Comments on: HAS IRAN REJECTED THE TRR PROPOSAL? NOT ACCORDING TO ITS FOREIGN MINISTER http://www.raceforiran.com/has-iran-rejected-the-trr-proposal-not-according-to-its-foreign-minister Wed, 08 Feb 2012 22:06:34 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: speech therapy stuttering http://www.raceforiran.com/has-iran-rejected-the-trr-proposal-not-according-to-its-foreign-minister#comment-42 speech therapy stuttering Wed, 02 Dec 2009 03:06:57 +0000 http://www.raceforiran.com/?p=915#comment-42 Thank you for another essential article. Where else could anyone get that kind of selective information in such a clear way of writing? I have a presentation next week, and I am on the lookout for such selective information. Thank you for another essential article. Where else could anyone get that kind of selective information in such a clear way of writing? I have a presentation next week, and I am on the lookout for such selective information.

]]> By: Mark Fitzpatrick http://www.raceforiran.com/has-iran-rejected-the-trr-proposal-not-according-to-its-foreign-minister#comment-35 Mark Fitzpatrick Wed, 25 Nov 2009 08:23:18 +0000 http://www.raceforiran.com/?p=915#comment-35 Your analysis is very useful, but casting the TRR fuel issue as a technical problem ignores the overriding strategic and political issues. Iran's request to buy TRR fuel was almost surely a gambit to create an excuse for further enriching to 20%. Iran would have known that Argentina, which provided the original load, would not agree on a re-supply once Iran appointed as defense minister a man wanted in the 1994 bombing of the Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. Iran might further have predicted that France, which has taken the hardest line among Iran's negotiating partners, would not be interested in a commercial transaction either. The US/Russia/French offer to provide the fuel called Iran's bluff. It is to France's credit that it agreed to a confidence-building measure that, if implemented, would provide a possible way out of the nuclear impasse by establishing a precedent for Iran to send its LEU stockpile out of the country. Iran knows it cannot fabricate the 20% fuel for the TRR itself. It is not just a matter of 'figuring out' how to do it. Iran's engineers surely can meet the technical challenge. But to be used in the research reactor safely and without voiding the liability provisions, the fuel production has to be certified, a process that would take many years. Iranian production of 20% fuel now would be highly provocative. Your analysis is very useful, but casting the TRR fuel issue as a technical problem ignores the overriding strategic and political issues. Iran’s request to buy TRR fuel was almost surely a gambit to create an excuse for further enriching to 20%. Iran would have known that Argentina, which provided the original load, would not agree on a re-supply once Iran appointed as defense minister a man wanted in the 1994 bombing of the Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. Iran might further have predicted that France, which has taken the hardest line among Iran’s negotiating partners, would not be interested in a commercial transaction either. The US/Russia/French offer to provide the fuel called Iran’s bluff. It is to France’s credit that it agreed to a confidence-building measure that, if implemented, would provide a possible way out of the nuclear impasse by establishing a precedent for Iran to send its LEU stockpile out of the country.

Iran knows it cannot fabricate the 20% fuel for the TRR itself. It is not just a matter of ‘figuring out’ how to do it. Iran’s engineers surely can meet the technical challenge. But to be used in the research reactor safely and without voiding the liability provisions, the fuel production has to be certified, a process that would take many years. Iranian production of 20% fuel now would be highly provocative.

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