Over at the Middle East Report Online, Farideh Farhi offers a thorough analysis of the P5+1 negotiations from an Iranian perspective.
I can’t speak to the accuracy of all of Farhi’s conclusions, but I do agree with her assessment that the Islamic Republic’s approach to the negotiations is more complex than simply an effort to buy time.
Her critique of the Obama administration’s response is also worth paying attention to:
But neither is the Obama administration fault-free, if the US intent at Geneva was to strike a bargain limiting Iran’s enrichment program and instituting a robust inspection regime. (If the intent was to make pro forma overtures designed to be disdained, so that the US might garner support for further sanctions, then all bets are off.) When the agreements encountered opposition, the US could have counseled forbearance, allowing the P5+1 to wait for a counter-offer from Tehran. The White House could have reflected upon the fact that the hardliners themselves had floated the ideas of keeping Iran’s LEU stockpile small and enriching no more uranium beyond 5 percent. Instead, impatient with Iran’s messy domestic dynamics, the US chose a more familiar path: announcements of deadlines, patronizing speeches and ominous reminders that the clock was ticking. In effect, Washington’s insistence that the Geneva and Vienna drafts were the only offer on the table turned the tentative agreement into an ultimatum — and the IAEA censure became a foregone conclusion. Already under fire for caving into Western pressure their political opponents likely imagined, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad could hardly bow to pressure that was real.
The entire article can be read here.
Iranian – believe me, I don’t trust the west in the slightest, and neither should Iran. My point about the 20% and extra enrichment plants is that the West has no right to stop them anyway. Sure they would oppose it with threats etc, but they have no legal right to do so, which has always been Iran’s main point.
But it does seem as though the Iranians want to do a deal, and that is why I don’t think Ahmadinejad’s approach can be explained by negotiating tactics. It can only be explained by other pressures, otherwise why would he reject the very deal he himself offered?
This is the big point here – up until now I had thought Iran had asked for help to get 20% fuel for the TRR, the P5+1 offered the deal we are all familiar with, Iran then counter-offered with the exchange on Iranian soil.
Now it seems as though the deal we thought was offered by the P5+1 was actually initially suggested/offered by Ahmadinejad, and the P5+1 simply picked it up and ran with it.
The strategy of the West certainly shouldn’t be to try and sideline Ahmadinejad and work with others in Iran – that would be hopeless. Rather, if there was dissent in Iran, they should let the Iranian politicians build the consensus they need domestically, then do the deal that suits that consensus.
Sadly it is starting to look as though the West isn’t smart enough to do that, but I hope I’m wrong.
If the intent was to make pro forma overtures designed to be disdained, so that the US might garner support for further sanctions, then all bets are off — and indeed that is the case.
The offer to Iran was meant to be rejected. This is part of Dennis Ross’ strategy of making a war more palatable.
Alan-for your second paragraph: the trustworthiness is for the other side as well. it took almost 4 years for the same west to accept bellow 5% enrichment in Iran’s soil, not just out of nicety, but Iran’s stubbornness. i remember, even when Iran started SF6 in Isfahan in 2005 not Natanz, the same media were question the trustworthiness of Iranians. and that time, Iran was not even practicing her rights under NPT. it’s fair to say the blame for the lack of trust should be put entirely on the west. do you really think the west would easily accept, without noise and threat, Iran to enrich uranium up to 20%? if so, this is a very simplistic approach. the west even doesn’t want to see low level enriched uranium to be in Iran! how can one believe they would accept for higher level enrichment, that Iran is entitled under NPT which she is a signatory? I think, you have put too much trust on the west.
I think the Obama admin. should look at Iran as a single entity and deal with her legitimate gov. that has just received 63% of the votes. as the events of the past 11 months show, playing with Iran’s domestic politics is counterproductive (remember, the fact that Obama didn’t do much before the election was partly the same as the advice of these so called experts to wait for a moderate gov. to come out of the election. and as the Leveretts said before, these experts are feeling burden for their ridiculous analysis of the election). in that sense, I would consider Farahi’s analysis as useless as I see her election judgment.
Iranian – thanks for reply. Firstly with regard to Obama, one imagines he started talking of other options in response to Ahmadinejad changing his own position. That said, I think most of the belligerence was coming from France and the UK, not the US. It may just be a silly, ill-judged game of good cop bad cop, but I get the feeling there is a lot for Obama to gain if he can pull off a deal, and he knows it. I think the insight offered in this piece by Farideh Farhi shows how achievable a deal is if he is prepared to roll with the internal Iranian political dynamics a bit. I think there is certainly scope for an initial, simultaneous exchange deal on Iranian soil, and the astonishing thing is that this wasn’t Ahmadinejad’s opening gambit, because I think the P5+1 would have seriously considered it.
I think your idea that Ahmadinejad backtracking was an elaborate ploy to engineer a better scenario vis-a-vis enrichment in the future assumes the Iranians don’t want a deal, and reinforces all the stereotypes the Western media loves to employ about the “trustworthiness” and “good faith” of the Iranians. That is not my understanding of the Iranian approach to date, which I believe has been very consistent and fair. Under the NPT, they are entitled to enrich to 20%, and to have multiple enrichment sites anyway.
So I still think Ahmadinejad/Khamanei et al being unnerved by high level domestic opposition to their initial proposal is a more plausible explanation for their change in position. The West now just needs the common sense to acknowledge that and do a deal based on the revised Iranian offer.
I think Obama changed his position after the June elections. Even if they were legitimate, here in the US they are considered frauduent by most. So Obama could not make the concession of Iranian enrichment. He would have been eaten alive politically.
Also many in the west believe Iran is in a weak position domestically and so now is the time to push for sanctions and try to collapse the government. It doesn’t matter if they are mistaken. They believe it to Bo true and so act accordingly.
well, I think, first of all, in mid October, he almost got his credibility back, international and internal. the international mode was different by then, he was scheduled to visit Latin America, and the green movement had lost its relevancy on the eyes of the majority of Iranian people all together. remember, after Oct.1th meeting, Iran was on the offensive. and even in the recent IAEA report, there is no mentioning about the fact that Uranium enrichment was not suspended. compare the recent report with the previous ones. I don’t think, Iran’s gov. have ever believed the west could agree with this deal, neither did the west(the west was openly talking about removing the “strategic asset” as an advantage and to buy time, but not a trust-building measurement). and this was a surprise for them to see how the other side is out of option and begs for a leverage. after all, now, the door is opened for higher level enrichment. it’s true that the sanction might get applied in some sections. but, back in Sept. it was going to be applied just because of the continuation of the enrichment (there was no Fordo, no talk of 20%…), not higher level one, and the expansion of the program. so, it’s fair to say, now is a far better situation for Iran than 3 months ago.this is not a desirable or an ideal situation though.just a better scenario.
Alan- why did Obama back tracked from what he said in his early messages to Iran-namely the Norouz message? he explicitly said that he will not advance the engagement policy with threat and talked of mutual respect as well. was that only for domestic pressure? I think, Pres.Obama switched to the confrontational mode so early.
An Iranian – how do you account for the change in Ahmadinejad’s stance then? Most of the circumstances you describe apply to the time before he was quoted as making the original exchange offer (September 29). Why did he back-pedal on the deal in October/November if it was not in the face of domestic opposition?
For what it’s worth, I think the Iranians would be most unwise to entrust their LEU to the Russians/French for 12 months, and was very surprised to read that this offer originated from Ahmadinejad/Khamanei, and not the West.
“Khamenei and Ahmadinejad underestimated the volatility of Iranian domestic politics pursuant to the fraudulent June 12 presidential election”. the first section might be partly true, but somebody should ask this so called expert, who really underestimated the election results? it surprises me to see a so called expert, or better say a conspirator, who is trying to disclose hidden dimension of the body politic of a country, without even been in that country for more than 5 years, let alone having first hand contact with the decision makers in Tehran, is taken seriously while the same individual fails to back up her big claim of fraud in an election with that scale.
isn’t the election aftermath that had locked Iran’s gov. for the whole summer, a reason for the Islamic Republic to look for a scapegoat so that it could reconstruct itself within the few months time it could make by offering such a deal? one should have the atmosphere of that time in mind, particularly the high uncertainty of Ahmadinejad’s trip to the U.N.in particular the encounter he was promised to experience in NYC, partly with the deeply misguided analysis of people like Farideh Farahi and their illusion of a rigged election. at that time, the sanction was looming, the media was full of the talk about Sept. deadline, and the public was prepared for that matter.
Thanks for posting this Ben. It’s a real eye-opener, a fascinating insight into the dynamics of what is going on in Iran. It correlates in part with El Baradei’s assessment in his recent interview with Newsweek where he said part of the problem with getting a deal done had to do with Iranian leaders jostling over who would get the credit for bringing Iran in from the cold.
The whole thing is tantalisingly close; I wonder whether Obama is a bit cannier than his European counterparts here because his initial approach to the Iranians seemed to be a direct response to Netanyahu so blatantly telling him to get lost over a settlement freeze. Talking to Iran was the last thing Netanyahu would have wanted him to do, and if he can make real progress it will make it extremely difficult for the Israelis to act unilaterally.
That was a good piece. Thanks for drawing my attention to it.