As some of our readers have already noted, in comments to previous posts, Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies has published an article, “Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan”, in this month’s edition of the IISS journal Survival. Given that Iran, Brazil, and Turkey all appear to be working to see if the particular fuel-swap plan put forward in the Joint Declaration of May 17, 2010 can still be elaborated and implemented following the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 last week, we thought that a more thorough examination of some of the issues at stake in fuel-swap plans for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor—and how such plans might be used to invigorate broader discussions on nuclear issues between Iran and other players in the international community—is in order. To that end, we are pleased to publish a guest post by Mark Fitzpatrick.
Mark is Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at IISS. Before coming to IISS, he had a distinguished career in government service at the U.S. Department of State, where he concentrated on non-proliferation and international security issues. We are grateful to Mark not only for this guest post, but also for arranging with IISS for an exemption from the normal copyright restrictions on articles published in Survival to make the text of his new article freely available to readers of www.TheRaceForIran.com, via a link below.
Mark’s post and article should (and do) speak for themselves. We think it is fair to say that Mark takes a different approach to some aspects of the Iranian nuclear issue than we do—for example, in his analysis of the implications of Iran’s domestic politics for the country’s nuclear posture and endorsement of “targeted sanctions” as a useful policy tool for the United States and its international partners. But his post and article provide an excellent overview of the technical, political, and strategic factors that are necessarily bound up with any fuel-swap proposal, and offer real insights into official thinking in Washington, major European capitals, and Moscow about the parameters for an acceptable fuel-swap deal. Moreover, we can’t resist noting that he makes at least three arguments that overlap with major themes in our writings about the nuclear problem: any long-term, negotiated solution “surely will have to accept some degree of enrichment in Iran”, it would be a mistake to try to “affect Iran’s nuclear policies by actively siding with domestic opponents of the regime”, and “a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is a bad option for many reasons”. Thanks again to Mark for his important contributions to public discussion of the Iranian nuclear issue.
From Mark Fitzpatrick:
In an article entitled “Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel-Swap Plan” in this month’s edition of the IISS journal Survival, I discussed Iran’s failure last year to accept the US plan for French supply of replacement fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in exchange for what was then the bulk of Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU). The working title was “The Tragedy of the Failed Fuel-Swap Plan,” but when Turkey, Brazil and Iran announced agreement on a revised form of the deal on 17 May, a few hours before the journal went to print, I had time to change the title and some of the text. Because the article has already been the subject of comments on www.TheRaceForIran.com, I have arranged for an exemption from the copyright restriction to make the complete text freely available (in read-only format).
My article argued that: “This new version of the fuel-swap plan is less attractive on non-proliferation grounds, but on balance will be a plus if Iran is willing to export LEU and if it agrees to stop enriching to 20%. Exporting the LEU is key to a longer-term solution that accepts enrichment only under terms that reduce the potential for weapons production. Unfortunately, however, the deal is likely to fail over the same disparity in goals that has frustrated all negotiation efforts to date over Iran’s nuclear programme: Iran is determined to have a nuclear-weapons capability, something the West is just as determined to deny.”
Unfortunately, Iran’s insistence on continuing to enrich uranium to 20%, which it cannot today use to produce fuel but which is perilously close to the weapons-usable level, undermined any hopes for Western acceptance of the revised deal.
In my Survival article I noted that “From the start, the deal was tangential to the main issues at stake, and it offered only temporary respite from the growing threat posed by Iran’s fissile-material production programmes.” I explained that the deal had value as a confidence building measure, by providing diplomatic breathing space for negotiation of a longer-term solution. In establishing the principle that Iranian uranium could be enriched outside of Iran, it would have set an important precedent. “Any long-term solution to the nuclear issue surely will have to accept some degree of enrichment in Iran, the proliferation danger of which can be reduced if the product is exported elsewhere for fuel fabrication, so that Iran does not have enough on hand to pose a nuclear threat.”
The deal as offered in October offered important benefits to both sides. I wrote that “For Iran, in addition to keeping the research reactor operating, the plan was a way to show that its LEU really was being used for the civil nuclear purposes it proclaimed, even if what came back to Iran was not actually its own poor-quality uranium but cleaner uranium substituted by Russia or France along the way. The deal thus offered Iran a way to legitimise its enrichment programme, a goal Tehran had long sought.”
In assessing future policy options for the West, I argued for not trying to affect Iran’s nuclear policies by actively siding with domestic opponents of the regime, as appealing as this might seem. I wrote: “If Iran were led by internationally oriented democrats, the nation’s dual-purpose nuclear technologies would be of lesser concern…because such leaders presumably would be more willing to accept limitations on the country’s nuclear programme that would lessen the chances of nuclear materials being used for weapons purposes”. But I said that “Hopes that the Green Movement will prevail must not be allowed to distort analysis of what is actually happening in Iran” and that “Westerners should also be humble about their ability to positively influence political developments in Iran.”
I argued that with regard to both support for the Green Movement and the imposition of additional sanctions, Western policymakers should be cautious about actions that could harm the changes of democratic change in Iran. But on balance I saw a positive value in targeted sanctions, and noted that the “efficacy of sanctions should not be judged solely on whether they bring about the desired behaviour change”. Among other purposes, sanctions “can be an effective means of limiting Iran’s strategic programmes and deterring support from third parties.” This is one way to keep Iran’s nuclear-weapons production capability latent.
As I also argued in a 2008 Adelphi Paper, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-case Outcomes, if a negotiated solution continues to prove impossible, as I believe will be the case, various means of containing the nuclear programme combined with a deterrence policy are the second-best way to avoid both war and the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. But these are not fail-safe policies. The final point of my Survival article was that “Iran’s lack of restraint risks triggering military action.”
The Fitzpatrick article is pretty useless. His position is not very far from that of the US government. Iran must continue with 20% enrichment, because as the West’s response to the Tehran Declaration has proven Iran simply can not trust the US and it’s allies.
kooshy,
Thanks. I did see that comment, and it may very well mean Iran will be able to construct the necessary fuel plates, if American stupidity continues to impede Iran’s sourcing the fuel plates through the IAEA protocol.
James
I think your question is answered by Salhi in his interview that I have posted. here you go
“we have completed fuel plate know-how and its plan is under construction in central city of Esfahan.”
“God willing Iran is going to make the first nuclear fuel complex for Tehran’s research reactor in September 2011, so if they (the West) does not provide us with 20-percent fuel, we will not lose ,because we are making 20-percent fuel and we have fuel plate know-how.”
kooshy,
I’m glad Salehi reiterated that Iran does not want nukes, and Iran still wishes to proceed with the Turkey-Brazil-Iran deal (that Obama so foolishly failed to endorse).
Obama is now putting Petraeus in charge in Afghanistan. Yet another American general who thinks he can achieve “success” in Afghanistan is the absence of a deal between the US and Iran. What we have is the national security of the US being compromised by the Israel lobby and its numerous stooges in the US Congress.
kooshy,
Assuming Iran has enriched 17kg of 20% U, is Iran able to build the fuel plates? Or will be able to in a reasonable time?
Is Obama able to comprehend that US stupidity is virtually forcing Iran to enrich U to 20%?
This interview with Dr Salehi the head of AEOI was published in Iran Student News Agency today, since important policy stands are mentioned I thought to post the entire report for everyone to read.
TEHRAN (ISNA)-The Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi said the country makes 20-percent enriched uranium as much as it needs, adding that it has produced 17kg of 20-percent enriched uranium so far.
“Iran can enrich uranium to any percent it wishes, it is Iran’s legal right, the country makes 20-percent enriched fuel as much as it needs, we have made 17 kg of the enriched uranium stockpile (at the level of 20-percent) so far and we can produce up to 5 kg of the fuel in month, but we do not hurry, we continue our job at an appropriate pace so that fuel plate plant is equipped,” he told ISNA.
Regarding the issue that Iran’s Parliament is going to oblige the government to keep enrichment of 20-percent uranium whether or not it receives required fuel for Tehran reactor from Vienna Group, Salehi said, “we do not want to produce something that we do not need, we are not going to turn our complete uranium stockpile into 20-percent enriched fuel and we secure our right to enrich fuel at any level that we need.”
Meanwhile as to the West’s dual-track approach regarding Iran, he said, “the US believes in carrot and stick strategy on Iran, off course Iran has taken a smart twin-track strategy regarding them which involves talks and continuous enrichment activities.”
Outlining some Iran’s nuclear achievements, he continued, “Iran is now enriching uranium by 3.5 percent, building Arak heavy water reactor and is going to produce new generation of centrifuges.”
“Testing the third generation of centrifuges is being completed and we are working on the 4th generation of centrifuges,” he said adding, “they failed to halt Iran’s nuclear activities despite political pressures and sanctions.”
The Iranian nuclear official also added, “we have completed fuel plate know-how and its plan is under construction in central city of Esfahan.” He added, “Iran has the complete capability to construct a reactor such as Tehran research reactor locally.”
“Designing 360-megawatt reactor of Darkhovin has been accomplished by 90 percent, but the project takes 14-15 years to be completed.”
Meanwhile regarding Bushehr nuclear power plant, he said, “3000 Russian experts are working there and we hope that it will be operational in mid September.”
The project needs 1.5 billion dollars to be completed, he added.
He continued, “God willing Iran is going to make the first nuclear fuel complex for Tehran’s research reactor in September 2011, so if they (the West) does not provide us with 20-percent fuel, we will not lose ,because we are making 20-percent fuel and we have fuel plate know-how.”
Salehi then said Iran is not a country like North Korea or Iraq, it is neither going to make bombs and violate NPT, nor it allows anyone to assault on its territory.”
He then referred to Tehran trilateral declaration, saying that, “we abide by Tehran declaration and all treaties that we have signed, unless if they (the West) want to take an approach against Iran’s national interests such as the UN Security Council resolutions.”
He then referred to Iran’s nuclear dossier and said based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) constitution and bylaw, Iran’s nuclear case should have been forwarded to the agency from the Security Council.”
He added, “Iran’s nuclear issue must be ultimately settled and I am sure that it is solved in favor of Iran, there is no other way and it is the West that should accept Iran’s right stance.”
Salehi also added, “I hope that we will hold talks with Vienna Group on Tehran declaration, and our nuclear swap dialogue is going to focus on the declaration.”
The Iranian official also criticized the IAEA stonewalling on nuclear education cooperation, saying that, “at the time of the previous IAEA Chief Mohammad Elbaradei, our education cooperation with the agency was good and balanced, but we have recently faced stonewalling from the IAEA.”
http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1561085&Lang=P
Alan:
thanks for the explanation. just a personal concern, and I speak only for myself without any link of any kind. what if Iran tell the world tomorrow; you know, we actually have the nuke, get over it? what is gonna happen next? who dares to mess up with it even if it’s a bluff?
Mousavinia:
yeah, of course! in the same way as the last Shah was popular probably! (so much so he got overwhelmed finally!) you better get out of your close circle and know Iranians more. the era of Mullacracy in Iran is over, believe it or not. this doesn’t mean that Islamic Republic is gone. Iran was an Islamic land for more than 13 century, and a Shitte one for nearly 5 century. IR is nondetachable from Iranian consciousness and will remain so for the decades to come probably. we want Islamic Republic, not like what we see today.
I don’t have any personal hatred for him. I even think what he did for in the past year in handling the election aftermath was great. but that doesn’t mean to accept him and his offices as they are. anybody with a deep knowledge of Iran’s internal affairs knows that his office (Friday prayers, and offices in every small city, villages, univ.) is a serious structural problem Iran faces today that has exacerbated the inefficiency of the system. the reformists understood this. actually, in addition to their incompetence, the Khamenei dimension was the main source of their failure. and they finally reached to the point of a coup out of desperation. I am afraid the other side gets there too. and if so, there would little regard for outside repercussions as Alan alluded (I think Hashemi wanted to keep himself on power by shrewdly mentioning this few days ago). and you know, in such a messed up situation, as the history of contemporary Iran shows, a military elite (competence) is actually welcome if it does not go to the point of (unnecessary) arrogance(y) (this is not my ideal option, but nonetheless a better option than the current one as a pragmatic move. what I want is a democratic Iran with an iron fist). in the absent of this scenario, Iran, I think, would have two eventualities, one is the continuation of this national downward, and the second one ….
Persian Gulf – very interesting couple of posts indeed. While I totally agree with the sentiment behind them, I would query the tactics.
I don’t think Iran “achieving” a nuclear capability in that way will solve anything. In all likelihood, a huge number of Iranians will be dead before that level of deterrent is reached. The Americans and British will slaughter them without a backward glance and with overwhelming public support if Iran gives them cause.
Iran’s “Japan Option” or nuclear deterrent will happen by default. There is no need to push it or promote it. It is not necessary to wage a diplomatic war over it. It is not necessary to allude to security or defence or Options or anything. Iran’s diplomatic tactics should be about emphasising rights under the NPT, and patiently resolving differences in a non-confrontational, conciliatory manner. In time, this will secure as much of the full fuel cycle as Iran wants, unopposed by those that can cause it harm, and with it the Japan Option.
The great irony of that is that it would also bring about conditions where the Japan Option need not even be considered necessary. On the other hand, as things stand, the apparent pursuit of the Japan Option is more likely to result in the events it seeks to avoid.
On your other point, regarding Ahmadinejad ousting Khamenei. This is very, very serious stuff, and I believe it influences an awful lot of Western strategic thinking regarding the nuclear programme.
I think the West fears regime change in Iran, because of the risk of a rise to power of a younger generation of hardline military types at the expense of the more liberal or pragmatic elements that exist. In that situation, Iran with the Japan Option looks dramatically different to how it looks right now. In a sense, from a Western strategic perspective, the old revolutionary veterans/elite are a known, and therefore safe “pair of hands”, whether reformist or conservative. What follows them is unknown, and that scares them.
How Iran makes that risk/fear go away I’m not entirely sure, but it seems to me a ratcheting down of rhetoric, tension and confrontation, on both sides, is essential in order to stop feeding the monsters, on both sides, that can mess this up for all of us.
Ayatollah Khamenei is the most popular public figure in Iran.
btw, I forgot to say that one of the reasons I voted for Ahmadinejad was this: I was having a great hope that he, and his guys, can finally shake the supreme leader from this ridiculous position and remove him from that post (I really don’t see any difference between him and a monarch). again, probably stupid greens didn’t allow this eventuality from happening and instead pushed Ahmaadinejad more toward Khamenei for survival reason. it was a historic chance that was lost, I think.
it’s “sick” not “seek” in my last post. sorry for the spelling.
James,
I am sure you know very well that closing the Persian Gulf (you can also call it a shot in the head), or making trouble for the U.S troops in Iraq & Afaghinistan etc, etc, etc are not long term solution for this problem. it seems, the talk of attack only grows no matter what kind of conventional capability Iran achieves. nukes might be expensive (not sure how expensive 5-10 nukes could be), but in today’s Iran, the government wastes money in running an inefficient bureaucracy in an unimaginable level. btw, just office of the supreme leader and his stooges itself are wasting money probably several times more than the whole nuclear program (I have removed other expensive and unnecessary stuff the gov. does). IR spends tremendous amount of money just to inject a backward ideology that only produces dissatisfaction and paranoia in the society as we see here and there.
I am actually seek of this confrontation that has been going on more than my entire age, and I am afraid, by the current trend, it is going to be case for the generations to come. if achieving the nukes would somehow alleviate the problem, as it seems to be the case, I would love the gov. of Iran to get it done and pay attention to other priorities (after all, the world has come to accept a s**t country like Pakistan, why not Iran?).
James,
I agree with Pirouz 2’s comments on Kooshy’s post. Self-sufficiency is worth paying extra for, especially when other countries have made a habit of exploiting Iran’s lack of self-sufficiency.
James,
“Are you saying that, assuming Iran completes the required IAEA protocol and gets approval for the purchase of the needed 20% fuel for the medical research reactor, the US will then intervene and block the transaction?”
The US is part of the so-called “Vienna group” that must approve the Brazil-Turkey-Iran deal in the first place. Your question assumes that Iran has already cleared this hurdle.
James:
James:
Your question was to Kooshy and she can give you her own answer, but I give you my opinion on the matter:
Yes it does make sense for Iran to produce this fuel for several reasons:
1)As you can see it is not being sold to Iran, so even at a higher cost we have to produce it ourselves.
2) Even if it is not economical to produce it when you can buy it at a cheaper cost, being ABLE to produce it (albeit at a higher cost) will make you NOT vulnerable to blackmail and sanctions. The moment a foreign country refuses to sell you, you can always know that worse comes to worst you can produce it yourself. That is the advantage that the “ability” provides.
3) Unless you start doing it and do extensive R&D on the field you will NEVER be able to progress to a level where you will have the technological ability to do it at a cheaper cost, you will ALWAYS be dependent on outside. Unless you start walking (even at the cost of falling down and hurting yourself a bit) you will never learn how to run and you will always be dependent on wheelchair and someone else pushing it for you!
James
“Regarding the fuel plates/rods for the Tehran reactor, does it make sense for Iran to attempt to build/create this fuel? If Iran had a dozen reactors using this type of fuel, perhaps there would be economic sense in the deal. But for one reactor? Surely the Russians have a feel for the economics involved in the matter, and they apparently cannot build the plates/rods needed.”
James
Frankly I can’t figure out what your angle is, for month you have signed the same tune, but, as I am sure that you have read all the past arguments regarding the fuel for TRR the point “is no longer the economy” it’s about all that I pointed in my last post plus many more internal and external benefits that will effect Iran’s standing which I did not “bother’ to mention. One last point to ad is, if I correctly understand Iranian mentality and resolve, in a not distant future we will learn that the supply of the TRR fuel by west is no longer necessary.
Richar Javad Heydarian calls for US-Iran rapprochement today on Foeirgn Policy in Focus online: “An Iran-U.S. Grand Bargain”.
http://www.fpif.org/articles/an_iran_us_grand_bargain
Eric,
Are you saying that, assuming Iran completes the required IAEA protocol and gets approval for the purchase of the needed 20% fuel for the medical research reactor, the US will then intervene and block the transaction?
This could be very damaging to the US, if the entire world were aware of the game.
Persian Gulf,
Thanks. I think it is only too obvious that Iran, using very low-tech and inexpensive weapons, could close the Gulf easily if attacked by Israel (or the US).
On the other hand, nukes are very expensive, and as pointed out by Colonel Gaddafi, dangerous for the country that posseses them.
Investment funding for roads, power lines, water lines, sewers, airports, etc etc etc is much better placing of limited capital.
kooshy,
Is anyone at this point doubting that Iran is able to enrich uranium?
Regarding the fuel plates/rods for the Tehran reactor, does it make sense for Iran to attempt to build/create this fuel? If Iran had a dozen reactors using this type of fuel, pehaps there would be economic sense in the deal. But for one reactor? Surely the Russians have a feel for the economics involved in the matter, and they apparently cannot build the plates/rods needed.
Kooshy,
I agree entirely with you. It’s really hard not to, since Iran presently has only two choices:
1. Do what you suggest: enrich to 20% and figure out how to make fuel plates, however long that may take; or
2. Buy medical isotopes from non-Iranian sources, thus leaving the US able later to demand concessions in exchange for access to those isotopes.
Alan,
Let’s assume that:
1. The US intended that France and Russia would perform their obligations to Iran in the fuel-swap deal first proposed to Iran: 20% fuel for 1,200 kg of Iranian LEU.
2. Iran would not have been required to suspend enrichment in the meantime.
3. Iran’s ongoing enrichment has since yielded about the amount of additional LEU the US had reason to expect.
4. The US’ principal reason for proposing a fuel-swap was to reduce Iran’s LEU stock by 1,200 kg.
Reasonable assumptions?
If so, why would the US now:
A. Suggest that Iran buy medical isotopes instead of producing its own, since this will not reduce Iran’s LEU at all?
B. Not favor the Brazil-Turkey-Iran fuel-swap proposal, since this would reduce Iran’s LEU stock by 1,200 kg?
Is the explanation that one or more of the assumptions above is not correct?
In light of West’s refusal to accept the Tehran declaration for cooperation in refueling the TRR, for Iran the best way forward is to internally manufacture the fuel plates as soon as possible at any cost with its full scientific focus on manufacturing of this plates. The benefits of manufacturing fuel plates by Iran and in Iran are:
1-Proof that Iran is using its uranium for peaceful proposes
2-Iran proves to the west and P5 that has a full fuel cycle capability and has past the thresh hold
3-Brakes possibility of formation of a fuel cartel for future fuel requirements
4-Iran will strengthen the NPT countries by refusing to accept west’s blackmail
5-Iran strengthens the NPT treaty
Of course when this happen, experts in the west like Mark and Alan will claim that Iran always had the fuel and is using its old stock pile, similar to what we heard
When they claimed Iran is not currently capable to enrich to 20% by likes of David Albright. There is a proverb in Persian that is “The wall of denial is high”
@Everyone:
By the way I forgot to add a 6th item (as usual!):
6) One possible reason that Iran may have not been bothered too much about the Wests blackmail over TRR fuel is that (and mind you I am just saying a “possible” reason) it believes that it can produce its own fuel plates before the TRR fuel runs out. I know you guys are very sure that the sophisticated black magic of producing fuel plates is far beyond the grasp of Iran (at least for a few years), but Ali Akbar Salehi claims otherwise and he has said EXPLICITLY in an interview that Iran is capable of making its own plates. I don’t deny that he might be bluffing, but then again he maybe not! :-)
Arnold – my words are not opaque. I have seen nowhere that the price for the fuel plates is suspension of enrichment. If indeed that is the price, and it may be, then Iran should elucidate that fact if the US won’t. But they don’t.
In the paper Mark referenced below, the authors, who in my opinion have consistently been the most dovish of their type on the Iranian nuclear programme, suggest there is possibly up to 9 years life left in the TRR fuel. Also, Arak is being built to replace the TRR, and is approx. 70% complete.
So that coupled with the guaranteed supply of isotopes Mark mentions if they did run out of fuel raises legitimate cause to question the position as presented by Iran. It also seems extremely unlikely that Iran would put themselves in a situation where they could just haplessly run out of fuel in “late 2010″.
The only thing that I can see that mitigates this at the moment is the possibility that the internal strife did scupper a genuine Iranian attempt to open doors. If that is so, they will possibly make the next move. Otherwise it seems to me the West may be happy to see the whole TRR thing drift away.
@Everyone:
Regarding whether Iran is bothered or not about not being able to buy the fuel for TRR:
1) BASED ON NPT, the “price” of the fuel for TRR, to bought from outside is in “dollars” not in “concessions”. Replacing the dollar price by some other sort of price (ie. concessions) is a DIRECT violation of NPT.
2) To the best of my understanding TRR is not just for the purpose of radio-isotopes for the medical purposes. So addressing the medical aspect, does not mean that TRR problem has disappeared.
3) Who died and made the West king of the world to decide whether we should produce our own radio-isotopes and have an R&D in that field or not? Other countries would like to rely on outside for their radio-isotopes? GOOD FOR THEM, WE WANT TO MAKE OUR OWN MEDICATIONS. Besides one look at over 500,000 Iraqi children who died as a result of malnutrition caused by your governments sanctions on Iraq, one look the sanctions on the spare parts of the CIVILIAN airliners in Iran and the death that that causes, makes anyone with the LEAST of brain not trust a reliable flow of radio-isotopes from outside!
4)The very fact that you expect Iran to budge under your blackmail and that you are frustrated by the apparent resolve of the Iranians and the fact that they have not budged, shows your true nature. It shows you are ready to use ANY MEANS including threatening the life of cancer patients in a country to blackmail it into submitting to your goals! It also makes Iran all the more right not to back off from its rights and persisting on being able to produce its own radio-isotopes.
5) Iran may have been bothered but not have shown it. It may have not been bothered at all. If “I” were in charge of making the decisions in Iran, and if my own mother were a cancer patient in severe need of radio-isotopes, and if I knew that TRR will run out of fuel TOMORROW, still I would not budge under your blackmail. The more we do concessions the more you will demand. This is a struggle of life and death, this is a struggle for INDEPENDENCE for Iran. This is a struggle of not being under your hegemony! Giving in today for the sake of the cancer patients today means that future cancer patients will be ALWAYS under the threat of your blackmail FOR ANY reason which would suit your strategic goals!
James:
I agree with you that “Khamenei certainly does Iran poor service, if he suggest Iranian enrichment to 63% may be the way forward”, specially when the goal is above 90%. I think, pirouz_2 clearly stated what would be end game. I personally think whoever disputing the fact that having access to the ultimate weapons is the only means Iran can really deter an attack, should be living in another world. and as he rightly says Iran doesn’t necessarily need to match up with others in terms of number. 5-10 would be more than enough (2 is already in the grasp!).
world opinion! what a nonsense, we have seen the world opinion for decades. this game would not finish with the illusion of having the world opinion on our side, if there is any chance of doing so.
Alan,
Re: June 21st, 6:27pm – - Khamenei certainly does Iran poor service, if he suggest Iranian enrichment to 63% may be the way forward. The 20% enrichment seems clearly to be a mistake, if Iran is in fact unable to use the 20% U to manufacture the necessary rods/plates for the Tehran reactor.
How unusual is the Tehran reactor? Does it require a fuel less generally available on the international market?
Stop Commenting and Do Something,
Re: June 21st, 7:19pm – – As you point out, Iran stopped enriching LEU for more than two years, as part of an effort to demonstrate good faith. And the US response was pathetically foolish, in my view and in the view of many commentators around the world.
The question remains, regarding continuing LEU production: if Iran will have no use for the LEU for a number of years to come, what is the economic/political benefit to Iran from continuing production of LEU? I’m not arguing for stopping enrichment, but asking what political and economic benefits come from that enrichment, as compared with the economic (and political) cost of that enrichment. This cost includes diversion of vital capital from oil and gas infrastructure, etc.
Eric,
Re: June 21st 9:15pm – - If Iran is unable to build/construct the fuel plates/rods for the Tehran reactor, even if it has sufficient 20% U to hand, there seems no gain to Iran to continue to enrich U to 20%.
Iran has a solid case before world opinion, for obtaining the needed fuel following the IAEA protocol. Iran enhances its standing, when it follows established protocol and expects delivery in due course. If the US is interfering, behind the scenes, this fact should be established as clearly as possible.
Arnold and Mark,
ARNOLD WROTE: “Mark Fitzpatrick: Are you aware if this guarantee [to sell medical isotopes to Iran], from a party that will not identify itself, has conditions attached, such as Iran renouncing its right to fuel, or try to fuel the TRR itself?”
I’m also curious about this. I suspect the US was at least whispering in the ear of this guarantor, insisting that it impose conditions on Iran, and I have considerable doubt that this guarantor responded with something like this: “When I say guarantee, I mean guarantee! No conditions! Back off, US!”
Call me skeptical.
Arnold,
“Eric, I’d love to read your thoughts on nuclear weapons capability in general and how they apply to both Iran and Japan in your opinion. You probably noticed you got a flurry of questions from myself, Lysander and Pirouz_2 with your statement about Iran and nuclear weapons capability earlier.”
I am working on a response to some excellent questions and comments, which requires more time because the questions and comments are excellent. I can understand it may seem that I am taking inconsistent positions to agree strongly with you on some points but disagree on others.
Arnold,
YOU WROTE: “Except that ElBaradei agrees with Iran that there is no practical difference between storing Iran’s uranium in Kish and storing it outside of Iran’s borders, if you assume the fuel will actually be delivered.”
I’ve certainly never seen any practical difference. Yes, Iran might have swooped down on Kish Island, shoved aside the IAEA monitors, and taken back its LEU even though the other side had not breached its obligations under the fuel-swap deal. But I’d have put the odds of that happening at considerably lower than the odds of Iran pulling out of the NPT, which I consider to be low odds indeed.
The one practical difference between Kish and a third-country escrow would have been revealed if the other side unquestionably DID breach its obligations under the fuel-swap deal (for example: refused outright to deliver the 20% fuel, or imposed substantial new conditions not stated in the fuel-swap deal) and Iran then swooped down on Kish Island and took back its LEU. Since that really is the only practical difference between Kish and, say, Turkey (where Iran could not “swoop in”), does it not make one wonder whether the West’s objection to Kish reflected a desire to prevent Iran from recovering its LEU even if the other side had unquestionably breached its obligations? That thought has crossed my mind.
YOU WROTE: “Maybe ElBaradei didn’t see what the US nuclear policy community is now slowly beginning to admit, that the fuel was never going to actually be delivered without an Iranian suspension, and Iran has never intended to comply with Western suspension demands.”
Is “the US nuclear policy community …[only] slowly beginning to admit” this? From the outset, it struck me that the chances of Iran ever receiving 20% fuel in exchange for its LEU, without being required in the meantime to jump through a large number of additional hoops, were well under 10%. Even if most members of “the US nuclear policy community” have greater faith than I that the other parties to the initially proposed fuel-swap deal would have honored that deal as written, it’s hard to believe – and a bit depressing if true – that at least a few of them didn’t share my suspicion.
Eric, I’d love to read your thoughts on nuclear weapons capability in general and how they apply to both Iran and Japan in your opinion. You probably noticed you got a flurry of questions from myself, Lysander and Pirouz_2 with your statement about Iran and nuclear weapons capability earlier.
Mark and Alan,
MARK WROTE: “In answer, I do not know whether or not the TRR is in danger of running out of fuel, although the best open-source information on this suggests it is not the case.”
Assuming that Iran has not failed to declare the TRR fuel under its Safeguards Agreement, presumably the IAEA knows the answer to this question. I understand the IAEA is not at liberty to publicize this information. But might the fact that El Baradei, last summer and fall, pressed both sides to work toward a fuel-swap deal suggest his belief that Iran was not bluffing?
MARK WROTE: “In any case, Iran will be able to buy isotopes from the international market, as do most other countries.”
Two questions here:
1. Suppose Iran does this. What do you think should be done, then, with the TRR, and should nuclear fuel be supplied from outside Iran for that purpose?
2. My understanding is that medical isotopes have a very short half-life. Within a few days, considerably less than half of the isotope is left. A large portion is lost even after a long flight from northern Europe. Stockpiling is prohibitively expensive. The demand for medical isotopes exceeds the supply, which keeps prices artificially high. If the TRR can help to relieve this shortage and keep down the price of medical isotopes, and adequate safeguards can be put in place, do you nevertheless believe this is the proper field for the US/Iran battle over Iran’s right to enrich uranium?
“As far as I know the guarantee remains valid. The supplier does not wish to be identified.
Mark”
a guarantee is as good as the guarantor’s track record. the nuclear armed perm members have been reneging on their npt obligations all along! So lets say the guarantee is only good when delivered. In the mean time, lets promote the idea of 20% just as an escrow for the guarantee vs the none-sense of non-existing weapons program. Unless ofcourse, these are the stepping stones to yet another war crimes atrocities planned.
The West wants to supply fuel plates to Iran’s medical reactor if and only if Iran suspends enrichment. Iran does not want to suspend enrichment. This is the entire situation at its base.
On top of that base, because the condition that Iran must suspend enrichment to get fuel to make isotopes is unreasonable, Western apologists have created entire structures of lies, distortions and deceptions and placed them into their narrative of Iran’s efforts to have its reactor resupplied.
France, not only cannot make fuel plates in ten months as it told Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan. France cannot commit to delivering the plates by any set time. It can make them in “about” three years.
But as a confidence building measure, Iran must keep its uranium stock at a level it passed long before this deal became a consideration, for the duration of the transaction that, as we see above, will run for an indefinite time.
The United States has offered substantial political guarantees that Iran would actually get its fuel. What guarantees? A declaration of support for the agreement. Seriously, that is supposed to be the substantial political guarantees (plural).
Why did Iran turn this down? Obviously because the Green Movement, whose main claim that the election was stolen was believed by 10 or 12 percent of Iran’s population, prevented Iran from suddenly changing the position it has repeated consistently ever since 2003 that Iran does not intend to suspend enrichment for any long-term period.
It can’t possibly be because “the price” the US is trying to extract from Iran is more than any party in Iran would be willing to pay, and in fact more than any self-respecting sovereign government anywhere would be willing to pay. (Only colonial entities like Saudi Arabia or Jordan could agree to conditions like this.).
No. Iran “agreed in principle” to submit to these demands and mysteriously and unexplainably has withdrawn that agreement. This proves that Iran has been negotiating in bad faith.
Another unexplainable behavior from Iran is that it has never expressed its concerns with the offer that was made. Except that every statement every Iranian official has made since October regarding the proposal has stated that the proposal as presented does not provide sufficient guarantees that Iran will receive fuel in return.
But ElBaradei agrees with the West that Iran was willing to accept Western terms until thwarted by Mousavi. Except that ElBaradei agrees with Iran that there is no practical difference between storing Iran’s uranium in Kish and storing it outside of Iran’s borders, if you assume the fuel will actually be delivered.
Maybe ElBaradei didn’t see what the US nuclear policy community is now slowly beginning to admit, that the fuel was never going to actually be delivered without an Iranian suspension, and Iran has never intended to comply with Western suspension demands.
Brazil and Turkey made a sincere effort to resolve the issue, but they produced a proposal that doesn’t address Western concerns about Iran having a break-out capability. How can a proposal address those concerns? Either it can spell out an Iranian commitment to suspend, or it can be structured so that if Iran does not suspend, Iran has no recourse if the fuel never arrives as the October proposal was.
But if “addressing concerns” means require a suspension for delivery, why not say that directly, why hide behind these vague terms? It is really a difficult and uncomfortable argument for apologists of the Western position that it is holding this acknowledged humanitarian item as leverage in its political and strategic dispute with Iran. Instead we see many examples of distraction and obfuscation of the real position of the West on this issue.
Alan:
Your language is really opaque. I can see you’ve been hanging around with the US nuclear policy community. They like these kinds of constructions that divert attention away from the key issues.
Arnold’s third option is that Iran has been negotiating all along, wants the plates, but doesn’t want to pay the price.
By “pay the price” you mean, effectively, suspend enrichment. Why not just say that? Iran wants the plates but does not want to suspend enrichment. “Pay the price.”
But how did suspending enrichment become “the price”? Your construction removes agency from the West. If the West has said the price for this medical fuel is giving up the strategic benefit of nuclear capability – denying itself a potential deterrent to prevent what happened in 2003 in Iraq from happening to them, then the fact that the West would even attempt to charge this price is a strong argument that Iran not only should not pay it, but try to reach a position where it can provide, or even offer to provide these services to other countries that the West may attempt to extort in the future.
Mark – many thanks for your reply. I hadn’t seen it before my last post (not sure why, considering the 5 hour time difference between posting times), so apologies that I didn’t respond or consider it in that. I’ll read the link this afternoon.
Alan
Mark Fitzpatrick:
Are you aware if this guarantee, from a party that will not identify itself, has conditions attached, such as Iran renouncing its right to fuel, or try to fuel the TRR itself.
I’d also like you to talk more about France’s claim that it could produce three batches, each in “about a year”. I’m sure Argentina did not take about three years to supply 115 kgs of fuel in 1994. This strikes me bad faith negotiating the insults the intelligence of the Iranians.
Most importantly, far more important than the other two questions, is the issue of nuclear weapons capability. Am I correct as describing your position as no matter what questions Iran answers, no matter how transparent Iran’s program is, Iran must not have as much nuclear weapons capability as other non-weapons states that are in good standing such as Japan and Brazil? How do you justify that position?
Eric:
“If one concludes (or speculates) as you do that Iran is not “bothered,” and that, therefore, it must have some other acceptable solution in mind – more TRR fuel in reserve than it has claimed, an expectation that it will buy isotopes, a belief that it can buy fuel plates before the TRR runs out of fuel, or a willingness to do without the TRR – then it may well be that Mr. Fitzpatrick is (and you are) correct that Iran’s continued enrichment to 20% shows “a lack of restraint.” But suppose you start instead from the assumption that Iran indeed is “bothered” by its imminent lack of TRR fuel – an assumption which has at least as much basis for it, if not more, than your assumption that Iran is not “bothered.” On that alternate assumption, you are left with little or no basis for concluding that Iran believes it has the problem covered through one or more of the solutions you mention. To the contrary, it may believe it has NO solution to the problem, other than to try to soldier on all by itself. In that light, “cracking on with the 20% enrichment” looks a lot less like pointless provocation, a lot more like making the best of an unpleasant situation.”
—–
I agree with you, there are grounds for believing both viewpoints. It seems to me either Iran has been unable to negotiate, or have been able to and not wanted to. If the former, they are bothered, if the latter, they are not. The former is El Baradei’s position, the latter appears to be Fitzpatrick’s. Both have a logic to them, but the latter would mean Iran basically never wanted the plates in the first place.
Arnold’s third option is that Iran has been negotiating all along, wants the plates, but doesn’t want to pay the price. This to me also indicates a lack of concern over whether they get the plates or not. After all, nearly all other countries in the world import isotopes, so no great hardship. This lends credence to Fitzpatrick’s interpretation.
However, as much as the West needs to see it from Iran’s perspective, and I agree they do, Iran needs to see it from the West’s perspective. Fitzpatrick very lucidly describes that perspective. It is real. So if we finish up in an argument over isotopes and Khamenei DID talk of 63% enrichment for that purpose, you can see where those thought processes, rightly or wrongly, will lead. (I don’t think the West would get into an argument over isotopes by the way, it would be politically disastrous. Also, international supply of isotopes would provide a way to make the whole TRR business disappear, which I suspect is what the West really wants).
Now, if Iran are bothered and couldn’t negotiate due to internal problems, in May that problem seemed to go away. There seemed to be a consensus again for a deal. Yet if Iran wanted to buy candlesticks, why do a deal with the butcher and the baker? Why not talk to the candlestick maker? It didn’t look like a burning enthusiasm to negotiate, just another way to complicate things.
However, if Iran made a gesture such as exporting their LEU to Turkey pursuant to the butcher/baker deal, that would be significant. In fact, it would be the only way to make it count for anything. But I think things have moved on from that now in any case, which is not to say it was not an authentic offer.
So for me the jury is still out. Either of the bothered/not bothered scenarios could be true, but Iran’s actions will ultimately dictate it. As I alluded to above, I get the feeling the West thinks Iran has made its choice over the TRR, and just wants the issue to go away so that they can get on with talking about the nuclear programme, which is the purpose of the proposed EU/Iran meeting which I don’t believe has been set up yet.
Alan,
In your June 21 11:13 post, you asked: “If Iran’s initial offer to buy fuel was a bluff, anticipating a “no” in order to gain grounds to increase enrichment to 20%, is it your assumption that they are not bothered by the TRR running out of fuel, and the consequent shortage of medical isotopes? Or do you believe that the fuel has some distance to go before it runs out and/or Iran intends to plug any isotope shortfall from the international market?”
In answer, I do not know whether or not the TRR is in danger of running out of fuel, although the best open-source information on this suggests it is not the case. See Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich, ‘The Twenty Percent Solution Breaking the Iranian Stalemate’, Federation of The American Scientists Issue Brief, 16 April 2010, http://www. fas.org/programs/ssp/_docs/Twenty_Percent_Solution_FINAL-1.pdf.
In any case, Iran will be able to buy isotopes from the international market, as do most other countries. The Leveretts wrote an insightful post about this several weeks ago in which they discussed the international shortage of isotopes. What they did not know know at the time they wrote that post is that Iran had been guaranteed an isotope supply from one of the makers. (The supplier does not wish to be identified.) This guarantee is among the many that Iran chose to ignore when it proceeded with its production of 20% enriched uranium. As far as I know the guarantee remains valid.
Mark
Interesting South American view on NPT rights that perhaps Mr. Fitzpatrick or Alan care to comment
Brazil and Iran: our motives and the bullying trio
by Tomás Rosa Bueno (source: CASMII)
http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10378
“Despite what the experts of barefoot diplomacy [1] never stop repeating, there is nothing even remotely anti-American in the Brazilian position on Iran: our motives, unlike those of the bullying trio (USA, France, United Kingdom), are clear, transparent and openly stated several times.”
“We support the peaceful development of nuclear energy. We do not believe there is any evidence that Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program. Defending Iran, we are defending our own right to master the full nuclear-fuel cycle, we are defending our right to develop our own enrichment technology, we are defending our right to build our own reactors that will move the nuclear submarines that will defend our sovereignty. No more, no less. We want for Iran just what we want for ourselves.”
“If we allow Iran to be illegally prevented from developing a peaceful nuclear program they are entitled to, the NPT would become a dead letter, and we may be subject to the same treatment in the future. The illegal attack against Iran’s rights and the preparation of another illegal military intervention against a sovereign country under false pretenses obviously needs to be stopped now, while it is still possible. Brazil has a duty to defend the rights of Iranians today, lest we endanger our own rights in the future. Our status as an emergent global power and the very continuity of our development depend on our unconditional support for the right of the Iranian people to develop a peaceful nuclear program without interference, threats and attacks.”
“This bullying trio has even tested us and almost succeeded against Turkey on the eve of the Brazil-Iran-Turkey agreement – which was forged only at the insistence of the Brazilian president.”
Eric (Re your Jun21, 9:15 pm post)
I don’t trust IRI as far as all their internal issues are concerned but I believe on the subject of their nuclear activities their recent policy is to be strictly honest, direct and forthright.
My reasons for the above assertion are:
1- They are aware of existence of a relatively large army of spies, dissidents, potential defectors or MEK insiders who could prove the IRI’s dishonesty on the international arenas. Any trickery or major cheating could be disproportionally blown up by their adversaries bringing about devastating irrecoverable effects.
2-In Shi’a culture, every year in Ashura time the devout are reminded of unforgivable oppressors such as Shemr or Yazid as appalling, barbaric yet powerful individuals while divine heros such as Hossein and his entourage shine as honest holy characters who possess the highest possible sense of morality, humanity, integrity and courage. Hossein and his followers were more than willing to sacrifice their lives and stand up against the tyrants for defending the oppressed and protecting the righteous world.. According Shi’a precepts Yazid thought he has killed Hossein but Hossein now lives forever. (So standing up against the despots and being honest and brave is the only way of honorable living. I have to remind you the remarkable bravery they showed during 1979 revolution and in Iran-Iraq war).
3- Although in Iran crooks and charlatans are as many as other places, in traditional Iranian culture there is no justification for mass murder of civilians. I believe Iran may want to reach the level of Japanese who could assemble a bomb in a few months or weeks (just to deter their enemies) but if they had the bomb they’ll not use it. For many Iranians it is unimaginable to kill civilians, women and children en mass to win a war. I really believe that aspect of the old culture still prevails.
In the Hall of Nations of UN building a poem from Saadi (Iranian poet who died about 800 years ago) is inscribed. One line of this poem says.
If you don’t have sympathy for human pain
The name of human you can not retain.
This poem is in the one of text books of Iranian primary school children.
“Eric, I think what Alan and Mark Fitzpatrick are saying is “just suspend enrichment and we’ll give you the fuel.” Alan and Fitzpatrick probably honestly believe that is a small thing.”
I agree that that is what they are saying – at least the first sentence. As for the second sentence, I’m not sure they believe it’s a “small thing,” but I think at least Mr. Fitzpatrick believes that Iran should accept this condition whether it’s a “small thing” or not. He may not understand the importance to Iran of controlling the whole soup-to-nuts fuel cycle, or, more likely, understands this perfectly well but doesn’t accept it
“I believe Iran should be denied the ability to make a bomb; we have more than enough nuclear-armed states as it is. I recognize I part company with many on this website on that point.”
Eric
In light of your statements above, can you explain what the difference is, between your position and Alan and Fitzpatrick, what you wrote may sound different but the eventuality is the same, I think the only reason US does not want Iran to enrich is to deny Iran the ability to make bomb. At least that is the official position, what kind of guarantee by Iran will be sufficient to accept full fuel cycle, I suspect none for Fitzpatrick.
From me:
Iran should, like Brazil, openly not have any weapons and unless a crisis is forced upon it, knowingly, Iran should be able to say we have no reason to expect that we will ever build a weapon. That does mean we expect the US not to mass troops the way troops were massed in Kuwait against Iraq. It means we expect the US will not declare Iranian territory a no-fly zone. But if those expectations are met, which is by far the most likely case, Iran will not have a weapon. I don’t see that as ambiguous. That is the situation Brazil and Japan are in.
Let me come back here. Iran being in a position that it could pull out of the NPT in an emergency makes it less likely that the US will put Iran into an emergency position. It is not that the United States is really going to mass troops on Iran’s border and then Iran will spring on the US that it could build a weapon. It is that the US will know Iran could build a weapon, just as it knows Japan could build a weapon, and because of that, will not mass troops on its border.
I really feel like nuclear weapons capability is poorly understood even by Americans who make an effort to be reasonable.
I believe Iran should be denied the ability to make a bomb; we have more than enough nuclear-armed states as it is.
This construction seems to say that the ability to make a bomb constitutes a nuclear-armed state. By this, you’d say Japan is a nuclear armed state, as is Brazil.
This is the type of position that has to be out in the open.
Please in your own words, tell me what you think of Japan’s nuclear program.
I think Iran ought to be much more forthcoming in its disclosures
Can you be specific? What questions should Iran answer that it has not?
Eric:
And, as I’ve argued earlier, I think Iran ought to be much more forthcoming in its disclosures – no more “hide the ball” in an effort to develop the illusion or reality of nuclear-weapons capability.
We disagree here too. As I ask James, you don’t think Japan is playing “hide the ball” do you? Iran has no reason to play that any more than Japan or Brazil.
But, the laptop of death is an egregious case. The US just concocted it, Iran has never seen it, the IAEA has seen excerpts selected by the US. What Iran has been shown, Iran has provided evidence that it was at least doctored if not outright forged. The story at one point was that a laptop was smuggled out of Iran. The story has changed to that it is a bunch of files the US has gotten from Iranian networks using electronic surveillance, at various times.
So the laptop of death is really a never-ending pretext for claiming Iran has unanswered questions.
The US could invent a laptop of death against Japan, and then Japan would, forever, have unanswered suspicions.
Iran was, in 2006 if memory serves, given a list of seven questions, the seventh was the allegations in the laptop of death. Iran was told that if it resolved those seven issues there would be no outstanding questions. Iran was also told that it would get to see the laptop of death evidence before answering questions.
Iran was to address the issues in order, and did. The first six have been retired as sources of suspicion about Iran’s nuclear program. The seventh, the laptop of death, has never been shown to Iran as the IAEA committed in writing.
If you think Iran is deliberately pursuing a policy of ambiguity it is not, no more than Japan is or Brazil. The US will not show Iran its supposed evidence. Iran can’t subject itself to an investigative process where its adversary is able to invent evidence and just concoct some more by the time the first has been disproven.
Iran has an agreement, the CSA, that spells out how suspicions that there is undeclared material is to be resolved. The IAEA can call a special inspection of any facility in Iran that it has real evidence about. This is what Iran and the IAEA negotiated. Iran and the IAEA expressly negotiated that military programs, unless there is evidence of diversion of fissile material, are off limits.
You’ve read the CSA more closely than I have. I don’t have to dwell on that argument for too long, but when you and James say Iran is trying to hold an ambiguous position, I always what are they talking about?
Unless you actually think Japan has an ambiguous position. Is that what you think, because if you’d define Japan as having an ambiguous position, then Iran should have an ambiguous position. But if not, then there is a real communication failure because I can not say enough times that Iran has no need to hide any balls.
Iran should, like Brazil, openly not have any weapons and unless a crisis is forced upon it, knowingly, Iran should be able to say we have no reason to expect that we will ever build a weapon. That does mean we expect the US not to mass troops the way troops were massed in Kuwait against Iraq. It means we expect the US will not declare Iranian territory a no-fly zone. But if those expectations are met, which is by far the most likely case, Iran will not have a weapon. I don’t see that as ambiguous. That is the situation Brazil and Japan are in.
“I believe Iran should be denied the ability to make a bomb; we have more than enough nuclear-armed states as it is. I recognize I part company with many on this website on that point.”
Why do you wish to deny this ability specifically to Iran? Is it because you trust Iran less than other countries, or is it because its far too late to deny that ability to Brazil or Argentina? If the latter, will you accept Iran’s ability once it is too late to prevent it?
Also, do you think there is a possibility that either Israel or the US will try to destabilize/attack/or even Invade Iran, regardless of its nuclear program? Do you feel Iran has an obligation to accept attack rather than develop a nuclear capability to deter it?
Eric:
YOU WROTE:”I believe Iran should be denied the ability to make a bomb; we have more than enough nuclear-armed states as it is. I recognize I part company with many on this website on that point. And, as I’ve argued earlier, I think Iran ought to be much more forthcoming in its disclosures – no more “hide the ball” in an effort to develop the illusion or reality of nuclear-weapons capability. ”
So I have a few questions for you:
1) Once a state has industrial level Uranium enrichment, it has the abilty to make the bomb. NPT clearly gives the right of domestic enrichment (on the industrial level) to all its members. Is that your suggestion that NPT should be breached in case of Iran to deny them the “ability” to make the bomb?
2) What is it exactly that you refer to when you say “hide the ball”? Which behaviour of Iran in your opinion is/was “hide the ball”?
Arnold,
“Eric, I think what Alan and Mark Fitzpatrick are saying is “just suspend enrichment and we’ll give you the fuel.” Alan and Fitzpatrick probably honestly believe that is a small thing.”
I agree that that is what they are saying – at least the first sentence. As for the second sentence, I’m not sure they believe it’s a “small thing,” but I think at least Mr. Fitzpatrick believes that Iran should accept this condition whether it’s a “small thing” or not. He may not understand the importance to Iran of controlling the whole soup-to-nuts fuel cycle, or, more likely, understands this perfectly well but doesn’t accept it. I thought for a brief moment that Mr. Fitzpatrick accepted it when he wrote: “Any long-term solution to the nuclear issue surely will have to accept some degree of enrichment in Iran…” until he continued the sentence with this: “, the proliferation danger of which can be reduced if the product is exported elsewhere for fuel fabrication…” Obviously Mr. Fitzpatrick would insist that at least one key step in the fuel cycle be denied to Iran – if not enrichment, then fabrication.
I believe Iran should be denied the ability to make a bomb; we have more than enough nuclear-armed states as it is. I recognize I part company with many on this website on that point. And, as I’ve argued earlier, I think Iran ought to be much more forthcoming in its disclosures – no more “hide the ball” in an effort to develop the illusion or reality of nuclear-weapons capability. But the quid pro quo for more openness from Iran (if that happens) ought to be a frank acknowledgement by the US and others that Iran has the right to develop and operated a peaceful nuclear energy program without the need for any outside help whatsoever. Outside help hasn’t been very reliable for Iran in the past – nice if Iran can get it, but not something it should be expected to depend on.
Not related to the topic but interesting,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/who-will-be-punished-for-killing-civilians-in-the-gaza-war-1.297390
Kooshy,
James can speak well for himself, of course, but I think he’s previously argued that Iran should stop enriching to 20% only because it appeared to James that Iran really didn’t need to do that if approval of the Brazil-Turkey-Iran proposal was likely and imminent. Enrichment to 20% would then be unnecessarily provocative in those circumstances. When the Brazil-Turkey-Iran proposal looked more likely to be approved than it now seems, James’ suggestion seemed to me to make good sense. Why keep enriching to 20% when you’ve just struck (or are on the verge of striking) a deal designed to get you 20% uranium fuel plates before your existing stock runs out, and the only thing likely to thwart that would be the other side’s suspicion that you have something more sinister in mind than making medical isotopes for cancer patients? Now that the Brazil-Turkey-Iran proposal looks less likely to be approved, I’m not sure whether James would still conclude that Iran’s continued enrichment to 20% can fairly be interpreted as unnecessary provocation. I’ll leave that for James to answer.
Whatever James’ view may be, the apparent sharp decline in the prospects of the Brazil-Turkey-Iran proposal makes it appear to me that it’s no longer fair to conclude that Iran’s continued enrichment to 20% shows, as Mark Fitzpatrick phrases it, “a lack of restraint.” My impression is that Alan agrees with Mr. Fitzpatrick that our conclusions about Iran’s behavior should not change, because (1) Alan has concluded that Iran is not “bothered” by the imminent lack of TRR fuel, and (2) since Iran is not “bothered,” there must be a reason for that which belies Iran’s earlier claim that the TRR fuel will run out soon. Alan suggests several possible reasons for Iran’s apparent nonchalance: it’s got more TRR fuel than it has admitted, it thinks it can enrich enough uranium to 20% and figure out how to make fuel plates before the TRR runs out of fuel, it’s counting on buying medical isotopes, or it’s pretty sure some fuel-swap deal will get worked out. If any of those events comes to pass, Iran won’t need the 20% uranium it’s now producing. Since Iran (in Alan’s view) believes that one or more of those events will occur, it follows that Iran’s continued enrichment to 20% shows “a lack of restraint.”
My response was that Alan may not have a sound basis for concluding that Iran is not “bothered” by the imminent lack of TRR fuel. Iran appeared to be “bothered” a year ago, after all. That’s presumably why Iran approached the IAEA for help in getting more fuel – unless one accepts Mark Fitzpatrick’s assertion that this was merely a “gambit” on Iran’s part, an assertion for which Mr. Fitzpatrick did not offer any support that I found persuasive. And now there’s one year’s less fuel left than there was back then.
As I argued earlier, the mere fact that Iran doesn’t show it’s bothered does not mean it isn’t bothered. It may mean only that Iran sees no advantage in showing that it’s bothered (I certainly don’t). If one abandons Alan’s “not bothered” assumption because it has no alternate basis, I see no reason to conclude that Iran must have one or more solutions up its sleeve. It may well have no solution at all up its sleeve – other than the one solution totally within its control: enrich to 20% and try to overcome all problems that presently prevent it from making fuel plates, however long that may take.
What else can Iran do, after all, if it’s “bothered” about the imminent lack of TRR fuel and no one is offering to help it solve that problem? If Iran is doing nothing more than the one thing it can do, and if one agrees that Iran has a legal right to keep the TRR operating and that doing so makes good sense, how can one fairly accuse Iran of acting provocatively, or showing “a lack of restraint?” Isn’t it equally fair, or more fair, to conclude that it’s just making the best of a bad situation by pursuing the only course of action available to it? Mr. Fitzpatrick, and Alan, point out various shortcomings – especially that it will take “a few years” if not longer for Iran to solve its TRR-fuel problem in this way – but that doesn’t establish bad faith if Iran’s only other choice is to do nothing at all.
thanks for the link to the Kampala consensus, Stop Commenting. (“ICC Makes Waging War a Crime”, Payvand/ Aj Jazeera)
I did not find anything in the article that defined an enforcement mechanism. Closest thing to teeth the ICC provides is:
“Apart from the deterrent dividend that being a member of the Court could yield by potentially changing the calculus of would be aggressors (that is strategic power), ratification would also mean empowerment and legal remedy in the event that crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court are committed.”
Who can bring an action against, for example, the US State Department or the US Congress or the US President or the State of Israel? Does a signatory have to have suffered harm before ICC action can be taken, or do threats of harm constitute harm that the ICC would litigate? Can citizens refer a perpetrator to the ICC? How? By petition? What is the jurisdiction of the ICC — all UN members?
On the one hand:
Financial Times reported that Brazil is bowing out of negotiations with Iran. between the lines: US strong-armed Brazil. Not only did Brazil concede to US to disengage from Iran, it gave up on a 6 year old claim against US regarding tariffs on Brazilian cotton. Inasmuch as State Dept knows only carrots and sticks, and carrots are not in season in Washington’s concrete jungle, I wonder what stick Hillary used to beat Lulu into submission.
On the other hand:
NPR quoted P J Crowley stating that US is still working with Turkey to keep negotiations open with Iran.
Are these all atmospherics to keep Crazy Bibi mollified?
Eric, I think what Alan and Mark Fitzpatrick are saying is “just suspend enrichment and we’ll give you the fuel.”
Alan and Fitzpatrick probably honestly believe that is a small thing.
I, Pirouz_2 and others and I’m quite sure also the Iranians see that as a huge concession, wholly out of proportion to this transaction. From our point of view, if the west is not willing to give the fuel without a suspension, that means, effectively, the west is not willing to give the fuel.
As you say, in that situation, Iran has no choice but to make due with what it has. It also increases what Iran has paid so far for its nuclear program and hardens Iran’s attachment to it. Now that the price Iran has paid for reaching two tons includes sacrifices in nuclear medicine, (along with the sanctions, scientists abducted and assassinated and sponsorship of separatist bombing campaigns), it is just that much more difficult to go back below that level.
Eric, since you smartly figured it out that the posts were was just moved again, that is, if the TRR deal is not possible, then let’s make belief that Iran really didn’t need the fuel, since they can’t make the fuel themselves it now is clear that they are not running out of fuel, they were just making this up to have an excuse for doing the 20% enrichment, it all looks like someone has played a bad hand and trying to catch up. There is nothing new with this claim, James has been wrting on this site about this for months That does Iran really need to enrich 20%. James yes it does and is legal get over it.
{One thing seems abundantly clear to me though – somebody has to get some decent translators involved because the wording of practically every so-called understanding between Iran and anybody just ends up causing more confusion}
Don’t you know that THERE WAS NO “MISUNDERSTANDING”, BUT LIES AND DECEPTIONS COMING FROM THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL AND EU?
{If Iran’s fear was they would be blackmailed over the return of the plates if they didn’t suspend enrichment, they could have clarified that in the negotiation process.}
Again, you are the one who should stop commenting until you remove your veil of IGNORANCE on Iranian legal enrichment program.
Then, what was Iran doing when she was negotiating for years with European countries on behalf of the United States during Khatami’s presidency where Iran STOPPED HER LEGAL ENRICHMENT PROGRAM FOR 2 YEARS and a half, dummy? What did happen? Everyone was saying that Iran made a mistake to stop her legal enrichment program. That action meant to give assurances to the criminal west. They did not appreciate it and Iran was INSULTED by a petty Zionist Jew who constructed “axis of evil” for Iran, which is fitted for Israel, to be read by an illiterate American Zionist ‘leader’, where everyone called him a fool.
The EU on behalf of the United Zionists said: Iran should stop its LEGAL enrichment program permanently in return for the title “axis of evil” made by a Zionist Jew, Frum, and a peanut.
Where were you? WE ARE FED UP WITH ALL OF YOU.
The intention of all these DIRTY GAMES of the war criminals is that IRAN SHOULD STOP ITS LEGAL ENRICHMENT PROGRAM PERMENATLY, while Israel, an apartheid and terrorist state along with India a racist country to be showered with economic concessions and more advanced technology to help their WMD program since India is in bed with Israel. Only petty people accept that.
If you are still not clear on US intension to keep Iran down , then you should stop presenting yourself as an IRANIAN, because we do not need fools among ourself.
Arnold and Alan,
I now understand from each of you that the LEU to be turned over by Iran was not considered to be worth much to whomever ended up with it. It was the getting it out of Iran that counted. That clarifies things a bit. Thanks.
Alan,
“Eric – I conclude it because they have no obvious source of fuel before the TRR supposedly runs out. So they either have fuel in reserve, anticipate being able to buy the isotopes, think they can make the plates before the fuel runs out, or intend to go without. Or they intend to do a deal! Cracking on with the 20% enrichment could probably be classified as what Mark Fitzpatrick calls “a lack of restraint”.”
You assume Iran is not “bothered” by its imminent lack of TRR fuel, and then you speculate why it is not “bothered.” My point is that Iran may well be “bothered,” but may conclude there is no advantage to be gained in showing that.
If one concludes (or speculates) as you do that Iran is not “bothered,” and that, therefore, it must have some other acceptable solution in mind – more TRR fuel in reserve than it has claimed, an expectation that it will buy isotopes, a belief that it can buy fuel plates before the TRR runs out of fuel, or a willingness to do without the TRR – then it may well be that Mr. Fitzpatrick is (and you are) correct that Iran’s continued enrichment to 20% shows “a lack of restraint.” But suppose you start instead from the assumption that Iran indeed is “bothered” by its imminent lack of TRR fuel – an assumption which has at least as much basis for it, if not more, than your assumption that Iran is not “bothered.” On that alternate assumption, you are left with little or no basis for concluding that Iran believes it has the problem covered through one or more of the solutions you mention. To the contrary, it may believe it has NO solution to the problem, other than to try to soldier on all by itself. In that light, “cracking on with the 20% enrichment” looks a lot less like pointless provocation, a lot more like making the best of an unpleasant situation.
Eric, it wasn’t important that Iran’s LEU ever be used, the point was just to get it out of Iran. It would be studied for signatures, maybe used in some way, maybe just disposed of.
I have never understood why the TRR and its lack of fuel had been at the center of these negotiations in Geneva and Vienna. The reactor is 43 years old. Does it make sense to still focus on that technology? What are other Middle Eastern and South Asian countries doing for their cancer patients? Are they just buying the isotopes on the market?
When reading Fitzpatrick’s article, he seems to assume that Iran bluffed about its real intentions. Nobody apart from Obama seemed to have expected successful negotiations. I find that absurd. Of course, Iran smelled that Obama was craving for an immediate success. Iran saw the possibility of having its enrichment program eventualle be accepted. But Fitzpatrick also points to the fact that any agreement, which would indirectly have recognized Iran’s enrichment efforts, would have been in violation of several UNSC resolutions demanding that Iran immediately abandon any enrtichment. Obama, leading the World’s sole superpower, obviously was about to ignore that simple fact. France and Russia had not been amused that much, I suppose. Is Ahmadinejad right when he is ranting about arrogant western powers?
After reading Mr. Fitzpatrick’s essay, one would firmly conclude as previously and numerously discussed and detected by many on this site, the nucleus of existing issues in between this two countries is not the nuclear proliferation, simply US wants to prevent Iran to become a model of self determination, this has been the notion, regardless of which party has been running the US’s administration. So, the conclusion is, since we haven’t been successful to bring Iran to capitulation, let’s continue with the good old policy of sanction and pond them even harder with more lies and disinformation, this could make us lucky and get us a nice little colorful revolution if not that, at least,we may see some regime destabilization. I hate to say it, but what I have understood from Mr. Fitzpatrick’s observation, is a continued thirty year policy of hallucination.
Eric – I conclude it because they have no obvious source of fuel before the TRR supposedly runs out. So they either have fuel in reserve, anticipate being able to buy the isotopes, think they can make the plates before the fuel runs out, or intend to go without. Or they intend to do a deal!
Cracking on with the 20% enrichment could probably be classified as what Mark Fitzpatrick calls “a lack of restraint”.
Eric – I think the fuel swap idea as it stood in its first incarnation envisaged further enrichment of Iranian LEU in Russia, but when it came to nutting out the details the Russians objected to using it. I think there was a short time when it was proposed that it be sent to France for purification then back to Russia for further enriching. In reality, there was never any need for Iranian LEU to be used in the first place. So the idea a couple of weeks later to put the LEU in escrow addressed this point, along with other points. I don’t think it really mattered to them where the Iranian LEU finished up following plate delivery, so long as it was outside Iran.
James – I think the internal turmoil was critical in it all too. Up until now, I have thought that to be the key factor. El Baradei has said so as well. But in reading Mark Fitzpatrick’s account, it seems at least plausible that Iran’s fallback was either that there was more TRR fuel in reserve than we knew about, or that the isotopes can be imported, or produced via another method. Although I am highly sceptical of any reference attributed to MEMRI, if Khamenei DID say 63% enrichment was possible as an alternative to TRR reactor fuel as a source of isotopes, I can see a very slippery slope before us.
Arnold – no, I’m not going to say the French were transparently lying. They may have been, but I don’t know if they were. I don’t make fuel plates. They have a monopoly, and that is something the French would probably relish.
If Iran’s fear was they would be blackmailed over the return of the plates if they didn’t suspend enrichment, they could have clarified that in the negotiation process. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to me to presume that if Iran really wanted those plates, they could have held those kinds of conversations. Besides, what did they stand to lose? They could replace the LEU soon enough. Ahmadinejad said so.
There could be mitigating circumstances if domestic difficulties meant they COULDN’T have those kinds of conversations, which is El Baradei’s view (amongst others). That in turn could mean something IS still on the cards, because it now appears they CAN have those conversations if they want to, so if they do really need those plates we’ll find out soon enough.
One thing seems abundantly clear to me though – somebody has to get some decent translators involved because the wording of practically every so-called understanding between Iran and anybody just ends up causing more confusion.
James,
“My understanding is that Russia, wanting to facilitate a diplomatic solution to the dispute regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, agreed to accept the Iranian LEU, as part of a deal where France would sent the 20% U for the Tehran reactor.”
Where was the Iranian LEU expected to end up being used?
Eric,
My understanding is that Russia, wanting to facilitate a diplomatic solution to the dispute regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, agreed to accept the Iranian LEU, as part of a deal where France would sent the 20% U for the Tehran reactor. Issues of purity did not enter into it, as I understand. Later, the question arose whether Iranian 20% U could be used to manufacture the needed plates/rods. And here, the impurity issue came to the fore.
Alan,
“The Iranians don’t seem bothered about the impending lack of fuel.”
I don’t understand how you conclude this. I see no reason to doubt that the Iranians are as “bothered” by it today as they were when they first sought to obtain 20% fuel a year ago, if not more.
But what good would come from Iran’s letting the US know that it is “bothered?” If there is still hope for a fuel-swap deal, Iran’s appearing “bothered” will inevitably cause the US to insist on tougher terms. On the other hand, if a fuel-swap deal is unlikely ever to occur, Iran’s appearing “bothered” will only give the US satisfaction that its obstructionist approach has succeeded in harming Iran, which means the US will be even more likely to behave that way next time.
Given the unfortunate circumstances, it seems to me that Iran is better off keeping a stiff upper lip, pressing ahead to make 20% fuel and solving whatever problems it needs to solve in order to use that 20% fuel in its TRR. All that may take several years, but the closer Iran gets, the more likely that either (1) it will actually get there; or (2) the West will see that it’s close to getting there, and so will be more willing to deal.
Alan,
“Eric – I don’t know the answers to your technical questions. I believe the Russians were not intending to remove impurities, they objected to using the Iranian LEU because they didn’t want to damage their centrifuges. This contributed to the evolution of the escrow idea.”
I find this confusing. If the Russians did not want to run the Iranian LEU through their centrifuges, why would they have agreed to participate in the fuel swap in the first place? One obvious answer is that they intended to use the “dirty” Iranium LEU in Russian nuclear power plants, and to send “cleaner” Russian fuel to France. But if that’s the answer, why would that intention lead to “the escrow idea?” On the other hand, if the Iranian LEU was so “dirty” that the Russians could neither run it through their centrifuges nor use it “as is” in their own nuclear power plants, what DID they plan to do with it? Send it to some third country that was less finicky? Keep it forever and do nothing with it? Send it back to Iran?
Stop commenting and do something,
I was a vociferous opponent of the invasion of Iraq, and I believed the intelligence had been “cooked” to set up an illegal war.
Getting at the truth is one way to expose foolish and dangerous policies pursued by the US and other countries.
Eric,
If Iran is in fact unable to produce the needed fuel plates/rods for the TRR, surely continuing to enrich to 20% U only plays into the hands of those who seek to discredit the regime.
Has anyone seen any cost figures, for the needed fuel (presumably as quoted by the French company that would supply it)?
{but Iran is already capable of “cleaning up” its dirty fuel sufficiently for use in the TRR.}
You people should know IRAN WAS FORCED TO STRAT ENRICHMMENT FOR 20% to make rod to be used in TRR and for cancer patients. Iran has been denied,illegally after Iran lost billions of dollars investment in French and Germany firms due to US criminals who stop this investment. What kind of a world is this that Iran cannot buy 20% rod for its reseach? This is CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND YOU FUND IT WITH YOUR TAX $$$$$$$$$, since say nothing except writing a few dull comments which is almost worthless to justify your arrogance.
People of the world do not trust you and respect you. We are fed up with your arrogance. You must ask yourself:
what are Americans with more than 200 killers, soldiers, doing OVER THERE IN OUR REGION? you are,instead, asking foolish questions like this STUPID ARTICLE FULL OF LIES which inject doubts about the motivation of people who post it at this site.
To show that you are serious about what you are preaching, you must go into the street and bring down the whore houses of the war criminals over their stupid heads to stop another illegal war. These criminals have been engaged in waging warm and cold wars, sanction is worse than warm war because it kills slowly but surely since WWI, ignoring the wars against the indegenous people where killed millions of them.
The sanction in Iraq wich YOU DID NOTHING AGAINST THAT, KILLED MORE THAN 650,000 PEOPLE many were CHILDERN less than 5 years of age, and Zionist MAD Albright said “is worth it.” This is kind of people you are. What did you do except shopping at the malls and rubbing each other’s FAT behind? Now, you are doing the same, ‘commenting’ back and forth to justify your silence and your stupid passivity
http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jun/1188.html
Eric, I’m not calling Iran’s product dirty LEU. I take Fitzpatrick as about right that one way or another it will take a few years for Iran to be able fuel its TRR from its own supplies, keeping in mind that if Fitzpatrick is biased, it is likely longer than shorter. I would not be shocked to see Iran able to fuel the facility in 2015 with its own uranium, that it has purified to whatever degree is necessary.
So yes. There are a bunch of technical issues to overcome, but the 20% enrichment Iran is doing now is an integral part in reaching the state of self-sufficiency in the middle of this decade.
Alan: Iran has this spring been thoroughly vindicated in its claims that the West is attaching conditions to any fuel delivery that are beyond both what it has ever claimed to consider acceptable and beyond what the Obama administration had been admitting to attach until the aftermath of the Brazil, Turkey agreement.
I have another question for you: do you believe France would not be able to make 120 kgs of fuel sooner than “about three years”? I’d guess most people here consider that a transparent lie. Do you?
Alan,
From what I can gather, Iran correctly followed IAEA protocol in seeking the uranium fuel for the Tehran reactor, and the object was to obtain the fuel. The object even now seems to be to obtain the needed fuel.
I think some of the apparent inconsistency that might be argued can be seen, arose from the political bickering that was going on after the election last year.
Eric – I don’t know the answers to your technical questions. I believe the Russians were not intending to remove impurities, they objected to using the Iranian LEU because they didn’t want to damage their centrifuges. This contributed to the evolution of the escrow idea.
It seems to me there is little impetus from either side to get a deal done, which suggests both sides are comfortable with their position as it stands. The Iranians don’t seem bothered about the impending lack of fuel and the West don’t seem bothered that it has run out of steam. The Vienna group have responded, welcoming the initiative while expressing their problems with it. It seems people were/are looking toward the proposed meeting between Iran and the EU in Turkey to see what happens next.
“It is about to maintain the Western “HEGEMONY” on that region and its resources for over a hundred years to come!”
As pirouz, kooshy, cyrus, others have repeated from time to time, it is not about what iran does, or did, or will do with the nuclear issue.
Fidel’s cuba stood-up against the us hegemony for decades and now, the majority of south america is united in their stand against us hegemony. In the us’s very own back yard.
All the well wishing about how to approach the nuclear issue may be great.. but Iran’s independence and progress will continue turning hair grey in washington. what is there to do, if they loose the ME as well!!!
and the title race for iran, “IF” it meant to suggest competing for iran vs china and russa, perhaps a more realistic term would be; race WITH iran.
James – do I see merit in it? I don’t know. I have always thought Iran’s need for the plates meant a deal was in their interests, even likely. But they have hardly bent over backwards to make one happen. Right now, they can’t get any plates for at least 12 months, but they don’t seem to care, and there is only the most rudimentary initial work done on a fabrication line in Iran for them.
Perhaps they simply wanted to put the West in the situation of having to supply them with finished isotopes, or refusing to.
Arnold,
Thanks. Is it your understanding that the 20% fuel Iran is now producing will be usable in the TRR? Presumably a “yes” answer means either that (1) the higher concentration of impurities doesn’t prevent the use of Iran’s 20% fuel in the TRR even if no “clean up” occurs; or that (2) some “clean up” is required, but Iran is already capable of “cleaning up” its dirty fuel sufficiently for use in the TRR.
Eric, I’m not sure what to make of this Western talk about impurities. This talk is in the categories of technical problems Iran would have to solve. Iran has solved a lot of technical problems so far in converting yellowcake to hex and then enriching it to 4.5% in mass. The general consensus is that given time, Iran will be able to overcome pretty much every technical problem between where it is now and both TRR fuel and nuclear weapons.
Alan (and others),
Two technical questions:
Background:
If it appeared that the Brazil-Turkey-Iran proposal had any realistic prospects of approval by the “Vienna group,” I’d agree that Iran should stop enriching LEU to 20% as a display of good faith, and possibly, for the same reason, even ship its 1,200 kg of LEU to Turkey before the Vienna group had formally approved the proposal. Given that that approval presently appears unlikely, however, I wouldn’t expect Iran to take either step.
Suppose, then, that Iran continues to enrich LEU to 20%, as it presently appears to be doing. While I understand that further enriching 20% fuel to bomb-grade would not take long, I also recall reading here several months ago, or perhaps on the Arms Control Wonk website, that Iran’s uranium has so many impurities that enriching it to a bomb-grade percentage would not leave Iran with bomb-usable fuel. If I recall those discussions correctly, the enrichment process results in an ever-higher concentration of certain impurities that prevent the HEU from being used in a bomb, presumably because those impurities cannot be substantially removed during the enrichment process. My understanding is that this problem was the reason that the initial fuel-swap proposal called for Iran’s LEU to be shipped first to Russia, which (unlike Iran and France) has the ability to remove these impurities, and then to France for the now-purified and enriched fuel to be placed into fuel assemblies for use in the TRR.
Questions:
If my understanding is correct, then Iran’s present insistence on enriching LEU to 20% raises two questions, one of which arguably casts Iran in a bad light and the other of which casts Iran in a good light:
1. If it would have been necessary for Russia first to purify the impure Iran LEU before further enriching it to 20% and then transferring it to France to make the fuel assemblies, how does Iran expect to end up with “clean” enough 20% fuel now that it is doing the enrichment on its own? What exactly is the point of Iran’s enrichment to 20% if Iran lacks the technology necessary to remove impurities so that the 20% uranium can be used in the TRR?
2. If Iran is capable of enriching LEU to 20% and removing the impurities sufficiently to use that 20% fuel in the TRR (after Iran figures out how to make the fuel assemblies in Esfahan), or if Iran’s 20% fuel will be usable in the TRR even if the impurities are not removed, would it nevertheless be true that Iran’s further enrichment of that 20% fuel to bomb-grade percentage would be pointless because, at that much-higher level of concentration, the impurities would prevent that HEU from being used as bomb fuel? If so, is the West worrying unnecessarily about Iran’s enrichment of LEU to 20%, for the reason that that 20% fuel cannot be used for anything but TRR fuel?
Alan,
“But my initial question to Mark is this: If Iran’s initial offer to buy fuel was a bluff, anticipating a “no” in order to gain grounds to increase enrichment to 20%, is it [Mark's] assumption that [Iran is] not bothered by the TRR running out of fuel, and the consequent shortage of medical isotopes?”
That question occurred to me as well. If the TRR was about to run out of fuel, and Iran wanted to keep operating it, how can one conclude – especially with the assurance Mr. Fitzpatrick expresses – that it was a mere “gambit” for Iran to offer to purchase 20% fuel from abroad? Mr. Fitzpatrick might answer that Iran should have been content to shut down the TRR and purchase medical radioisotopes on the open market. But that solution – setting aside the broader question of whether the West has any right to insist upon it – would have raised the short-term “supply shortage” issue (too few medical isotopes were being made to satisfy world demand, notwithstanding predictions from various writers that this shortage would end soon) and the longer-term “very short half-life” issue (medical isotopes deteriorate extremely quickly, within a few days or even hours after production) discussed on this website several months ago, which meant that Iran could never stockpile medical isotopes and thus prevent its 850,000 cancer patients from remaining what they are today: pawns in the nuclear dispute between Iran and the West.
To avoid these predictable down-sides of purchasing medical isotopes, an objective which struck me as sensible but did not strike Mr. Fitzpatrick as even worth mentioning, much less evaluating, what world-pleasing choice did Iran have that was better than offering to purchase 20% fuel from abroad? And when Iran’s offer to buy 20% fuel was rebuffed, what choice did Iran have (other than shutting down the TRR) but to make the 20% fuel itself and develop the capability to make its own fuel assemblies? What Mr. Fitzpatrick describes as an “excuse” seems to me to have been the only choice left to Iran at the time. The fact that it would take “a few years” for Iran to build the required fuel assemblies at Esfahan does not necessarily establish Iran’s bad faith, as Mr. Fitzpatrick argues, but more likely reflects an understandable desire to get started on that long but unavoidable effort without further delay.
If, as appeared likely then and still does, the only acceptable (to the US) way for Iran to acquire 20% fuel for the TRR would be through a deal that requires Iran to renounce its right to enrich uranium, I think that would have been an unreasonable demand on Iran. I understand you would agree. It appears that Mr. Fitzpatrick would not agree. Absent that assumption, I can think of no support for his conclusion that Iran was engaging in a “gambit” when it offered to buy 20% fuel from abroad.
Here is a nice read by Stephen Kinzer on Zurkhaneh (strength house) in Isfahan:
http://www.minnpost.com/globalpost/2010/06/21/19052/what_an_ancient_persian_martial_art_form_tells_us_about_iran
There is a short report in the Financial Times today: “Brazil drops mediation role after ‘fingers burned’”. “A senior US administration official welcomed news that Brasilia would no longer place itself at the forefront of talks”. Is this foolish reaction to be attributed to Hillary Clinton?
Alan,
Are you suggesting you see merit in the assertion Iran was not actually seeking to obtain the 20% U needed for the Tehran reactor, when Iran made its application to the IAEA for that purchase?
I have seen nothing to indicate it was a ploy. For that matter, is Iran even able to build the plates/rods needed for the reactor?
pirouz_2,
You ask how Sadddam Hussein could have proven the negative, that Iraq had destroyed its WMD in the 1990s. He might have invited Dan Rather and the CBS News team from “60 Minutes” to visit any site they chose in Iraq.
The astonishing dishonesty, duplicity, lying, cheating, etc etc etc by the Bush administration. to set up the illegal war, could have been exposed to a sufficient degree to erode the “deniability” the stooge American politicians were relying on for cover.
kooshy,
I agree with you the story about the fabulous wealth of Afghanistan was planted in the NYT to help politicians worried about being hammered for the growing costs of the war in Afghanistan.
The UN coordinator for al-Qaeda/Taliban monitoring team writes in the Financial Times today: “Why the Afghan end-game is so hard to play”. The author, Richard Barrett, notes that “al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan” and the Taliban say they will not allow al-Qaeda to use Afghan soil, for purposes of attacking other countries.
Obama, of course, only recently told US soldiers that the purpose of the war in Afghanist was to defeat al-Qaeda.
Rehmat
“The New York Times reporter, James Risen, who wrote the cooked-up story “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,” worth US$1 trillion”
This made up report just surfaced up when there were some mild concerns by some US congress members about the increasing cost of Obama’s AFPAK operation before the start of the US midterm elections.
Talking point is to mean that Afghanistan is rich and can ultimately pay for the war in the future, this a bit newer version of Paul Wolfowitz testimony before the Iraq war that the cost of the war in Iraq will be 100 billion. And Iraqi oil can pay for the war, at the end of the day if you are a US tax payer like me and Mr.Fitzgerald “We are the Ones” who has the Afghanistan riches, and the newly found rich afghan mineral mines is our wallets, “don’t worry be happy” and let them rush to have their soviet moment.
The publication of this post by Mark Fitzpatrick creates some much-needed balance here, and I for one am grateful for that. Hopefully he will post a reply or two, because it could be a very useful conversation/thread if he did.
I think the full article is very interesting and unearths various aspects that were not widely known previously. But my initial question to Mark is this: If Iran’s initial offer to buy fuel was a bluff, anticipating a “no” in order to gain grounds to increase enrichment to 20%, is it your assumption that they are not bothered by the TRR running out of fuel, and the consequent shortage of medical isotopes? Or do you believe that the fuel has some distance to go before it runs out and/or Iran intends to plug any isotope shortfall from the international market?
The greedy American empire and it`s western allies are afraid of the power shift to the East , being Iran a key player of the East`s growing influence in the international arena, the Washington strategists are running out of options to counter Iran`s growing influence in the oil and gas rich Middle East.So far all the U.S measures against Iran are counter productive and will in long term backfire! The only viable and rational option available to U.S is for Washington to stop its hypocrisy and double standards on nuclear issues. Long live the Islamic Republic of Iran :)
The New York Times reporter, James Risen, who wrote the cooked-up story “US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,” worth US$1 trillion – wrote earlier in his book ‘State of War: The Secret history of CIA’ that CIA tried to disrupt Iranian nuclear research by providing Tehran with flawed blueprints for a nuclear weapon – hoping to sow confusion but in reality helping arm itself faster. Sounds like another Iran-Contra false-flag operation.
However, he refuses to mention his “Gen. Petraeus” source in the book. His fantasy was to plant the seed that like Israeli nukes – Iran’s future nukes would be by American help.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/06/21/afghan-mineral-hoax/
I almost read the whoule article from Fitzpatrick.
I understand his Survival journal has its readers and sponsors but, what an egregiously written piece of junk!
Weren’t we reading something about poor journalism and reality bending on Iran on this very same site a few days ago?
This article perfectly fits the narrative of the good guys in the West who did all they could and offered the best of deals to those wily Iranians who badly want a break-out capability. But then again, how will Mr. Fitzpatrick retain his job and take his family on vacation if he were to walk a different line?
Pathetic!
Arvin,
I agree with both Eric and pirouz_2
Pirouz_2 wrote:
“You try to bend the truth to make it fit with your beliefs”
In regards to the election,
Eric wrote:
“The burden of proof fairly shifts to those who allege fraud.”
In my opinion, those who alleged fraud (GM and the west), have failed miserably.
@Fiorangela:
No my friend I am afraid it has not advanced so much (if any).
I am a GREAT admirer of Karl Marx. Yet the only part of Marxism which has always given me trouble, is his theory regarding the history and how the humanity is supposed to progress. Even if there is a progress, it is at a MUCH slower pace than some people think.
@Fiorangela:
The reason that I wrote the excerpt from that movie was that it answers your questions regarding Iraq (and Iran) very eloquently.
Why is the West interested in the Middle East? The oil and gas (in general their reaources including labour resources).
The West is trying to maintain its “HEGEMONY” in that region (and even Israel is only one “tool” for that purpose). It is not about the oil profit from Iraq (even for a decade) per se.
It is about to maintain the Western “HEGEMONY” on that region and its resources for over a hundred years to come!
What USA tried to do was just to show that “We are the OWNERS” of this region, and you have no say in this matter. With a very small force we can overthrow ANY government in this region which does not suit us and you have ZERO control over the process. Submit like obedient slaves and LEARN YOUR PLACE. PERIOD!
That is even why Rumsfeld was so persistent in going into Iraq with as small a force as possible! TO MAKE A POINT!
What people usually disregard is that USA never thought Iraq would end up like this, they thought that they could easily overthrow Saddam and replace him with a stooge like Mobarak with minimal force and casualty!
And had they succeeded in their plan right now we wouldn’t be asking: “why did we do what we did?”
Why does America do it?
Answer #1: because they’ve been doing it since 1607.
Answer #2: power
Answer #3: special interests (merchants of death, oil companies, oil service companies, etc.) still expect that there will be spoils. Afghanistan and Iraq seem to prove this wrong, though merchants of death have profited handsomely. Other interests may be starting to awaken to the fact that militarism does not necessarily lead to a pot of gold at the end of the war.
Answer #4: As in Quemada, current spoils may be threatened by the example of Iran selling oil in other currencies, busting the nuclear cartel by selling its own enriched uranium, etc. Other allies (Brazil, Turkey, Japan) are chafing under the US yoke. The US-European mantra of “all for one and one for all” could be threatened if this gets bad enough.
pirouz-2, now I get it.
Thomas Jefferson, my hero, did the equivalent to Haiti when Haiti’s black people were so uppity as to liberate themselves.
humanity has not advanced that much, has it?
@Fiorangela:
Have you seen the movie “Quemada” (or “Burn” in English)? It is an amazing movie.
I believe that it answers the question that you ask:
“what is it that “we did” and why did “we” do it?”
together with the fact that Petraus points out:
“for the price of one year of our operations in Iraq we could have bought all of Iraq’s oil for the next 10 years and we wouldn’t have had to go in there and do what we did,”
The movie is about British competition with Portugal over the hegemony on the Antilles islands for their sugar.
At one point towards the end of movie, Marlon Brando (Playing the role of Sir William Walker), in order to suppress the guerilla resistance orders the army to completely burn the entire land under sugar plantations and to masaccre the villagers in the plantations and to remove the survivors to other regions of the island.
The represantative of the “Royal Sugar Company”, Mr. Shelton, in dismay tries to stop him, telling him that in the quest to suppress the insurrection and the guerillas he was actually destroying the enitire sugar output of the island (and the profit coming from it for the next years to come) which was the entire reason that they were fighting the guerillas to beging with. In other words “sugar” is the sole reason that the “Royal Sugar Company” was fighting the guerillas (using the British Army), if the whole sugar industry is to be burned to the ground to fight the guerillas, then what is the point of fighting them any way?
Here is an excerpt from that movie, which I believe answers your (and Gen. Petraus’) question very eloquently:
Mr. Shelton: I must report to London. (to let the company know that William Walker is destroying the entire islands sugar plantations to suppress the guerillas)
Sir William Walker: Do that, Mr. Shelton.
Mr. Shelton: I’ll tell them how things are.
Sir William Walker: Yes, I hope so.
Mr. Shelton: I’ll have to inform them that the island has been completely burnt… and José Dolores [the leader of the Guerilla movement] has once again broken through the encirclement.
Sir William Walker: Tell them that, Mr. Shelton. And tell them also that you make me sick.
Mr. Shelton: Sir William!
Sir William Walker: Do you know why this island is called Queimada? Because it was already burnt once,and do you know why? Because even then, it was the only way to conquer the resistance of the people… and after that, the Portuguese exploited the island in peace… FOR NEARLY 300 YEARS.
Mr. Shelton: Yes, but I was merely trying…
Sir William Walker: You know that fire can’t cross the sea because it goes out.[referring to the fact that he was burning all the plantations on that ONE island where there was a rebellion] But certain news, certain ideas travel by ships’ crews.
Have you any idea how many islands there are on which Royal Sugar has concessions?
You should know.
And have you the vaguest notion of what would happen to our employers… if the example of José Dolores reached those islands?
Fior, they’re just lies, that’s all. The nature of politics.
JohnH –
“What’s mysterious here is that, unlike organized crime, the US has not figured out how to exact fees for its “protection” services. It receives nothing in return other than the satisfaction of being top dog and perhaps the privilege of providing the pick of the lot to some of its most important companies.”
THAT is the entire point: the US receives nothing in return. Why are they doing it? What is the thought process? When Petraeus said,
“for the price of one year of our operations in Iraq we could have bought all of Iraq’s oil for the next 10 years and we wouldn’t have had to go in there and do what we did,”
what is it that “we did” and why did “we” do it?
the neocons are still trying to sell the “mistaken intelligence” tripe. Several weeks ago Paul Wolfowitz rolled out that tired argument on C Span/Washington Journal. Watch him carefully at 20.21 minutes: compare his comportment, his reaction to the question, the look on his face with the look on the face of the women on this essay. Wolfowitz’s behavior bordered between bizarre and sociopathic. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/id/223546
America’s policy of waging war rather than pursuing the economic health of the United States likewise borders between the bizarre and the sociopathic.
Fioranglea–”If control of Iraq’s oil resources was a goal of US invasion of Iraq, nobody told the DoD.” Except that they took immediate control of the Oil Ministry and let everything else, even munitions sites, get looted.
Yes, the US allows Japan to get lithium in Afghanistan, Germany to build railways in Arabia. It’s part of the quid pro quo for agreeing to US hegemony. Members get carrots, non-members (Iraq, Iran) get sticks. But the point here is that the US is the gatekeeper (the indispensable party), because it exercises overall control of the assets. Part of the deal is that the US assures junior partners that their investments and raw materials will be protected by the US “protection services.”
What’s mysterious here is that, unlike organized crime, the US has not figured out how to exact fees for its “protection” services. It receives nothing in return other than the satisfaction of being top dog and perhaps the privilege of providing the pick of the lot to some of its most important companies.
But the price of US hegemony seems to be getting steeper and steeper. Whereas in the case of Iraq War I, GHWB could promise the French oil concessions in Kuwait and then renege in favor of US companies, GWB has had to allow Russian and Chinese companies into Iraqi oil contracts. The whole Iraq fiasco has tilted the cost-benefit equation against US control, which may also be a reason why the US is hesitant to take control of Iraq.
@James Canning:
By the way, you are WAY exaggerating the role that US public plays in the decision making process. It is not the American public which is the ultimate decision makers, but rather it is the US elite! And the US elite ALREADY knows the truth. And the American elite is not trying to resolve a threat to the US security, it is trying to resolve a threat to the US HEGEMONY!
@James canning:
“Saddam Hussein’s fatal blunder, looking back now, was to fail to demonstrate to the grossly ignorant and rather stupid American public that he had destroyed Iraq’s WMD in the 1990s.”
Could you please tell us “how” Saddam could have possibly “demonstrated” to the “grossly ignorant and rather stupid American public” that he had destroyed Iraq’s WMDs in 1990s??
Are you too, trying to say that the burden of proof was on Saddam and he should have proven the negative?!?!?
Iraq could only demonstrate the absence of WMDs by allowing full inspection of the UN, something that it did do! Which is why you say:
“The CIA knew the weapons had been destroyed, and the UN weapons inspectors were confirming the WMD had not been reconstituted.”
Other than that what could have he done?
“But the grossly ignorant, and rather stupid American public, were in something of a lather due to the incessant propaganda put out by mainstream media in the US – – to the effect Iraq had WMD and would soon have nukes and would be sure to use the nukes.”
Well that is the whole problem my friend, the grossly disinformed and misinformed American public is under total control of the mainstream media which in turn is under the total control of (and is indeed and extension of) the US capitalist elite. What was there that Saddam could possibly do (or Iran can do) to get the US public out of the control of their own mass media? I am sure you are not suggesting that Iraq or Iran should invade your country, and do a regime change so that your people would come out of the hegemony of your own corporate media.
No my friend, the way to avoid wars is by “deterrence” and by showing an ability that you are not an easy prey and that you can hurt back big time. Other than that if you think that people can some how educate the American public DESPITE their own government’s complete hegemony over them, that is not possible.
Regrading Iran’s ability to close down the strait of Hormoz:
First of all I am not a military analyst, so I don’t know what Iran’s real capabilities are (in terms of closing down the Hormoz Strait indefinitely), other than that you have to understand that Iran’s main concern is to deter an invasion and to increase the cost of a US/Israeli attack on Iran to a level much higher than just a sharply increasing oil price.
Iranian demonizing propaganda is picking momentum each day. On June 14, US State Department released it 10th annual report on “human trafficing”. It Islamic Iran as one of the 13 worst human trafficing record among the 177 world countries judged by the AIPAC. Obviously Israel is not among those 13 countries though Amnesty International criticies it every year for giving legal protection to sex-slavery. Interestingly, the US’s name showed up on the for the first time…..
Human Trafficking and Politics
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/06/21/human-trafficking-and-politics/
JohnH – One of the arguments Stephen Kinzer makes in “Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future,” is that US foreign policy is stuck in Cold War modality while Turkey and Iran have moved beyond that framework to a more economically pragmatic and less militaristic set of policies.
The State Department’s dogged determination to continue to fight the last war is dramatically shrinking the economic future of the American people, while it’s not only costing exorbitant amounts of US blood, treasure and intellectual effort and focus, it is ceding the field of global interrelationships to America’s allies AND her enemies.
Several factoids to consider: if control of Iraq’s oil resources was a goal of US invasion of Iraq, nobody told the DoD: about six weeks ago David Petraeus told an audience at Wilson Center:
“I pointed out to a couple of Iraqi leaders at various times that for the price of one year of our operations in Iraq we could have bought all of Iraq’s oil for the next 10 years and we wouldn’t have had to go in there and do what we did.”
Petraeus does not seem to recognize that he just proved the validity of Turkey’s approach to relations with neighbors and with states whose resources are essential; namely, that it’s cheaper to make friends and trade honestly than to make war.
Another example: Hamid Karzai announced yesterday that Japan will be granted priority rights to mine Afghanistan’s mineral deposits, including lithium, the mineral that will be the essential element for alternately fueled cars. The value of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth has been estimated at about $3 trillion. It is also estimated that the US has spent $1 trillion in its seven-year long war in Afghanistan. Perhaps Japan will send the White House a very attractive greeting card next Thanksgiving.
A third example: Germany has signed deals to build railroads across the Arabian peninsula, ensuring to the German economy immediate economic benefits and employment opportunities as well as a foothold and trade relations with that important region for the next 35 years.
Meanwhile, in the US, President Obama doled out $8 billion in seed money to build high speed rail lines in a key Florida voting district. Unfortunately, the state of US technology is such that the designers of the US rail line are shopping in Europe for the engineers and technology to build the project.
The US is not entirely closed out of the Saudi Arabian/Persian Gulf market, however: over the past four or five years, Robert Gates and David Petraeus have been urging Arab sheiks to buy US armaments; last March, Petraeus announced that their efforts are bearing fruit, as Gulf states have purchased $18 billion in US weapons systems.
Israel, more specifically, right-wing militarist zionism as defined by Jabotinsky as well as Leo Strauss and subscribed to by Begin and now Netanyahu, has been a dominant influence on US foreign policy, financial affairs, and geostrategic goals for perhaps half-a-century. Those intertwined influences do not seek merely to control the natural resources of their target states, they seek to reshape the banking and finance structures as well, to conform them with predatory capitalism, which has characterized zionism since at least the early nineteenth century. Zionist capitalism has Marxist features, including the proclivity to socially dominate the target population. Further, zionist capitalism is different from the capitalism of Adam Smith, which used to characterize the American style of doing business, and it is radically different from the principles of Shari’a finance, which Arab and Islamic states in Middle East attempt to practice. Adam Smith’s style of capitalism has more in common with Shari’a finance than with zionist capitalism.
James Canning
In fact – Israel-born writer and world-renowned Jazz player Gilad Atzmon and I wrote way back that Islamic Republic must go for the “nuclear deterrenc”.
“Whether Iran is aiming towards a nuclear military capability is obviously beyond me. However, after reading David Aaronovitch, it should. Iran must produce a bomb as soon as possible. Deterring the Jewish state and its allies is the only key to peace in the Middle East. Sadly, that’s the only language that is understood,” Gilad Atzmon in Hasbara author va Iran’s bomb.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/iran-must-produce-a-bomb/
James Canning–”Obtaining Iraqi oil had zero to do with the reason Iraq was invaded.” I agree. But obtaining control over the Iraqi oil had a lot to do with the invasion. Unless you can cite another plausible, official reason, all of which have been exposed as fraudulent, then you have to assume that control of energy resources was paramount.
Arnold Evans points out important commercial reasons for the nuclear cartel not wanting Iranian enrichment–to keep a firm grip on the exploding market for nuclear fuel.
From a strategic point of view, controlling a nation’s lifeblood (oil, natural gas, nuclear) ensures that you have a veto over a nation’s policies.
In the Persian Gulf, strategic and commercial interests meld seamlessly, which is why Cheney’s Energy Task Force coined the term “Energy Security,” officially adding energy interests (Halliburton) to the military-industrial complex.
These interests are all excluded from Iran, though military budgets benefit handsomely from the greatly exaggerated Iranian threat. The others can’t wait for regime change to exploit resources and sell a future regime lots of useless military hardware.
The problem is that, after the Iraq fiasco, they’re uncertain as to how to realize their goals.
Pirouz_2,
Saddam Hussein’s fatal blunder, looking back now, was to fail to demonstrate to the grossly ignorant and rather stupid American public that he had destroyed Iraq’s WMD in the 1990s. The CIA knew the weapons had been destroyed, and the UN weapons inspectors were confirming the WMD had not been reconstituted. But the grossly ignorant, and rather stupid American public, were in something of a lather due to the incessant propaganda put out by mainstream media in the US – - to the effect Iraq had WMD and would soon have nukes and would be sure to use the nukes.
Iraq had no ability to counter-attack, and the punishment of the US could only come about after seriously idiotic decisions by the Bush administration after Saddam was overthrown. Iran, by contrast, can close the Gulf to shipping and cause immense problems globally.
JohnH,
Does the possession of large energy resources, by Iran, make an attack from the US more likely, in your view? Obtaining Iraqi oil had zero to do with the reason Iraq was invaded, if one excludes the calculation made by some neocons that they could gain great riches in Iraq following the overthrow of the Sunni regime.
JohnH:
I don’t want to over-emphasize the deterrent value of Iran’s nuclear program, though I believe that is what Mark Fitzpatrick disapproves of, as well as Israel, as well as Barack Obama.
Iran could also give Venezuela, Egypt, and other countries enriched uranium under better terms than they could get from the West or Russia if Iran is allowed to have a full nuclear program. But that can only happen when people like Mark Fitzpatrick realize that their efforts to treat countries in Israel’s region as separate cases that must be denied nuclear technology have failed.
Iran has no intention of building a weapon, just as Japan has no intention of building a weapon. But short of that, Iran has the right to a wide range of nuclear technology, even technology that would give it a break-out capability.
Iran could not be a nuclear fuel exporter under the conditions offered by Mark Fitzpatrick in the name of preventing Iran from legally achieving the same break-out capabilities that a lot of other countries have.
I agree that Iranian possession of the capability to produce a few nukes on short notice would provide a powerful deterrent against US attack, something the Iran has to assume to be a real threat given its vast energy resources.
But I would argue that Iran doesn’t need it. A cheaper, more cost effective route is to simply target Ras Tanura and the rest of the Gulf oil infrastructure with lots a short range, widely dispersed missiles. Iran disabled Iraq’s oil export infrastructure during their war, and I believe that their prime goal would be to disable the West’s in the event of an attack. The resulting astronomical price for oil would seize up the industrial world’s economy in short order, even though neither Europe nor the US are particularly dependent on Gulf oil. In fact, I believe that this deterrence has already proven its effectiveness, given the Bush administration’s uncharacteristic restraint.
Iran’s possessing a nuclear capability would provide a deterrent, as Ray Takeyh says, but it would be superfluous and Iran might not have enough time to deploy it if the US suddenly got a bee in its bonnet and decided to whack Iran.
@Arnold Evans:
” More important is the question of would Iran reduce its chance of being attacked by giving up break-out capability. Ray Takeyh says no. He says that capability would take regime change off of the table. I agree with Takeyh. Iran avoids attack by being able to hurt the US more than an attack would benefit it.
Iraq’s cooperation with the inspection process by 2002 defied belief. There was nothing inspectors could not see, that was not how Iraq could have prevented an attack. Iraq could have prevented an attack by demonstrating that an attempted invasion would weaken the US position in the region.
If Iran gives up any break-out capability but is weak enough that the US can attack the country without fear of Iranian retaliation, the US will, under some pretext or another, attack Iran. Iran can avoid an unavoidable attack from the US by deterring such an attack, by maintaining an ability to harm US interests in case of an attack. Nothing else matters for avoiding attack.
Iran can either invite Hosni Mubarak to be its pro-US stooge dictator or it can maintain a defensive deterrent from attack. Those the the exact only two ways Iran can avoid being attacked by the US.”
THAT IS THE END OF STORY!. You have explained the situation in the best and clearest way possible. I agree with every word of your comment completely.
James:
1) It seems you don’t want to answer the question of whether or not you think Japan has a break-out capability. It clearly does. I’ll note your argument that it does not need one, but point out that Japan does not have tons of plutonium stockpiled by accident. Somebody in Japan disagrees with you.
2) More important is the question of would Iran reduce its chance of being attacked by giving up break-out capability. Ray Takeyh says no. He says that capability would take regime change off of the table. I agree with Takeyh. Iran avoids attack by being able to hurt the US more than an attack would benefit it.
Iraq’s cooperation with the inspection process by 2002 defied belief. There was nothing inspectors could not see, that was not how Iraq could have prevented an attack. Iraq could have prevented an attack by demonstrating that an attempted invasion would weaken the US position in the region.
If Iran gives up any break-out capability but is weak enough that the US can attack the country without fear of Iranian retaliation, the US will, under some pretext or another, attack Iran. Iran can avoid an unavoidable attack from the US by deterring such an attack, by maintaining an ability to harm US interests in case of an attack. Nothing else matters for avoiding attack.
Iran can either invite Hosni Mubarak to be its pro-US stooge dictator or it can maintain a defensive deterrent from attack. Those the the exact only two ways Iran can avoid being attacked by the US.
Arnold,
Iran has the potential to be one of the major economic powers in the world (top ten or fifteen). Avoiding an avoidable attack on Iran obviously is in the best interests of Iran.
I think the idea of a Chinese attack on Japan is very near absurd. I say this being aware of the disputes etc regarding seabed, islands etc etc.
Sakineh,
I join you in congratulating Iran on its educational achievements over the past 30 years, particularly for women.
Iran is making major progress in many areas, and this gets very little attention in western newspapers, TV, etc.
Many of us hope to see a great deal more Iranian progress in the various areas, and to avoid a major disruption/setback.
James,
Japan has been attacked before, by parties it would not have expected to be at war with 30 years earlier.
search [dot] japantimes [dot] co [dot] jp [slash] cgi-bin/nn20020407a1.html
In a speech here, Ozawa criticized China’s military build-up, saying that the conceited attitude of Beijing could make the Japanese “hysterical.”
“If Japan desires, it can possess thousands of nuclear warheads. Japan has enough plutonium in use at its nuclear power plants for three to four thousand (of them),” Ozawa said. “If that should happen, we wouldn’t lose (to China) in terms of military strength. What would (China) do then?”
Japan does not have a stock of plutonium by accident. That does not mean it has a weapon, or wants anyone to think it has a weapon today, but it could get one. American strategists, Chinese strategists, Japanese strategists and even people like Mark Fitzpatrick clearly understand the value of break-out capability.
Now Iran is not under threat of attack because of fear of its nuclear program, if it was Japan and Brazil would be under far worse threats of attack, as would Germany, Canada, Romania, South Korea and a lot of countries.
Iran is under threat of attack for the same reason Iraq was under attack, which also was not any particular weapons program, but because the United States has in place a delicate colonial structure in the region with a key consideration that every state in the region be weak enough that Israel, with only 5 million Jewish citizens, can be a Jewish state that massively overpowers any potential regional adversaries.
That principle, that Israel must have dominance over its region, is what Mark Fitzpatrick is trying to defend. Because it is so unreasonable on its face, he and people who advocate the position he’s advancing are loathe to express it openly, which makes it more difficult for me to counter that position.
Back to Japan though, because if you think Japan does not have a break-out capability, then I think Iran, by your definition, should not have a break-out capability. If you think Japan does have a break-out capability, then you agree with me on that, and I think Iran should also have one.
Let me assure you that Mark Fitzpatrick believes Japan has a break-out capability and is working to ensure that Iran does not get such a break-out capability.
Fiorangela,
Thanks especially for your post of June 19 at 6:06 PM. I still haven’t had a chance to read Mark Fitzpatrick’s article, and plan to later today, but you’ve already given us a lot of additional food for thought and a number of links to more of the same.
It looks peculiar that the Leveretts didn’t sign this piece (usually: “–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett”). Did it come from them?
Regardless, all this talk of nuclear energy/bomb distorts the view of Iran’s other accomplishments, or maybe, it is keeping the focus on this issue alone so as to keep the gaze from other endeavors.
Iran throughout the last thirty+ years has advanced in many ways that couldn’t even be dreamed of under the shah (yes, lower case ‘s’ for lack of respect). For as the much as the West and its lapdogs/poodles have tried to keep it backward, Iran has advanced in the areas of nanotechnology, stem cell research, medicine, nuclear, agriculture, rocket science, etc., and is becoming more self sufficient under sanctions every day.
Iran has now over 4 million college grads, half of which are women. By contrast at the time of shah, it had 400,000. While true that the demography is different, and population size is twice as much, but 10 times the graduation rate? Iranian women can drive, vote, head businesses, and hold office. While still insufficient in many respects, where else in the ME do women have this much freedom?
The shah as subservient to the west as he was did not want educational foundations, so people would not know any better, stay ignorant and would not revolt. He did not build universities and one had to pass the dreaded Konkoor (national exam) to get in to university slots available for the top 2%, resulting in many Iranians fleeing for foreign universities.
So, Mullahs of Iran (as much as this term has become demonized) have done well by their people. By the way, the word Mullah itself means educated (in theology). By educating Iranians, the Mullahs have lifted Iran out of poverty and ignorance.
So, keep talking about LEU or whether it should be enriched to 4% or 20%. Keep talking about the bomb and ignore other realities on the ground.
Fiorangela,
Do you have current figures on US, UK and Japanese aid to Afghanistan? Interesting link. I would guess the US is spending $50 or $100 for every $1 spent by Japan, but its just a guess.
Arnold,
Who would be attacking Japan? And how would the attack by launched? Isn’t the idea a bit preposterous (barring an event carried out by an insane North Korean)?
Do I understand you to be arguing that Iran, under threat of attack for having what is feared to be a capacity to develop nukes quickly, should respond to the threat by making it clear it does have the capacity to develop nukes quickly?
If Iran did not pose a “plausible” threat, in the form of nuclear first-strike capability, Iran would not be under the pressure it currently sustains. Personally, I do not think Iran would use nukes even if the nukes were available.
Iran campaigns against nukes. It should continue to do so, and not undercut its own campaign by seeming to arrange for its own nukes.
Arnold Evans, thanks for a very clear explanation of why Iran SHOULD have breakout capability.
A little window dressing for your Japan analogy: according to this morning’s HuffPo: Japan Has ‘Priority’ On Rights To Mine Afghanistan Mineral Deposits, Says Hamid Karzai
Banks have safes and armed guards to protect the wealth they store. The greater the wealth, the bigger the safe, the more heavily armed the guards. Japan has guards to protect its (potential) treasure-trove. Iran’s treasure is, even more than its oil, the intelligence and dynamism of its people, as RaceforIran’s resident picturegenius has displayed for us once again: look into the face of the young woman on this page, and ask yourself what lengths you would go to to ensure her future.
As eppie said earlier, it’s a simple concept, really.
along those lines… Happy Fathers Day to Papa Leverett and to all of you who are fathers.
James:
Arnold seems to be arguing that Iran should either develop nukes or at least appear to have developed them, for purposes of “deterrence”. In fact, this would virtually guarantee an attack on Iran. Why play into the hands of the Iranophobes?
This seems to be a more difficult concept to express that I’ve thought.
Do you think Japan has either nuclear weapons or appears to have developed nuclear weapons?
Japan is absolutely transparent. It does not have nuclear weapons today. If things go as we all expect, Japan will not have nuclear weapons tomorrow. If the United States, China or anyone else tries to impose a blockade of Japan, preventing food or materials from entering the island, or even worse, attacks Tokyo, Japan has the capacity to retaliate and can pull out of the treaty and will have the option to retaliate with a nuclear weapon.
Nobody expects that to happen. In fact, because Japan has that option, we are even more sure there will never be a blockade or attack on Tokyo. I am very confident in predicting that Japan will not have a weapon during this century and nobody will think Iran has a weapon during this century.
But Japan does have a break-out capability that Mark Fitzpatrick believes is critical to deny to Iran. A lot of countries have that capability. Iran is a special case because it is in the same region as Israel, a small country founded by dispossessing a large majority-Muslim population in a region dominated by Muslims.
This is really not about bluffing, or pretending to have something it does not have. This is about openly having the ability to move from not having a weapon to having one in an emergency.
Egypt is not like Japan. Israel, if it wants, can safely threaten to destroy Cairo knowing that an Egyptian response would be impossible. That impacts a lot of Egyptian strategic calculations. If Egypt had a Japan option, then Egypt would be able to respond to an Israeli threat the same way Japan can respond to Chinese threat “woah, not so fast, if a crisis was to reach the point that you’d consider bombing us, we may by that time have left the NPT and be able to respond.”
Israel losing its ability to make unanswerable threats is the fuel of this dispute, why Iran is to be treated differently than Japan or Brazil.
But the expectation is that, like Japan, nobody will ever think Iran has actually built a weapon because the capability will deter crises from developing to that point.
I have to write more about nuclear capability, I’m not sure at exactly what step this becomes difficult to follow.
DWZ,
You also should bear in mind the enormous power and influence of the armaments manufacturers, their lawyers, lobbyists, stooge politicians, paid “retired” generals and admirals, etc etc etc etc. They are in it for the money (and power). They need an “enemy” with which to frighten the grossly ignorant American public, so they can in effect steal hundreds of billions of dollars per year, year in and year out, decade in and decade out. This is one of the greatest scams in the history of the US.
Iran should avoid playing into the hands of the accomplished liars who serve the armaments manufacturers and that entire lobby (military-industrial-congressional complex).
DWZ,
Most reasonably well-informed Americans I talk to want normal relations with Iran. And virtually every one of my British friends wants normal relations with Iran, (between the US and Iran, and between the UK and Iran).
The incessant propaganda put out by the Israel lobby, in the US particularly, distorts the picture seen by most Americans.
I see no element whatever of “racism” in the matter. The Persians are Aryan.
Rehmat,
Excellent and essential point: Iran does not want nukes or the ability to develop them on short notice.
Arnold seems to be arguing that Iran should either develop nukes or at least appear to have developed them, for purposes of “deterrence”. In fact, this would virtually guarantee an attack on Iran. Why play into the hands of the Iranophobes?
Arnold,
Your argument appears to be that Iran, by retaining a few tons of LEU, would have a nuclear “deterrent” that prevents an attack a la Iraq War.
But Iran insists it does not want nukes. And that the LEU is solely for the purpose of the nuclear power plants.
Richard Steven Hack
YES – “Iran doesn’t even want a “breakout capability”. Dr. ahmadinejad said that few months ago – but “the world” should not believe in the words of an honest leader – when the “chosen people” like Netanyahu and Lieberma say so.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2009/02/04/is-iran-a-threat-to-world-peace-nyeth-its-israel-stupid/
Soltanie once said under the NPT regulations, a member state, like Iran, is allowed to enrich uranium up to literaly any level (he even mentioned 100%, I am not sure if that is feasible theoretically). is this statement right?
if so, then what is wrong with Iran in going to higher level of enrichment? let’s say 95% and put that under 7/24 camera surveillance in a museum. I would love to go and visit that, and probably many people would want to do the same! it might make sense economically in the later stage! 20% is not that charming.
I also don’t think any government in Iran can suspend the enrichment process. after decades of talking about it, and after getting there, any government that ceases enrichment would fall immediately. this pretty obvious to me.
nuclear capability, or a Japan option, will inject uncertainty in Iran’s case even in the short term. and I think we are seeing that partly now! otherwise, we shouldn’t have seen this discussion here with the assumptions of the past few years.
THANK YOU EPPPIE, WELL SAID, especially when you write:
{The Leverettes are going to have to learn that if they really want to be supporters of truth, they cannot continue to dance with those who are attacking truth, every damn day, day after day. At some point, you cannot maintain your good standing in the world that circulates lies until they become ‘facts’ upon which ‘crippling’ sanctions and wars are based. Iran has the same rights as any other nation. The situation is really not more complicated than that, in the end.}
We say shame on arrogant racists, black and white, in Washington who are willing to commit a ‘nuclear holocaust’ against Iranian people and its civilization of more than 7000 years, to satisfy their lust for power based on nothing but LIES. Iranian people will destroy their enemies if they are attacked and will not stop until they are destroy them all, otherwise they would have not survived this long. Iran was on the map for hundred years before either Russia or the United States appears on the map. They must think twice before any foolish actions against Iran, because Iranian people are fed up with your stupid and criminal acts and will not allow the kid on the block humiliate a nation with an ancient and glorious history and culture. Iranians say to criminals in Washington, black and white, if you dare to hurt us we will defend ourselves until your destruction.
As long as Americans are silent on US/Israel crimes against humanity, we will view you as supporting party of war criminals. Stop funding the wars with your tax money. You are responsible for millions of deaths in Islamic countries. Many countries have been destroyed by you daily attack, how long do you want to stay SILENT? We never forget, you must remember that.
Get up and pour into the street to bring the war criminals home.
Of course this isn’t my site, but why is this published here? We’ve seen all these lies and distortions many times, hundreds of times, and they don’t make a whit more sense now than they did before. The fact that this guy, whatever his glossy state department credentials, is maybe a ‘moderate’ in the current scheme of things in the foreign policy establishment doesn’t magically turn his sack of disinformation into gold. All it demonstrates is how insane the foreign policy mainstream truly is, and the CRUCIAL NECESSITY FOR HAVING THE COURAGE TO CALL OUT THE LIES AND DISTORTIONS. How many times does the point have to be made that we have seen this movie before?!!!
If Fitzgerald is a ‘moderate’ thinker, than we are far closer to war than one feared.
There’s really no point to taking Fitzgerald’s reeking ‘argument’ apart, since it makes no more sense than the Iraq arguments we all remember. Even if Iran HAD a bomb, it would make no difference that anyone needs to be concerned about, UNLESS they intend to attack Iran. All Iran would have would be a deterrent and barely that.
But in any case, there is no evidence worth taking seriously that Iran IS seeking a bomb. At most, we can IMAGINE that they MIGHT be seeking some degree of capability or knowledge. Even if that’s true, that would be their right, and that would undoubtedly put them in the same group as every single military on earth of any size. My God, these people would have to do SOME research at least to have an idea of what someone else might have pointed at them (and in Iran’s case, both the US and Israel have in fact threatened them with nuclear attack). But there’s very little reason to believe that Iran has even done signifigant research, to a point where we need to be seriously concerned.
In fact, the context of this whole (non)issue, the context that NO ONE seems to ever care to mention, is that Iran’s attempts to develope civilian nuclear power have been blocked by the US at every turn, and it is more and more obvious that Russia too has been dragging its feet in fulfilling its nuclear contracts with Iran, to the point where it might as well be said that Russia too is blocking Iran. In other words, these two nations that BOTH accuse Iran of having an enriched uranium stockpile in order to make bombs, have BOTH been most of the reason that Iran is sitting on a stockpile for which it cannot demonstrate a use. The screaming hypocrisy of both the US and Russia here are Mafia like. But oh, we dare not call it out for what it is, for august personages with glossy state department credentials declare very solemnly…yes, much as they did when they were driving us to war with Iraq and were prepared to indulge any lie and distortion to ‘get ‘er done’.
Fitzgerald reiterates the false claim that Iran rejected the original swap deal. Of course he knows that isn’t true, that Iran accepted the deal in principle, but immediately proffered serious and legitimate reservations and possible fixes, which were rejected out of hand, and really quite viciously, by Obama. As Fitzgerald knows, that’s not negotiation. Negotiation is when the folks on the other side of the table come back to you with issues and ways to deal with those issues, and you look them over and make counteroffers that take those issues seriously and seek to close gaps in reasonable ways. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT TURKEY AND BRAZIL DID. They worked out with Iran a proposal that compromised between Iran’s concerns and the US position. Turkey and Brazil showed how diplomacy is really done, and showed that what the US has been doing has NOT been diplomacy.
One can go on and on. Fitzgerald also regurgitates the lie that Iran has insisted on enriching to 20%. As he knows, that’s not true. Iran has made it clear that it will continue to enrich to 20% until an agreement has been finalized on the swap. This is an entirely reasonable position, and NOT the unreasonable ‘danger sign’ that Fitzgerald pretends it to be.
Again, Fitzgerald speaks of the importance of making sure that Iran doesn’t have enough enriched uranium on hand to be a bomb threat. As he knows, Iran’s stockpile is under careful IAEA observation. In the extremely unlikely event that Iran decided to make a bomb, the process would be very public, and would be long and drawn out – and to make the whole brouhaha about this even more absurd, THEY WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED TO PRACTISE A LITTLE, dontcha think? Yes, of course they would. Enough uranium for one bomb or two would not be enough.
Point after point made by this supposed moderate is simply absurd. This kind of foreign policy ‘thinking’ would be fine if we were all living in a Cirque de Soleil world, I suppose. In such a world, Israel could drop all the bombs it wanted on Iran and they would all turn into flowers. The US and EU could ‘cripple’ Iran with sanctions and they would all turn into dancing contortionists. The US could send a massive fleet to possibly confront Iran in the Straits of Hormuz and it would all be a marvelous tumbling act on the highwire.
But if we aren’t living in a Cirque de Soleil world, then we shouldn’t dignify Fitz and his lying Sack of Verbal Crap.
The Leverettes are going to have to learn that if they really want to be supporters of truth, they cannot continue to dance with those who are attacking truth, every damn day, day after day. At some point, you cannot maintain your good standing in the world that circulates lies until they become ‘facts’ upon which ‘crippling’ sanctions and wars are based. Iran has the same rights as any other nation. The situation is really not more complicated than that, in the end.
Israel lies when says “Iran is a threat”. In fact, the threat is coming from Israel against all countries in the region including Iran. Israel uses the ZIONIST MEDIA to mislead people in the West.
Israel always turns the facts on its head and sells the victims as aggressors to the ignorant people. A good example is presentation of Palestinians as aggressors, and Zionist war mongers as victims.
Israel and the United States are trying to expand their influence through Wars. Israel is using Israel lobby to wage a war against Iran, similar to Iraq war.
Obama is following the order. Daniel Pipes has told Obama he should stage a military attack on Iran to ‘improve’ his position for the next election, otherwise he will not be elected for the second time. There is NO LEADER in Washington to be able to correct the policy regarding Iran, then; Obama may find Pipes’ suggestion attractive to go for it.
Israel’s aim is to establish ‘greater Israel’ where goes from Mauritania to Afghanistan. Zionist project is not limited to Palestine. Israel is NOT INTERESTED IN PIECE; therefore, she goes for war.
Israel is using ‘security’ concern as a pretext to refuse peace. In fact between the two parties, are Palestinians who MUST BE CONCERNED WITH SECURITY against Israel who has more than 300 nuclear bombs.
@Richard Steven Hack:
Over all I agree with you when you say: “And being proven to have one or several nuclear weapons – and they would have to be found out because at least one weapon would have to be tested, which could not be concealed – would cause them no end of regional diplomatic issues which might hamper their growing regional influence.”
Any country when considers an “option”, looks at the pros and cons. The cons of Iran literally going the extra mile (or inch) and make one or a few nuclear war heads outweights the pros by a lot. Which is why I have no doubt that the Iranian leadership is not after making a few (or even one) war head.
However, I disagree with you when you say:”Why? Simply because they are so far behind that it would do them absolutely no good. They will never catch up to either Israel or Pakistan, let alone the US, in terms of number of and ability to deliver nuclear weapons.”
Iran’s main security threat is not from Pakistan. It is from US/Israel. And Israel because of its miniscule size is litterally a “one-bomb state”.
If Iran were after attacking or bullying Israel, I would agree with you. There is no way that Iran could catch up with Israel/US in a nuclear weapons race.
But that is NOT Iran’s concern. Iran’s main concern is to break the shackles of US/Israeli “hegemony” in this region. Therefore it’s main concern is to have a “viable” deterent. And less than 5 war heads with the means of delivery is far more than enough for that purpose irrespective of howmany hundreds of war heads US/Israel has..
My personal opinion is that Iran doesn’t even want a “breakout capability”. To be more precise, I think that Iran’s MILITARY has an interest in acquiring the KNOWLEDGE to have a breakout capability and HAD at one point a nuclear weapons database research project. This would obviously be within the purview of ANY military organization threatened as Iran is by more than one nuclear power (Israel and the US) and close other nuclear capable countries (Pakistan).
However, I do not believe that the Iranian leadership has at this time any interest in either a nuclear weapons development AND DEPLOYMENT program or even a nuclear weapons breakout capability.
Why? Simply because they are so far behind that it would do them absolutely no good. They will never catch up to either Israel or Pakistan, let alone the US, in terms of number of and ability to deliver nuclear weapons. And being proven to have one or several nuclear weapons – and they would have to be found out because at least one weapon would have to be tested, which could not be concealed – would cause them no end of regional diplomatic issues which might hamper their growing regional influence. And I think that regional influence is far more important to them than even worrying about regime change efforts by the US and Israel – which is the only value they would get from having one or a few nuclear weapons.
Bottom line: Iran’s military may have had a nuclear weapons research program, but they stopped that in 2003. And the only evidence we have of even that level of program comes from a tainted laptop and interpretations of SIGINT. And Iran does not now have and never has had a nuclear weapons development and deployment program.
Sadly, Fitzpatrick’s case seems bounded by the same blinders as the US government: “Iran is determined to have a nuclear-weapons capability, something the West is just as determined to deny.”
Instead of seeing what it would take to reach a solution, they just presume that negotiations will fail.
I believe that Iran would bound its nuclear ambitions at peaceful purposes (energy and medical), if the nuclear club would GUARANTEE delivery of nuclear fuel. That would mean that the nuclear club could not hold the TRR hostage to Iran’s bending to its will. Russia could not pursue and “off and on” development at Bushehr. Of course, they would need to accept the fact taht Iran would need to maintain a backup enrichment capability to ensure that the nuclear club was faithful to its guarantees. But Iran’s internal stock could be negotiated to be limited to the amount of fuel needed for its peaceful purposes at its reactors.
By refusing to entertain the possibility of such an outcome, Fitzpatrick and the Washington establishment preclude it from happening.
Also, by refusing to separate politics from commercial delivery of nuclear fuel delivery, the nuclear club is inviting anyone who consumes nuclear fuel to enrich their own, else be subject to blackmail by the nuclear club, a profoundly stupid policy.
There are people, Cyrus comes to mind first, who disagree with my emphasis on break-out capability. Pointing out that besides what I consider the strategic benefits of being able, like Japan, in an emergency that hopefully will never occur, to pull out of the NPT and build a weapon, Iran would also need to be able to store substantial quantities of LEU in any unfettered nuclear industry.
Iran 1) could import uranium from more reliable sources in the global south and enrich it themselves rather than depending on the West and maybe even more important, 2) could provide nuclear fuel to other countries, importing unprocessed uranium from, maybe, Niger and exporting fuel suitable for reactors in, maybe Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt and/or Venezuela. And Iran would be happy to do so on better terms the Russia is willing today, without being as susceptible to Western political pressure as Argentina.
To reach those goals, the United States is going to have to, one way or another, come to terms with the idea that Iran is a regular nuclear capable country like Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina or Japan. The US will never come to terms if Iran submits now and accepts a proposition from someone like Mark Fitzpatrick that there is an arbitrary limit on how much uranium it can host on its own soil.
There is a point to that argument. Either way as a sovereign nation, both for reasons of applying nuclear technology and attaining strategic advantages, Iran has an obligation to its population and the leaders and people of later Iranian generations to resist the conditions Fitzpatrick would impose on Iran’s nuclear program today.
Aha – Britain’s IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) another ‘Islamophobe’ pro-Israeli think tank. It is no different than the Foreign Policy (FP) or CFR. There job is to prepare the American public for Obama’s next war on the Islamic Repulic. Last year IISS warned in a report that in four years Iran “could be able to target London” (not Tel Aviv mind you) with missiles. The claim comes as Iran tested the Fajr-5 missile.
On June 15, 2010 – the Wall Street Journal (listed as an Israel Hasbara Committee member) published an Israeli propaganda crap,written by Zionist Jew Senator Joe Lieberman, chairman Senate Homeland Security Committee. In the ‘opinion’ Joe Lieberman claims that America’s real enemy is “violent Islamist extremism”.
I am sure, ‘Mr. Israel’, cannot be so ignorant of the fact that since the creation of Israel – most of terrorist acts against the US were carried out by the Jewish extremists and not the ‘Islamist extremists’. To name a few Jewish terrorism; Lavon Affair (1954), President John F. Kennedy’d assassination (1963), USS Liberty attack (1967), Operation Trojan (1986), Pan Am 103 bombing (1988), 9/11 (2001), AA Flight 587 (2001), Bali bombing (2002 & 2005), Madrid train bombing (2004), USS Cole bombing (2000), Nigerian underwear bomber (2009), Time Square hoax (2010) and unlimited other false-flage operations…….
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/06/20/lieberman-whos-the-enemy-in-the-war-on-terror/
I don’t understand why Leveretts are presenting Mark Fitzpatrick’s article here. Are they trying to form misleading opinion for more informed people at this site to bring them on board for the war criminals in Wahsinton?
SCOTT RITTER HAS EXPOSED THE POSITION OF WAR CRIMINALS AND THEIR STOOGES IN WASHINGTON WHEN HE WRITES:
This is why the Obama administration never paid much attention to the details of such a swap, since these details simply didn’t matter. The U.S. approach was never about facilitating a swap so much as it was about facilitating a kidnapping. The policy objective was to get the majority of Iran’s enriched uranium stocks under international control. Once Iran no longer had access to 1,600 kilograms of its 1,800-kilogram stockpile of low-enriched uranium, the Obama administration could blunt the fear-driven concerns over the immediacy of any Iranian nuclear capability. It would take Iran several months to reconstitute its low-enriched uranium stocks to the level needed to produce its hypothetical nuclear bomb. During this period, the U.S. would redouble its demands for suspension of uranium enrichment and develop a comprehensive package of stringent economic sanctions that would be imposed on Iran should it fail to cooperate.
http://www.truthdig.com/report/print/the_end_of_obamas_vision_of_a_nuke_free_world_20100216/
James, meant to add this:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66032/james-m-lindsay-and-ray-takeyh/after-iran-gets-the-bomb
James, Iran’s stock of uranium does have a use. The use Ray Takeyh was talking about when he said:
They do offer a deterrent capability: unlike Saddam’s Iraq, a nuclear Iran would not be invaded, and its leaders would not be deposed.
A break-out capability is both legal, in line with international precedent, and very strategically useful.
Notes about “Iran: The Fragile Promise of the Fuel Swap Plan”:
1) The agreement in principle: By the time of the Vienna meeting, Iran pointedly did not accept the terms offered. By that point, it is clearly not true to say there was an agreement in principle. Before that, for example at the October 1 meeting in Geneva, it is not clear that the terms had been spelled out fully – an agreement in principle means an agreement subject to the satisfactory determination of specific details. It is not breaking an agreement in principle to not make the agreement if details cannot be resolved to a side’s satisfaction.
2) “accepts enrichment only under terms that reduce the potential for weapons production”: Does this mean limit its stock to less than one ton of LEU?
This raises a bunch of questions about nuclear weapons capability. The first one is that the argument that nuclear weapons capability is perfectly legal, that Japan and Brazil have it seems to be met by the United States with “we don’t care”. We’ve engineered these security council resolutions and Iran, because we say so, is a special case.
The second is now, what makes up nuclear capability? It seems to me that if Iran has a stock of two tons or so of LEU and is continuously enriching, it has nuclear capability to a degree unacceptable to the United States. Nothing Iran could do in terms of signing, ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocols, no questions Iran can answer, nothing within Iran’s power will cause the United States to accept Iran having more than two tons of LEU and ongoing enrichment.
3) The current fuel load made by Argentina and delivered in 1993: When was it ordered, how long did it take to be produced and delivered? 1993 was also after the 1984 bombing. Why was Argentina willing in 1993 to deliver fuel but not 2010? It seems more like a pretext to follow the US lead than the actual reason for Argentina’s current refusal to refuel the reactor.
4) According to the article, it will take a few years for Iran to make its own fuel. This touches a central contradiction of the US position. If a deal is actually struck, and fuel is actually delivered, then when this fuel runs out, will the US be in a position to try to get more concessions because Iran was not able to enrich its own uranium to 20%?
5) The US foreign policy is so wrong about the domestic pressures that Ahmadinejad faced by fall 2009. According to the only poll evidence we have, 90% of Iranians do not accept that the election was fraudulent. Mousavi has not produced evidence that the election was fraudulent. While many of Mousavi’s supporters were willing to trust that evidence would come later the month of the election, by the time this deal was under consideration, Mousavi was probably no longer a factor in Iranian politics.
The Fordow facility was also not some lever of pressure on Iran. Also it has not been established that Iran waited until it learned that some secret had been discovered. The known timeline is that Iran made a report to the IAEA of the facility which is publicly known to have caught the Obama administration by surprise, and Obama stitched together a clearly unplanned presentation “exposing” the plant after Iran made its report to the IAEA but before that report became public. Obama did not credit the IAEA as a source for this supposedly scandalous revelation.
I remember reading at the time that US nuclear policy community thought this revelation would force Iran to accept US terms for exporting its uranium, but that was wrong then and now, as events have proven. It is, from Iran’s point of view, not a big deal. There is no uranium in the facility.
6) For France “each load would take about a year to manufacture”: This just sounds like a lie. There is not a less blunt way to put it. France is able to produce fuel at a rate of 40kgs a year?
I’ll get a link if anyone asks, but Erdogan says he was told by the French that they could make the fuel in 10 months. Is Erdogan lying? And France really can’t make fuel faster than 40kgs a year?
7) “France’s reluctant agreement came with a strict condition the LEU would have to be exported in one batch before the end of the year”: Again this seems like games. More importantly, under the terms presented in 2009, once the fuel is out, Iran cannot get it back. It would be in IAEA custody but the West specifically objects to the term in the May 2010 agreement with Turkey and Brazil that Iran retains ownership of the fuel and can recall it if the West does not deliver the fuel.
8) Calculating Iran’s uranium production by your numbers: August 2008 Iran had 400kgs. October 2009 it had 1600 kgs. Feb 1 2010 it had 2065 kgs. So from August 2008 to October 2009 Iran produced about 85kgs per month and from October 2009 to Feb 2010 Iran produced about 115kgs per month. The amount of centrifuges has remained steady and the rate of 115kgs per month is about the rate Iran had reached by summer 2009 before the deal came into consideration, correct?
9) Did anyone in the US expect Iran to race for a nuclear weapon in 2010? I’ve always found the US insistence that the rationale behind the deal is to prevent a short-term weapons option suspicious. Unless the US has plans I don’t know about to bomb Iran before the medical fuel is delivered, I don’t see what would make the US think preventing a short-term weapon option matters. Nobody I’ve read seriously thinks Iran is building a weapon in the short term.
10) The US’ “substantial political assurances” that the deal would be completed, according to the letter to Lula, is a declaration of support for the agreement. That is very underwhelming.
11) Iran will not accept limitations that would impede a break-out capability – but neither would Japan, Brazil, Germany and I can go on an on with that list. Break-out capability is legal. The question is, will the US live with Iran having break-out capability under conditions of sanctions and hostility or conditions of greater cooperation. If the point is to get Iran to accept limitations that would impede break-out capability (as a special case only for countries in Israel’s region) that point would not have been achieved in 2003, 2010 or ever, most likely. But Iran would have agreed in 2006 to a progression to break-out capability slower and possibly less robust than it would today.
12) The fundamental purpose of the proposal was not the prevent Iran from getting a break-out capability, at least from Iran’s point of view. Honestly in early October, I thought what the proposal did was allow Iran to make a gesture towards the US of exporting uranium that would allow the US to declare victory while accepting the reality that Iran cannot be prevented from gaining a what Fitzpatrick is here describing as a break-out capability – or a stock on its soil of more than a ton of uranium and ongoing enrichment.
It is important to reiterate that break-out capability, as Fitzpatrick uses it here, is completely independent of answering questions about laptops of death or ratifying the additional protocols. These are pretexts to accomplish a strategic goal that Fitzpatrick does not explain why it is so important to deny Iran a break-out capability.
13) The slippery slope from 20% to 90%. In a way, the higher the level of enrichment, the more robust a break-out option uranium could provide. On the other hand, with its safeguards in place, Iran would not be able to break out without leaving the NPT according to its rights outlined in that treaty. The AP, which Iran agrees to ratify if its enrichment program and break-out capability are accepted, provides further verification.
14) So here we see that Iran is technologically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon in a few years. So what is the importance of Iran exporting all of its uranium at once? What makes it unacceptable for Iran to retain ownership of the uranium and have the right to recall its uranium if the deal is not met as the West complains in its letter to the IAEA regarding the Brazil/Turkey agreement?
15) The December 2009 document about neutron initiators could well have been forged. I’ll dig up a link about that report if anyone asks.
16) A new NIE that will not be made public raises the question of why was the last one was made public. It seems to me that it was a deliberate effort by the Bush administration to provide a tangible assurance to Iran that it was sincere in working to reduce hostility – caused by the fact that the US needed Iranian cooperation in Iraq.
17) If Iran intended to use Fordow as a clandestine enrichment plant 1) when was it supposedly going to start? Why had it not started already 2) Iran’s converted uranium is also under safeguard. What was it going to enrich, whenever Fitzpatrick thinks it was supposed to start enriching?
A better explanation for the Fordow plant is that it is a reserve to be activated if Natanz is bombed. And there may well be more plants like that, also in reserve, that are necessary as long as Obama continues to insist that bombing Natanz is on the table.
18) So Iran has high breakage of its centrifuges. Somehow or other, though, it is holding its LEU production at least steady, slightly increasing it since 2008.
19) Now here’s idea that the Green movement might take power in Iran and be more willing to accept limitations on Iran’s nuclear program that would deny it break-out capability.
Ray Takeyh says that if Iran had a nuclear capability, there would not be a feasible regime-change option available to the US. No independent or even self-respecting Iranian government would forgo an effective deterrent against US hostility as the US nuclear policy community admits a break-out capability is.
20) Let’s not be too congratulatory about Obama’s outreach to Iran. There have been bombings in Iran that may well have had foreign support. Obama’s policies toward Iran have not been any drastic improvement over Bush’s and in some ways are worse. Importantly the goal of preventing Iran from having a break-out capability is a common goal for both.
Recently, according to the New York Times, under Obama the US has emplaced a bureaucracy to conduct covert action in the Middle East, including Iran. There is the infamous $400 million for democracy promotion. Overall, Obama is quite hostile and belligerent with Iran.
21) Nobody believes Israel can act without US permission.
22) Iran’s stockpile must not be able to grow “too large”. Being coy about how large is acceptable and how large is unacceptable harms US interests. The Western insistence that Iran commit to a stockpile of under one ton, embodied in the October iterations of the TRR deal is by now a dead idea. I think that if not for the Balochistan bombing, it may have been possible – but we do have to acknowledge that this was a major event shaping Iranian perceptions at a key moment.
***
Overall I certainly expected the article to be worse. The key question is what does the US consider unacceptable break-out capability. I understand the problem that if the US publicly expresses a position, Iran will pass that, because passing it is legal. On the other hand, what Iran will be willing to accept in 2012, with 4 or 5 tons in its stock instead of 2 now, will more more than it would accept today. Aiming for zero enrichment, even if just publicly, just allows time to pass and Iran’s stock to grow.
It seems to me that Iran considers the sanctions it undergoes the payment for the stock it builds. So that Iran has already paid for two tons of uranium, for example in the political delays of Bushehr that it has endured. Stopping Iran from going to four tons will be easier than getting it to go back under two tons.
Second, it is not clear that the US is able to negotiate with Iran in good faith. If we accept that domestic considerations prevented Obama from stating in October that the US can accept Iranian enrichment, then after Iran has committed, will those same domestic considerations prevent Obama from actually striking the deal he may have been talking about?
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the US is going to have to choose between Iran and Israel. There is a large degree to which he is right. Israel will continue to pressure any US administration toward both zero enrichment and the hostility that follows from that demand that Iran will not accept. Unless the US becomes able to withstand that pressure, and Obama has not show such a capability to at all, the US cannot hope for anything but hostility with Iran.
Arnold,
Why would you regard it as unnacceptable for Iran to keep its stock of LEU to under one ton? None of the LEU has any use, for years to come.
Fiorangela,
Bravo for challenging the unquestioned acceptance of the so-called “existential threat” that clearly seems a pretext for an unjustified military attack on Iran.
Arnold,
My understanding is that Iran is unable to create the fuel rods or plates needed for the TRR, even if it enriches sufficient 20% U.
You will remember that Iran stressed for years it was only enriching U to 5% or lower, for the electrical power generating stations. Even at that, Bushehr #2 will not come online for years, and #1 is being fueled by Russia.
James, 20% is not qualitatively different from 4.5 percent. The fact of the matter is that the United States intends to impose conditions on Iran getting reactor fuel, and if left to their own devices, those conditions would be unacceptable to Iran. The US would love to see an Iranian full suspension as a condition, whether expressed or de-facto of receiving the fuel.
At this point, it looks like the only way the Tehran reactor will get fuel without unacceptable conditions such as, at the very minimum, exporting nearly two tons of uranium and holding its stock below one ton indefinitely, will be for Iran to make the fuel itself. If it is going to do that, or if there is a possibility it may have to do that, which more than exists now, Iran could not prudently refrain from enriching to 20% now.
More after I’ve read the articles though.
Fitzpatrick makes the same fatal error in analysis that Stephen Kinzer makes when discussing his new book, “Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future.” Both gentlemen treat Israel as both a rational actor and as an infantilized state whose perpetual claims of “existential threat” are worthy of being taken seriously.
Fitzpatrick writes: “Israel is likely to carry out a military strike if it judges that Iran’s nucler programme presents an existential threat. The deeply held view in Israel is that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable and must be prevented by any means necessary.”
Fitzpatrick apparently takes Israel’s assessment and the attendant threat at face value, an astonishing failure of critical analysis given that matters of life and death for millions of people hang in the balance.
If Fitzpatrick had explored the nature of the “existential threat” that Israel claims a nuclear Iran represents, he would have discovered that numerous of Israel’s leaders, from Tzipi Livni to Ephraim Halevey, have dismissed the notion that a nuclear Iran poses an “existential threat.”
Livni behind closed doors: Iran nukes pose little threat to Israel
“Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said a few months ago in a series of closed discussions that in her opinion that Iranian nuclear weapons do not pose an existential threat to Israel, Haaretz magazine reveals in an article on Livni to be published Friday.
Livni also criticized the exaggerated use that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is making of the issue of the Iranian bomb, claiming that he is attempting to rally the public around him by playing on its most basic fears. Last week, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy said similar things about Iran. ”
Olmert’s tactic has mushroomed to the point that the Israeli public functions in a cloud of fear and hate; Israeli-born clinical psychologist Avigail Abarbenal says of Israeli society:
” Fear of annihilation is at the heart of Jewish, not just Israeli culture and it pre-dates the Holocaust. But the climate in Israel today is far more extreme than it was in my time, as Israel on the whole moves further and further to an irrational fanatic position.
“When a person’s perception of reality is completely out of touch with reality itself, we begin to get an uneasy feeling that something might be wrong with his or her mind. Where is the evidence that the Jews, right now are facing a “real danger of complete annihilation”?
{snip}
“To ignore Israel’s psychology is dangerous because it means that any intervention based only on political considerations, will miss the mark and risk being irrelevant. Indeed if you look at the history of diplomacy and ‘peace negotiations’ in the region, it is quite obvious that they have achieved nothing at all. Things seem to be progressing on a trajectory determined by something that to someone in my profession, looks more like a mental illness than a political plan, bearing no relation to any rational diplomatic efforts, ‘roadmaps’, peace plans or truces.”
In another essay, titled, “Israel’s Trauma Psychology and the Attack on Gaza, Abarbenal wrote:
“One of the things that is not being discussed much in the media is how much talk there is in Israel about attacking Iran. Word on the (Israeli) street is that an air attack on Iran’s nuclear reactors is imminent.
Israel has been itching for a ‘good war’ for a while now. The botched attack on Lebanon in 2006 was a psychological disappointment that did not fulfill its purpose, and only led to a deepening chasm between the political and military arms in Israel. An Israeli friend told me in disgust the other day, that there is an atmosphere of ‘national orgasm’ in Israel about the prospect of attacking Iran. While people are being bombed in Gaza, all Israelis can talk about is the coming attack on Iran. But there is a link between the two.
{snip}
“Israel and perhaps the rest of the world too, refuse to see that Israel’s problems are a direct result of deep-seated Jewish trauma and its consequences. Israel’s response to trauma was to arm itself to the teeth, and to become an incredibly aggressive country while perpetuating inside and out the myth of victimhood and goodness. As a psychotherapist I recognise this reaction to trauma. Some people who have been traumatised respond to it by becoming very powerful and very frightening. This is a reaction to having been hurt, and a response to the desire to never be hurt again.
Unfortunately this isn’t a good or wholesome way to live. This is a way of life that perpetuates inner conflicts, leads to isolation and invites animosity from others. It’s hard to spread good will and kindness in the world when one’s inner world is based on an adversarial foundation. What is true for individuals can also be true for whole societies. Israel had a chance to heal its traumatised Jewish past but instead chose to perpetuate the trauma and pass it on to subsequent generations. The very creation of the state of Israel is a reaction to trauma. If you understand the dynamic of trauma and the solutions people try to find to it you can understand why Israel’s existence has always been fraught with trouble. The fact that Israel has never used its education system and national institutions to facilitate healing from trauma is sad but not unusual. Trauma becomes so much a part of the sufferer’s identity, that to heal means to change the very foundation of who you are, something most people, let alone entire cultures are rarely prepared to do.”
(http www dot avigailabarbanel dot me.uk/growing-insanity.html and
http www dot avigailabarbanel dot me.uk/gaza-2009-01-04.html)
Ian Lustick, Jewish American professor of political science at University of Pennsylvania, agrees with Livni’s charge that Israel’s leaders persistently “retraumatize” Israelis in a “kind of death cult,” and with Abarbenal’s assessment that Israelis live in a constant state of PTSD. http www edmaysproductions net/webvideo/irannuke wmv
Echoing Livni’s assessment, Iran, with or without nukes, is not the problem; Israel’s traumatized psyche is the problem.
As Trita Parsi detailed in “Treacherous Alliance,” a triangle of tensions characterizes the interrelationship of Iran, Israel, and the US. The pivot-point of those tensions is the Israeli psyche, not an “existential threat” emanating from Iran. If Israel were to bomb Iran tomorrow, killing thousands or tens of thousands and turning the entire region into a cauldron of devastation and suffering, by next week Israelis would emerge from the euphoric phase that such violence evokes in a traumatized people and spiral into a new depression that could be slaked only by enacting more violence on yet another “existential threat.”
In short, like most western analysts of the Iran-Israel cycle of enmity, Fitzpatrick bases his entire argument on the unexplored assumption that IRAN is responsible for, and can resolve, Israel’s “existential” angst. He fails to address the foundational issue in the entire conflict: the nature of Israeli trauma psychology.
When Stephen Kinzer discusses his new book, he tells the story of how his daughter reminded him of Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity: “Insanity is doing the same thing and expecting different results.” Giving Israel yet more money to buy weapons (as Obama and the Congress did in the past month) and punishing those that Israel perceives to be “existential threats” has been tried again and again and again over the past decades; Israel feels not only less secure and “existentially threatened,” it exhibits signs of greater insecurity; double insanity.
Israel must be isolated from consideration in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. In that isolated state, the world community must come together to, first, demand that Israel stop killing people as a way to solve its problems, and second, try to heal Israel’s badly damaged sense of self.
Iran and her neighbors and friends have demonstrated the capacity to cooperate rationally in resolving momentous issues. The US and its allies, minus Israel, should seek to join those negotiations rather than disrupt them. With Israel removed from the calculus while Israel heals its soul and psyche, the region holds every promise of developing on the course of cooperating national sovereigns that Israel’s and Iran’s neighbors first sought at the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the end of the last “great” war.
In the six decades since the end of World War II, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria have moved on to create new national identities that are oriented to the future. Israel desperately needs to do the same.
Well, thanks Mr. Fitzpatrick, Leveretts, Mr. Katcher and everyone involved in getting this out. I have questions and comments before I even read it, but I’ll hold off, and 1) reiterate my appreciation and 2) express hope that Mr. Fitzpatrick and maybe others in the US nuclear policy community may participate in the comments.
I agree with Fitzpatrick Iran makes a serious mistake by enriching U to 20%, at this time. Iran has demonstrated its ability, and more 20% enrichment only plays directly into the hands of those who demonise Iran for ulterior reasons having nothing to do with the nuclear programme.
Last figure I saw was 7.8kg of 20% U enriched by Iran.