Writing at Middle East Strategy at Harvard, Raymond Tanter provides a thorough analysis of the current state of play regarding possible American-led sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
Tanter explains the difference between the current sanctions in place against Iran and those being considered now:
Previous U.S. and UN sanctions against Iran have been “smart” sanctions—targeting individuals and entities related to specific behavior, while leaving the overall economy unaffected. The next round, likely to involve restricting Iran’s imports of gasoline, represents a different approach, designed to have a macroeconomic impact to change the strategic calculus of Iran’s rulers.
After providing a smart analysis of the Iranian gasoline market and the likely effect of sanctions, Tanter concludes that
Given the Iranian regime’s continued refusal to surrender its nuclear programs in response to economic incentives and threats—what Iranian President Ahmadinejad has characterized as “chocolate in exchange for gold”—gasoline sanctions are unlikely to have enough impact to cause a strategic rethinking in Tehran.
So far, so good. But then Tanter arrives at a conclusion that doesn’t seem to follow from his analysis. He says that
This is not to say they should not be tried, because any economic pressure, even if it not decisive, is welcome. And producing consensus for another sanctions round is useful in case force has to be used later. But there is little leverage to compel international corporations to suspend gasoline sales to Iran, and Tehran has options for plugging the shortfall and dampening economic damage. Because of the low likelihood of success of another round of sanctions, the breakdown in nuclear talks, and the absence of a regime-change alternative focusing on the Iranian opposition, the West is moving toward having to decide between accepting an Iranian nuclear bomb or bombing Iran.
Does it really make sense to implement more sanctions, acknowledging that they are unlikely to have their desired outcome (Iran giving up its nuclear program)? This kind of approach assumes that our relations with the Islamic Republic will be hostile indefinitely, and that there is no other option.
Engaging in a sincere effort to achieve a game-changing, strategically significant agreement with Iran is a much better option.
– Ben Katcher
Raymond Tanter was a champion of the MEK so what else do you expect? These people don’t care if the sanctions themselves are effective or not. They want sanctions because it is an incremental step towards an eventual confrontation, their real goal, and a step away from dialogue and rapprochement.
Ben: Tanter is a pro-MEK anti-Iran advocate. In fact, I’ve never seen anything published over at MESH which has not been overtly pro-Zionist.
It’s not sanctions that they want, it’s the stalemate it produces: Iran won’t discuss its nuclear programme with sanctions imposed, and the US are going to veto any attempt to lift them. We had this stalemate in 2002/2003, and we know what followed it. Regime change is the key word. I hope the Russians will send the darning S-300s soon.