Stratfor’s George Friedman, recognizing that neither sanctions nor a military strike will produce enduring, strategically significant outcomes for the United States, considers whether there is a third option.
The diplomatic approach consists of creating a broad coalition prepared to impose what have been called crippling sanctions on Iran. Effective sanctions must be so painful that they compel the target to change its behavior. In Tehran’s case, this could only consist of blocking Iran’s imports of gasoline. Iran imports 35 percent of the gasoline it consumes. It is not clear that a gasoline embargo would be crippling, but it is the only embargo that might work. All other forms of sanctions against Iran would be mere gestures designed to give the impression that something is being done. The Chinese will not participate in any gasoline embargo…Since all other sanctions are gestures, the diplomatic approach is therefore unlikely to work.
The military option has its own risks. First, its success depends on the quality of intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities and on the degree of hardening of those targets. Second, it requires successful air attacks. Third, it requires battle damage assessments that tell the attacker whether the strike succeeded. Fourth, it requires follow-on raids to destroy facilities that remain functional. And fifth, attacks must do more than simply set back Iran’s program a few months or even years: If the risk of a nuclear Iran is great enough to justify the risks of war, the outcome must be decisive….
As long as the problem of Iran is defined in terms of its nuclear program, the United States is in an impossible place. Therefore, the Iranian problem must be redefined. One attempt at redefinition involves hope for an uprising against the current regime. We will not repeat our views on this in depth, but in short, we do not regard these demonstrations to be a serious threat to the regime. Tehran has handily crushed them, and even if they did succeed, we do not believe they would produce a regime any more accommodating toward the United States. The idea of waiting for a revolution is more useful as a justification for inaction — and accepting a nuclear Iran — than it is as a strategic alternative.
Friedman also posits that Iraq – not the nuclear issue – is the key strategic issue between the United States and Iran. I agree that Iran’s future role in Iraq is of immense importance to the United States, but would also add that Iran possesses the power to play a “spoiler” role in two other conflicts of immense importance to the United States: Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan.
Friedman’s key insight is that pushing Iran to give up a key instrument of leverage (its nuclear program) without any significant concessions on our part is simply not going to happen. We will not know whether “engagement” can work unless the United States recasts the nuclear issue as part of a broader set of strategic issues between the United States and Iran.
Friedman’s entire article can be read here.
– Ben Katcher
It will be interesting to see if Alan is on the right track. I still think not; in any case it could be years before we learn just what’s going on behind the scenes.
Jon – my view is that Obama is playing a clever game; that he is using the Iranian nuclear issue as a lever over Israel, and therefore there is a wider strategy at work. Why do I think that? Because it was immediately after Netanyahu told Obama to take a walk over the settlements that he approached the Iranians over the TRR deal, which had to be the last thing Netanyahu would have wanted. Netanyahu then could not get an easy appointment witn Obama during his visit to Washington, and encouragement for Fayyad’s unilateral declaration was voiced. An ambassador to Syria has been appointed, and the template for I/P negotiations drawn up by the US has been delayed, possibly pending a Hamas/Fatah reconciliation and a TRR deal with Iran.
On the other hand, Hillary Clinton charges round the place espousing her hawkish line. Maybe she’s playing the bad cop, maybe she’s being lined up for a fall, maybe it is the genuine administration line. Who knows? Obama is as inscrutable as ever.
But I’m hopeful. I see in Brazil today that officials are now talking about at least 2 months before any new sanctions could be agreed, so it is looking more and more like we’re in a holding pattern while they try to sort out the TRR deal.
Jon Harrison wrote:
“Didn’t somebody mention recently that they felt perhaps a hidden initiative was underway (Obama trying to pull a Nixon, that is)? My gut tells me it isn’t so (sad to say).”
Jon,
I think your gut’s telling you right.
From all accounts, it seems, some rapprochement will serve both US and Iran well. With that synopsis one question may be, is all recent activity geared toward what to do with Iran? Or is it intended to defuse the nay Sayers within the FP circles?
http://www.scribd.com/doc/24075542/From-Hope-to-Audacity-Appraising-Obama-s-Foreign-Policy
The Z-man’s recent policy paper from last year, issued to public very recently stated three concerns vis-à-vis the US FP. (from memory), Concerns relating to polarization of internal politics, The excessive influence of Israeli lobby (specially US FP interests) and the knowledge level (or lack there of) of the general public relating to the world geography, politics and the geo-politics of US FP interests.
With the change of heart from the likes of Friedman, is it reasonable, to consider issue one and possible some of issue two, raised by the Z-man, may be close to resolution?
This may be a wild guess; however, the timing of Rigi’s arrest is of interest as well. This is not to undermine the capabilities of the IRI intelligent ministry. However, Rigi was small potatoes as far as US FP arsenal. His purge could be considered a building confidence measure and the means to gain support from the hard-line faction of IRI. The next phase of the confidence building step, “may be”, the recent IRI letter to IAEA outlining Iran’s interest in the swap as well as highlighting the broken promises by the west. Could the introduction of the Japanese option for the swap be the next step?
Of course, all of these wild assertions could be hogwash on my part!! :-) However, as another poster had commented earlier, in today’s world of politics you go to bed with an ally at night, only to find your throat cut in the morning. Keeping in mind, US is bleeding in more ways than one. Change is essential.
Eric, yes, I would reverse the order of probability, as you do in your comment. And certainly, I think it’s possible we could get dragged into a war under Obama. However, on the latter, I consider Gates and Jones to be cool-headed professionals in this area; therefore, I think war by accident or miscalculation is unlikely while these two are in position. Having said that, I grant that the situation is potentially very unstable, and that under such conditions war by accident or miscalculation is possible.
The point Fiorangela makes is of course very valid. Germany, France, Japan — or at least the business interests in these countries — want to do business with Iran. Thus, they have no interest in sanctions. The US is crazy if it thinks the important players are going to go along with a tough sanctions regime.
I would venture to say the eatbees speaks for all of us with his/her two-sentence comment.
Didn’t somebody mention recently that they felt perhaps a hidden initiative was underway (Obama trying to pull a Nixon, that is)? My gut tells me it isn’t so (sad to say). Does anyone feel that the administration, which appears to be drifting, is secretly trying to reach out to Iran in a comprehensive way? If you do believe this, is it just a feeling or can you point to some evidence or indication?
I’m still wondering why Iran is perceived by the United States as a “problem”? All the strategic gaming blah-blah flows from that….
Wouldn’t it be better to start over by perceiving Iran as an “opportunity”?
hmmm.
Friedman shifts the rhetoric from “game-change” to “unthinkable.” Perhaps that “game” HAS changed in a way that the shapers of game thange thinkology (Michele Flournoy) did not anticipate.
The real shift that is taking place is a kindling awareness among European and American bourgeoisie that sanctioning Iran is harmful to European and American business interests. Trita Parsi pointed that out in “Treacherous Alliance,” that the first wave of sanctions on Iran, enacted by executive order in 1995, at the behest of Israel lobbyists, were harmful to at least one American oil business, Conoco, which was forced to forego an oilfield development contract in Iran (the contract was taken up by the French). Keith Weissman, AIPAC operative who helped write that executive order and much of the subsequent legislation invoking sanctions, is on take stating that, 1. AIPAC wrote the sanctions legislation; 2. it didn’t work; sanctions have never worked, except in the case of apartheid S. Africa.
http www edmaysproductions.net/webvideo/irannuke.wmv
French and German business interests are complaining that sanctions on Iran are bad for French and German business: http english dot iribnews.ir/NewsBody.aspx?ID=6791
“by imposing sanctions on Iran, France deprives itself from a market of 75 million costumers. [sic]”
German business leaders take a dim view of Angela Merkel hawkish stance for Iran sanctions: http mrzine dot monthlyreview.org/2010/shafaie070210.html
“Jens Nagel, Managing Director of the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (BGA), believes unilateral German sanctions against Iran to be totally incomprehensible because they will open Germany’s lucrative slice of the Iranian market to Asian and European competitors. According to BGA President Anton F. Boerner, Germany could be the biggest loser of a unilateral sanction policy against Iran because it could lead to the loss of 10,000 German jobs, in mostly medium-sized German companies, many of them family-owned businesses which depend heavily on trade with Iran.”
Brazil carries on trade with Iran and hopes to increase commerce with Iran: www dot google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i6w07wzLKrukn4Ff3baGx5ZK9vrQ
“Lula, whose country has friendly ties with Iran, spoke at a summit of leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean at a joint press conference with the event host, Mexican President Felipe Calderon.
“Peace in the world does not mean isolating someone,” Lula said.
“I’m going to Iran in May to buy things from them. Brazil exports to Iran are worth one billion dollars a year and imports nothing from them,” Lula added.”
Japan and Iran are increasing its commercial ties, Japan having emerged as the latest uranium exchange partner for Iran.
Everybody’s doing it — practicing mutually beneficial global economic relations. Everybody except US, Great Britain, and Israel, the world’s three major practitioners of predatory capitalism.
Jon Harrison wrote:
“I am 99.9% sure that so long as Obama is president, the United States will not attack Iran. We don’t know the man’s character well enough yet to say that he would resist a political imperative (that is, from the point of view of electoral politics and his own political future) to strike, though my guess is he would resist that temptation. [In my opinion, however, any Republican likely to be elected in 2012 might be inclined to “solve” the Iranian “problem” by military force. Still, unless our economic and strategic position has improved substantially by 2013, I don’t think a Romney or a Gingrich or even a Palin would deliberately start a war with Iran.] I think we could drift into war; I think the Israelis might drag us into one;”
Jon,
You express considerable confidence (which I share, as I suspect most people on this board do) that Obama won’t order an attack on Iran. You then suggest one possible exception: he might succumb to a “political imperative” (i.e. the need to get re-elected). You then proceed to suggest that a Republican president elected in 2012 might be more inclined to order an attack on Iran (again, a view I share, as I suspect most people on this board do), though you suggest that this Republican president would not “deliberately start a war with Iran,” but that the “Israelis might drag us into one.”
My question is this: When you’re considering exceptions to your general belief that Obama won’t order an attack on Iran, why do you conclude that the most likely exception to that would be Obama’s “political imperative” (to get re-elected)? What about the same possibility that you explicitly consider for the hypothetical Republican president? Do you not consider it possible that we could get dragged into an Iran war while Obama is president?
While neither possibility — Obama attacking Iran to get re-elected; Obama attacking Iran to defend Israel after Israel attacks Iran — strikes me as a serious risk, if I had to rank those two risks, I’d put them in reverse order from how I just listed them.
Would you?
Well, Cyrus, I think much of what you say below is overdrawn or simply incorrect. But I don’t claim to be all-knowing; we’ll just have to agree to disagree, I guess.
Jon – my point was that the US may not have invaded Iraq under Clinton, and may not invade Iran under Obama, but both Democratic presidents allowed the continuation of the build-up towards the invasions without the slightest distraction. They did nothing to hinder it, but actively participated in the build-up. Nor is there is prerequisite for a Republican to be in office for an invasion. I defy you to point out a substantive change in either Clinton’s approach to Iraq, or Obama’s approach to Iran from their Republican predecessors. As for what you believe were reasons for the war — reasons which are plausible but not authoritative (except for the need to remove WMDs which we knew for a fact no longer existed. And, I am not sure how walking into a known quagmire helps promote anyone’s security in the region) — a similar list can be made for Iran too.
Anyway, we are told that Iran an attack on Iran is unlikely as it would be unsuccessful or have all sorts of other negative consequences. This line of thinking proceeds on the “reality-based” assumption that the people who want to see Iran bombed really care about whether the bombings themselves can be successful in the limited sense of taking out their intended targets and setting back Iran’s “nuclear weapons program”. However, this assumption is open to question. After all, we just invaded an entire country in order to destroy WMDs that WE KNEW didn’t exist there in the first place. We also know that there isn’t a nuclear weapons program in Iran, and yet the beaters of the war drums don’t seem to care. The actual bombings are merely incidental to their other goals.
Cyrus, I don’t believe the Clinton administration was planning an invasion Iraq — or to put it another way, I don’t think a President Gore would have invaded (I’m not a Democrat or a Republican, by the way). Of course the US military has contingency plans for everything, but that’s beside the point. The invasion of 2003 was made possible by the post 9/11 hysteria in this country, and the willingness of the neocons to take advantage of same. I have written pretty extensively on why the invasion took place, the primary reasons being 1) the desire on the part of influential people, in government and out, to preserve and enhance the security of Israel; 2) Bush 43’s desire to surpass his father (the oedipal imperative); 3) the need, as seen in some quarters, to secure US participation in the exploitation of energy supplies throughout the Middle East-Central Asia; 4) a desire to eliminate Saddam’s presumed stocks of WMD.
I am 99.9% sure that so long as Obama is president, the United States will not attack Iran. We don’t know the man’s character well enough yet to say that he would resist a political imperative (that is, from the point of view of electoral politics and his own political future) to strike, though my guess is he would resist that temptation. In my opinion, however, any Republican likely to be elected in 2012 might be inclined to “solve” the Iranian “problem” by military force. Still, unless our economic and strategic position has improved substantially by 2013, I don’t think a Romney or a Gingrich or even a Palin would deliberately start a war with Iran. I think we could drift into war; I think the Israelis might drag us into one; but I don’t regard it as likely that the U.S. will attack Iran unless our strength is much greater than it is today.
I think talk about the military-industrial complex’s influence over policy is overstated these days. However, Fiorangela reminds us that we cannot discount this factor completely. (I know many of you out there will contend that the M-I’s influence is decisive. Sorry, I don’t buy that.)
Eric Brill wrote:
“On the third, I don’t have a good feel for how much pressure the military/industrial complex is exerting right now, but I suspect it’s not that much relative to other sources of pressure for escalating the confrontation with Iran. Understandably, I think the MIC prefers to let others take the lead on pressure-exerting, stepping in only when those others are shirking their duty – which surely isn’t the case these days.”
Iran is the focal point of the US MIC marketing campaign, MidEast/Arabian Peninsula division; Gen Petraeus is sales manager.
2009: www npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121498041
“In his public remarks, General David Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command, urged Gulf leaders to beef up their weapons systems and cooperate more on security matters. He said America was feeling more welcome in this part of the world than it had for some time, largely because of worries about Iran. Petraeus said the United Arab Emirates alone in the past year had done $18 billion worth of business with the U.S., half of that coming in military purchases.
General DAVID PETRAEUS (U.S. Central Command): There’s a reason that they’re buying U.S., and we think it’s because the products are quite good. In fact, the fact is that because of those purchases and because of training and assistance and some great investment in human capital in the Emirates, the Emirati air force itself could take out the entire Iranian air force, I believe.”
2008: http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2008/december-2008/united-arab-emirates-buys-patriot-missile-defenses/
“At a security conference in Bahrain this month, the sizable U.S. delegation, led by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, discussed security and terrorism threats from Iraq to Afghanistan, to India and Pakistan. But a number of analysts at the conference got the impression that the Americans had one thing on their minds: a $7 billion dollar missile-defense deal with the UAE. Gates made sure to remind delegates of the threat from Iran.”
A lot of people in 2003 thought the US would impose by force a new Mubarak on Iraq. Chalabi had auditioned for and gotten the role. I remember that was my second biggest fear, after the suffering that would be caused for millions of Iraqis by the invasion and occupation themselves.
That Iraq has averted that outcome is a surprise for me as much as for the US foreign policy establishment.
So my point is that today is not 2002 or 2003. The US foreign policy establishment does not think it is militarily easy, or even feasible, to put a pro-US regime into a country it defeats. Because of this, I very strongly doubt the US foreign policy establishment has any desire to attack Iran. That would be a repeat of a mistake the US has learned in Iraq.
The United States does not want to tolerate a country as powerful as Brazil or Argentina whose people do not accept the legitimacy of Israel in Israel’s region. That’s why the US has not agreed to even discuss Iran having a Brazil-like or Argentina-like nuclear program.
I think we are seeing a new realization that there is no way to prevent that outcome, or at least we are seeing that realization expressed consistently by mainstream foreign policy analysts. Sanctions have been postponed long enough that negotiations could conceivably arrive at an agreement to export uranium and begin talks.
If there is an agreement to begin talks, I’m pretty sure it is because the US indicated, and Iran has concluded that the indications are credible, that Iran is to be left with a nuclear program that meets Iran’s requirements, in other words the US has retreated from its position that Iran cannot have a Brazil-option.
Cyrus wrote:
“In the current circumstances with respect to IRan, there is no pressing strategic imperative for the US to bargain with Iran, no American politician is capable of withstanding the ire of AIPAC, and the military-industrial complex certainly needs a new enemy-du-jour to justify a ginormous military budget in the post-Cold War era.”
Cyrus,
You make three statements here.
On the third, I don’t have a good feel for how much pressure the military/industrial complex is exerting right now, but I suspect it’s not that much relative to other sources of pressure for escalating the confrontation with Iran. Understandably, I think the MIC prefers to let others take the lead on pressure-exerting, stepping in only when those others are shirking their duty – which surely isn’t the case these days. If everyone else suddenly turned into a bunch of limp-wristed peace mongerers, the MIC might (or might not) step up the pressure, but it’s presumably got enough order flow from Iran and Afghanistan (among other real or imagined hot spots) to keep it happy for the time being.
On your first point, I agree completely. It’s your second point that confuses me a bit, since I think that point, if true, may prevent the natural consequences of the first point from occurring. There is a big difference (which I have always understood, even though I didn’t mention it in my earlier comments) between (1) not having a strategic imperative to bargain [grandly] with Iran; and (2) being practically able to behave accordingly. That difference can have several causes, of course. Some might argue that your second point just might be one of those possible causes (and here I’d like to quote Billy Bob Thornton, who used to review gory movies, such as The Texas Chain-Saw Massacre, for the Sunday paper in my city): “… if you know what I mean, and I think you do.”
rfjk – if so, it’s going to be hilarious watching them fall over each other in the rush to be able to say “just like I said on [insert date from some time after mid-Feb 2010]” ….
Jon – I don’t know if the party-affiliation of the administration makes a difference. The buildup towards war in Iraq continued under Clinton too. People assume that we are not building up to a war in Iran simply because the results would be so disasterous, as if that matters. However, even Cheney specifically stated in 1994 that an invasion of Iraq would lead to a quagmire, yet he pursued that course anyway (See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BEsZMvrq-I) To date, no one really knows why we invaded Iraq (WMDs were certainly not the real reason, as any sane person now acknowledges.) In any case, what would be the motivating force for the US to reach a grand bargain for Iran? When Nixon went to China, it only happened after years of bloody proxy wars in VIetnam and Korea, and there was a strategic imperative (a US-China alignment against the USSR) as well as domestic support (Nixon managed to sideline the pro-Taiwanese lobby.) In the current circumstances with respect to IRan, there is no pressing strategic imperative for the US to bargain with Iran, no American politician is capable of withstanding the ire of AIPAC, and the military-industrial complex certainly needs a new enemy-du-jour to justify a ginormous military budget in the post-Cold War era. So what if such an attack leads to a protracted mess? No one cared about that when invading Iraq either.
I’ll bet a dollars worth of donuts that something is moving within the F/P making establishment and the Obama administration. And that better late than never George Friedman of Stratfor.com fame is yanking his hands out of his pockets and jumping on the caboose before the train leaves him in the station.
Cyrus, I agree — I don’t think the US administration or a majority of the foreign policy establishment wants a grand bargain with Iran. (That’s why this blog exists, I’d say.) But I don’t think we’re witnessing a deliberate runup to war as in Iraq. The circumstances are just so different today. Of course, if a Republican administration takes over in 2013, things may change. And in the meantime the Israelis may very well do something.
Friedman at least is advocating a grand bargain, if I read him right. We have to hope that more and more people with power and influence come to his position. It’s critical for the future of both the American and the Iranian people.
I think in Iran, the US should limit itself to ensuring their interests are no worse off than the Chinese or the Russians or the Indians. The Iranians are not interested in elevating the US to greater importance than the others, but nor do they want to be in the pocket of the Russians or Chinese.
Iran is the playing field for the big powers, and I can’t think of a cannier bunch of people to referee them.
Jon I didn’t read friedman’s article that way. He along with the rest of the foreign policy establishment seem absolutely determined not to even acknowledge Iranian compromise offers, settling instead for a narrative that posits a false choice: we either have to sanction/contain Iran or bomb Iran. Of course many of the sanctions proponents acknowledge that sanctions will probably be ineffective too, and make little secret of what they expect should come afterwards: bombings. So even to them, sanctions are just an incremental step towards war. To date no one has seriously considered the Iranian compromise offers. These have included for example operating the enrichment program as a multinational endeavor, which matched a proposal by the IAEAs own committee created to investigate options to reduce the liklihood that civilian nuclear programs could be diverted to bomb-making. Iran has also offered to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol allowing more intrusive inspections. Neither Argentina, brazil, S Korea nor Egypt have gone so far with their nuclear programs, though the last two were caught violationg their own safeguards agreements and engaging in perhaps weapons-reslted nuclear experiment (there are still traces of weapons grade enriched uranium in Egypt which have not been explained) and yet the US insists on trying to totally deprive Iran of enrichment, in blatant disregard of the NPT. What can we conclude from all this except that the nuclear weapons issue is pretextual, that the US is simply using it just as “WMDs in Iraq” as a justification for another agenda, and so no amount of inspections and compromises will ever suffice because the real goal is regime change by force if necessary? And if that’s true what makes you think the US is interested in any grand bargains? Just look at how our media and think tanks issue daily barrages of scaremongering and disinformation about Iran. The parallels to the buildup on Iraq are eeeeerily obvious.
I recommend that everyone take the time to read Friedman’s piece in its entirety. A very lucid exposition of realpolitik. It’s so good, it basically recapitulates arguments I made in print four years ago!
Everything stated in this piece by both Friendman and Katcher is so obvious that one wonders why the administration hasn’t gotten there yet. The answer must be politics, that is, the influence wielded by the neocons/Israel Lobby in the American media and Congress. Or do we believe that the administration is simply too dense to perceive realties?
The Obama administration must a) accept the reality of the situation as laid out in this piece, and then b) educate an American public that by and large agrees with the neocon/Israeli view of Iran. The alternative is a continued drift toward war, not to mention increased Iranian meddling in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.
Cyrus, when Friedman says the diplomatic approach consists of trying to achieve a broad consensus for tough sanctions, he means that this is the course the Obama administration has been following — not that he (Friedman) believes diplomacy should be restricted to this approach.
Lysander, I would not feel so confident that the establishment has concluded it can do nothing about the Iranian nuclear program. O’Hanlon’s view remains very much a minority one. The usual suspects will turn up the heat as they see the opportunity to do so with profit, and especially after the November elections, assuming the Deomcrats do indeed suffer big losses.
Alan
I’ll submit that all of southwest Eurasia is the overarching “key strategic issue” for the US of A. Friedman thinks small and Ben can’t be faulted for framing his arguments for discussion. Its Stratfor’s boss who plays the ‘master of the obvious’ when he states that the prime US strategic interest by the numbers is:
“…First, it must maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States cannot tolerate interruptions, and that limits the risks it can take. Second, it must try to keep any one power from controlling all of the oil in the Persian Gulf, as that would give such a country too much long-term power within the global system. Third, while the United States is involved in a war with elements of the Sunni Muslim world, it must reduce the forces devoted to that war. Fourth, it must deal with the Iranian problem directly. Europe will go as far as sanctions but no further, while the Russians and Chinese won’t even go that far yet. Fifth, it must prevent an Israeli strike on Iran for the same reasons it must avoid a strike itself, as the day after any Israeli strike will be left to the United States to manage…”
Should the US and Iran have a war, the Iranians have the means to strike back in the region and the Persian Gulf that would in all likelihood be disastrous to the US and the global economy. It would also be a Holocaust to the Iranians, because the US will unleash its military might against Iran, possibly using even theater nuclear weapons. No matter how that game is played there are no winners, not even Russia or China, except Zionists who would be leering from the side lines in malicious satisfaction.
Perhaps it has something to do with Iran’s recent letter to the IAEA, which is as succinct and to the point as you can get. They will exchange their LEU in one hit in Iran simultaneously for fuel plates. It implies political consensus in Iran has returned, at least over this.
Also, our leverage appears to have gone. If we don’t give them the plates, and they can’t make them, their third option is to buy the isotopes. It would be a very tricky business to deliberately block their purchase of essential medical supplies wouldn’t it?
And contrary to Ben’s view in the post, I don’t think Iran can act as a spoiler in I/P. Iraq and Afghanistan most definitely, but not Palestine.
Eric brings up an interesting point concerning the confusion that reigns over ‘grand bargains.’ A lot of this uncertainly is deliberately spread by opponents of any form of deal limited or otherwise between Iran and the US, and is actually designed to thwart such an outcome. Demands for preconditions or negotiated settlements prior to engagement are only invitations to sabotage.
In a nutshell a deal can arise out of nothing more than a simple and limited understanding between antagonists, as that arrived at between the US and China. And must be conducted in secrecy to build the trust between leaders to take the leap. It takes guts and a deep, intuitive understanding of the other on the part of the countries leaders, to engage in what essentially is a gamble that can so easily go wrong and destructive to their careers and political fortunes.
The great question of the hour is whether Obama has these attributes, or will it be left to another to accomplish.
Lysander
Thank you for the link to the FT article of O’Hanlon, what is striking is how similar these two articles (and Friedman’s) are, and not only of their positions but even in the verbiage.
Love to hear every ones opinion, that if you think this is a new tactical shift to center, buy the war party to create space, or if you think they are genuinely accepting the current realities and if the latter, why now., it’s astonishing that just a few weeks ago a self declared realist (Haass) recommended war with Iran is the only option we have left, and now these war for ever optimists want a detente of a kind.
What do you think is going on?, are the think thanks shuffling analyst and strategy papers, or is this the change that was promised
Eric
You hand me on board all the way till your last line:
“…But it strikes me that the perceived need to reach such a deal casts it as more of a road-block than an ice-breaker, and may give the US a convenient excuse to pull out its Ray-O-Blaster if it can’t (or won’t) find a way to get around that road-block.”
rfjk writes: “These diplomatic affairs mark the beginning of a process towards normalization that could take years, decades or even a generation to complete.”
I think what you have in mind as a “grand bargain” is a lot less concrete than what I understand the term to mean as it’s been used here: not just some diplomats’ meet-and-greet that might lead to a reestablishment of diplomatic relations and eventually to some generally warm and fuzzy feelings between the countries — but something more immediate and concrete: actual settlements of (real or manufactured) disputes on major points: Iran’s nuclear program, Iraq/Afghanistan, maybe even Israel/Palestine. Most important: “grand bargain” as it’s been used here appears to me to mean something that would be expected to precede — not to follow, as you seem to have in mind — the establishment of more friendly relations between the “bargainers”. I think your sequence is the right one: quit posturing, find something less “grand” to talk about than Iran’s nuclear program, strike some simple deals on small points, and eventually work your way to the tougher subjects without any sense of urgency. But most people, I think, have in mind that the “grand bargain” needs to be struck first, or at least that it would be best if that could occur. It’s somehow thought of as an “ice breaker”, an entree to generally better relations. But it strikes me that the perceived need to reach such a deal casts it as more of a road-block than an ice-breaker, and may give the US a convenient excuse to pull out its Ray-O-Blaster if it can’t (or won’t) find a way to get around that road-block.
Eric
The US and Iran haven’t been kissing cousins for the past 30 years. Nor has the perpetuation of conflict between the US and Iran been solely the US’s fault. We are enemies just as much by chance and circumstance, as by fault, error or design. But regardless of the arrows and slings of outrageous misfortune, that’s no excuse to remain trapped in an insoluble state of discord that is detrimental to both countries national and strategic interests.
This is an interesting piece and somewhat linked to the broader debate:
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/022710.html
Lysander
The F/T article comes to a conclusion that even George Friedman of Stratfor.com now admits are untenable. “Containment” only perpetuates crises and conflict between the US and Iran, and in the end is an even bigger loser than sanctions where Russia and China will be happily about their business thwarting.
rfjk wrote: “Grand bargains, rapprochement or deals are not made with friendly states or current allies, but with one’s enemies.”
[We declare that] Iran is our enemy, and that’s why we need to make a grand bargain with it. That I understand. What I don’t understand is the sentence without the bracketed words.
I strongly doubt US policy makers ever believed they could stop the Iranians from nuclear technology or weaponry. They have tried to delay Iranian acquisition, which is a sensible, non proliferation strategy. But the Iranians are already in possession of a level of nuclear technology that cannot be reversed. I have always believed the US would accept a nuclear Iran, even with nukes and the means to deliver them as the US accepted Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities and arsenals.
Grand bargains, rapprochement or deals are not made with friendly states or current allies, but with ones enemies. Such are by no stretch of the imagination treaties or negotiated settlements. These diplomatic affairs mark the beginning of a process towards normalization that could take years, decades or even a generation to complete. It simply arises out of the recognition of the futility of conflict between enemies, who rationalize a scheme of coexistence in pursuit of their interests and means to negotiate their differences short of war or senseless conflict.
Holy cow! Somebody, please tell me who clued Stratfor.com’s George Friedman in!!!!
There’s nothing new or revelatory in this report, since its all been discussed or revealed at this and other F/P sites. What is new is that Friedman has finally had the light bulb explode in his skull, that sanctions are as dead an option as military strikes or fantasies of regime change in Tehran, and that no coercive means whatsoever exist for an alliance of the willing, or the US alone in imposing its will on Iran.
Friedman is wrong on several points. Sanctions as he envisions or describes them are not diplomatic tools, they are in fact economic weapons of coercion intended to force Iranian compliance. Its only sinking into Friedman’s brain now that such won’t work. Its ludicrous to equate US opposition to a fringe element of Sunni, international terrorists like al Qaeda, on a par with the Sunni/Shiite divide between Arabs and Iranians. Nor are minimal US combat forces in Iraq or Afghanistan a stumbling block for the Iranians, anymore than a nuclear Iran is to the US. And the greatest losers aren’t the Sunnis, they are the Israelis, though he indirectly assets this by the anger and rage over betrayal Israelis would undoubtedly express at any US/Iranian accord, no matter how limited.
The latter must be extraordinarily painful in the extreme for Friedman to admit, but having done so is an example of how far advanced within the US F/P making community the idea of engagement with Iran is being discussed and embraced, despite the media hype and off color remarks of certain principals in the Obama administration. Its just as likely the media hype over sticks instead of carrots is camouflage not for sanctions or air-strikes, but kabuki theater as cover for secret interchanges between the Obama and Ahmadinejad regimes.
Friedman is getting ahead of the curve by giving his client base a heads up on the unthinkable and inevitable. I got my first clue there was something wrong in Friedman’s thinking regarding the Middle East when he was among the first to champion the US invasion of Iraq. And the analysis in this sit/rep is not the wanted outcome George Friedman of Stratfor.com ever imagined he was going to report. Wars are uncertain affairs and always result in unintended consequences, and Friedman is still learning and being instructed in the brutal truths of realpolitik.
John H. wrote:
“Maybe the US could simply cease and desist its confrontational approach, and the whole issue would simply disappear.”
Exactly.
“Does there really exist a discrete dispute between the US and Iran that requires some sort of settlement?” Excellent question!
Maybe the US could simply cease and desist its confrontational approach, and the whole issue would simply disappear. Of course, Israeli politicians would have nothing to distract attention from their brutal occupation or reason to beggar the diaspora and US taxpayers, so the issue can’t die quietly.
Cyrus wrote:
“Why is diplomacy automatically equated with sanctions, and a civilian IAEA-monitored nuclear program automatically equated with weapons?”
An even more fundamental question: “Why does US policy toward Iran require any sort of “bargain” at all – “grand” or otherwise?” Do we see the need for any kind of “bargain” with, say, Pakistan? India? China? Russia? Malawi? Or do we just sort of keep an eye on things with those countries – day after day, year after year, and make adjustments as necessary along the way?
A “grand bargain” sounds much like a treaty — a formal settlement that provides finality (for a time, at least) to a war or some other long-running dispute between two countries. Does there really exist a discrete dispute between the US and Iran that requires some sort of settlement, other than the chip-on-our-shoulder confrontation that the US has created and continually escalates? Doesn’t the very fact that we even talk about the possibility of a “grand bargain” imply that there exists a serious dispute that needs to be settled somehow or other? And if so, does that not imply as well that, if some “grand bargain” cannot be struck, one party or the other (the US, here) to this imagined dispute might be left with no choice but to resolve it by force?
In addition to the Friedman essay, there is also a piece in the Financial Times by Pro Iraq war, Pro surge neoconservative of the ‘left’ Michael O’Hanlon entitled “Don’t Even Think About Bombing Iran.” The importance of these articles is not so much their touting of “diplomacy,” but as a sign that the establishment has realized that Iran is going to continue its nuclear work and there isn’t a thing they can do about it.
Whether Iran ever intended to build a bomb is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is, it can if it wants to and that capability, even if Iran hasn’t the slightest intention of ever using it, gives it immense geopolitical leverage. It also give Iran regional prestige and with it a greater ability to influence events and the policies of its neighbors.
US policy makers are just now realizing that they can’t do a thing to stop any of that. The point of these articles and many like them sure to follow is to now persuade the public, fed on a diet of “we will never allow Iran to have nukes” that the decision will be Iran’s to make and not theirs.
How Iran decides doesn’t matter so much as the fact that the US can’t control the decision itself.
The O’Hanlon article:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a5af1b8-24a3-11df-8be0-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1
Cyrus said, “Could it be because the entire nuclear issue is merely pretextual and a manufactured crisis to cover another agenda entirely such as regime change?”
That would explain why the rationale for confronting Iran has been shifting constantly over the last 30 years…
Eerily reminiscent of the constantly shifting reasons for occupying Iraq, isn’t it?
Why is diplomacy automatically equated with sanctions, and a civilian IAEA-monitored nuclear program automatically equated with weapons? Brazil and Argentina have also developed uranium enrichment programs that are far less transparent than Iran’s, so instead of assuming that crippling sanctions should be the purpose of our diplomacy, why not work for a solution were Iran’s rights and interests in maintaining an enrichment capability is respected? Iran has already made compromise offers that would address ant real concern about nuclear weapons proliferation by for example offering to operate it’s nuclear program as joint ventures, thus making it imossible to secretly make bombs. Why does our “diplomacy” not at least acknowledge these offers and use them as a starting point for real negotiations with Iran? Could it be because the entire nuclear issue is merely pretextual and a manufactured crisis to cover another agenda entirely such as regime change?
Brilliant, wow finally some folks are spelling it out