We noticed a small news item yesterday, see here, reported from Tehran, which we think deserves more media attention and reflection in the West than it received. According to the story,

“Chinese Transport Minister Liu Zhijun is expected to visit Iran Sunday to sign a $2 billion contract to build a 360-mile-long railway linking key Iranian destinations that could later join to existing Iraq and Syrian railway networks and extending to the Mediterranean Sea.

Iran is forging ties with neighbors such as Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan as a strategy to rebuild itself as a trade center, ultimately forging a regional alliance that could support it against NATO countries.”

The article also quotes Nicklas Swanstrom, who heads Johns Hopkins University’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, on what the project means from a Chinese perspective.

“It also makes political sense, because while technically the U.S., Europe or Russia could block China’s sea routes, it would also have a land route. And by tying your neighbor’s infrastructure to you, it brings them closer.”

All of this, of course, is playing out in the wake of the most recent United Nations Security Council resolution imposing sanctions on Iran, the latest round of Iran-related unilateral and secondary sanctions by the United States, and the adoption of “national measures” by a growing number of U.S. allies (e.g., the European Union, Japan, Australia, Canada, and South Korea). China voted for the most recent UN sanctions and has said that it will abide by them. But Beijing has also made clear that it does not consider itself bound by sanctions defined unilaterally by other states outside the Security Council—and that, indeed, it considers such measures to be wholly lacking in legitimacy.

None of the initiatives discussed in the news report cited above violate UN sanctions against Iran. In fact, we cannot see how these efforts would even violate U.S. or other unilaterally-defined national sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, there have been other indications in recent weeks that China is not going to let a U.S.-led push to maximize Iran’s international economic isolation get in the way of Sino-Iranian economic ties. India has taken a similar position, see here, and may, like China, be acting to strengthen its economic and strategic ties to Iran.

Since the latest round of sanctions was adopted, China has stepped up its “economic diplomacy” and its concrete commercial ties with Iran in tangible ways. For example, China committed last month to new investments in Iranian petrochemical projects. As we have noted before, since 2004, all major investment contracts for new energy projects in Iran have been concluded by non-Western companies—primarily Chinese companies. We suspect that Chinese energy companies will conclude additional new investment contracts on Iranian energy projects in coming months.

These kinds of deals do potentially violate U.S. unilateral and secondary sanctions vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic (if Washington is foolish enough to push the point). The willingness to take advantage of such opportunities suggests that, while China’s leadership still does not want an open confrontation with the United States, Beijing is prepared to be more assertive in pursuing its interests in—and around—Iran.

While Western media, by and large, paid little or no attention to China’s commitment to build new railways in Iran, non-Western commentators did. As C. Raja Mohan, dean of India’s strategic commentariat, wrote in The Indian Express, “As the United States steps up the effort to isolate Tehran, China is penetrating deeper into the Iranian plateau.” Describing the railway deal as “an agreement on one important segment of this new Silk Road between the Far East and the Mediterranean”, Mohan argues that “Like the British Raj and the Russian empire that extended their railways into remote inner Asian frontiers more than a century ago as part of the Great Game, China wants to push transport corridors into all corners of Eurasia”.

But we are even more interested in what recent events indicate about foreign policy assessments and calculations in Tehran. On the Iranian side, these developments suggest that the current direction of Western policy toward the Islamic Republic—imposing more sanctions, rolling back previously established economic ties, getting ever more exercised over whatever sensationalized human rights case du jour is attracting the most Western media attention—is accelerating Tehran’s exploration of what can be described as “regional” and “Eastern” options for Iran’s foreign policy.

The Islamic Republic’s relations with regional neighbors—e.g., with Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Turkmenistan and other Central Asian states—are clearly becoming more prominent aspects of Iranian foreign policy. Likewise, Iran’s ties to China and other “rising” Asian states are taking on greater strategic as well as economic significance.

There is a human dimension, as well, to the “Eastern option” in Iranian foreign policy.  When we visited the University of Tehran in February, we had the opportunity to tour the university’s Confucius Institute, sponsored by the Chinese government to provide Chinese-language instruction and facilitate opportunities for Iranian students to study in China. There is clearly growing interest among young Iranians in such opportunities; we were told that the Confucius Institute’s offerings are the fastest-growing foreign language program on the campus.

More broadly, a number of our academic colleagues in Iran have described to us how the population of young Iranians studying abroad is shifting from Western locations (North America, Australia, Britain, and elsewhere in Europe) to places like China, India, and Malaysia. Ultimately, this trend could have a profound impact on the international orientation of the next generation of Iranian businesspeople, government officials, and thought leaders.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

There has, of course, been much commentary about the “re-launch” of the Middle East peace process last week in Washington.  Actually, the process is, at best, an Arab-Israeli peace process.  And, to be even more accurate, the process that was re-launched last week is really the highly conditioned Israeli-Palestinian “track” of old.  

Just giving an accurate description of the Obama Administration’s approach to “Middle East peacemaking” provides important insights into why this approach is unlikely to produce anything meaningful or positive.  We would highlight three considerations, in particular.     

First, several parties that need to be represented at the table are not there.  This is purely an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. 

–Syria—a nation-state with a significant portion of its territory under Israeli occupation since 1967, the provenance of which not even the most right-leaning Israeli politicians and commentators dispute—is not included.  Syria was left out, even though, according to the Arab League peace initiative, Israel will not get comprehensive peace with all Arab nations until it has returned all of the Arab territory it currently occupies and has resolved its disputes will all of its immediate neighbors—including Syria and Lebanon, along with the Palestinians. 

–As to the Palestinian side, a number of commentators have already pointed out—correctly, in our view—the absurdity of advancing negotiations when the Palestinian interlocutor does not represent all of the major Palestinian factions and communities and almost certainly could not “sell” to the Palestinian people any agreement it might actually negotiate with Israel.  The most glaring deficiency, in this regard, is the exclusion of HAMAS.  We recognize that HAMAS may not want to be a direct party to negotiations with Israel, and has accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the appropriate negotiator for the Palestinian side.  But HAMAS has also long advocated a reorganization of the PLO to encompass important Palestinian factions—like HAMAS—not currently included.  And, HAMAS has made clear that, in its view, any peace agreement negotiated by the PLO should be submitted for the Palestinian people’s approval or rejection in a genuinely representative referendum.  None of these conditions is in place—and the Fatah-dominated PLO that is negotiating almost certainly could not “sell” to the Palestinian people any agreement it might actually conclude with the Netanyahu government.   

–Moreover, for a “Middle East peace process” to have any chance of working, the Islamic Republic of Iran needs to be at least an indirect party.  Of course, Iranian officials have said over a number of years that, while Tehran respects the prerogative of Arab parties to negotiate an end to their conflicts with Israel, the Islamic Republic is not prepared to recognize a Zionist state.  But the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace holds potentially profound implications for the balance of power across the Middle East as a whole.  The interests of key Iranian allies—among them Syria, HAMAS, and Hizballah—and of the Islamic Republic itself could be deeply affected by the nature of an Arab-Israeli accommodation.  That is why Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, see here and here, is advocating a genuinely comprehensive settlement—encompassing the Syrian and Lebanese tracks along with the Palestinian track, with HAMAS playing an important role on the Palestinian side, and with the indispensability of Iran to a truly regional settlement recognized from the outset.

Second, the Obama Administration is stuck in an untenable position regarding Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territory.  More specifically, the Administration’s refusal to declare such settlements as illegal—as the rest of the world does and as the Geneva conventions stipulate—effectively guarantees that there will be never-ending haggling over what is or is not a new settlement, what is or is not “natural growth” of existing settlements, etc.  This, in turn, means there will be no confidence, on the Palestinian side, that negotiations will produce a viable territorial outcome.  The historical record on this point is clear.  When U.S. policy clearly identified the illegality of Israeli settlements—as it did during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations—U.S. diplomats were able to achieve genuine progress at beginning to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, as evidenced by various armistice agreements and the Camp David accords.  Even if Arab parties did not “like” Israel, they knew that there was at least the possibility of a settlement based on return of occupied territory.  But, ever since President Ronald Reagan changed U.S. policy to describe Israeli settlements as “unhelpful” but nonetheless legal, this prospect has slowly but surely evaporated.  President Obama had a chance in his first months in office to take U.S. policy back to its original, legally correct, and diplomatically effective position regarding Israeli settlement activity—but he “tanked” on this in his June 2009 Cairo speech. 

Third, the Obama Administration’s approach is grounded in a delusion that has warped America’s Middle East policy at least since the Clinton Administration—the mythical prospect of an Israeli-“moderate Arab” coalition brought together under U.S. leadership to contain and/or fight the Islamic Republic.  This truly bad idea suffers from many of the same deficiencies touched on in the preceding discussion—in particular, it seeks to exclude important regional constituencies with effective vetoes over diplomatic outcomes.  Moreover, while purportedly seeking to “contain” Iran, it blithely ignores the reality of the Islamic Republic’s effectively “uncontainable” regional position, and raises regional tensions.  In retrospect, one might say (with more intellectual generosity than we would extend) that, when this approach was first tried during the Clinton Administration, it was an experiment.  But today, we have “data” collected through repeated runnings of the experiment—across the Clinton Administration, the George W. Bush Administration, and the Obama Administration.  And the results are clear—the experiment has consistently failed, thereby invalidating the “theory” underlying it.  Unfortunately, the Obama Administration persists not only in continuing with this failed and irredeemably flawed approach—it has brought back some of that approach’s original champions to guide yet another ill-conceived effort at “Middle East peacemaking”. 

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Hooman Majd had another interesting piece in Foreign Policy yesterday, see here.  His article does something that is very necessary, but which we’ve not had to opportunity to do properly over the past couple of weeks—to take on the stream of recent Western commentary arguing that the Islamic Republic is “unraveling under the weight of economic mismanagement, the effect of sanctions, and the lingering discontent over last year’s election results and the aftermath of state-sanctioned violence”. 

As Hooman rightly points out, “that’s little more than wishful thinking dressed up as political analysis.”  The public disagreements among various factions and power centers in Iran that have so many Western analysts transfixed is, in reality, “business as usual”—or, as we would argue, it’s normal politics.       

Too many Western analysts persist in trying to depict Iranian politics as a binary, almost Manichean conflict between reformists and conservatives (or principlists).  According to Western conventional wisdom, if conservatives gain the upper hand over reformists, that can only be the result of repression.  From a mainstream Western viewpoint, if one notices political disagreements among conservatives—well, that must be a sign that the whole political order is falling apart.  And, in the current context, if the regime is falling apart, many Western observers will happily leap to the conclusion that this must be because of international sanctions. 

On these points, Hooman nicely re-injects both history and present-day reality into this discussion: 

“The tension surrounding Ahmadinejad isn’t a product of international sanctions, at least not primarily, nor does it signify the rebirth of the Green Movement:  It’s largely the expression of Iranian conservatives’ discontent with the status quo…Some of these conservative politicians have even challenged Ahmadinejad at the ballot box:  Ali Larijani, speaker of parliament, and Mohammad Qalibaf, mayor of Tehran, both ran for president in 2005.  In 2009, Mohsen Rezaee, former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, threw his hat in the ring against the sitting president.  Their differences range from the rhetorical—many traditional conservatives think Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory grandstanding has hurt Iran’s cause on the world stage—to the bureaucratic—Ahmadinejad has pointedly restricted decision-making on economic policy to all but his most-trusted aides.

Conservative clerical opposition to Ahmadinejad has been a constant throughout his presidency:  Early in his first term—in one of his only attempts to reach out to liberal, urban Iranians—Ahmadinejad procliamed that soccer stadiums should allow women, as well as men, to attend as spectators.  The result was a wave of condemnation by clerics and conservative lay politicians alike.  The major bazaar merchants have also long held the president accountable for what they see as a mismanagement of the economy and his planned economic reforms that would raise taxes on some Iranians, while cutting subsidies on gasoline and certain foodstuffs.

That there’s vocal—albeit limited—opposition to Ahmadinejad shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the Islamic Republic…Khamenei makes a point of accepting advice from anti-Ahmadinejad conservatives…” 

We would add that, according to our understanding, the Supreme Leader also maintains consultative channels with figures from the reformist camp.  Hooman draws out the implications of his analysis for Iran’s foreign policy and nuclear diplomacy: 

“By emphasizing unity—something former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, no fan of Ahmadinejad, has also done in recent weeks—Khamenei likely means to project an image of strength, internationally and domestically, at a crucial period in Iran’s history.  The rallying together isn’t a flailing reaction to sanctions; it’s a concerted show of strength in the face of adversity.

The fact is, there is broad consensus on major foreign-policy issues across the political spectrum in Iran—particularly with respect to the nuclear issue.  While U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration claims that the latest and toughest sanctions seem to be working, forcing the Iranians to consider negotiations on the nuclear issue, the Iranian leadership was already in agreement on actual compromises before the sanctions were imposed.  There’s no reason to doubt the good-faith bona fides of the Tehran declaration, which Iran signed together with Turkey and Brazil, and in which it agreed to an exchange of enriched uranium and even suggested further negotiations with the IAEA and the P5+1.  From Iran’s perspective, it was the United States that rejected the deal without any evident consideration.

The suggestion that tensions within the leadership have been aggravated by the sanctions, or that sanctions are responsible for Iran’s apparent willingness to talk, is a misreading of the political scene in Tehran.  At a base level, it ignores the long history of clashes and rivalry between strong personalities in government and among the ayatollahs.  Moreover, history has shown that outside threats tend to create unity rather than divisions among Tehran’s leadership; that unity does not need to be coerced…”

Furthermore, it is worth keeping in mind that there will be another presidential election in Iran in 2013 (as Hooman notes)—and Ahmadinejad is term limited.  So politics is going to continue in the Islamic Republic—and Westerners shouldn’t confuse that with system collapse, exacerbated by outside pressure. 

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

At this point, America’s “Iran debate” has largely been reduced to a consideration of arguments for Israel and/or the United States attacking the Islamic Republic, on the one hand, or preparing for militarized “containment” of the Islamic Republic, on the other hand.  And, of course, that debate continues to be conditioned by advocates of “regime change”, in “harder” and “softer” varieties, as the ultimate goal of America’s Iran policy. 

On www.RaceForIran.com, we continue to argue for a very different approach to dealing with the Islamic Republic.  We recognize that many of the analyses and policy recommendations we present are controversial.  But we believe that they are correct and stand perhaps the most rigorous test of all—the test of time.  We have just found an acknowledgement of this in an unexpected place. 

Among those who have been critical of our analyses of Iranian domestic politics since the Islamic Republic’s June 12, 2009 presidential election, Dan Drezner—political economist at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and blogger on “Global Politics, Economics, and Pop Culture” at Foreign Policy—has been one of the more prominent and outspoken.  Since last June, Dan has written a number of posts taking issue with our reading of the election results and the subsequent emergence and decline of the “Green movement”, as well as some of our ideas about sounder U.S. policy toward Iran.  We have occasionally responded to Dan’s criticism, including once on his blog.  Flynt also debated Dan about Iran on bloggingheads.tv last October, see here.

Given this record, we could not help but notice that Dan devoted his post yesterday, see here, to looking back at “the big things I think I got wrong over the past year”.  And we were impressed to see that the number one item in Dan’s list of things he thinks he got wrong over the past year was the following:

“The Green Movement did not cause Iran’s regime to crack up.  Score one for the Leveretts—Iran’s regime has effectively silenced the Green movement, without any visible internal cost.  Indeed, the regime now seems entrenched enough so that the fundamentalists and conservatives can now ignore reformists and start turning on each other.  I confess, I thought the Ashura protests marked an inflection point on Iran.  Nope.  The regime has suffered some serious costs from its internal repression, but Khamenei ain’t going anywhere anytime soon.” 

As our regular readers might anticipate, we still take issue with some of the reasons Dan adduces as to why “the Green Movement did not cause Iran’s regime to crack up”.  We would underscore two points in this regard.  First, as a commenter on Dan’s blog notes, “the wrongness you cite isn’t the important way you were wrong.  It was not just a prediction of what Ashura meant for the future of the Iranian regime—surely predictions are often wrong—but a factual one about the number and intentions of those protesting during that time.  As the Leveretts pointed out in their comment, you had literally no evidence to back up your claim that the Greens made up more than half of the Iranian population.  That and realizing that the Green movement didn’t want to overthrow the regime would have prevented you from ever making the wrong prediction in the first place.” 

In sum, there was no revolution afoot in Iran that was “silenced” by the regime, somehow “without any visible internal cost”.  Rather, there was a backlash against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election—but that backlash was concentrated in specific strata of Iranian society that could never have mustered anything close to majoritarian support across the whole country.  And, while we have been excoriated by some for making this observation, we believe it is true, important, and bears repeating—there was no “Tiananmen Square” moment, in which Iranian security forces marched into crowds of protestors and shot down hundreds of people in a single episode.  Not even close.    

Second, to the extent that there were abuses perpetrated against Iranians by the security forces and the judicial apparatus, the Supreme Leader and other parts of the political order sought to impose accountability.  Kahrizak prison was closed, and 12 security personnel implicated in the deaths of prisoners there were put on trial; at least two of those officers have been sentenced to death.  (By way of comparison, how many people has the U.S. Government put on trial for abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the Bagram detention facilities in Afghanistan, and Guantanamo?)  The head of Iran’s judiciary was replaced, and the former chief prosecutor for Tehran and two judges have been suspended from their official duties, see here.  Iranian media report that this step is significant, among other reasons, because it removes these officials’ “judicial immunity”, paving the way for their prospective criminal prosecution, see here.    

It is easy for agenda-driven Western critics of the Islamic Republic to ignore these actions or discount them as inadequate.  But, unlike most non-OECD governments, the Iranian government is able to impose a measure of accountability on itself that responds to the needs and concerns of its citizens.  From this perspective, one might say that the political system is at least “accountable enough”; such a perception might help to explain why the government has not suffered “any visible internal cost” from its handling of the controversy surrounding the June 2009 election and its dealings with the Green movement since then. 

We do not offer these observations in a spirit of triumphalism.  Dan’s post yesterday was written in a spirit of intellectual honesty and personal graciousness that we appreciate.  But, while we are impressed by that spirit, we are also struck by how unique it is, relatively speaking.  There need to be more people in the United States and elsewhere who acknowledge that their expectations about the course of Iranian politics since June 2009 have not panned out.  It is particularly galling that this has not happened, given how many of the advocates of coercive policies toward Iran today are the same individuals who encouraged the United States to invade Iraq on false pretenses.  

The reality-based analysis that we have offered should be the basis for a frank and intellectually honest discussion of the Islamic Republic’s domestic foundations and stability—and of what that should imply for U.S. and Western policy toward the Islamic Republic.  That would be an “Iran debate” worth having. 

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

In the lead up to a likely resumption of Western “diplomacy” with Iran, conducting an interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, with questions designed to elicit substantive and revealing responses, could potentially yield real benefits for the international community.  The prominent German newsmagazine Der Spiegel had an opportunity to conduct such an interview today.  But Der Spiegel opted, instead, to engage in an egregious exercise of agenda-driven, ideologically-loaded journalism, see the full interview in Der Spiegel here or here for the reprint in the Tehran Times. 

The questions that Der Spiegel posed to Foreign Minister Mottaki were, with few exceptions, not formulated to elicit meaningful, substantive responses.  We reproduce below the first fifteen of these “questions” (we put the word “questions” in quotation marks because, as you will see, Der Spiegel did not punctuate most of their interviewer’s statements to Mottaki with question marks):

1) Mr. Foreign Minister, you are the senior diplomat of the Islamic Republic of Iran. You represent a nation that prides itself on a cultural history stretching back more than 2,500 years. Don’t you find it shameful that people are stoned to death in your country? 

2) It isn’t a matter of legal subtleties.  Stoning is a glaring violation of universal human rights.  It’s barbaric.

3) We are not talking about murder, for which the death penalty by hanging is imposed in Iran, but about the stoning of adulterers.  International human rights organizations report that there have been seven cases in the last five years alone.

4) The names of 14 other potential stoning victims are also known.  This places Iran on the same level as countries like Somalia and Afghanistan when it was under Taliban rule.

5) (interrupting Mottaki)…the impending stoning of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani …

6) Will you lobby for Ashtiani not to be stoned?

7) This case is only one example of Iran’s contempt for human rights.  Iran, which executed 400 people last year, is second from the top of the list of countries that still impose the death penalty—behind China, with a population 20 times as large.

8) But it isn’t just criminals who are executed.  Death sentences are also passed against political prisoners.

9) The large wave of arrests after the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last June shows that your legal system is political.  Thousands have been arrested since then.  The revolutionary courts have imposed long prison sentences on people whose only offence was to oppose the president.

10) For the West, but also for millions of people in Iran, the most recent election was a huge fraud.

11) The victims of your legal system included highly respected people like Mohammad Ali Abtahi, vice president under the former reformist President Mohammad Khatami, Mohammed Atrianfar, an adviser to Khatami’s predecessor, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the well-known journalist Issa Saharkhiz, who was arrested after an interview with SPIEGEL.

12) But those were extorted confessions.

13) The charges included contact with the West. What’s wrong with that?

14) Isn’t the crackdown by the security apparatus a sign that the Ahmadinejad government is finished, and that the only way it knows to stay in power is to use repression?

15) Ahmadinejad came into office five years ago promising to fight mismanagement and corruption.  But the situation has only worsened under his leadership.  The inflation rate is estimated to be at least 25 percent, and half of Iranians live at or below the poverty level.

Mottaki manages to make some interesting points in the course the journalist’s “questions”.  But it is only with the sixteenth “question” that the journalist actually raises a substantive issue regarding the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy:  “The United States and the EU, in particular, have implemented sanctions that go beyond the United Nations Security Council resolutions.  They are now affecting the important oil industry and gasoline imports.  Were you surprised by the Europeans’ tough approach?” 

In response to this question—and several (highly charged) follow ups—Mottaki offers interesting observations about the Iranian view of sanctions and the Islamic Republic’s approach to upcoming discussions about its nuclear program:

“Europe will undoubtedly suffer more under the new sanctions than we will. Europe will be the big loser in relation to this policy.  We already reduced our trade relations with Europe considerably in recent years.  We now produce some of the goods ourselves, and we have found new suppliers for the rest.  We’re not concerned about our supply of gasoline and other energy sources…If [the German] government is not interested in expanding and deepening our relations, Iran doesn’t have to run after it.  We think it’s beneath the dignity of the German people to support a certain US policy.  My recommendation is for Germany (to pursue) an independent policy…I would like to direct a comment at your foreign minister, Mr. (Guido) Westerwelle, and his European counterparts:  We don’t want more than what is our right.  We have created this right without outside assistance.  And I think the best thing now would be to recognize this right, within the framework of the appropriate provisions and regulations…

We want to talk to the so-called Vienna Group about the exchange of fuel:  We deliver low enriched uranium in return for 20 percent enriched fuel for our research reactor in Tehran.  The negotiating partners are France, Russia, the United States, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.  There are also proposals to include Turkey and Brazil in these talks…[On uranium enrichment,] we want to talk, but first the structure of the group, which consists of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, must be changed.  Other countries must be added to the group.  The talks can then be resumed with this new structure.”   

Der Spiegel’s interviewer, however, seems reluctant to be drawn into a potentially serious discussion about Iranian foreign policy.  Again, he tries to go on the attack:

“SPIEGEL:  In other words, Iran is continuing to try to stall for time.  You are aware that there is a substantial risk of a military strike against your nuclear plants?

Mottaki:  You cannot disregard a country’s rights and force it to make compromises.  We are determined to defend our right.  Anyone who attacks Iran will regret it.

SPIEGEL:  There are growing calls in Israel for a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities—with or without Washington’s approval.

Mottaki:  Israel has been talking about this for years.  The Zionist regime knows exactly what fate awaits it here.  The regime would be putting its own existence at stake with an attack.

SPIEGEL:  You would attack Israel?

Mottaki:  I have just told you what would happen.

SPIEGEL: Your first reactor, in Bushehr, is scheduled to go online on Sept. 26 after more than 30 years of construction. Do you really want to see the Israelis reduce it to rubble?

Mottaki:  Do you have evidence that Bushehr will be attacked? How probable do you think such an attack is?

SPIEGEL: The likelihood is considered high.

Mottaki:  We don’t see this likelihood.

SPIEGEL:  Do you want to ignore reality?  Don’t you recognize the military threat?  Don’t you see the worldwide protest against the impending stoning of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani?”

We will refrain from speculating about what Mottaki thought about the abrupt segue from the risks of a military confrontation over Iran’s nuclear activities to the Ashtiani case.  We simply note his response:

“What is the point of these questions?  You would be better advised to listen to us.  It was our interpretations of the situation in this region that have proved to be right.  We predicted that the United States would capitulate in Iraq, and that’s what has happened.  Instead, you are playing the human rights game.  You ask me about the possible killing of a human being.  But you show no sensitivity for the many, many people that are being killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.  How long does the West intend to live with this contradiction?”   

Der Spiegel’s interviewer tries one final time to put Mottaki on the defensive.  We will let you judge how well he did:

“Spiegel:  [N]ow the Ashtiani case has caused an international reaction.  And the international community is extremely alarmed in light of Iran’s nuclear activities.  It seems to be one minute before midnight.

Mottaki:  No.  On my watch it’s one o’clock, and precisely at that moment the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which was originally supposed to be built by the Germans, will be loaded with Russian fuel rods.”   

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Salehi said today that the Islamic Republic has proposed to Russia that the two countries create a joint consortium to fabricate fuel for the Bushehr reactor and other nuclear power plants that Iran plans to build in the future.  Salehi reportedly told IRNA that the consortium would “do part of the work in Russia and part of it in Iran”.  Salehi said that “Iran does not intend to produce the whole amount of the fuel needed for its power plants on its soil”, but reiterated that “Tehran would not stop enrichment” and would “prove itself to be capable of producing uranium and transforming it into plates”. 

Salehi’s proposal is the latest signal from Tehran that, as we have argued previously, “American/international ‘acceptance’ of Iranian enrichment is critical if nuclear talks with Iran…are to have any chance of lasting success”.  It is further reaffirmation of our point that Iranian officials have “indicated their openness to multilateral cooperation on enrichment—so long as, under whatever cooperative arrangements might be established, uranium enrichment continues to take place inside Iran”. 

Nasser Karimi of the Associated Press writes that the proposal described by Salehi “appeared to be an attempt by Tehran to gain some control over the nuclear fuel process at its Russian-built Bushehr nuclear plant”.  But we believe that the Iranian proposal is much more strategic in character.  And, on that point, we were struck by a piece, “Russia and the Future of Nuclear Talks” that Kayhan Barzegar published yesterday in Iran Review.

Kayhan argues that, with the fueling of the reactor at Bushehr and the prospect that the Bushehr power plant will soon be on line, “Russia has practically conceded that Iran is a nuclear state”.  This, in his view, will “enhance the peaceful nature and legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear program”, creating a “new political atmosphere” in which Tehran will have “greater bargaining power in future nuclear talks”.  In particular,

“As Iran gains membership to the world’s nuclear club, the direction and nature of negotiations will change.  In the past, the West’s prime aim was for the most part based on bringing Iran’s nuclear activities to an overall halt.  This time around, however, the focus of the talks will be on the preservation of the domestic fuel cycle capability, insisting upon independent enrichment on Iranian soil.  In this respect, the role of Russia will be significant in future talks.

The main reason behind the current standoff between Iran and the West is that the Tehran approach to enriching uranium within the framework of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) aims to develop Iran’s domestic fuel cycle capability.  Iran strives to connect the different aspects of the fuel cycle and preserving the independent fuel cycle, might be viewed as Iran’s trump card in any nuclear talks…In this respect, the Bushehr’s launching can be seen as a turning point in the Russian stance towards Iran’s nuclear activities.” 

In Kayhan’s assessment, after the United Nations Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1929 in June, “the Russians realized that uncritically pursuing the Western line would cause them to lose their importance in the diplomatic tug-of-war surrounding Iran’s nuclear program…Russia, as a result, in a shift of policy decided to launch the Bushehr plant”.   

Kayhan points out that, while Russia hopes it will provide the annual installments of new fuel required by the Bushehr reactor, “according to the two sides’ agreement this is not obligatory”.  More broadly, Russia will seek to be “the sole supplier of nuclear fuel to Iran and reap the benefits” and “to cooperate in the construction of Iran’s new nuclear reactors”.  While cautioning that “Iran should not limit itself to or be dependent on Russian goodwill”, Kayhan argues that, in the current climate, Moscow has real incentives to be more forthcoming on nuclear cooperation with Tehran. 

It is in this context that the strategic character of the Iranian proposal to Russia, as described by Salehi, becomes clear.  We have anticipated for some time that “preservation of the domestic fuel cycle capability, insisting upon independent enrichment on Iranian soil” will be at the forefront of Iran’s agenda for the next round of nuclear discussions with the Vienna Group (the United States, Russia, and France, along with the International Atomic Energy Agency) and the P-5+1.  A formal commitment by Russia to cooperate in the development of Iran’s enrichment capabilities would boost Tehran’s position on this issue. 

Kayhan’s underscores that China has never been overly concerned about safeguarded enrichment in Iran: 

“Beijing does not consider Tehran’s nuclear program a threat to its national and security interests and maintains that Iran is entitled to peaceful use of nuclear energy…China has set limits for cooperation with Western policies against Iran.  From China’s perspective, initiating war against Iran or adopting tough and coercive sanctions will endanger China’s interests and are as a result seen as undesirable”. 

In the wake of Bushehr’s launching, Kayhan anticipates that there will be “more differences of opinion” among European states about the appropriate goal of nuclear diplomacy with Iran:  “The main challenge now facing the EU is whether to come to grips with the existing realities and accept the international legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, or insist on the effectiveness of past policies predicated on the adoption of tough sanctions to instigate negotiations with Iran.”  As a result of these developments: 

“The forging of a sustainable consensus between the 5+1 parties for the adoption of coercive policies against Iran will not be an easy task in future talks…International conditions have changed.  The West is no longer capable of creating a united front against Iran and this has been proven by Iran’s ability to bypass sanctions.  Russia, China, Turkey and even South Korea have major stakes in Iran and are, therefore, against unilateral sanctions against Iran…Sooner or later the great powers involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute should come to realize that Iran has crossed the line drawn by their demarcation of the traditional monopoly on enriching uranium.  Thus they should try to find a genuinely sustainable solution in the course of future nuclear talks with Iran.  With Bushehr’s launch and Iran becoming a member of the nuclear club, along with maintaining the strategic card of independent and domestic fuel cycle capabilities, Iran will have the upper hand in future talks.  This of course may further deepen the rift between Iran and the West.” 

We fully agree that the United States and its European partners should “try to find a genuinely sustainable solution in the course of future nuclear talks with Iran”, and that such a solution will necessarily entail Western acceptance of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.  But we are skeptical that the Obama Administration is prepared to move in this direction.  Likewise, we are skeptical that Britain and France, the European states with the most rigid positions on the enrichment issue, are willing to “come to grips with the existing realities and accept the international legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear capabilities”.  And, if those assessments are correct, the next round of nuclear discussions could indeed “further deepen the rift between Iran and the West”.  But the enrichment issue is certainly not going away.    

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

In recent days, a good deal of attention has been focused on Iran’s first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, still in its final stages of development.  We believe that there are some important lessons to be learned from the Bushehr experiences that could help move U.S. policy on the Iranian nuclear issue in a much more positive and productive direction—if the Obama Administration is sufficiently interested in successful nuclear diplomacy with Tehran that it is willing to take these lessons on board.    

Earlier this month, the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (ROSATOM) announced that fuel rods for the Bushehr reactor would be delivered to a “reactor storage facility” at the site, from which they would be installed in the reactor itself, on August 21.  News reports over the weekend confirm that Iranian and Russian engineers began installing the fuel rods on Saturday.  Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that he hopes the reactor will be sufficiently operational to be connected to Iran’s national electricity grid by mid-September, adding that it will probably take 6-7 months for the plant to achieve full operational capacity. 

Both Salehi and the head of ROSATOM stress that all of this will take place under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Nevertheless, these developments prompted the irrepressible John Bolton to argue that Israel needed to strike Bushehr before August 21.  In Bolton’s view, the facility represents a “major, major plus for the Iranian nuclear weapons program”, adding that “what this does is give Iran a second route to nuclear weapons in addition to enriched uranium.  It’s a very huge, huge victory for Iran”.  However, Bolton also worried that striking Bushehr after fuel rods begin to be inserted into the reactor “would almost certainly release the radiation into the atmosphere”—hence, his argument that Israel needed to strike before August 21.  

We must admit that we are somewhat surprised by Bolton’s acknowledgment of environmental considerations as a constraint on potential military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets.  But, more than that, we are struck by how marginal Bolton’s position on Bushehr—that an internationally-safeguarded nuclear power plant, the fuel for which will be provided and (after use) removed by Russia, is an unacceptably dangerous source for weapons-grade fissile material which should be destroyed through military action—has become. 

Of course, assertions about the apocalyptically dangerous character of the Bushehr project were a staple of U.S. policy throughout the Clinton Administration and for much of the George W. Bush Administration.  But, before he left office, even President George W. Bush had come to recognize the non-threatening character of Bushehr.  For its part, the Obama Administration has never had a problem per se with Bushehr as a serious source of proliferation risk. 

Earlier this year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, see here, tried to get Russia to delay (once again) delivering the fuel rods, arguing that “we think it would be premature to go forward with any project at this time, because we want to send an unequivocal message to the Iranians”.  However, earlier this month, the State Department’s chief spokesman, P.J. Crowley, said that “Bushehr is designed to provide electricity to Iran.  It is not viewed as a proliferation risk because Russia is providing the needed fuel and taking back the spent nuclear fuel, which is the principal source of potential proliferation”.  And, over the weekend, as the fuel rods were beginning to be installed at Bushehr, one of Crowley’s deputies confirmed that “we recognize that the Bushehr reactor is designed to provide civilian nuclear power and do not view it as a proliferation risk”.  

According to the Washington Post, “Israeli officials also said they were not particularly worried about the fuel being loaded into Bushehr.  Even the Netanyahu government’s hard-right minister of national infrastructure, Uzi Landau, said that “our problem is with the other facilities that they have, where they enrich uranium”.   

So, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted about critics of Bushehr coming on line, “there will always be some, even regarding such an impeccable event from the standpoint of international law as the opening of Bushehr”.  But, at this point, the overwhelming weight of international opinion does not contest Lavrov’s description of the deal as “an important anchor that keeps Iran within the non-proliferation regimen”.  (And, while we are considering the international legal aspects of the matter, Salehi noted—correctly in our view—that a military strike against Bushehr would be a “crime”.) 

Today, the United States and some of its Western partners—in particular, Britain and France, which have their own narrow interests in not having the strategic cachet of their small strategic arsenals “cheapened” by the emergence of more states (especially in the “developing” world) that have mastered the nuclear fuel cycle—focus on Iran’s work on uranium enrichment as apocalyptically dangerous.  But we believe that there is an important lesson to be drawn from the Bushehr precedent about how the international community should approach the matter of Iranian enrichment.        

It should be clear by now that the Islamic Republic is going to continue enriching uranium.  From a non-proliferation standpoint, does the international community really want Iran pursuing enrichment under circumstances in which Tehran is progressively alienated from the non-proliferation regime’s “managers” because of the way the Iranian program is treated—with sanctions, talk about military strikes, and perhaps even the initiation of aggressive war against Iran by Israel or the United States?  Or, would it be preferable for major players in the international community to work with the Islamic Republic to develop its uranium enrichment capabilities in ways that are fully compatible with the non-proliferation regime? 

As we have written previously, see here, American/international “acceptance” of Iranian enrichment is critical if nuclear talks with Iran later this year are to have any chance of lasting success.  In our conversations with Iranian officials over a number of years, we have received a consistent message that American/international acceptance of enrichment on Iranian soil would facilitate Iranian cooperation with a wide range of non-proliferation measures—e.g., ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Iranian officials have also indicated their openness to multilateral cooperation on enrichment—so long as, under whatever cooperative arrangements might be established, uranium enrichment continues to take place inside Iran.  Four years ago, Sir John Thomson and Geoff Forden of MIT described one way in which such an outcome might be achieved; they have continued to update and refine their ideas in this regard, see here.  Just as the world has—John Bolton aside—learned to live with an Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr, it should learn to live with internationally-safeguarded enrichment inside the Islamic Republic.       

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

On bloggingheads.tv, www.RaceForIran.com publisher Flynt Leverett and Reuel Marc Gerecht debate the wisdom of (either Israel or the United States) bombing Iran.  This debate is noteworthy, in our view, primarily as an entrée into the neoconservative mindset about Iran.  The full video can be watched at this link: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/30306?in=00:00&out=58:41

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

The Atlantic continues to heat up its “bomb Iran debate” by highlighting the views of Elliot Abrams, Patrick Clawson, Martin Indyk, Karim Sadjadpour, and a few other like-minded Iran “experts.” It is remarkable how The Atlantic seems to have systematically excluded analysts who do not support either bombing Iran or active support for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.  It really is becoming Iraq all over again.  Below, and in subsequent pieces, we will feature the views of important analysts who should have been included in The Atlantic’s one-sided discussion to make it an actual “debate.”  We will break down the real debate into a series of important questions that are becoming prominent in public discussions on Iran in the United States.    

The first of these questions, on which we focus today, is:  Is there an orchestrated campaign to build public support—and political pressure—in the United States for a U.S. or U.S.-backed Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear targets?  For our part, we clearly believe that there is such a campaign—and that this campaign is being brought to you by many of the same journalists, public intellectuals, and organizations that spearheaded the campaign to “sell” the Iraq war to the American public in the years leading up to the March 2003 invasion.  From this perspective, we see Jeffrey Goldberg’s attention-getting article published last week by The Atlantic as an important step in what we anticipate will be an intensifying push for war against Iran over the next 12-18 months. 

Interestingly, James Fallows argues that Goldberg—Fallows’ colleague at The Atlantic—is not, in fact, making the case for a military strike against Iran: 

“I think that those reading the piece as a case for bombing Iran are mainly reacting to arguments about the preceding war.  Jeff Goldberg was a big proponent of invading Iraq, as I was not—and those who disagreed with him about that war have in many cases taken the leap of assuming he’s making the case for another assault.  I think this is mainly response to byline rather than argument.  If this new article had appeared under the byline of someone known to have opposed the previous war and to be skeptical about the next one, I think the same material could be read in the opposite way—as a cautionary revelation of what the Netanyahu government might be preparing to do.” 

We think, see here, that Goldberg’s reporting on why so many Israeli political and policymaking elites want a military strike against Iran should be read as a “cautionary revelation,” because the reasons adduced by Israeli elites for a strike are extremely weak, especially from the standpoint of American strategic interests.  With regard to Fallows’ argument just cited, Ken Silverstein of Harper’s Magazine—who scrupulously catalogued Goldberg’s history of journalistic malpractice during the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq—holds, see here, that

“Goldberg’s past work as a dishonest advocate for the Iraq War and his long service in support of the Israeli military (literally for a time, when he served in the Israeli Defense Force) makes Fallows’s argument harder to accept.  Goldberg has never seen an Israeli military action that he didn’t approve of. Can anyone honestly believe that Goldberg wouldn’t support an Israeli attack on Iran in the event that it came to pass?

“Goldberg’s article in The Atlantic is more balanced than his Iraq war ‘reporting’, which ranked with British propaganda from World War I about German soldiers bayoneting babies, but it’s awfully sympathetic to the Israeli point of view.  If Israel does attack Iran, its supporters will surely point to Goldberg’s piece as evidence for why such a strike was necessary, just as President Bush cited Goldberg’s work in making the case for war in Iraq.”

In this regard, we also highlight Glenn Greenwald’s arresting, “How Propaganda Works”: 

“Jeffrey Goldberg, in the new cover story in The Atlantic, on an Israeli attack on Iran: 

“‘Israel has twice before successfully attacked and destroyed an enemy’s nuclear program.  In 1981, Israeli warplanes bombed the Iraqi reactor at Osirak, halting—forever, as it turned out—Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions; and in 2007, Israeli planes destroyed a North Korean-built reactor in Syria.  An attack on Iran, then, would be unprecedented only in scope and complexity.’

“Good news!  Israel can successfully end a country’s nuclear program by bombing them, as proven by its 1981 attack on Iraq, which, says Goldberg, halted ‘forever, as it turned out—Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions.’

“Jeffrey Goldberg, The New Yorker, 2002, trying to convince Americans to fear Iraq: 

“‘Saddam Hussein never gave up his hope or turning Iraq into a nuclear power.  After the Osirak attack, he rebuilt, redoubled his efforts, and dispersed his facilities.  Those who have followed Saddam’s progress believe that no single strike today would eradicate his nuclear program.’ 

“When it suited him back then, Goldberg made the exact opposite claim, literally, of the one he makes today.  Back then, Goldberg wouldn’t possibly claim what he claims now—that the 1981 strike permanently halted Saddam’s ‘nuclear ambitions’—because, back then, his goal was to scare Americans about The Threat of Saddam.  So in 2002, Goldberg warned Americans that Saddam had ‘redoubled’ his efforts to turn Iraq into a nuclear power after the Israeli attack, i.e., that Saddam had a scarier nuclear program than ever before after the 1981 bombing raid.  But now, Goldberg has a different goal:  to convince Americans of the efficacy of bombing Iran, and thus, without batting an eye, he simply asserts the exact opposite factual premise:  that the Israelis successfully and permanently ended Saddam’s nuclear ambition back in 1981 by bombing it out of existence (and, therefore, we can do something similar now to Iran).

“This is what a propagandist, by definition, does:  asserts any claim as fact in service of a concealed agenda without the slightest concern for whether it’s true.  Will the existence of a vast and menacing Iraqi nuclear program help my cause (getting Americans to attack Iraq)?  Fine, then I’ll trumpet that.  Now, however, it will help my cause (mainstreaming an attack on Iran) to claim that the Israelis permanently ended Iraq’s nuclear efforts in 1981, thus showing how well these attacks can work.  No problem:  I’ll go with that.  How can anyone take seriously—as a Middle East expert and especially as a journalist—someone with this blatant and thorough of an estrangement from any concern for truth?  Can anyone reconcile these factual claims?

“…[T]he core premise of Goldberg’s article—that Iran is currently pursuing nuclear weapons—is asserted, in the very first sentence, as indisputable fact without so much as acknowledging, let along resolving, the substantial evidence casting serious doubt on that scary claim…Goldberg’s latest historical assertion—that the 1981 Israeli attack ended Saddam’s nuclear efforts—is the precise opposite of reality:  Iraq had no genuine nuclear weapons program prior to 1981, but it was the Israeli attack which caused Saddam to conclude that he needed one.  That is what spawned the very substantial Iraqi efforts from 1981 to 1991 to develop nuclear weapons:  efforts which were actually ended by Operation Desert Storm and the subsequent U.N. inspection regime…Goldberg wants to obfuscate those facts lest one conclude:  just as happened with Iraq, nothing would spur an Iranian desire for nuclear weapons more than a bombing campaign against their country.” 

Drawing, in part, on the work of another blogger, Jonathan Schwarz, Greenwald insightfully describes Goldberg’s role in the current “propaganda effort” regarding Iran:

“Goldberg is not Bill Kristol or Charles Krauthammer, at least in terms of function.  He’s not going to run around overtly beating his chest demanding that the U.S. attack Iran (or that the U.S. support Israel’s attack):  at least not yet.  Although Goldberg did precisely that in the run-up to the attack on Iraq, his function now is more subtle, and more insidious.  He’s nothing if not shrewd, and certainly shrewd enough to know that if he spouts nakedly bellicose demands for a war with Iran, he’ll be quickly dismissed as a neocon fanatic, especially in light of his discredited and falsehood-filled campaign to persuade Americans to attack Iraq.  Indeed, Goldberg himself notes that even George Bush derided Kristol and Krauthammer as ‘the bomber boys.’  He’s much too smart to let himself be consigned to the lowly and limited (though important) role of fanning the flames of right-wing fanaticism; he’s intent on re-branding himself after what he did in 2002 and 2003 and preserving his mainstream influence.

“Thus, his pose is objective journalist.  He’ll feign ‘ambivalence’ about whether Iran should be bombed—thus showing how thoughtful and non-ideological he is—while infecting the discourse with the kinds of factual falsehoods documented here, all in service of skewing the debate towards ensuring an attack happens.  At its core, it’s only a slightly modified version of what he did with Iraq (I’m merely ‘reporting’ on Saddam’s extensive relationship with Al Qaeda and his nuclear program/I’m merely ‘reporting’ on the view of Israeli leaders that ‘a nuclear Iran poses the gravest threat since Hitler to the physical survival of the Jewish people’).  

“It’s really one of the strangest and most revealing facts that the ‘objective journalist’ to whom America’s political elites most faithfully turn for ‘reporting’ on the Middle East is someone whose loyalty to Israel is so overarching that he actually went and joined the IDF (just try to imagine an American journalist reporting on this conflict for a large media outlet who previously joined the Iranian military or the military of any predominantly Muslim country).  There’s nothing wrong per se with his doing so or with maintaining loyalty to other countries; many Americans do so with all sorts of countries and for all sorts of reasons.  It’s also true that Goldberg’s intense, Israel-devoted agenda doesn’t preclude some good reporting; there are interesting and even revealing aspects in his article about how Israeli leaders think about Iran, or at least how they want Americans to believe they think about Iran.  

“But Jeffrey Goldberg is no more of an objective reporter on such matters than Benjamin Netanyahu is, and the fact that so many are willing to treat him as though he is provides a valuable testament to the ongoing vitality of the Supreme Law of Beltway Life:  Seriousness credentials, once vested, can never be revoked, no matter how grave one’s past sins of falsehood and error are.  The purpose of this Atlantic article is as obvious as it is odious:  to mainstream the debate over an Israeli or American attack on Iran by defending its rationale, all masquerading as objective reporting (I’m merely describing the substantial possibility that it could happen and, if it does, why it would be justifiable).  I’m tempted to say that anyone who falls for Jeffrey Goldberg’s act again deserves what they get, except that—as always—they’re not the ones who will pay the price for the fallout.” 

Greenwald also usefully underscores Goldberg’s frequent comparisons of Iran to Nazi Germany, reminding us “it was endlessly claimed that it was Saddam who was the New Hitler in order to ratchet up fear levels and justify an attack on that country, too.  How many times can we be persuaded to attack the New Hitler?”  (We have argued that the comparison of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hitler’s Germany is particularly misplaced; see here.)    

Finally, Flynt’s New America Foundation colleague Robert Wright, writing on The New York Times’ “Opinionator” blog, suggests that the main issue with regard to “Goldberg as propagandist” is the way in which his article helps to frame future public debate: 

“His piece leaves you thinking that Israel will attack Iran very soon unless America does the honors.  So the debate becomes about who should bomb Iran, not about whether Iran should be bombed. 

“And this is the way Israel’s hawks want the debate framed.  That way either they get their wish and America does the bombing, or, worst case, they inure Americans to the prospect of a bombing and thus mute the outrage that might otherwise ensue after a surprise Israeli attack draws America into war.  No wonder dozens of Israeli officials were willing to share their assessments with Goldberg, and no wonder ‘a consensus emerged that there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will launch a strike be next July’…I’ve long felt that most ulterior motives are subconscious, and Goldberg seems to be a case in point.  Back in 2002, when he was vociferously arguing for an invasion of Iraq, he just wanted to believe that his Kurdish sources were giving him solid evidence of Saddam Hussein’s links to Al Qaeda—notwithstanding the fact that they, as fellow invasion advocates, had an interest in fabricating evidence.  Now Goldberg again seems eager to accept the testimony of people whose testimony is obviously suspect.” 

In a subsequent piece for www.RaceForIran.com, we will look at how the “bomb Iran” debate is shaking out on another important question:  what is the justification for what some euphemistically describe as “preventive war” against Iran?  Note:  Some advocates of starting a war with Iran use the phrase “pre-emption”, but this is a misleadingly inaccurate formulation.  Pre-emption means that there is an imminent threat—the gun is not just loaded, but cocked, and the “evildoer” is pointing the gun at an innocent victim with his finger around the trigger, preparing to fire.  A “preventive war” scenario means, by definition, that there is no imminent threat, but that a national government somehow concludes it should act anyway to prevent such a threat—which may not even be theoretically possible now—from emerging.  

We think that “preventive war” is itself a somewhat euphemistic formulation, which could be used, as Flynt’s former colleague Paul Pillar put it so well, to “make aggression respectable”.  Nevertheless, it is important not to let those making the case for initiating military action against Iran get away with labeling this “pre-emption”. 

But we will save a discussion of the case for “preventive war” with Iran—as we have written before, we think it is a very bad idea, on multiple levels (see, for example, here and here—for another day.  

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Today, in The Financial Times, Daniel Dombey reports, see here, that “President Obama has personally warned Turkey’s prime minister that unless Ankara shifts its position on Israel and Iran it stands little chance of obtaining the US weapons it wants to buy”.  A senior Obama Administration official told Dombey that “The president has said to [Turkey’s Prime Minister] Erdoğan that some of the actions that Turkey has taken have caused questions to be raised on the Hill…about whether we can have confidence in Turkey as an ally.  That means that some of the requests Turkey has made of us, for example in providing some of the weaponry that it would like to fight the PKK, will be harder for us to move through Congress”. 

According to Dombey, the Administration “was deeply frustrated when Turkey voted against United Nations sanctions on Iran in June”.  Obama reportedly told Erdoğan that Turkey “had failed to act as an ally” when it voted against the sanctions on Iran, rather than abstaining. 

This story is a remarkable statement about the Obama Administration’s willingness to damage important strategic relationships in order defend its dysfunctional Iran policy.  The claim, as the senior Administration official puts it, that the Turks “need to show that they take seriously American national security interests” is preposterous with regard to a NATO ally of long standing.     

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett