***We are pleased that this piece is also published on www.ForeignPolicy.com***
The standing of Iran’s so-called Green Movement is a deeply serious matter, with potentially profound implications for America’s Iran policy. Since the Islamic Republic’s June 12, 2009 presidential election, it has become widely accepted among Iran analysts in the United States and the Western political class more broadly that the emergence of the Green Movement in the wake of that election represents a fundamental challenge to Iran’s current political order.
As we have discussed previously, the Obama Administration is increasingly incorporating “support” for the Green Movement as a factor in its policymaking calculations about Iran. Congress is now becoming engaged with legislative proposals to make “regime change” the explicit goal of America’s Iran policy and to provide material support for Iranian oppositionists—just as Congress and President Clinton enacted the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, formally defining regime change as the goal of America’s Iraq policy and providing a wide range of material assistance to Iraqi opposition groups.
But, if the Green Movement is not what many Iran analysts and other foreign policy and political pundits have cracked it up to be, adopting such a policy course with regard to Iran would be, to recall Talleyrand’s memorable observation, “worse than a crime”; it would be a “mistake”—a mistake with potentially devastating consequences for the United States and its interests in one of the most strategically vital parts of the world. We have argued since last June that the Green Movement is not the ascendant political force that its Western champions would have us believe.
Recent events in Iran provide further evidence for the proposition that the movement, in fact, is fading fast into strategic irrelevance. Yesterday, March 16, was celebrated in Iran as chahār shanbeh sūri—an ancient Persian festival marking the beginning of preparations for the celebration of Nowruz, the traditional Persian New Year, on March 21. (Chahār shanbeh sūri means “Wednesday” in Farsi, and sūri means both “festival” and “red”; the celebration of chahār shanbeh sūri takes place on the eve of the last Wednesday of the Persian calendar year.) Chahār shanbeh sūri, like Nowruz itself, marks not only the turn of the Persian New Year but also the revival of spring. From time immemorial, Iranians have celebrated the holiday with fire—making bonfires and jumping over them or, in the modern period, shooting off firecrackers. (Some of our Iranian friends complain about how much money their kids compel them to spend each year on fireworks to celebrate chahār shanbeh sūri.) Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, there has always been some measure of tension between the Islamic Republic’s religious worldview and the Iranian public’s enthusiasm for observing chahār shanbeh sūri, which is clearly pre-Islamic in its origins. But, each year, Iranians continue to celebrate chahār shanbeh sūri to mark the beginning of their New Year holidays. In recent years, some Iranians have gone beyond the limits of the law in their celebrations—just last year, there were reports of younger people burning tires and garbage bins and even tossing Molotov cocktails at police.
Both in Iran and outside the country, Green Movement partisans anticipated that, this year, chahār shanbeh sūri would be an occasion for the movement to show the depth and breadth of its social support and recover from its failure to elicit overt demonstrations of popular support on February 11, the anniversary of the Islamic Republic’s founding. In the run up to the February 11 observance this year, Green Movement supporters talked about how the movement would mobilize hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people in the streets of Tehran, marking the “beginning of the end” of the Islamic Republic. But February 11 came and went with very small numbers of actual protestors on the streets. (It was this result which prompted our favorite sentence in Michael Crowley’s recent effort to critique our work on Iran in The New Republic; after summarizing our analysis of Iranian domestic politics since the June 12, 2009 presidential election, Crowley seemed to feel obliged to write, “It’s not obvious that this analysis is wrong—especially in the wake of a disappointing Green turnout…on the anniversary of the 1979 Iranian revolution.”)
Iranian contacts tell us that, this year, chahār shanbeh sūri was quieter than usual—almost certainly because, a few days before, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a public statement reiterating that the holiday had no basis in the Islamic religion and prompted various types of “harm and corruption” that it would be “appropriate” to avoid. And, once again, a major public commemoration or holiday has taken place in Iran, and the Green Movement has failed to make its presence felt to any significant degree. According to The Guardian, which had a live blog providing “real time” coverage of events on Tuesday afternoon and evening in Tehran, the Tehran fire department reported 164 “incidents” or calls for “fire service”, some involving homemade fireworks; perhaps a few dozen people were arrested, but without any clear indication that they were arrested for political protest as opposed to apolitical rowdiness. Even pro-Green Movement journalists like Nazila Fathi of The New York Times had to acknowledge that “given the traditional pyrotechnics of the occasion, [the] number [of people reported injured] was not unusual”.
Still, opposition websites tried to present the participation of thousands of people in these celebrations as a sign of the Green Movement’s “success”, while Nazila Fathi proclaimed from, we presume, Toronto, in a completely unsourced lead that should not have survived responsible editing, that “Iranians defied a ban on events marking a traditional festival on Tuesday, turning an annual celebration into a show of antigovernment sentiment”. One of our Iranian friends compared this to the Green Movement calling on people to drive around Tehran during rush hour and then claiming “victory” because of the traffic. The Guardian concluded that, all in all, “the opposition must be disappointed not to have witnessed a greater show of strength”.
Clearly, the Green Movement is not, at this point, a social force with any significant potential to impose fundamental change on the Islamic Republic’s political order by operating “outside” that order. Events on the ground continue to confirm our assessment that the social base for the Green Movement is shrinking, not growing. Most Iranians, it seems, lead normal lives, focused on their families, jobs, their children’s educations, etc., and are not attracted by the prospect of sustained political and social disruption. Even those Iranians who want to see the Islamic Republic evolve in ways that Westerners might see as more “liberal” are not hankering for another revolution.
The future course of Iranian politics will be charted within the parameters of the Islamic Republic, not by efforts to overthrow it. Of course, there are individual political figures and political factions that associated themselves with Mir Hossein Mousavi’s presidential candidacy and, later on, with the Green Movement and who will continue to play roles in Iranian politics. But these political figures and factions have not helped themselves by their association with the Green Movement. For reformists, in particular, their performance in the run up to and the aftermath of the Islamic Republic’s June 12, 2009 presidential election will be an additional burden for them to overcome as they attempt to regain greater salience in Iranian politics.
As we noted earlier this month, after our return from a visit to Tehran, “there is no significant elite challenge to the current political structure”. Mousavi is increasingly marginalized. This week, with Nowruz looming, Mousavi could only note on his website that “we have to call the next year the year of patience and endurance until the aims of the Green Movement are achieved”. But, at this juncture, what, precisely, are those aims, and how do “patience and endurance” constitute a strategy for achieving them? Former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi has even less of a public following than Mousavi. Former President Khatami has already demonstrated during his career that he does not want to challenge the core constitutional elements of the Islamic Republic’s political order; in recent weeks, he has been largely silent in public.
With regard to former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current head of both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council, we wrote as early as last June that it was foolhardy for Western analysts to hypothesize that he was prepared to challenge fundamentally the authority of Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader or lead a behind-the-scenes effort to remove him. The personal ties of the two men go back too far to permit that, and their political ties have been forged and tested across long periods of great adversity. That forecast was absolutely on the money; while we were in Tehran late last month, the Assembly of Experts convened for one of its regular, twice-a-year meetings. In his opening address, Rafsanjani said clearly that “those who care for the revolution must clarify their position vis-à-vis supporters of regime change and opponents of the Supreme Leader, and must regard him as the center of unity” (emphasis added).
This analysis will, no doubt, prove discomfiting, even disturbing for many who read it. But it is correct, which is the only test that should matter where analytic judgments are concerned.
The record of most Western analysts in interpreting and predicting the course of Iranian politics since the Islamic Republic’s June 12, 2009 presidential election has been, to put it gently, disappointing. It is also altogether too reminiscent of the analytic failures, wishful thinking, and determination to find a “smoking gun” when one did not exist that fed the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. To those Western analysts and political pundits who made their personal aspirations for the course of Iran’s political evolution the basis for their analytic judgments, we would respectfully ask, what is your evidence that the Green Movement is not shrinking before our eyes? What is your evidence that the Green Movement is capable of affecting political outcomes in the Islamic Republic over the next several months or even the next few years in a strategically significant way?
These questions matter, and need to be addressed seriously. The United States cannot afford more “mistakes” in the Middle East.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Dan Cooper – - An important report (bunker buster bombs being shipped to Diego Garcia). The US has supplied a large number of them to Israel, though not the deepest-penetrating type.
Most Americans are grossly ignorant of what is taking place, and most could not find Iran on a map of the Middle East.
I can’t blame inside-the-beltway functionaries like the Leveretts for reducing politics in Iran to the “hardliner” versus reformist polarity. After all, that simply extends what they might be used to in the USA, with its own two-party system. The odd thing is that this article got crossposted on the nominally Marxist website MRZine, where their apologias for Ahmadinejad get circulated routinely. For an analysis from real Marxists, I recommend this article by Mina Khanlarzadeh:
http://revolutionaryflowerpot.blogspot.com/2010/03/green-movement.html
Eric:
Iran as of today is making its own isotopes with the supply of reactor fuel it got in 1993 from Argentina which is projected to run out this year. I don’t think Iran is buying isotopes on the world market today.
There is an assumed link between a US plan to supply Iran with isotopes and Iran ceasing operation of the TRR and stopping efforts to enrich uranium to 20% because if there was not, it would not be a “plan”, it would just be a cash-price. What I mean is that sure, Iran is willing to pay cash to buy isotopes while it progresses toward making its own TRR fuel, but that option has all of the downsides of the status quo for the US as it relieves pressure the US may hope to exert by holding Iranian patients hostage.
The United States does not have to say it expects Iran to shut its efforts to make its own TRR fuel in exchange for the isotopes because otherwise the US would not be making the offer. But if the US is making the offer, I’m sure Iran will take it.
As to why Iran would continue working towards either getting TRR fuel so that it can make its own isotopes or making its own TRR fuel, that is substantially more reliable than foreign supplies, even if there was not a global shortage. Iran would get a 5 year supply according to ArmsControlWonk for its 1200 kgs of LEU, Kuperman, in his bomb Iran New York Times editorial said it would be a thirty year supply. ArmsControlWonk is nearly certainly right, but in five years Iran may well have its own domestic supply and never be reliant on foreign isotopes again.
Iran could not get a five year supply of isotopes, and so would be forced to repeatedly give its suppliers a means to pressure the country if it was to give up domestic isotope supply efforts. Giving the US a means to pressure the country means putting the US in a position where it is better placed to continue efforts to prevent all Iranian enrichment as is its goal today.
What westerners think about Iran’s program and how convincing westerners find Iran’s isotope arguments are very unimportant. Iran is not being attacked because Iran would harm the US in response to an attack. That is the only reason the US has not attacked yet and will not for the foreseeable future.
Hass,
“I think a better question to ask is why the US prevents the sale of the reactor rods for the TRR.”
Few doubt that the US will try to delay sales as long as possible. But even the US must recognize it cannot block Iran forever from obtaining fuel for the TRR. At some point, after all, Iran would get to play its “800,000 suffering patients” ace-in-the-hole.
So Iran needs only to ensure that it does not get compromised by the delay. I think the best way to accomplish that is to do exactly what it’s doing – enrich uranium to 20% and figure out how to make fuel plates – with just one added wrinkle: Offer to swap or sell its 20% uranium if and when Iran is actually permitted to buy fuel plates for the TRR (or to obtain them in some swap).
That sweetener would provide Iran just the answer it needs to my tough question posed earlier (“Why are you making it when you can just buy it?”):
“We’re making it because we haven’t actually been permitted to buy it yet, despite all the earnest assurances that we’ll be allowed to, and goodness knows we’ve tried. Let us know if and when that changes. We’ll have our checkbook ready, and we’ll also be happy to swap whatever 20% uranium we’ve got on hand when you call. In the meantime, we sure are learning a lot about how to refine uranium and make fuel plates!”
According to news reports, the U.S. military is shipping “bunker-buster” bombs to the U.S. Air Force base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The Herald Scotland reports that experts say the bombs are being assembled for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The newspaper quotes Dan Plesch, director of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the University of London: “They are gearing up totally for the destruction of Iran.” [Final destination Iran?, March 14, 2010]
The next step will be a staged “terrorist attack,” a “false flag” operation as per Operation Northwoods, for which Iran will be blamed. As Iran and its leadership have already been demonized, the “false flag” attack will suffice to obtain U.S. and European public support for bombing Iran. The bombing will include more than the nuclear facilities and will continue until the Iranians agree to regime change and the installation of a puppet government. The corrupt American media will present the new puppet as “freedom and democracy.”
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article25024.htm
If the past is a guide, Americans will fall for the deception.
Incidentally Eric I think a better question to ask is why the US prevents the sale of the reactor rods for the TRR. Once the 20% fuel is in rod or plate form, it no longer presents a weapons threat. By allowing Iran to refuel the reactor — which is also under IAEA safeguards — Iran would be capable of making the isotopes it needs, conserving a few million bucks that would otherwise be wasted on isotopes that would decay along the way if purchased and delivered from abroad, and would also allow Iran to establish its radio-nuclear medicine program that as a developing country, it badly needs. So had the US not prevented the refueling of the TRR, there would have been no need for Iran to enrich to 20% in the first place.
- Cyrus
Eric – that letter is not an exhaustive nor forthright exposition of the US position on Iran, which continues to be “zero enrichment” and always has been. The probably merely represents the min. it could get Russia to sign onto but left open the option for the US to insist on zero enrichment down the road. Reading an implicit acceptance of 5% enrichment just because the letter complains about 20% enrichment is just reaching too much. Remember, back in Aug 2007, Iran and the IAEA reached a “modalities agreement” to resolve a specific and exhaustive list of outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. By Feb 2008, the IAEA reported that all the issues on that list had in fact been resolved, with no evidence of a nuclear weapons program. The US said that Iran should comply with the modalities agreement, BUT also said that even Iran’s FULL COMPLIANCE with that agreement would still not suffice. (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,296242,00.html) See? Rope-a-dope. Same thing with this letter.
And anyway, why shouldn’t Iran make its own isotopes? Did you read the Forden excerpt I posted below?
Here is an interesting read in globalresearch. Why, those Iranians, they couldn’t possibly know what to do with their riches? Could they?
Finian Cunningham:
“In this context of a major realignment in the world’s energy economy – one where there will be a continuing diminished role for the US – Washington’s blustering rhetoric about democracy and peace and war on terror or alleged Iranian nuclear weapons can be seen as a desperate attempt to conceal its fear that it stands to be a big loser. Encircling Iran with wars and threatening gas supplies to possibly the world’s top future gas customer – China – is the real deal. US actions are more accurately seen as putting a knife to the energy arteries of a world economy that it will no longer be able to dominate.”
Read More here:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18176
Alan, in one of your posts you said: “Surely Iran can buy the isotopes…they’re doing it now…” Do you have a source for that? Where are they buying the isotopes from? Best regards and many thanks for your posts, Flynt and Hillary
Fiorangela,
“Eric Brill cautions that Sahimi is not to be trusted…”
I didn’t intend to impugn Dr. Sahimi’s integrity, which I have no reason to doubt. I just don’t think what he has to say is worth much attention. I should add I’ve had a few email exchanges with him regarding the 2009 election, so my impression is based not only on what he’s published. Perhaps I shouldn’t judge him on emails – we’d all probably suffer if others judged us by our emails.
Alan and Cyrus,
I finally tracked down the February 12 letter, which I’d not read in full until now.
The letter states no conditions at all. It refers to Iran’s continued violation of UN resolutions, but it doesn’t say that Iran’s right to make open-market purchases should be conditional on Iran complying with those UN resolutions. Nor does it even mention the US position that Iran is not entitled to enrich uranium at all. In fact, although the following sentence makes clear that the three countries disapprove of Iran’s enrichment of LEU to 20%, it implies that they are not complaining about Iran’s enrichment up to 5% (or whatever the LEU upper limit is):
“Iran’s enrichment of its LEU stockpile to higher levels is not only unnecessary, but would serve to further undermine the confidence of the international community in Iran’s actions.”
An earlier sentence also implies acceptance of up-to-5% enrichment:
“[Ahmadinejad's] February 7 announcement that Iran will enrich uranium up to 20%…[is] wholly unjustified…”
Quite likely, these implicit acknowledgements reflect the fact that Russia would not have signed a letter that stated the US’ “no enrichment at all” policy. So I don’t suggest this reflects a general US abandonment of that policy. But I do think it reflects an ad hoc US abandonment of that “no enrichment” policy on this TRR fuel issue. After all, the US did sign this letter.
So it’s the over-5% enrichment that’s really at issue, at least regarding the TRR. Iran’s entitled to enrich to 100% if it wants to, for peaceful purposes (and I agree with Cyrus’ well-put observation that the NPT doesn’t create that right; it merely acknowledges Iran’s sovereign right). But the fact remains that Iran’s real-life position isn’t quite so strong. Sovereign rights or not, I think Iran will still have some trouble with the question I posed earlier:
“If you only need LEU to run power plants, and you can buy medical isotopes on the open market, why do you need to enrich up to 20%?”
Iran’s got answers acceptable to most of us (“Because we don’t trust you to keep letting us buy the stuff” or “Because it’s our sovereign right”), but I am not so sure it has an answer acceptable to most Westerners.
I think the best way forward for those in Iran seeking an improvement in the economy, and greater political freedom, is to follow Moussavi’s change of course (avoiding public demonstrations, and certainly avoiding direct threats to the regime itself). Neocon notions of “regime change” are dangerous and foolish.
Persian Gulf,
“Eric: did you really believe Iran could agree to hand over her hard gained strategic asset with that swap idea?”
Not sure what you’re referring to, since I feel just the opposite: that’s why I explicitly put the initial LEU-today 20%-fuel-someday proposal in the “you’ve got to be kidding” category. My only puzzlement was that the mid-level Iranian bureaucrat to whom the proposal was first broached reportedly replied that it sounded OK to him. As I said, that made me doubt him, not Iran, and I recognize that even his reaction may have been incorrectly reported.
CharshanbeSuri was always a day for teenagers to make noise and enjoy. The idea of CharshanbeSuri as the point of breaking the regime is even more than a ridiculous one. When I moved to Tehran in 2002, at that time there was virtually no political discourse in Iranian society and the public wasn’t interested for political discussion by no means, and stayed there for few years, I was always shocked by the magnitude of firecrackers used there. a day or two before the event and sometimes one day after that. Probably, the regime collapsed at that time and we are all in illusion! we could also ask those so called “Iran Expert” named here and get very insightful arguments of what is going on in Iran!
Takeyh’s action was questioned in the last post. I personally think, he feels burden in being so wrong, as Leveretts also mentioned, about Iran’s political dynamics since last year, in particular for the election. So, what he does now is a sort of must be done action. We call it in Farsi “tofe sar bala” (spitting upward). If not, there is another possibility. That I call wife’s effect (I am very sorry, I don’t want to be insulting anybody here). There used to be a difference between Ray’s writings and his wife’ ones. Now, they write almost identically. As his wife changed her style a bit, it’s fair to say Ray shifted radically! We have seen such an effect for Mousavi’s case! When Mousavi started his campaign, he was not that interested in expressing many of the ideas he declared at the end of the campaign or after the election. He even was reluctant to symbolize green color for his campaign. We have seen Mousavi’s evolution since then, marginalization; will Tekeyh follow the same path?!
Eric: did you really believe Iran could agree to hand over her hard gained strategic asset with that swap idea? It’s interesting that politicians in the West say this openly, as if Iran is a kid and don’t understand political implication at all!
I think, a sort of deal is still possible on the nuclear issue. Actually, 20% enrichment is irrelevant. Iran passed that stage. It’s a failed affair, after all. As far as I know, for agricultural purposes, Iran needs around 60% uranium. So, this could be discussed as the possible deal. Will the West grab this opportunity or let Iran take that as step as well?
Alan – I have to quibble with your language a bit when you say “Iran is of course entitled to enrich under the NPT” because it is a pet peeve of mine.
Actually, the NPT merely recognizes that right, it does not grant it. Thus those who say that the NPT does not entitle Iran to enrichment are simply barking up the wrong hills because 1- the NPT does recognize enrichment by implication and 2- The NPT is not the source of that right anyway.
Enriching uranium and developing nuclear technology in general is a preexisting sovereign right that the NPT merely recognizes. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states such as Iran agreed to allow IAEA Inspections of their nuclear programs to ensure that there has been no diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful uses, in exchange for certain promises from the 5 nuclear-armed states who are also NPT signatories and theoretically bound by the same treaty (though in practice they have totally ignored their own obligations.) The IAEA has consistently stated that Iran’s nuclear program has never been diverted for non-peaceful uses, thus meeting the legal standard for compliance with the NPT.
That enriching uranium is a sovereign right is plainly seen by the fact that countries which did not sign the NPT but have developed nulear technology, or countries who started their nuclear program before the NPT came into existence, did so entirely legally. After all, if developing nuclear power was not a sovereign right, then by what right did CHina, Russia, Israel, Argentina, Japan, etc. develop their nuclear programs?
The “secrecy” of Iran’s enrichment program was always exaggerated — I have written more about this on by blog at http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2007/12/irans-not-so-hi.html (Sorry for tooting my own horn but the details are too much to describe here.) In short, the program started under the Shah, with the active assistance and participation of AMerican and European states. Iran announced the discovery of uranium and plans to use it for an domestic power program on national radio in the 1980s on NATIONAL RADIO. In 1983, the IAEA was planned to provide Iran with technical assistance to make reactor fuel however the US killed that program by illegally pressuring the IAEA to drop it. Nevertheless the Iranians persisted. They openly announced plans to extract uranium and even invited IAEA experts to visit their uranium mines in the 1990s. After the Chinese were forced by the US to withdraw from a contract to build a uranium conversion facility, the Iranians informed the IAEA that they would build it themselves, and in 2000 they formally declared the facility to the IAEA. THis is all prior to the dramatic “exposure” of the sites at Natanz which were not required to the declared to the IAEA yet in the first place. To the extent that Iran’s enrichment plans were ever secret, they were a poorly-guarded secret. Iran did import some natural uranium from China without reporting it to the IAEA but the Iranians say the net uranium content fell below the reporting requirement (and the US and others knew about it anyway.) And they did import centrifuge components, but after the US forced their program to go underground by pressuring other countries and the IAEA to cease cooperation with Iran’s nuclear program (Contrary to the NPT requirements for sharing nuclear technlogy “to the fullest extent possible” and “without discrimination”.)
Eric – it is the official US position that Iran must stop ALL enrichment, including to 5%, and there are UN resolutions demanding they stop. Iran is of course entitled to enrich under the NPT. I am unaware of any link between the demand to cease enrichment and the supply of medical isotopes – perhaps Cyrus can give us a link for that? It certainly isn’t in the 12 Feb letter to the IAEA.
Fiorangela – that account is basically true. Ever since the revolution, Iran had been trying to kick start the nuclear programme originally begun by the Shah but was blocked at every juncture. In the end, they elected to source nuclear technology in secret from Pakistan via the A Q Khan network, but as they were not required to declare any nuclear facility until 6 months before fissile material was introduced, they had not acted illegally. However, there were a variety of procedural issues where their reporting was not as it should have been prior to the declaration of the facilities, but my understanding is that at no point were they actually running any facility that should have been under safeguards.
Alan wrote: “Iran will be enriching to 20% on a regular basis, out of necessity, and can point to US intransigence as the reason why. I can’t see how the US can easily spin that into an excuse for sanctioning or bombing them, but no doubt somebody will try.”
I learned this from a talk Sahimi made in Seattle, WA, last December, and Eric Brill cautions that Sahimi is not to be trusted, so maybe someone here could clarify–
Sahimi addressed whether Iran restarted nuclear research “in secret” as is argued by Iran hawks, and used as the basis for not trusting Iran with nuclear technology (“they operated in secret for 18 years, why should we trust them now….”) He explained that in 1983 Iran sought permission, under NPT guidelines, to enrich uranium. All the proper steps were taken and Iran submitted its request to UN/IAEA. US refused to permit the otherwise permitted operations to be undertaken. Therefore, Iran studied the letter of the law, determined that by carefully arranging timing and reporting, it could stay within the letter of the law, without US approval. US refusal to grant permission was itself a violation of the rules. So, did Iran violate NPT rules and develop nuclear technology in secret? Yes and no.
US has been intransigent and has been spinning Iran’s nuclear program since at least 1983; unlikely US will stop now.
Difference is the window on US intransigence that has been opened by the internet and keyboard warriors such as this blog. A trickle becomes a stream, and eventually Jon Harrison’s best-of-the-bad-options, containment, is unnecessary.
Eric – The line you describe is the very line being taken by the US, France and Russia in the letter to the IAEA dated Feb 12.
Iran need simply respond that they have a reactor that can only use 20% fuel, and as nobody will sell it to them, they would have to shut it down unless they made it themselves. As there is no legal impediment to Iran enriching uranium, and as the reactor and the enrichment is under constant IAEA surveillance, how can we deny them?
Even if we want to stop them, the only source of pressure would be to refuse to supply isotopes during the down time, which would in any case only work temporarily. That seems a very risky line to take, and one that really just plays into Iran’s hands.
Alternatively, as James says, the swap deal could quite possibly include an undertaking by Iran not to enrich to 20%, provided future supply was also secured. In fact, perhaps the securing of that concession from Iran would be enough to sell it, although the counter argument would be the US was outmanoeuvred. Overall though, my feeling is a swap deal could still be sold in the US as Iran seeing sense over the threat of sanctions, or something like that.
Cyrus (and Alan),
“Eric – the WP doesn’t report ALL the facts. The offer to sell Iran isotopes is conditional on Iran ceasing enrichment.”
I’m assuming by “enrichment,” you mean even up to 5%. If so, I agree completely with you, and also with Alan’s observation. If the US won’t even OK enrichment up to 5%, its “permission” for Iran to buy medical isotopes on the open market is illusory. Iran has no real choice but to make them itself or leave its 800,000 patients in danger. As Alan points out, that’s a slam-dunk winner for Iran.
What still puzzles me, though, is this:
If the US has imposed this condition, how is Iran PRESENTLY able to buy medical isotopes on the open market, as Alan mentioned it’s doing?
James – Iran has already offered to put a legally-enforced ceiling on its enrichment (something which it is not obligated to do under the NPT) in addition to imposing a variety of other limits on its nuclear program that go well beyond its (or anyone else’s) legal obligations (see for details: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/opinion/05iht-edzarif.html )
However these offers have been simply ignored by the US which insists that Iran should be deprived of enrichment in toto, regardless of how well-guarded or inspected or limited the program may be, which once again proves that the entire nuclear issue is pretextual, and thus no amount of Iranian compromises will suffice. Lets not forget that Iran suspended enrichment for 2.5 years, only to see the goalposts moved and demands increased. This is the policy of rope-a-doping Iran along.
Eric – the WP doesn’t report ALL the facts. The offer to sell Iran isotopes is conditional on Iran ceasing enrichment.
Dan Cooper,
Israel’s continuing oppression of the Palestinians is in effect strongly encouraged by numerous US Senators and Congressmen, even though this oppression is very damaging to the national security interests of the US. The extent to which many US politicians subvert the national security of their own country is kept out of US newspapers.
The Iranians continue to say the exchange deal can be accomplished, and I assume part of it would call for Iran not to exceed enrichment above the 5% max level needed to operated power plants. I continue to be fascinated, morbidly, at the refusal of the US even to discuss the Turkish or Japanese offers to act as middleman for the exchange of LEU for the 20% U. And Hillary Clinton is in Moscow today, lobbying for the foolish additional sanctions!
Alan,
“So, all Iran needs to do is buy the extra isotopes as a stopgap until they have made the 20% fuel themselves, at which point the entire TRR issue just disappears. However, we will have forced Iran to enrich to 20%, where before they had limited themselves to 5%. Well played.”
I’d like to be convinced, but the missing step in your argument is an answer by Iran to this question:
“Since you only need 3-5% fuel for power production, and the isotope store is open, why are you enriching your LEU to 20%?”
Again, I think Iran’s honest answer will be “Because we don’t trust you to keep the isotope store open.” But whether that answer will be good enough is far from clear to me. It sure won’t satisfy the US administration or the American public.
Eric & Cyrus,
Surely Iran can buy the isotopes Cyrus, they’re doing it now, and according to the letter to the IAEA from France, Russia and the US dated Feb 12, the option to purchase them remains open.
So, all Iran needs to do is buy the extra isotopes as a stopgap until they have made the 20% fuel themselves, at which point the entire TRR issue just disappears. However, we will have forced Iran to enrich to 20%, where before they had limited themselves to 5%. Well played.
So the only option through which the US can apply pressure is through blocking the supply of the isotopes. This must surely be a diplomatic nightmare. They are medical supplies; they hold absolutely no value for the Iranian nuclear programme. All the US will be doing is directly blocking the treatment of Iranian cancer patients.
At a time when the US is fumbling about trying to build a diplomatic coalition against Iran, that strikes me as a totally self-defeating tactic. Also, it undermines the NPT to the point of ridicule. The nuclear states are obliged under the NPT to give that kind of assistance. Iran has the backing of the 118-nation Non-Aligned Movement over it, and it is intriguing to contemplate what that means when the NPT comes up for review in May.
So, it seems to me that unless a swap is agreed very soon, Iran will be enriching to 20% on a regular basis, out of necessity, and can point to US intransigence as the reason why. I can’t see how the US can easily spin that into an excuse for sanctioning or bombing them, but no doubt somebody will try.
Fiorangela,
Sahimi (who teaches at the University of Southern California) writes extensively for the Tehran Bureau. For those who aren’t familiar with him or his work, you might find it useful to read his stuff at the TB. I’m surprised he’s taken seriously by Trita Parsi, or anyone else.
Cyrus,
I just re-read the Washington Post article I cited, and don’t see any mention of that “Iran must stop enriching” condition. It wouldn’t be the first time Glenn Kessler left out an important detail like that, of course, but where did you find that condition mentioned?
Eric
Cyrus,
I missed until now this important point in your last post:
“The US has essentially offered to sell isotopes to iran but on condition that Iran give up enrichment, thus holding 800,000 Iranian cancer patients as hostage and subject to blackmail.”
If the US has imposed that condition, then I agree it’s too stringent a condition. That does amount to over-reaching, and puts Iran back in the tactical driver’s seat. I don’t think the American public agrees that that condition (stop enriching) is unfair, and so Iran would still have some hurdles to clear to exploit this tactical advantage, but I do think that most of the world (notably Russia and China) would agree that that “stop enriching” condition was unfair, fully justifying Iran in making its own 20% fuel.
America’s relationship with Israel is important, but not as important as the lives of America’s soldiers. Maybe Israel gets the message now.
Petraeus Warns Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mullen that Israel Is Jeopardizing US Security Interes:
Watch the video:
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/3/17/report_petraeus_warns_joint_chiefs_of
Cyrus wrote (on Mar 17 at 10:24 pm): “What exactly IS the “Green Movement” anyway? Does anyone know? What is their agenda, who are its leaders etc?”
The aforementioned Parsi hosted a conference in DC about a week ago at which the aforementioned Sahemi explained the agenda of the ‘Green movement.’ The agenda involves “Amendment 17″ (I don’t know what that is), and demands for various rights, as well as reforms in election process. see it here:
There are any number of groups in the US who organize and act to advance one or another reform of US government policy; the existence of such groups does not cause Americans to believe that a revolution or toppling of the US government is imminent. By analogy, one could argue that various groups in Iran, however loosely organized and whether “Green” or puce, do not predict an overthrow of the Iranian government or revolution; rather, they suggest the existence of an on-the-street awareness of and practice of popular expressions of dissatisfaction with government and demands for reform. In short, it’s pretty normal and ‘chronic’ rather than an acute expression of revolutionary outrage.
That might be what causes the US to need to identify the Green movement as something extraordinary and heroic: for several decades, Israel has been advertised as “the only democracy in the Middle East” and Iran has been tagged as backward and ruled by theocratic tyrants. None of these assertions has a basis in fact, but US leaders have been deadened to any other perception of Iran. Israel routinely stifles dissent among even Jewish Israelis — no Israeli Jew may discuss Israel’s nuclear arsenal for fear of being punished as harshly as are Arab Israelis, by imprisonment; Arab Israelis are routinely arrested and imprisoned for no reason at all and without redress, but the mainstream US press does not discuss these undemocratic characteristic of Israel.
Pirouz’s observation is extremely important to bear in mind when other of us non-Iranians attempt to assay the lay of the land. The Leveretts analyze Iran-US relations with the discipline of Enlightenment thinkers — the basis of the American democratic system.
To worthy conversant Jon Harrison — your sage comment once again argues for prudence, which is certainly necessary and welcome. However, I do take issue with this statement:
“engaging Iran is the best way to preserve the kernal of the Green movement as a possible basis for a more pro-Western government down the road.”
If by “pro-Western” you mean Iran should be more willing to engage with Western states, in my opinion, the roadblock is on the other side of the divide: it is not Iran that is demanding that China, Russia, and Europe sunder all commercial ties with the US. Rather,the US, through the office of Stuart Levey at US Treasury, travels tirelessly to Chinese, European, and Arabian capitals demanding that those nations desist from trade with Iran. (Levey’s actions actually harm American interests, but that’s another matter.)
Or, if by “pro-Western” you mean that Iran should act more like the US and other western states, that would be a tragedy, in my opinion. What I find so valuable and intriguing about Iran is precisely that Iran is not cast in the same mold as the US. For Iran to become westernized would be to serve up all potatoes with no salt. I would urge that Americans attempt to understand and engage with Iran-as-Iran, rather than either expect or demand that Iran act the way Westerners think Iran should act in order to be deemed suitably “Western.”
Cyrus,
“Alan – Iran cannot purchase nor should be forced to purchase the medical isotopes on the open market.”
Setting aside the “cannot” part (by which I understand you mean the practical restrictions posed by the short supply of raw material and the two reactor problems you described), the “should [not] be forced to purchase” part may be a fair point in theory, but I’m not sure now is the time for Iran to press that point. As I said in my longer post, I think it opens Iran up to too much suspicion of its motives.
I agree completely that Iran has the right to buy, refine or otherwise get whatever uranium it needs to run its TRR, or any other reactor, for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, for better or worse, Iran has elected to press its “medical isotope” needs as the basis for its present “urgent” demand for 20% fuel. Having done so, I think Iran has been “hoist by its own petard” for the time being. It would look a little slippery falling back now on this argument: “OK, we don’t really need 20% fuel for medical isotopes, but we’re entitled to 20% fuel anyway.” Perfectly true statement, and maybe it would carry more weight now if Iran had just started with that position. But having hung its present argument on the “need for medical isotopes” peg, I think it’s diplomatically compelled to leave it there for at least a while.
Alan and Cyrus,
I should add this. If the US says “no swap” but permits Iran to buy isotopes, critics will say this:
“We could’ve drawn down Iran’s LEU stock by doing a swap deal, but now they have BOTH the medical isotopes AND their LEU. I wonder what they’re going to do with all that LEU now that they don’t need it to make medical isotopes? You guys are a bunch of geniuses, aren’t you?”
That has always struck me as the main reason to OK a swap deal rather than just allow open-market purchases, but what I still don’t see is a graceful way for the US to OK a swap deal without Obama’s political opponents saying: “Obama? Isn’t he the guy who’s supplying highly enriched uranium to the Iranian regime?” Obama might prefer to say: “They’re getting it from the Russians.”
Alan – Iran cannot purchase nor should be forced to purchase the medical isotopes on the open market. Leaving aside the issue of whether the current sanctions permit this or not (I don’t know) and the fact that Iran has a sovereign right to make its own medical products, there is a worldwide shortage of molybdenum-99 since the world’s main suppliers — the problem-ridden NRU reactor (Chalk River, Canada) and HFR reactor (Petten, Netherlands) — are both shut down for major maintenance.
Per ArmsControlWonk:
“Iran already imports a sizable quantity of this pharmacological radionuclide but producing it indigenously would not only save Iran a considerable amount of money each year, much more than it would pay for the fuel for the reactor it would use to produce it, but also allow a more efficient use of this short lived isotope by preventing the decay of nearly half of the amount bought before it even reached the patients….It costs Iran about a $1 million per annum to import its current needs for diagnostic 99Mo. About half of that is “wasted” in transit as the molybdenum decays, an amount that could be saved if the isotope was produced locally…The real benefit to Iran for completing this deal, however, will not be the savings of a few million dollars or even the savings of nearly half the imported diagnostic radioisotopes from unavoidable wastage due to decays during shipment. The real savings will be the foot up Iran gets in its health care from starting to develop its own nuclear medicine industry. The discrepancy between the use of diagnostic isotopes in Iran and the developed world can, and should, be dramatically reduced; as it should for the entire world.”
(http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2492/a-primer-on-irans-medical-reactor)
ON whether they have the technological know-how to make the fuel. I suspect they can do so given time. However in the meantime they will run out of the istopes. THe US has essentially offered to sell isotopes to iran but on condition that IRan give up enrichment, thus holding 800000 Iranian cancer patients as hostage and subject to blackmail.
Alan and Cyrus,
Thanks for your helpful answers.
Alan raises a tactical concern with this sentence: “Iran does not need to make [the medical radioisotopes] in Iran – they can purchase them on the open market.”
That appears to be true, at least since last month – see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020903848.html.
I think now that I’ve made too little of that third option, having essentially dismissed it as too unreliable a source. But why would an agreement to provide 20% fuel (which Iran seeks) be any more reliable than an agreement to let Iran buy finished isotopes (which Iran is ignoring)? Nor do I see any merit in this closing passage from the Post article:
“Some analysts faulted the [US] administration for first pursuing the swap offer, arguing that it opened the door for Iran to go after higher levels of enrichment. “They should have started with [permission to buy] the isotopes,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington. “Going to something sensible after you’ve promised something stupid and generous is a hard sell.”
I don’t agree with that last sentence. Early might have been better than late, but late seems good enough. If the West lets Iran buy finished isotopes – whether it should have OK’d that sooner or not – doesn’t that undercut Iran’s argument that it needs either to buy 20% fuel or make 20% fuel? Can’t the West simply say:
“All that Iran really needs are medical isotopes, not 20% fuel. It doesn’t even need the TRR. Why let a bunch of mad mullahs have 20% fuel for a so-called ‘research’ reactor, when they don’t need either? Ahmadinejad is wringing his hands about these 800,000 deprived patients, but he can go out and buy isotopes for them any time he wants. The Iranian regime is risking the health and lives of its own people by playing brinkmanship with the West on this issue. For what purpose? I think we all know the answer to that question!”
On the other hand, although I don’t see any difference in reliability of (1) a promise to supply 20% fuel; and (2) a promise to let Iran buy finished isotopes, I see a world of difference between those two options and a third option: Iran refining its own 20% fuel and making its own medical isotopes. That is the one and only choice that prevents the West from pulling the plug on Iran any time it wants. Unfortunately, that leaves Iran in a tactically shaky position. The West can just say: “The isostope store is open for business, so why is Iran refining LEU to 20%?” Iran’s frank answer, of course, would be “Because we don’t trust the West to keep the isotope store open for business.” But I suspect that answer won’t be good enough to persuade the Western public, much less the US administration.
In short, it looks to me as if it might be Iran, not the US, that’s boxed into a diplomatic corner on this issue. Am I missing something in my analysis?
TRR is designed to run on 20% ‘fuel rods’. What Iran announced is that it will make ‘fuel plates’ of material enriched to the same level, which i take is somewhat simpler to manufacture.
Eric – I see Cyrus has answered you already. Interestingly, it took 7 years for Iran to get the fuel from Argentina last time.
As I understand it, Iran cannot at this point make the plates, but probably could over a period of time, but not before the TRR runs out of fuel. Also, they have very, very little 20% U at the moment; it was only made using a pilot centrifuge cascade in Natanz.
The real issue now is to do with the medical radioisotopes. Iran does not need to make them in Iran – they can purchase them on the open market. At the moment we are refusing to let them have the 20% fuel. Surely we can’t seriously be considering blocking the supply of the finished radioisotopes too?
That sounds like a diplomatic disaster zone if we did, which is probably why Ahmadinejad has seen fit to mention the 800,000 patients. As Dan says below, Iran has now offered to make the LEU swap in one hit, simultaneously, in Iran. It’s all in an official letter dated February 18 from Iran to the IAEA.
The NPT review is due in May. This TRR business is starting to look more and more like an elephant trap the West is walking straight into because it is only serving to demonstrate our duplicity in the implementation of the NPT in its current form.
The article, “Petraeus Confirms Link Between Israel-Palestine and US Security” appeared on LobeLog the other day. I commented on it, if anyone cares to read same.
Rawhide,
“Who is Cyrus Safdari:
Cyrus Safdari: He is the editor of news for Caspian affairs or something like that headquartered in Tehran…”
You’re too kind to Cyrus, Rawhide. Few know this, but “Cyrus” is not his real name: it’s actually “Cyrus.” Even fewer know that he’s a co-founder of the Crush The Greens secret society (not so secret after all, eh Cyrus?) and has lunch every Tuesday and Friday with the Leveretts, Professor Marandi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader. I’d tell you what they talk about at lunch, but I think you can guess. On the last Tuesday of every month, they add Mir-Housein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi to the guest list, tell them the “CG” in their coat of arms stands for “Change is Good,” and pump them for information. It’s pretty widely accepted that the Green movement would have succeeded long ago but for the behind the scenes efforts of the Crush the Greens group. Now that I’ve blown their cover, I suppose that will change.
Dan,
Thanks for your third post above. I’ll confess that I almost overlooked it, but then I did a quick scan for the word “Israel,” saw it wasn’t there, and read it more carefully.
Petraeus Confirms Link Between Israel-Palestine and U.S. Security.
The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel.
Petraeus’ willingness to publicly — and in uniform with all those decorations on his chest — make the connection between Israeli treatment of the Palestinians and the spread of “anti-American sentiment” and the deterioration of the U.S. position in the region — a connection which, of course, is completely evident to any casual observer of Middle East — marks what can only be considered a major breakthrough in the debate over the relationship between the United States and Israel.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article25010.htm
Turkish PM: why pressure Iran, not nuclear Israel?
Erdogan: countries with nuclear weapons not in moral position to lecture other nations on nuclear.
“It’s only rumours that Iran is making nuclear weapons,” Erdogan told the BBC, speaking through an interpreter.
“I believe it is Iran’s most natural right to employ nuclear energy for civilian purposes.”
Take Israel. Israel possess nuclear weapons. Why aren’t other countries warning Israel to dispose of her nuclear weapons but they’re doing the same to Iran?” he asked.
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=37881
Iran ready for nuke fuel exchange inside country
No sign of China budging on sanctions
Iran has said it is ready for a one-shot nuclear fuel exchange on its own soil, edging closer to the conditions of a plan drawn up by the UN atomic watchdog last year as major powers mulled a new round of sanctions.
Iran’s atomic chief Ali Akbar Salehi revealed the new offer in an interview published by hardline daily Jawan on Wednesday, signalling a major change in Tehran’s longstanding position on the nuclear fuel plan first drafted last October.
Salehi said Iran is ready to deliver 1,200 kilogrammes (2,640 pounds) of low-enriched uranium (LEU) in one go in return for fuel for a Tehran medical research reactor, but the exchange must be inside the country.
http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?et=1103203804574&s=107098&e=001Yxy96y3EDpd2MNbAtDeeUxHfPfzo5m7yISqtWxNxKLmCGByQ5XEQYnbI5HxzlcW2IOtz-0OHsddlI5OrJ9kce8awSzErjAcBGWmcAn_NZYhPmNYKZo5AqrgVUxv7nOSM8f5Rp45Enl1713mLUC3CVoF0JsNKrq-Jxx4Cltt2IPb0YsF6Bu25Kg==
Who is Cyrus Safdari:
Cyrus Safdari: He is the editor of news for Caspian affairs or something like that headquartered in Tehran…
Cyrus,
Thanks. Is Iran capable of making the fuel plates required for the TRR?
Eric
By the way about those “analysts and pundits” (Friedman, Pollack, Takyeh etc.) — they were oh so wrong about Iraq, and yet our media continues to pay attention to them, and our think tanks continue to pay them. Why? If they were stock market brokers, they’d be fired. Why do they continue to exert influence and have a say? Because their utility is not in being “right” so much as in being willing to promote the official line, whatever it is. They’re not there to challenge conventional wisdom, but to create. They’re part of the “manufacture of consent” process. It doesn’t matter that they’re bad analysts who should have been discredited by now, as long as they toe the official line and promote it. If they were really out to CHALLENGE the official line, they wouldnt get hired by those establishment think tanks and would have been marginalized. Their job is not be right so much as it is to be convincing at least in the short-term.
Eric — iran got’s its current fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor from Argentina in the 1990s. The reactor was given to Iran by the United States in the 1960s, along with I think 6 pounds of highly-enriched, weapons grade uranium as fuel. In the 1990s, Iran converted the reactor to use 20% enriched uranium and bought fuel from Argentina.
Why does Washington still bet on the “Green Movement”? SIMPLE: Because by holding out the illusion that the government in Iran is about to fall, Iran-hawks can further undermine and delay meaningful negotiations and can gain support for destructive sanctions measures… After all, if Western policymakers start banking on domestic political unrest to undermine the Iranian government, they will pursue policies that would be very different than if they assume that the current Iranian government is not changing and not going anywhere.
Now here’s a question for you: What exactly IS the “Green Movement” anyway? Does anyone know? What is their agenda, who are its leaders etc? One reason why it fizzled is because it really didn’t exist in the first place. Initially it was people who voted for Mousavi and thought they were the victims of election fraud — but none of the allegations of fraud withstand much scrutiny, and independent polls show that Ahmadinejad did in fact win (indeed, since Mousavi is a regime-insider who was specifically vetted and pre-cleared to run for office, why would the regime need to resort to massive fraud to keep him out of office?) Then there were the various discredited exiled opposition groups who, lacking much legitimacy or gravitas of their own, jumped on the bandwagon and started to claim that THEY represented the movement — and so promptly discredited the movement even further (After all, who wants to be associated with the MEK or the Shahis nowdays?) Then there were the various keyboard warriors and wanna-be rock stars, none of whom could get much traction either. The Green Movement seems more and more like a phantasm, an artefact manufactured from hokum and wishful thinking by some people in the West more than anything else. Good for selling papers but not much substance there.
Anthony:
That is simply not true. Iran has many newspapers that are completely opposed to the government, unlike almost all Arab countries alligned to the US. The people arrested were linked with the riots and the polls have always shown Ahmadinejad to be well ahead of his opponents. It’s time to wake up.
Anthony,
“Why is my post providing evidence for Ahmadinejad’s lack of support awaiting moderation? There is nothing wrong with it.”
I had a similar problem a few weeks back. I think if your post had more than one link in it, it doesn’t automatically get posted. So maybe re-post it with no more than one link. Good luck.
Sorry I should have explained that in Persian, a court “Madah” is traditionally a court poet, who regardless of the truth, constantly has to elevate the King and the court’s grandeur in his poems, to get the “Seleh” (grants), otherwise he can get kicked out or in some cases even be killed
Pirouz, you are right on the money, I would also ad the old, very Iranian culture of “Madahi “ to get the grants coming, specially if you are affiliated with a TT in the west
Why is my post providing evidence for Ahmadinejad’s lack of support awaiting moderation? There is nothing wrong with it.
—
By the way, I should add that despite many exiled Iranians would like to believe, Iran is not in a revolutionary phase and in all likelihood will not be anytime soon HOWEVER to come and say that the green movement is dead or nobody supports it is stretching the truth. The movement, if allowed to wage demonstrations will prove the Leveretts of washington and Marandis of Iran wrong. Ask yourself why they have not allowed gatherings for the green movement? Why they are the world record holder of imprisoned journalists, why many thousands political prisoners exist, why websites are filtered, newspapers banned, people arrested for blogging, some tortured…
Alan,
This relates to an earlier topic from a week or so ago, but I doubt you’re still checking there:
I just read an article stating that Iran’s 20% uranium is being sent from Natanz to Esfahan for processing into fuel rods (though you mentioned the TRR uses “fuel plates”). I’d read elsewhere that Iran lacked this capability. If so, it’s not in a position to force the West’s hand on this 20% fuel swap matter.
Do you know? Also, where did Iran get the 20% fuel plates being used by the TRR now?
Eric
P.S. Ahmadinejad mentioned that 800,000 patients will be affected if the TRR cannot produce medical isotopes because it runs out of 20% fuel (early next year, if not replenished).
You know, I get asked why I think the Leveretts- non-Iranians that they are- are more able to accurately grasp the situation than the rest. My answer is they don’t carry any personal baggage into their analyses.
Myself, I was caught off balance by the events immediately following the June 2009 election. But I was able to keep an open mind, and not long afterward I came around to a similar perspective expressed by the Leveretts.
On the other hand, Sadjadpour, Parsi, Milani, Sahimi, etc. are all so heavily invested in their anti-IRI, green power predictions, they have no way out. So all we can expect from them is more of the same skewed analyses. To do otherwise, they would have to drop their highly emotional involvement, and admit to the fact that their analyses over the past nine or so months are no longer valid. That, it appears, is beyond them.
Thank you Leveretts for maintaining the voice of reason.
Well, I have to accept what you say, as I don’t pretend to approach the knowledge and experience you possess in this area. I hope the Greens do indeed lie low rather than sacrifice themselves to no purpose. Their time may come, by and by. I think, by the way, that engaging Iran is the best way to preserve the kernal of the Green movement as a possible basis for a more pro-Western government down the road.
its a good article. Iran is not about to have another revolution. The sooner American regime understands this the better because any miscalculation that may lead to war with Iran will only accelerate US humiliating departure from Middle East. As we have seen Iraq was not Afghanistan and Iran is not Iraq. Any attempt at regime change in Tehran will surely mean end of American hegemony in Middle east. Iranian people will not support occupiers and will fight it; just like Afghanis and Iraqis.
Perhaps, the US administration should just continue listening to the Iran experts daydreaming in their offices in the US. Why should the administration stop now?
For over three decades, different administrations have been listening to these people state that the Islamic Republic of Iran is about implode or crumble from within. Even if these “experts” are always getting it wrong, at least they are consistent…
Of course there is another option and that is taking a realistic look at the situation and accepting the reality on the ground.
A very good piece. While the movement thrives in DC, there is absolutely no sign of a Green Movement in Iran. Mousavi never had the support of the majority and after he failed to provide any evidence of fraud and continued to support rioting in Tehran, most of his supporters deserted him.
A very good piece. While the movement thrives in DC, there is absolutely no sign of a Green Movement in Iran. Mousavi never had the support of the majority and after he failed to provide any evidence of fraud and continued to support rioting in the north of Tehran, most of his supporters disserted him.
“Iranian contacts tell us that”…..
which contacts I wonder Leverett? Marandi the tehran uni “professor” and pro-Khamenei contact you mean?
How about you contact one of the pro-green movement activists inside iran for once instead of relying on pro-regime intelligence agents? Oh wait, you cant. since most of them are in evin prison, tortured into silence and died as a result of protest.