In the wake of the Iraqi parliamentary elections on March 7, there has been a steady stream of commentary among foreign policy pundits and others about the nature and extent of Iran’s ongoing influence in post-Saddam Iraq.
Predictably, Vice President Biden said last month that Iran had been “clobbered” in the elections. Alternatively, one of the Iranian officials with whom we spoke during our trip to Tehran in February—roughly two weeks before the Iraqi elections—said to us that the Islamic Republic has good relations with all of the major Shi’a coalitions and parties (as well as with the major Kurdish parties). Under these circumstances, Iran would do fine whichever of the three Shi’a led electoral lists ended up taking the lead in forming the next governing coalition. But, our Iranian interlocutor asked (perhaps somewhat rhetorically), if you Americans keep sticking up for disqualified Baathists, what kind of influence do you expect to have in Iraq?
As Iraq’s post-electoral drama has unfolded, it has become increasingly clear that our Iranian interlocutor was closer to the mark in his observations about current trends in Iraqi politics than Vice President Biden was in his.
It seems ever more likely that the core of the next Iraqi government will be a partnership between the “State of Law” list, headed in the March 7 elections by incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the Iraqi National Alliance, which probably has the strongest ties to Iran of any of Iraq’s major Shi’a political groupings. Among other things, such a scenario would almost certainly exclude Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya list from a place in government. Iraqiya is an explicitly secular political slate, and while Allawi is nominally Shi’a, he drew some of Iraq’s most important Sunni parties into Iraqiya as critical parts of his support base.
As the Sadrists—who emerged from the balloting on March 7 as the largest single party in the INA—strongly oppose Maliki’s retention as Prime Minister, State of Law and the INA must sort through the difficult challenge of either moving Maliki aside or persuading the Sadrists to go along with his continuation in office. Reports conflict as to how this question is likely to be resolved. But Iran seems likely to be centrally involved in brokering the eventual outcome.
Juan Cole draws on two articles from Al-Hayat (in Arabic) to explore this. Specifically, he notes that
“Iran had brokered the coalition [between State of Law and INA] in order to deny secular ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi, a known CIA asset, out of the prime ministership, and to stop any move to internationalize the process of forming an Iraqi government (as Allawi has called for). Internationalizing the deliberations would give the United States, which supports Allawi, a disproportionate influence on the outcome”.
As Cole points out, Iraqiya has already “denounced the [coalition between State of Law and the INA] as having been orchestrated by Iran and returning Iraq to the sway of sectarian religious parties”. (Cole points out, though, that Iraqiya “failed to form a government in its own right in part because of frictions between Sunni Arabs in the North and Kurds in the East, over the division of spoils.”)
Furthermore, as Cole goes on to note,
“The two wings of the new coalition are said to be continuing their negotiations in Iran even now. Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Corps is there. Badr is the paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and it had been trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Amiri is likely an intermediary with Brig. Gen. Qasim Sulaimani, head of the Jerusalem Brigades special forces of the IRGC, who is generally the liaison to Shiite militant groups outside Iran. Also there is Shaikh Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, another stalwart of the fundamentalist Supreme Council, and Abd al-Halim al-Zuhairi of the Da’wa Party as well as the head of one of its splinter groups, the ‘Da’wa Party – Iraq Organization.’ They are negotiating with Muqtada al-Sadr and Iranian officials in order to maintain the unity of the coalition and to reach final terms on the coalition.”
While we are not often in agreement with the analyses produced by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, we thought that the Institute’s Michael Knight drew the strategic implications of all this quite nicely, at least as far as the relative balance of influence in post-Saddam Iraq between the Islamic Republic and the United States is concerned:
“Hand in hand with its proxies in the INA, Iran has successfully stymied the development of a strong nationalist government in Baghdad for at least another four years—the ultimate payoff for its virtuoso performance in manipulating Iraqi politics. With the U.S. government’s horizon limited to its military withdrawal, an exhausted Washington does not appear capable of making such fine distinctions and will likely greet the formation of a new Iraqi government, any government, with relief.”
So, Vice President Biden—just who has been “clobbered” in Iraq?
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
R.d.,
Does Obama strike you as a cowboy in the big Texan hat and the high-heeled boots? Are you thinking of G W Bush?
“Obama probably has the vision, but it lacks the courage.”
IOW, Cowboy diplomacy does not befit obama.. perhaps he need to take a good look into a mirror with his caoboy hat and six shooters to see for himself!
JohnH,
I agree with you that it is rubbish from WINEP to claim Iran is trying to prevent a strongly nationalist government from taking power in Baghdad. Iran does not want an independent Kurdistan. Nor do Syria and Turkey.
JohnH,
Any Iraqi government is likely to oppose any Israeli or US attack on Iran. This is a “pro-American” stance.
Any Iraqi government is likely to coninue the effort with Iran, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and other countries, to achieve a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. This too is a “pro-American” position.
Any Iraqi government is likely to continue to support the effort to end the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the West Bank. This is also a “pro-American” position.
Fiorangels,
I agree with you that Obama probably has the vision to reach out to Iran in the way Nixon did to China, but he lacks the courage to do so. Or, he believes the punishment he would be obliged to absorb is too great.
I continue to be disconcerted, to say the least, that Obama would claim Syria poses a threat to the national security and economy of the US! Astounding rubbish, given that Bashar al-Assad would welcome normal, and even good, relations with the US.
Peter – the writers at Irananders concur with the recommendations Flynt and Hillary Leverett offered in the Charlie Rose interview; namely, “Consider Nixon and China.”
Irananders: “The U.S. has the mid-20th Century for 25 years in vain attempts to contain China until Nixon came to the conclusion that regional powers are not controlled. . Nixon extended his hand, not only from the Chinese rhetoric, as Obama now the Iranians did it, but immediately launched a political action, such as stopping the Destabilisierungsprogramme against China. Das ganze vollzog sich mitten in der chinesischen Kulturrevolution. The whole took place in the middle of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.
If ever an American president again, this vision is questionable. Obama probably has the vision, but it lacks the courage. “
Eric,
If I remember correctly the US government, or persons therein, did indeed oppose a recount for the reason you mention, but this opinion was offered on background only, so as not to be seen as intervening overtly in Iraqi domestic affairs. Odierno and Hill issued a joint statement calling the election legitimate at the time the results were made public. I don’t believe any further official U.S. statement has been made.
I am going on memory but did do a quick lookup which turned up nothing re an on-the-record US statement opposing a recount . . . .
Iran’s influence is preserved in Iraq
http://translate.google.de/translate?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.irananders.de&sl=de&tl=en&hl=&ie=UTF-8
“Iran has successfully stymied the development of a strong nationalist government in Baghdad?” Where does WINEP get that? Seems to me that any government including Al-Sadr will exude plenty of nationalism. Unfortunately for Israel and the US, it won’t be the anti-Iranian kind of nationalism that WINEP cherishes. Rather, it will be more anti-US and anti-Israel.
I am mystified and beg to know, why one would think that the Iraqi Shih’s and for that matter the Iraqi Kurds or any Shih community in the region would be better served by siding with an outside power and her related Sunni client states and not with shih Iran, doesn’t it make sense that if you are a majority shih community in an overwhelmingly Sunni region you would want to have the support and backing of the largest and strongest Shih nation in your immediate region. Would it be lost to US policy planers that since the aftermath of the events of Lebanon in 1982 and southern and northern Iraq in1992 the Arab shih communities of the Middle East region have no longer any desire to trust or even to listen to US again, is this something hard to understand why the shih and Kurds feel safer with Iran?
Can someone confirm or deny my recollection that the US government initially opposed a recount, in Baghdad or elsewhere, on the ground that the resulting delay in forming a new government would be harmful to Iraq?
Iran’s strategic interests are tied to a stable government in Iraq. On the other hand, no democratic government can survive without the cooperation of Iraq’s 60% Shia majority. The great majority of Muslims under foreign non-Muslim occupation – consider Tehran as one of the very few friends among the 57 Muslim nation-state. That’s the reason both Karazai and Maliki had made more visits to Tehran than to Washington.
In addition to Iraq – Iranian influence is on the rise in US occupied Afghanistan too.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/ahmadinejad-ruffles-us-feathers-in-kabul/
Can someone explain why it takes two weeks to recount the ballots, and another two weeks just to do a recount of Baghdad.
I’ve never even seen an attempt to explain the Iraqi ballot-counting process, but I’ve never heard of ballots taking this long to be counted anywhere.
Being that Iraq is under foreign occupation, it is very difficult for me not to be suspicious of this process – but as I say, I have not even come across an attempt at an explanation to believe or not believe.
Liz,
Isn’t the government of Iraq that ensures all US forces leave asap, the government truly most “pro-American”? Iraq has warned Israel not to overfly Iraqi territory in order to attack Iran. For the time being, it would be up to the US to shoot down any intruding Israeli planes. Something Zbig Brzezinski called for, I believe.
I agree with this analysis. However, when Michael Knight speaks of a strong nationalist government in Baghdad, I think he means a pro-American ex-Baathist government!
Iran supports a central government in Iraq able to maintain the territorial integrity of the state. Iran also quite rightly wants all US military forces pulled out of Iraq as soon as possible, including all mercenaries. Both objectives of Iranian policy should be supported by the American people.