran being ambiguous or Iran building a weapon. That is not what is at issue. The demand that Iran suspend uranium, as well as the demand that Iran export LEU to reduce its stock beneath one ton is not to prevent it from building a weapon, it is to prevent the statements that are true for Japan from being true for Iran.
It seems you are not comfortable with Iran having Japan or Brazil’s nuclear configuration. Your, Obama’s Bush’s and Netanyahu’s positions are pretty much indefensible. You’re allowed to feel whatever you want, but there is no logical justification for such a position. It cannot be supported without special pleading.
If you hold a position that cannot be defended on a board where a defense of such a position would be demanded, I guess it’s best to kind of never talk about it. There would be a kind of honesty though, if you were to say you don’t believe Iran should be allowed to reach Japan’s position even though you would not be able to provide support for that belief.
Eric
“If Iran already possessed nuclear weapons, I suspect you’d prefer that none of these other states acquire them, just as I and most Americans prefer right now that neither Iran nor any other country acquire nuclear weapons. I recognize it’s easier for a citizen of a nuclear weapons state to reach this conclusion, but I nevertheless believe it’s the right conclusion for such a person to reach.”
Eric frankly I was not shocked reading the above sentence, this greedy attitude is the exact cultural difference between the western and the eastern mentality what the westerners commonly call double standards or American Exceptionalism which is expected to be accepted by the rest of the planet. If I understand the Iranian and the Middle Easterners mentality this can’t be easily explained.
If it was state of Israel with all the mighty US military behind him would have been accepted by now and would not have to fight for its legitimacy.
Eric
“A person can reach that conclusion and yet think of ways that a non-nuclear state (Iran, for example) can resist unfair pressure and demands placed on it by one’s own swaggering nuclear-weapons state. Such a person’s suggestions might be worth considering by citizens of that non-nuclear state if the fact is that the swaggering bully will never let them get even close to acquiring nuclear weapons.”
Again I am not suggesting that Iran should be or needs to be a nuclear state, but what you are suggesting here, can’t possibly be presented as fact, since with or without help of this same swaggering nuclear state multiple number of states have passed this thresh hold. This is another reason why the nuclear issue is not the core of the problem, as I am sure you are very well aware that the core of the issue is losing control and hegemony which when Americans come to realize the consequence of losing American hegemony they tend to accept the government’s policies which includes a permanent land based fortress off of the eastern Mediterranean sea. This I realize and respect.
Kooshy,
“I have come to believe that for you not having another “nuclear capable state” in the world is more important than even if Iran is attacked whiteout having an actual bomb, or bomb making program, sorry but that is not the case for me, for me Iran is more important at any way that Iran can deter and maintain its independence, even if war becomes unavoidable.”
You’re correct. I was explicit in saying that my priority is not to have another nuclear-weapons state, even if this restricts Iran’s ability to achieve its legitimate political goals. I expected you and other Iranian readers would have exactly the opposite priority. I would too if I were Iranian. Similarly, I’d have been all for Israel acquiring nuclear weapons – or India or Pakistan, or any of the five NPT “nuclear weapon states” – if I’d been a citizen of any of those countries when they acquired their nuclear weapons.
Several other countries arguably deserve the same right as Iran to develop nuclear weapons because they too are threatened by an aggressive world power or a nuclear-weapon-state neighbor. I’ll name just a few: Cuba, Venezuela, South Korea, Saudi Arabia. And if any those countries were to acquire nuclear weapons, I could draw up an even longer list for you. And so on.
If Iran already possessed nuclear weapons, I suspect you’d prefer that none of these other states acquire them, just as I and most Americans prefer right now that neither Iran nor any other country acquire nuclear weapons. I recognize it’s easier for a citizen of a nuclear weapons state to reach this conclusion, but I nevertheless believe it’s the right conclusion for such a person to reach.
A person can reach that conclusion and yet think of ways that a non-nuclear state (Iran, for example) can resist unfair pressure and demands placed on it by one’s own swaggering nuclear-weapons state. Such a person’s suggestions might be worth considering by citizens of that non-nuclear state if the fact is that the swaggering bully will never let them get even close to acquiring nuclear weapons.
That’s all I’m trying to do.
If Iran follows Mr. Brill’s suggested programme, will Mr. Hack’s choice #4 become less inevitable?
How will Mr. Hack’s question be answered: what will happen next, and when will it happen?
Senator Joe Lieberman: “Is it fair to say that Iranian-backed special groups are responsible for the murder of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians?”
Gen. David Petreaus: “It certaily is – That is correct.” – Gen. Petreaus testimony to US Senate, April 8-9, 2008.
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/07/20/israelis-in-iraq/
Eric
“In your response of July 19 at 7:29 PM, you wrote that you do not disagree with James, but it appears to me that you do. You asked rhetorically “why should Iran now forfeit its rights and sovereignty when it’s sure immediately a new dispute will be created?” Since James made clear that he accepted “Iran’s wish to make use of its rights under the NPT and to enrich LEU,” it’s not clear what “rights” you feel Iran should be jealously preserving. The right to limit its disclosures sufficiently that the world is left to guess whether Iran is working on nuclear weapons?
If that is what you mean, then it seems to me you’re flatly disagreeing with James. If that’s not what you mean, what “rights” do you mean?
Eric, thanks for asking
I meant on what you and Arnold were exchanging, meaning the AP and the code 3.1 that apparently you feel it should be thrown in even if US is not willing to concede anything and I argue why should Iran forfeit its sovereign right and adopt these additions to the treaty since the actual dispute as far as I can believe is not the nuclear enrichment. And to be frank I suspect everyone on this site including you has the same belief with regard to the core of the thirty one year dispute.
Look Eric I very well understand your position and respect your views, however I have come to believe that for you not having another “nuclear capable state” in the world is more important than even if Iran is attacked whiteout having an actual bomb, or bomb making program, sorry but that is not the case for me, for me Iran is more important at any way that Iran can deter and maintain its independence, even if war becomes unavoidable.
Kooshy,
I agree with what James wrote:
“I think it is a serious mistake to regard Iran’s nuclear programme as a card or cards in Iran’s hand, that gives Iran a better situation. I understand Iran’s wish to make use of its rights under the NPT and to enrich LEU. But any game playing suggesting Iran is secretly working on some nukes, is very bad for Iran.”
In your response of July 19 at 7:29 PM, you wrote that you do not disagree with James, but it appears to me that you do. You asked rhetorically “why should Iran now forfeit its rights and sovereignty when it’s sure immediately a new dispute will be created?” Since James made clear that he accepted “Iran’s wish to make use of its rights under the NPT and to enrich LEU,” it’s not clear what “rights” you feel Iran should be jealously preserving. The right to limit its disclosures sufficiently that the world is left to guess whether Iran is working on nuclear weapons?
If that is what you mean, then it seems to me you’re flatly disagreeing with James. If that’s not what you mean, what “rights” do you mean?
James,
“Wasn’t it Roone Arledge who so stupidly played up the hostage taking, and in so doing made it very difficult for Khomeini to arrange the release of the embassy personnel? Americans need to know it was the utter foolishness of American news media that did so much to create the problem …”
I don’t want to get sidetracked on the 1979 hostage crisis. I raised it only to highlight my point that Iran’s focus on past behavior will not be productive because (1) Iran would gain utterly nothing by pointing out the US government’s past misconduct; and (2) if the US government does anything but dismiss such Iranian complaints out of hand, many Americans will be reminded of the hostage crisis and will put put considerable pressure on US to ratchet up the pressure on Iran – just the opposite of what Iran should be hoping for here.
If that occurs, you’ll have a very hard time persuading many Americans that Roone Arledge shared the blame. I lack the imagination to predict what Glenn Beck, Rush Limbaugh or Bill O’Reilly might do with such a charge.
James
“But any game playing suggesting Iran is secretly working on some nukes is very bad for Iran. Why expose the country to the propaganda broadsides put out by the neocons and associated warmongers in the US (and Israel)? Iran says it does not want nukes, and Iran is working for a Middle East free of nukes. It should continue to do so.”
James- that’s not at all what I am suggesting, as far as I understand Iran’s position, Iran is not looking or needing to have a nuclear military program, however considering Eric’s position vs. Arnold’s, if the core of the dispute is not the nuclear issue and is rather more complex strategic issues which apparently prevented a reset during the 80’s and 90’s, why should Iran now forfeits its rights and sovereignty when it’s sure immediately a new dispute will be created and presented to the “international community”. In that format the nuclear issue is doing its supposed work; consider that known known’s are not as dangerous as the unknown known’s.
The Iranian foreign minister, Mottaki, said once again that stability in Afghanistan needs the cooperation of the countries in the region, and that Iran is prepared to do its part. How very interesting, that discussions in the US, regarding the way forward in Afghanistan, seldom even mention Iran! And what is that? Israel lobby! And idiot Republicans.
kooshy,
I think it is a serious mistake to regard Iran’s nuclear programme as a card or cards in Iran’s hand, that gives Iran a better situation. I understand Iran’s wish to make use of its rights under the NPT and to enrich LEU. But any game playing suggesting Iran is secretly working on some nukes, is very bad for Iran. Why expose the country to the propaganda broadsides put out by the neocons and associated warmongers in the US (and Israel)? Iran says it does not want nukes, and Iran is working for a Middle East free of nukes. It should continue to do so.
kooshy,
The achievement of normal relations between Iran and the US, in the mid-1990s, was sabotaged by the Israel lobby. Keep in mind that Geore H. W. Bush had made great progress toward resolving the Israel/Palestine problem, during his term of office. His defeat opened the way for Clinton to sabotage the progress made by his predecessor. Clinton was a stooge of Jewish financiers.
Eric,
Wasn’t it Roone Arledge who so stupidly played up the hostage taking, and in so doing made it very difficult for Khomeini to arrange the release of the embassy personnel?
Americans need to know it was the utter foolishness of American news media that did so much to create the problem (that helped to defeat Carter in the 1980 election).
Did the UK start knocking the knees of the PM (and everyone on down) together, after some British sailors were taken into custody a while back in the Gulf? No. Quiet diplomacy resolved the matter in a satisfactory manner, in just a short period of time.
I recommend Lawrence Davidson’s “Are We Replaying Iraq. . .In Iran?”
http://readersupportednews.org/opinion/139-139/2458-are-we-replaying-iraq-in-iran
Eric’s argument would have been an option if the US’s beef with Iran was just about the nuclear program. What Eric and almost everybody else including the Levreets
never consider to analysis is: what were the reason that US was not able to reconstruct / reset its relationship with Iran during the Clinton administration, when there were no nuclear dispute between the two countries, could it be that same strategic constraints still exist, and the nuclear issue is being used as a pressure boiler, if the answer is a yes, then what difference would resolving the nuclear issue makes, except reducing or eliminating some cards that might strengthen Iran’s hand.
James,
“Speaking of the hostage crisis of 1979, it is worth bearing in mind that Khomeini did not order the takeover of the US embassy and only learned of it after it happened.”
I’m well aware of this. How many Americans do you think are? And what explanation might they accept for Khomeini’s failure to order the hostages to be released once he learned of it?
Arnold,
“Either code 3.1 or the additional protocols would give the US information that would make it easier to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.”
I’ll respond more later, but a preliminary question on this: Are you assuming the IAEA would violate its obligation not to turn over confidential Iranian information to the US, or that confidential Iranian information would leak to the US, or that even non-confidential information would be good enough?
Arnold,
“Why do you think Bush/Cheney did not attack Iran in 2007 or 2008?”
I have no idea.
Arnold,
Admiral Fallon said any US attack on Iran would be insane. And the 2007 NIE on Iran said Iran was not developing nukes.
fyi,
I think the chances of an attack on Iran, with nukes employed, is near zero. Barring some insane terrorist event. Any use of nukes would be extremely counter-productive, to say the least.
Iran should continue to work toward a Middle East free of nukes.
Eric:
I’ll come back later with more details about the deterrence effect of the US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan but in the mean time, why do you think Bush/Cheney did not attack Iran in 2007 or 2008?
fyi,
The so-called doctrine of “pre-emption”, put out by the arrogant ignoramus in the White House, was adopted to provide cover for the illegal US/UK invasion of Iraq because it was all too clear there was no evidence of WMD in Iraq. In other words, yet another vicious scam by the G W Bush adminstration.
My “greater disclosure” suggestion means giving up the so-called “nuclear option” that Arnold and many others think is essential for Iran to preserve.
In practical terms, from the US point of view, as of right now, giving up a nuclear option means holding its stock of enriched uranium beneath one ton, instead of the 2 and a half tons Iran has now.
In other words, Iran having a nuclear option is not a matter of disclosing facilities or answering questions. When you say Iran should give up a nuclear option, both I, Israel’s government and the US government would interpret that to mean Iran should export most of the LEU stock it already has and commit to either stop enriching or to make exports in the future if its stock becomes too big.
Is that what you mean?
I disagree that this is essential, I would not like to see Iran produce a deliverable bomb under the US’ nose even if it could do so, and I doubt very seriously that the US would accept ambiguity about Iran’s nuclear intentions long enough for Iran to create even the illusion that it had accomplished this.
I still think we’re arguing past each other. When I say nuclear option, I use it interchangeably with “Japan option”. Japan has not built a deliverable bomb, and nobody thinks it does. Japan is a case any model you have for the nuclear issue will have to incorporate. Japan does not have a weapon and could make one if it chose. Once again I’ll reiterate that Japan is not an ambiguous state. Japan could clearly build a weapon if it left the NPT. Japan clearly does not have one now. Whenever I read you write about ambiguity I think you didn’t understand what I had written.
But I would strongly consider adopting the new Code 3.1 and the additional protocols
Either code 3.1 or the additional protocols would give the US information that would make it easier to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.
For Code 3.1 Iran having facilities planned or partially constructed in reserve, just in case its declared facilities are attacked is an important part of the US public calculation that it attacking Iran’s program could set it back a finite amount of time but would not stop it.
For the additional protocols, knowing where and how centrifuge components are built would give the US more tools to prevent necessary supplies from arriving and improve US targeting information if it were to choose to attack.
Neither one is just an example of testosterone. Every denial has some strategic motivation. In fact, the reason the US asks for this information is not to test Iran’s testosterone, but to put Iran into a position from which it either assists US efforts and potential efforts to hamper its nuclear program or seems unreasonable to those who aren’t following the issue closely.
(1) however useful the reality or illusion of nuclear-weapon capability may be for Iran to accomplish its foreign policy objectives, that usefulness is trumped by the world’s compelling need to pull up the nuclear-weapons gangplank once and for all: no more nuclear-armed states, even if that world policy makes it harder for Iran to resist unwarranted foreign pressure on its nuclear program.
Oh, yes, we disagree on this. Now “the world’s compelling need”? Who is “the world”? Does the world have a compelling need for the nuclear states to fulfill their commitment to fully disarm?
Because you don’t use the word “Japan” in your statement, you also leave that question open. Does “the world” have a need for Japan to give up its tons of plutonium that, as far as I know, serve no purpose in Japanese territory other than giving Japan the potential, if it chooses, to build tens of thousands of warheads?
(2) whether or not Iran is complying with the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement obligations, the important fact remains that Safeguards Agreements – at least without new Code 3.1 and the additional protocols added on, and arguably even when they are – are not (if they ever were) adequate to ensure enforcement of a country’s most important obligation under the NPT: its obligation not to develop nuclear weapons.
What you’re doing here is essentially re-writing the NPT in favor of the US and the nuclear states. Nobody has ever built a weapon while applying the safeguards. Nobody has ever kept a weapons worth of fissile material, or anything close to that outside of the existing inspections regime.
The NPT gives states an obligation not to build nuclear weapons. It does not give states any obligation to disclaim a Japan option. The safeguards agreements provide the same amount of assurance they provided when they were negotiated. If not, what are you claiming is different? But the US wishes a different agreement had been negotiated, in which US disarmament is sometime in the distant future while non-weapons states can only have a Japan option if the US likes them.
***
Overall, I’m pretty sure you’re aware of the argument I make and ignore the most important elements of it. My question to you is what do you think of the Japan option. I say again and again, the Japan option is not related in any way to ambiguity or building an actual weapon.
Eric,
What is the limit on the number of US warships allowed to be in the Black Sea at any given time. Is it two?
I think the US would do well to put very few warships into the Gulf at any time.
Speaking of the hostage crisis of 1979, it is worth bearing in mind that Khomeini did not order the takeover of the US embassy and only learned of it after it happened. Moreover, if Carter had not over-reacted (largely in response to a great deal of noise put out by ABC News), the situation probably could have been resolved quietly in a matter of a few weeks.
FYI,
I’ll make a deal with you. I’ll promise not to mention to any human being in the United States (especially Rush Limbaugh) that you suggested the US should consider the need to “caress Persian vanity” in its dealings with Iran, if you’ll promise not to use that phrase ever again in serious discussion.
If I or you were running the world, we might well take into account the need to “caress Persian vanity.” I don’t deny for an instant that Iran has been mistreated. Unfortunately, we can hope, at best, only to influence the thinking of those who will decide the matters we discuss here. There may be some Iranian decision makers who insist that the US “caress Persian vanity,” though I suspect that most Iranian decision makers would live without such a caress if they could strike a good deal without it. In any case, I can assure you that US decision makers won’t be thinking very much about how to “caress Persian vanity.”
FYI,
“If I were you, I would not discount its negative consequences – I do not think that it is a good idea to go around and make enemies.”
I don’t discount Iran’s anger at all, nor do I feel the US should “go around and make enemies.” But if Iran wants to get somewhere with its nuclear program, it had better accept the fact that the US isn’t going to put much weight on Iran’s anger, nor apologize for its behavior. In fact, if Iran wants to focus on past behavior, I can assure you that many in the US will want to discuss the 1979 hostage crisis.
Countries have mistreated other countries for millennia, and this often makes the other country very angry. Sometimes apologies are given. Not often. Sometimes the wronged country can’t or won’t move on until an apology is received; other times it can and does.
If you’re looking for soothed feelings here, don’t get your hopes up.
Eric A. Brill:
My initial point was about submarines.
I am telling you how it looks to many Iranians.
And would thant cause harm to caress Persian vanity and get something done (with them)?
FYI,
“Precisely my point – humiliating the other side, specially such vain people as Iranians – is not conducive to good diplomacy is it?”
I don’t understand what you mean by this. My point is that the US passes through the Straits of Hormuz without asking for Iran’s permission. Call if “humiliation” if you like, but the US – and many other countries, consider the narrowness of the Straits to be an unfortunate geographical fact that does not give Iran the right to deny access to the Gulf. There are many other narrow bodies of water about which most of the world feels exactly the same – the Red Sea and the Straits of Gibraltar, to name two obvious exammples.
Eric A. Brill:
It was deep anger at US that caused the 9/11 attacks and a variety of other attacks by Sunni Muslims.
If I were you, I would not discount its negative consequences – I do not think that it is a good idea to go around and make enemies.
FYI,
“By the way, I was not aware that US had oil tankers. I thought all of that work is out-sourced to the less developed nations, no?”
I don’t know who owns which oil tankers, but certainly the US has owned a lot over the years (the Exxon Valdez, for an obvious example).
FYI,
“There is deep anger at US, EU, China and others who shredded the CWT in case of Iran.”
Deep anger and a dime (or maybe $3.00, if you go to Starbucks), will get you a cup of coffee.
US government policy will not be affected by Iran’s anger. Iran has good reasons to be angry, but unless you have in mind some “grand bargain” (in which case, we might as well toss in Iran-Iraq war reparations, US support for the MEK, and all sorts of other issues which have little if any hope of resolution), so what?
Eric A. Brill:
“When do you suppose US oil tankers last requested permission from Iran or Oman to pass through the Straits of Hormuz?”
Precisely my point – humiliating the other side, specially such vain people as Iranians – is not conducive to good diplomacy is it?
By the way, I was not aware that US had oil tankers. I thought all of that work is out-sourced to the less developed nations, no?
I agree with the Leverrets , I think in about two years the Zionist lobby will lunch a huge propaganda campaign in the media to deceive the American people ! When that happens , Obama will be under a huge pressure from the the Zionist lobby to take military action against Iran , they will try to convince him that failing to take a military action against Iran will cost his re – election bid. However I think Obama`s knowledge on the negative consequences of an attack against Iran will weigh more than his re – election ambitions , so I think ultimately he would rather lose the re – election than putting the lives of the American people at risk !
FYI,
“As you are probably aware, the Straits of Hormuz are in the Iranian and Omani territorial waters and not considered open sea.”
Not “considered open sea” by whom, exactly? I suggest you put away your territorial-waters measuring stick and consider real life. When do you suppose US oil tankers last requested permission from Iran or Oman to pass through the Straits of Hormuz?
Eric A. Brill:
I agree with some of what you have written to Richard Hack but not with all of it.
For the reasons of state security, cohesion, and survival Iran should have constrcuted nuclear weapons back when India and Pakistan exploded theirs.
Survival of the Iranian state and people is not threatened by a non-nuclear air war by the United States.
There are political constraints as well as physical constraints on what US and EU could do against Iran.
The reason for lack of attack against Iran has been that their leaders (US & EU) comprehend that such a war will be the closest thing to a World War they are likely to get.
It is not due to good Iranian behavior in the nuclear arena.
Iran was attacked by WMD extensively.
Everyday, some one in Iran dies because of the lasting effects of the Chemical Weapons.
There is deep anger at US, EU, China and others who shredded the CWT in case of Iran.
The fear is that the next war, launched by whomever, will include nuclear weapons which could potentially annihilate Iran.
This possibility must be weighed against the damages and casualties that I estimated in past posting for a possible US-Iran War.
That, I suspect, was the reason that Mr. Khamenei was willing to accept a war with US in 2006.
No state in the world can offer Iran security guarantees, not even US.
US has that power but the political structure is not there – “Iran becoming – in effect – another Israel for US? Oh, please.”
Fiorangela:
Iran has the rights to defend herself if a war is imminent.
She may not be able to enforce that for lack of power.
US provocations are not limited to Economic Warfare (began under Mr. Clinton), Intelligence War (began under Mr. Bush and continuing under Mr. Obama) and Diplomatic Haraasment since 1985.
US airplanes used to routinely “buzz” broder areas of Iran to see if they would provoke anti-aircraft fire or at least radar lock-ons.
US un-manned aircraft have been routinely violating Iranian air space under Bush – I do not know the current situation.
As you are probably aware, the Straits of Hormuz are in the Iranian and Omani territorial waters and not considered open sea.
Submarines are supposed to surface while making passage.
US submarine do not do so.
These are all aimed to mostly humiliate Iran.
But all power is local.
And Iranians apparently have retaliated but not necessarily with soldiers.
I think that the Iranians – at least in their confrontation with US – are being reasonably well led.
Arnold,
While it’s not quite as full as I’d intended, please consider my last post to be my promised response to you and Lysander on your questions left unanswered from several weeks ago. There’s more than enough there for you to sink your teeth into.
Eric
Richard Hack,
You wrote to Arnold:
“HOW LONG do you think the status quo can be continued before it becomes ridiculous?”
A lot longer than you do, apparently, and I agree with Arnold on that. I acknowledge that it will take considerable diplomatic skill from Iran, but I’d put the odds of success of your Choice 4 at well above 50/50.
Arnold can speak for himself as to how he’d accomplish this. I’ve written earlier at great length on how I’d accomplish it, and won’t repeat that here in quite such detail.
Nevertheless: my long-term plan would be for Iran, patiently and politely, to maintain its firm resistance against US pressure on Iran’s nuclear program while the US’ influence and foreign-wars-pocketbook continue to shrink over the next few years and decades, firm up Iran’s economic and political ties (carefully) with China, Turkey and other rising countries, continue to develop Iran’s peaceful nuclear program (including enrichment) with or without cooperation from other countries, and become much more open in Iran’s nuclear-program disclosures so that other countries will believe Iran’s intentions are peaceful and thus resist US and Israeli calls for war. All this while welcoming opportunities to cooperate with the US on mutually beneficial specific matters (though I now expect that few if any such narrow opportunities will arise, given the outcome of the recent “fuel swap” proposals).
My “greater disclosure” suggestion means giving up the so-called “nuclear option” that Arnold and many others think is essential for Iran to preserve. I disagree that this is essential, I would not like to see Iran produce a deliverable bomb under the US’ nose even if it could do so, and I doubt very seriously that the US would accept ambiguity about Iran’s nuclear intentions long enough for Iran to create even the illusion that it had accomplished this. I predict confidently that, if Iran were to insist on the level of ambiguity this “nuclear option” would require to be worth pursuing, the US would bomb first and ask questions later.
Fortunately, in my view, Iran seems to be following essentially the course I’d follow, though I’d be more inclined than Iran seems to be to dial down the testosterone level on the disclosure dispute. I certainly would not respond to every “laptop of death” allegation or exaggerated US claim about disclosures made by some screw-loose defector. But I would strongly consider adopting the new Code 3.1 and the additional protocols (or at least following them scrupulously, if Majlis ratification remains a political impossibility in Iran), and would make sincere and diligent ad hoc efforts to answer reasonable additional IAEA questions about what Iran is up to – whether or not the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires those answers. I’d save my testosterone for my insistence on full-fuel-cycle nuclear development rights – not to insist on my real or imagined right to keep my nuclear activities secret from the rest of the world.
In my view, Iran has a right under the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement to do everything it’s been doing (or at least what it’s publicly disclosed), but I also think Iran needs to recognize two points that many of its supporters either overlook or disagree with:
(1) however useful the reality or illusion of nuclear-weapon capability may be for Iran to accomplish its foreign policy objectives, that usefulness is trumped by the world’s compelling need to pull up the nuclear-weapons gangplank once and for all: no more nuclear-armed states, even if that world policy makes it harder for Iran to resist unwarranted foreign pressure on its nuclear program. Whether or not it worked out well for North Korea, I don’t feel any safer knowing that North Korea has the bomb today, and I certainly won’t feel safer if Iran either acquires the bomb or keeps us all guessing about that for years to come; and
(2) whether or not Iran is complying with the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement obligations, the important fact remains that Safeguards Agreements – at least without new Code 3.1 and the additional protocols added on, and arguably even when they are – are not (if they ever were) adequate to ensure enforcement of a country’s most important obligation under the NPT: its obligation not to develop nuclear weapons. Safeguards Agreements focus too narrowly on nuclear material, a focus that may have been appropriate 50 years ago but is not sufficient today. That insufficiency has been acknowledged ever since just after the first Iraq war, when the additional protocols were drafted, and even compliance with the additional protocols (and new Code 3.1) may not be sufficient to allay some legitimate international concerns that arise from time to time.
Unfortunately for all of us – Iran included, as will become clear below – the NPT includes no enforcement mechanism outside of the Safeguards Agreement signed by a country under the NPT, and the IAEA has chosen so far to ignore even the Article 22 arbitration procedure prescribed under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (probably, in my view, because it fears that an arbitrator would rule in favor of Iran). Although the IAEA has additional authority under the IAEA Statute to revoke a country’s IAEA membership for certain NPT or Safeguards Agreement violations, that penalty probably wouldn’t upset Iran very much at this point.
The UN Security Council has tried to fill this “enforcement gap” by exercising imaginary authority to enforce the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement whenever the IAEA “refers” a matter to the UNSC under Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, even though neither the NPT nor Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (nor any other treaty or agreement) grants any enforcement authority whatsoever to the UNSC in response to such a referral. The UNSC may or may not also be overstepping its independent authority under Articles 40 and 41 of the UN Charter, and probably will not be able to accomplish much more under those two Articles even if is not. It also appears unlikely that the UNSC will exercise authority it actually could have under Article 39 of the UN Charter because Russia and China probably cannot be persuaded to declare that Iran is a “threat to the peace.”
While all this means, in my view, that Iran can “legally” dig in its heels at least as firmly as it has done so far, I don’t think that would be a wise course for Iran. In the unlikely event that Iran ever persuades the UNSC that the UNSC lacks authority to enforce the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (either directly through UNSC resolutions, or by asking the IAEA to take specified actions pursuant to those resolutions, as the UNSC has also done), Iran’s successful “legal” argument ironically would strengthen the US’ hand. The US almost certainly would persuade its allies that the absence of UNSC authority under the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement made it no less proper for the “international community” to insist on certain behavior from Iran, and that – much to the US’ regret, of course – some other enforcement measures accordingly are required to ensure that Iran behaves as it ought to. I think we all know what other enforcement measures would come to the US’ mind.
For these reasons, I think Iran would be wise (1) not to challenge the UNSC’s claimed authority to enforce the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, since the UNSC-as-enforcer probably beats the alternative (the US military, possibly with allies); and (2) to continue its gentle-but-firm resistance against US pressure on its nuclear program, enhancing the prospects of success of that strategy by expanding Iran’s nuclear-activities disclosures to undercut the US’ effort to drum up support for war.
fyi, I wish I could be so generous as to grant Mr. Bush the motive of ensuring the safety of the US; I don’t, and even if I did, Bush and the policy failed.
Does Iran have the pre-emptive right to strike Israel or the US, who have Iran encircled, who routinely violate Iran’s political and economic sovereignty, spy on Iran, and threaten Iran’s citizens? Would US put up with that? The boys in the basement plotting maneuvers might see their tin soldier armies swept up in the vacuum cleaner if Iran decides to become as aggressive as everybody accuses Iran of being.
The psychological dynamic that drove Barnett was his young daughter’s bout with cancer: her illness “changed the rule set.” The congruence of his daughter’s suffering — a devastating, disempowering experience for a parent, and Barnett’s flagging career, apparently caused something to snap. He lighted on a theory that brought him 15 minutes of fame as well as a way to make sense of a world he could not otherwise control. His daughter survived. A million Iraqis did not.
Fiorangela:
All states have an intrinsic right to pre-emption.
That is, some other actor (state or non-state) is bout to pull the trigger; so to speak.
Mr. Bush’s formulation was extrremist – in my opinion – for he was seeking absolute security for the United States – as far as I could tell – at the cost of absolute insecurity for every other state actor except possibly the Russian Federation and possibly PRC.
Fiorangela,
Yes, my sense was that Lamb was becoming less reliable. And Barnett is an idiot.
I saw the press reports that the testing service was suspending activities in Iran, with dismay. Utter lunacy! Iranians should be encouraged to study at US prep or high schools and colleges and universities.
James Canning — Lamb is the tabula rasa; his philosophy of C Span is to provide a neutral platform for many, many points of view (or was; it’s become influenced by zionism, most likely via James Glassman who is deeply involved with C Span AND wears at least two other hats: runs VOA for State Department and coordinates VOA with Defense Department. C Span beams over VOA networks. Thus, it’s likely C Span is coached to shape some commentary to fit the VOA/State/DoD agenda.)
Thank goodness the US government is protecting its citizens from the threat that evull Iranians might learn English. I’ll sleep better tonight.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/world/middleeast/18tehran.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=iran&st=cse
Fiorangela,
Maybe lamb should get credit for calling attention to idiocy from Barnett? Iraq was a secular state, and it was not “politically bankrupt”. In fact, there were more Shia in the Baath party, than Sunni (though the Sunnis controlled the army and secret police). Destroying the Sunni power structure was one of the greatest acts of stupidity carried out by the Pentagon. Thanks, idiot neocons!
Fiorangela,
What remarkable rubbish from Brian Lamb! Osama bin Laden hated Saddam Hussein and wanted him killed! Why? Because Saddam’s Iraq was secular! The idiots in the Pentagon took out an enemy of Osama bin Laden! Thank you, neocons!
Fiorangela,
As you know, I am a strong supporter of William Hague, and I think it makes very good sense for Britain to sell armaments abroad. At home, the UK is cutting defence spending. By contrast, the US is squandering greater sums on spurious “defence” projects than ever before in the history of the Republic.
James Canning, you wrote:
“The many stooges of the armaments manufacturers, in the US Congress, are doing their best to ensure continuing squandering of hundreds of billions of dollars each year, by the US, on totally useless “defence” projects.”
Conservatives’ top defence priorities when in government would be to
“preserve UK defence jobs by maximising exports. The Conservative Party will use defence exports as a foreign policy tool and we will seek to increase Britain’s share of the world defence market.”
James Canning, thanks for the mention of “Icarus.”
I recommend to you this interview between Brian Lamb and Thomas Barnett, author of “The Pentagon’s New Map.”
“So when we take down an Iraq and try to connect an Iraqi society to the outside world, we create, and I would argue what the Bush administration argues is, they seek to create a big bang, a transformative kind of moment that says, look, this is the connectivity that`s possible. We`re going to bring you into our world, and by bringing you into our world, we`re going to deny the outcomes that a bin Laden would seek, which is a very isolated, authoritarian rule for the Middle East, that probably has very, very little interaction with the outside world. And as a long-term pathway for that region, I see only danger and repression and terrorism coming out of it, just like we saw between us and the Soviets.
LAMB: So it was a good idea?
BARNETT: I think it`s a good idea. I think it`s a long term idea, and I think the way it was sold to the American public was probably not so good. And I think it reflects the fact that in effect, in the global community we don`t have a rule set, if I can use that term, we don`t have a rule set A to Z, you know, from the beginning to the end, that says this is how you process, rehabilitate a politically bankrupt state.
What`s an example of such a rule set? I would say we have one for economically bankrupt states. It`s called the International Monetary Fund`s sovereign debt, Chapter 11. OK? You can be Argentina and have a debt crisis. You will go into that IMF process at point A, come out at point Z; you`re rehabilitated, with no bias against you at that point.
We do not have one for processing a bad, politically bankrupt leadership that nobody wants, that everybody wants to see gone. OK? So the world wanted to see a Saddam Hussein gone, but we didn`t have a system for getting Iraq from A to Z. What we have is the U.N. Security Council that goes the first few steps by saying, we indict you with this resolution, we indict you with that resolution. Then they turn it over to who? There is no executive function in the international system that says, OK, I will act on those indictments, I will take him down for you. OK? We sort of have one called the U.S. military. But there, you only have a military that gets you to the point of the removal of power.
We don`t have an international organization or a rule set that says this is how we build your nation back up after we take down your leadership, and this is how we reintegrate you into the global community.
LAMB: Let me read a quote from your book, to see if you remember this quote. “Don`t those idiots in the White House realize they`re destroying the concept of deterrence? For heaven`s sakes, does this mean we`re supposed to attack China tomorrow because they have nukes and might use them against us?” Who said that?
BARNETT: My mother said that. My mother said that after she saw the speech, the historic speech where George Bush enunciated the concept of preemptive war as a new cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy. And what I say in response to that argument is that you have to understand, there is one rule set on security that exists within those globalized parts of the world. OK? That says, in effect, there is transparency among states in terms of security issues. There is collective security. There`s mutual assured destruction as a concept to avoid nuclear war among great powers.
That`s a fairly stable rule set. OK? There has been no war among great powers since we invented nuclear weapons well over half a century ago. OK?
None of that changes with this new enunciation of preemptive war, because that enunciation of this new concept of preemptive war has nothing to do with that functioning core of globalization. We`re not talking about China, we`re not talking about Russia, we`re not talking about any of the great powers with nuclear weapons going at it. What we are talking about are actors and rogue regimes inside those non-integrating parts, where the rule sets on security have not yet extended, where globalization hasn`t taken deep root. It`s in those situations where*** we don`t believe we can deter people, where the rule sets on mutual assured destruction and those kinds of things that keep us secure in our nuclear arsenals and strategic balances don`t apply.*** “
James,
You wrote to Richard Hack:
“I think Iran has made it clear enough, that if the Palestinians make a deal with the Israelis, Iran will accept it.”
I couldn’t agree with you more, but it certainly doesn’t help to repeat that, as you’ve done, because it seems to go unnoticed by most observers.
Arnold,
One can quibble about whether the US would disperse some troops among civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, but I suggested other alternatives that would work just as well – send them to defensible positions at key installations, send them back to the US, and send them as needed to the Iran-attack staging areas.
I’m still curious to hear your and others’ views on my speculation (which is all it is) that the US might use an attack on Iran (though I don’t expect one) to kill three birds with one stone: (1) further reduce our presence in Iraq down to a hunker-down guarding of key US installations; (2) reduce our presence in Afghanistan to the Kabul-Bagram area and suspected al Qaeda haunts in the east/southeast; and (3) refocus the US” flagging war-lust on a new enemy (Iran) that all Americans can be whipped up to hate with very little effort.
Arnold,
It is not a matter of Israel having leverage over the US, to cause the US to launch an insane attack on Iran. The issue is whether Obama would allow himself to get “boxed in” by American warmongers, who will argue that the US “needs” to show it has teeth, or something proposterous along these lines. Let’s remember Robert McNamara warning Lyndon Johnson that if he did not greatly enlarge the US troops commitment to the civil war in Vietnam, in order to “win” that idiotic adventure, US credibility would be gone and Turkey and Greece would leave NATO. [!] Astounding rubbish, but not challenged by most of LBJ’s advisers.
I recommend Ed Luce’s review in the Financial Times July 17/18, of Peter Beinart’s “The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris”. Luce mentions Admiral Mullen’s recent comment: “Our national debt is our biggest national security threat”.
The many stooges of the armaments manufacturers, in the US Congress, are doing their best to ensure continuing squandering of hundreds of billions of dollars each year, by the US, on totally useless “defence” projects.
Richard Steven Hack,
I think Iran has made it clear enough, that if the Palestinians make a deal with the Israelis, Iran will accept it.
Bravo, Flynt! I think Ahmadinejad was speaking forthrightly when he said that if Iran decided to build nukes, it would not try to conceal that fact.
Mahmoud Abbas is quite rightly taking the line that there should be no direct Israel-Palestine talks without an Israeli agreement in principle on the Green Line as the boundard of Palestine, and on having international peacekeepers on the borders (not Israeli forces). Netanyahu would just as soon have the US taxpayers squander a few trillion more dollars on another unnecessary war, rather than do the obvious thing and agree to end the occupation of the entire West Bank.
WigWag,
You and others make far too much of these “all options are on the table” remarks. They may well indicate what the speaker believes, but they may well not when you consider that it would be virtually impossible to say anything BUT that.
How would it sound, after all, if someone asked a US official “What will happen if sanctions don’t cause the mad mullahs of Iran to give up their relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons?” and the official answered: “Well, if that happens, we’ll be plumb out of good ideas and I guess we’ll just have to live with a nuclear-armed Iran.”
WigWag,
You wrote:
“Last week we had a prominent Arab Ambassador attending a U.S. conference practically inviting the United States to attack Iran. A few months back we had Egypt permitting Israeli navy ships (surface and submarine) which may have been carrying nuclear weapons to traverse the Suez Canal. And let’s not forget the continuing rumors of Saudi Arabia giving Israel permission to overfly its airspace to attack Iran.”
The weakness of this “the Arabs want us to attack Iran” argument is highlighted by your own choice of three weak examples to support it.
First, I must assume the “prominent Arab ambassador” to whom you refer is the UAE ambassador whose remarks were highlighted and much-discussed on this very forum a few weeks ago. You’re free to reach whatever conclusions you like, of course, but my conclusion – shared by most others, I’m confident – is that he’d like the US to poke Iran at least hard enough for it to disclose much more about its nuclear program, but not to attack it.
Second, Egypt doesn’t have the right to exclude military ships from passing through the Suez Canal, and so the passage of Israeli navy ships through the Suez Canal indicates nothing at all about Egypt’s position on Iran. I’ll add something about this example: Not only is it weak, as other the other two, but I think you know full well that what I write here is true, and so I cannot help but conclude you are deliberately trying to mislead people.
Third, as to the “continuing rumors of Saudi Arabia giving Israel permission to overfly its airspace,” I’ll take your advice and remember that they are rumors.
Is that it? Any other examples of Arabs salivating for a US attack on Iran? I’ve heard this so often that I’d expected you to come up with better ones than you have.
colin campbell:
Do not underestimate Providence.
US has destroyed 2 of Iran’s enemies.
And Providence may yet not have completed his work.
WigWag quoates Admiral Mullen about expectation of Iranian non-conofrmance to “international norms”.
Last I looked, US had attacked 2 countries that were not her enemies and were not seeking war with her (Iraq, Yugoslavia) and had used her diplomatic outposts as vehicles for destablization of sovereign states (Guatemala, Iran, Chile).
hmm…. “international norms”?
Who’s delusional, Wigwag?
It seems that neither the US intelligence community nor the IAEA believe that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. And those are the folks who should know best.
It’s only the political types, those folks under the sway of wealthy Jewish campaign contributions, who assert that Iran has such a program.
So if sanctions fail to eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it will likely be because the Lobby has found ways to embed more malleable types, people who, like in the run up to Iraq, managed to “find” Saddam’s nukes.
Wigwag is the one who is willfully delusional.
Eric:
Generally speaking, the types of steps the US could take to prevent US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan from being vulnerable to Iranian reprisals would eliminate any element of surprise in the attack but would still leave the US exposed to significant losses.
If the US does pull out, it would change my calculations, but I don’t see that happening over the next several years.
But the idea of dispersing the troops into civilian areas would definitely not work.
Hillary Mann Leverett; delusional as usual!
Speaking of Netanyahu, she says
“And he’s shifting the onus…if and when sanctions fail, and he thinks they probably will fail, the only thing that can really stop the Iranians is the threat of U.S. military action. And I think he’s putting all these pieces in place.”
Perhaps she was too busy to notice that the CIA Director Panetta already agress with Netanyahu; the Israeli Prime Minster doesn’t need to “put pieces in place” when the Americans are already as convinced as he is that sanctions will fail. When asked on ABC’s “This Week” about the sanctions, the CIA Director said,
“Will it deter them (Iran) from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability? Probably not,”
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen echoed Panetta’s (and Netanyahu’s)remarks at a recent Aspen Security Forum. Mullen said there was “no reason to expect Iran to conform to international norms, given its past behavior,” but he declined to describe what measures the US was considering. He has often said that all options remain on the table.
And it seems that all the little voices inside of Hillary’s and Flynt’s head that keep whispering “Israel…,” “Israel…,” “Israel…” are once again drowing out the deafening messages coming out of the Sunni Arab world. Last week we had a prominent Arab Ambassador attending a U.S. conference practically inviting the United States to attack Iran. A few months back we had Egypt permitting Israeli navy ships (surface and submarine) which may have been carrying nuclear weapons to traverse the Suez Canal. And let’s not forget the continuing rumors of Saudi Arabia giving Israel permission to overfly its airspace to attack Iran.
Yet despite the chorus of Sunni Arab nations begging the United States to eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Hillary just can’t get Israel out of her mind.
Just as I said, she’s delusional as usual.
Thank you Joe Lieberman; Homeland Security Makes Americans More Secure
Public Law 110-429 US Naval Vessel Transfer Act and QME
off-topic
lately I notice a delay just before pages are loaded on rfi, as we make a detour to
http://www.google.com/analytics/
so what are we being targeted for? hopefully not the same kinda ads that enduring place was promoting!!!!
Arnold,
YOU WROTE TO HACK:
“I’ll also say that possibility [that the US will not attack Iran] will continue to be the most likely as long as there are 50,000 troops in Iraq or total 100,000 troops between Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Interesting point. But we must be hiring the wrong military commanders and politicians if they lack the imagination to handle the risks to American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are so many obvious steps, after all, and many attractive options beyond them. Send the family members and other “non-essentials” home. Concentrate our troops where we have adequate defense against air and ground attacks, disperse them among the civilian population where we don’t (and subtly inform US media outlets that “human shield” stories will be considered bad form until further notice). Save time and fuel by shifting Iraq/Afghanistan troops and equipment to the Iran-attack staging areas (I’m confident the Iraqis and Afghanis could survive without us for a while; most of them probably would send us off with a breezy pax vobiscum and encourage us not to hurry back). Keep enough troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to guard embassies, air bases and other key installations, and send the rest home. What more graceful and crowd-pleasing exit from Afghanistan and Iraq can you imagine than to protect our troops by bringing them home to a long-overdue hero’s-welcome parade? And how many Americans would later press Obama to send them back?
Maybe, of course, we’d end up sending back a lot of troops a few months later, after the “surgical strikes” on Iran had turned out not to end the matter as quickly and cleanly as we’d predicted, but most Americans would agree by then that we are finally fighting the “right” enemy. That should keep public opinion reasonably settled for another, say, 6 to 8 years, and then we could think about what to do next. Who knows – maybe Pakistan?
Fio:
No, I think the US positions in Iraq and Afghanistan prevent the US from starting a new war with Iran, meaning US planners understand that attacking Iran will cause deteriorations, and troop deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I think this is the specific reason Cheney was over-ruled by the military in his desire to attack Iran’s nuclear program in 2008. As long as substantial numbers of US troops are in Iraq and Afghanistan, I do not believe the US can launch a provocation against Iran.
Once the troops are gone, which will be, I’m guessing, sometime before 2020, but not before 2015, then Iran will no longer have that deterrent and will by then have to have a replacement response to a US provocation, since cutting off supply lines or increasing US troop deaths will no longer be an available response to a US attack.
Arnold, I don’t understand your logic or the language: “If US forces drop below 50,000″ and “Iran’s deterrents.” Do you believe Iran threatens aggression toward US forces or anybody in the region, that is only being tamped down by the presence of US troops?
Ok, ok Hack.
Out of your four possibilities, I see the one where Iran keeps enriching, sanctions continue and the United States does not bomb Iran as the most likely at least through 2012, or the end of this presidential term.
I’ll also say that possibility will continue to be the most likely as long as there are 50,000 troops in Iraq or total 100,000 troops between Iraq and Afghanistan. If the total in the two countries goes down under 50,000 – and more seriously under 20,000 – then I’ll be concerned about the state of Iran’s other deterrents.
Colin Campbell — this morning’s dose of MSM news reports that RICO statutes will be used to sue BP and its related corporations re Gulf well spill.
There are one million lawyers in the US.
It only takes a few of them to form the theory and gather the evidence that many of the groups forming the so-called Israel lobby in the US are a criminal conspiracy.
iirc, a RICO conviction enables treble punitive damages.
to repeat the punch line of my too-long argument in another thread, urging that groups such as Iran Task Force be held to account for disseminating hate speech, what is the downside of entangling the Israel lobby in law suits from now until their money runs out?
Isn’t the American justice system supposed to protect and defend the American people? The contract that citizens make with their government is that the people surrender prosecution and enforcement to their government, in exchange for defense of their requirements for equity and justice. If the government fails to keep its part of that contract, the people may take “justice” in their own hands.
@Rehmat
Victory?
@Richard Steven Hack
I think we’re all avoiding the question because we all know the answer. The only thing that will stop armed conflict with Iran is Providence. I’m not much of a believer in that.
I like Fiorangela’s question much better. I fear that our legal options will only continue to diminish. In every part of the Western World we see the rise of “big government”, and further degredation of citizens’ rights and freedoms. For the most part, individual populations seem to mostly buy into the “greater good” rhetoric. Which leaves us- Realists, Libertarians, Anarchists, Isolationists, etc.- more and more marginalized.
Where I’m from, the Government shut down Parliament to avoid dissent and the public supports them. It’s hard to envision an anti-war citizens assmebly with any clout in this kind of atmosphere.
silly Rehmat.
Collateral Damage.
I wonder what the American Zionist Jews would call the mass murder of innocent Iranian men, women and children as result of USrael nuclear attack – a Genocide or a Holocaust?
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/07/19/holocaust-vs-genocide/
oogede:
I agree with your assessment.
In fact, you can go further and say that UNSC could forward the Iranian File back to IAEA and go from there.
I think American Jews are right to be concerned about a US attack on Iran because “Israel is uncomfortable” with enrichment in Iran.
Already, in some circles, non-Jewish Americans have begun to question the motivations of Jews and their loyalty to America.
I am not saying it is fair, just something to keep in mind.
musing: the only Israeli leader to have been assassinated was the one who sought peace.
The question, dear Richard Stephen Hack, is what can we do to derail the “inevitable” genocidal scheme?
I suggest lawsuits.
The alternative is much bloodier.
Richard;
I believe that the reason no one wants to answer the question to #4 is because the outcome of an invasion of Iran will be so devastating for the U.S., Israel,the Middle East and the entire international community that one would have to agree that U.S. on behest of Israel will have to be insane to go down this path.
I myself agree with you that the only viable alternative left after sanctions prove to be ineffective will be option #4. However, I have a hard time accepting that the U.S. will take an action which will bring about its own demize and plung the rest of the world in a long period of darkness both politically and economically.
I believe the U.S. will rather use methods to create civil unrest in Iran, using all possible groups including terrorist organizations (i.e. Jundallah, MEK, PJAK etc..) in order to bring about total chaos within Iran. Once the Islamic Republic is weakened, isolated, economically unable to address domestic issues then it will send in the troops for the final act – regime change with a U.S. puppet. However, the problem with the U.S. and Iran will not end. Iranians will never accept another U.S. puppet. Once again another Iranian nationalist group will rise up challenging the U.S./Israel.
Once again, no one here addresses the real issue.
Pick one of the four outcomes! There are only four! And three of them are quite frankly NOT going to happen, in the real world. Iran will NOT give up enrichment, Obama will NOT make a “Grand Bargain” because of the political consequences, and the US and Israel will not just accept Iranian enrichment and “kick the can down the road”! How LONG can you kick the can down the road and NOT end up looking like an idiot when there is no Iranian bomb?
Just saying that, well, things will change over the next few years means absolutely nothing. There are only four outcomes. Pick one and defend it!
Instead, everyone here just dithers about with non-answers. Answer the damn questions! Which outcome do you predict, and if you don’t believe any of them except the status quo, HOW LONG do you think the status quo can be continued before it becomes ridiculous?
Kooshy: After option 4, what happens next I and many others have already described. The probable outcome: a long war the US loses after devastating Iran and causing millions of Iranian casualties and thousands of US casualties and more hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars wasted and the US (and possibly the world) economy also devastated.
My predictions for the next couple of years…
Over the next 2 years most western govts will be dealing with street demonstrations over austerity measures, high unemployment, and the high death rate of allied troops in afghanistan. Mubarak of Egypt is probably dead, and the saudis are going through a succession crisis. netanyahu might still be in govt with a smaller majority, or minority govt depending on Labor, or Israel will be choosing its next govt.
A western intelligence report will acknowledge the negetive impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy, and push the ball further down the road. Iran’s black economy will grow, making it harder for western intelligence to determine the real impact of sanctions on the nuclear issue.
Iran meanwhile will continue to demonstrate some high profile military, technological ability for example, putting satellites in space, building or obtaining an s-300-like air defense missile system, building submarines and anti-access military platforms, thereby making the cost of military action seem even more prohibitive. Meanwhile Israeli/Turkish relations remain in the dumps with all that implies. And the security situation in Iraq worsens.
Into this mix will a military attack on Iran happen? I doubt it.
Richard Steven Hack
“We need to extend the discussion a little further. Always ask the NEXT question!”
“Why won’t ANYONE ask the question: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
I’ll tell you why. Because no one wants to ANSWER that question. Because there are only four possible outcomes, in order of ascending likelihood:”
“4) War. This is the INEVITABLE end of a cycle of sanctions and belligerence over a non-existent crisis. This was the case in Afghanistan, this was the case in Iraq, and it requires a massive amount of cognitive dissonance to not see the same result with Iran.”
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT!?
Gregory Stanton, professor of Human Rights at University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, VA, has studied genocide extensively, participated in reconciliation projects in the aftermath of genocides in Africa and Asia, and founded Genocide Watch.
Stanton devised the Eight Stages of Genocide rubric, which he describes as follows:
“Genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable. At each stage, preventive measures can stop it. The process is not linear. Logically, later stages must be preceded by earlier stages. But all stages continue to operate throughout the process.
1. CLASSIFICATION: All cultures have categories to distinguish people into “us and them” by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide.
2. SYMBOLIZATION: We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We name people “Jews” or “Gypsies”, or distinguish them by colors or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups. Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily result in genocide unless they lead to the next stage, dehumanization. When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups: the yellow star for Jews under Nazi rule, the blue scarf for people from the Eastern Zone in Khmer Rouge Cambodia.
To combat symbolization, hate symbols can be legally forbidden (swastikas) as can ***hate speech.***
3. DEHUMANIZATION: One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. In combating this dehumanization, incitement to genocide should not be confused with protected speech. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech, and should be treated differently than democracies. Local and international leaders should condemn the use of hate speech and make it culturally unacceptable. Leaders who incite genocide should be banned from international travel and have their foreign finances frozen. Hate radio stations should be shut down, and hate propaganda banned. Hate crimes and atrocities should be promptly punished.
4. ORGANIZATION: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility (the Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal (Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants) or decentralized (terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are often trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings. To combat this stage, membership in these militias should be outlawed. Their leaders should be denied visas for foreign travel. The U.N. should impose arms embargoes on governments and citizens of countries involved in genocidal massacres, and create commissions to investigate violations, as was done in post-genocide Rwanda.
5. POLARIZATION: Extremists drive the groups apart. ***Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda.*** Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating and silencing the center. Moderates from the perpetrators’ own group are most able to stop genocide, so are the first to be arrested and killed. Prevention may mean security protection for moderate leaders or assistance to human rights groups. Assets of extremists may be seized, and visas for international travel denied to them. Coups d’état by extremists should be opposed by international sanctions.
6. PREPARATION: Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. Their property is expropriated. They are often segregated into ghettoes, deported into concentration camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and ***starved.*** At this stage, a Genocide Emergency must be declared. If the political will of the great powers, regional alliances, or the U.N. Security Council can be mobilized, armed international intervention should be prepared, or heavy assistance provided to the victim group to prepare for its self-defense. Otherwise, at least humanitarian assistance should be organized by the U.N. and private relief groups for the inevitable tide of refugees to come.
7. EXTERMINATION begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called “genocide.” It is “extermination” to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with militias to do the killing. Sometimes the genocide results in revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the downward whirlpool-like cycle of bilateral genocide (as in Burundi). At this stage, only rapid and overwhelming armed intervention can stop genocide. Real safe areas or refugee escape corridors should be established with heavily armed international protection. (An unsafe “safe” area is worse than none at all.) The U.N. Standing High Readiness Brigade, EU Rapid Response Force, or regional forces — should be authorized to act by the U.N. Security Council if the genocide is small. For larger interventions, a multilateral force authorized by the U.N. should intervene. If the U.N. is paralyzed, regional alliances must act. ***It is time to recognize that the international responsibility to protect transcends the narrow interests of individual nation states.*** If strong nations will not provide troops to intervene directly, they should provide the airlift, equipment, and financial means necessary for regional states to intervene.
8. DENIAL is the eighth stage that always follows a genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile. There they remain with impunity, like Pol Pot or Idi Amin, unless they are captured and a tribunal is established to try them. The response to denial is punishment by an international tribunal or national courts. There the evidence can be heard, and the perpetrators punished. Tribunals like the Yugoslav or Rwanda Tribunals, or an international tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or an International Criminal Court may not deter the worst genocidal killers. But with the political will to arrest and prosecute them, some may be brought to justice.”
Dr. Stanton spoke at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center in 2008. As you might suspect from the examples above, his experience is mainly with African genocides; for historical perspective, he draws heavily on analogies to Jewish experience in Europe in the 20th century.
At the 61-minute point of Stanton’s 67 minute talk, he was asked by a member of the audience who identified himself as a Palestinian who had been driven from his home by Israelis in 1948, to comment on the situation in Israel. Stanton’s response was extremely troubling.
Dr. Stanton stated that his organization had discussed the Israel-Palestine conflict and had a difficult time reaching a consensus. He said that while it was possible to identify some activities in Israel as genocidal massacres, he did not believe that Israel intended to commit genocide on the Palestinian people, nor did the Palestinians intend to commit genocide on Israelis.
However, Stanton continued, he did find reason to be concerned about genocidal intent on the part of Iran, since Ahmadinejad had made statements about causing Israel’s government to disappear, and ballistic missiles in Iran had anti-Israel messages painted on them. He repeated that those markers were very troubling signs of the possibility of genocide. In closing, Stanton did remark that the Middle East is not his area of expertise.
I respectfully suggest that Dr. Stanton is pointing his worry in the wrong direction. In order to continue to serve the cause of preventing genocide, it is important that Dr. Stanton inform himself of the valences in the Israel-Palestine-Iran interrelationship.
Among his numerous academic accomplishments, Dr. Stanton has a degree in divinity; it is not unlikely that he hears “Israel” and thinks of the great religious traditions of the Jewish people. Zionism, much less Likudnik zionism, is NOT a part of that tradition. As Dr. Hillary Leverett has cautioned, the actions of Likudnik zionism may cause more harm to Jews in the United States and in Israel than could any action of Iran.
I would suggest to Dr. Stanton that he study the brand of zionism that was taught by Jabotinsky; Prof. Ian Lustick of University of Pennsylvania presented a succinct overview of Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall doctrine in this video: www dot edmaysproductions dot net/webvideo/irannuke.wmv
Finally, Dr. Stanton could not find a better source for sound information on the Iran-US-Israel-Palestine complex than Raceforiran.com.
There is no need to list 4 possibilities, Richard. 4 is the only one to discuss. Engagement has been a ruse. The rising belligerence says it all. The purpose of the sanctions is clearly to weaken Iran militarily, and to foster social and political breakdown and factionalization in Iran, and to isolate Iran internationally, in preparation for Regime Change almost certainly involving US/Israel military action; so the timetable for war depends not on seeing how the sanctions play out, but rather on considerations as to what will be the best combination of political and military circumstances for Regime Change. In other words, when the Regime Change happens is about when the plum will be ripe for picking.
And what’s fascinating to observe in all of this is that the UN Security Council has been turned into a means to bring about war, instead of a means to prevent war, and that this never seems to be a concern expressed even by those who question the drive to war, nevermind any ethical issues (such as aggressive war is the root of all international evils, and just plain wrong in just about every possible way that has anything to do with morality or ethics).
I don’t see Israel as having any leverage over the US that would allow it to force a US war with Iran.
The question, to the degree there is a question, is will the US reduce its vulnerabilities especially in Iraq and Afghanistan enough that the losses Iran could cause there have been reduced to an acceptable range.
Iran does have plan its deterrent structure in a post Iraq/Afghanistan world. Until the troop level has gone down, even beyond 50,000 that is planned as a long-term arrangement in Iraq for now, I don’t think there is a real threat of a US attack on Iran, and I don’t think there, under nearly any circumstances, is a threat of an Israeli attack on Iran.
YES “through the US” – otherwise, Zionist army showed us their ‘military capabilities’ during their 34-day invasion of Lebanon.
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2010/07/06/how-to-destroy-hizbullah-and-hamas/
We need to extend the discussion a little further. Always ask the NEXT question!
So Obama brings the Israelis into the planning for the attack on Iran – supposedly in order to prevent Israel from going it alone.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu is revealed to be a liar about the Oslo Accords and so forth in nine year old video released in the last day or so. So why does Obama believe him NOW?
The next question which must be asked – and isn’t being asked is – WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
Obama plays out his little sanctions game over the next year. Israel and the neocons keep up their PR campaign which has already convinced most Americans according to polls that Israel should attack Iran or the US should.
So twelve or eighteen months rolls around, and what happens NEXT?
So maybe Obama says, “well, let’s give sanctions more time, OR let’s have MORE sanctions. We won’t do anything until after the 2012 elections.”
OK – NOW WHAT? Obama wins a second term, or he doesn’t and maybe a Republican gets in.
What happens NEXT?
Does Obama or the next President dither for another four years? Another two terms, eight years?
Does Israel go along with this?
Why won’t ANYONE ask the question: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
I’ll tell you why. Because no one wants to ANSWER that question. Because there are only four possible outcomes, in order of ascending likelihood:
1) Iran suspends enrichment unilaterally or as a result of sanctions. Good luck with that! If Iran wants energy in the future, it has to have a nuclear energy program. And if Iran wants control of that program, it has to master and use the full fuel cycle. Which means it HAS to have a “nuclear breakout” capability.
2) Obama (or the next President) makes a “Grand Bargain” with Iran, which results in Iran suspending enrichment. Good luck with that! Anybody here see Israel going for that? Even if Iran recognizes Israel’s right to exist, ceases to support Hizballah, and suspends enrichment, Iran is STILL a geopolitical threat to Israel’s intentions to dominate the Middle East. There is NO WAY Israel is going to go along with ANY “Grand Bargain”.
3) Obama AND Israel “blink” and accept Iranian enrichment. Crisis defuses. Anybody here see Israel going for that? Why would they? What have they got to lose by sabotaging that with their own attack on Iran? Does anybody think ANY sitting Democratic US President is doing to totally defy the Israel Lobby AND the Republican heat that would come down on him if he does this (OR a “Grand Bargain”)? Really? You really believe that?
4) War. This is the INEVITABLE end of a cycle of sanctions and belligerence over a non-existent crisis. This was the case in Afghanistan, this was the case in Iraq, and it requires a massive amount of cognitive dissonance to not see the same result with Iran.