Recently, there has been a torrent of high-profile calls for military strikes—either by the United States or by Israel—against Iranian nuclear targets. Amid this push for war with Iran, no one is asking—much less answering—what we believe is a critical and fundamental question: What, exactly, would be the legal basis for attacking the Islamic Republic?
While the legal basis for America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 was clearly inadequate, there were at least some legal authorities—Security Council resolutions, etc.—that could be (mis)interpreted and stitched together by clever lawyers to make a case for war, even if large parts of the world did not accept that case. (Once Saddam had been overthrown, America’s European partners—even those that had opposed and questioned the legitimacy of the invasion—focused on getting a United Nations Security Council resolution in place to legitimate the post-Saddam occupation, so that we could all move beyond the previous unpleasantness.)
But, in the case of Iran, there will be no legal justification for an attack. All of the relevant Security Council resolutions dealing with the nuclear issue say explicitly that they do not authorize the use of force against the Islamic Republic and that such authorization would require further and separate action by the Council. That action will not be forthcoming. And while, no doubt, the U.S. government has lawyers at the State Department, Pentagon, and the National Security Council who would do their best to come up with a self-defense case under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, literally no one—even advocates of attacking Iran—will be able to take that case seriously. There will be no casus belli.
As we wrote in May, see here, “a proper assessment of Iranian military capabilities should put to rest the constantly recycled, hyperbolic rhetoric in the United States and some quarters of the Middle East about the Iranian ‘threat’ to peace and security. Iranians correctly point out that their country has not invaded any of its neighbors for centuries—and, since 1979, they have not developed the military capabilities that would let them carry out large-scale offensive operations”. In the end, we will be attacking Iran because it is enriching uranium.
We have written previously, see here, about the immediate costs of strikes against Iranian nuclear targets on America’s strategic position in the Middle East. But the United States would also pay a heavy price in terms of international legitimacy. This matters, because legitimacy is a critical factor influencing how others view America’s still prominent role in international affairs.
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the United States, under Democratic and Republican administrations, has presented itself to the world as a uniquely benign hegemon—a superpower that other important states did not need to fear. That image was called profoundly into question with the invasion of Iraq. Launching an illegitimate war of aggression against the Islamic Republic—a war that would have deeply negative consequences for virtually everyone else in the international system—would have a much more strategically consequential impact on international perceptions of the United States than the Iraq war did. Other important states would almost certainly determine that using non-military means to constrain such a dysfunctional hegemonic power need to become a much higher and more explicit goal of their foreign policies. As we also wrote in May,
“[A]ny wars that the United States chooses to fight in the Middle East in the future will be fought on borrowed money—money borrowed from creditors like China and Saudi Arabia that will not be amused by Washington undertaking a military initiative that would be so harmful to their own interests. Starting a war with Iran would “break the back” of America’s increasingly strained superpower status—just as surely as the British mistake of invading Egypt and seizing the Suez Canal in 1956 (with help from France and Israel, to be sure) forever ended the United Kingdom’s claims to great power status.”
There is a historical precedent which Iran hawks would do well to consider—the Cuban missile crisis. In October 1962, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers were not facing a perfectly legal civilian nuclear program in a country that had no nuclear weapons but did have tense relations with the United States, with some highly questionable and certainly inconclusive intelligence suggesting that the country in question might, at some point, have thought about some of the engineering challenges it would need to solve if it ever wanted to build nuclear weapons at some point in the future. No, in October 1962, the Kennedy Administration had hard, photographic evidence that the Soviet Union—a nuclear superpower that had had the bomb since 1949—had deployed nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba, thereby obviating the elaborate systems built up by the United States to provide early-warning of a nuclear attack.
The arrival of this intelligence catalyzed 13 days of intense debate among President Kennedy’s closest advisers, convened in an ad hoc “Executive Committee” (ExCom) of the National Security Council. During the ExCom’s deliberations, some of the most imposing figures in the Kennedy Administration urged the President to order preventive strikes against the Soviet missiles in Cuba; America’s senior military leadership recommended strikes coupled with a full-scale invasion of Cuba.
As these arguments garnered momentum, the President’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, pushed back hard. In what Robert Kennedy’s biographer Evan Thomas rightly describes as “testy exchanges” with former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who had been asked to join the ExCom’s deliberations by the President), the Attorney General used international law to draw a clear red line, making it clear that “My brother is not going to be the Tojo of the ‘60s”. [Note: The reference is to Hideki Tojo, the Japanese Prime Minister who presided over the surprise attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii in December 1941.] For the United States to strike the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba in a similar surprise strike would, Robert Kennedy argued, be a “Pearl Harbor in reverse”.
In the end, President Kennedy took care to ensure that all of his major decisions during the Cuban missile crisis plausibly conformed to the requirements of international law. Critically, the naval “quarantine” of Cuba announced by President Kennedy as the crisis headed toward its climax was endorsed by a unanimous vote of the Organization of American States, under the hemispheric defense provisions of the Rio Treaty. The policy choices made by President Kennedy—including his willingness to “swap” the Soviet missiles in Cuba for aging U.S. missiles forward deployed in Turkey and to abandon the pursuit of coercive regime change in Havana—resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba while avoiding direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Kennedy’s refusal to be pushed into aggressive military action against Soviet missiles in Cuba was indispensable to this outcome.
We concur with the judgment on President Kennedy’s handling of the Cuban missile crisis offered President Obama’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, see here, who wrote in 2008, before returning to government service,
“If [the United States had attacked and recent scholarship on Soviet decision-making at the time is correct], Cuba and the Soviet Union would have fought back, perhaps launching some of the missiles already in place. One can only conclude that our nation was extremely fortunate to have had John F. Kennedy as president in October 1962. Like all presidents, he made his share of mistakes, but when the stakes were the highest imaginable, he rose to the occasion like no other president in the last 60 years—defining his goal clearly and then, against the demands of hawks within his administration, searching skillfully for a peaceful way to achieve it.”
Fifty years from now, will a reviewer be able to write anything nearly as laudatory about President Obama’s handling of U.S. relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran?
Today’s Iran hawks would also do well to consider another powerful precedent from the Kennedy era: President Kennedy’s commencement address at American University in Washington, DC, delivered in June 1963—eight months after the Cuban missile crisis and just five months before Kennedy’s assassination. This speech is rightly remembered as the occasion for Kennedy’s announcement of negotiations aimed at producing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—a goal, sadly, that still eludes the international community. (Kennedy, it should be noted, also provided critical impetus for the diplomatic discussions that would lead to promulgation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—the same treaty that remains today the only appropriate legal framework for dealing with international controversies regarding the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities.) But many passages from the speech seem highly relevant to current debates in the United States about how to deal with Iran:
“Some say that it is useless to speak of peace or world law or world disarmament, and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitudes, as individuals and as a Nation, for our attitude is as essential as theirs…[E]very thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward, by examining his own attitude towards the possibilities of peace, towards the Soviet Union, towards the course of the cold war and towards freedom and peace here at home…
First examine our attitude towards peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable, that mankind is doomed, that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade; therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man’s reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable, and we believe they can do it again. I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of universal peace and good will of which some fantasies and fanatics dream…
Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned…With such a peace, there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor, it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever…
And second, let us reexamine our attitude towards the Soviet Union…No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue…[L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal…
[Also, l]et us reexamine our attitude towards the cold war, remembering we’re not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points…[A]bove all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world…
The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we must labor on—not towards a strategy of annihilation but towards a strategy of peace.”
Unfortunately, the world learned in 2003 that the United States will sometimes start a war. Now is the time for Americans to remind themselves that it is never in the interests of the United States to do so. There is a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue—particularly if the United States is willing to trade acceptance of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil for tighter international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities and abandon the pursuit of coercive regime change in Tehran. Will President Obama “rise to the occasion” as President Kennedy did?
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Joshua Holland is warning that the Obama administration may be trying to please the neocon warmongers by falsifying the upcoming NIE on Iran, to make it appear Iran poses a threat due to its supposed nuclear programme, when this is not the opinion of the CIA. see alternet.org today. (Link on latest Leverett site posting)
Masoud,
Extreme ignorance about the Middle East is a pronounced characteristic of most Americans, and most Canadians but perhaps to a lesser degree. But deceptive news stories would not be planted so frequently in the North American newspapers if public opinion were not so important. The Israel lobby is strong in both countries. By contrast, the Cuban lobby in the US is strong, but not a factor in Canadian politics (for obvious reasons).
Eric,
Are you planning to at some point respond to my post at
July 27, 2010 at 2:52 pm, or can I consider this discussion as over?
Castellio,
“The decision NOT to go into Iraq has been consistently supported since, and has had an impact on the desire for Canadians to get out of Afghanistan.”
That’s a lie and I beleive you know it. Most Canadians don’t give a damn how many Afghans their government kills, and you won’t find any criticism of that war in any Canadian media. The only national party, the NDP, to support withdrawal is still hovering in third or fourth place, and the current leader of the Liberals is an Ivory tower hawk who argued passionately for the Iraq war, which is largely why he staged a coup to cancel the planned ndp-liberal coalition. At least two set dates for Canadian withdrawal from Afghanistan have come and gone, with no consequence. Canada’s got a fruit basket of a political system which is even more structurally dysfunctional than America’s, it’s just that it’s people are too dumb to care or do anything about it.
Masoud
Castellio,
What retards ‘resistance to immoral policies’ is naivety wielded by a people who are ‘dumb as fuck’.
The majority of Americans who believed, and still do, that Saddam was behind 911–dumb as f**k.
The majority of British who believed the ‘dodgy dossier’ which alleged that Saddam could launch a WMD attack on them within 40 minutes–dumb as f**.
The majority of Canadians who like to brag that their country ‘did not support’ the Iraq war, even though the US could not have freed enough troops for that operation if Canada had not purposefully escalated it’s deployment in Afghanistan for that very purpose–dumb as f**k.
It would be a mistake for anyone to believe that these populations could be reasoned with or otherwise convinced to make their leaders act in any kind of sane or moral fashion. Their just too dumb for that. End of story. Whether or not that hurts your feelings is entirely irrelevant.
Masoud
Arnold: “Eric says that Iran implementing the Additional Protocols would cause the US to accept Iran having the nuclear capabilities Japan has. But he also says the US would never allow Iran to have as much ambiguity as Japan has and would attack it first. I’m not sure these can be reconciled.”
Well, I think he’s never said – but perhaps has implied – the first sentence. All he has really said is that he thinks Iran implementing the AP would “calm the waters” – whatever the hell that means in the real world. He’s never said for HOW LONG would it “calm the waters”, or what would come NEXT? Or why the Iranians acceptance of the Turkey-Brazil deal – which he has studiously ignored – didn’t “calm the waters”.
In other words, he’s being deliberately vague because he has no legitimate argument. He has some sort of hidden agenda, but I can’t tell whether he’s pro-Israel or just full of cognitive dissonance about an Iran war.
Or he just likes to argue for the sake of arguing. A LOT of people are like that.
Arnold: “The question “should the US double its rate of losses in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to prevent Iran from having technology that would make it capable of building a weapon if it left the NPT” is a better question.”
A better question: “Should the US double – or quadruple – its costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – and hence double or quadruple the amount of taxpayer dollars going to war versus domestic spending – in order to prevent Iran from obtaining technology that could make it capable of building a nuclear weapon if it left the NPT”?
A lot of Americans don’t have relatives in the military. But most pay taxes. If the US electorate knew that an Iran war would probably cost two to four times or more the cost of the extant wars, I think the US electorate would say to hell with that, in preference to domestic spending. Especially if it was made clear that an Iranian bomb couldn’t threaten the US in any way even if Iran had one, and couldn’t really even threaten Israel, given Israel’s second strike capability.
Arnold: “I find the issue of disclosures the most humorous issue on this topic because Eric literally pretends he cannot read when I point out the costs disclosure would impose on Iran in the current environment. He’ll respond later. He won’t respond any more. He’ll repeat his older assertions that have already been responded to. But at no point will we get, ‘information Iran discloses could be used by the US to harm Iran’s nuclear program.’”
I find it less amusing than irritating. It’s becoming almost troll-like.
I personally don’t find the idea that Iran’s adopting the AP would actually impose any more costs on Iran to be persuasive. That is, Iran already KNOWS the US is full of it. So I think the reason Iran does not currently adopt the NPT is because it already KNOWS it doesn’t matter, therefore why subject its nuclear program to any further intrusions (although you are correct that Iran has to worry about US intelligence, just as Saddam did – justifiably when it was discovered UNSCOM inspectors WERE passing Iraqi info to the CIA).
More importantly, Iran is operating on a quid pro quo basis – give us something, we’ll give you something. But the US is a bully, not a negotiator. So Iran simply said, “OK, screw us once, shame on you. Screw us twice, shame on us.” So they withdrew from the AP and continue to do so. Brill wants them to say, “Screw us any number of times, no shame, no blame.” Why? Because he has this fantasy that the US is NOT interested in regime chance, is NOT interested in attacking Iran, is NOT interested in suppressing Iran in favor of Israel, etc. He can’t point to any reasons for this belief system, it’s just there. OR he doesn’t WANT to point to his reasons for this belief system.
Either he’s closet Zionist who wants to see Iran suppressed in favor of Israel, or he’s just loaded with cognitive dissonance about what the results of an Iran war would be, and therefore can only believe that Iran must comply with any amount of nonsense from the US in order to avoid it.
Either way, we’re not going to get anywhere discussing it with him. He’s impervious. I’m beginning to feel like I’m attached to a Tar Baby.
Mr. Brill’s argument get more and more fanciful:
“Arnold and those who agree with him say the US must live with the bargain they’ve struck. Iran has every right to build “fuel free” nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them, and then withdraw from the NPT, insert the fuel and launch the bomb. Arnold doesn’t necessarily recommend that Iran push it that far, but he believes Iran should establish the same useful ambiguity that Japan has achieved (though without making any of the additional disclosures that Japan makes).”
Complete ruminant evacuation. While I personally believe Iran’s leadership has no desire for nuclear weapons at all (and in fact, even if attacked, wouldn’t bother developing them even if they could under wartime conditions), the issue is not whether Iran, Japan OR Brazil WANT a “Japan option”, the fact is that the NPT AS WRITTEN AND IMPLEMENTED ALLOWS FOR the “Japan option”. The Additional Protocol was designed and implemented to improve the detection of a nuclear weapons program BEFORE any nation, such as North Korea, could withdraw from the NPT and manufacture nuclear weapons. But the NPT was never designed or intended to PHYSICALLY PREVENT ANY nation from developing and deploying nuclear weapons, which is proved by the cases of Israel, India and Pakistan. It was intended as an “alerting mechanism” to enable the international community to intervene diplomatically and under international law in the case where a nation developing nuclear power decided to make nuclear weapons. Its only “enforcement” mechanism is the ability to refer a country’s case to the UNSC in the event the country in question violates its obligations under the treaty. The UNSC in turn really can’t authorize any actual physical enforcement of the treaty short of imposing sanctions, absent any actual treat to use nuclear weapons against another nation.
It is the FACT that the NPT ALLOWS FOR a “Japan option” that bothers people. But short of developing a dictatorial One World Government, there is no way the international community can change the facts of technology. If you master the nuclear fuel cycle, you can build a bomb. It’s that simple. There is nothing to be done about that, disclosure or no disclosure.
If the international community wants to re-negotiate the treaty, that is their right. So far, even though many nations have signed on to the AP, not all that many have implemented it. So a comprehensive re-negotiation of the NPT would involve probably a decade or more of work. And the Non-NWS would demand more disarmament of the NWS in return.
Further it is a red herring to even discuss the “Japan option” in this context, given that no evidence exists that it applies in Iran’s case, other than as stated above, i.e., it is INHERENT in the NPT. Once again, the bottom line is that there is ZERO EVIDENCE that Iran has or ever has had a nuclear weapons program, aside from a possible nuclear weapons research database. The NPT was NEVER DESIGNED to prevent a country from acquiring the KNOWLEDGE to build a nuclear weapon, but merely to provide a warning if a nation ACTUALLY DECIDED to build a nuclear weapon.
The entire discussion over Iran is the US attempt to extend the NPT beyond what it was intended to do as justification for beating down Iran as a regional influence, and preferably for regime change.
And anyone arguing for “more disclosure” by Iran is inherently allied with that US intention. This means you, Mr. Brill!
“This, Arnold believes, is the only way to keep the US at bay. The US will worry that Iran might already have nuclear weapons or might be able to finish them even after the US attacks – even if it takes another full year. He even speculates that Iran may already have progressed this far, and that that is why the US has not attacked it.z”
And I disagree with Arnold on those points (to the degree he holds them). I believe Iran will never construct nuclear weapons, even after an attack on Iran, nor do I believe Iran can or will construct nuclear weapons within a short time of being attacked, nor do I believe the US thinks Iran has done so and that this has anything to do with the lack (so far) of an Iran attack.
“If the US attacked, it wouldn’t muddle around on yet another “regime change” crusade. It would understand that the attendant delay would only increase the risk that Iran would finish up and deliver a nuclear weapon. And so the US would pummel Iran, quickly and forcefully, pausing for breath just briefly to give Iran a chance to surrender. And Iran would surrender, within two or three weeks at most.”
The first part of your point is probably correct. For strategic and tactical reasons, any US attack on Iran will probably be massive.
The second part, that Iran would surrender within a few weeks, is ludicrous. It completely ignores Iran’s political and social nature and history. While the US could no doubt easily damage Iran’s economic and physical infrastructure, to say nothing of its conventional military forces, within a couple months of aerial and naval bombardment, the notion that Iran’s political leadership would just surrender is just nonsense. That leadership is not Saddam Hussein. No lessons about the outcome of an Iran war can draw on the Iraq war because the situations are completely different, both in terms of political, social, economic, and military circumstances.
“As any sensible people in Iran’s situation would do: how many Iranians, after all, will want to accept no electricity, water, fuel, food and medicine, and bombs raining down on their heads, for up to a year while a few determined scientists hunker down in deep underground laboratories, powered by gasoline generators, to put the finishing touches on a nuclear bomb that most Iranians will not want them to finish.”
This is just ridiculous speculation on so many levels. First, as I said, it is unlikely Iran would be trying to develop a nuclear weapons under these conditions because a) it would be too difficult under the immediate circumstances, and more importantly, b) one or more nuclear weapons which cannot be delivered are useless – and Iran would know this.
Second, the Iranian population would immediately rally behind the government. One of the most serious problems with a US attack on Iran, as virtually every observer has noted, is that it would definitely turn the mostly pro-American Iranian population against the US in a big way.
“And suppose those die-hard scientists succeed, and manage to lob their feeble bomb at Tel Aviv, or maybe at some US troops in Iraq or Afghanistan? How might the US react to that? Is that reaction likely to improve the lot of the long-suffering Iranians? Is the US likely to acknowledge what a mistake it made and plead for a negotiated settlement?”
And Iran ALREADY KNOWS THIS. If YOU do, then THEY do. The Iranian leadership is not ignorant or stupid. Which is precisely why Iran would not bother to manufacture a nuclear weapons EVEN UNDER ATTACK, as I said above.
“I don’t think the US wants to pull the trigger, but it very well might if Iran leaves it no other way to find out what Iran is up to.”
Once again, THIS IS COMPLETE BULLCRAP! The US KNOWS Iran does not have a “secret nuclear weapons program” and KNOWS that Iran stopped whatever “nuclear weapons research database program” (which is quite different from a “development and deployment program”) it had in 2003 (if it ever really had one). So the notion that the US is somehow dependent on Iran “disclosing more” is just complete nonsense.
You’re truly a pathetic debater, Brill. No amount of careful reasoning makes any impression on your fanatical devotion to the idea that if Iran just “disclosed more”, everything would be just fine. And given your innumerable attempts to ignore the reasoned arguments here and your constant circular reasoning and mantra-like refrain about disclosure, it’s clear that your motivations are something other than seriously discussing the Iran issue.
Arnold: “But we get back to the core issue of the dispute, as I’ve been saying for weeks now. You claim you are not uncomfortable with Iran having the same nuclear capabilities Japan has. I honestly do not believe you because your arguments are really bending to reach the conclusion that Iran should submit to the US campaign to prevent that.”
This is why it’s a waste of time arguing with Brill. He goes round and round and always ends up circularly claiming it’s all Iran’s fault for no “disclosing” (whatever) more but never addresses the fact that Iran DID THAT and got nothing for it. He completely ignores the US trashing the Brazil-Turkey deal and what that implies.
He ignores what he cannot answer, then circles back to repeating “disclose more” like a mantra. He’s not a serious debater.
James,
“The US could not occupy any part of Iran, other than very briefly, without instituting a draft.”
I recognize that. In fact, I think what you say would be true if with a draft. But the US didn’t find it necessary to occupy Iraq after the first Iraq war. It just extracted an agreement from Saddam on UN inspectors, and then enforced that agreement with the threat of further force.
Kooshy,
“Yes they did mind it, that is why their leaders were in Iran at the time and now they are called the government of Iraq, but some like “Alawi” yes they were fighting for Sadam but not for Iraq, just for you to know the Shiihs that were fighting Sadam they were in Iran at the time and they are running Iraq currently and their Shiih army is Iranian trained, and there would be no reason for them to fight their Shiieh neighbors, some of them are still in high places in Iranian government . I see no problem with that, all along the discussion on this site is that part of Iranian security architecture is this, as you put it “pan shiiehism” what do you think Hezbollah is for , did you read Nassrulah’s comments 3 days ago?”
- You telling me that you don’t see the problem with Iraqis being overrepresented in Iranian security architecture and the government in general?! You don’t find it odd or troubling that those that killed a million of your people and continue to oppress others tend to have higher confidence among the present day rulers of Iran than their own people?
“Now as far as your concern about the Syrian comment, that is standard comment like what Syria has to make every time with regard to the Iranian Islands, but look who Syria, supported during Iran war with Saddam…I can’t understand why the greens (at least expat part) would want to think that Shiiehsm is not part of our nationality but Zorashtanism is, I am not a bit religious and I come from a family that for at least three generation has not been a religious.”
- I find it offensive that you’d characterize me as one of those Greens. I was quite critical of their chants of “death to Russia and China”. Those that are so willing to sacrifice national foreign policy interests for petty domestic politics get no respect from me. And when did anyone bring up Zorostorianism? LOL. I never suggested Iran shouldn’t use pan Shiism as a foreign policy tool but simply recognize its limitations and realize that Arab Shias often tend to be more Arab than Shiah. And with Saddam gone, Syria is really no longer an ally which is why it seems so eager to sign a peace treaty with Israel. But I don’t blame Syria; they are doing exactly what any other rational government would do in its place. In fact, every country in the Middle East tries to advance their own geopolitical interests but Iran. Iran insists on being on a cause rather than a country, with their idiotic hostility towards Israel.
Fiorangela,
You write: “…even more secret than Israel’s nuclear bombs — is the fractured state of Israel’s Jewish domestic society. For example, Mizrahi Jews and Ethiopian Jews are discriminated against by Ashkenazi Jews in educational opportunities, social and government services, and housing opportunities. At the same time, Israel’s government is attempting to constrain the fertility of Arab Israeli women.”
- Why is it every time I bring up the situation in Iran (as I suppose is the purpose of this site) you always try to deviate the issue by turning to Israel and engage in bizarre anti-Semitic rhetoric? You say that you are an American not happy with your country’s policy towards Israel and I can respect that but why should Iran sacrifice its geopolitical objectives simply because you find Israel’s actions to be morally outrageous? I hope you can understand why some Iranians might not like their country used as a battering ram in such a way just like how some Americans might not appreciate having their country used so deviously by Israel.
You also ask: “In your opinion, is Ahmadinejad a loose cannon or are his rhetorical, um, flourishes, part of political theater within Iran’s government power centers? Iran is noted for its contributions to film-making and creative writing.”
- Hey I don’t know whether he intends it just as theater. I think you realize that I do not have the highest regard for Mr. Ahmedinejad sorry Dr. Ahmedinejad or his intelligence. I do know that he does not understand economics. I also know that when the Islamic government first came to power it began to discourage family planning and soon the population nearly doubled. I also don’t think that it is a good idea to increase the population so drastically in such a “strained and threatened economic environment.” But Ahmedinejad has put forward financial incentives to increase the size of families and I fear that lower income families (Basijis) might just do so.
- You also talk a lot about Iran’s women but Ahmedinejad’s cohorts don’t seem to have the highest regard for them so I don’t know what you were getting at: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/19/world/main6411387.shtml
Castellio,
Isn’t the “Islamofascist” label something used by neocons in the US to deceive the ignorant American public? Surely this isn’t something that works in Israel too?
Eric,
The US could not occupy any part of Iran, other than very briefly, without instituting a draft. And no draft will be put into place because a draft would mean an end to the idiotic US military adventures in the greater Middle East.
In Ankara yesterday, David Cameron said that Turkey was the European country with “the greatest chance of persuading Iran to change course on nuclear policy.”
I agree with the British PM, but it is not clear what specifically is sought. William Hague is trying to facilitate a diplomatic resolution of the dispute.
Nasser,
Iran has a $28 billion development programme underway to build more gasoline (petrol) refineries and upgrade other oil and gas facilities, with about one-third spent so far. Obviously, Iran should have built the refineries years ago. Underinvestment in oil and gas facilities was a huge mistake. Iran also has tariffs that are too high, and impediments on business investment that work against the best interests of the country.
faith that Iran is correct, tactically, in pursuing their ends in the way they do.
I haven’t mentioned faith. I’ve made arguments that you’re free to demonstrate are in error if you can.
It WAS a question of rights, one I had a lot of sympathy for, but it isn’t any more. It’s a question of politics and playing the system.
I can’t figure out what you’re trying to say. I could ask you a bunch of questions to put whatever you’re thinking into a format that I can understand, but instead, I’ll just say I don’t see anything here I’m able to disagree with.
I assume you mean by nuclear weapon capability that Japan would have a nuclear weapon tomorrow if they chose to assemble one. In other words, they have completed all weaponisation experiments/development necessary to join the club at a stroke. The only thing stopping them is the NPT.
I’ve never said that and have no idea if it’s true for either Japan or Brazil. If it was true for one or both, that would not in any significant way change their strategic position since either could do the necessary development in a reasonably short time after they were provoked to leave the NPT just fine.
The important thing is neither can launch an attack on a city today. We can say that with complete certainty. That’s what we cannot say for the US or Israel. That is what the NPT was successfully designed to ensure.
Iran does have every right to join Japan and Brazil (and Canada and Germany and Netherlands …) in having that capability, which is in no way grey or imaginably a violation of their obligations under the NPT.
Iran and the US duly met for the first time in about 200 years, but no deal was done.
The US wanted Iran to hold its uranium stock under one ton indefinitely until the talks where Iran agreed to permanently cease enrichment unless it got US permission to restart were done. You saw the US response to the Turkey proposition.
Arnold – faith that Iran is correct, tactically, in pursuing their ends in the way they do. Unlike you, I don’t think they are – as far as I can see Iran and the US are two sides of the same coin. It WAS a question of rights, one I had a lot of sympathy for, but it isn’t any more. It’s a question of politics and playing the system.
Regarding Japan (and Brazil), I assume you mean by nuclear weapon capability that Japan would have a nuclear weapon tomorrow if they chose to assemble one. In other words, they have completed all weaponisation experiments/development necessary to join the club at a stroke. The only thing stopping them is the NPT.
Regarding squeezing Israel, any kind of deal that brings Iran in from the cold pushes Israel a little further out into it. In September last year, Obama had picked a fight with Netanyahu. It might not look much from the US, but in Israel they were apoplectic. That was the moment to close the Iranian flank and leave the Israelis stewing in their own juices. Iran and the US duly met for the first time in about 200 years, but no deal was done. The Israelis regrouped, with the consequence that we have now had another year with the Iran flank open and the AIPAC bomb-them crowd beating their drum louder and louder.
Pre-War Jitters in Palestine and Lebanon
Ahmadinejad: “US will likely attack 2 mideast countries within 3 months” www dot haaretz dot com/news/diplomacy-defense/iran-u-s-will-likely-attack-2-mideast-countries-within-3-months-1.304361?localLinksEnabled=false
Arnold Evans – your comment to Tony neatly captures the larger problem; namely, the way that the “debate” is framed.
Yes, indeed, if the question were: “should the US double its rate of losses in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to prevent Iran from having technology that would make it capable of building a weapon if it left the NPT” , most Americans would likely say NO.
There are powerful and well-financed forces who do not want to hear NO; those forces can influence media and legislators in ways that the most Americans cannot.
Several hurdles would have to be overcome before “the issue [could] . . . be discussed in the open instead of the present situation where only a tiny proportion of Americans understand the issues and that tiny proportion has a far higher ratio of people strongly committed to Israel than the general population.”
Those hurdles include defanging the charge of antisemitism. People strongly committed to Israel will resist any attempt to neutralize the charge of antisemitism: it’s an easy and effective way to shut down rational debate. When that happens, persons arguing against being tagged an antisemite might easily loose their composure and resort to wild rhetoric — and prove the point of the person making the charge. Thus, resistance to the charge of antisemitism must be principled, disciplined, practiced, and relentless. The alternatives, either to cede the field to those who advocate for war, or to resort to group hatred as a means to counter war advocates, both result in destruction of some, frequently large, groups of people. The people of the United States MUST not go down either of those roads, but resisting those twin temptations will be a monumental undertaking that has never been successful in the past and that will require courageous and steadfast leadership.
Trita Parsi works very hard to keep NIAC on a path that is not “anti-” anything, and that tries to maintain a seat at the anti-Iran table by agreeing to the proposition that Iran should be called to account for human rights abuses. In my opinion, NIAC should slightly refine its strategy. True, Iran does commit human rights abuses, but Iran advocates give away too much ground by allowing anti-Iran groups to exploit that issue. It should remain OFF the table of Iran advocates. NIAC and advocates for a just US foreign policy toward Iran should not allow themselves to be put on the defensive; quite the opposite: they should seize the offensive by clearly and forcefully naming and stating the ways that individuals and groups are influencing policies in deceptive ways and in ways that are harmful to American interests and values.
After that first hurdle has been cleared….
Sorry, not Arnold’s most recent post, his post at 10.13
Alan: Ah! Understood. Yes, life under the rocks.
Massoud: I’m sorry your longer post got lost, as I’d like to read it. I think it a major error to dismiss the hundreds of thousands (millions, actually) of protesters who took to the streets to demonstrate against the invasion of Iraq. The rhetorical flourish of grouping whole populations together as “dumb f**ks” retards the development of resistance to immoral policies.
What Eric has been insistent upon, and in his most recent post Arnold also points to, is the information available to the public.
All of this is really vague.
you appear to have total faith in the Iranians and none in the US, while I have very little faith in either.
What that I wrote indicates total faith in the Iranians? My feeling about the Iranians is 1) they are morally right that they can have the same nuclear status as Japan and 2) they are in a decent strategic position right now to achieve that against US opposition, in other words, I expect US opposition to Iran’s morally just demands to fail. But nothing about faith. I thought you might have italicized something I wrote that implies that I have faith.
If you are happy for Iran to cavort in the grey areas of the NPT, of which there are plenty, then you can’t complain if the US does the same.
I’m not even going to call Japan cavorting in grey areas. Japan does not have a weapon. The chance that Japan destroys Pyongyang tomorrow? 0.00000000000000000%. This is not a grey area. Japan is within its rights as outlined.
The US is also not in a grey area. The reasonableness, of the US position that Iran must not have access to technological rights “without discrimination”? 0%.
My view is that a real chance has been missed to squeeze Israel, but all that demonstrated was that Palestine is little more than duplicitous bluster for Iran, although even that is probably better than what it is for the US.
Not sure what you mean here. It’s a different topic but I’d appreciate if you spell it out in detail.
I don’t know Cyrus – formally, informally, does it really matter? The issue is nothing without a nuke poking out the middle of it. It’s as much a media war as anything. It’s equally brain dead whichever way round you cut it.
Arnold – the only difference between you and me is that you appear to have total faith in the Iranians and none in the US, while I have very little faith in either.
If you are happy for Iran to cavort in the grey areas of the NPT, of which there are plenty, then you can’t complain if the US does the same.
It’s a bit like complaining about the US funding militant groups in Iran while Iran funds them in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.
Iran is right, the whole IAEA business IS political; it’s as political in Iran as it is in the US. Iran has chosen a political path since 2005, matching the long-dated US one.
My prescription for it all is that nobody should do anything other than meet. At that time a negotiation can take place and all these issues can coalesce into a single combined outcome – the AP, any limitation on enrichment, etc etc.
My view is that a real chance has been missed to squeeze Israel, but all that demonstrated was that Palestine is little more than duplicitous bluster for Iran, although even that is probably better than what it is for the US.
I also don’t think the US is that bothered about the Iranian regime, I think it’s what comes next that bothers them, and it sure doesn’t look like anything green.
Angle brackets, \ shift comma and shift period on my keyboard. i to start /i to end.
[i]this would be italic if it the square brackets had been angle brackets.[/i]
Actually Alan, you’re wrong — the US does not formally accuse Iran of having a secret nuclear program. Sure there are rumors promoted reguarly mostly by unofficial sources about hidden programs as a form of scaremongering, but the formal accusation by the US is that Iran is seeking the “intention to obtain the capability” to make nukes. This was the gist of the NIE report too. The significance of the Fordo site is not that it was part of an extant hidden nuclear weapons program but that it “could be” used for that, when and if the Iranians decided to excerise the “capability” that they supposedly “intend” on obtaining. The accusation against IRan is that Iran seeks “breakout capability” not actual nuclear weapons. This is of course rubbish — any country with a nuclear program can be similarly accused, and Iran has offered repeatedly to implement additional restrictions on their nuclear program well beyond their NPT obligations and even the AP, as long as their right to enrich uranium is recognized. The US has thus far insisted on a “zero enrichment” standard, deliberately unachievable and meant to be refused by Iran because like I said the nuclear issue is pretextual anyway.
As for the Additional Protocol, like I said before, Iran already offered to permanently ratify it — unlike Argentina, Brazil and Egypt. You have to remember that this conflict is not just about Iran, that there is a bigger North-South conflict over the control of the uranium fuel cycle. The South isn’t going to give up its right to enrichment as the Norht demands. The AP is a bargaining chip. The South says “Why should we accept even greater restrictions on our nuclear programs, when the North continues to thumb its nose at its own NPT obligations, and seeks to monopolize the nuclear fuel cycle?”
Arnold – how do you do that italics thing?
Tony,
That bill by the Republicans is interesting in a bunch of ways. I look forward to a debate in the United States about the wisdom of attacking Iran because most Americans do not have a good idea of the possible costs of such an attack.
Many Americans answer yes to the question “should the US attack Iran to prevent it from building a weapon” but that is the wrong question for an uninformed audience.
The question “should the US double its rate of losses in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to prevent Iran from having technology that would make it capable of building a weapon if it left the NPT” is a better question.
Doubling its rate of losses is much too conservative an estimate, but at least it is tangible.
But a debate, with Republicans on the side of attacking Iran, or authorizing an Israeli attack which is in every way a worse option for the US, will widen the US appreciation of the costs of such an attack. I’d love to see this as a major campaign issue for the midterm congressional elections. I’d love to see a Republican politician make campaign commercials claiming his Democratic opponent is not enthusiastic enough about bombing Iran.
Because that way the issue will be discussed in the open instead of the present situation where only a tiny proportion of Americans understand the issues and that tiny proportion has a far higher ratio of people strongly committed to Israel than the general population.
speaking of Japan —
some sort of incident involving a Japanese tanker in Straits of Hormuz. Japanese Tanker Damaged in Strait of Hormuz
prolly the North Koreans did it.
Castellio:
“No, the non-repatriation of a minor (and the support of his being mistreated) is not a decision of the majority of Canadians or its legal system, it’s a government decision playing to the prejudices of its base.”
This is what I meant actually, sorry if not clear. Apparently, in Australia the defence lawyer for an Australian Guantanamo inmate conducted a big public awareness campaign on his behalf that mobilised public opinion. As it was election time, Cheney threw John Howard a bone and released him. Howard still lost.
In Canada, it seems others shouted louder when a similar campaign was attempted, so it was politically expedient to NOT seek Khadr’s repatriation.
Politicians all crawl out from under one stone or another.
Alan is not as naive as this sounds. He has read the treaty, knows there are no actual terms that [edit] Japan is violating and is being, depending on how you take him, either cute or deliberately deceptive.
Nasser
“those Shiahs sure didn’t mind fighting for Saddam against Iran now did they. Where was your pan Shiism then?! Everyone but Iran seems to realize that ethnic and state loyalties tend to matter a lot more than religious loyalty. Iran needs to wake up and realize that these guys care more about being Arab than being Shiah and it is only Iran that is sacrificing its geopolitical priorities by foolishly engaging in hostilities with Israel.”
Yes they did mind it, that is why their leaders were in Iran at the time and now they are called the government of Iraq, but some like “Alawi” yes they were fighting for Sadam but not for Iraq, just for you to know the Shiihs that were fighting Sadam they were in Iran at the time and they are running Iraq currently and their Shiih army is Iranian trained, and there would be no reason for them to fight their Shiieh neighbors, some of them are still in high places in Iranian government . I see no problem with that, all along the discussion on this site is that part of Iranian security architecture is this, as you put it “pan shiiehism” what do you think Hezbollah is for , did you read Nassrulah’s comments 3 days ago?
“And what do you make of Syria’s accusation against Iranian meddling in Yemen?”
Now as far as your concern about the Syrian comment, that is standard comment like what Syria has to make every time with regard to the Iranian Islands, but look who Syria, supported during Iran war with Saddam.
I can’t understand why the greens (at least expat part) would want to think that Shiiehsm is not part of our nationality but Zorashtanism is, I am not a bit religious and I come from a family that for at least three generation has not been a religious.
So I guess the distilled dispute that I have with Alan and Eric is over the question: Should the US allow Iran to reach the level of nuclear capability Japan has?
Eric’s answer is, maybe yes legally and/or morally. But the US will not accept Iran having the capabilities Japan has and the US has military options that would prevent that outcome that it hasn’t used yet. He hasn’t said why the US hasn’t used its military options yet, and says he doesn’t know, but discounts the idea that the US is deterred militarily from attacking Iran.
Alan’s answer is no. Alan’s argument is that Japan has broken the rules and Iran should not be allowed to do the same. Which rule? Alan says the name of the treaty “non proliferation treaty” means Japan has broken the treaty by proliferating. Alan is not as naive as this sounds. He has read the treaty, knows there are no actual terms that Iran is violating and is being, depending on how you take him, either cute or deliberately deceptive.
That’s the fundamental dispute.
As a side issue, both Eric and Alan say Iran should resume implementing the Additional Protocols.
Eric says that Iran implementing the Additional Protocols would cause the US to accept Iran having the nuclear capabilities Japan has. But he also says the US would never allow Iran to have as much ambiguity as Japan has and would attack it first. I’m not sure these can be reconciled.
Alan says Iran implementing the Additional Protocols would cause the US to offer what Alan believes is the best deal the US can get from Iran, which is that Iran is allowed to enrich uranium to 5%. No US administration official has ever said anything remotely like this. US administration officials say the exact opposite routinely. But Alan is certain he is right and Iran should implement the Additional Protocols to find out.
Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocols when its nuclear file was reported to the Security Council despite the fact that there was no fissile material unaccounted for and no evidence that suggested that there might be fissile material unaccounted for.
Iran’s position, as I understand it, is that the reporting of its file was a political rather than technical decision taken in violation of Iran’s rights and that under those circumstances, Iran would not continue voluntarily disclosing information to the IAEA beyond the requirements that had earlier been ratified by its parliament.
Iran has offered to resume implementation of the AP if its file is removed from the UN Security Council. Iran’s policy position is that Iran will implement the AP and further legitimate disclosure programs in the context of an agreement in which the US accepts and stop working to prevent Iran’s right to access nuclear technology and materials.
Another side issue is leaks from the IAEA to the US for use in hampering Iran’s nuclear program.
Eric says they must not happen because if they had, the US would have announced the Fordow facility the day after Iran reported it instead of three days later. Eric ignores the Washington Post’s reporting that the US was given a copy of Iran’s letter to the IAEA the day after Iran sent it. There is no way to make this idea coherent.
Alan says the IAEA has offered to discuss ways to keep its information secret and Iran refuses to talk about them. Iran’s response to that would be that this is a structural problem that will not be solved by just introducing new rules for the US to break. The US was not supposed to have gotten the information it is known to have gotten. The solution to the US breaking rules is not to talk about new rules.
Lastly there is the issue of what capabilities the US has to prevent Iran’s nuclear program and what Iranian retaliations are available to either deter of punish the US for attacking.
Alan hasn’t written about this.
Eric believes the US campaign against Iraq in 1991 could, in its important elements be reproduced against Iran and would quickly force Iran’s government to accept whatever nuclear program, with whatever restrictions, the US is willing to offer. Eric has not written about retaliatory options available to Iran, but the implication is that Iran would quickly surrender and the conflict and any retaliation would stop by that point if not before.
This strikes me as insanely unrealistic, but I’m relieved that I have never heard anyone associated in any way with the US military present such an optimistic scenario for a US military campaign against Iran.
That main issue and those three side issues, as far as I can tell, are the extent of disagreement about Iran’s nuclear program that is currently under debate.
I haven’t seen this discussed anywhere:
Resolution Green-Lighting Israeli Strikes on Iran Introduced by House Republicans
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Resolution Green-Lighting Israeli Strikes on Iran Introduced by House Republicans
Friday, July 23, 2010
By: Jamal Abdi
Republicans in the House of Representatives have introduced a measure that would green-light an Israeli bombing campaign against Iran.
Republicans in the House of Representatives have introduced a measure that would green-light an Israeli bombing campaign against Iran. The resolution, H.Res. 1553, provides explicit support for military strikes against Iran, stating that Congress supports Israel’s use of “all means necessary” against Iran “including the use of military force”. US military leaders have warned that strikes could be catastrophic to US national security interests and could engulf the Middle East in a “calamitous” regional war.
Nearly a third of House Republicans have signed onto the resolution, which has been publicly discussed and circulated by its lead sponsor, Rep. Louie Gohmert (R-TX), for months.
http://www.niacouncil.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6644&security=1&news_iv_ctrl=-1
This 1999 report from the Rand Institute
<a href="www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR1028.pdf
warns that US air bases in the Gulf are vulnerable to missile attack from Iran, and that no easy way to counter this threat exists: hardened shelters for the hundreds of additional aircraft that would be deployed in wartime could not be built quickly
“We posit a simple illustrative scenario to explore the impact GPS-
guided cruise and ballistic missiles equipped with submunition
payloads might have on current USAF theater air operations. In our
scenario, Iran uses an Iraqi succession crisis turned civil war as an
opportunity to invade southern Iraq. The United States responds in
a variety of ways, including deploying USAF combat aircraft to the
following bases on the Arabian peninsula: Dhahran, Doha, Riyadh
Military, and Al Kharj.
These bases have a total of 14 potential parking areas ranging in size
from 600 × 300 feet to 9,000 × 900 feet. The total area of the parking
ramps at these bases is over 44 million square feet—the equivalent of
almost 1,000 football fields. These bases can accommodate a huge
number of combat aircraft and an intense aerial-port operation.
However, the number of GPS-guided, submunition warhead cruise
missiles and ballistic missiles required to attack this huge area is
surprisingly small, assuming a 20-foot lethal radius for the 1-pound
submunitions employed and standard USAF aircraft-parking proce-
dures. A 0.9 Pk (probability of kill) against all aircraft on the parking
ramps of these four bases could be achieved with 30 GPS-guided M-9
and 30 M-18 ballistic missiles, and 38 small GPS-guided cruise
missiles, at an estimated cost of about $101 million. Attacking the tent cities at all four bases and a Patriot or theater high-
altitude air defense (THAAD) radar at each requires an additional 40
ballistic missiles and 8 cruise missiles, raising the total cost to about
$163 million—about the cost of four Russian Su-27 export-version
fighters. The effect on USAF sortie generation of destroying a large
number of aircraft, living quarters, most personal equipment, and
some work centers while creating widespread foreign-object damage
would be devastating.”
It’s likely that Iran’s missile capabilities and guidance systems have considerably improved since 1999. If so, not only naval but also land-based US aircraft in the Gulf may be vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. The US might still be able to launch air attacks from more distant bases (though not in Turkey or Europe), but the number of sorties would be nowhere near enough for the brief devastating air bombardment that Eric seems to think is possible.
Nasser, two questions:
1. In your opinion, is Ahmadinejad a loose cannon or are his rhetorical, um, flourishes, part of political theater within Iran’s government power centers? Iran is noted for its contributions to film-making and creative writing.
2. Women form the majority of Iran’s university population, and women are employed in large numbers in every level of professional endeavor. How realistic do you think it is that a significant number of Iran’s young, educated, female population will turn their backs on those achievements in favor of raising “more than two” babies, particularly in a strained and threatened economic environment?
A corollary to questions #1 and #2: do you see Ahmadinejad’s lines as a more-or-less scripted pique to Israel, for whom the “demographic challenge” is the greatest “existential” threat? Numerous private organizations in Israel dedicate their efforts to trying to reduce the large numbers of abortions among Jewish Israeli women — estimated at 50,000 each year. One of Israel’s best-kept secrets — even more secret than Israel’s nuclear bombs — is the fractured state of Israel’s Jewish domestic society. For example, Mizrahi Jews and Ethiopian Jews are discriminated against by Ashkenazi Jews in educational opportunities, social and government services, and housing opportunities. At the same time, Israel’s government is attempting to constrain the fertility of Arab Israeli women.
In short, my suspicion is that crazy Ahmadinejad is suggesting to Israel a peaceful way for Israel to solve its “existential” crisis: by creating rather than destroying.
More lunacy from Ahmedinejad http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/07/27/world/AP-ML-Iran-Population.html?ref=global-home
Not to be a nag Eric, but are you still planning to respond to my post?
Castellio, I wrote a long post in response to you, but it got lost in the muddle some how. The long and the short of it was that claiming that either france germany or canada opposed the invasion of Iraq is a serious rewrite of history. Iran Syria and Turkey did oppose the invasion, mostly rhetorically, but there was no serious effort to support Iraq by any party. And yeah, American, British, and even Canadian voting publics are generally speaking, dumb as f@#K.
Not to be a nag Eric, but you are planning to respond but are you still planning to respond to my post?
Castellio, I wrote a long post in response to you, but it got lost in the muddle some how, but the long and the short of it was that claiming that either france germany or canada opposed the invasion of Iraq is a serious rewrite of history. Iran Syria and Turkey did oppose the invasion, mostly rhetorically, but there was no serious effort to support Iraq by any party. And yeah, American, British, and even Canadian voting publics are generally speaking, dumb as f@#K.
Rezz,
“Finally a democratic free Iran will make an attempt to become as big an economic power it can be (>turkey), to the dismay of the Saudi’s and UAE, the latter being most happy to keep the current status quo for its own well being. A free Iran would not ship as much business to Dubai (think China and HK) I would think. The US should really seek the grand bargain as this will be to the Iranian peoples benefit in the long run.”
A more rational Iranian government would also attract massive capital inflows from Iranian expats. UAE has publicly voiced concern about this fearing divestment away from them.
If only the current government was more economically competent Iran would not be in such a sorry state. Iran should’ve removed those wasteful subsidies a long time ago and allowed the prices of oil and gas to rise. They should’ve invested that capital instead on increasing Iran’s production capacity, infrastructure and R&D instead of such wasteful purposes. Of course I realize full and well that none of this is likely to happen because doesn’t actually have a competent government.
Kooshy,
“…do you believe that Augustus Richard Norton, Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at the Department of International Relations, Boston University understands and feels more of Arab shiih sentiments then you do if you are a shiih Muslim , who besides the largest shiih country in the region would you feel is the safest bet for shiihs belief anywhere in the region.”
Those Shiahs sure didn’t mind fighting for Saddam against Iran now did they. Where was your pan Shiism then?! Everyone but Iran seems to realize that ethnic and state loyalties tend to matter a lot more than religious loyalty. Iran needs to wake up and realize that these guys care more about being Arab than being Shiah and it is only Iran that is sacrificing its geopolitical priorities by foolishly engaging in hostilities with Israel. And what do you make of Syria’s accusation against Iranian meddling in Yemen?
As a “green/liberal” Iranian reading your comments, I wanted to shed light on the Iranian mindset. In a scenario where Iran was attacked, Iranians would unite and the repressive government would consolidate power but likely not be reckless in attacking say the Arabs. It would seize moral high ground and use the US aggression as a means to legally leave the NPT and build a protective weapon or at least be ambiguous going forward to negate future attack (plus at that stage it would have plenty of sympathizers). This view is brought up in the report by the Oxford Research Group.see here.
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/military_action_against_iran_impact_and_effects
Also some people talk about regime change as a solution to many things, one being the Palestinian/Hezbollah issue. If it happened, a democratic Iranian government will only take away the tired excuses for not dealing with the Palestinians in a just way, and put the focus back on Israels own failures regarding its neighbors.
For the Iranian people though, regime change will be a good thing but not for US/Western interests ala Oil/whatever else they want. Under what circumstances do you think that the Iranian people would not want a nuclear enrichment program? The new Iranian class depicted by the greens (being more tech savy/liberal/educated relative to all Arab countries) would demand that their scientists and engineers be competent and protect the country, so no kind of research that is Iran’s right will be off limits in any Iranian future regime. Arabs/Israelis may not like it but we dont care about their opinion. Iranians will firmly believe they have this right, shaped by the last 30 years experience when the west wasnt impartial when it came to aggression against Iran, so they wont trust anyone anymore. The Arabs (+US) ganging up on Iran with the Saddam war, via money/tech equipment/intelligence transfers was a bitter pill and Iranians have formed this “never again” attitude towards humiliation.
I believe the only way the US can work with Iran is as the leveretts propose: a Grand Bargain. Iran’s security has to be guaranteed by the US because the last war cost us over half a million lives. Iranians are proud and will never say this, but the US should create security arrangements for the middle east or else stay out and not threaten Iran.
Finally a democratic free Iran will make an attempt to become as big an economic power it can be (>turkey), to the dismay of the Saudi’s and UAE, the latter being most happy to keep the current status quo for its own well being. A free Iran would not ship as much business to Dubai (think China and HK) I would think. The US should really seek the grand bargain as this will be to the Iranian peoples benefit in the long run.
Nasser – do you believe that Augustus Richard Norton, Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at the Department of International Relations, Boston University understands and feels more of Arab shiih sentiments then you do if you are a shiih Muslim , who besides the largest shiih country in the region would you feel is the safest bet for shiihs belief anywhere in the region.
So, a population the size of the city of Ahmadābād in India, or Belo Hoizonte in Brazil, or the areas of Boston or Houston in the US, with completely unregulated nuclear weapons deliverable by rocket, airplane and submarine, along with a mature chemical weapons program, terrorizing its neighbors, ethnically cleansing its cities and ‘hinterlands’, determining American-European military policy in defense of its expansionism and institutionalized racism, with a sustained siege against another people locked in a prison camp … and no end to the madness in sight.
Interesting article in the Lebanon Daily Star: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=31&article_id=115777#axzz0uwNi3WrS
This part really caught my eye: “In addition, there are strong feelings in some quarters [of the Shite community] that Hizbullah is too closely aligned with Iran, and that the community’s interests are better served through Arab as opposed to Persian ties. We see variants of these views in Iraq.”
- Ah yes “Arab ajam.” These Iranians will never learn, even after a million of them died! In another story Syria criticizes Iranian role in Yemen!
Israel fears no one militarily; that is to say, it respects no other force’s military to the extent that it feels deterred.
Jonathan Cook has argued that Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions could hurt Israel; I think it would take a very,very long time to do so. Israel’s economic strength is in technology, weaponry, pharmaceuticals, intelligence and data gathering and data mining; it’s hard to imagine that BDS would reach an intensity that would constrain Intel or Teva or some of Israel’s NASDAQ-listed communications industries.
Israel does experience an existential threat, but it’s not from Iran. Rather, it arises from the contradictions at the core of zionism which are causing young Jews, particularly American Jews, to be disinterested in Israel . This is the ‘nuclear bomb’ that Peter Beinart exposed in his essay, “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment.”
Eric:
“The law forbids Israeli citizens to promote, encourage, or provide information which makes it possible to maintain a boycott of “Israel” – in other words, the Israeli occupation and the persons benefitting from it. It makes possible automatic damages and fines. It makes possible, and in fact requires action against any “foreign national entity” – which would be the Palestinian Authority – if it harms the settlers’ livelihood. The most interesting item here is Section 8(ii): “Despite the content of subsection (i), any person who initiated a boycott or encouraged participation in a boycott under paragraph 2 during the year preceding the publication of the Law, it will be a refutable assumption that this person is still an initiator of a boycott or still calls for a boycott even after the date of the publication of the Law.” In other words, in contrast with nearly all the laws of the State of Israel, this law is a retroactive law, which will penalize people for actions they took before it was made into law. The settlers and the settler collaborators must be quite stressed out.
The proposed law prohibits non-violent protests and determines that it will be legal to boycott anything in Israel – which is how they obtained ultra-orthodox support – except for settlers and the occupation. That is pretty much the only case where non-violent protest is prohibited. Former Haaretz editor David Landau has already called other parliaments to boycott the Knesset due to this law. If it passes, it will be very hard to denounce people who employ violence against the occupation, its emblems and the people who enforce it. After all, they will have been barred from non-violent forms of protest.”
which is from:
http://mondoweiss.net/2010/07/israeli-bds-bill-would-turn-opponents-of-the-regime-into-enemies-of-the-state.html
The US’ limited goals didn’t include “regime change,” and it achieved them with an air war.
An air war with 600,000 ground troops preparing for an invasion.
Castellio,
“Israel is afraid of international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions, which is why it has made expressions of support of BDS illegal in Israel.”
I hadn’t heard this. Can you elaborate a bit?
Kooshy,
“As past experience should have demonstrated, wars are foggy and no one can surely predict what outcome will be…”
I recognize that, and will take credit for predicting even before the Iraq war began that we’d be there at least 5 years, maybe longer. That’s how “regime change” wars tend to play out – just like in Vietnam. The same for Afghanistan (though I can’t claim to have predicted that one’s astonishing length).
But not all wars are “regime change” wars. The first Iraq war was not, for example, and that war was over within about six weeks after it began – within just days after the so-called “ground war” began (during which the US lost only 4 troops in battle). The US’ limited goals didn’t include “regime change,” and it achieved them with an air war. On schedule, no surprises.
I’d like to make a request Eric:
Can you explain what you mean when you use the term “ambiguity”?
Eric, this is funny:
Arnold and those who agree with him say the US must live with the bargain they’ve struck. Iran has every right to build “fuel free” nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them, and then withdraw from the NPT, insert the fuel and launch the bomb.
The first part is weird. I say it doesn’t matter if Iran has a fuel free weapon or just the level of technology Japan has, because with that level of technology, once the decision is made, the actual construction of a weapon is a minor issue. I maintain that Japan does not have a weapon. Japan cannot destroy a city the way the US did in Hiroshima. I maintain that Japan can build a weapon if it leaves the NPT.
Because being where Japan is, and having what you are calling a fuel free weapon are strategically identical, I see no need to build what you are talking about, but it is not a terribly big deal if an NPT country has a device that would be an nuclear explosive device if it were to have additional fissile material. It still would not be able to use it to destroy Hiroshima. It still could not put it into a military submarine and have it patrol off of Iran’s coast as Israel is doing now.
Now, my position is supported both by the words of the treaty and by the examples set by many other nations. I guess you want to recast my position in as negative a light as you can, but where is the support for your position?
Arnold doesn’t necessarily recommend that Iran push it that far, but he believes Iran should establish the same useful ambiguity that Japan has achieved (though without making any of the additional disclosures that Japan makes).
Wrong twice. I don’t see Japan’s position as ambiguous. Japan has no nuclear weapon. No nation is threatened that Japan, unlike the US, may make a mistake and destroy one of its cities or deliberately destroy one of its cities. If Japan is provoked, then Japan will also unambiguously build a weapon. You keep inserting the concept of ambiguity. This must be the sixth time I’ve said there is no ambiguity and you refuse to either even argue that I’m wrong or acknowledge that. This is one of your patterns, a necessity for arguing a weak position.
The second part is that as long as the US denies Iran’s right to have Japan’s technological capabilities, Iran should not disclose information that will help the US campaign to hamper its nuclear program. The US can fix that, as I point out that Iran repeatedly has offered, by accepting Iran’s right to the technological capabilities Japan has.
This is related to your attachment to the concept of ambiguity. Japan’s disclosures do not render even the slightest bit less nuclear capable. If the US stops its program to hamper Iran’s nuclear progress, disclosures would not render Iran’s nuclear program even the slightest bit less effective as a deterrent.
Because of that, disclosures are not an important issue. No amount of disclosure would make the US comfortable with Iran’s nuclear program. No amount of disclosure would be distasteful to Iran if there was not an active campaign to thwart it that could make use of these disclosures.
I find the issue of disclosures the most humorous issue on this topic because Eric literally pretends he cannot read when I point out the costs disclosure would impose on Iran in the current environment. He’ll respond later. He won’t respond any more. He’ll repeat his older assertions that have already been responded to. But at no point will we get, “information Iran discloses could be used by the US to harm Iran’s nuclear program.”
But once the US accepts Iran’s nuclear capability the way it accepts Japan’s and Brazil’s, Iran I’m certain, as Iran as offered repeatedly, will have no problem ratifying and fully implementing the AP and giving all the disclosure you claim to want, even if you don’t have any specific requests.
This, Arnold believes, is the only way to keep the US at bay. The US will worry that Iran might already have nuclear weapons or might be able to finish them even after the US attacks – even if it takes another full year. He even speculates that Iran may already have progressed this far, and that that is why the US has not attacked it.
For now, the deterrence of the US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are Iran’s primary deterrent. One day Iran’s nuclear program may well take over as Iran’s primary deterrent. But it is already beginning to have a deterrent effect.
I, on the other hand, see nothing to be gained and a lot to lose from this approach. Whether or not Iran has a right to do what Arnold thinks it should do, the US will never let Iran get far enough to create the useful ambiguity to achieve the deterrence that Arnold believes that ambiguity will provide.
I’ve never used the word ambiguity to describe the deterrent effect of a nuclear weapons option. I’m not sure why you are so attached to that concept. Again, Iran does not need ambiguity.
But the “US will never allow” is too strong a statement. There is a question, how many US troops will the US willingly allow to die to prevent Iran from having the capabilities Japan has, even if Iran does not build a weapon. Is it worth 1000 troops, is it worth 10,000 troops, is it worth committing the US to a new Vietnam?
Why is it worth even 1 soldier? The US has the option of telling Israel that it is going to have to live without the luxury of a regional monopoly of nuclear capability. Instead the US would rather lose thousands of its soldiers? That isn’t clear. So far it has not and I hope that continues.
The US may (at least if cooler heads prevail) offer Iran ample opportunities to eliminate that ambiguity (such as by disclosing more about what it’s up to),
This is just stupid. There is no reason to believe there is any fissile material in Iran that is unaccounted for despite both the most intensive inspections program ever applied on an NPT state and the most thorough penetration of a nuclear program by espionage ever. There is no ambiguity. I’m not sure the attachment Eric has to this ambiguity concept.
Anyway, Japan does not have ambiguity and implements the Additional Protocols. It still has a nuclear option. I keep repeating this, you keeps not understanding it. At this point this is for the benefit of others, you for some reason want to believe there is ambiguity. That makes you feel good in some way that you won’t admit and that I can’t figure out.
but both cool heads and hot heads eventually will agree if Iran persists in declining those opportunities. I doubt very seriously the US is worried that Iran already is far enough along that the US can’t risk attacking. Nor is the US worried that Iran could and would continue its bomb-making activities for up to a year after a US attack – a few weeks, perhaps, but not much longer. Well before the US worried that Iran might soon pass the point where the US could stop it, the US would do whatever is necessary to prevent that. And if the US got cold feet, Israel might step in.
The US will make its calculations to determine how many US soldiers it wants to sacrifice for delaying Iran’s nuclear program by a few years. Secretary Gates is clearly not as knowledgeable about US military capabilities as you are, Eric. Gates believes an attack could not stop Iran’s program but only set it back about three years. I’m going to defer to Gates on this one, but note that the amount the US could set Iran’s timetable to get a weapon if it chose is steadily declining from that point.
I don’t think the US wants to pull the trigger, but it very well might if Iran leaves it no other way to find out what Iran is up to. That may not make the US’ action “legal” or “moral,” but I find it ironic that Arnold would expect such principles to guide the US in this decision. The Iranian people would end up legal, moral and dead.
This is what Iran is “up to” building the technological basis for the kind of nuclear option Japan has, that in an emergency it could build a weapon if it left the NPT.
Eric, your idea that Iran’s program is some big mystery has no basis in fact, it’s just kind of a fantasy you’ve invented. This is not an ambiguous situation. We get every year a precise inventory of the amount of uranium Iran has, and enriched to what level. We get every three months a new estimate based on the operations of the machines under IAEA observation.
There is no nation about which the United States knows more about its nuclear program than Iran. The problem is not ambiguity. The problem is that the US does not want Iran to be in the unambiguous situation Japan is in. Japan unambiguously does not have a weapon, if attacked, Japan unambiguously can build a weapon.
So that if the US was to want to attack Iran the way it did Iraq, Iran would have the option switching from unambiguously free of any nuclear weapon to unambiguously having a nuclear weapon at its own discretion. That ability in itself is a deterrent. Once again, ambiguity plays no role at all in Iran’s nuclear program.
Richard’s question of “what do you want Iran to disclose” is a good one. You don’t know but it is public information you can look up, read from IAEA reports. Read the actual questions and you’ll see how tenuously they could even possibly be related to any secret bomb-making program. There are no questions related to secret sources of fissile material. Which means there are no questions whose answers would put Iran’s program in any different strategic place than where everyone who’s look knows it is right now. Closing in on 3 tons of LEU at 5% and making a little more than 5 kilograms of 20% LEU per month.
I feel like you’re not reading the situation more closely just so you can believe there is ambiguity.
Kooshy,
“Iranians have struggled for couple of centuries to exercise independence they will fight.”
The Iranians are a great people. I believe that more and more as I learn more about Iran. If the US ever attacked, and the short-term victory went for the US as I have predicted, I have no doubt that you’d be right in the long run. The Iranians would re-acquire their independence and push the Americans out of Iran, which is where the Americans would belong. The US attack would be a hiccup in the historical record.
But, brief or not by historical measures, that “hiccup” would last far longer and be cause far more suffering than the Iranian people deserve. They’d suffer only marginally less to know that the US had acted illegally, immorally and stupidly. If the hiccup might be avoided just by cooperating more in disclosures about Iran’s nuclear program – helping the US not to behave stupidly – why not do that? I guess I just don’t see the downside in taking that step that others appear to see.
Fiorangela: It’s not true Israel is afraid of nothing.
Israel is afraid of international Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions, which is why it has made expressions of support of BDS illegal in Israel. Increasingly, all forms of non-violent resistance are illegal in Israel.
Israel is afraid of an eventual loss of American sponsorship in money and arms, and understands BDS as a move in that direction.
Israel is also afraid of Islam, which is why it has (wrongly) targeted it as a ‘fascism’, and not only works to lessen the number and influence of Muslims within its borders, even to the point of mass “prison camps” (as identified by the current UK Prime Minister), but persistent attempts to weaken all Muslim societies throughout the Middle East.
Castellio,
“This is where even I leave you as a supporter. If the US pulls the trigger, its because the US wants to pull the trigger, it has not been ‘forced’ into it, whatever it may claim. There are, right now, many “other ways” on offer that the US should take to move forward (the Brazil-Turkey negotiation just being the most recent). Why oh why are you making that fundamental error?”
When I write about what I think the US might do, it too often is misinterpreted as my seal of approval. It is very far from that. As vividly as I try to paint the horrible picture of what could happen, please don’t conclude that I find that picture pleasing.
This time, for example, I wrote that:
“I don’t think the US wants to pull the trigger, but it very well might if Iran leaves it no other way to find out what Iran is up to.”
That does not mean I believe the US SHOULD pull the trigger if Iran leaves the US no other way to find out what Iran is up to. It means only what it says: that’s what I think the US MIGHT DO if Iran leaves the US no other way to find out what Iran is up to.
If I were running the US and Iran left me no other way to find out what it’s up to, I would not feel boxed into a corner at all. An important premise of the bomb-Iran crowd’s argument is that the US should not accept any degree of uncertainty about Iran’s intentions. I strongly reject that premise. I would decide without hesitation to accept the uncertainty, just as we do in much of our political and personal lives. I agree with my opponents that we have no reason to doubt Iran’s peaceful intentions, and goodness knows our spies and others have looked hard for such reasons. That’s good enough for me, unless and until something serious happens that calls for a reconsideration.
But I am not running the US. While I am confident that Obama and most of his advisers think the same way as I, I won’t be so confident if he leaves office in 2+ years, or if some unforeseeable event shifts US public sentiment even more strongly against Iran while Obama remains in office.
I could not agree more that there are “many other ways” to proceed, and that the US should pursue other ways. I have written a great deal here in support of such other ways (the fuel swap proposal, for a recent example). But I felt exactly the same way in 2003 and, regrettably, the US did not pursue those “other ways” back then. I vowed then that I would try to become part of the “early warning system” if the same situation ever arose with Iran. That requires more than merely opining about what the US “should” do. It requires a frank recognition, based in part on past US behavior in similar situations, about what the US “might” do, whether it should or not.
I hope this gets you back on board.
Fiorangela,
Iran has not been backed into a corner, though the warmongering neocons et al. would be pleased if this was Iran’s perception of the situation that obtains. William Hague has made clear the UK wants a negotiated resolution of the dispute. The Israel lobby cannot control UK foreign policy in the way it very nearly controls US foreign policy.
kooshy,
Yes, war would be disastrous for the US and Iran, should one come about. It is remarkable how many rich, reasonably well-informed Americans cannot even be bothered to pay attention to what is going on. And after years of idiotic military adventures in the greater Middle East! At a cost of trillions of dollars!
For most Americans, if a foreign policy issue is not prominently placed in the day’s local newspaper, or on the front page of the New York Times perhaps, it is not part of their consciousness for that day. Are they intellectually lazy? Of course. Self-satisfied? Yes again. Quite possibly, foolish beyond belief? Perhaps yes again.
James, I say capitulation because the US has structured its policy not to behave maturely and to achieve what is most desirable for all concerned but to bully and paint Iran into a corner — exactly that nuclear corner that JFK mentioned in the passage I quoted.
US could have had a deal with Iran a long time ago; US does NOT have a deal with Iran because that was never the goal: the goal of US “diplomacy” is to emasculate Iran, preparatory to reshaping Iran in the image and likeness of US. When a nation’s pride is threatened it will do almost anything to retain it; and the US has been playing the bully toward Iran for far too many years. I understand all the fine points of diplomacy and negotiating tactics that several on this forum love to explain in exquisite detail; I think they miss the human factor. Israel and the US are playing a very dangerous game; Israel and the US are behaving badly. They should be called to account; it should not be Iran’s task to buckle to the insane and homicidal demands of two out of control nuclear armed hypermilitarized “exceptionalist”, spoiled rotten states.
Israel needs a serious bloody nose, but Israel has cleverly – and evilly, in my opinion, built up its military might and its intelligence capabilities so that not even the US is able to contain Israel; the US is afraid of Israel, and Israel is afraid of nothing, least of all the world’s opinion: that is a very dangerous state of affairs.
Castellio,
I very much agree with you that the US has a number of options available, to move things forward in a diplomatic context. Brazil and Turkey are willing to do what they can to resolve things, and I agree the Obama administration should be encouraging this avenue. Instead, idiots in the Obama administration have tried to discourage Brazil and Turkey! Do I smell Dennis Ross?
Eric as usual thanks for your reply
The more I read and browse around, the more I understand that amazingly even majority of the informed and educated class have no clue what they are gearing up for, like the past ten years of war with Islamic nations has had no effect on their lives and living here at home. As past experience should have demonstrated, wars are fogy and no one can surly predict what outcome will be laid for the aggressor or the aggressed. I for myself don’t believe that a new war under the current circumstances (US’s) is on the offing, but again if one is becoming necessary to settle the matter of bullying and respect for equality on international law, relentlessly one may come to stand and fight.
Eric my reply to you is similar to most major Think Tank modeling exercises of the last few years we I am sure you know about, they have all commonly predicated that Iran will retaliate and widen the war, it will not submit to threats, just as you made one in your reply. The price is too high to fold; Iranians have struggled for couple of centuries to exercise independence they will fight.
Castellio,
I think the public in France and Germany were aware the US had agreed not to launch war with Iran unless a further UN resolution was passed. How much this influenced the foreign policy position of France and Germany I do not know.
I think that if most Americans believed Iran had no nuclear weapons programme, it would be very difficult for Obama to launch an attack on Iran (unless a pretext was staged in the Gulf).
Eric writes: “I don’t think the US wants to pull the trigger, but it very well might if Iran leaves it no other way to find out what Iran is up to. That may not make the US’ action “legal” or “moral,” but I find it ironic that Arnold would expect such principles to guide the US in this decision. The Iranian people would end up legal, moral and dead.”
I agree that Iran should do everything it can within reason to allay the concerns of popular opinion in the US and around the world… but I see a vast difference between that and your saying “If Iran leaves it no other way…”
This is where even I leave you as a supporter. If the US pulls the trigger, its because the US wants to pull the trigger, it has not been ‘forced’ into it, whatever it may claim. There are, right now, many “other ways” on offer that the US should take to move forward (the Brazil-Turkey negotiation just being the most recent). Why oh why are you making that fundamental error?
James, you write: “France, Germany, Russia and China, as well as Turkey, Syria, and Iran, opposed the idiotic invasion of Iraq. And in Britain, almost all of the hereditary peers in the House of Lords opposed the invasion of Iraq.”
Just to tie this in with the conversation… did popular understanding of the weaponless state of Iraq have an effect on those national positions?
Kooshy,
“This great exercise of past few weeks, this debate on the letter of the NPT has clearly demonstrated that one side is dissatisfied with NPT they currently have…”
I think both sides in this debate agree with your analysis on that point. They diverge on how Iran ought to proceed in light of that fact.
Arnold and those who agree with him say the US must live with the bargain they’ve struck. Iran has every right to build “fuel free” nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them, and then withdraw from the NPT, insert the fuel and launch the bomb. Arnold doesn’t necessarily recommend that Iran push it that far, but he believes Iran should establish the same useful ambiguity that Japan has achieved (though without making any of the additional disclosures that Japan makes). This, Arnold believes, is the only way to keep the US at bay. The US will worry that Iran might already have nuclear weapons or might be able to finish them even after the US attacks – even if it takes another full year. He even speculates that Iran may already have progressed this far, and that that is why the US has not attacked it.
I, on the other hand, see nothing to be gained and a lot to lose from this approach. Whether or not Iran has a right to do what Arnold thinks it should do, the US will never let Iran get far enough to create the useful ambiguity to achieve the deterrence that Arnold believes that ambiguity will provide. The US may (at least if cooler heads prevail) offer Iran ample opportunities to eliminate that ambiguity (such as by disclosing more about what it’s up to), but both cool heads and hot heads eventually will agree if Iran persists in declining those opportunities. I doubt very seriously the US is worried that Iran already is far enough along that the US can’t risk attacking. Nor is the US worried that Iran could and would continue its bomb-making activities for up to a year after a US attack – a few weeks, perhaps, but not much longer. Well before the US worried that Iran might soon pass the point where the US could stop it, the US would do whatever is necessary to prevent that. And if the US got cold feet, Israel might step in.
If the US attacked, it wouldn’t muddle around on yet another “regime change” crusade. It would understand that the attendant delay would only increase the risk that Iran would finish up and deliver a nuclear weapon. And so the US would pummel Iran, quickly and forcefully, pausing for breath just briefly to give Iran a chance to surrender. And Iran would surrender, within two or three weeks at most. As any sensible people in Iran’s situation would do: how many Iranians, after all, will want to accept no electricity, water, fuel, food and medicine, and bombs raining down on their heads, for up to a year while a few determined scientists hunker down in deep underground laboratories, powered by gasoline generators, to put the finishing touches on a nuclear bomb that most Iranians will not want them to finish. And suppose those die-hard scientists succeed, and manage to lob their feeble bomb at Tel Aviv, or maybe at some US troops in Iraq or Afghanistan? How might the US react to that? Is that reaction likely to improve the lot of the long-suffering Iranians? Is the US likely to acknowledge what a mistake it made and plead for a negotiated settlement?
I don’t think the US wants to pull the trigger, but it very well might if Iran leaves it no other way to find out what Iran is up to. That may not make the US’ action “legal” or “moral,” but I find it ironic that Arnold would expect such principles to guide the US in this decision. The Iranian people would end up legal, moral and dead.
Iranian,
You make an excellent point, that to compare Iran to the USSR, in the sense of being a “threat” to the national security of the US, is preposterous. The Leveretts make an excellent point, that even if Iran were a threat, going to war would not be the way to deal with the situation.
Fiorangela,
Why would you see anything like “capitulation” in Iran’s agreeing to further negotations?
Lysander,
Are you hoping to talk the Iranian government into developing nuclear weapons? Obviously you are aware the Iranian government says it does not want nukes, has no secret programme to develop nukes, and in fact wants a Middle East free of nukes.
Arnold, Eric and others
This great exercise of past few weeks, this debate on the letter of the NPT has clearly demonstrated that one side is dissatisfied with NPT they currently have, since the treaty no longer can protect the NWS monopoly on possible proliferations (Respond) as technology is widely more available and easier to obtain. Since this group can’t publicly acknowledge the treaty’s shortcomings with regards to the enrichment by none nuclear weapon states, as is been demonstrated in real life they end up gearing to the same tactic that is factually is used by the NWS, continually shift the debate and put the burden of the proof on the other side and somewhere down the road hope for submission. I would say out of not having much other options you may as well keep up it may come to fermentation.
Castellio,
France, Germany, Russia and China, as well as Turkey, Syria, and Iran, opposed the idiotic invasion of Iraq. And in Britain, almost all of the hereditary peers in the House of Lords opposed the invasion of Iraq.
Let’s remember that the Bush administration double-crossed Germany and France. Bush obtained French and German approval of the UN vote, in the fall of 2002, on the express agreement NO INVASION would take place WITHOUT A FURTHER UN RESOLUTION. The lying, cheating, and other gross dishonesty, by the Bush administration, to set up the illegal invasion of Iraq, should have resulted in criminal prosecutions.
Arnold: “The belief you two are expressing, that if Iran was to implement the AP, the US would just have to accept defeat in ensuring none of Israel’s neighbors have a Japan option is absolutely bizarre. Especially given that Iran already implemented the AP. I can’t figure out how a reasonable person could hold that belief.”
Because it is abundantly clear to me that an Iran with a domestic enrichment program that satisfies the US, e.g. limited to 5% enrichment, is the best possible strategic outcome for the US vis-a-vis Israel.
Now this is not, apparently, abundantly clear to Obama or to Israel.
But regardless, what does limiting to 5% enrichment, even assuming, contrary to what Obama administration officials say, they will accept that, have to do with the AP?
What we have here is you and Eric proving that you can keep typing even after your arguments are exhausted. I’m impressed, I guess.
But now we see you concede, tacitly, that Iran implementing the AP would not be enough for you. Good.
So what would be enough for you?
You’re going to make a semi-reasonable sounding proposal and may not even demand Iran relinquish its stock of LEU.
Now what makes you think your answer to the previous question, what would be enough for you, is enough for Obama or for Israel?
You’re going to say Iran should take that risk. Even if taking that risk means exposing its own nuclear program and nuclear scientists to sabotage, espionage and assassination.
OK. That’s what you would do if you were in Iran’s leadership. Fine. Iran’s leadership does not have as rosy a view of US motives as you do.
Now, Eric, you said something about the preamble not being operative. It seems like Alan’s entire argument is based on the treaty’s title.
Do you want to explain to him which parts of the treaty have force?
Alan. Thanks for telling me the title of the treaty. Now can you point to any of the articles that you claim Japan and Brazil are in violation of?
And in case you don’t know, Japan and Brazil have not developed weapons. But since you make that assertion, can we have your definition of a “weapon” that is prohibited by the NPT? And if you’re able to read past the title of the treaty, I’d also appreciate any support for your definition you can find in the actual operative text of the treaty.
Alan: It is true that Khadr’s family background plays a role in the public’s perception of the issue, especially as argued in the National Post, a right wing and fiercely pro-Israeli mouthpiece. However, my estimate is that less than a half of Canadians are against the repatriation, but that half is to be found among supporters of the current Conservative government.
Romeo Dallaire, respected in Canada, has stated that the current Canadian government, by its actions, is no better than other countries supporting the acceptance of child soldiers, and he is right. (Khadr was 15 at the time of the alleged incident.)
No, the non-repatriation of a minor (and the support of his being mistreated) is not a decision of the majority of Canadians or its legal system, it’s a government decision playing to the prejudices of its base.
Massoud writes: “I beleive there was no serious international opposition to the war with Iraq because, everyone knew Saddam was isolated, weak, and defenseless, that he would ultimately lose, and that backing a lost cause is a waste of any state’s resources, and that on the other hand the US could make things very complicated for any country that wanted a post war relationship with Iraq but opposed the US’ conquest.”
Perhaps true as a major generalization, however…
Canada was asked to join the Coalition of the Willing. It didn’t. It certainly knew the US would win, it knew that the Bush government would make things hard for Canada, and Canada usually rushes to join action where the Brits and the Yanks are together. But it didn’t join the invasion of Iraq. Largely because there was an election coming up and the Quebec populace were in the great majority against the war. Partly because of Hans Blix.
The decision NOT to go into Iraq has been consistently supported since, and has had an impact on the desire for Canadians to get out of Afghanistan. (Remember that Afghanistan was perceived as a NATO obligation, for the 9/11 attack was perceived as a foreign attack on US soil. The Iraq invasion was not a NATO action.)
There is no positive reason, in the court of world opinion, to write off populations as “dumb f**ks”. Definitely the wrong path for Iranians to follow, even if the game is rigged against them within the media.
I am aware that Blix had a major impact in Canada and Germany, with repercussions still with us.
You may respond that all this is small change, it is… but these situations are cumulative. There is no fresh start.
Alan,
“The purpose of the NPT is to eliminate nuclear weapons, not create a framework for developing them legally.”
I don’t understand how you can interpret “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” to mean that the treaty is aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hard to imagine how any reasonable person could reach that conclusion.
Keep up the good work.
Arnold: “That’s kind of what I’m asking”
Try “Non-Proliferation”. I think it gets a mention somewhere.
Arnold,
“Are you positive there were no ground forces involved?”
Positive.
Turns out the Iraqis had resolved to give up before the “ground war” began. The ground troops were there, but entirely unnecessary — other than to drive a few miles into Iraq to accept surrenders from Iraqi troops who emerged from bomb shelters to wrap their arms around the legs of American soldiers and kiss their boots. Had there been no ground troops, the Air Force probably could have spared a few cooks and dishwashers to do the same thing.
According to one news report I still recall, until a number of sleeping US soldiers were killed by an Iraqi missile that hit their barracks near the very end of the war, fewer American ground troops died in the Iraq war than would probably have died if the same number of young men had never left the US and had engaged in the same sort of activities as their non-military counterparts (fast driving, suicide, crime, drugs – the standard self-destructive behavior that kills young men in disproportionately high numbers).
I have the greatest respect and gratitude for the soldiers sent to fight that war. They were trained, ready and willing to lay down their lives for their country. It just so happened that they were unnecessary. The 1991 Iraq war was an war.
“Are you being serious?”
Yes.
Arnold: “But somehow it didn’t neutralize the US approach for the 2 and half years Iran was implementing it before.”
Because at the time they withdrew (Feb 2006) there were still many unanswered questions remaining from the original inspectors findings. There were also further Iranian revelations in December 2005 that were likely to spark further AP inspections.
Arnold: “The US is committed to defending Israel’s strategic situation whether Iran discloses AP information or not.”
Iran should put it to the test. For example, I saw an article recently by Philip Stephens in the FT, largely supportive of Obama, but criticising him for trying to tackle Netanyahu with no plan B. To me, the plan B appeared to be some kind of deal with Iran, because he kicked off the meetings with Iran immediately after Netanyahu told him to get stuffed the first time. Iran didn’t, and hasn’t, played ball, missing a big opportunity to marginalise Israel, and hanging Obama out to dry in the process. Well played, if that was their goal.
Arnold: “The belief you two are expressing, that if Iran was to implement the AP, the US would just have to accept defeat in ensuring none of Israel’s neighbors have a Japan option is absolutely bizarre. Especially given that Iran already implemented the AP. I can’t figure out how a reasonable person could hold that belief.”
Because it is abundantly clear to me that an Iran with a domestic enrichment program that satisfies the US, e.g. limited to 5% enrichment, is the best possible strategic outcome for the US vis-a-vis Israel.
Arnold: “Information relayed to the US is used to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.”
Possibly so. The IAEA have offered to discuss modalities to prevent this, but Iran won’t talk about it. However this relates mainly to defence issues, missiles etc, rather than the nuclear program. If there is a nuclear site the US is unaware of that would be at risk of sabotage, chances are it would be in violation of the CSA anyway.
Arnold: “Assuming Iran wants all of the technological capabilities Japan and Brazil have, which means a nuclear weapons option if they were to leave the NPT, do you deny that Iran has the right to those capabilities. If you do deny it, on what basis do you assert that Iran does not have the right to those capabilities?”
The purpose of the NPT is to eliminate nuclear weapons, not create a framework for developing them legally. If some have used it for that purpose, then it is something of a case of fool me once shame on you, fool me twice shame on me.
The article is good, but I don’t like comparisons between Iran and the USSR. Personally, I think the US is more similar to the Soviet Union than Iran is.
Lysander,
“So you argue that Iran faces catastrophic attack…”
I didn’t argue Iran faces attack at all. I said that seems very unlikely to me.
“Iran’s best chance for long term security is it’s nuclear program. They would be fools to give it up.”
Sounds like you mean more than a peaceful nuclear program (which I’ve always argued Iran should press ahead with). If you mean “nuclear weapons program,” I’m afraid we disagree.
Assuming they have a nuclear weapon capability, the bit that says they forego the right to them.
That’s kind of what I’m asking. What text are you claiming says signatories forego the right to nuclear weapon capability?
A lot of Americans have their own custom NPTs in their imaginations that say everything they want it to say, including guaranteeing Israel a regional nuclear monopoly.
Is there any language you can point to in the actual NPT that says Japan or Brazil forego the right to nuclear capability?
I’m not even going to wait for an answer. Of course the treaty says nothing of the sort.
Arnold:
“Now what language in the NPT is not being enforced with respect to Japan and Brazil.”
Aassuming they have a nuclear weapon capability, the bit that says they forego the right to them.
Castellio:
“That young man, Omar Khadr, is Canadian. The Supreme Court of Canada said his human rights have been abused, and have demanded that the Canadian government obtain his repatriation. The Canadian government refuses to make the request.”
Apparently there is little public support for him in Canada owing to his family background, which is why there has never been political impetus behind securing his repatriation.
Lysander, I don’t think there is a way out for Iran. American and Israeli actions so far seem to define a trend that moves the bar two notches for every 1-notch concession Iran grants.
Was Iran’s agreement, today, to enter into unconditional talks a capitulation?
How does it square with Kennedy’s speech:
“[A]bove all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world…”
Richard S Hack’s scenario is chilling, moreso because it is not beyond the realm of the possible: If US and/or Israel attacks Iran, war will come to the United States “homeland;” indeed, it might well happen that Americans turn upon one another in a reprise of the madness that overtook Europe 70 years ago. As Flynt and Hillary Leverett have warned, American Jews will be placed in a very uncomfortable posture.
Lysander,
I completely agree with you: “Or, my personal favorite, how would we really know that Iran has given up it’s nuclear program? It’s a large country and could hide a program anywhere. Just like Iraq did.
No. Iran’s best chance for long term security is it’s nuclear program. They would be fools to give it up.”
But Iran shouldn’t openly carry out tests or anything that invites further international condemnation or risks alienating crucial countries like China or India that are neutral at the moment. Iran should be highly ambiguous. Like Israel :)
If Saddam had seriously wished to end the UN sanctions, he could have accomplished this by broadcasting to the entire world he had destroyed his WMD in 1991.
Except that the Bush administration announced, publicly that the sanctions would not be lifted as long as Hussein was in office, and that destroying his WMD was not enough.
‘Saddam is discredited and cannot be redeemed. His leadership will never be accepted by the world community. Therefore,’ Gates continued, ‘Iraqis will pay the price while he remains in power. All possible sanctions will be maintained until he is gone.’
http://www.lewrockwell.com/spl2/lrb-cockburn-worth-it.html
I’m sometimes amazed at how naively Americans view United States foreign policy decision making.
Eric,
“Iraq, 1991.”
So you argue that Iran faces catastrophic attack, but at the same time insist Iran should halt the one program that could deter such an attack? Do you think stopping it’s nuclear program makes Iran safe?!? It didn’t help Iraq. Or Serbia for that matter.
I strongly suspect that if Iran submitted to US demands now, we would simply move on to the next pretext. Iran is helping the Taliban. Or the Iraqi insurgents. It’s a destabilizing influence. Or, my personal favorite, how would we really know that Iran has given up it’s nuclear program? It’s a large country and could hide a program anywhere. Just like Iraq did.
No. Iran’s best chance for long term security is it’s nuclear program. They would be fools to give it up.
James,
You write: “If Saddam had seriously wished to end the UN sanctions, he could have accomplished this by broadcasting to the entire world he had destroyed his WMD in 1991. I think pride, amour propre, his conception of national honour, prevented him from doing this.”
- Ah I think we have a fundamental disagreement regarding the intent of the sanctions. I firmly believe that the sanctions were not there for wmd purposes but were meant to punish Iraq and hopefully impose regime change. If the regime didn’t collapse, then at least it was sufficiently softened up. The Americans only invaded after they were convinced that Iraq had no wmd capability and thus the means to defend themselves. I have heard some Iranians comment as much and suggest this being the reason for their ambiguity.
Iraq, 1991.
Are you positive there were no ground forces involved?
Are you being serious?
Alan:
That is also why disclosure, and the AP, could be so significant for Iran – it has the power to completely neutralise the US approach. If the US is making things up, all Iran would need to do is take the IAEA inspector to the place this “illegal” activity was alleged to have taken place to demonstrate it was nonsense.
But somehow it didn’t neutralize the US approach for the 2 and half years Iran was implementing it before.
I agree with Iran that this talk of the AP is a pretext for the US to pursue a goal it has independent of disclosure, which is to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option.
You and Eric, except when Eric is cornered, seem to think the AP is an issue in itself. Here’s the thing. If Iran has a Japan option, that compromises Israel’s strategic situation whether Iran discloses AP information or not. The US is committed to defending Israel’s strategic situation whether Iran discloses AP information or not.
The belief you two are expressing, that if Iran was to implement the AP, the US would just have to accept defeat in ensuring none of Israel’s neighbors have a Japan option is absolutely bizarre. Especially given that Iran already implemented the AP. I can’t figure out how a reasonable person could hold that belief.
Eric follows up with “it can’t hurt to try”. But it can hurt to try. Information relayed to the US is used to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. That’s how we get Eric’s theory that possibly the IAEA is actually keeping secrets from the US, while ignoring reports, including a report in the Washington Post that directly says it is not.
We’ve asked Eric directly. Now I’ll ask you.
Assuming Iran wants all of the technological capabilities Japan and Brazil have, which means a nuclear weapons option if they were to leave the NPT, do you deny that Iran has the right to those capabilities. If you do deny it, on what basis do you assert that Iran does not have the right to those capabilities?
Eric,
You start off by saying: “You’re asking me to assume the goal of a US attack on Iran would be regime change.”
- You are wrong about your initial assumption. I thought the goal of the air strikes would be to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities NOT to impose regime change. I do not doubt for a moment American air power and its capacity to impose catastrophic suffering onto civilians. But, if the goal of the strikes is to destroy Iranian nuclear infrastructure, how are they supposed to carry out a successful air campaign when they cannot be sure that they know of all of Iran’s facilities?
“And Iran would end up with no nuclear weapons program – just as today (I believe) it has no nuclear weapons program. No change at all, except that Iran’s people would have suffered very greatly, and the rest of the world will have suffered as well.”
- Now I think it will be very irresponsible for the Iranian government not to have a nuclear weapons program. But I happen to agree with you, I too believe it probably doesn’t have one. The Islamic Republic’s incompetence never fails to astound me. But, those contemplating an attack cannot be sure of that. They risk not knowing of all of Iran’s nuclear facilities. So in the event of an attack, it is possible that those undetected sites would escape destruction thus rendering those air strikes meaningless. Those contemplating an attack would have to take such unlikely probabilities into account.
Arnold,
“Historically, where has dramatic policy change imposed from the air ever worked?”
Iraq, 1991.
Re Russia and Iran, also interesting:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKfdlC8TUOU&feature=player_embedded
Nasser,
You wrote to James:
“So why would Iran implement the additional protocols to win over such people when they are largely ignorant of the issues anyway and has made up their minds to vilify Iran?”
I agree completely that most American people are ignorant of the issues, and that it would be a waste of time to try to “win them over” on most issues. But this very ignorance makes it a simple matter for the bomb-Iran crowd to pick just one issue that even the most simple-minded American can understand: WMD.
The argument made to the American public is often dumbed-down to something like this, and it is repeated every day in many forms:
1. Iran has nice people but its government is illegitimate and run by evil people.
2. Those evil people hate America, and this means that they hate you.
3. Those evil people, who hate you, claim they’re not working on nuclear weapons. But whenever we ask them about their nuclear program, they always say it’s none of our business, even though 100 other countries don’t mind answering the same questions.
4. If Iran gets the bomb, nobody will be able to stop it. It will take over the Middle East, push Israel into the sea, and send thousands of terrorists to the United States.
5. Some people tell us not to worry. A few people say they know that Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons. Others aren’t so sure, but they say we should just cross our fingers and take our chances.
6. What if they’re wrong? What if Iran turns out to be another North Korea?
7. We don’t think America can afford to take that chance. What do you think?
Can you understand why many Americans might find this argument persuasive?
Eric,
You end your last piece with
“Disclosing more about Iran’s nuclear program would be a useful step in the right direction. I have little trouble defending Iran on almost other issues, but I have trouble on that one.”
But you started it off by saying Iran has neither a moral or legal obligation ‘to disclose’ in which case you should have no trouble ‘Defending Iran’. You see how easy it is to get carried away with sloppy language? In any case, would it be accurate to say that everyplace you write ‘Iran should…’, you mean ‘If I were leading Iran, I would…’? I think there are important differences in how these sentences can be interpreted. If you actually mean the latter of the two formulations, it becomes significantly more difficult to disagree with you, although I am going to try to argue that you would be making a mistake.
Essentially what you’ve just asserted is that, yes, in the case of Iraq there was some kind of level of cooperation with weapns inspectors that Saddam could have agreed to that would have limited US freedom to act, and that Saddam’s main problem was that he didn’t agree to such inspections early enough, and that Iran should not make the same mistake. Actually you don’t say this exactly. What you say is that Iraq ‘openned up’ too late to make a difference, you don’t even assert there would have been a different outcome if Iraq had given inspectors free reign over the last two decades, but you urge a kind of a muddled logical jump to that effect, and recomend that Iran proceed by taking it on faith that such a solution exisrs for it’s particular case.
I am going to posit a different interpretation of the buildup to the war, and draw some different conclusions, and I’d like to have your take on my view, and then I’m going to ask you to answer some questions about the cost benefit analysis of your suggested course of action.
I beleive that the US did not invade Iraq because of concern over it’s WMD program. I beleive the US invaded Iraq in order to serve it’s own strategic interests having to do with controlling the oil resources of the gulf. I believe that every country in the world knew this at the time of the invasion,at least at the decison making level, and that the accusations regarding Iraq’s WMD did not play any kind of role in any state policy makers decision about the war, and consequently Iraq’s supposedly late capitulation couldn’t have been a contributing factor to it’s victimization. I beleive there was no serious international opposition to the war with Iraq because, everyone knew Saddam was isolated, weak, and defenseless, that he would ultimately lose, and that backing a lost cause is a waste of any state’s resources, and that on the other hand the US could make things very complicated for any country that wanted a post war relationship with Iraq but opposed the US’ conquest. I beleive the crucial question any state that is considering taking Iran’s side in the current despute must ask itself is “Do I want to back a loser?” And consequently Iran’s only hope of gaining international support is by projecting strength(in a principled, controlled, and responsible fashion), and that obeying the various arbitrary dictates of the US and it’s lackeys(UR enrichment suspension, AP ratification etc…) projects weakness and increases Iran’s isolation. It doesn’t matter where the US tries to draw it’s arbitrary red lines, what’s important is that Iran must make a point of overstepping it. Furthermore I think US and UK domestic opinion can’t be the focus of any Iranian strategy, because it’s too easy for the elites of those countries to shape opinion about Iran, and that in general those electorates are a dumb as f€*k anyway.
Now about your suggested course of action for Iran. What is your response to the forged documentation and the ‘question creep’ and the phantom issues tha go hand in hand with such measures. When Iran had increase cooperation it had to deal with an incredible amount of this nonesense, when it decreased cooperation it was able to control it. Do you deny a causal link. What about the espionage, sabotage and assasination that this level of cooperation enables? Have you decided that these are relatively unimportant nuances? Lastly if Iran agrees to everything the US demands and even gives upt it’s nuclear program altogether, won’t the US simply move the goalposts yet again? How are Iran’s leaders to determine when they have won sufficient amount of world or domestic US opinion to say ‘no’ to Obama?
With all that out of the way, I hope you get a chance to get the rest of your thoughts together and make a stronger case for yourself. No rush though, I think this will be my last post of the day…..
Masoud
When the dust clears, Iran’s government probably would remain in place, just as Saddam’s did after the first Iraq war, but the US would have its way clear to set up whatever inspection scheme it saw fit to impose.
How would the US have the way clear to set up a new inspection scheme? The same government that won’t even ratify the AP will still be in place.
Historically, where has dramatic policy change imposed from the air ever worked? Is there a military person you can link to who thinks it might work? This is really just a fantasy.
worth reading, as a reminder:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/27/hans-blix-iraq-war-inquiry
Disclosing more about Iran’s nuclear program would be a useful step in the right direction. I have little trouble defending Iran on almost other issues, but I have trouble on that one.
You have this theory that the United States must not be able to get information from the IAEA that it could use to hamper Iran’s enrichment program, since if it did, it would have issued a press release that Iran had the day before informed the IAEA about a facility in Fordow, and that Iran only rushed to inform the IAEA because it knew the US would issue this press release today.
Now, the fact that it has been reported that the US actually did receive the information the next day, and for some reason chose not to execute the gambit you thought of will just be ignored.
Arnold – it is not the purpose of the NPT to give a nuclear weapon capability to a state. If Japan and Brazil have one, then it is contrary to the Treaty. I guess it’s a bit like one of those contractual clauses which say that a party’s failure to enforce an aspect of an agreement at one point in time doesn’t preclude them from enforcing it in the future.
OK. Now what language in the NPT is not being enforced with respect to Japan and Brazil.
Nasser,
You’re asking me to assume the goal of a US attack on Iran would be regime change. I seriously doubt any attack will ever happen. But if it does, I doubt the US government will believe that US military action can directly bring about regime change. It may count on a popular revolt, or at least hope for one, but that will be about it. Forced regime change, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, requires protection of infrastructure, lots of ground troops and a great deal of patience. The US hasn’t got a lot of the last two required ingredients left, and protecting infrastructure reduces the effectiveness of an air war.
In the unlikely event that the US ever attacks Iran, I think the US military will recognize that its only real strength lies in its ability to destroy enemy property and people by air attacks, and that its success even at that can be assured only if it doesn’t hamstring itself with concerns about protecting infrastructure. As a result, I’d expect a much quicker and more ruthless air war against Iran’s infrastructure, carefully ratcheted up with brief breathing spells to give Iran opportunities to consider whether it should continue or not. The actual attack won’t last long.
When the dust clears, Iran’s government probably would remain in place, just as Saddam’s did after the first Iraq war, but the US would have its way clear to set up whatever inspection scheme it saw fit to impose. This time, unlike in Iraq, the inspectors wouldn’t leave until (if ever) some US-friendly Iran government came into power. The US would try to bring that about through its usual methods, including sanctions that it would promise to lift the moment an acceptable Iranian government was put in place. It might or might not succeed in that effort, but one thing would be quite certain: all this would be very, very hard on the Iranian people. Undoubtedly, the US people would also be punished for the attack, in several or many different ways that I hardly need to detail here.
And Iran would end up with no nuclear weapons program – just as today (I believe) it has no nuclear weapons program. No change at all, except that Iran’s people would have suffered very greatly, and the rest of the world will have suffered as well.
Nasser,
Is American public opinion all that fickle? It took decades of relentless propaganda to convince the American public Israel is a fellow “democracy” threatend by bad guys who “hate American freedom”!
Iran is wise to have obtained the Chinese cruise missiles that guarantee the Gulf would be closed in event of an insane Israeli or US attack on Iran. I would welcome Russian delivery of the S-300 missile defence system to Iran.
The warmongers will not succeed in setting up an attack on Iran, unless Iran makes mistakes along the lines made by Saddam Hussein.
If Saddam had seriously wished to end the UN sanctions, he could have accomplished this by broadcasting to the entire world he had destroyed his WMD in 1991. I think pride, amour propre, his conception of national honour, prevented him from doing this.
“Speaking of efforts to get Saddam to abdicate or resign, did you ever read about Richard Branson apparently obtaining Saddam’s agreement to leave the country? Branson proposed to fly into Baghdad in his own plane, and take Saddam to another country. But the invasion was launched before Branson could go in.”
- No I did not hear that before. Interesting story though. I remain convinced however that Saddam assumed that there wouldn’t be an attack until the very end.
“Keep in mind the extreme ignorance of the American people, in matters of geography, history, international relations, etc. Many do not know Iran and Iraq are different countries.”
- My point exactly! So why would Iran implement the additional protocols to win over such people when they are largely ignorant of the issues anyway and has made up their minds to vilify Iran?
Nasser,
Speaking of efforts to get Saddam to abdicate or resign, did you ever read about Richard Branson apparently obtaining Saddam’s agreement to leave the country? Branson proposed to fly into Baghdad in his own plane, and take Saddam to another country. But the invasion was launched before Branson could go in.
Keep in mind the extreme ignorance of the American people, in matters of geography, history, international relations, etc. Many do not know Iran and Iraq are different countries.
James,
“The paramlount lesson from the Iraq catastrophe is that the neocon warmongers succeeded in deceiving the American public into thinking Saddam had WMD and was preparing to use it against the US. The deception was vital and imperative for the success of the colossal scam, and of course numerous incompetent news reporters aided and abetted the conspiracy, and covered it up afterwards.”
- The American public supprted a genocidal sanction regime on Iraq! How was it deceived then? You didn’t address my main argument to Eric though; that Iran should not be foolish enough to rest their security on something as fickle as world or American public opinion. Certainly, their experience with wmd attacks during the Iraq war should have taught them that much.
“I understand that Saddam’s disastrous judgement, in the months before the invasion, was in part caused by his reliance on advice from some Germans close to his military, that the US did not intend to invade, and that the build-up of the invasion force was a show for purposes of reinforcing the diplomacy. Possibly, this was a calculated deception, intended to ensure the invasion went ahead.”
- Saddam was a gambler, a very bad one at that. He gambled when he invaded Iran, then Kuwait and then when he convinced himself that the American were not going to invade. You bring up the case of German advisers but his Russian advisers were desperately pleading for him to abdicate his throne in order avert an attack, to no avail.
James Canning, your assertions would carry more weight if they were supported with reasons.
James Canning:
I think you are underestimating Kissinger (and also Nixon).
Nixon got US out of South East Asia.
But not before destroying Cambodia.
Castellio,
The chances the US would employ tactical nukes in an attack on Iran, are zero.
masoud,
I understand that Saddam’s disastrous judgement, in the months before the invasion, was in part caused by his reliance on advice from some Germans close to his military, that the US did not intend to invade, and that the build-up of the invasion force was a show for purposes of reinforcing the diplomacy. Possibly, this was a calculated deception, intended to ensure the invasion went ahead.
masoud,
Saddam did miscalculate catastrophically when he was slow to allow the UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq. Elements of pride, or amour propre, surely entered into this disastrous failure of judgement on Saddam’s part. And of course the warmongers were thrilled, and used the opening to put the war programme into high gear, so that it would be difficult for G W Bush not to proceed. (I think Bush was a dupe or stooge of the warmongers.)
That young man, Omar Khadr, is Canadian. The Supreme Court of Canada said his human rights have been abused, and have demanded that the Canadian government obtain his repatriation. The Canadian government refuses to make the request.
Nasser,
The paramlount lesson from the Iraq catastrophe is that the neocon warmongers succeeded in deceiving the American public into thinking Saddam had WMD and was preparing to use it against the US. The deception was vital and imperative for the success of the colossal scam, and of course numerous incompetent news reporters aided and abetted the conspiracy, and covered it up afterwards.
I think the G W Bush was one of those scammed by the warmongers, and that Bush actually believed Saddam posed a threat to the US. In my view, Dick Cheney played him for a fool, and relied on Bush’s pride for the deception to be kept private.
Eric,
You end your last piece with
“Disclosing more about Iran’s nuclear program would be a useful step in the right direction. I have little trouble defending Iran on almost other issues, but I have trouble on that one.”
But you started it off by saying Iran has neither a moral or legal obligation ‘to disclose’ in which case you should have no trouble ‘Defending Iran’. You see how easy it is to get carried away with sloppy language? In any case, would it be accurate to say that everyplace you write ‘Iran should…’, you mean ‘If I were leading Iran, I would…’? I think there are important differences in how these sentences can be interpreted. If you actually mean the latter of the two formulations, it becomes significantly more difficult to disagree with you, although I am going to try to argue that you would be making a mistake.
Essentially what you’ve just asserted is that, yes, in the case of Iraq there was some kind of level of cooperation with weapns inspectors that Saddam could have agreed to that would have limited US freedom to act, and that Saddam’s main problem was that he didn’t agree to such inspections early enough.
FYI: When the American rulers say “All options are open”, does that include ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons? I think it does.
I think it wishful thinking (and wrong) that the rest of the world will rally together to limit or defeat the ‘rogue state’.
Eric: I appreciate your argument. You are working within the context of popular understanding in America within the relatively ‘educated’ classes. It’s not wrong. I don’t think (after all the words) that there is an intolerable difference between yourself and Arnold, even though Arnold has, to good effect, worked hard to define what that difference is.
fyi,
Many important decision makers in Europe are well aware of the arrogance and stupidity, and political deviousness, of Henry Kissinger, which did so much to cause the deaths of millions more people in Southeast Asia, after Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969.
The warmongers in the US and Israel cannot “sell the war” without deceiving the American public into thinking Iran is on the verge of deplying nukes and using them to attack the US.
Eric,
You suggest that Iran learn from the Iraq experience and be more forthcoming of its nuclear program. Now I certainly agree that it should learn from the Iraq experience.
However, I think Iran should draw some very different lessons than what you prescribe. Iran should note that the real objective of the Americans was regime change and they used the weapons program merely as an excuse to convince their public. And the American public decided to believe whatever their government told them despite their common sense telling them otherwise. Furthermore, the US really decided to attack Iraq only after it was surely disarmed and sufficiently softened up with the sanctions. Isn’t the real reason lesson then that once the US decides on regime change it will make whatever dubious excuses it can think of to carry out its objective and the American public can be counted on to tag along. You suggest that implementation of the additional protocol be thought of sort of as a measure of public diplomacy to win over unconvinced Americans such as yourself to Iran’s side. Iran should note that these are the same people that supported a genocidal sanction regime against Iraq and so it cannot leave its fate upon something so fickle as American public opinion. I say the best way for Iran to avoid bombardment is to highly ambiguous about their true capabilities and to make sure others don’t actually know where all their facilities are and thus know what to bomb.
You also write: “Unfair characterizations are made of its (Iran’s) people.” No I think those characterizations are quite fair.
Alan,
The Russian foreign minister has made clear there is an opening for further negotiations with Iran, to resolve the dispute. The warmongers in the US and Israel who wish for Iran to set itself up for an attack, will of course hope Iran does not engage in further negotiations.
I agree with you that Iran can make a US attack politically risky in the extreme, by further cooperation. The issues of national pride and honour are clearly obstacles that the Iranian government should try to overcome.
pmr9,
The warmongers in Israel and the US comprehend that the US would not “win” any war with Iran. Their object is to damage the Iranian economy and fuel further enmity between the US and Iran, with a view toward helping Israel with its insane effort to crush the national spirit of the Palestinians.
Alan,
“Did you see that Guantanamo thing I posted for you earlier?”
Yes, and I agree with your assessment of that young man. Thanks.
Cyrus:
“And, Iran’s implementation of the AP would not resolve the conflict with the US because the US doesn’t accuse Iran of having a “hidden” nuclear weapons program that the AP would discover. Rather, the US accuses Iran of seeking the CAPABILITY and KNOWLEDGE which COULD allow it to ONE DAY make nukes if it so ever desired. No amount of IAEA inspections can disprove that because it is a purely hypothetical claim about a potential future course of action. The AP is therefore irrelevant to the issue.”
I disagree. The US constantly accuses Iran of having a hidden program. That, for example, was the point of the laptop of death.
That is also why disclosure, and the AP, could be so significant for Iran – it has the power to completely neutralise the US approach. If the US is making things up, all Iran would need to do is take the IAEA inspector to the place this “illegal” activity was alleged to have taken place to demonstrate it was nonsense.
Things appear to be past that stage now though. Iran’s leaders seem to want to take the country down some dodgy dark alley instead.
—–
Eric – I hang my head in shame …
Did you see that Guantanamo thing I posted for you earlier?
Alan,
Welcome back. I wondered when you were going to stop shirking your responsibilities here.
Eric
Richard,
Given the recent flurry of posts here, you may have overlooked my post of July 27 at 1:32 AM. Note especially its last two lines.
Eric
I think both Arnold and Eric may be missing the point: Arnold assumes that Iran seeks a Japan capability. Eric agrees, but argues that it should resume implementing the Additional Protocol to reassure the US and avert an attack. There is no reason to think that Iran is seeking a capability for NPT breakout, and its nuclear program is entirely consistent with the stated objective of having control of its own energy supplies. Iran doesn’t need a nuclear capability because unlike Iraq in 2003 it can easily deter a US attack by conventional means: especially anti-ship missiles. Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz for as long as it chooses, can disable or sink the US surface fleet in the Gulf, and can probably retaliate against oil installations on the other side of the Gulf if its own infrastructure is attacked. Iran, if fighting for its survival as an independent state, can sustain prolonged hardship. The US, on the other hand, will face increasing unrest at home unless it can win a quick victory, and the game will be over with the first failed auction of US government debt.
Arnold – it is not the purpose of the NPT to give a nuclear weapon capability to a state. If Japan and Brazil have one, then it is contrary to the Treaty. I guess it’s a bit like one of those contractual clauses which say that a party’s failure to enforce an aspect of an agreement at one point in time doesn’t preclude them from enforcing it in the future.
Iran’s stance is significantly different now to what it was in 2005. At that time, the desire for a Japan Option was practically zero, judging by the concessions they were willing to make for a settlement. Since then, Ahmadinejad and others have chosen to escalate the confrontation, which suggests a different strategic outlook. It has become less a question of rights, more a question of political game-playing and brinkmanship.
To wit, I notice the latest overture from Iran over a fuel swap deal hit the boards yesterday:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/iran-nuclear-fuel-swap-talks
I can barely contain my excitement.
Masoud,
“In other words Iran has some sort of obligation to sign, ratify, and or implement the Additional Protocol? In your view would this obligation be a legal obligation, a moral obligation or a strategic obligation that serves its own interests?
Strategic. Not either legal or moral.
Unfair accusations are made against Iran continually. Unfair demands are placed upon it. Unfair characterizations are made of its people. All this is what drew me to the subject, and I’ve tried to do what little I can to stem the tide. I’m less optimistic than some that any useful resolution of all this will be worked out any time soon between the US and Iran. I nevertheless believe Iran’s prospects will be good if it sticks to its knitting, builds relationships with others, and keeps the US at bay as US influence continues to diminish in relation to that of Iran’s new friends.
I think Iran’s worst enemies in the US also recognize that time is on Iran’s side. Unfortunately, this only heightens their sense of urgency. And they know one card that can be played with proven success: the WMD card. So they play it – over and over and over, day after day after day.
Iran, like some on this board, typically responds by insisting (and I believe it) that it has no nuclear weapons program, and never will. But if so, these screeching critics argue, what is Iran trying to hide? Why isn’t it, at the very least, signing up for the same breadth of disclosure as 100 other countries? It does almost no good to reply that Iran isn’t legally required to do this, or that Iran tried this once and didn’t get the promised quid pro quo, or that the US will just keep demanding more and so why not draw the line here? These are all fine responses but, take my word for it, they fall on deaf ears with most of the American public.
It would be much more effective if one could reply that Iran is disclosing everything that every other country is disclosing, and more, and that no hint of nuclear weapons has been found despite these broad and deep disclosures. There would still be those critics – many of them, no doubt – who insist that Iran is hiding its weapons program, but a significant chunk of American public opinion would shift toward Iran’s point of view and, nearly as important, the incurable Iran-bashers would be denied a very effective argument.
The arguments I’ve been making here are not my own original thoughts. I am simply reporting what I hear or read every single day, as most observant Americans can confirm. Keeping in mind the indisputable success of this very same WMD tactic in Iraq in 2003, it would be a mistake to minimize its effectiveness. From late 2001 on, I annoyed my dear wife at the breakfast table with “Can you believe this?” reactions to the latest Judith Miller story, and became more and more amazed that Americans accepted what she and many others were putting out day after day, week after week. In the end, though Judith Miller herself was disgraced, and though her employer (the New York Times) formally editorialized against the war shortly before it began, the drink was in us by then, and they had served it to us.
Saddam Hussein helped. His refusal to permit the UN inspectors to return was entirely justified in my view (after the 1991 war ended, it never occurred to me, frankly, that UN inspectors would be taking up permanent residence in Iran). Justified or not, that refusal enabled Saddam’s US enemies to make the very same “What’s he trying to hide?” arguments they’re now making about Iran.
Obviously those arguments worked – even though, by the end, Saddam Hussein was telling the UN “You can look under my bed if you like.” Too late. As I learned from the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, the march to war becomes unstoppable much earlier than I would ever have guessed. I was reminded of Barbara Tuchman’s observation in “Guns of August” that war becomes inevitable once the order for mobilization has been given, well before a government formally decides to declare war. The equivalent to a “mobilization order” is hard to pinpoint in the modern Iraq (or Iran) setting, but I think Tuchman’s point is no less valid.
Wherever the modern-day point of no return may be, it had long since passed when Saddam invited the inspectors to look under his bed. I’m not sure where that point is with Iran, but my very inability to spot it makes me want all the more to reverse the trend – before I find out the no-return point has already been passed.
Disclosing more about Iran’s nuclear program would be a useful step in the right direction. I have little trouble defending Iran on almost other issues, but I have trouble on that one.
masoud:
You and others are wasting your time arging the merits or de-merits of this or that part of the Iranian nuclear case.
If it is not Nuclear case, US/EU will find another cause; say Human Rights.
If not Human Rights, then Gay Rights, followed by Animal Rights (me and my sheep are a family).
This is about Iranian power – Kissinger has understood this and expressed it on different occasions.
Eric,
(Smart phones dont necessarily make smart people. This will be third time i try to post this. I hope there are no longer too many glarring errord.)
I appologize for trying to anticipate what some of your arguments may have been earlier on. I am short on time and only have intermitent access to wifi. I was only trying to move the conversation along and save some time.
“I’ll have to save most of my answers to the many comments for another time, but I want to make sure everyone understands at least this: Japan has adopted the Additional Protocols, which Iran now declines to follow. For that reason, my answer to your question must be — more than I wish it were:
Nobody but Iran knows what Iran is developing. If you’d asked about Japan rather than Iran, someone (the IAEA) could give you a more detailed answer.
That, all by itself, is a great deal of the reason why much of the world – not just the US – worries that Iran may be up to no good. Personally, I doubt that, but I certainly can understand why people would wonder. Many on this website seem to feel it’s in Iran’s interests to keep the world guessing.”
In other words Iran has some sort of obligation to sign, ratify, and or implement the Additional Protocol? In your view would this obligation be a legal obgligation a moral obligation or a strategic obligation that serves its own intrests? If it is not an obligation of one of the three types listed above, or a combination thereof, what kind of an obligation is it?
If you are asserting it is a legal obligation, which i doubt you are, we can leave it at that for now, and I can leave it to others to take up that fork of the discussion. Is it then a moral obligation? Well this is what Ban Ki Moon and Yukio Amano were asserting during the May NPT review conference. I found it stunning, as it had recently been revealed that Korea had been developing an active nuclear weapons program during mr moons tenure as foreign minister, and that japan had played host to US nuclear weapons, if not during the tenure of mr Amano then certainly during the tenure of his party. Of course, since both figures, and countries have become shameless lapdogs of the worlds only nuclear criminal, both crimes have been forgiven. What was the moral judgement of the rest of the world? Iran was not mentioned even once in the review conferences final resolution, though the Nuclear powers who control the UNSC were called out. Remember any single member state of the IAEA, including the P5+1 could have vetoed the resolution because it declined to mention Iran. Additionally, any member state of the IAEA, including the P5+1 could have vetoed the final resolution because it called out the Nuclear Weapons states. The fact that the resolution was worded in the specific way it was worded says a lot about where world opinion about Iran’s nuclear program is.
So I guess Iran may have a moral obligation to adopt the NPT, but the question really becomes: who’s moral judgement should be at play?
Does Iran have a strategic obligation to adopt the NPT? Consider that all the phantom issues raised during Irans implementation of the AP were resolved only when Iran commited itself to the painful incremental process of limting the IAEAs activities to their statutorily defined roles.
Consider also that Iran, following its current course, is winning in the court of world opinion. About a third of the IAEA bog, a body that adopts every other resolution by consensus and ridiculously rigged to favor european NSG countries , refuses to vote to condemn Iran. One fifth of the SC, which is dominated by Iran’s adversaries, also refuses to condemn Iran. The IAEA general assembly last september also voted to condemn Israels nuclear arsenal and to preemptively declare any attack on Irans nuclear infrastructure illegal. This wasnt happening in 2004.
If you disagree with the preceeding paragraph, please note that the Iranian politicians advocating the approach you suggest were sorely punished for their foolishness in 2005. Ahmadinejad was rewarded for his stand last year. If you disagree with Irans choices, you should still respect its freedom to make its own choices.
Is Iran making a mistake? Well from a certain point of view it might be, in roughly the same sense that rape victims ‘bring it on themselves’. I can’t say that these kind of viewpoints are incorrect in an absolute sense, only that I find them distasteful.
Post Script:
Eric, you repeatedly reference America’s concerns, and ‘World Opinion’ in your arguments. Do you beleive America was in some relevant sense concerned about Iraq’s Nuclear Program? Do you beleive that for the case of Iraq, ‘World Concern’ was what the US and it’s lackeys in the IAEA, UNSCOM and the various councils that either silently or activeley abetted the invasion of Iraq represented it to be? Do you beleive that there was any kind of cooperation formula that Iraq could have applied to stave off invasion? If your answer to any of these questions is yes, then we can leave the debate at that. If your answer is no, my next question would be: what methodology do you use to differentiate between the levels of honesty being applied by America and its allies in the UN bureaucracy and the various councils controlled by them, on a case by case basis.
Incidentally Iran has also offered to permanently ratify the AP if its nuclear rights are recognized. The US has refused.
Iran did implement the Additional Protocol for over 2.5 years. Furthermore, the answers that Iran gave to the IAEA under the “Modalities Agreement” were beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol. So even if Iran does permanently implement the Additional Protocol (unlike Argentina, Egypt, Brazil etc.) there is no real liklihood that there would be any surprises. The burden of proof is simply not on Iran anyway. And, Iran’s implementation of the AP would not resolve the conflict with the US because the US doesn’t accuse Iran of having a “hidden” nuclear weapons program that the AP would discover. Rather, the US accuses Iran of seeking the CAPABILITY and KNOWLEDGE which COULD allow it to ONE DAY make nukes if it so ever desired. No amount of IAEA inspections can disprove that because it is a purely hypothetical claim about a potential future course of action. The AP is therefore irrelevant to the issue. The US deliberately frames the issue in this way specifically to make the IAEA’s (lack of) findings on Iran an irrelevancy. Remember, the entire nuclear issue is pretextual anyway, and the US wants to keep it alive rather than resolving it. By framing the accusation against Iran in a purely hypothetical sense about a potential future course of conduct, it conveniently makes the accusation against Iran un-disprovable. After all ANY country could be similarly accused.
Arnold,
Time to end this discussion, since we’re getting too testy with each other. We’ll have to agree to disagree.
Eric
“My only and simply point is that, since you don’t know (I don’t either – nobody but Iran does) whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program, you have no way of knowing whether we would learn anything useful if Iran were to disclose all that is required under the Additional Protocols and new Code 3.1. Maybe we would learn more; maybe we wouldn’t. I don’t know, and neither do you.”
Any None NWS member of NPT, when it achieves a full nuclear enrichment capability it also becomes a second strike (Respond) capable entity, considering it has the knowhow and capability of how to put together the essential other elements, based on this assumption and if correct that Iran already has the knowhow and the industrial infrastructure to put together a nuclear detonation device and has the industrial scale enrichment capability in addition to a small stockpile of LEU, then safely it can be said that Iran already is capable of Responding to a nuclear first strike.
This already has militarily changed the balance of the power in the region, but politically is still not yet accepted which is the point of the coming negotiations.
Fiorangela:
Yes, the WASPs do have some positive attributes; work-ethic, inventiveness, and honesty.
Arnold Evans, re Why did Obama wait until AFTER Iran had disclosed Qom to disclose Qom…
Be aware of the forum and the optics of Obama’s BREAKING NEWS disclosure of Iran’s “secret nuclear weapons plant” “buried deep” in the mountains near “Qom,” that bad, bad place that represents ISLAMISM and its attendant evils.
Obama made the announcement from the stage at the G 20 Summit, surrounded by heads of state of major European countries. Not just the usual gaggle of US media attending to Obama but press from all over the world was gathered in Pittsburgh to turn Pittsburgh’s pride and joy, the David L Lawrence Convention Center, into the new Wannsee, the locus of Obama’s “final solution” to the Iran problem.
Paul, I’ve been reading Herzl’s establishing document, Der Judenstaat, about the nature of the zionist state. I got stuck when I came to this line:
“At the same time we continue to produce an abundance of mediocre intellects who find no outlet, and this endangers our social position as much as does our increasing wealth. Educated Jews without means are now rapidly becoming Socialists. Hence we are certain to suffer very severely in the struggle between classes, because we stand in the most exposed position in the camps of both Socialists and capitalists.”
“mediocre intellects”
Steve Clemons
William Kristol
Charles Krauthammer
Patrick Clawson
Richard Perle
Paul Wolfowitz
mediocre intellects
who have displaced the WASPs who founded America’s universities, and who have bought and subverted America’s once-proud “think tanks” such as Brookings.
zionism is affirmative action for “mediocre intellects.”
I asked you about a week ago whether you had any thoughts on why the US had delayed publicizing the Qom facility until several days after Iran had already reported it to the IAEA. That allowed Iran simply to shrug and say “Old news. We reported that several days ago.” Anyone who’d passed Public Relations 101 and knew of Iran’s disclosure would have put out a news release immediately, creating the impression that Iran had dashed for the telephone just seconds ahead of the US’ public disclosure.
I linked to this twice, about a week ago. The Washington Post confirms my loose lips assertion, that Obama had a copy of the disclosure a day after Iran sent it to the IAEA. I’m not sure what your public relations point could demonstrate in light of that.
You’ve also responded to threads where I linked to it, are you saying this is your first time seeing it?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092503913.html
Well now that you’ve seen it, is this where you respond to my assertion that given a publicly acknowledged US program to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program, along with a recently assassinated Iranian nuclear scientist, you acknowledge that giving the US additional information about its program has a real cost, or is this where you continue to pretend not to have seen it?
Here’s an approach that might work, for example. Immediately knock out the power grid for greater Tehran, plus 500 major highway and railroad bridges in and around the city, and as many water and oil pipelines as US bombers can find in the Tehran area. Threaten to do exactly the same for the next five largest cities 2 days later unless Iran agrees by then to whatever the IAEA deems necessary to ensure that Iran is not working on nuclear weapons. Same thing two days later for the next five largest cities, and so on. How long would Iran’s government continue to think that nuclear weapons development was in Iran’s best interests?
I’ll estimate about 36 hours.
So Iran responds to this by submitting? Then the US should do it now. Matter of fact, then the US should do it to China and get them to revalue their currency. Then do it to Moscow and get them out of Georgia.
So this will be filed under fundamental differences of opinion about the potency of US military power.
Iran actually would respond by going to war with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, and attacking energy facilities throughout the region. At the end of the process, Iran will emerge, likely with a bomb. I can’t prove that unless it happens, but US military planners likely have a more reasonable view of the coercive power of the US military – as I said, otherwise the US would do it now.
What Iran is insisting on here is special treatment, not equal treatment.
Japan has a nuclear option. Brazil has a nuclear option. You’re looking at this backwards, and it seems to me you’re starting from the US is right to try to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option fitting your argument to that, ignoring contrary facts.
Before there was an AP, Japan had a nuclear option. Iran, under the Shah, and effectively a colony of the United States did not yet have one, but the US’ opposition to it getting one was muted and Iran was making progress in that direction.
After Iranian independence, the US adopted the position that an Iranian nuclear option is intolerable. This is a matter of history. The reason an Iranian nuclear option is intolerable to the US has nothing to do with the level of Iranian disclosure. Another matter of history.
The US has, since the Iranian revolution and long before the conception of the AP opposed Iran’s achieving the status Japan has achieved using every tool at its disposal. These tools include IAEA personnel sympathetic to US goals, they include a majority bloc on the IAEA governors board, they include the ability to pressure the UN Security Council.
If it was true that the United States would accept Iran with a Japan option if it disclosed more, then the US could say so, and the dispute would be over. Iran has presented proposals to that effect. The US has never presented a proposal that would leave Iran with a Japan option.
More than that, Barack Obama said he aims to prevent Iran from having the capability to build a weapon. Many figures in US administrations have said that continuously.
The proposition that the US treats Iran differently from Japan for reasons other than Irans level of disclosure is not something that can be reasonably debated. You’re saying everyone in policy making positions in the US for at least the last decade have been lying. It is a ridiculous position.
But we get back to the core issue of the dispute, as I’ve been saying for weeks now. You claim you are not uncomfortable with Iran having the same nuclear capabilities Japan has. I honestly do not believe you because your arguments are really bending to reach the conclusion that Iran should submit to the US campaign to prevent that.
Do you claim that the US is not uncomfortable with Iran having the same nuclear capabilities as Japan, regardless of disclosure? Do you claim Israel is not uncomfortable with Iran having the same nuclear capabilities as Japan, if only Iran adapts the AP? This is a question like what is 2 + 2. If you answer wrong on either, this discussion is not worth continuing.
You really over-estimate the impact of AP disclosures on a nation’s strategic situation. And I don’t think it is because you’ve evaluated that impact, I think you over-estimate it because that’s what you have to do to reach the conclusion you are trying to reach.
Japan’s strategic situation is that if it is provoked to leave the NPT, it can build a weapon. Nothing Japan discloses makes that more or less true. It is widely accepted as a fact. Until Japan leaves the NPT, it cannot build a weapon because it does not have fissile material that is unaccounted for.
Iran is approaching the point where it will be able to build a weapon if it leaves the NPT. Until Iran leaves the NPT it cannot build a weapon because it does not have fissile material that is unaccounted for. Nothing Iran discloses or does not disclose will directly change that.
What Iranian disclosure can do is give the US better information to use in its campaign to prevent Iran from achieving a Japan option. More realistic forged documentation, better targeting for any US strike of Iranian nuclear facilities, a better picture of which Iranian figures to target for espionage or even assassination.
After the US accepts that its campaign to prevent Iran from attaining a Japan option has failed, after the US has made a political decision not to use Iranian disclosure as a way of generating technical and political pressure then Iranian disclosure stops being a big deal. Iran at that point, as it has proposed repeatedly, can implement the AP and more without any strategic cost, as Japan has.
Richard Steven Hack:
The best you can state about the economic cost of the war is that US will be using weapons systems that have already been paid – the munitions, the planes, the missiles, and the soldiers.
We shall have to wait and see what happens in the actual war once the dust settles.
In regards to the first use of nuclear weapons against a non-nculear state of NPT; that pretty much destroys the NPT bargain as it first consequence. The entire structure of alliances since WWII will unravel rather rapidly as states will seek their own deterrence.
Unless those that have ordered a nuclear strike are removed from power, tried, and swiftly punished, the nuclear rouge will become a target of every major state on this planet. If her decision-makers are not punished, then there will be first period of peace followed by more wars as the power of this nuclear rouge state is opposed.
Once a rouge state has used nuclear weapons, others could follow. This will be an intolerbale burden on other states. The best is to confront and remove the problem at the source by forcing that state to disarm.
Yet another alternapundit opines that we need not worry about the attack on Iran that Obama is relentlessly pushing towards …
http://www.truth-out.org/stop-hyperventilating-obama-will-not-choose-war-with-iran61698
… notice some of the pillars of his argument, though. There is the pure propaganda that Evil Evil Iran has a TERRA network throughout the (um, mostly Sunni) Middle East, all of it aimed at Israel, of course, because propagandists must never cease to push the notion that the only thing Iran ever has on its mind is ‘wiping Israel off the map’. Following up this ‘point’ is the claim that Iran WANTS to be attacked. Yes, that’s the most brazen blame-the-victim ‘thinking’ one can imagine, yet it’s not the first time I’ve seen it.
This guy even cites David Frum, as if that buttresses his opinion – yes, David Frum who disgraced himself with his nonsensical claims about Iraq that led to tragedy.
So much for lefty pundits, as coopted a bunch as one could hope to see, circling the wagons around Obama’s war policy.
Eric,
I appologize for trying to anticipate what some of your arguments may have been earlier on. I am short on time and only have intermitent access to wifi. I was only trying to move the conversation along and save some time.
“Nobody but Iran knows what Iran is developing. If you’d asked about Japan rather than Iran, someone (the IAEA) could give you a more detailed answer.
That, all by itself, is a great deal of the reason why much of the world – not just the US – worries that Iran may be up to no good. Personally, I doubt that, but I certainly can understand why people would wonder. Many on this website seem to feel it’s in Iran’s interests to keep the world guessing.”
In other words Iran has some sort of obligation to sign, ratify, and or implement the Additional Protocol? In your view would this obligation be a legal obgligation a moral obligation or a strategic obligation that serves its ow intrests?
If you are asserting it is a legal obligation.Is it then a moral obligation? Well this is what Ban Ki Moon and Yukio Amano were asserting during the May NPT review conference. I found it stunning, as it had recently been revealed that Korea had been developing an active nuclear weapons program during mr moons tenure as foreign minister, and that japan had played host to US nuclear weapons, if not during the tenure of mr Amano then certainly during the tenure of his party. Of course, since both figures, and countries have become shameless lapdogs of the worlds only nuclear criminal, both crimes have been forgiven. What was the moral judgement of the rest of the world? Iran was not mentioned even once in the review conferences final resolution, though the Nuclear powers who control the UNSC were. So I guess Iran may have a moral obligation to adopt the NPT, but the question really becomes: who’s moral judgement should be at play?
Does Iran have a strategic obligation to adopt the NPT? Consider that all the phantom issues raised during Irans implementation of the AP were resolved only when Iran commited itself to the painful incremental process of limting the IAEAs activities to their statutorily defined roles.
Consider also that Iran, following its current course, is winning in the court of world opinion. About a third of the IAEA bog, a body that adopts every other resolution by consensus and ridiculously rigged to favor european NSG countries , refuses to vote to condemn Iran. One fifth of the SC, which is dominated by Iran’s adversaries, also refuses to condemn Iran. The IAEA general assembly last september also voted to condemn Israels nuclear arsenal and to preemptively declare any attack on Irans nuclear infrastructure illegal. This wasnt happening in 2004.
If you disagree with the preceeding paragraph, please note that the Iranian politicians advocating the approach you suggest were sorely punished for their foolishness in 2005. Ahmadinejad was rewarded for his stand last year. If you disagree with Irans choices, you should still respect its freedom to make its own choices.
Is Iran making a mistake? Well from a certain point of view it might be, in roughly the same sense that rape victims ‘bring it on themselves’. I can’t say that these kind of viewpoints are incorrect in an absolute sense, only that I find them distasteful.
The Iranians have so far been very careful with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that would change as the western policy of confrontation increases. The Iranians have great influence in the north and east of Afghanistan (which is so far quiet) and most of Iraq.
Israel is too dependant on the US and it can not survive with nuclear weapons alone.
Eric
“I asked you about a week ago whether you had any thoughts on why the US had delayed publicizing the Qom facility until several days after Iran had already reported it to the IAEA. That allowed Iran simply to shrug and say “Old news. We reported that several days ago.” Anyone who’d passed Public Relations 101 and knew of Iran’s disclosure would have put out a news release immediately, creating the impression that Iran had dashed for the telephone just seconds ahead of the US’ public disclosure.
Any thoughts on that?”
Eric- For the same PR 101 reason if US as claimed at the time, knew of the Fardo (Qum) site for more than a year before EB told them , why then they did not announce it ahead of time and use the PR momentum before Iran release the news’ once that site was announced by Iran the US claimed “ oh of course we knew about that for years but didn’t want to talk about it” sorry that was another BS laptop moment, like Mashhadies ( Residence of Mashhad on eastern Iran), US’s afterword answer for the questions they don’t know the answers is “ we know but we wouldn’t want to tell”
“Nobody but Iran knows what Iran is developing. If you’d asked about Japan rather than Iran, someone (the IAEA) could give you a more detailed answer.
That, all by itself, is a great deal of the reason why much of the world – not just the US – worries that Iran may be up to no good. Personally, I doubt that, but I certainly can understand why people would wonder. Many on this website seem to feel it’s in Iran’s interests to keep the world guessing.”
In other words Iran has some sort of obligation to sign, ratify, and or implement the Additional Protocol? In your view would this obligation be a legal obgligation a moral obligation or a strategic obligation that serves its ow intrests?
If you are asserting it is a legal obligation.Is it then a moral obligation? Well this is what Ban Ki Moon and Yukio Amano were asserting during the May NPT review conference. I found it stunning, as it had recently been revealed th
Eric – a bit off topic, but as a lawyer, I thought you may be interested by this piece about the military tribunals for Guantanamo inmates.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072610.html
I particularly enjoyed this interchange between the judge and the defendant, Omar Khadr, who was arrested in Afghanistan aged 15 (now 23):
“Perhaps Judge Parrish did not understand Khadr’s statement [that he intended to boycott the proceedings], because he asked, “Will you represent yourself? I’m not going to release [defence counsel] Jackson if you choose not to represent yourself.” Khadr reiterated that he did not want any lawyer to represent him. Assuming Khadr meant that he wanted to represent himself, the judge asked, “Have you ever studied the law?” Khadr replied, “This is a military commission. You don’t need to study the law.” Judge Parrish: “What is your education?” Khadr: “Five years in the military commissions.”
As if the judge knew nothing about Khadr’s background or was working off a script, he asked, “Have you ever represented yourself or anyone else in this type of proceeding? Are you familiar with the rules of evidence?” Khadr responded, “The rules are always changing, so knowing the rules doesn’t really matter.” Parrish: “Are you familiar with the rules of the military commissions?” Khadr answered, “In general. My lawyers are as untrained as I am. No one has any experience in these military commissions.” Indeed, the new rules implementing the 2009 Act had materialized late in the afternoon of April 26, the first day of Khadr’s pre-trial hearing.”
I have nothing but the greatest admiration for that young man.
Eric – you said:
“You emphasize “discrimination” against Iran, as if all it’s requesting here is equal treatment. But all I’m recommending is that Iran start telling the world a lot more about its nuclear program. That’s not discriminating against Iran. Roughly 100 countries make the very same disclosures, without complaint – Japan among them.
What Iran is insisting on here is special treatment, not equal treatment.”
I think that is a very interesting point. Iran being in non-compliance since 2005 has proven a real headache for everybody and it seems how to deal with it, to some extent, gets made up as we go along simply because the situation is so unique.
But I agree with you that “dislosure” is the key. It is not necessarily a question of “proving a negative” although I acknowledge that the Safeguards/AP by definition require this. The IAEA are still required to formulate specific questions from any “evidence” they have, and “disclosure” becomes “merely” a matter of answering the specific questions formulated by the IAEA. Iran refuses to answer them.
With regard to the comparison with Japan, I argue that it is not valid on the grounds of Iran’s history of covert development, and their status of non-compliance. That requires different treatment.
Of course, Iran has every right to say they don’t want to be governed by the rules of the NPT/CSA/IAEA, withdraw, and do what they like at any time. But it can equally be argued they are using the rules to achieve the same end while avoiding the consequences of a withdrawal.
Liz, while I do buy your argument regarding Iran’s conventional deterrent, I have a few questions about your other remarks:
You write: “In addition to that the Iranians will have little option but to drive the US out of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf region.”
- How exactly do you suppose Iran would do this? It seems unable thus far! The Gulf Arabs continue to be hostile to Iran and welcome an American presence. And regarding Afghanistan, Iran doesn’t seem to have much influence in the Southern and Eastern parts of that country like say Pakistan does.
You also write: “For the people of the region, at least, that will effectively mean the end of America’s superpower status and, subsequently, it will severely weaken Israel’s ability to continue to exist as a state.”
I can’t see how this has any impact on Israel. Even if somehow America’s role in the Persian Gulf was reduced, how exactly would Iran influence America’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean? And are you suggesting that Israel cannot exist without this level of American help? It has nuclear weapons and thus the means to protect itself just fine.
Mr. Brill: “What Iran is insisting on here is special treatment, not equal treatment.”
This comment is just bizarre, under the circumstances.
This clearly demonstrates your basic hostility toward Iran.
“My recommendation would just buy time – quite a bit, I’ll predict, at a fairly low compliance cost.”
Completely speculative, and easily refuted by looking at the US backing away from the Turkey-Brazil deal. That sealed the fact in stone that the US does not care about disclosure, or the Iranian nuclear program AT ALL.
And you still haven’t said ONE WORD about WHAT Iran would disclose – again aside from vague suggestions about the AP, and now the MAP. In fact, Iran complied with the MAP during the period from December 2003 when it signed an agreement to comply with the AP (which included the MAP) and suspend enrichment. After reading more, I became aware that I was confused over the MAP – in fact, the MAP IS the AP at this time. And Iran complied with it UNTIL the US pressured the IAEA to ILLEGALLY refer the Iran case file to the UNSC.
You might also note that although the IAEA Board of Governors accepted the MAP in 1997, many of the NPT signatory nations have NOT signed on to it. As of 2005, the IAEA reported that:
“All told, 106 States have signed additional protocols as of 25 November 2005. However, additional protocols are in force with only 69 countries. Protocols are also implemented with Iran and Libya pending formal entry into force.” As of 2008, according to Wikipedia:
“As of 9 October 2008, 127 countries have signed Additional protocols, and 88 have brought them into force[6]. The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.[7] Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,[8] and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,[9] but has not ruled out signing.[10]”
Therefore Iran was AHEAD of the game in complying with the AP, not requesting “special treatment” as you claim. In fact, Brazil, as has been discussed here, has gone far beyond what Iran has done – and nobody seems to care.
So your ENTIRE argument about “disclosing more” is completely refuted. Iran HAS COMPLIED in the past, and the only reason they are not complying NOW is because the US DIDN’T CARE that Iran complied.
So your Pollyanna notion that if Iran suddenly decided to sign the AP and comply with the MAP NOW would suddenly “buy them time” is just ridiculous. At best, it would buy only the amount between one IAEA report and the next.
Meanwhile the US and Israel would be ginning up another fake NIE to accuse Iran of hiding a “secret program”.
Face it – you really believe Iran HAS a “secret program” and all this “disclosure” talk is code for that.
Here is what Mohamed ElBaradei had to say, May 23, 2009
“There is no way you are able to deny them the knowledge. But if they do not have the industrial capacity, they do not have weapons. It is as simple as that. I have seen the Iranians ready to accept putting a cap on their enrichment [program] in terms of tens of centrifuges, and then in terms of hundreds of centrifuges. But nobody even tried to engage them on these offers. Now Iran has 5,000 centrifuges. The line was, “Iran will buckle under pressure.” But this issue has become so ingrained in the Iranian soul as a matter of national pride. They talk about their nuclear program as if they had gone to the moon. And they also understood—unfortunately, not wrongly—that if you have the know-how, you’re still kosher within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And yet you are sending a message: I can do this; I have bought myself an insurance policy, and you don’t want to mess with me.”
You can see that ElBaradei himself agrees with Arnold’s point and with my point: that Iran can have the KNOWLEDGE to build a weapon, and that if they do, they are still within both the letter and the spirit of the NPT. And yet they still have by definition the capability to construct a bomb.
You might want to read this analysis as well:
Iran’s Nuclear Energy Program. Part VII: Are Referral of Iran’s Nuclear Dossier to the Security Council and Resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747 Legal?
payvand dot com/news/07/dec/1044.html
You might want to read this article by Gordon Prather:
Iran’s Sisyphean Task
www dot antiwar dot com/prather/?articleid=12448
This is exactly the same task I have here – rolling the boulder up the hill of your constant refrains for “more disclosure”, then having it roll back down again when you ignore the facts, and just demand “more disclosure” all over again.
Iran has already done more than enough to prevent confrontation and war. It would be foolish to appease the US and the EU any further, as they have shown themselves to be completely untrustworthy and unscrupulous. The Iranian “nuclear weapon” is its ability to destroy all the oil and gas instillations, pipelines, and tankers in the region. Such an event will make the 1929 Great Depression look like an economic hiccup. In addition to that the Iranians will have little option but to drive the US out of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf region. For the people of the region, at least, that will effectively mean the end of America’s superpower status and, subsequently, it will severely weaken Israel’s ability to continue to exist as a state. Iranians do not war. However, if it is imposed upon them, they will fight like Hezbollah did in the 2006 war. The difference is that the Iranians are much better prepared and almost infinitely more powerful.
Mr. Brill: “Have you read the Model Additional Protocols?”
OK, I just did. You’ll note two things:
1) There is nothing in the MAP that requires Iran to provide information on their ballistic missile program, EVEN if the IAEA thinks a warhead may be shaped for the delivery of nuclear weapons. That alone means the US would not be satisfied by the MAP and would demand even more information, even if Iran fully complied with the MAP.
2) The IAEA is enjoined from revealing any sort of confidential information to third parties. As Arnold has pointed out, this is problematical with the US.
3) We don’t know – and more specifically, YOU don’t know – if Iran is ALREADY complying with every aspect of the MAP, despite it lack of ratification for the AP, or if Iran fully complied with the MAP during the period when it was following the AP.
So we’re back to: “disclose more” WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE that Iran is NOT ALREADY DOING SO.
Not to mention that the basic problem of “disclose more” remains – that Iran already has at one point and did not get any benefit from it.
Nice try. Complete fail.
Arnold,
“Reading the rest of that comment, I’d say our first disagreement is over the potency of a US military option.”
You’ve certainly pinpointed a disagreement. I agree that the US probably can’t force a regime change, that Iran can punish the US severely in many ways, that oil prices would spike and extend the world-wide recession or start a new one, and that many other very bad things would happen to Americans, Iranians and other people all over the world. My strong desire to prevent all that is precisely why I recommend that Iran try to reduce the risk of US attack by volunteering more information about its nuclear program. It’s not much of a burden; it can’t hurt; it might help.
But if, God forbid, the US nevertheless did attack Iran, the possibility that Iran could just hunker down in underground caves for a year, finish up a bomb and deliver it is not even plausible to me. I think you only increase the risk of war by suggesting otherwise.
Bear in mind that the US military’s objectives in Iraq, especially in the second Iraq war, did not include destroying Iraq’s infrastructure. Destroying infrastructure makes nation building much more difficult. But nation building is something an attacker only needs to think about if regime change is on its list of objectives. Given the US’ poor track record on nation building, and the US public’s strong aversion to yet another multi-year war in the Middle East, I seriously doubt that the US will have regime-change and nation-building on its to-do list if it should ever attack Iran. Just a quick in-and-out air war, followed by a very tough and long-term inspection regime – essentially like the 1991 Iraq war and the 12 years that followed it, during which the US left Saddam in power and set up a very intrusive inspection regime (until, of course, the inspectors left and Saddam declined to let them return).
Others have argued that Iran would build a bomb after a US attack “if Iran considered that to be in its best interests,” an observation so obvious that I hesitate even to repeat it here. (Why, after all, would Iran build a bomb, or do anything else, if it did NOT think it was in its best interests?) It would not be difficult, however, for the US military to persuade Iran that it would not be in Iran’s interests to spend the next year working on a bomb in underground caves.
Here’s an approach that might work, for example. Immediately knock out the power grid for greater Tehran, plus 500 major highway and railroad bridges in and around the city, and as many water and oil pipelines as US bombers can find in the Tehran area. Threaten to do exactly the same for the next five largest cities 2 days later unless Iran agrees by then to whatever the IAEA deems necessary to ensure that Iran is not working on nuclear weapons. Same thing two days later for the next five largest cities, and so on. How long would Iran’s government continue to think that nuclear weapons development was in Iran’s best interests?
I’ll estimate about 36 hours.
That doesn’t mean a US attack would be a smart idea for the US. Quite the contrary. Reading your rosy predictions about Iran’s ability to withstand a US attack makes me think I worry about it more than you do – enough to suggest that Iran’s government take a few simple steps to see whether they can reduce that risk.
Remember: time is on Iran’s side. What I am suggesting will not, and is not intended to, entice a grateful US into making all sorts of concessions (or any concessions) to Iran on its nuclear program. My recommendation would just buy time – quite a bit, I’ll predict, at a fairly low compliance cost. During that time, Iran can continue developing its peaceful nuclear program, the US’ power and (therefore) belligerence are likely to wane, the rest of the world (notably Russia and China) are likely to feel that Iran is doing all that can be expected of it, sanctions may be eased (or at least evaded with greater ease and frequency), and the whole problem may eventually just go away.
“You admit the US is discriminating against Iran relative to Japan. That’s important because the reasons the US discriminates against Iran are not primarily driven by Iran’s level of disclosure.”
So you believe, but I think that’s a belief worth testing, especially since I see little downside for Iran in doing so.
You emphasize “discrimination” against Iran, as if all it’s requesting here is equal treatment. But all I’m recommending is that Iran start telling the world a lot more about its nuclear program. That’s not discriminating against Iran. Roughly 100 countries make the very same disclosures, without complaint – Japan among them.
What Iran is insisting on here is special treatment, not equal treatment.
Arnold,
“You have not addressed this, except to ask if the IAEA can keep secrets from the US. The answer is no. I have not seen that answer incorporated in your position or refuted.”
That’s not a fair point, Arnold. You declined to respond to my pointed questions aimed at casting doubt on your “loose lips” assumption.
I asked you about a week ago whether you had any thoughts on why the US had delayed publicizing the Qom facility until several days after Iran had already reported it to the IAEA. That allowed Iran simply to shrug and say “Old news. We reported that several days ago.” Anyone who’d passed Public Relations 101 and knew of Iran’s disclosure would have put out a news release immediately, creating the impression that Iran had dashed for the telephone just seconds ahead of the US’ public disclosure.
Any thoughts on that?
Richard,
“Iran CANNOT DISCLOSE WHAT IT DOES NOT HAVE!”
Have you read the Model Additional Protocols?
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf
“Again, this is really a waste of everyone’s time.”
Maybe so. In any case, I agree it’s true for the two of us on this issue.
OK, Let’s re-anchor this,
[ARNOLD: ON WHAT "NUCLEAR OPTION" (OR "NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY," IF YOU PREFER) MEANS, PLEASE GIVE SOME CAREFUL THOUGHT TO WHETHER MY FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION MAKES SENSE TO YOU: THE ILLUSION OR REALITY THAT IRAN HAS A DELIVERABLE BOMB –
To that, the answer is no.
OR, IF YOU PREFER, THAT IRAN IS CLOSE ENOUGH TO ONE THAT IT COULD WITHDRAW FROM THE NPT (OR NOT - JUST KICK OUT THE INSPECTORS) AND FINISH UP ITS BOMB BEFORE THE US COULD STOP IT BY ATTACKING.
To that, the answer is essentially yes, except that I'd leave room for the US to lack confidence that it could stop Iran's weapon program, which is slightly different.
One commenter at armscontrolwonk stated that uranium is essentially indestructible. Bomb Natanz and Iran can send teams with vacuums into the tunnels and get a lot of it back. I've looked and not found verification of that, but it seems plausible. If that is the case, US confidence that it could set Iran's nuclear program back is far less than otherwise, but even otherwise, the US has to assume after bombing Natanz, Iran will continue to enrich uranium.
HOWEVER YOU DEFINE IT – AS LONG AS YOUR DEFINITION IS REASONABLY CLOSE TO WHAT I MEAN BY THE TERM – MY ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT THE US, JUSTIFIED OR NOT, WON'T BE WILLING TO LET IRAN GET THAT FAR WITHOUT EITHER (1) INSISTING THAT IRAN TAKE SOME CONCRETE STEPS (E.G. MUCH BROADER DISCLOSURES, MORE INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS) TO PERSUADE THE US THAT IRAN IS NOT AS CLOSE AS THE US HAD FEARED]; OR (2) IF IRAN REFUSES, ATTACKING IRAN TO ENSURE THAT IRAN DOESN’T GET THAT FAR. I HOPE YOU’LL AGREE THIS FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION IS THE ONE WE OUGHT TO USE.]
I’ll agree with the definition. 1) I’m not sure Iran is not already across that definition, in which case it is clear that the US will not bomb immediately upon Iran’s arrival. 2) Attacking Iran may not work to prevent Iran from moving forward with its nuclear program. If the US does not think attacking will cause Iran to lose its nuclear capability, then it is just striking for spite. The US would pay a heavy cost for an attack just out of spite.
A lot of Americans have this idea that the US military is the ultimate trump card. That the US tries to be nice, but in the end can fall back on its military to make anything it wants to happen in the world happen. There are scenarios, and I think this is one, where the US military is not able to bring what the US hopes to accomplish into being.
*****
Reading the rest of that comment, I’d say our first disagreement is over the potency of a US military option. I just don’t think the US can stop Iran’s nuclear program with bombs. Israel would like to see Iran bombed for short-term reasons. The US in a Middle East Vietnam would cause, as the Leverett’s warned, a severe anti-Zionist backlash in the US, deservedly so because the US itself is not threatened by Iran having a Japan option. I don’t think the US bombing Iran is, in the long term, good for Israel or Zionism, but Netanyahu is a better evaluator of that. I’ll defer to him. But the US is certainly worse off if it bombs Iran.
You call Iran building a weapon over a year after leaving the NPT unrealistic. I guess that reflects your idea that US bombing attacks are limitlessly potent. The US will bomb Natanz. But then Iran will put the pieces back together. Some facilities will be missed. Some assets will be salvageable. Iran will take stock and, deeper underground, reconstruct its program with the sole intention of building a weapon. When I say a year, I take US bombing into account but also take into account that this bombing will be imperfect in different ways. Some facilities will not even be targeted. Some facilities that are targeted will not be completely lost.
Our second disagreement is over the idea that Iran should disclose more information. In the abstract, more is better. In practical terms, the US acknowledges that has a program inside of Iran attempting to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. You have not addressed this, except to ask if the IAEA can keep secrets from the US. The answer is no. I have not seen that answer incorporated in your position or refuted. Iran reported Fordow to the IAEA on Monday. A copy of the report was on Obama’s desk on Tuesday.
You admit the US is discriminating against Iran relative to Japan. That’s important because the reasons the US discriminates against Iran are not primarily driven by Iran’s level of disclosure. It is primarily driven by Israel’s evaluation of its strategic needs. So further disclosure would not solve the problem for the US, it would just give it more tools to accomplish the goal it has been trying to accomplish on Israel’s behalf since the birth of the Islamic republic.
I guess we also disagree on what constitutes a nuclear option. I think Iran is there today, for practical purposes. If the US was to be massing troops in Iran’s borders, I know this is not going to happen right now, but as an illustration, like someone bombing Tokyo, Iran would pull out of the NPT and the US would not be confident it could get troops onto Iranian territory before a bomb was finished.
The United States is clearly uncomfortable with where Iran is today. The aim was to get Iran’s stock beneath one ton, and that seems to be the fundamental problem with the Turkey agreement. Now that Iran is past two tons and moving to three it seems that every year that passes is a year that Iran’s situation becomes more settled and getting Iran back under a ton becomes more difficult.
Paul:
“Now it’s up to us. It’s up to us to stop the war.”
How?
In a Miller Center presentation, Greg Stanton, who created the Eight Stages of Genocide concept, said that Genocide should be taught in every classroom and from every church pulpit.
Stanton relies on the holocaust as a prime example of genocide.
In that discussion at the Miller Center, a Palestinian exile pointed out to Dr. Stanton that not once in the hour-long speech had he mentioned Israel. Stanton hemmed and hawed; he said he thought neither Israel nor Palestinians intended genocide, although the subcategory of genocidal massacre may have taken place in the region. Stanton concluded with the caution that persons should be very concerned about Iran, because Iran had expressed the intention to destroy Israel and sought nuclear weapons.
So what we’re up against is that the people who claim as their special expertise the recognition and warning of genocide, and who educate people in every venue possible — government, military, churches, schools — about genocide, are able to see genocidal intent in Iran. But not in Israel, or the US.
When Izzeldin Abu Laish was verbally abused by a Jewish Israeli crowd on the day after his daughters were killed by IDF, he put his head in his hands and moaned, “They don’t want to know the truth.”
So. Paul. What do we do? What actions do we take to prevent US and Israel — the guys in the white hats — from waging an unjust war on Iran?
Mr Brill:
You really need to start reading what you’re writing. The contradictions within a few sentences are breath-taking.
First you say you’re not asking me – or Iran – to prove a negative. Which is then precisely what you require me – and Iran – to DO in the VERY NEXT SENTENCE by demanding that Iran disclose…WHAT? Once again, your only response is to cite the AP! We’ve been OVER THAT AGAIN AND AGAIN! Iran DID disclose under the AP! For years! And got nothing in return! So why should Iran do it AGAIN? The obvious answer is that the US, Israel, the IAEA and YOU want Iran to PROVE A NEGATIVE!
“My only and simply point is that, since you don’t know (I don’t either – nobody but Iran does) whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program, you have no way of knowing whether we would learn anything useful if Iran were to disclose all that is required under the Additional Protocols and new Code 3.1. Maybe we would learn more; maybe we wouldn’t. I don’t know, and neither do you.”
“I hate to belabor this simple and obvious point, but your reluctance to acknowledge it makes me wonder whether I simply haven’t been clear enough.”
Once again, you’ve simply reiterated your standard argument. In the process, you’ve entirely ignored my statements explaining that we DO KNOW the state of the Iranian nuclear program. Then you fall back once again on the idea that “we don’t know” – which is PRECISELY the argument of proving a negative. You’re making the “Flying Sphaghetti Monster” argument which is logically and practically invalid.
Iran CANNOT DISCLOSE WHAT IT DOES NOT HAVE! The fact that Iran is not disclosing WHAT IT DOES NOT HAVE CANNOT be taken to mean that we do not know the state of Iran’s program. We DO KNOW based on ALL the evidence to date! You are hypothesizing that there could be “something more” that Iran needs to disclose despite all evidence to the contrary.
It is an exercise in solipsism.
Again, you have not established ANYTHING that Iran NEEDS to disclose or COULD disclose. You are simply ASSUMING that IF Iran were to disclose SOMETHING that it would help Iran – despite ALL evidence to the contrary over the entire history of this “crisis”.
“You’re missing my point about your claim to “know” that Iran has no nuclear weapons program. I’m not suggesting that you’re required to “prove a negative.”
This reminds me of Summer Glau’s comment in an episode of “Dollhouse”: “This conversation is becoming vague.” Let’s “un-vague” it.
1) You cannot point to one single piece of evidence that Iran has or ever had a nuclear weapons program.
2) You cannot point to one single thing that Iran needs to or has not disclosed.
3) You cannot point to one single time when Iran got any benefit at all from disclosing what it has disclosed.
Yet you continue to harp on “disclosure” as if the term actually meant anything, which it clearly doesn’t in your arguments. It’s just a vague term signifying nothing, allowing you to voice broad generalities without any real content. And then you make the absurd claim that you’ve “shot down” my statements.
Then you drag in your previous long posts which merely re-iterate the same argument, as if that is going to bolster it at all. Your entire argument is based on “proving a negative”, despite your denial of that.
Again, this is really a waste of everyone’s time. Until you come up with some actual specifics that Iran needs to disclose that are VALID under the NPT – not just vague references to the AP and Code 3.1 – I’m afraid there’s no point in engaging with you further.
Richard,
You’re missing my point about your claim to “know” that Iran has no nuclear weapons program.
I’m not suggesting that you’re required to “prove a negative.”
If either of us knew for sure that Iran is telling the truth (as both of us believe), obviously it would be pointless to ask that Iran disclose anything at all – including what it’s already disclosing under its Safeguards Agreement. But neither of us does know that.
Agreed?
My only and simply point is that, since you don’t know (I don’t either – nobody but Iran does) whether Iran has a nuclear weapons program, you have no way of knowing whether we would learn anything useful if Iran were to disclose all that is required under the Additional Protocols and new Code 3.1. Maybe we would learn more; maybe we wouldn’t. I don’t know, and neither do you.
I hate to belabor this simple and obvious point, but your reluctance to acknowledge it makes me wonder whether I simply haven’t been clear enough.
OK, enough grasping at the straws to find precedent where none exists!
Iran is not Cuba in 1962 where evidence of nuclear weapons was found on the island. No evidence of a nuclear device exists in Iran. Maybe it was the foolishness of not going to war that got JFK assassinated (a Persian word from Hashishian). Iran has always been held to a different set of standards than any country in the world as far as the great powers are concerned. Ever since oil was discovered in Iran in early 1900s, the colonial powers have tried to keep that country backward, in poverty, ignorance, and servitude. The less the people know, the less they will revolt mentality has become modus operandi of the foreign powers. Beat them with sticks and offer them carrots – just like donkeys (the lowest form of mental state in Iranian culture)
Iran is not China of the 1970s when Nixon saw a strategic opening and went for it. China was never as demonized as Iran has been relentlessly for the past 30+ years.
Now everybody hails this as a great achievement, before you put some thought into whom is holding the paper on the US debt/deficit, and how much Chinese junk is clogging up the shelves of the US stores. How many manufacturing jobs have moved offshore, or, when you see Chinese nationals gobbling up real estate in CA and elsewhere. America is not American anymore.
Iran is a country that is trying to release itself from the yoke of tyranny/imperialism/colonialism. Sure, independence has a cost, but Iranians are unanimous in paying that, than to be a lackey of a foreign power again.
Deal with Iran as IS: a young, educated, vibrant society, with roots going back 7 millennia. Unless Iran and Iranians get what is rightly their due – R E S P E C T, not much will happen vis-à-vis foreign policy toward Iran. No sanctions, no pre-conditions, no regime change, and no take it or leave it dialogue.
Someone here chided me for what he appeared to claim to see as my excessive certainties. I was struck by that, because my philosophical stance is – in general – one of doubt, one of resistance to any certainties. But IN THE CONTEXT of a political establishment that has pushed the framing of nearly every issue, but particularly of issues relation to geopolitical power and war, and even more particularly relating to Iran (and other ‘enemy’ countries, such as Venezuela), the range of views considered ‘respectable’ by the political establishment is a tissue of lies and distortions that the ‘elites’ have simply gotten used to. To those who have become habituated to such vaporous realms, a breath of truth must – alas – feel like a punching fist, no matter how softly it blows through.
The reaction of those who demand deference for their realm of distortions, lies and delusions, when a bit of truth brushes against their world without apology, is like the Israeli reaction to the flotilla. Only those who have truly lost their way could have seen such a peaceful flotilla as a dire threat. Only those who have truly lost their way would insist that we bow solemnly to the fallacies of the Beltway Worldview.
I am certain of very few things in life. But one of the things I am most certain of is that the Beltway Foreign Policy establishment has been stewing in their poisonous think-tank brine for far too long.
IT’S DAMNED HARD TO MISS THAT, when you see them starting war after war after war.
Re. Obama and JFK: Obama had his Kennedy moment when Brazil and Turkey made the swap deal with Iran. He kicked that moment in the face. And it’s a terrible shame he did that, because had he lived up to the Secret Peacemaker Myth in that moment, he might have stepped into global history as a man to be remembered for all time, as a man who asserted that for once, and maybe even for all, international relations could be based on true amity and on what is Right, and NOT on Might, not on which nation has umpteen carrier groups and weapons to make even Russia and China tremble. Barack Obama could have been the founder of real hope for a New World Order that could be truly diverse, democratic, for all, by all.
Now it’s up to us. It’s up to us to stop the war. But if we continue to offer our prayers and pleadings to the Great Secret Peacemaker Myth, we’ll have no chance at all to fulfill our responsibility for peace.
Arnold, Richard and others,
Please allow me to re-anchor this debate to two LONG posts I made a few weeks ago on the “March to War” thread, since I feel I’m shooting at moving targets when I try to address some of your recent responses. I may be entirely unjustified in believing that, and it may be my fault if it has occurred. Nonetheless, I’d prefer that you reconsider how all this got started. Doing so should enable you to make your attacks even more effective than they’ve already been.
I’ve embedded a few comments.
MY TWO EARLIER COMMENTS FOLLOW:
Eric A. Brill says:
July 19, 2010 at 4:19 pm
Richard Hack,
You wrote to Arnold:
“HOW LONG do you think the status quo can be continued before it becomes ridiculous?”
A lot longer than you do, apparently, and I agree with Arnold on that.
I acknowledge that it will take considerable diplomatic skill from Iran, but I’d put the odds of success of your Choice 4 at well above 50/50.
Arnold can speak for himself as to how he’d accomplish this. I’ve written earlier at great length on how I’d accomplish it, and won’t repeat that here in quite such detail.
Nevertheless: my long-term plan would be for Iran, patiently and politely, to maintain its firm resistance against US pressure on Iran’s nuclear program while the US’ influence and foreign-wars-pocketbook continue to shrink over the next few years and decades, firm up Iran’s economic and political ties (carefully) with China, Turkey and other rising countries, continue to develop Iran’s peaceful nuclear program (including enrichment) with or without cooperation from other countries, and become much more open in Iran’s nuclear-program disclosures so that other countries will believe Iran’s intentions are peaceful and thus resist US and Israeli calls for war. All this while welcoming opportunities to cooperate with the US on mutually beneficial specific matters (though I now expect that few if any such narrow opportunities will arise, given the outcome of the recent “fuel swap” proposals).
My “greater disclosure” suggestion means giving up the so-called “nuclear option” that Arnold and many others think is essential for Iran to preserve. I disagree that this is essential; I would not like to see Iran produce a deliverable bomb under the US’ nose even if it could do so; and I doubt very seriously that the US would accept ambiguity about Iran’s nuclear intentions long enough for Iran to create even the illusion that it had accomplished this. I predict confidently that, if Iran were to insist on the level of ambiguity this “nuclear option” would require to be worth pursuing, the US would bomb first and ask questions later.
[ARNOLD: ON WHAT "NUCLEAR OPTION" (OR "NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY," IF YOU PREFER) MEANS, PLEASE GIVE SOME CAREFUL THOUGHT TO WHETHER MY FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION MAKES SENSE TO YOU: THE ILLUSION OR REALITY THAT IRAN HAS A DELIVERABLE BOMB – OR, IF YOU PREFER, THAT IRAN IS CLOSE ENOUGH TO ONE THAT IT COULD WITHDRAW FROM THE NPT (OR NOT - JUST KICK OUT THE INSPECTORS) AND FINISH UP ITS BOMB BEFORE THE US COULD STOP IT BY ATTACKING. HOWEVER YOU DEFINE IT – AS LONG AS YOUR DEFINITION IS REASONABLY CLOSE TO WHAT I MEAN BY THE TERM – MY ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT THE US, JUSTIFIED OR NOT, WON'T BE WILLING TO LET IRAN GET THAT FAR WITHOUT EITHER (1) INSISTING THAT IRAN TAKE SOME CONCRETE STEPS (E.G. MUCH BROADER DISCLOSURES, MORE INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS) TO PERSUADE THE US THAT IRAN IS NOT AS CLOSE AS THE US HAD FEARED]; OR (2) IF IRAN REFUSES, ATTACKING IRAN TO ENSURE THAT IRAN DOESN’T GET THAT FAR. I HOPE YOU’LL AGREE THIS FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION IS THE ONE WE OUGHT TO USE.]
Fortunately, in my view, Iran seems to be following essentially the course I’d follow, though I’d be more inclined than Iran seems to be to dial down the testosterone level on the disclosure dispute. I certainly would not respond to every “laptop of death” allegation or exaggerated US claim about disclosures made by some screw-loose defector. But I would strongly consider adopting the new Code 3.1 and the additional protocols (or at least following them scrupulously, if Majlis ratification remains a political impossibility in Iran), and would make sincere and diligent ad hoc efforts to answer reasonable additional IAEA questions about what Iran is up to – whether or not the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires those answers. I’d save my testosterone for my insistence on full-fuel-cycle nuclear development rights – not to insist on my real or imagined right to keep my nuclear activities secret from the rest of the world.
In my view, Iran has a right under the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement to do everything it’s been doing (or at least what it’s publicly disclosed), but I also think Iran needs to recognize two points that many of its supporters either overlook or disagree with:
(1) however useful the reality or illusion of nuclear-weapon capability may be for Iran to accomplish its foreign policy objectives, that usefulness is trumped by the world’s compelling need to pull up the nuclear-weapons gangplank once and for all: no more nuclear-armed states, even if that world policy makes it harder for Iran to resist unwarranted foreign pressure on its nuclear program. Whether or not it worked out well for North Korea, I don’t feel any safer knowing that North Korea has the bomb today, and I certainly won’t feel safer if Iran either acquires the bomb or keeps us all guessing about that for years to come; and
(2) whether or not Iran is complying with the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement obligations, the important fact remains that Safeguards Agreements – at least without new Code 3.1 and the additional protocols added on, and arguably even when they are – are not (if they ever were) adequate to ensure enforcement of a country’s most important obligation under the NPT: its obligation not to develop nuclear weapons.
Safeguards Agreements focus too narrowly on [diversion of] nuclear material, a focus that may have been appropriate 50 years ago but is not sufficient today. That insufficiency has been acknowledged ever since just after the first Iraq war, when the additional protocols were drafted, and even compliance with the additional protocols (and new Code 3.1) may not be sufficient to allay some legitimate international concerns that arise from time to time.
Unfortunately for all of us – Iran included, as will become clear below – the NPT includes no enforcement mechanism outside of the Safeguards Agreement signed by a country under the NPT, and the IAEA has chosen so far to ignore even the Article 22 arbitration procedure prescribed under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (probably, in my view, because it fears that an arbitrator would rule in favor of Iran). Although the IAEA has additional authority under the IAEA Statute to revoke a country’s IAEA membership for certain NPT or Safeguards Agreement violations, that penalty probably wouldn’t upset Iran very much at this point.
The UN Security Council has tried to fill this “enforcement gap” by exercising imaginary authority to enforce the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement whenever the IAEA “refers” a matter to the UNSC under Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, even though neither the NPT nor Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (nor any other treaty or agreement) grants any enforcement authority whatsoever to the UNSC in response to such a referral. The UNSC may or may not also be overstepping its independent authority [i.e. entirely separate from the NPT and Iran's Safeguards Agreement, over which the UN has no authority] under Articles 40 and 41 of the UN Charter, and probably will not be able to accomplish much more under those two Articles even if is not. It also appears unlikely that the UNSC will exercise authority … under Article 39 of the UN Charter [which would permit military measures under Article 42 and the remainder of Chapter VII] because Russia and China probably cannot be persuaded to declare that Iran is a “threat to the peace.”
While all this means, in my view, that Iran can “legally” dig in its heels at least as firmly as it has done so far, I don’t think that would be a wise course for Iran. In the unlikely event that Iran ever persuades the UNSC that the UNSC lacks authority to enforce the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (either directly through UNSC resolutions, or by “asking” the IAEA to take specified actions pursuant to those resolutions, as the UNSC has also done), Iran’s successful “legal” argument ironically would strengthen the US’ hand. The US almost certainly would persuade its allies that the absence of UNSC authority under the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement made it no less proper for the “international community” to insist on certain behavior from Iran, and that – much to the US’ regret, of course – some other enforcement measures accordingly are required to ensure that Iran behaves as it ought to. I think we all know what other enforcement measures would come to the US’ mind.
For these reasons, I think Iran would be wise (1) not to challenge the UNSC’s claimed authority to enforce the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, since the UNSC-as-enforcer probably beats the alternative (the US military, possibly with allies); and (2) to continue its gentle-but-firm resistance against US pressure on its nuclear program, enhancing the prospects of success of that strategy by expanding Iran’s nuclear-activities disclosures to undercut the US’ effort to drum up support for war.
SECOND LONG COMMENT FROM EARLIER THREAD, FOLLOWING EXCHANGES WITH SEVERAL OTHERS:
Eric A. Brill says:
July 21, 2010 at 12:36 pm
Arnold,
First, a minor complaint:
I have not been “on the fence” on this issue, and so it’s inappropriate to insist that I must climb down and “take a side.”
We’ve previously discussed this “Japan option” issue at great length, most recently in a late-May thread. Indeed, it’s best that I start with a comment I posted then – for several reasons: (1) it will save me time here; (2) it will establish my point that we’ve walked this ground before; (3) I know the author of that comment well, and someone assured me (I think it was my bathroom mirror) that you may safely accept what he writes as being entirely correct; (4) if there are any gaps in what I wrote back then, my addition of quotation marks below should add just the extra patina of authority needed to cover them up.
YOU WROTE IN THAT EARLIER THREAD:
“You say Iran should give up any efforts to attain a Japan option. Why?”
I REPLIED IN THAT EARLIER THREAD:
“For several reasons. First, because it’s very dangerous for the Iranian people since the US is hell-bent on preventing this, and devoting gobs of money and personnel to detect it. Nor do I consider it necessary if Iran’s only objective really is to develop peaceful nuclear energy (and if that’s not Iran’s only objective, I feel strongly that it ought to be).”
“The only reason I can see for Iran to press its luck would be to attain not what Japan has, but rather what North Korea has. I don’t think that’s feasible, since the US (and the IAEA) now have a very watchful eye on Iran. I think it would be not worth the considerable risk to the Iranian people to make the effort.”
“Finally, I think that some or many countries and people who now support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy would withdraw support if they were to conclude that Iran also wants to develop nuclear-weapon capability as a useful tool for keeping the US at bay. That may be desirable for Iran, and the urge is entirely understandable given the shabby treatment Iran receives at the hands of the US, but for the rest of the world the bottom-line result would be yet another nuclear-armed state. One can probably justify India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea having taken the very same strategic approach in the past, after all, and look what that has left the world with today: four more nuclear-armed states. In addition, some states that back Iran in its defiance of the US might not feel quite so sympathetic once the dust clears and Iran has nuclear weapons but they don’t.”
[END OF MY EARLIER REPLY].
YOU THEN WROTE IN THAT EARLIER THREAD:
“Are you claiming such an option is illegal?”
I REPLIED IN THAT EARLIER THREAD:
“Possibly it’s illegal, under the argument I made in my [earlier] post that a “nuclear explosive device” without fuel is still a “nuclear explosive device,” but I acknowledge that that argument may not be a winner … Far more important to me, whether it is “legal” or “illegal,” I think it’s very ill-advised for the reasons stated in the preceding long [passage quoted above].”
[END OF MY EARLIER REPLY].
The phrase “an option” in your question above highlights another point I’ve made several times before: I’m not always sure what “Japan option” means to you, though I’ll concede you’ve defined it clearly enough in this current thread.
If you look back at our previous thread, you’ll recall that you’ve argued, at your most extreme, that Iran (or Japan), without violating the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement, could develop and build a deliverable nuclear bomb so long as it didn’t put any nuclear material in it. That argument prompted my observation that “a gun without bullets is still a gun,” which led to a brief “dual-use” skirmish since guns can also be used to shoot robbers and squirrels. As I recall, we got past that once I’d refined my metaphor to “a nuclear explosive device without fuel is still a nuclear explosive device,” and you conceded (I think) that a nuclear explosive device probably isn’t useful for shooting robbers and squirrels.
[JULY 26 COMMENT: I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU'VE SINCE MADE CLEAR THAT YOU'RE STICKING TO YOUR GUNS (AND I THOUGHT IT BEST TO STICK WITH THE SAME METAPHOR): A GUN WITHOUT BULLETS INDEED IS NOT A GUN, IN YOUR VIEW. IN OTHER WORDS, I'D BEEN INCORRECT THAT YOU'D AGREED WITH ME ON THIS.]
As my last-quoted reply mentioned in passing, my having established this point did not, despite what one might think, necessarily mean I’d also established that Iran (or Japan) would violate the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement by building such a fuel-free nuclear bomb. I don’t concede that, but I do recognize that your argument on that point is strong.
But far more important is the fact that we draw opposite conclusions from the strength of your argument on this point, as I explained in my long previous post on the current thread (July 19 at 4:19 PM). Your conclusion (paraphrased here) is:
“Iran is within its legal rights. Back off, US.”
My conclusion, by contrast (also paraphrased):
“The very fact that the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement (arguably) would allow Iran to get this far without the US, the IAEA, or anyone else having a right to complain only highlights the insufficiency of the assurances provided by the NPT and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Treaty or not, “legally” or not, the US is going to find some way or other to assure itself that Iran is not building nuclear weapons – even ones that, as yet, have no nuclear material in them. Either Iran can cooperate by disclosing more of what it’s doing so that the US does not get trigger-happy, or Iran can insist on its legal rights until hell freezes over – or until a mushroom cloud rises over Tehran because the US gets tired of guessing about what Iran is up to.”
[JULY 26 COMMENT: ON REREADING THIS, I CERTAINLY CAN UNDERSTAND WHY SEVERAL READERS, PERHAPS EVEN MOST, BELIEVED I FELT THE US WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN BOMBING IRAN IF IRAN SHOULD DEVELOP A FUEL-FREE BOMB. THAT WAS NOT MY INTENTION. I WAS POINTING OUT WHAT I WORRY THE US MIGHT DO IF THAT SHOULD OCCUR, JUSTIFIED OR NOT. THE US GOVERNMENT OFTEN DOES THINGS I BELIEVE ARE NOT JUSTIFIED, BUT IT DOES THEM NONETHELESS, AND THAT IS WHAT IRAN MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. ON THE OTHER HAND, I DO AGREE THAT SOMETHING – FAR SHORT OF BOMBING IRAN – OUGHT TO BE DONE IF THERE IS EVER REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IRAN (OR ANY OTHER NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE) HAS DEVELOPED A FUEL-FREE BOMB. PRESUMABLY THAT WOULD INVOLVE MORE EXTENSIVE INSPECTIONS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, AS WERE REQUIRED OF IRAQ – THOUGH THIS TIME THE UN WOULD GO IN WITHOUT AN ARTICLE 39 RESOLUTION IN HAND, SO THAT THE US COULD NOT UNILATERALLY DECIDE WHETHER IRAN HAD COMPLIED WITH THE UN'S DEMANDS (SETTING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE US HAD THAT RIGHT IN IRAQ – IMPORTANT HISTORICALLY, BUT NOT IF WE ENSURE THE US NEVER GETS THAT OPPORTUNITY AGAIN).]
Next, the question of whether the US is discriminating against Iran because the US doesn’t complain when Japan does the same things as Iran is doing – or worse: maintains vast stockpiles of plutonium that can have no useful purpose other than to build bombs.
I believe I’ve answered this adequately before, but just in case:
First, the US indeed does discriminate between Japan and Iran, for reasons the US deems valid (regardless of whether you and I would) in light of the US’ overriding objective: to ensure that countries the US considers to be dangerous don’t get nuclear weapons.
I don’t claim to know all of the US’ reasons, nor to agree with all of those I can think of, but I’ll mention a few possible reasons. First, Japan is not located in the Middle East or another “hot spot” part of the world. Second, Japan has been very peaceful, in both actions and words, ever since the end of World War II. Third, the US knows it probably can count on China to squelch any military ambitions that may creep back into the Japanese mind-set. Fourth, some US officials might not consider it such a bad thing that Japan point a few nukes in the direction of the Chinese mainland, and are confident the US wouldn’t get blamed for that if it had done nothing more than to loosen the Japanese leash. There probably are numerous other reasons – I haven’t given this narrow question a lot of thought – but at least none of those I’ve mentioned so far would apply to Iran. This may explain why the US treats Japan differently from Iran.
Finally, however you might define “nuclear option,” having a “nuclear option” strikes me as pointless, and extremely dangerous for one’s own country to pursue, unless it enables the country to create the real or enemy-imagined ability to drop a nuclear bomb on one’s enemy before the enemy can prevent that. In an earlier thread, you frankly acknowledged that Japan would need to leave the NPT in order to put the finishing touches on any nuclear weapon. You’ve made the very same observation regarding Iran, and you’ve provided various estimates as to how long this would take once Iran had left the NPT. Your estimates have generally been stated in “months,” and I remember even “a year” in one post.
Estimates with such time frames presume a US reaction so slow as to be entirely unrealistic – a phrase I choose only because I hesitate to upset you by using “absurd.” Bear in mind that the US’ number-one stated goal here is not to let Iran acquire deliverable nuclear weapons. Achieving that goal requires not allowing matters to drift so long that the US no longer is confident that it can prevent Iran from producing a deliverable bomb. Depending on how much the US is confident it knows about Iran’s nuclear program when Iran leaves the NPT, the US might estimate that Iran can produce a deliverable bomb in, say, a year, or three months, or perhaps three weeks.
The length of that estimate will be significant principally for bomber-scheduling purposes. If Iran were to leave the NPT, thus thumbing its nose at the IAEA, the US and everyone else – or, it is important to note, even if Iran does not leave the NPT but continues to resist demands for much greater disclosure – US bomber pilots probably would be strapping on their helmets no later than about one week before the end date of that estimate, possibly much earlier if the US’ carefully laid attack plans call for more lead time.
The notion, implicit in your “nuclear option” scenario, that the US would wait any longer than this is unrealistic. That is why I believe that Iran’s pursuit of a “nuclear option” – if that term has any practical meaning – would be both pointless and very dangerous.
Mr. Brill: “far too much of what you write responds to statements and arguments I’ve never made.”
Because you keep dancing around NOT answering the arguments WE’VE made.
You keep repeating and circling back to the same arguments over and over:
1) “Iran should disclose more”. Disclose WHAT, we ask?
2) “The Additional Protocols.” We tell you they did and got nothing for it.
3) ???
4) “PROFIT!!! I’ve shot down your arguments!”
5) Rinse and repeat.
Forgive the Slashdot joke, but that’s really where your arguments wind up. They’re circular and based on nothing but generalities. You keep putting off making any real, pointed response to the arguments we’ve made over and over, then you come back and just re-iterate the same generality starting the cycle all over again.
It’s a waste of everyone’s time.
Mr. Canning: “Since I believe the US is crashing over the financial precipice, due to idiotic “defence” spending (much if not most related to the effort to “protect” Israel), there certainly are no funds available for a third war in the greater Middle East.”
What’s wrong with that sentence?
You just said the US economy is crashing because of DEFENSE SPENDING. Then you say there’s no money for war. The money expended in a war GOES TO DEFENSE SPENDING. It’s just the taxpayer who loses.
So the US has more than enough money to start a war with Iran. When I say the US will be bled economically by that war, I mean the NON-military-industrial sector and the taxpayer and yes, eventually the entire economy including the MI sector.
Obviously if the economy TOTALLY collapses so that NO ONE can pay their taxes, then that is a different situation. In such a situation, you have revolutions. The US is far from that yet.
Not to mention that Bush financed a lot of his wars by increasing the US debt. Yes, the chickens will come home to roost. But they are flying by way of Capistrano so as long as the current sitting President doesn’t have to deal with it, he doesn’t care as long as his MI cronies get their money, and the Israel Lobby continues to fund his election campaign.
So assuming Obama won’t start a war because “the US can’t afford it” is just naive. We can’t afford it NOW – but he’s still increasing the defense spending and conducting a pointless Afghan war. As long as any sitting President can bleed the taxpayer in an endless shell game of shifting funds around from one group to another, this nonsense of the “all war all the time US economy” will continue.
fyi says:
“Any use of nuclear weapons by US or Israel, against Iran or any other non-nuclear weapons state, will take this planet to the period of Napoleonic Wars. But this time with nuclear warheads.”
Please specify your scenario which makes you confident of that specific an outcome. A plausible case can be made that it’s wildly overblown. A major conventional war between the US and Iran – and possibly other Middle Eastern states such as Syria, sure. A major asymmetric war by various entities against the US, sure. A full-blown nuclear WWIII – highly unlikely.
“There will almost certainly be a war to contain the nuclear rouge state, a war to the bitter end.”
So you’re saying Russia and China – and who else, Great Britain? The Non-Aligned Nations? – will attack the United States and/or Israel on first use of nukes?
You could conceivably make a plausible case for somebody attacking Israel after first use of nukes by Israel against someone. I’ve made that case myself on occasion. I could even plausibly believe the US would attack Israel in that event.
But an attack on the US? Highly, highly improbable. Certainly there would be a highly negative reaction in the world community, but nobody is going to attack the US while the US has dozens of nuclear armed submarines and the biggest most advanced military on the planet.
“American leaders are not mad.”
Not relevant to the argument. American leaders make “mistakes” (actually hidden agendas) all the time throughout US history. In fact, it’s rare they make good decisions, especially in foreign policy.
Mr. Brill:
“Richard, you rest much of your argument on your claim to “know” that Iran has no nuclear weapons program. I believe you’re correct, but I don’t “know” this. Nor do you, of course, which makes it simple for me to shoot down your arguments.”
It is presumptuous to assume you’ve shot down anything. If you think you have, welcome to “a hero in your own mind” status.
As for what I “know”, your statement that I don’t know is a rhetorical red herring, a common enough debating ploy. I am basing my opinion on the EVIDENCE. You’re just waving the old religious argument “You can’t KNOW there is no god”, just substituting an equally non-existent Iranian weapons program for the term “god”.
Yes, we can “know”. If a belief system’s origins and emotional satisfactions and practical benefits to the one holding the belief are known (as it is in the case of religion and also in Iran), then we can safely say the belief is invalid without having to enumerate or examine every possible scenario in the universe. Occam’s Razor rules here.
“I’d prefer a tougher challenge.”
You’re not handling the one you’ve got.
“Can you take a look at your argument and see whether you feel it’s sound enough for you to present without this assumption underpinning it?”
Which argument? That Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program or that Iran does not need to disclose more? As I’ve said, if Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program, then by definition it does not need to disclose more, because there is nothing to disclose. We’re back to the basic fact that you can’t prove a negative – and as I said above, there is no need to as long as all the other circumstances engendering a belief system are accounted for.
To use the classic argument, I can’t prove the “Flying Spaghetti Monster” does not exist, either. (Look it up). That doesn’t mean one should spend any time worrying about that.
The same applies to Iran – except there we have to worry because some people want to start a war over it.
It could be plausibly said that Iran’s “nuclear weapons program” is a religious belief in the sense that it is claimed to exist without any evidence other than faith in the trustworthiness of one’s government. Which by now is a laughable notion. Anybody who takes that argument seriously is not worth talking to.
Therefore you might want to reconsider your position.
Mr. Canning: “The US supported the recent effort in the UN to seek to pressure Israel to sign the NPT.”
And almost immediately, Obama turned his back on that in his comments when Netanyahu visited. Obama EXPLICITLY said that Israel had a right to nuclear weapons outside the NPT, and even went further and implicitly said that Israel has a right to USE nuclear weapons as it sees fit. Obama said that Israel had the right to conduct its own military affairs, which includes over bombing its neighbors and threatening to use nuclear weapons.
The support for the docket in the UN was just another lie Obama has no intention of pursuing.
Fyi: “US cannot afford the price tag. This was understood even before the Great Depression II.”
You still aren’t getting it. That money is GOING INTO SOMEONE’S POCKETS! It’s not just evaporating into thin air. The military-industrial complex is profiting by these wars. In ANY economy, short of complete economic collapse, somebody makes money, somebody loses money. In this economy, the taxpayer is losing money and the MI complex is making it.
Therefore the economic cost of an Iran war is not relevant to those who are making the profits.
Neither is it relevant to Israel, who doesn’t care if the US bleeds economically as long as it accomplishes Israel’s goals.
Also, I think you overestimate the intelligence of the people in power on the subject of whether they even understand the impact of a war in Iran in economic terms, other than the profits they stand to make.
And again, in the same manner as the MI complex, you overestimate the politicians’ concern about the economic impact of an Iran war on the US economy, because like the MI complex they are not going to pay the price. The only possible way the politicians might pay a price is if they get turned out at elections. And what good is that is you replace “Bush” with “Bush Lite”, as the electorate has done? The same people are in power behind the scenes – the MI complex, the Israel Lobby, and the politicians.
Michael Drohan, Director of The Thomas Merton Center, recently posted an op-ed, “The Iran … Threat?” in The New People,” Merton Center’s blog.
fyi says:
“A bargain is based on prevailing conditions at the time of its inception.
The bargain that was available in 2003 was not available in 2006 and would not be available is 2010.”
And whose fault is that IF true? Are you saying that just because we’re seven years down the road that IRAN is no longer interested? Are you saying that because the US beat up Iraq that was the reason Iran offered a grand bargain in 2003? That may be plausible, but the situation Iran faces from the US today is in fact more dangerous.
“US can use Iraq but she is on her way out. I meant that Iraq and her population are no longer a danger to Iran. Moreover, Iran has enormous political influence in Iraq. That is a changed situation since 2002/2003 time frame.”
Duh! That’s obvious and was obvious the minute Saddam Hussein was out of power.
“Hizbullah’s victory indicated what could be done to neutralize the power of an organizationally and technologically superior force. It has ramification for Iran’s war fighting tactics. Moreover, an Iranian allie won a war against a US allie. It means something.”
Another obvious conclusion. What does it mean in the context of your question that Iran might not be interested in a bargain anymore?
“Iranians were willing to fight in 2006, I do not see them changing now. But having raised the stakes, so to speak, in 2006, US has increased the cost of a so-called Grand Bargain. That was my point.”
Sigh. Once again, what is your point? Of COURSE the US has raised the ante. How does that make Iran less interested in resolving the problem? THAT was your question to me!
“And so on with my other comments: that any bargain – Grand no not so Grand – will now cost more to US than before.”
No, it won’t. Since there is no cost to the US. The US manufactured this “crisis” out of whole cloth. If the US pays any price at all for resolving it, it will be because Obama – just like Bush – will be exposed for having had another agenda from the first. And that isn’t terribly important (except perhaps in the next election) because if a bargain is struck, the “crisis” is over and that’s all the pubic (if not Israel and the neocons) care about.
This has nothing to do with whether IRAN is still interested in a grand bargain, which was your question to me.
“I am satisifed that US will leave the Middle East after the Iran-US War and let Israelis fend for themselves.”
Did you mean Iraq-US war or Iran-US war? There’s no guarantee the US will cut Israel loose even after a war with Iran. The US didn’t after Iraq. In my view, the US will only cut Israel loose when there is a change in the influence of the military-industrial complex and the Israel Lobby in the US. If those two are not DIRECTLY blamed for a disastrous Iran war (as they were not blamed for a disastrous IRAQ war), then we can’t assume it will happen.
You asked if Iran would still be interested in a grand bargain because “things have changed”. I said it would. You have now specified a list of things which are different from 2003, but no where have you indicated exactly HOW these changes might cause Iran to not be interested in a grand bargain.
As I’ve been saying all along, there are two possible outcomes: the US accepts Iran enriching, or the US attacks Iran. There is no third outcome without a grand bargain. Therefore by definition Iran is still interested in the 2003 offer they made. If you are making this case by presuming that the US CANNOT and WILL NOT start a war with Iran because of the list you cite, you have to deal with this issue, not by suggesting Iran is no longer interested in a grand bargain because it has the US over a barrel by the list of circumstances you cite.
You need to make your posts clearer if you want a useful response from me. Don’t ask questions if your intent is to make a point. Instead, make the point.
Charles Freeman brings up the race for Iran quite a bit during the debate at the Nixon Center last week
“But the very same people are now urging an American military assault on Iran explicitly to protect Israel and to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Their advocacy is fully coordinated with the Government of Israel. No one in the region wants a nuclear-armed Iran, but Israel is the only country pressing Americans to go to war over this.”
Great debate
http://www.nixoncenter.org/
Prominent and influential American strategic thinkers who have pitched their tents in the Leverett camp:
www dot youtube dot com/watch?v=sj7cDZoZagA Chas Freeman (transcript and video)
antiwar dot com/radio/2010/07/21/stephen-m-walt/ Stephen Walt (Mp3 and transcript)
www dot wilsoncenter dot org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=Media.play&mediaid=FB5A4349-F88E-6E97-9DC908499450860D John Tirman
www dot radio4all dot net/index.php/program/42979 Geoff Wawro (audio)
www dot raceforiran dot com/live-stream-at-1215pm-realigning-americas-relations-in-the-middle-east Stephen Kinzer
Arnold,
I do not think Iran would develop nuclear weapons even if it left the NPT – - something I think unlikely.
Iran has said for years its LEU is solely for the purpose of fueling Bushehr #2, and perhaps #1 after 2015. It would be a great mistake for it to appear the purpose of the LEU was to set up a nuclear weapons programme! This is what rabid neocons and other warmongers claim Iran is in fact doing (secretly setting up a build-nukes-quickly programme).
My understanding is that:
Iran believes that Japan has a nuclear weapons option if it was to leave the NPT. (That Egypt does not have.)
Iran believes Japan has a right to a nuclear weapons option if it was to leave the NPT.
Iran believes it also has a right to a nuclear weapons option if it was to leave the NPT.
Yes, Iran is not planning or likely going to leave the NPT. But having the capability puts it into a different strategic position. It makes threats against it less credible. Japan is in a different strategic position from Egypt, Iran believes it has the right to join Japan. The US is campaigning very vigorously to prevent Iran from joining Japan.
I think in the US’ campaign, Iran has justice on its side.
Arnold,
The fact that ignorant people may cast votes, and not even know what they are doing beyond obeying someone who has told them what to do, does not confer “legitimacy” on the course of action a country may take. At least, it does not in my book. In my view, economic development comes before “democracy”. Needless to say, I am a monarchist.
Cyrus,
Bravo! Indeed, there is no Iranian nuclear weapons programmed that needs to, or could be, “pre-empted” by an insane attack. By Israel or the US.
Arnold,
Iran is not likely to leave the NPT, even though that course of action would please the warmongers. In fact, Iran wants the NPT strengthened, and to oblige countries that have not signed, such as Israel, to sign it.
Alan: The nature, extent, and rational for Saudi state support for Hamas in particular, or Fatah, or Palestinian society at large. I would like to be clear on what is actually happening.
Cyrus: Good points.
Arnold,
“Iran believes it has the right to as much material and technology as Japan as a right to. I believe Iran has the right to as much material and technology as Japan has a right to.”
That makes three of us.
OK, again.
Japan has nuclear weapons capability. Which means, unlike Egypt, if Japan leaves the NPT it will be able to make a weapon using material and technology already present in Japan’s domestic stock.
The United States is working to prevent Iran from gaining that capability. To prevent Iran from having in its domestic stock material and technology that is sufficient to make a weapon if it was to leave the NPT.
That is the core of the dispute between Iran and the United States.
Iran believes it has the right to as much material and technology as Japan as a right to. I believe Iran has the right to as much material and technology as Japan has a right to.
You’ve argued, repeatedly, that Iran does not have the right to nuclear weapons capability. You’ve argued that Iran should stop short of having nuclear weapons capability or else it will be attacked because the US will be uncomfortable. You’ve also argued that Iran deserves to be punished if it does not stop short of attaining nuclear weapons capability.
I’ve asked, repeatedly, yes or no, does Iran have the right to the same degree of technology as Japan. You’ve not answered, and among other things, reiterated that Iran not implementing the AP justifies the US’ position on its program.
I’ll ask again, yes or no, does Iran have the right to the same degree of technology as Japan?
Eric – keep it up, your tenacity shames me.
Castellio – certainly my understanding is that the majority of Hamas’ external funding comes from Saudis and Gulf Arabs, not necessarily from governments of course. Are you seeking verification of Saudi support for Palestine in general, or certain elements?
Arnold,
“All we know for sure about Japan is what we know about Iran. If it wants to build a weapon, it would have to visibly leave the NPT. For Japan that is enough for you, for Iran it is not. That position is indefensible.”
Indefensible? Then I’m relieved I’ve never taken that position. If any country leaves the NPT, it can do whatever it wants. I’ve never said otherwise. So can other countries.
“Nuclear targets” = civilian, IAEA-monitored nuclear energy sites, operating under full inspections and safeguards, with no evidence of any weapons applications. Lets not justify an attack by using terms like “targets” to describe these sites, just as lets not automatically label an Israeli or US attack as “pre-emptive”.
Arnold,
“You say the opposite, the Iran does not have the right to a program that gives it the option, if it leaves the NPT, to build a weapon.”
I’m sorry, Arnold, but can you please be more specific? It should go without saying that I’ve never claimed this. Any country, even the Marshall Islands, has such a right.
“To the first question, [Masoud] anticipates you may answer…”
Please, please just stick to what I’ve actually said. This is getting out of hand. It’s tough enough just responding to your sometimes excellent comments on what I have said.
Eric:
I’m pretty sure you misunderstood Masoud
Does Iran have the right to develop the same technological infrastructure that Japan and Brazil a right to develop? If not, why not?
If Iran is in violation of it’s NPT obligations, which obligations are you referring to, how do you know Iran has violated those obligations, and how could that possibly have any effect on what Iran is or isn’t allowed to do under the NPT?
To the first question, he anticipates you may answer Iran does not have the right to develop the same infrastructure that Japan and Brazil have a right to develop by saying Iran is in violation of its NPT obligations. That is the standard response people sympathetic to US policy give. If you give the standard answer, to save time, he’d like you to flesh that answer out. What obligations, and how do they relate to the denial of technology.
You’re free to say Iran has the right to a Japan option, and to any technology Japan as the right to, and to configure its nuclear program, as Japan has, so that it reserves the option, if provoked to leave the NPT, to build a weapon.
If you don’t say that, then your arguments in support of the US position, unreasonable as it’s been demonstrated to be with no specific refutation from you, imply that you support the US’ position that Iran somehow does not have the right to a nuclear program like that of Japan.
You say the opposite, the Iran does not have the right to a program that gives it the option, if it leaves the NPT, to build a weapon. That is not a reasonable position to try to defend against unless you’re in an environment that is already sympathetic to that position. Japan has such a program, as you no longer dispute. Japan is not in violation of its NPT obligations, as you’ve never disputed. Iran either has the same obligations as Japan or different ones. You have to be arguing different ones, but that is a terribly losing argument.
Masoud,
“If Iran is in violation of it’s NPT obligations, which obligations are you referring to, how do you know Iran has violated those obligations, and how could that possibly have any effect on what Iran is or isn’t allowed to do under the NPT?”
I’ve never said that Iran was in violation of its NPT obligations, which makes the rest of your question irrelevant. You, Arnold, Richard and others make some good points worth responding, but far too much of what you write responds to statements and arguments I’ve never made.
Americans, please wake up, remember who took you to war in Iraq based on lies, dont swallow the lies again. The only reason there is such a pressure in the US against Irans is due AIPAC. Lets be serious, they were behind much of the ILSA sanctions against Iran 1995 and the previous ones made in the 21th century. We dont want another war, and we dont want this ugly hypocrisy being carried out with israel, a nuclear power refuse to even sign the NPT.
James:
To me, the primary issue is stable government able to advance the agenda of economic development in a sensible way.
Who can legitimately decide on a country’s agenda, if not the people who comprise that country?
You’ve decided that the agenda of economic development is of primary importance for a country where you don’t live. On what authority?
I am an actual believer in democracy which actually is one of my primary motivations to oppose the dictatorships over more than 100 million people that are necessary for the security of a majority-Jewish state for about 5 million Jewish people in the Palestine area.
But a government like that of China, which is not democratic but also not nepotistic and in which foreign influence does not significantly direct policy is preferable to the governments in the US colonial structure.
Jordan’s kings are atooges to the same degree and for the same reasons Egypt’s King Fahd was a stooge. He served at the mercy of the British Empire and accepted direction from that empire on issues the empire considered important. His descendant now on the throne is in the same relationship with the United States, which, for Israel’s sake, inherited and now manages the British imperial holdings in Israel’s region.
To add one other thing, Japan has implemented the AP. Still nobody can or has ruled out that Japan has somewhere in its country a full set of plans or even a functional mock-up of a nuclear weapon.
All we know for sure about Japan is what we know about Iran. If it wants to build a weapon, it would have to visibly leave the NPT. For Japan that is enough for you, for Iran it is not. That position is indefensible.
Japan would not implement the AP if there was an active program to sabotage its nuclear industry, including by assassinating its scientists that could make use of information gained by Japan’s disclosing of additional information for the AP.
Our disagreement is absolutely not primarily should Iran give more information. Our disagreement is over whether nor not Iran has the right to achieve a Japan option, that you claim is somehow ambiguous, but whose ambiguity you’ve never described.
The AP, and disclosing information about a nuclear program, does not limit a country’s nuclear weapons capabilities. Japan has tremendous nuclear weapons capabilities, more than it is conceivable that Iran could have for the next two decades at least. You want Iran not to have weapons capabilities Japan and all NPT signatories are entitled to, and don’t say that because it is an indefensible position.
But let’s pretend, just for a second, that our disagreement is over whether or not Iran should give more information. Your position is what? If the US uses the information it gets from Iran’s AP disclosures to sabotage and later target Iran’s centrifuge production facilities, to target Iran’s key nuclear employees for assassination, and to produce new, more detailed forged evidence to pressure Iran do stop enriching, that is an acceptable price? An acceptable price for what? To say to the IAEA that the US is not being fair?
The US is already not being fair. The US has reasons that it states openly, that it does not want Iran to be nuclear capable that have nothing to do with its level of disclosure or acceptance of the AP. After Iran has given the US information that will help the US increase its pressure on Iran’s program, it will be in the same position it is in today.
Iran disclosing information about its nuclear program to fulfill the Additional Protocols would not help preserve Israel’s regional monopoly of nuclear capability. Because of that, parties sympathetic to that strategic desire of Israel, and parties that can be swayed by sympathetic parties, will not change their position on Iran’s nuclear program if Iran implements the Additional Protocols. How do we know for sure? Well, we’ve seen Iran implement the Additional Protocols. That did not reduce, in the least, US calls that Iran relinquish any nuclear capability. The AP, or transparency, or a secret nuclear program had never been the issue of contention. The issue of contention has always been nuclear capabilities.
If anyone thinks you would be willing to accept Iran having the same capabilities as Japan has if only Iran ratified and implemented the Additional Protocols, then you have deceived them. You’re not comfortable with Iran having the level of nuclear weapons capability that is clearly allowed by the NPT. And you don’t have a rational defense for your discomfort.
James: A friendly reminder that I’m waiting for links to any comprehensive and sound analysis of Saudi Arabian support for the Palestinian cause.
fyi,
Since I believe the US is crashing over the financial precipice, due to idiotic “defence” spending (much if not most related to the effort to “protect” Israel), there certainly are no funds available for a third war in the greater Middle East.
fyi,
Any use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, or anywhere else for that matter, truly would be insane. Any idiots in the US, connected to the foreign policy-making apparatus, who advocate using nukes on Iran, are insane.
James Canning:
The political support might be there but wars cost money.
Specially wars of indulgence.
The money could not have been there in 2004 and will certainly not be there in 2010.
Castellio:
Any use of nuclear weapons by US or Israel, against Iran or any other non-nuclear weapons state, will take this planet to the period of Napoleonic Wars. But this time with nuclear warheads.
There will almost certainly be a war to contain the nuclear rouge state, a war to the bitter end.
American leaders are not mad.
Arnold and Richard,
CLARIFICATION:
I just wrote:
“Our disagreement lies only in whether Iran should disclose more about what it’s doing – as Japan does, for example. That’s a big enough disagreement, and so I suggest you stick to that. You feel it’s in Iran’s interest to do so. I don’t.”
As I’m sure you recognize, I meant that you feel it’s in Iran’s best interests NOT to disclose more about what it’s doing, and I feel the opposite.
Richard and Arnold,
I still don’t have time for a lengthy response, but let’s be clear about one important point: I strongly support Iran’s right to enrich LEU. Not clear to me why Richard suggests the opposite, or why Arnold feels Iran must respond to the US’ insistence that Iran limit its enriched LEU to some small quantity. I’ve always argued that Iran should carry on its peaceful nuclear program, including LEU enrichment – with the assistance of others if it’s offered on reasonable terms, on its own if not.
Our disagreement lies only in whether Iran should disclose more about what it’s doing – as Japan does, for example. That’s a big enough disagreement, and so I suggest you stick to that. You feel it’s in Iran’s interest to do so. I don’t.
Richard, you rest much of your argument on your claim to “know” that Iran has no nuclear weapons program. I believe you’re correct, but I don’t “know” this. Nor do you, of course, which makes it simple for me to shoot down your arguments. I’d prefer a tougher challenge. Can you take a look at your argument and see whether you feel it’s sound enough for you to present without this assumption underpinning it?
FYI writes: “I am satisfied that US will leave the Middle East after the Iran-US War and let Israelis fend for themselves.”
I very much doubt that. I believe you underestimate the resources available, unfortunately, to the American government, including so-called ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons.
It’s hard to believe that a major country would squander its resources to safeguard the institutional racism and expansion of a small state: but its even harder to believe that the dominant narrative of highly polarized American-Israeli exceptionalism (us = good, them = bad) will be sufficiently damaged to create a new set of policy alternatives.
Which brings me back to a previous point: discussion of the finer details (and I agree this is necessary) tends to hide from general discourse the irrationality of current policies and priorities. The American people have a vague feeling of something going badly wrong, but they don’t know what it is…
Arnold,
Why do you describe the late King Hussein of Jordan as a stooge of the British Empire? Or were you referring to King Abdullah I of Jordan?
I have to concede I share little of your enthusiasm for “democracy”. To me, the primary issue is stable government able to advance the agenda of economic development in a sensible way.
James:
Egypt is not a colony of the US and it adds very little if anything to US national security. For Israel, however, a benign Egypt is of huge importance.
How many of the colonies could we say that about? All of them. A democratic Egypt poses no direct threat to the US, but would likely not be the benign Egypt that is of huge importance to Israel. A democratic Jordan would pose no threat to the US but preventing that is of huge importance to Israel. A democratic Saudi Arabia would pose no threat to the US but would not be relatively benign to Israel – preventing that is of huge importance to Israel.
The UAE alone spends twice as much money on US weapons as Israel, but the US is committed to Israel having a qualitative military advantage over the UAE plus every other US client in the region, plus the independent countries put together. Would a democracy tolerate that? No, but Barack Obama’s colonial subordinates do. An independent UAE would demand better terms. That is not a threat to the US, but preventing it is of huge importance to Israel.
Mubarak is not like Jordan’s Abdullah in that he did not directly inherit his position from a stooge of the British empire. Other than that, though, his behavior and the role he plays in the US regional colonial structure is identical. The US congress and executive branch clearly have more leverage over him than the Egyptian people.
fyi,
I agree that US “support” for Israel is taking the American republic over a financial precipice. The multitude of stooges of the Israeli government, in the US Congress, will still be there, no matter how great the financial catastrophe “support” for Israel is bring down on the heads of the American people.
R S Hack,
I agree with you the Obama administration could offer Iran a guarantee against regime change efforts, sponsored by the US or Israel. And offer help with the Iranian civilian nucear power programme. These measures might enable Iran to allow a greater degree of IAEA supervision.
The US supported the recent effort in the UN to seek to pressure Israel to sign the NPT. Netanyahu and other Israelis have been shuttling between Tel Aviv and Washington, in an effort to get the US to back off from its support of that very sensible programme.
James Canning:
US cannot afford the price tag.
This was understood even before the Great Depression II.
fyi,
Your expectation that the US “would leave Israel to fend for itself” after a US-Iran war, has no credible basis that I can see. The Israel lobby set up the insane invasion of Iraq, and prevented any official investigation of how the illegal war was set up.
paul,
I agree with you that Obama’s advisers could readily come up with ways to facilitate an improvement in relations with Iran. Obama has to cope with the numerous stooges of the Israeli government to be found in the Senate and House, up on Capitol Hill.
Arnold,
I agree with you that the mood of the country is different today than it was in the run-up to the idiotic invasion of Iraq in 2003. So a US attack on Iran is less likely than the attack on Iraq was, months before it was launched.
However, Nasser overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1953. Egypt and the Suez Canal were a vital part of the lifeline to India, that was essential to the security of the British Empire earlier in the 20th century. Egypt is not a colony of the US and it adds very little if anything to US national security. For Israel, however, a benign Egypt is of huge importance.
Richard Steven Hack:
A bargain is based on prevailing conditions at the time of its inception.
The bargain that was available in 2003 was not available in 2006 and would not be available is 2010.
US can use Iraq but she is on her way out. I meant that Iraq and her population are no longer a danger to Iran. Moreover, Iran has enormous political influence in Iraq. That is a changed situation since 2002/2003 time frame.
Hizbullah’s victory indicated what could be done to neutralize the power of an organizationally and technologically superior force. It has ramification for Iran’s war fighting tactics. Moreover, an Iranian allie won a war against a US allie. It means something.
Iranians were willing to fight in 2006, I do not see them changing now. But having raised the stakes, so to speak, in 2006, US has increased the cost of a so-called Grand Bargain. That was my point.
And so on with my other comments: that any bargain – Grand no not so Grand – will now cost more to US than before.
I have already included my estimation of casualties and damages.
I am satisifed that US will leave the Middle East after the Iran-US War and let Israelis fend for themselves.
Paul: “It’s not Iran that is keeping the world guessing; it’s the ceaseless barrage of propaganda against Iran that is keeping the world wondering,”
And Eric is one of those who is spreading the propaganda by continually harping on the notion that “Iran must have something to hide if it doesn’t ratify the Additional Protocols” – despite the fact that Iran DID do so and was rewarded by having its case illegally turned over to the UNSC.
Face it, folks, Eric buys the propaganda despite his protestations that he doesn’t. As Arnold says, Eric believes Iran is a “special case” and by definition this means Iran can’t cut a break unless it bends over for the US without any benefit to it at all.
It’s ridiculous.
Mr. Brill: “Nobody but Iran knows what Iran is developing. If you’d asked about Japan rather than Iran, someone (the IAEA) could give you a more detailed answer.
That, all by itself, is a great deal of the reason why much of the world – not just the US – worries that Iran may be up to no good. Personally, I doubt that, but I certainly can understand why people would wonder. Many on this website seem to feel it’s in Iran’s interests to keep the world guessing. ”
Sigh. Here we go again.
You’ve circled back AGAIN to the same point Arnold and I and others have demolished over and over again. THERE IS NOTHING MORE TO DISCLOSE! And if there is no nuclear weapons program, THERE IS NOTHING TO DISCLOSE AT ALL.
Once AGAIN, Iran DID follow the Additional Protocol for years. And despite not currently following it, there is STILL ZERO evidence of diversion of any and all nuclear materials that were declared and known during that period.
Anybody in the world who is still “worried” about “what Iran is developing” is someone who has not paid ANY attention to the situation. Such people should not be in the position of making decisions about whether Iran needs to be sanctioned or not, let alone attacked.
In addition to which, “much of the world” does NOT worry about Iran. The bulk of the Non-Aligned Nations support Iran in its nuclear energy program, and decry the imposition of sanctions. Only a handful of states do otherwise. You blithely declare that everybody is “worried” about Iran, and nothing could be further from the truth.
Also, I see very few people on this site who think “it is in Iran’s interest to keep the world guessing.” What I see are people here who, unlike you, recognize that Iran has been as transparent about its program as it has been required to be under the NPT and for several years even more so. What people on this site think is that Iran has been badly rewarded for doing so, and therefore should not bow down any further to US demands to suspend enrichment unilaterally in the absence of ANY benefit whatsoever.
That is the position which YOU seem to prefer since you continually bring it up over and over again without specifying WHAT Iran should disclose, except in the most general “Additional Protocol” terms which as I have repeatedly said Iran has ALREADY DONE ONCE.
The ball is NOT in Iran’s court! It is in the US court to do credible negotiations with Iran to persuade Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol and resume complying with it – which Iran WILL DO IF it can get some assurance from the US that the US will hold up its end of the deal – which means no sanctions, no demanding suspension of enrichment FIRST, and no regime change.
You keep harping on the Additional Protocol as if you and the world must assume that because Iran ceased complying with it that it means Iran is doing something suspicious. In fact, Iran ceased complying with it because the IAEA ILLEGALLY referred its case to the UNSC. If you can’t negotiate with the US, what else is Iran supposed to do? Apparently you think Iran should just continue to follow the Additional Protocol, while the US uses the IAEA to request information about and thus spy on Iran’s military ballistic missile system. Iran is not so foolish as to give up bargaining points just to make you happy or to ease the paranoid fears of people who do not understand the situation.
Paul: “I don’t think that Iran will agree to tighter monitoring of its nuclear activities if that means singling Iran out more than it already is.”
I think Iran would agree to it IF there was a quid pro quo from the US at least. If, for example, the US would consent to assisting Iran in its nuclear energy program as the NPT requires the nuclear nations to do, or alternatively if the US would agree to cease all covert operations against Iran, and/or agree to take regime change off the table. In short, an actual deal to show Iran that the US is a credible negotiating partner.
One really excellent way for the US to show that is to demand in the UN that Israel place itself under the NPT and submit all its nuclear weapons and materials to IAEA inspection at the very least, and preferably disarmament unilaterally. That would REALLY show Iran the US was serious about treating everybody equally, and the Iranians would jump at the chance.
Never happen, but it shows things the US could do to convince Iran it would be in their interest to ratify the Additional Protocol. And I’m convinced Iran would do so.
fyi says:
“1- Iran is clearly entrenched in Iraq. Iraq cannot be used as an anti-Iran platform, ever.”
Wrong. The US can and will use Iraq. Unfortunately for the US, they will be heavily attacked by the Iraqi Shia for doing so. But that’s not the same as “cannot be used”.
“2- Hizbullah defeated Israel in 2006.”
So what?
“3- In 2006, Iran and US were on verge of war but Iran did not budge.”
What’s your point?
“4- The nuclear program is much more extensive now.”
True. What’s your point?
“5- US is on her way out of Iraq.”
To some degree – still going to leave probably 50,000 troops – and, oh, by the way, the Obama administration is doubling or tripling the number of “contractors” mercenary companies.
“6- Afghanistan is not going the US/EU/NATO way.”
True. This is the one thing that might delay the Iran attack. Mind you, it really doesn’t have to delay the initial attack, if the initial attack is mostly air and naval. Also, if it turns into a ground war, that’s an excellent face-saving reason for Obama to pull out of Afghanistan without admitting defeat.
“7- Iran has withstood enormous amount of pressure.”
But there’s more to come.
“These are the reasons that caused me to pose my initial question.”
And none of them address the basic value of Iran accepting a grand bargain, or even just the US admitting they are allowed to enrich by the NPT.
Now can you provide any indication to the contrary? I doubt it.
I just love the ethos that says ‘if we all just sit around like nice respectable little pundits and put our heads together I’m sure we can come up with some good ideas to improve relations with Iran’ – yeah, that’s nothing but a good way to ignore the elephant in the room. There’s nothing hard to figure out here. We aren’t going to come up with any brilliant solutions that the poor aching heads in the Obama administration just can’t think of. IT’S AN ISSUE OF MOTIVATION, not an issue of tactical details. Obama’s people could come up with plenty of great ideas for improving US/Iranian relations if that was what they wanted to do.
Actually, Iran’s program is one of the most heavily monitored programs in the world. It’s not Iran that is keeping the world guessing; it’s the ceaseless barrage of propaganda against Iran that is keeping the world wondering, in classic ‘where there is smoke there must be fire’ fashion.
But sure, it’s always easy to blame the victim. If everyone is on Iran’s case, they surely MUST deserve it.
As we all know, the US political establishment NEVER plays political games with its various accusations against other nations. Oh NEVER!
I’ll have to save most of my answers to the many comments for another time
Why? You’re not trying to convince anyone that you have persuasive answers that you’re withholding, are you? Another time after you’ve made up answers that you don’t have now? Just say you feel uncomfortable with the idea of Iran being where Japan is which is not something you can rationally justify.
There is no rational answer coming later.
Nobody but Iran knows what Iran is developing. If you’d asked about Japan rather than Iran, someone (the IAEA) could give you a more detailed answer.
That, all by itself, is a great deal of the reason why much of the world – not just the US – worries that Iran may be up to no good.
Purely wrong, as a statement of fact. Japan reaching a state that it could build weapons if it left the NPT and the US effort to ensure Iran does not reach that state pre-dates the conception of the additional protocols.
That is none, not any at all, of the reason the US and countries either sympathetic to the US aim of preserving Israel’s monopoly of nuclear capability in its region or countries that have been moved by US pressure treat Iran differently from Japan.
What you write implies that you would favor Iran having a nuclear option if it implemented the AP. You would not. That implication is wrong and deliberately misleading. You want to hold Iran as a special case and are grasping at justifications for it.
Some who give that advice think Iran would be able to accomplish this before the US would become so uncomfortable with the uncertainty that those who argue the world shouldn’t tolerate the uncertainty will get their way.
More uncertainty stuff. Iran does not have a weapon, the material Iran could use to make a weapon is under IAEA supervision, not enriched enough and in a known location. What do you consider uncertain about Iran’s nuclear program?
This threat you’re making, that the US will attack Iran when it becomes uncomfortable, would accomplish what? An attack would make Iran build a weapon sooner, instead of later.
The way to guarantee that Iran will not stop where Japan is, which is a valuable strategic position that is consistent with Iran’s obligations under the NPT and the public and private statements Iranians have made consistently for many years at all levels, is to attack it.
If the US would do that, Iran will have to respond in a way that makes the US regret it, and that isn’t very hard because the US is not directly threatened by Iran having a Japan option, and would lose a lot of soldiers if it wanted to prevent it.
Iran adopted the additional protocol for over two years and halted enrichment as well and got nothing in return even though no evidence was found to show that anything illegal was taking place inside the country. The US on the other hand used the additional protocol to spy on Iranian military facilities. Iran will only accept the additional protocol again if the US stops threatening the country and accepts Iran’s nuclear rights.
Masoud (and others),
“More to the point, Eric, what do you believe Iran is developing that you believe Japan doesn’t have?”
I’ll have to save most of my answers to the many comments for another time, but I want to make sure everyone understands at least this: Japan has adopted the Additional Protocols, which Iran now declines to follow. For that reason, my answer to your question must be — more than I wish it were:
Nobody but Iran knows what Iran is developing. If you’d asked about Japan rather than Iran, someone (the IAEA) could give you a more detailed answer.
That, all by itself, is a great deal of the reason why much of the world – not just the US – worries that Iran may be up to no good. Personally, I doubt that, but I certainly can understand why people would wonder. Many on this website seem to feel it’s in Iran’s interests to keep the world guessing.
I don’t.
I think it would be difficult for Iran to turn what is now a promising situation – little risk of attack from the US – into a very dangerous situation for the Iranian people. Nonetheless, if Iran were to follow the advice of some on this board, it might accomplish that pointless objective. Some who give that advice think Iran would be able to accomplish this before the US would become so uncomfortable with the uncertainty that those who argue the world shouldn’t tolerate the uncertainty will get their way.
I don’t.
Folks talk about how to improve relations with Iran as if there is some kind of mystery here. There is no mystery. If Obama had begun actual negotiations in good faith, fast progress would have been made. As Brazil and Turkey demonstrated, it’s not Iran that has been making negotiation impossible. And as Obama demonstrated in response to Brazil/Turkey, it is the US that has a brutally impossible attitude.
The Turkey/Brazil situation put everything in clear, undeniable perspective. But sure, we can all sit around here and pretend that’s not true. And we can call anyone who talks about reality someone who ‘lights hair on fire’. That’s what happens when a society gives in to the despair JFK talked about, to the assumption that a world dominated by warmongering fools is the only world possible, to the assumption that those fools define reality and the rest of us must sagely nod our heads and maybe once in a while suggest, perhaps, a slight difference in tone?
You are looking at a Beltway world that has gone insane with war. The way they see the world is colored with war thinking. We do NOT have to assent to that vision.
Arnold
In a way Israel’s case is technically a bit different and in a way more dangerous than a declared or known NWS since it is ambiguous on its military nuclear program it does not need to leave NPT to gain first strike capability at the same time because unlike Pakistan and India officially it does not acknowledges or denies it’s military nuclear program, therefore complicating its adversaries planning.
I don’t think that Iran will agree to tighter monitoring of its nuclear activities if that means singling Iran out more than it already is. In particular, if Israel continues to avoid monitoring, how is Iran going to agree to it? Who monitors the US? Who monitors Russia?
And does anyone really think that if Iran gave up uranium enrichment today that the threats and harassment and the drive to war would stop? Of course it wouldn’t.
Stephen Walt is capable of criticizing neocon influence, Israel and US policy, summarizing and analyzing US – Iran relations, and outlining possible and beneficial steps toward better relations (a Leverettian posture), all without setting his or anyone else’s hair on fire.
http://antiwar.com/radio/2010/07/21/stephen-m-walt/
Arnold Evans:
You are quite correct about NPT.
IAEA is not a disarmament agency and NPT is not an instrument of nuclear or non-nuclear disarmament.
US, US, Russia, and China are shredding NPT in their dealings with Iran.
Just like they shredded the CWT during the Iran-Iraq War against Iran.
I suppose these states and state-groupings think that they can live with the consequences.
Furture (wars) will tell.
[I personally think it is foolish.]
The actual detonator would be irrelevant. Nobody could ever know for sure if Iran had one or not. They would assume the worst and stay clear.
This is my point. I don’t know if Japan has a detonator. I don’t care if Japan has a detonator. If Japan is provoked, Japan is going to get a detonator. If Tokyo is destroyed, we do know for sure, Japan will get a detonator and use it. As long as Tokyo is not destroyed, or a similar provocation does not cause Japan to openly rescind its commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, we know for sure that Japan does not have the means to destroy any other city. That is what is important, and it is what the NPT negotiators representing the weapons states and the non-weapons states agreed on.
Whether Japan has a detonator or not, it does not have a weapon, because we are sure that Japan’s fissile material, at this moment, is separate from its military program. That is very important because Japan is not capable of a surprise first strike the way the US, Israel and China are.
That is what Japan agreed to when it signed the NPT, not that Eric could let his imagination run wild trying to invent scenarios that he’d have to investigate before Japan could be allowed to use nuclear technology.
I also think there is an improper focus on ambiguity. That is not important. You don’t steer clear on attacking Tokyo because you don’t know whether or not it has a detonator. You steer clear of attacking Tokyo because you do know that Tokyo can get a detonator, whether it has one at this moment or not, in time to punish you for attacking. Iran is entitled to the technology that makes Japan’s position possible.
Israel could remove all fissile material from its weapons, put that material under IAEA supervision, and join the NPT as a non-weapons state. This would be a major strategic change because with the material under supervision, there is no longer an implicit threat that Israel could attack another country without warning. For Israel to use a nuclear weapon to attack after that, it would have to leave the NPT or at least visibly remove the fissile material from IAEA oversight.
If anyone thinks putting all fissile material under IAEA oversight is the same as leaving it in weapons, don’t convince me, convince Benjamin Netanyahu. Because if he does that, Israel can join the NPT and, according to you, retain the benefits of Israel’s weapons. And then convince Barack Obama. Because if the US was to put all of its fissile material under IAEA supervision, away from weapons, the world would be a vastly safer place.
What the NPT assures is that at the moment a non-weapons state cannot launch a nuclear attack and will not be able to without making a visible preparation. That is a very important piece of information that means rival countries do not have to devote resources to planning to respond to an unexpected first strike.
Obviously Eric wants the NPT to assure more than it does, for the special case of Iran. But the weapon-state responsibility to enter good faith negotiations for full disarmament? The one that is written in black and white and unarguable? Of course nobody was stupid enough to think the US would ever do that. That promise isn’t as solemn as the one Eric has invented for Iran. What Eric wants is not what the NPT negotiators agreed on, and not something reasonable for Iran to concede.
{The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough—more than enough—of war and hate and oppression.}
Yes, NO ONE WANTS A WAR, BUT US IS UNDER CONTROL OF ZIONISTS AND WHO ARE SITTING IN THE DRIVING SEAT LEADING AMERICA TO ANOTHER WAR TO EXPAND ISRAEL’S INTEREST IN THE REGION. MILLIONS OF PEOPLE BELIEVE THIS FACT. THE WAR IS WAGED BY ZIONISTS.
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/rejoinder-to-criticism-of-chomsky-asset-or-liability/
You thought Clemens or Frum are closet war hawks, you should read this one,
http://thinkprogress.org/2010/07/25/pipes-to-get-obama-to-act-netanyahu-should-threaten-to-nuke-iran
Richard Steven Hack :
You wrote: “I don’t think anything’s changed in the last seven years that Iran would not jump at a grand bargain, or even a lesser one resolving just the fake nuclear “crisis”.”
I think several things have changed:
1- Iran is clearly entrenched in Iraq. Iraq cannot be used as an anti-Iran platform, ever.
2- Hizbullah defeated Israel in 2006.
3- In 2006, Iran and US were on verge of war but Iran did not budge.
4- The nuclear program is much more extensive now.
5- US is on her way out of Iraq.
6- Afghanistan is not going the US/EU/NATO way.
7- Iran has withstood enormous amount of pressure.
These are the reasons that caused me to pose my initial question.
“Let me make sure I understand. What is it that “Japan has now” that you think I would deny to Iran? Just the plutonium?”
I don’t know. What are you denying Iran? The nuclear device or the weapons grade material to put in it? Are you saying that you don’t care which one they have as long as they don’t have both?
Whatever your thoughts are, or mine, I suspect that the US and Israel would be infinitely more concerned about the plutonium. And yet, as far as the NPT is concerned, Iran would still be in compliance if it obtains it. Or conversely, Iran, Japan, Canada and Brazil must all be in violation.
Regardless, the attitude of the US and Israel is that the law is what they say it is. Therefore, Iran is in violation and the other nations are not, simply because they say so. It doesn’t matter what the NPT says.
“I just read the Spiegel article quickly, but can’t figure out why you ask this question. I saw nothing but some speculation that Brazil might be working on a bomb. Can you point me to what you had in mind?”
I guess it was the same point as above. If Iran declared it had built nuclear submarines and that it was enriching uranium to 90% to fuel them, would you think they are in violation of the NPT? Or would they be in compliance so long as they haven’t built a nuclear detonator?
Because the fact of the matter is, Iran in possession of either plutonium or HEU, changes the equation entirely. There would not even be a **mention** of a military option on the table in such circumstances. The actual detonator would be irrelevant. Nobody could ever know for sure if Iran had one or not. They would assume the worst and stay clear.
Kathleen: You’re especially right about Rachel Maddow. While Maddow is considered the “Great White Liberal Hope” on broadcast news, the fact is she toes the party line frequently. For instance, she is utterly uninterested in the Sibel Edmonds whistle-blower case, as is the entirety of the US media, despite the massively important information Edmonds possesses about high treason by US government elected officials.
Corruption in US society goes to the bone, not just in the US government.
House Resolution 1553 set up just in time for the fall elections. Either pledge your allegiance to Israel or take a hit from the Israeli lobby.
http://seminal.firedoglake.com/diary/61897
Phillip Giraldi
“Even when everything changes, nothing changes for the American mainstream media (MSM), which continues to be wedded to a policy of all war all the time. There is a long history of media lies. [...]
————————————————————————————-
Today it is different as newspapers rarely compete for market share and have no interest in exposing the half-truths of their peers. The unanimity of view is particularly evident on the editorial pages where the neocons and the groupthink that they have fostered have become deeply embedded. Everyone in the MSM agrees that Iran either already has nukes or is about to go nuclear and that the country shelters terrorists on every block, all colluding to attack a completely innocent and guileless United States. Saturated with the propaganda, the American public more or less accepts that narrative…”
Chris Matthews, Diane Rehm, Neil Conan, Rachel Maddow, David Gregory, George Stephanapoulous, Keith Olbermann, etc have all allowed the unsubstantiated and inflammatory claims about Iran to be repeated on their programs. “Irans nuclear weapons program” not “Iran’s nuclear energy program” They have all allowed the “Iran wants to wipe Israel off the map” lie to be repeated. I have heard Terry Gross many times not only allow this hogwash to be repeated but I have heard her repeat these unsubstantiated claims herself. Scott Simon a few times also
These claims have been repeated so many times that a large percentage of the American public believe them. The stage for an attack on Iran has been set. And the Iraqi dead, injured and displaced have not even been counted and barely mentioned on these news outlets
Lieberman: ‘Pentagon is ready to strike Iran’
Senator Joe Lieberman (aka Mr. Israel) along with Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham flew all the way to Tel Aviv to let Israeli Defense Minister Gen. Ehud Barak and other military officers that he has been told Pentagon is ready to strike Iran. Lieberman’s “secret” was published in Israeli daily The Jerusalem Post, while the Zionist-controlled American mainstream media kept Lieberman’s view secret from the US public. Though they make military threats – they also have come to the realization that bombing Islamic Republic is not worth the consequences.
All such trips doing Israeli PR work around the world by US government official, Senators and Congressmen are paid by the US taxpayers.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/07/26/lieberman-pentagon-is-ready-to-strike-iran-2/
I think somewhere in the dark halls of political horse-trading, something did happen. Obama decided to throw good sense with Iran under the bus for something…
Little wonder we see names like Clinton, Gates, Rice, and Emanuel etc as top US policy makers on Iran.
And once again, the Israel lobby is having the last laugh.
Let’s spell out what Japan has though.
1) A stockpile of tons of plutonium, already weapons grade, that is enough to make, in the correct words of one of its politicians “thousands of warheads”
2) A space program with missiles capable of being converted to fully functional ICBMs
3) Ongoing processing of nuclear material.
If I was Iran, I would not give up my right to stockpile LEU, would continue to make steady progress in my space program and would not suspend enrichment pending US permission to restart.
If the United States acknowledges Iran’s right to do those three without interference, things Japan does to a much much more provocative extent, the nuclear dispute certainly can be resolved.
As long as the United States hold the position that Iran, unlike Japan, must not have a stockpile of fissile material, must suspend its rocket program and cannot continue processing nuclear material, the dispute cannot be resolved, and Iran is the party that is right.
“Let me make sure I understand. What is it that “Japan has now” that you think I would deny to Iran? Just the plutonium?”
-Eric
More to the point, Eric, what do you believe Iran is developing that you believe Japan doesn’t have?
Hurray for Arnold! He makes it so much easier to just skulk in the background.
Eric, you are free to maintain that a pistol without bullets is still a gun, just as a nuclear weapon without fissile material is still an implosion device, but neither would make much of a weapon. I myself lean towards Arnolds position, but i don’t see why this is a big deal, since there is absolutely no evidence that Iran has committed itself towards such a course. We could have the exact same discussion about how far Lithuania could go before it technically violates the Convention on Biological Weapons. It’s a question that seems too unreasonably hypothetical to keep circling back to.
I think Arnold’s point deserves a response, and i’ve seen him bring it up several times without soliciting one from you successfully, how can Iran be in violation of the NPT when everything that Iran has done has already been done by Japan, and Japan is not in violation of the NPT? Especially in light of the provisions in the NPT itself about the ’sovereign equality’ of member states, and the applicability of the treaty ‘without discrimination’(if I remember correctly). Does Iran have the right to develop the same technological infrastructure that Japan and Brazil a right to develop? If not, why not?
If Iran is in violation of it’s NPT obligations, which obligations are you referring to, how do you know Iran has violated those obligations, and how could that possibly have any effect on what Iran is or isn’t allowed to do under the NPT?
Masoud
Mr. Brill: May I suggest that your responses to Arnold and Lysander just under my latest posts are disingenuous in the extreme.
Why are you asking Lysander to guess what you think? Why don’t you just SAY what you’d like Iran not to have that Japan has? Or what you think the actual difference is between Japan and Iran SPECIFICALLY?
Your response to Arnold is just “hey, I disagree and I’ll get back to you on that.”
Not very persuasive. You’re scrambling badly for a comeback. Good luck.
Mr. Brill: Let’s say that Arnold holds the precise position that a complete nuclear weapon system without nuclear materials is not a weapon. In this, he is technically correct. A gun without bullets is a gun, but it is not able to harm anyone (unless used as a club, of course.) It’s mostly an argument over semantics. A nuclear weapon system is still a nuclear weapon system regardless of the presence of nuclear material. A gun is still a gun regardless of the presence of bullets.
The issue of importance is what does the NPT PROHIBIT. I say it prohibits Iran from actually constructing a nuclear weapon, with or without nuclear material actually in it.
You ask where I stand on THAT point. I stand on the fact that Iran is obligated not to construct such a device under the NPT. I also stand on the fact that Iran does NOT appear to be obligated not to have the designs, the knowledge, the technology, and the resources to BUILD such a device. Why? Because Japan and Brazil have all these things and the IAEA does not care (or at least if they care they aren’t making a big deal about it.)
Arnold’s point is pretty much oriented around the example of Japan. Japan has the weapons grade uranium (or can make such very quickly), it has the technology, the industrial resources, and probably has the blueprints and specifications, to build a nuclear weapon. This would APPEAR to be allowed under the NPT – because nobody has said one word about that. Thus, it is clear that de facto, if not de jure, the IAEA has no problem with Japan’s ability to construct a nuclear weapon because Japan has never said it wants nuclear weapons, because if Japan HAD nuclear weapons there would clearly be a destabilizing factor vis-a-vis China and especially Korea (which is why Japan is VERY concerned about a nuclear North Korea), and because there is zero evidence that Japan has built, is building, or intends to build nuclear weapons, and this is backed up by Japan’s not diverting any fissile material.
All of this precisely applies to Iran, as Arnold argues correctly. Iran is in EXACTLY the same position as Japan, except that it has no weapons grade uranium, and it has EXPLICITLY DENIED wanting nuclear weapons. The other difference is that Israel doesn’t hate Japan (as far as I know) and Japan is not a regional influence in the Middle East as Iran is. Nor does Japan have any oil.
What matters in non-proliferation – at least a RATIONAL non-proliferation concept – is whether a country is actually MANUFACTURING and DEPLOYING nuclear weapons – NOT whether they have the resources and know-how to do so. Now, I’m sure a LOT of people involved in non-proliferation would disagree with my assertion. They may think it is important to prevent countries from having the nuclear trigger blueprints and specs, for example. Nonetheless I stand by my claim that this is an unrealistic stance in the real world of the Internet, open sources of technology, and smuggling.
Should Valerie Plame be trying to prevent Iran from obtaining an actual nuclear trigger? I would ask: “How MANY?” One to study? Sure. Five hundred to actually put in manufactured nuclear weapons? Probably not. Therein lies the difference between a rational non-proliferation program and a fantasy non-proliferation program.
Mr. Brill: I agree with your criticisms of Clemons. I used to read his stuff over at Talking Points Memo (before Josh Marshall, a “closet Zionist”, banned me from that site over my views on Israel). Clemons is one of those “Very Serious People” (VSPs) who have the imagination of a potato and a complete ignorance of just how corrupt the US government actually is (because it would cause him cognitive dissonance to acknowledge that corruption). Plus he’s one of those fools who still believes – and it IS a belief based on nothing but faith and not facts – in Obama as an “agent of change”.
Arnold,
“The treaty says what it says. Your interpretation is so unreasonable, so clearly contrary to the treaty’s words and spirit that you don’t even spell it out. You’d be embarrassed. This is not unique. Others, even professionals, who are sympathetic to your point of view also tend not to express it before potentially skeptical audiences.”
I’ll reply later to the substance of what you have to say other than in this paragraph, but I’ll dispose of this paragraph briefly and ask you to consider whether such closing flourishes really add to the discussion.
Your first sentence is hard to disagree with. I disagree with every part of your second sentence, which makes your third sentence irrelevant. Same for the fourth. I disagree with your fifth sentence. Many others are “sympathetic” to my point of view; I’ll confess I’m not sure which of my several “points of view” you’re referring to here, but I’m confident that I’m correct no matter which one you pick.
Lysander,
“Arnold is entirely correct. If Iran achieves what Japan has now and stops at that, it would certainly be in compliance with the NPT.”
Let me make sure I understand. What is it that “Japan has now” that you think I would deny to Iran? Just the plutonium?
Lysander
“Sorry to trouble you again, Eric but, given the following, woyld you consider Brazil to be in violation of the NPT? http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,693336,00.html.”
I just read the Spiegel article quickly, but can’t figure out why you ask this question. I saw nothing but some speculation that Brazil might be working on a bomb. Can you point me to what you had in mind?
Richard,
“I don’t think Arnold is arguing that Iran can actually manufacture a full nuclear weapon, just without nuclear material in it, as well as the ballistic missile warhead to deliver it under the NPT. I think this is clearly under the purview of the NPT. Arnold can weigh in on whether that’s what he actually means.”
Arnold indeed can weigh in, but trust me: that’s exactly what he means. Granted, he adds that it doesn’t matter, but that is what he means, and it does matter to me.
“Whether I agree with such a view is irrelevant.”
Not to me. Arnold says a gun without bullets isn’t a gun, and I say it is. If you agree with me and not with Arnold on that, why not just tell me why? I can use all the help I can get.
To their credit, the Leveretts are probably too gracious to criticize certain colleagues, at least as bluntly as some of them deserve. I’ll take that burden on myself for Steve Clemons’ July 23 Washington Note, entitled “Stop Hyperventilating: Obama Will Not Choose War with Iran.”
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/07/stop_hyperventi_1/
First, let me assure Mr. Clemons that few of us were hyperventilating in the first place. What concerns me more, though, are a few of the unexamined assumptions on which he bases his comforting conclusion.
First, he argues that attacking Iran could result in Iran losing its ability to “dial up or dial down the activities of its transnational terrorist networks.” We should be grateful, he reminds us, that Iran “has them on low simmer at this point,” and we should understand that an “attack against Iran would probably blow this control valve off – resulting in a terrorist superhighway running from Iran through Iraq into Jordan and Syria right toward Israel. This network would also unleash itself against allied Arab state governments in the region and also cause havoc against US forces and affiliates in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Ouch! Who can disagree that the US should not want all this to happen? But what’s conveniently overlooked is a two-part assumption that many of us do not accept: that Iran even has “transnational terrorist networks,” much less the ability to “dial up or dial down” their activities.
We all can guess what “transnational terrorist networks” Mr. Clemons has in mind, but he ought to remove any doubt by naming them. The reader then can decide whether he accepts the premise on which Mr. Clemons’ analysis is based. I don’t, and so his analysis strikes me as baseless. A “transnational terrorist network” or two may well react badly to a US attack on Iran – indeed, I’d be surprised if that didn’t occur – but it won’t happen because Iran’s leaders are so pre-occupied with the US attack that they loosen the reins on those “terrorist networks.” Those “terrorist networks” will decide for themselves. Just as they do now.
Mr. Clemons moves on to David Frum’s argument that the US “should pause a bit before actually doing what Iran’s theocratic elites seem to be inviting.” For the most part, this is the familiar argument that a US attack would cause Iranians to rally round the flag, restoring the “strongly consolidated position” of Iran’s rulers that has been seriously eroded by the “contested election and turmoil among Iran’s top elites and other strong tensions inside Iran’s political system.” As such, Mr. Clemons’ argument rests on the same glossed-over assumption on which this argument has always rested: that Iran’s rulers were seriously weakened by the “contested election.” Mr. Frum builds on this already shaky assumption by asking us to accept – as Mr. Clemons does – that these leaders lately have become so desperate that they actually are “inviting” the US to attack Iran.
Can you imagine more heartless leaders? Good thing Mr. Clemons advises us to hold ourselves back. One’s anger could cloud his judgment so much that he might forget he doesn’t actually agree with Mr. Clemons’ assumption that Iran’s rulers are weak and desperate – much less with Mr. Frum’s absurd suggestion that those leaders have become so desperate that they’re actually “inviting” the US to attack.
The remainder of Mr. Clemons’ article largely catalogues arguments made many times by many others, though it’s useful to see them collected in one place. For just a few: China and Russia are likely to veto a UNSC attack-Iran resolution. They will then second-guess us if things go poorly, and may muscle in on our Middle Eastern oil/gas resources while we’re distracted. Another Middle East war might erode domestic support for the US military, which in any case will be stretched so thin that morale and performance will suffer. Iran might get angry and try harder to build a nuclear bomb, and we won’t be able to stop it. Other countries might get upset too, and sympathize with Iran. The war might last longer and be messier than we expect. Obama has fewer pro-war advisers than Bush did. And so on – nothing new, though, again, it’s useful to see so many of these points stated in one place.
Despite all this, I will give Mr. Clemons credit for one bold prediction:
“There are many who worry too much that Obama’s recent highly scripted, positive, buddy-buddy encounter with Benjamin Netanyahu means that the United States is acquiescing to Israel’s view of Iran, of settlements, and of the world. [Admit it, gentle reader, you're probably one of those people.] This would be a misread of the situation. Come December 2010, my hunch is that all of those who have recently placed faith in a White House posture of Israel uber alles will be as disappointed in the Obama White House as many other interest groups have been who thought that Obama would deliver on their single issue.”
December 2010, eh? We’ll see.
Arnold insists that Iran may go well beyond that: it may actually build what some (I, at least) would call “nuclear weapons” – right down to the last nut, bolt, nuclear trigger and user’s manual – as well as the ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them anywhere in the world, in any numbers it may see fit, so long as Iran doesn’t actually insert nuclear material into any of these “non-weapons.”
Yes, or no. Iran has the right to as much nuclear technology and material as Japan has. Your answer is no, based on what you feel in your heart. But there is literally no way to support your answer based on any reasonable set of principles.
I’ll indulge this, but I want everyone reading to understand what’s happening. This is an elaborate way to dodge the question of why Iran should be denied technology Japan and many other countries are allowed to access. I’m not even going to ask for an answer at this point. There is no answer.
So to your question of what makes a “nuclear explosive device” that is forbidden by the NPT. 1) Without fissionable material, it is physically impossible to damage any country with a nuclear weapon. An agreement that prevents fissionable material from being applied to weapons, automatically and with 100% certainty prevents Hiroshima and the use of nuclear weapons. 2) The CSA was designed to enforce the NPT, and it does so by monitoring fissile material. This was based on the correct understanding that all you need to do to prevent Hiroshima is make sure nobody puts fissionable material into a weapon.
You pretend to be very concerned with how close a country can get to having a weapon without adding fissionable material. It doesn’t matter. There is an important practical difference between the position the US is in, with weapons ready for firing and the position Japan is in, that it could build weapons if it was provoked. There is not an important strategic difference between this scenario you’ve concocted, in which Japan has an entire weapon but has not added fissile material and Japan’s actual situation, where it would probably take a matter of months to build a weapon. But there is an important strategic difference between Japan’s situation and Egypt’s situation.
If Israel destroys Cairo with a nuclear weapon, the United States can demand that any technology that could be used to build nuclear weapon be kept out of Egypt because, say, “an escalation would only make this difficult period worse”. Egypt would be helpless. If Israel destroys Tokyo with a nuclear weapon, Israel will be uninhabitable three months from now, and there is no important strategic difference if that had been one day from now or 9 months from now.
There would be nothing the US could do. In this scenario Israel just made a big mistake and will soon be over. Because of that, Japan is more secure than Egypt that Israel will never consider, even as a hypothetical, destroying its capital.
Israel wants to maintain the freedom to consider destroying Tehran with Tehran, like Egypt, unable to respond. Here you are, Eric, on Israel’s side. You also want Israel to be able to destroy Tehran. That is not a defensible position, so you focus on unimportant side issues. You’re not right on those side issues either, but they remove the focus away from the strategic core of the dispute where your position, as you demonstrate, is absolutely indefensible.
Anyway, the NPT is designed to keep countries where Japan is, and not where the US is. This is done with specific language in the treaty that was negotiated, clearly in bad faith by the United States. The NPT is not designed to keep countries where Egypt is.
Whatever. Iran is not as comfortable as you with the idea that Israel should be able to threaten, without fear of retaliation, any capital or city in its region. There is a string of colonies that goes along with this because the US, for Israel’s benefit, has remained a full-fledged colonial power in Israel’s region, as if today was 1890. This is contrary to the US’ founding ideals and values and this situation will only become more of a drain on US resources.
The treaty says what it says. Your interpretation is so unreasonable, so clearly contrary to the treaty’s words and spirit that you don’t even spell it out. You’d be embarrassed. This is not unique. Others, even professionals, who are sympathetic to your point of view also tend not to express it before potentially skeptical audiences.
Fyi: Is the deal still viable? No, since I don’t believe the US will EVER offer it.
Would Iran still be interested? Of course. They’ve said so repeatedly.
The sticking point of the second part on regime change would hinge on Iran’s support for Hizballah and Hamas and that in turn would hinge on Israel being pressured to resolve the Palestinian situation. OTOH, I could see Iran reducing its support for Hizballah and Hamas if it were offered a serious enough grand bargain, because a full resumption of diplomatic relations with the US and the ability to resume normal economic trade would be much more important to Iran than the Palestinian situation. Iran might not like giving in on the Israel question, but according to the 2003 offer they made via the Swiss, Iran has indeed offered exactly that in return for a normalization with the US.
I don’t think anything’s changed in the last seven years that Iran would not jump at a grand bargain, or even a lesser one resolving just the fake nuclear “crisis”.
I also don’t think it’s going to happen due to the US and Israel hidden agenda.
Paul: I agree entirely with your and Finkelstein’s impression of Obama. As I said all during his Presidential campaign, the man is either CLUELESS about military affairs and foreign policy, or he’s a LIAR about what he intends. There is no third option.
Lysander: Thanks for the Spiegel link. I was not aware that Brazil was moving so far in that direction (assuming that the article is correct and it is.) It is notable that Brazilian officials are actually quoted saying that Brazil doesn’t like the NPT and that it may actually want nuclear weapons. Iran, on the other hand, has done neither.
I find it also interesting that Brazil has ACTUALLY done as much or more than Iran is ACCUSED of doing, and yet there isn’t a PEEP out of Obama and the neocons about it.
Of course, Brazil has no oil – and isn’t close to Israel. If one needs any more evidence for an Obama double standard, I’d say Brazil is pretty damn clear.
Mr. Brill: My position and Arnold’s are not at odds. He just carries it further to the actual manufacturing of nuclear weapons, whereas I stop at Iran acquiring the knowledge and technology without actually assembling much of anything.
The issue is whether any sovereign state has the right to conduct its own internal military affairs, especially given that certain states – such as Israel and India – are allowed and even encouraged in some aspects to ignore the entire international thrust of non-proliferation. And the worst source of proliferation – especially of functional weapons – are those countries with actual nuclear arsenals, especially including Israel (and Pakistan) whose weapons are right in the middle of a hot spot. This includes the major powers, but at least those powers have large countries and large militaries and sophisticated permission links on those weapons.
I don’t think Arnold is arguing that Iran can actually manufacture a full nuclear weapon, just without nuclear material in it, as well as the ballistic missile warhead to deliver it under the NPT. I think this is clearly under the purview of the NPT. Arnold can weigh in on whether that’s what he actually means. Whether I agree with such a view is irrelevant.
Clearly Iran’s development of ballistic missiles does NOT fall under the purview of the NPT. And the only evidence of Iran’s development of a ballistic missile warhead capable of carrying a nuclear weapon comes from the suspect laptop and I believe experts have said the warhead plans there are unrelated to a nuclear weapon (I should double-check that).
What I believe is not and should not be under the purview of the NPT is the accumulation of the technical knowledge – the blueprints, the design specs, etc. – of a nuclear weapons. It’s simply not hard to get that level of capability, so trying to suppress it is a waste of time.
This really brings up the entire issue of what IS “proliferation of nuclear weapons”? In my view, the goal is simply to prevent more nations from having ACTUAL nuclear weapons developed, manufactured and deployed. It’s not to try to “put the genie back in the bottle” on the technology itself. That is impossible. If the non-proliferation people think that is a battle they can win, in this day and age of the Internet and the level of technology available to even smaller countries or even larger organizations, they’re insane.
Sorry to trouble you again, Eric but, given the following, woyld you consider Brazil to be in violation of the NPT?
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,693336,00.html
Because, it seems Brazil can enrich uranium to weapons grade level to power nuclear submarines. This, according to the article, is not a violation of the NPT.
“It sounds harmless enough, but it isn’t, because the term “nuclear-powered submarines” could in fact be a cover for a nuclear weapons program. Brazil already had three secret military nuclear programs between 1975 and 1990, with each branch of its armed forces pursuing its own route. The navy’s approach proved to be the most successful: using imported high-performance centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium from imported uranium hexafluoride, so as to be able to operate small reactors for submarines. At the appropriate time, the country’s newly acquired nuclear capabilities were to be revealed to the world with a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” based on the example set by India. The 300-meter (984-foot) shaft for the test had already been drilled. According to statements by the former president of the National Nuclear Energy Commission, in 1990 the Brazilian military was on the verge of building a bomb.
But it never came to that. During the course of Brazil’s democratization, the secret nuclear programs were effectively abandoned. Under the country’s 1988 constitution, nuclear activities were restricted to “peaceful uses.” Brazil ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1994 and, in 1998, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Brazil’s flirtation with the bomb had apparently ended.
Under Lula da Silva, however, this flirtation has now been reignited, and the Brazilians are becoming less and less hesitant about toying with their own nuclear option. Only a few months after Lula’s inauguration in 2003, the country officially resumed the development of a nuclear-powered submarine.
Even during his election campaign, Lula criticized the NPT, calling it unfair and obsolete. Although Brazil did not withdraw from the treaty, it demonstratively tightened working conditions for inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). The situation became tense in April 2004, when the IAEA was denied unlimited access to a newly built enrichment facility in Resende, near Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian government also made it clear that it did not intend to sign the additional protocol to the NPT, which would have required it to open previously undeclared facilities to inspection…”
Eric,
Arnold is entirely correct. If Iran achieves what Japan has now and stops at that, it would certainly be in compliance with the NPT. Or, if it is in violation, then so is Japan, Canada, Brazil, etc. Perhaps you think the world would be a better place if Iran does not pursue that capability possessed by the aforementioned nations. You are entitled to your thoughts on the matter, though I disagree. The world would benefit greatly if American and Israeli casual use of military force were constrained.
Be that as it may, Iran isn’t even pursuing a true Japan option. Japan has lots of weapons grade plutonium, whereas there is no hint that Iran even intends to produce weapons grade material. Until it does, it cannot be said to have a true Japan option. Perhaps when the experimental reactor at Arak comes online, Iran will have plutonium. Then it will have a Japan option. (I believe if Bushehr ever starts up, Iran will have to turn over the spent fuel rods to Russia.)
“trade acceptance of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil for tighter international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities and abandon the pursuit of coercive regime change in Tehran.”
Is this deal still viable?
Will Iranians still be interested?
I have a question, the answer to which I’ve been wanting to understand for a long time… how much of this is, in any real sense, rational?
Psychopaths are not stupid, but have low impulse thresholds for base desires which they consider “essential” and “deserved” as the opportune moment presents itself, facilitated by a complete lack of empathy and/or remorse and a memory that sees only one’s self as victim.
Palestine (The Occupation, the Siege, the Bombardment of Gaza) Lebanon (the wars) Afghanistan (the wars) Iraq (the wars), Iran (the 1953 deception, support for the Shah’s totalitarianism, the new war)…
…and somehow, it is the “west” which is being threatened by Iran?
What is actually happening, and how does one speak of it?
Richard,
In the preceding thread, which I’ll continue here, you took an uncharacteristically timid view of what Iran is free to do under NPT Article II. As you noted and I agree, Article II prohibits Iran from manufacturing a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. You argued that Iran nevertheless may develop the “knowledge and technology” to manufacture a nuclear weapon as long as it doesn’t actually build one.
Arnold insists that Iran may go well beyond that: it may actually build what some (I, at least) would call “nuclear weapons” – right down to the last nut, bolt, nuclear trigger and user’s manual – as well as the ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them anywhere in the world, in any numbers it may see fit, so long as Iran doesn’t actually insert nuclear material into any of these “non-weapons.” Inserting nuclear material, Arnold acknowledges, would instantly transform such a non-weapon into a nuclear weapon, but until then it remains a non-weapon. In Arnold’s view, Iran is free to make as many of these non-weapons as it might like, without any restrictions or disclosure obligations under the NPT or its Safeguards Agreement.
As you know, I take a narrower view: just as a gun without bullets is still a gun, a nuclear explosive device without nuclear material is still a nuclear explosive device.
It may be necessary to respond separately to each of you, but I thought it would be worth asking whether you think your position on this can be reconciled with Arnold’s.
While I agree with the need to be vigilant regarding both war and the trajectory of US hostility toward Iran, and I respect and applaud the work the Leveretts are doing to prevent the US from making what would end up a much more costly mistake than the invasion of Iraq, I don’t see a US war against Iran as either imminent or plausible.
Personally, I remember the run-up to the Iraq war. I personally expected the US to win, and at great Iraqi expense to prop up someone like Chalabi who would extend what I was coming to understand was the US regional colonial structure. The Western anti-war movement, as I remember it, was motivated by a desire to save Iraqi lives based on the proposition that these lives were more valuable than the interests the US was attempting to advance. I also opposed the war, for that reason.
Today, I personally expect the US to lose its war with Iran. Richard Hack’s analysis seems about right to me. Nobody in the US thinks regime change is possible. Given scrutiny, nobody even thinks occupying Iranian territory or breaking the country up is possible. Nobody even thinks a war is likely to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so.
I oppose a war with Iran because the Iranian lives that would be lost are more valuable than the extension of the US colonial structure, but unlike Iraq in 2003 – there is no consensus that a war can actually extend the US colonial structure. (By colonial structure, I mean string of pro-US dictatorships in Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc. most of whose leaders are the children of the British Empire’s subordinate rulers, and whose relationship with the US is identical to that their parents held with Britain).
An attack on Iran would end up putting the US into a Vietnam-like conflict in a zone at least through Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, at least. This is not poorly understood among the US military establishment, unlike the way Iraq’s capacity to resist an occupation without a central government was not understood in 2003.
The US does need a way to lower tensions, and lost an opportunity with the Turkey deal, even though another opportunity will come in September when Iran comes to talk on that deal. But the air does not feel now the way it felt in 2003.
paul,
Obama’s “safe picks” were safe in the sense the armaments manufacturers, their lawyers and lobbyists and other influence peddlers, could be sure would not tell the president: “You know, this country wastes hundreds of billions of dollars every year on useless or unnecessary weapons and unnecessary military adventures. Gates and Clinton were reliable stooges.
Pirouz,
You make important points about the inherent conflict of interest of so many of Obama’s advisers, who are deeply imbedded within the Israel lobby.
Bravo! JFK had the confidence and good sense to reject the advice of his senior military advisers. Obama, on the other hand, clearly lacks confidence and seems to be in a sense a captive of the generals. More of this will take the US to disaster.
Finkelstein gives a solid evaluation of Obama:
” It’s easy to make broad brush statements about how terrible he is, but on every front, when I read the details, it’s really deeply depressing how terrible he is. I think he was too young and too inexperienced to become President. He rose from very humble roots, and he’s bedazzled by power and elite institutions. They’re easy to be intimidated by, and so all the people he has surrounded himself with are just Harvard people who have very secure positions in power. Because he has to be very insecure about the fact that he’s a relatively young person from a relatively humble background who has very little experience. He was a senator for two years, that was it. And this insecurity manifested itself in what you call ‘safe picks’ – everybody he chose was very safe.
Look who he chose for the Supreme Court – Elena Kagan is a complete nonentity. Her only impulse is ambition. We all have ambition, but ambition in the service of an idea, a cause, a principle. But hers is just ambition in the service of ambition. And that’s him – there’s no cause, there’s no principle, there’s nothing, except for these empty, vapid homilies.”
http://www.zcommunications.org/god-helps-those-who-help-themselves-part-2-by-norman-finkelstein
As far as one can tell, there’s nothing there in the oval office but a roiling mass of ambition. That’s always true, with every president, but it seems especially true this time around. Bacevich spoke to this, I think. He asked what is worse – a president who does wrong because he doesn’t seem to know any better (Bush) or a president who does wrong knowing it’s wrong (Obama)?
If we don’t want war, we have to be the ones who stand up against it. But hey, let’s all just delude ourselves with dreams of the Secret Peacemaker and flickering memories of JFK … these days self-delusion is amazingly respectable.
He would have responded very positively to the Turkey/Brazil effort. That was his perfect offramp from war, the ultimate godsend if he truly were a Secret Peacemaker.
I have to say, this probably was the most disappointing moment in the Obama presidency, the second most was probably the nobel prize speech. At least as far as foreign policy.
Regarding the legal basis for attacking Iran: it doesn’t matter what antiwar codicils the sanctions contain. What matters is that the sanctions are war, economic war, and the arguments justifying the sanctions thus are effectively arguments for war. They also clearly prepare the way for shooting war by preventing Iran from arming itself even defensively, as we see with Russia’s s-300 gameplaying. In any case, the current sanction contains a provision for stopping Iranian shipping that is effectively a war trigger, as we have seen with the threatening US fleet sent to the region and Iranian threats to stop shipping in return if their shipping is stopped.
There would be numerous ways for a false flag incident (shades of Cheonan, possibly), or an exaggerated incident to be turned into a casus belli. And then there is Israel, which pays no attention to the UN Security Council anyway.
But the real point we need to understand is that the affect of the Iraq war was to permanently lower the threshold for war. That war proved that any UNSC opposition to war was irrelevant, that the UN would come around in any case; the next war will be easier to start, not harder. No one truly cares anymore. If the US wants a war badly enough, everyone will get out of the way and be glad that they aren’t in the crosshairs.
In the narrowest sense, this is the real reason for the war …
“In the end, we will be attacking Iran because it is enriching uranium. ”
… but why is it important to stop Iran from enriching uranium, and does anyone really think that if Iran stopped enriching uranium tomorrow that they would be allowed off the hot seat?!!! Seriously?
No, of course not.
It’s laughable, also, to assert that the US was viewed as a uniquely benign power during the Cold War. That’s just propaganda. Every World Power has had those who defended it and those who saw it quite differently. The US has been no different. But what IS valid, I believe, is that the world hoped that after the Cold War was done, perhaps the US would turn out to be genuinely well intentioned. The Iraq invasion demonstrated that that was not the case. The Iran war buildup has shown that Obama made no difference. I mean, you can see in Medvedev’s eyes that he thinks the whole thing is a scream. Yesterday I’m defending Iran, today I’m kicking Iran under the bus. It’s all just a game, and both the currency and the prize are power. Hegemony is not about legitimacy today. It’s about military power, and the US has loads of that.
The stuff about the dollar is a red herring. The US dollar is basically a fiction; they can print as many as they wish and they don’t even have to print them anymore. They can just make up the numbers and run them through the Fed to make them look a little bit real. The securities sold to China, etc’, are just to tie other countries into the system. The dollar is power as long as people around the world believe in it, and they believe in it as long as the US controls the global trade routes. The only thing that might weaken the dollar would be a move to a global currency and that will only happen if US elites agree to it.
The US’ superpower status has never been greater. The world network of power of the US and of the US dominated Nato and Nato-associated powers is close to absolute.
I do think that Kennedy grew into the presidency in some ways. He seems to have appreciated in a way that few presidents have that what is right and what is good actually matters. I have long thought that the civil rights movement may have changed the frame of reference for him in a way that no movement today will do for Obama. There simply is NO political movement in America with anything remotely resembling the combination of power and principle that the Civil Rights movement demonstrated, nor is there any sign whatsoever that Obama has a shred of the character that JFK seems to have had (not that I’m a JFK fan – I’m not). We have already had a clear demonstration of the lack of goodness in Obama’s soul. If Obama had a shred of goodness (I’m talking about him politically. I don’t know him or care to know him as a human being), he would have responded very positively to the Turkey/Brazil effort. That was his perfect offramp from war, the ultimate godsend if he truly were a Secret Peacemaker.
Sure, I hope he proves me wrong. But you might as well have hoped that Bush would, at the last moment, have decided that he could not in conscience invade Iraq.
You are right, Castellio. I should indulge in some Beltway Bullshit. I’d be more ‘respectable’ that way.
Good call.
What fascinates me is the way virtually all alternapundits are promoting the blatantly absurd myth of Obama the Secret Peacemaker. It is this myth that keeps the antiwar left, if such a thing even exists anymore, off Obama’s back. As US and world political history have repeatedly demonstrated, no one pushes a bad policy more effectively than someone associated with the opposition. Obama’s whole antiwar reputation is based mainly on one speech against the Iraq invasion, that he made in 2002, when it cost him nothing politically, since he didn’t have to vote on anything at the time, in which his reasons for opposing the war were so carefully hedged that his stance was easily abandoned once he was in the Senate.
But yes, I understand that in order to be ‘respectable’, I must buy into the same bullshit all the ’serious people’ are promoting. Gotta drink that Beltway Koolaide.
Just curious, Paul, you write what you write with what level of certainty? Any doubt at all?
The thing is, OBAMA MADE THIS SITUATION HAPPEN! Can we please STOP pretending that Obama had nothing to do with the relentless buildup of tensions with Iran? PLEASE!
Please?
This situation is Obama’s baby. It didn’t just happen to him. He bought it from Bush and then proceeded to water and feed it, helping turn it into a monster hungry for human blood…
I agree, exceptional post. Timely and appropriate.
The critical quote from the Leveretts has the issue simmered to a deciding point: “There is a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue—particularly if the United States is willing to trade acceptance of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil for tighter international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities and abandon the pursuit of coercive regime change in Tehran.”
But the post deserves consideration not only for the clarity of that choice, but also by pointing to an extremely critical historical precedent of renegade pro-war elements within the American government and intelligence communities, as in the Bay of Pigs under Dulles, also as in the lead up to the Iraq invasion. As we know, Kennedy eventually fired the top men of the CIA, and paid a price. George Bush the younger gave his renegade crew the highest honours possible. Different men, different time…
Unfortunately, I have to add that Obama’s Nobel speech gives little reason for optimism and, what the post fails to acknowlege, the current conflict is rooted in Iranian support (of whatever sort) for Hezbollah and Hamas, and less in the ‘wmd’ talking point – although that is what the public has been led to believe is the outstanding issue.
If Israel, as has been reported, is now part of the planning process for the bombardment of Iran, it’s already as if Kennedy had invited the Cuban emigrees of Miami to set military policy, abdicating his own responsibility.
Exceptional post.
Here’s one of the major differences between the two presidents. Compare the twos’ most influential advisors. In the case of Obama, you’ll find some of his key advisors possess a distinct conflict of interest. To put this into Kennedy’s context, it would be as if Kennedy’s key civilian advisors were exiled Poles (or Cubans), with one advisor in the past even serving in the Polish Armed Forces in the West during WWII (Rahm Emanuel is ex-IDF). Obama’s deck of cards is stacked with foreign interest, compared to Kennedy’s.
To be sure, I’m disappointed with Obama’s insincere engagement policy with Iran. And while I think the sanctions track is counter-productive, given the Iranian mentality, so far all I have to fall back on is the fact that Obama hasn’t attacked Iran.
Hopefully there will be a more sensible and sincere effort made when talks resume later on in September. If not, the situation will only grow that much more dangerous.
The problem with the comparison, apt as it is in most respects as your insightful article specified, is that Iran has no nuclear weapons. Therefore the sort of fear of a major war that an adversary with nuclear weapons provokes is not present. The US is over-confident of its ability to win a Fourth Generation conflict, despite the fact that it lost one in Iraq and is losing the other in Afghanistan.
The problem is that while Iraq was horribly expensive both in money and lives, the US – and its leaders – remained untouched. The same is true in Afghanistan.
But a war with Iran could bleed right into the United States. And the cost in money and lives will be at least four times larger than both Iraq and Afghanistan. But I have ZERO confidence that the people surrounding Obama understand that.
Biden, Emanuel, Clinton? One has to laugh to imagine that lot comprehending the danger of a war with Iran.
The real question is: does Obama have the military and foreign policy smarts to stand up to the sort of pressure being put on him now by his closest advisers? The even more difficult question: Does Obama have even any INTEREST in standing up to those advisers on this issue?
My answer is: No, he doesn’t. Because the issues are very clear here and if he doesn’t comprehend them now, in his pursuit of sanctions against Iran on the basis of zero evidence, then I can’t see how he can be declared to be either smart enough or honest enough to be able to rise to the necessity of a “grand bargain”.
Once again, the bottom line: either Obama (AND Israel) blinks and accepts Iranian enrichment on some negotiated basis – or the US will end up in a war with Iran (either by Israel’s doing or the US’s own doing). There is no third outcome.