Thanks. I think Flynt and Hillary’s piece was especially valuable because it clearly explained just how short of these isotopes the world is. Iran’s making them would be good for all of us, not just Iran.

Flynt and Hillary’s piece also made me recognize that my earlier suggestion — that Iran proceed as it has been but be prepared just to purchase isotopes if the opportunity actually arises — was not the right approach, at least in the long-term. That suggestion still is the best course for Iran, I believe, if it’s just limited to fuel plates rather than the isotopes themselves — i.e. Iran could offer to swap its 20% fuel (not just LEU) for 20% fuel plates. In the very short-term, Iran might also agree to buy isotopes (assuming they’re really offered), but it would need to be very careful that the US not get away with what it almost certainly would try to get away with in that event: an insistence that Iran do the same thing in the future. If I were Iran, I’d be quite concerned that buying isotopes this time, and then insisting on making its own next time, would be (loudly) mischaracterized by the US as very suspicious behavior.

One way or another, Iran has to preserve its long-term practical ability to keep running its TRR to make its own isotopes. There is simply no way to stockpile them, and that means there is no way to assure supply other than by making them itself.

I think it was Jon Harrison who made this point — the contributions of everyone on this site really do help to sharpen one’s thinking about these issues.

Also, I think Iranian scientists have invested a lot of time, brainpower and money in developing these isotope production techniques, right at a time when the world is desperate for more of them. It just looks petty to try to take it all away, not to mention cutting off your nose to spite your face. In any case, it would be very short-sighted because sooner or later Iran will be fuelling the TRR themselves if we don’t agree to help them.

“I do not think that they are able to enrich to 20% without destroying their centrifuges in Natanz.”

What difference does it make whether the centrifuge is running, say, .7% uranium or, say, 10% uranium? It’s all in a hexafluoride gas form either way, isn’t it? If anything, I would think the higher concentration would be easier on the centrifuges since it contains more U-235, less U-238, so it’s marginally lighter.

Cyrus, what has been further enriched is minimal amounts. The problem of manufacturing the fuel rods persists. They are bluffing.

1. The “transport delay” argument strikes me as correct but not strong.

This argument is that, because medical radioisotopes have such a short half-life, requiring Iran to purchase them from foreign sources is wasteful and expensive because half of what it buys will have decayed by the time they can be transported to Iran for use. All true, but apparently overstated, and not likely to persuade the West even if it is not. According to the ArmsControlWonk piece, the Technetium-99m (99mTc) actually used for medical diagnostics has a 6-hour half-life. But molybdenum 99 (99Mo), the more stable material that effectively “warehouses” the 99mTc while it is being transported or stored, has a half-life ten times as long – 60 hours. So if a hospital in, say, Mashhad, needs medical radioisotopes, it’s maybe a 5-hour plane flight from a Russian reactor, compared to a one-hour flight from Tehran. Still some waste, to be sure, but not significant. If this “transport delay” concern were really that big a deal, after all, there probably would be a reactor in Japan to make medical radioisotopes. It’s a very long flight to Tokyo from any of the world’s six reactors (in Europe, Canada and South Africa) that make medical radioisotopes. The US undoubtedly would raise this “If it’s good enough for Japan…” counter-argument if the “transport delay” argument were pressed very hard.

2. The “It would save Iran money” argument strikes me as correct but not worth making.

This argument, in a nutshell, is that it would be less expensive for Iran to produce its own medical radioisotopes, and the fuel used to run the reactor that makes them, than it would be for Iran to buy from foreign sources – in part because of the “transport delay” factor discussed above, but for several other reasons as well. Again, probably true, but I confidently predict the Western reaction to this argument essentially will be “Are you kidding, or what?” I can just imagine a Monday morning meeting at the State Department: “OK, now I need a volunteer to go up to the Hill and explain to some Senate staffers that we should let Iran refine uranium to 4 times its present purity so that it can use the stuff to run a reactor that makes medical radioisotopes because that will save Iran a few million bucks a year. Volunteers? Nobody? Bill, how about you? Come on – you’re due to retire in a few months anyway.” In other words, a wonderful argument but either (1) Iran gets to make the decision, in which case it doesn’t need to make this argument or any other argument; or (2) Iran doesn’t get to make the decision, in which case whoever presents this argument to the decision-makers will not get halfway through the first sentence before his audience bursts into uncontrollable laughter.

This does not mean, of course, that this “money-saving” argument (and the “transport delay” argument that is really part of this larger “money-saving” argument) should not be taken into account by Iran itself if Iran decides, as I think it should, to press forward with domestic production of medical radioisotopes for the more compelling reasons discussed below.

3. The “dependable supply” argument strikes me as compelling because of the short half-life of Molybdenum 99, and so Iran, long-term, should do all it can to avoid the “buy foreign” alternative.

Though short-term tactical considerations might require purchasing medical radioisotopes from foreign sources, I can see after reading the ArmsControlWonk piece that Iran really has no long-term choice but to press forward with its program to produce medical radioisotopes domestically. While the “transport delay” argument may be less strong than some believe (because 99Mo’s half-life is long enough that a longer plane flight won’t matter all that much), a 60-hour half-life nevertheless is far too short to permit any “stockpiling” of medical radioisotopes in Iran. The time span between the making of a medical radioisotope and the use of that medical radioisotope is inevitably short, and so Iran must control that time span. If Iran must call up, say, Russia, and order some medical radioisotopes, it must count on Russia being in a good mood that day. If Russia is not, and no other supplier of medical radioisotopes is in a good mood that day either, Iran will be out of luck. It can’t avoid this problem by stocking up well in advance, since the medical radioisotopes would decay quickly while sitting on the shelf in Iran. Iran can avoid the problem only by controlling the timing of when those medical radioisotopes are made, and it can only control that timing if it is making them itself. (The same argument applies to the 20% fuel used to run the reactors that produce the medical radioisotopes, though the argument is not quite so forceful in that context because the reactor fuel has a much longer half-life than 99Mo, so some “stockpiling” might be feasible.)

The rough equivalent in the petroleum world would be this. Assume that (1) the US is about to run out of gasoline, its strategic petroleum reserve consists of three quarts of motor oil and a half-empty can of lighter fluid, and it has no facility that can produce gasoline from crude; (2) it wouldn’t help even if the US’ gasoline reserves were a thousand times greater because gasoline decays and becomes useless within a matter of days or weeks; (3) the few suppliers of gasoline to the US include several countries that have been saying nasty things about the US lately; and (4) the US does not have the military power to blow those suppliers back to the Stone Age if they even think about turning off the tap – in fact, those suppliers, or their friends, could instead do that to the US, on a moment’s notice. Would the US feel that its supply of gasoline was secure merely because its suppliers were saying “Don’t worry; you can always buy it from us.”?

That’s essentially Iran’s situation with respect to medical radioisotopes. Thus, while short-term diplomatic bobbing and weaving may call for Iran to purchase medical radioisotopes from foreign sources, it cannot afford to let purchasing become a permanent substitute for domestic production of medical radioisotopes. It’s got to make its own medical radioisotopes so that it controls the time span between making and use; the “half-life clock” ticks very fast during that time frame.

This means that Iran should (1) continue to refine uranium up to 20%; (2) continue to develop the capability to make its own fuel plates for the TRR; and (3) if and when it strikes some near-term deal to buy medical radioisotopes from foreign sources (which might require that it swap or sell some or all of the 20% fuel it’s refined in the meantime), make clear that it nonetheless intends to press on with its domestic program to refine uranium, make fuel plates and manufacture its own medical radioisotopes (which, it should add, it will be glad to sell to others as well).

Needless to say, that will not be well-received by Western countries, but Iran has little choice but to hold firm on this.

The truth is that our media, which is supposed to be the “watchdog” over government, proved that it cannot be relied upon to be objective, and despite the rather weak mea culpa by the NY Times, nothing has changed since the Iraq invasion build-up. And, our Congress proved to be totally ineffectual in stopping the rush to war in Iraq too, despite the notion that it was supposed to act as a check on the Executive. Our judicial branch has thus far failed to check the executive too, what with legalized torture and “military commisions” which use “secret evidence” that defense lawyers aren’t allowed to see, tortured confessions, etc. And our vaunted “The People” have shown that they can be easily misled too (how many STILL think that IRaq had a role in 9/11?) Our academic elite commentators (Leveretts excepted) are just talking head, mostly pushing the agendas of their paymasters at their think-tanks (lobby groups.)

So basically, what’s left of our system of Democracy that actually works? When push came to shove, all of the theories about how democracies function fell flat. Hate to say it but our democracy has shown itself to be a farce.

That said, the sourcing of isotopes from abroad TODAY is a bit murky, as is the actual production at the TRR. This is a quote from Soltanieh on PressTV on Feb 23:

“They were importing the radioisotopes when I was director of the center. There were many times when they did not send the radioisotopes to Iran on the right time. Many hospitals were waiting and we had difficult conditions. I am happy to say that we are producing radioisotopes for our people for the last 10 years or so and we are not importing any more.”

This conflicts with the ACW report, but I don’t know whether Soltanieh would necessarily know whether ALL isotopes used were made in Iran or not. If we’re talking about a supply of $500,000 a year, it is peanuts, and could conceivably be organised through Iranian pharmaceutical distribution companies with hospital contracts sourcing from Europe.

On whether the TRR is currently making isotopes, it appears that Iranian scientists have come up with and implemented new proprietary methods for producing isotopes over the years (I have seen references from 2003 and 2007). The latest appears to have been published this month in Nuclear Technology, entitled “Industrial-Scale Production of 99mTc Generators for Clinical Use Based on Zirconium Molybdate Gel”.

This I think is the method referred to in various IAEA documents that refer to Iran wanting to start a NEW isotope production technique, and may have resulted in some confusion over whether or not Iran was currently making isotopes using other techniques, which they are, but won’t be able to beyond the end of 2010.

The TRR instillation today is very different from what it was 40 years ago. It is much larger and highly developed. In addition, your claim that their “enriched LEU is contaminated” has not been stated in any of the IAEA reports.