The Dobbins piece is very interesting and very balanced, but it hardly confirms the positions adopted by either Leverett. The Taliban and Al Qaeda consider the Shia to be apostates who should be liquidated. They consider the government in Iran to be an abomination. The same Taliban controlled government allowed Afghan territory to be used to plan the worst terrorist attack in American history. The fact that Iran and the United States could cooperate to oppose such a bitter mutual opponent doesn’t seem all that surprising to me; nor does it seem particularly consequential. Dobbins does make the point that the United States came late to the game; a coalition of Iran, India, Russia and the Northern Alliance had already been formed to oppose the Taliban. Of course, they were completely ineffective; that is until the Americans stepped in.

By way of comparison, Dobbins references the coalition (mostly European) that worked to settle the disputes in Bosnia and Kosovo. Of course this European led effort was equally ineffective until the United States stepped in with diplomatic intervention and the threat of military force; a threat that was actualized.

Dobbins also makes the point that Mann-Leverett never does; the Iranian diplomats he met with were accountable to a reformist regime; that of President Khatami who was wildly popular with that segment of the population that morphed into today’s “Green Movement.” To claim that the same people running Iran today is simply not true.

Dobbins also makes the point that at the time he was meeting with the Iranians, the regime could claim to be more democratic and representative than the regimes in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Of course today, whatever “Race for Iran” readers think of the legitimacy of the regime, millions of Iranians believe their leaders are illegitimate.

Dobbins makes the point repeated by many that the Bush Administration missed a major opportunity to achieve a rapprochement with Iran; this is almost certainly true. But there is no reasonable inference that can be taken from this strategic mistake that suggests a rapprochement is possible today. In fact, unlike Mann-Leverett, this is what Dobbins says,

“President Barack Obama holds a much weaker hand in dealing with Iran than
did his predecessor in 2001 or 2003…Obama can not, therefore, pick up the dialogue with Tehran where it was left in 2003. Nevertheless, the experience of cooperation over Afghanistan, and incipient cooperation over Iraq, remains relevant, a reminder of what was once possible and could be again.”

Dobbins also explains why the Iranians were so interested in engaging the United States in those days,

“The Iranian leadership was both thankful and fearful thankful that the United States had eliminated its two most dangerous regional rivals, and fearful that their own regime would be next.”

These motivations for engagement no longer exist and the Leveretts oppose incentivizing the Iranians by threatening regime change.

There are numerous other differences between what Dobbins says and what the Leveretts say. Here are just a few:

1) The Leveretts are convinced the regime is legitimate and that the election was not stolen; Dobbins says no such thing.

2) The Leveretts believe that the Green Revolution has no chance for success; Dobbins is agnostic on that.

3) The Leveretts are convinced that sanctions are destined to fail; Dobbins is skeptical that they will work but doesn’t suggest that they aren’t worth a try.

4) The Leveretts don’t think Obama has genuinely reached out to the Iranians. In his essay, Dobbins sites chapter and verse how the Obama Administration has reached out to the Iranians only to be rebuffed.

At the end of his essay, Dobbins essentially damns the approach that Mann-Leverett, Leverett and Katcher advocate. Here’s what Dobbins says,

“For thirty years, Washington and Tehran have communicated only intermittently and then usually at low levels. Given the distrust and misunderstanding that have built up on both sides, it would be remarkable if the recent reestablishment of higher level contact led to early breakthroughs. Yet, while engagement may not always produce accommodation, but it always yields information, which helps to create better policy. Thus, even failed negotiations are better than no negotiation at all.”

Dobbins seems to think that engagement is almost destined to fail at least in the timeframe necessary for Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Leverett and Mann-Leverett think the opposite.

I’m afraid Alan that citing Dobbins to support the Leveretts accomplishes exactly the opposite of what you intended.

http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_Dobbins.pdf

Regarding your point (2), Ahmadinejad is much more pliable over the nuclear issue than his predecessors, but it’s not up to him anyway. Khamenei is and was Supreme Leader, Rafsanjani now heads the Expediency Council. Previous lead negotiator Larijani now heads the Majlis. The regime is the same. Where’s the problem? The point is nobody talks to them, and somebody should.

Regarding your point (3), Iraq was March 2003, HML refers to her work regarding Afghanistan two years earlier.

On the whole, Mr Goldberg doesn’t sound too devastating, and I fear he has made you look silly rather than HML. I think I’ll give him a miss.

I am looking forward to Ms Mann-Leverett’s response to Goldberg’s new post because it is truly devastating to her argument. Goldberg points out the following: (1) Diplomats who were more senior, more experienced and more respected than Mann-Leverett don’t remember the negotiations with Iran as being as productive and she does; (2) Many of the Iranian diplomats that Mann-Leverett negotiated with have been purged or even arrested. Goldberg points out that negotiating with the previous reformist regime was one thing while negotiating with the current hard-line regime is something else again; (3) back when Mann-Leverett was negotiating with the Iranians they were petrified of the United States because of our very early success in Iraq and the keen anger at Muslim extremism in the United States generated by the fresh recollection of the 9/11 tragedy; this fear on the part of the Iranians has now evaporated. Of course, it could easily be reintroduced if the Iranian leadership genuinely believed military action aimed at overthrowing the regime was being contemplated.

Ms Mann-Leverett and her husband would be wise to try to develop a better appreciation for history and its lessons. First they exaggerate the similarities between China in the 1960s and Iran in 2010 and then they exaggerate the similarities between Iran in the early part of this decade under Khatami and the Iran of today under Ahmadinejad.

I hope Ms Mann-Leverett’s new response to Goldberg is a good one because he sure makes her look silly.

What are you trying to say?? You’re contradicting yourself. The solution is for the United States, Israel, Timbaktu, to stay away from Iran, period. Iran’s government has never been stable due it’s inherent structural and foundational inconsitancies. Instability has been the bread and butter of the regime for the past 30 years. That is the only way it has ever been able to survive. A stable IRI will not have lasted 30 years.

Iran does not have a nuclear weapon and it is no threat either to US or Israel.

Just stay the hell out, both Israel and US, and let the Iranian people determine their own future.

During my conversations with the Green supporters in Iran, not a single one purported to see Israel/Palestine as an Iranian issue. In fact, practically every Green I spoke with was very adamant in his/her belief that Palestinians are not Iran’s problem and Iran should reestablish its ties with Israel. (Unfortunately, this disassociation with the Palestinian cause in part stems from a rather racist perspective. Certain Iranian elites identify themselves as Persians as distinct from the Arabs, and by implication, in the context of both Iran’s history and contemporary events, superior.) Some of them had read or heard of Trita Parsi’s book on Iran/Israel relations and chosen to focus on his implicit suggestion that Iran and Israel are natural allies surrounded by Sunni Arabs and not his hypothesis that Iran/Israel relations has continued to be based on realism and power politics. Now, this does not represent the view of every Green, but a great many. It certainly does not represent the views of Mousavi whose take on Israel is somewhat closer to the present government (albeit more realistic) and the great majority of Iranians who feel a strong camaraderie with the Palestinian people and deep sympathy for their plight of occupation and oppression.

The evidence that the Neocons, AIPAC, and the rest of the Israel Lobby, including the media, have been working around the clock to fuel the unrest in Iran is simply overwhelming. How does Israel not stand to benefit from an unstable Iran adrift in civil strife and lacking strong leadership? How does it not stand to gain from an installed pro-western and puppet regime (Iraq/Afghanistan)? The Leveretts are certainly not Iranian, but they offer the most logical solution and one that is in the best interest of both Iran and its people and the US sans Israel.