On July 27, Iran’s English-language international news network, Press TV, broadcast a highly substantive interview with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, see here and here. Because it lays out Iran’s position on a range of important issues of importance but received very little attention in the United States, we thought it would be useful to highlight significant portions of the interview here:
On why Iran will proceed with talks over the nuclear issue:
You know that in recent months the nuclear fuel swap issue was put forth and it was agreed that by swapping fuel we would take a step ahead towards interaction to dispel the misconceptions on behalf of both sides and turn the confrontations into interaction and cooperation.
Nonetheless, other irrelevant issues were posed and unfavorable things happened. However, we have always been ready to interact. This was until Mr. Obama invited the Brazilian president and Turkish prime minister to talk to Iran and pave the way for interaction and this was what we also wanted. They came to Tehran and we held negotiations and the result was the Tehran Declaration.
The Tehran Declaration comprises of a reasonable, legal and fair framework, both for friendship and cooperation as well as a nuclear fuel swap and it was crystal clear. But, unfortunately some parties did not like it to happen. The US administration spearheaded and the UK added fuel to the fire and a couple of other governments aided and abetted, instead of offering a positive response to Iran’s great step.
Iran had really taken a significant stride. It accepted to send its nuclear materials out of Iran and sign an agreement with those who have repeatedly and unilaterally violated their previous agreements with Iran. Nevertheless, Iran accepted to enter the deal in order to pave the way for further cooperation.
[Instead], they issued a very deficient [United Nations Security Council sanctions] resolution, not only in terms of its effectiveness, but to the effect that the move, in its very nature, is suspicious…The resolution was issued at the time when the Zionist regime had attacked the Flotilla of humanitarian aid in international waters. They did not react towards Israel but issued a resolution against Iran which, as mentioned, had offered its hand to cooperate.
At that time, we denounced what they did and to teach them a lesson on how to treat nations, we will not enter any talks until mid-Ramadan.
Later, some of those states contacted us and accepted Iran’s timeline for talks. Surprisingly, it was about 3-4 months that Mr. Jalili (the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council) had been contacting the EU foreign policy chief for holding talks, but she did not reply. She even did not make a move ahead, making excuses such as their not being ready, etc. But the day after the resolution was issued she made an interview and sent a letter saying they are ready for negotiations.
Mr. Jalili responded to her, saying Iran is also ready for talks, but the negotiations will start at the time I mentioned.
On the impact of sanctions on Iran’s decision to proceed with talks:
We have previously said that the idea of issuing a [sanctions] resolution to force us enter into talks is a defeated logic. We have always held talks and have never stopped them. Never. If at any time the talks were halted that has been from their part because they always came short of logic and when they saw themselves having no reason or when they wanted to take illegal actions they stopped the talks.
Mrs. Ashton, who for 3 months, did not come for negotiations, sent a letter [after the passage of the UNSC sanctions resolution] saying they were ready for talks and, in response, Mr. Jalili said we were ready for talks as well and this is not a new thing because we have always been ready…This has nothing to do with the resolution, because if they came before the resolution we would enter the negotiations.
Even now we are ready to talk but it is the framework of the talks which is of importance. The basis of the talks is important. We say that the talks should be based on respect and justice. We have offered the framework to them through a package which includes international affairs and global concerns and it is quite clear…
On Iran’s “Conditions” for talks on its nuclear program:
We said that we will talk with P5+1 as of early September but there are some conditions. One of the conditions is that others should be present in the discussions as well. Why the P5+1 should talk to us? Where did P5+1 come from? If the five are the permanent members of the UN Security Council what is Germany doing in talks? We welcome the presence of Germany in talks but we say that others should be also present in talks for the same reason that those five countries and Germany are in the negotiations.
The second condition is that they announce their position on certain issues like their viewpoint on the Zionist regime’s atomic bombs. They should say whether they consent to it or not. That’s all. We don’t expect more.
With respect to the negotiations, they should announce whether they are after friendship or animosity. They should come and tell us if the aim of the talks is friendship or animosity…[Note from the Leveretts: Many in Washington dismiss this point as evidence of Tehran’s lack of seriousness to negotiate “real” issues. This view, however, ignores the lessons of Nixon’s approach to reorienting the American approach to China in 1969. As Kissinger writes in his memoirs, “Nixon decided to concentrate on the broader issue of China’s attitude toward a dialogue with the United States…If relations improved on that basis, the traditional agenda would take care of itself; if relations did not improve, the traditional agenda would remain insoluble. In other words, the practical issues would be resolved as a consequence of Sino-American rapprochement, not chart the path toward it.”]
Their response will paint a clear picture of the atmosphere of negotiations. Any response they give us would not matter. We prefer their response to be constructive, but if their response is not constructive, we would follow negotiations accordingly.
On the Iranian nuclear issue, we don’t have anything called the Iranian nuclear dossier. They have made it up. We act according to law. We have had the most cooperation with the [International Atomic Energy] Agency and we have cooperated with the Agency beyond legal obligations so far as the IAEA has released all intelligence pertaining to our nuclear program in violation of law…We are the only country whose nuclear information can be found in every paper. We have acted in accordance with law and we will continue to do that. Their claims will not have an impact on us but we will talk on international issues, our differences of opinion and our common concerns. We have always talked. I even said that I am ready to talk with Mr. Bush. Last year, I said that I was ready to talk with Mr. Obama. We have a clear logic and we talk based on that…
On Iran’s Relations with Russia:
Russia had voted in favor of resolutions already passed against Iran. It’s nothing new. There are different viewpoints in Russia today. What Mr. President says is in blatant contravention of Russia’s interests. It’s kind of echoing what the US says. They had participated in drafting resolutions against us before. They told us that they guaranteed that no serious problem would arise. But recently some remarks made by the Russian president are encouraging the US and giving it the green light to pressure Iran. These remarks are in fact sacrificing the interests of the Russian nation in favor of the US. And it is more to the detriment of Russia than to the detriment of us.
On sanctions:
There already are four [UNSC sanctions] resolutions [against Iran], they may as well add another three digits to it and declare in the next few years that they have passed the 4000th. It has become like an insider’s joke. Not that we welcome them; but, they will approve so many resolutions that they will eventually lose their effectiveness…
They seem to expect us to say that sanctions will work. They think as soon as the sanctions are imposed the Iranian nation will die. They are delusional in rating their capabilities. They [the West] think that all nations need them and cannot live without them, thinking that they can choke these countries by cutting off ties. This is wrong. Perhaps 60 or even 30 years ago this was acceptable to some people. They could not even get away with it in a small country with a mere 2 million population, let alone Iran.
Their knowledge of geography, history and politics is limited. Iran is 1,750,000 km2, and has close ties with its many neighboring states. All the major East-West transit lines cross Iran; a great economical, cultural, political power. It has a great population of 75 million people…
The US is unhappy about the fact that it has not had any political relations with Iran for the past 30 years, so it is trying to drag these poor Europeans into it as well. What will happen if the Europeans stop selling us goods? They have not been selling us any essential equipment that would play a part in solving the country’s problems. We made them ourselves.
For the past 12-20 years, they are playing games with us over the oil industry. Since Clinton imposed a ban on US trade and investment in Iran in 1995, they have just played games. We decided to invest ourselves, and in the space of a year we are devoting more money to the industry than the equivalent of their 30-year investment.
The concept of sanctions is in the refuge of the weak and the defeated.
On war mongering:
If we say sanctions will fail, it does not follow that there will be a war. I mentioned 4,000 resolutions because they are stuck in the first three and as an escape have imposed a fourth one. So it is likely that they will approve the fifth to escape this one. The question is whether they want to return to the literature of [former U.S. president] George W. Bush. I mean does the U.S. president want to revive Bush’s policies? They are welcome to experience the same defeat that following those policies has already entailed.
Are they seeking to come and talk with us? If so, is the [UNSC sanctions] resolution a maneuver to get concessions from Iran?…This is why we keep enquiring about the basis of the talks. We would like to know in advance whether they are hostile…
They, especially the influential Zionist lobbies in the US, love to fill the global atmosphere with the term “war.” A lot of them sleep on the wish that tomorrow they wake up and find Iran has disappeared from the map.
Iran is a growing and emerging reality which they cannot stop. They think the cry of war will scare some people in Iran. Of course, they have made plans with certain people I will name in future. They have coordinated a plan with this likeminded group to say things and start unrest, all for the purpose of scaring the Iranian nation…We are not happy about this. We have from the beginning invited them to logic and dialogue, but they want to switch to plan B.
In response to being challenged on the impact of sanctions:
Of course it has had an impact, namely accelerating the rate of domestic progress. Another side effect is that it in turn restricts them. Let us imagine some unprecedented event, for example an Iranian airplane is barred from fuelling at a European airport, or even the fact that Europeans deny visas to Iranians. What is the significance? Whose loss is this? These (tourists) would have been spending money there not making it. The world is not just limited to Europe.
There are so many states cooperating with Iran, many of which have already sent us messages of assurance that they will not heed these (sanctions). They have pledged to deliver anything that we may wish. The West talks of imposing sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. As an oil producing country, is this even a threat? We are producing 4 million barrels of oil per day, own dozens of refineries, and can add another 20 million liters of fuel by simple changes to the production line.
If we were not a country with a 100-year-old oil industry, or the refineries or experts, then a threat of barring fuel supplies would have been serious. They do not seem to grasp this…We will just sit here patiently and wait till they come to their senses.
On the American PR campaign against Iran:
We have precise information that Americans have devised a scenario to launch a massive propaganda campaign against Iran. The comments made by the Russian president were in fact a teaser for that…They have also made arrangements with some regional states as well as some elements inside the country. The Russian president’s comments that Iran is getting closer to a [nuclear] bomb were the starting point for the scenario. We think this play has no audience other than the US and its allies. [This approach] is a nonstarter…They are going to create an atmosphere to scare us into believing that danger is imminent and that they are serious. It’s just a PR initiative and they themselves know it. There is no way they enter a war with Iran and they know it. Of course they would like to see Iran vanish overnight, but such a thing won’t happen and Iran will continue to exist. And they shouldn’t be mistaken: Iran does not mean Ahmadinejad. Iran constitutes 75 million faithful, brave, informed and united people. They think the Iranian people are divided into two groups. The Iranian people are one single body. It is natural that everybody will vote for the candidate of their choice in elections, but this will not provoke animosity among the people. They are one family. The US thinks the Iranian people are partisans, believing some are Democrats while the rest are Republicans and they can put Iranians against one another. But it is not true. Iranians are all together.
Responding to whether Israel or the US could attack an Iranian ally in the region, like Syria or Lebanon, to pressure Iran:
This is not a possibility. They have already decided to do it now. I’m telling you, they have decided to launch operations against at least two countries in the region…[A]ll the pressures, the nuclear issue and all that have two objectives: First, to put the brakes on the Iranian nation’s progress. They are opposed to our progress. They are lying when they say they are against [atomic] bombs. That’s why I asked them to express their view about the Zionist regime’s nuclear bombs, but they haven’t. They are just using the A-bomb issue as a pretext to block our progress. We are continuing our progress in medicine, mathematics, engineering, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology etc, but they are opposed to that. They want us to always be dependent on them. They wouldn’t like any country to make progress beyond their realm. This is the logic of force.
Secondly, they want to save the Zionist regime. The Israeli regime itself thinks only a new war can save it because it has reached a dead end in all directions. Who is this regime going to live with in our region? What country or nation is it going to work with? All paths are closed. No one is willing to. Even those who are working with Tel Aviv are doing it surreptitiously. This means the Zionist regime does not have legitimacy. Its raison d’être has also been questioned. Israel continued to rule for a good sixty years with indisputable military power. They claimed they were invincible. It launched a war against Lebanon, but was defeated. It also failed in its Gaza war. Now, it’s going to make up for that. They are going to put political pressure on us to keep us from helping them.
Will you help them in case that happens?
There is no need for that. It is pretty clear to us that the Zionist regime will be the outright loser in any possible future military action. Regional equations indicate that the Zionist regime will be the loser, no matter how it gets involved. The Zionist regime is on the decline…If it is going to attack Lebanon, it is obvious what the outcome will be. What did it get after its 33-day aggression against Lebanon? I think this time the Lebanese nation’s response will be much stronger should Israel attack again. Not only Lebanon, but any other nation [will show a similar response]. So we are not worried and we needn’t help them. The fact that we exist means help for all nations because Iran is a country which is against expansionist and domineering policies. This is the biggest help to other nations. Moreover, the Lebanese nation is a lively, vigilant and powerful nation. Should they make such a mistake, it will definitely jeopardize the very existence of the Zionist regime.
On Afghanistan (and allegations of Iranian support for the Taliban):
We think the major problem that Afghanistan is facing is foreign intervention. The Afghan people have always suffered over the past forty or fifty years. There was the Soviet invasion before the Afghan nation rose up against Soviet occupiers. It was followed by more interference by Americans. And today, they are maintaining a direct military presence there. We do believe that the Afghan people are brave and capable of handling their own affairs. They can establish security and reconstruct their country on their own. They don’t need foreign intervention. Security in Afghanistan means security in the whole region, and insecurity in that country amounts to regional insecurity. As you saw, insecurity in Afghanistan spilled over to Pakistan as well. If the insecurity continues unchecked, it is highly likely to spread eastward…
We are friends with the Afghan nation. It’s a historical friendship…We are deeply upset about the situation in Afghanistan. We are unhappy to see people getting killed there. During my recent visit [to Afghanistan], the Afghan president said in an interview that they don’t let us make decisions on our own and put pressure on us. [He said] they want to impose their will on the Afghan nation, that they don’t allow national sovereignty to get established in Afghanistan, and that we want to handle our security ourselves…We believe there is no military solution to Afghanistan. Any single person killed will make it more difficult to solve the problem and make the situation more complicated.
Americans are in the habit of making wrong decisions and putting the blame on others any time they fail…The US has one hundred thousand military troops in Afghanistan. They have been on the ground for ten years. How come they haven’t been able to establish security in the country? The production of illicit drugs has multiplied. Insecurity has escalated. They said they were hunting for terrorists, but the number of terrorists has increased as well. Rather than admitting that their policy is wrong, they accuse Iran of training and arming [terrorists] because they have to be answerable to the American people for their failures. You came to Afghanistan to hunt terrorists. How many have you captured?…
There are dozens of political groups in Afghanistan, all of which have a friendly relationship with us. The Afghan government has very cordial ties with Iran as well. We want the political process to be completed in Afghanistan as soon as possible. Security in Afghanistan is in our interest. We support Mr. Karzai’s government. We back elections in Afghanistan. We want security and law take hold in Afghanistan as soon as possible. It is to our benefit…
On Iraq (and allegations of Iranian “interference” in Iraq):
The vice president of which country traveled to Iraq two or three times during the elections? And what did he tell the Iraqi prime minister, officials and people?
We are friends with the Iraqi people. Iranians and Iraqis have been friends throughout history. They marry each other. Each year, millions of Iranian pilgrims travel to Iraq and Iraqis travel to Iran. Many Iraqis have Iranian birth certificates. Many Iranians have Iraqi birth certificates. You see, Iranian and Iraqi nations have a very close relationship. We feel sorrow over every single Iraqi killed there.
Americans invaded Iraq to dominate the Middle East, but they failed. To justify their failure, they accuse Iran of interference in Iraq. They have 160,000 military forces on the ground in Iraq. Then they say Iran is interfering [in Iraq]. It’s ludicrous. You have deployed your troops there and are openly dictating to the Iraqi government and Parliaments what they should or shouldn’t do. The U.S. ambassador and vice president as well as its special envoy are always involved in a flurry of activities there.
All Iraqi groups are friends with us. We needn’t interfere in Iraq. They are all our friends. Any group which takes power in Iraq is our friend. We support any group which wins the most votes. We back the establishment of an Iraqi government. It is to our benefit. Insecurity in Iraq will imperil our security, not only ours, but the whole region…
Prospects for compromise on the nuclear issue
We have always been after compromise. The important thing is what should we compromise about? Our basic rights? There can be no compromise on such issues. Can you compromise on your independence and freedom? But when we talk about nuclear cooperation, it means we can cooperate to [alleviate] concerns. We have also concerns about the US. Why has the US stockpiled thousands of nuclear warheads? How a government that is unable to control an oil spill can have such an amount of nuclear warheads? The US has more than 100 military bases across the world and is keeping nuclear bombs in all of them, putting all the world in danger. Who will be responsible if one of them explodes? It is us who should protest.
It has been 60 years since they imposed the Zionist regime [on the world], which has threatened us repeatedly over the past 30 years. They repeatedly make threats to assassinate Ahmadinejad. [The Zionist regime] is treated like a spoiled child who does everything he wants. I am surprised that the U.S. nation with a population of 300 million people has been sold to a few Zionists. It is against the U.S. interests. Some European governments have also sold themselves to the Zionists. Why should they have all the power, wealth and the media in their hands? Why should they kill, destroy people’s homes and occupy and take no blame? Instead of making threats and wars, a humanitarian solution should be found. We believe what we say is in US and Europe’s interests, too. They do not understand; their point of view is limited. They cannot see what will happen in 10 years’ time. A new wave has been formed in the region against oppression and it will take the Europeans if they continue their support of the Zionist regime. Their actions have triggered this wave. The Zionists kill men, women and children alike in Gaza. This will cause an uprising in the whole world, not the region only. They should let the Palestinians hold elections to decide on their own fate. They talk of democracy, human rights and freedom, but they put such issues aside when it comes to the Zionist regime. We are not enemies to anyone. We are friends. We can hold talks with them on these issues. We either convince them or are convinced by them. Or we hold talks so that the world hears the both of us. We both offer our solutions.
Richard S Hack,
Are you arguing that the US opposes having Turkey as the middleman, to hold the Iranian LEU, because the US plans to double-cross Iran? So, no 20% U for the TRR, and no return of the LEU? Isn’t this a bit of a stretch?
Michael Kerwick,
Iraq destroyed its WMD during the 1990s, and the UN sanctions were keeping Saddam completely in check. But the warmongers saw their opening, after “9/11″, and they took it. With great help from incompetent journalists and idiot politicians.
Richard, your statement- The bottom line: The US is pursuing the exact same course it pursued against Afghanistan and Iraq, sanctions, sanctions, more sanctions, then war.
American and European businesses would prefer trade and jobs and not sanctions. As for war with Iran I refer you to a study of a war game carried out in 2002 in which Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper used the same tactics the Iranians are likely to use if attacked.The full text of: “Is the U.S. Vulnerable In The Persian Gulf” can be found on the web-site below.
http:/www.informationclearinghouse.info/article8558.htm
All that is changed in the eight years is that America is bankrupt and Iran has more speedboats and better cruise missiles and has more time to prepare.
Eric,
Obviously I agree completely with you on the importance of American public opinion. So does the Israel lobby. And newspaper in the US printing a letter that is favorable to the Palestinians or to Iran, will receive a barrage of complaints from Jews, Christian Zionists, and others (including warmongers) organized by the Israel lobby.
Let’s remember the relentless claims of the Bush administration, in the months leading up to the idiotic invasion of Iraq, that they did not want a “mushroom cloud” over an American city to be the manner in which they learned that Iraq was developing nukes.
fyi,
Yes, I readily see the merits of Israeli membership in the EU, provide it dumps its nukes and ends the occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights. However, Israel obviously is not in Europe.
You make a good point, in a subtle way, that Israel in fact is not seeking “security” as such, but is more interested is wholesale theft of Palestinian land (and water, etc.).
Eric/Richard – re public opinion; AIPAC is nothing without it on their side. The only real counter to AIPAC is conditioning of public opinion away from a reflex pro-Israel position. The day that happens, the entire ballgame changes.
Castellio – the BBC is not funded by the British Government.
James Canning:
Actually Israel membership in NATO and in EU, under certain conditions can be quite beneficial.
The conditions are:
-Defined, un-disputed borders for Israel
-Nuclear disarmament of Israel
-Israel peace with all her neighbours’ as well as her neighbours’ neighbours’.
The fact is that this idea has been floated for many years but the Israelis are not interested since it would interfere with their land theft in Palestine.
Richard,
“Nobody cares what the American public thinks. What matters is what the US government thinks. And the US government, based on the 2007 NIE, KNOWS that Iran does not have a weapons program.”
Quite to the contrary, if the US government were basing its conduct on what the US government really thinks or knows, it would be taking into account the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, among considerable other data that point to the very same conclusion. Clearly the US government is not doing that.
I don’t mean to say that the US government is responding to what the American public has come to believe all by itself, which would suggest that the US government simply feels unable to resist the popular will but nevertheless might have its heart in the right place. What I mean to say is that the US government shapes the beliefs of the American public – ignoring, in the process, much flatly conflicting data that the US government knows or believes to be true – so that the US government is always in a position to claim that its behavior toward Iran reflects the will of the American public.
I’ll add to that the only reason the US wants to seize Iran’s nuclear material stores is that Iran will probably retaliate in some way that the US can use to jump start the war.
Otherwise we’d have to believe that the US really does believe Iran has a nuclear weapons program, and THAT concept is simply not true.
Although I suppose one could theoretically make the argument that Obama, by seizing Iran’s nuclear material under the pretext of a swap, could then kick the can down the road about actually starting the war. If you really believe Obama doesn’t want a war with Iran, you’d better agree with that idea. But I don’t believe it.
In fact, I think I’ll point out that if Ahmadinejad actually wants a US comment on Israel’s nukes, he should know that Obama has already taken that off the table in direct response to the UN notion of a Middle East nuclear free zone.
Obama absolutely will not address Israel’s nukes. He’s already assured Netanyahu of that.
So if that is one of Iran’s preconditions, they won’t get it. But since they won’t get a swap done either, that won’t matter. The US wants to seize Iran’s nuclear material store – that’s the bottom line. So the US will not agree to Iran storing the stuff in Turkey. So that whole effort is a non-starter. The US is only agreeing to talks again so it can complain that Iran was “intransigent” – when in fact it is the US negotiating in bad faith – and start another run up of more sanctions.
The bottom line: The US is pursuing the exact same course it pursued against Afghanistan and Iraq: sanctions, sanctions, more sanctions, then war.
Mr. Canning: “Let’s remember the US did not try to block the effort at the UN to ban nukes in the Middle East.”
And the minute Israel bitched, Obama backed off and explicitly said Israel can have nukes AND can use them whenever it likes.
You keep forgetting this fact. By doing so, Obama completely neutered the UN position. This is how Obama operates – spin a lot of nicely worded BS, then stab people in the back with his actions. First he gives the Cairo speech, then as someone noted, “Since then when has he attempted to engage Muslims in any way that didn’t include drones?”
“A “No comment” indeed might have some value – at least the US will have acknowledged it had heard what Ahmadinejad had asked. Unfortunately, I’m highly confident that the US’ response will be no comment — without the quotation marks.”
Fortunately for the world with all huffing and puffing that is coming out of Washington US has positioned herself and its allies, which for a long time to come will not think or initiate a new war anywhere unless it’s “genuinely” attacked. , the only way I can see talks could progress at this time, is only when both sides can realize value in how much pain can be reduced on their “other” problems rather adding more by the way of the side issues.
Let say that US reduces founding insurgency by ethnic groups for reduce in troubles in Iraq or more cooperation with Pashtons, this kind of stuff is easier to agree on then the N word, or permit ion for over flight for supply of TRR fuel, this sort of stuff but if only the white house can keep its mouth shut.
Again I wrote it can only work at the point of desperation, Obama’s AR is in mid 30’s so even Rham may feel that they need some winner.
Mr. Canning: Yes, Ahmadinejad might have been referring to Lebanon and Syria, rather than Lebanon and Iran. In fact, that’s likely, as if he had been referring to Iran, he probably would have said so.
And he’s quite right, IF in fact Israel intends to take out Hizballah, it will have to do so by going through Syrian territory into the Bekaa Valley, as Colonel Pat Lang suggested once, although Colonel Lang has retracted that idea now since he thinks the IDF are a bunch of incompetents based on their 2006 endeavor.
Mr. Brill: ““There is no mistaken impression that Iran is working on weapons.”
This is demonstrably incorrect. The vast majority of Americans indeed do have the “impression that Iran is working on weapons,” as shown by numerous polls.”
Now you are demonstrably incorrect. Nobody cares what the American public thinks. What matters is what the US government thinks. And the US government, based on the 2007 NIE, KNOWS that Iran does not have a weapons program, and in fact there was little evidence they ever had one, especially since the NIE did not distinguish between a research program and a development and deployment program.
You’re being willfully obtuse here. When Arnold is talking about “no mistaken impression” he clearly is referring to the facts of the matter and what the US government knows, not what the ignorant, misled US public knows.
Arnold: “But you will agree that Saudi Arabia is much less hostile to Israel than Iran, could be much more hostile to Israel than it is and that a representative government of Arabia would have the potential to be just as hostile as Iran, and be a more effective threat as it has more money and is geographically closer.”
Agreed, especially the latter part. If the Arab street were running Saudi Arabia, it would be very hostile to Israel. So would Egypt, Jordan, just about every Arab state.
James,
“The UK wanted Israel out of the occupied territories within weeks of the end of the June 1967 war. This position has not changed.”
Israel is still in the occupied territories. Perhaps more immediately important, you will kindly forgive many observers for having forgotten that the UK has been opposed to this for the past 43 years. Perhaps the UK hasn’t always spoken up as loudly as it might have.
Arnold: Re your question to Brill: “How many US soldiers do you think Obama is willing to sacrifice to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option?”
As many as he needs to get re-elected with AIPAC money. Obama is like every other US President (with the possible exception of Eisenhower, who actually was a general during a major war): he couldn’t care less about how many US troops die to meet his political goals. Bush didn’t, quite obviously.
To be more precise, the Presidents care when it would be an immediate and obvious disaster, such as a war with North Korea in which almost all the 27,000 US troops currently deployed there would die within a matter of weeks.
That sort of situation did not obtain in Iraq or Afghanistan, and until Obama was forced to commit ground troops into Iran proper from Iraq, would not obtain in an Iran war (unless William Lind’s scenarion actually occurred which is unlikely).
Therefore I submit that Obama would happily accept the number of troops killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and probably a considerable multiple of those numbers, if he could believe he could do enough damage to Iran to satisfy Israel and the military-industrial complex.
James,
I hope you’re right in your predictions for William Hague. But I confess I share the skepticism expressed by Castellio in his 6:40 PM post. I still remember, albeit more vaguely every day, that Tony Blair once expressed skepticism about George Bush’s plans for an excellent adventure in Iraq. When the time came to “man up,” though, Tony didn’t.
Maybe Hague and Cameron will be different. We’ll see.
Kooshy,
“Well I don’t think [Ahmadinejad] is looking to get a commitment [from the US to push for Israel to get rid of its nukes, but] he probably wants a statement, even a “no comment” is a statement by itself which will serve the intended propose.”
A “No comment” indeed might have some value – at least the US will have acknowledged it had heard what Ahmadinejad had asked. Unfortunately, I’m highly confident that the US’ response will be no comment — without the quotation marks.
Fiorangela: “I think the blogs are doing Charlie Rangel wrong: his bill is not a stealth draft, it is a pushback against the warmongering H Res 1553.”
That’s been said before. I don’t believe it. I wouldn’t believe it even if Rangel said that was the purpose, which I believe he did in his earlier submission. I think he’s covering his butt if this thing gets passed. Not to mention that Obama has endorsed the concept in the past.
In any event, it’s irrelevant. If the Iran war develops into a full-scale general war in the region, the US will pull troops from Afghanistan and send them back to Iraq where the bases are already ready to house them. The US will just continue to rotate forces in and out as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan, without a draft. The US will also continue to issue stop-loss orders and force US soldiers to remain in the military beyond their discharge point, as they have done. If the war really goes bad, perhaps a draft will be enabled some years into it – but by then it will be too late to stop the situation.
Kooshy,
“It is possible that statements coming out of Iran including mentioned pre-conditions have been pre-coordinated with Turkey and Brazil to continue keeping them on board.”
Probably so, but that won’t make Israel and the US want any less to shove aside Turkey and Brazil, leaving Iran as “isolated” as the US likes to pretend that it is.
Castellio,
Fisk does a good service to sound the alarm. Israel’s membership in Nato or the EU would be a very bad thing. Hague has made very clear his government regard the Israeli smashing of Lebanon in 2006 as unacceptable, and that he would not have been mute while the idiotic rampage (promoted by the foolish Condoleezza Rice) continued.
Castellio,
The UK wanted Israel out of the occupied territories within weeks of the end of the June 1967 war. This position has not changed.
The new government in the UK is laying the goundwork for further action. I think Hague is doing an excellent job of showing the way forward for not only the UK, but also for the US.
Fisk:
http://countercurrents.org/fisk020810.htm
Are you telling me, James, that the UK, in a sustained and open fashion, is promoting:
an end to the blockade of Gaza;
no Israeli attack on Lebanon or Syria;
no Israeli or US attack on Iran;
and for Israel to get out of the West Bank and the Golan Heights?
Who knows that? Does anyone know that? Has the UK used the Security Council to achieve these ends? Have their been any demands with consequences outlined? Is the UK drawing up sanctions against Israel? Is it limiting investment, military exchanges? Is it, better yet, funding Hizbollah to better defend Lebanon? Come to an understanding with Syria? Considering selling air defense to Iran? It is running the siege? That’s what independence looks like.
If it did any of the above, all in line with what you claim are its objectives, then, yes, it would have influence. It would be interesting times.
But c’mon, the BBC, funded through the government, refused to run information about fundraising efforts for Gazans, it was so intimidated. Information about fundraising efforts was too much to handle.
Alan
“So it’s bollocks in other words. That’s a shock.”
Precisely, unlike Tony the lap dog one would need to have large ones to make such a statement in this current world condition.
One point to consider is, since the new tone of negotiations are somewhat different then the last October’s. It is possible that coming statements out of Iran including mentioned pre-conditions have been pre coordinated with Turkey and Brazil to continue keeping them on board.
Alan
“The less likely pre-condition from Ahmadinejad is the requirement for their interlocutors to express a suitable view on Israel’s nukes. It’s hard to see why this is required if they intend to talk at all, because they must know they’re not going to get it.”
Well I don’t think he is looking to get a commitment he probably wants a statement, even a no comment is a statement by itself which will serve the intended propose.
As has been numerously mentioned Israel is a point of weakness for US Middle East policy, it’s common to use the advisories’ weaknesses before negotiations, US did it last October with June election results.
“Well I don’t think he is looking to get a commitment he probably wants a statement, even a no comment is a statement by itself which will serve the intended propose.”
So it’s bollocks in other words. That’s a shock.
Castellio,
The UK wants an end to the blockade of Gaza.
And no Israeli attack on Lebanon or Syria.
And no Israeli or US attack on Iran.
And for Israel to get out of the West Bank and the Golan Heights.
kooshy,
Let’s remember the US did not try to block the effort at the UN to ban nukes in the Middle East.
Eric,
I think the condition (that Israel gets out of the West Bank) will be met. I expect the numerous stooges of the Israel lobby in the US Congress to do their best to prevent this from happening, however.
“The less likely pre-condition from Ahmadinejad is the requirement for their interlocutors to express a suitable view on Israel’s nukes. It’s hard to see why this is required if they intend to talk at all, because they must know they’re not going to get it.”
Well I don’t think he is looking to get a commitment he probably wants a statement, even a no comment is a statement by itself which will serve the intended propose.
As has been numerously mentioned Israel is a point of weakness for US Middle East policy, it’s common to use the advisories’ weaknesses before negotiations, US did it last October with June election results.
Eric,
Is Iran really a country that should be described as a long-time “enemy” or “adversary”? William Hague does not regard Iran as the adversary or enemy of the UK. His point of view, that the emphasis should be not on “enemies”, but instead on which countries are less easy to deal with, surely is correct.
The US has injured itself, over the past ten years, a hundredfold more than whatever annoyance Iran has caused. And, in fact, the primary problem is Israel’s determination to crush Palestinian national spirit.
Castellio – UK a figment of its own imagination – love it.
Eric – regarding the hand of friendship and all that, all offers to talk by the EU and US have been based on the original 2006 letter which spelled out in great detail how friendly they wanted to be. Originally that friendship did of course require a suspension of enrichment, but that pre-condition has since been dropped, although it may well be the case (as previously discussed with Arnold) that it simply remains unspecified.
The less likely pre-condition from Ahmadinejad is the requirement for their interlocutors to express a suitable view on Israel’s nukes. It’s hard to see why this is required if they intend to talk at all, because they must know they’re not going to get it.
On the other hand, all his talk of how Iran has been constantly talking, constantly wanting talks etc., while patently untrue, does strike me as the kind of thing he might say if he DID intend to open talks, in order to prepare his electorate for their eventuality.
Eric
“(Though I’m not optimistic about their outcome in any case, as I’ve argued elsewhere).”
At this point the only optimizers one may have is three points
Point one – how tough is getting for US with regard to Afpak and a lesser point in Iraq.
Point two – how tough is getting for Iran with regard to sanctions.
Point three – If the resolution of hostilities will help the democrats with Mid. Terms.
But realistically all three points are considerable and that’s all the hope there is. In my opinion although I am not optimistic I think the atmosphere is somewhat different then last Oct.
The Leveretts write:
“[Ahmadinejad said: 'With respect to the negotiations, they should announce whether they are after friendship or animosity. They should come and tell us if the aim of the talks is friendship or animosity…' [Note from the Leveretts: Many in Washington dismiss this point as evidence of Tehran’s lack of seriousness to negotiate “real” issues. This view, however, ignores the lessons of Nixon’s approach to reorienting the American approach to China in 1969. As Kissinger writes in his memoirs, 'Nixon decided to concentrate on the broader issue of China’s attitude toward a dialogue with the United States…If relations improved on that basis, the traditional agenda would take care of itself; if relations did not improve, the traditional agenda would remain insoluble. In other words, the practical issues would be resolved as a consequence of Sino-American rapprochement, not chart the path toward it.']”
This approach — start with an expression of good will, and only then turn to discussing nuts-and-bolts issues — may well have worked for US/China 40 years ago, and it may well work again with other country pairings in the future — possibly including even US/Iran talks many years down the road. But this historical fact does not establish that an effort to improve relations between two unfriendly countries must always be made in the same sequence. Sometimes that is just not feasible because one of the parties is not willing to give that expression of good will, at least well enough to persuade the other party that it is sincere.
Unquestionably that is the case here. If Ahmadinejad really expects these resumed talks will open with a sincere and credible assurance of friendship from the US, he will be sorely disappointed. Those in Washington who “dismiss this point as evidence of Tehran’s lack of seriousness to negotiate ‘real’ issues” probably believe this is so predictable that, unless Ahmadinejad is either very stupid or an incurable optimist, he himself is not sincere. I wouldn’t go that far — preferring to cling to the possibility that Ahmadinejad is an incurable optimist — but the fact remains that these talks will never get out of the starting gate if Ahmadinejad really expects that both sides will bow, curtsey and smile at one another before they get down to business. That is not going to happen.
But this does not mean that the upcoming talks must simply end before they begin (though I’m not optimistic about their outcome in any case, as I’ve argued elsewhere). The “hug first, talk later” sequence indeed worked for US/China 40 years ago, but the opposite sequence has been far more common, and it has often yielded ice-breaking deals that usher in broader improvements in relations — sometimes even to later “hug first” sessions between the two countries.
Except at the conclusion of a war, in which case “negotiation” is rarely an accurate description of the parties’ interaction, long-time adversaries usually approach one another with caution, working out either narrow-scope trust-based deals or somewhat broader deals that are acceptable to both sides only because the deal includes some provision that makes the other party’s performance very likely (e.g. a simultaneous-exchange provision) or at the very least permits close and continuous monitoring of the other party’s performance (for example, a typical mutual disarmament treaty). The latter type of deal may be presented in warmer, fuzzier language (for example, Reagan’s famous “trust but verify”) so that those so inclined can emphasize the “trust” part if it makes them feel better, but those who actually negotiate such a deal are likely to consider the “verify” part to be more important.
Nonetheless, whether or not any genuine warmth between the parties has preceded a “trust but verify” deal between two long-time adversaries, a deal will have been struck — a deal that may constitute an important step forward in itself and that may lead to greater cooperation down the road.
In the absence of any realistic possibility that the US will offer the hand of friendship to Iran in September, that is the best we can hope for this time. No hugs.
Castellio:
To that you must add the downstream costs of entitlements to be paid out to US officers and soldiers. Makes the procurement of new weapon systems very very difficult.
It does not preclude an initial attack on Iran since that equipment is already paid for.
http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/08/us-military-power-preeminence.php?comments=expandall#comments
Paul, My perspective on the Universal National Service Act is 180 degrees from yours: I would rename it the “Charlie Rangel flea swarm act,” to be unleashed on every occasion when warmongers threaten to unleash the dogs of war: Charlie has had his fleas at the ready and threatened to deploy them in 2006, 2007, and now, 2010. The message I think he is communicating is this: If you Democrats wish to endorse war, you will have to enact a draft; a draft will doom your chances of election/re-election.
What is particularly interesting about the timing of the House resolution green-lighting Israel to attack Iran, and Rangel’s resurrection of the National Service Act, is that THIS time, both Dems and Repubs have found a way to shut down Charlie Rangel, through the ethics investigation.
That’s an ominous sign. The war dogs will be unleashed under the false confidence that they can hunt their prey with no consequences.
James,
“The Saudis have persuaded more than 50 Muslim countries to accept Israel as a fact of life and a permanent member of the community of nations. Provided Israel ends the occupation of the West Bank.”
I acknowledge this. But if one is considering how well the US and Israel feel the Saudis are playing their alleged “lap dog” role, do you suppose the US and Israel care more about (1) the Saudis having “persuaded more than 50 Muslim countries to accept Israel as a fact of life” upon satisfaction of a condition that has not been met and appears highly unlikely ever to be met; or (2) the Saudis having reminded those 50 Muslim countries, and everyone else in the world, that this condition has not been met and appears highly unlikely ever to be met?
My guess is the latter. I think the US and Israel would prefer that Adbullah say nothing at all rather than put out a settlement proposal whose success would require Israel to do something it has shown no interest whatsoever in doing.
Arnold,
“I would have done better to say mistaken informed impression…”
Yes. That would have made your statement correct, but useless to you, since the conduct of the US government is based about 99% on what it has persuaded the American public is true, and about 1% on what is true.
FYI: You are right not to trust the UK leaders. James’ argument that the UK has ‘no reason’ to keep Iran down is ingenuous. You are right to ask the reason from those who act in the way they do, not ask the reason from those who note how others are acting. Is the UK arguing against the sanctions? Does it support them wholeheartedly in the international arena?
I doubt James’ assertion that the UK has ‘considerable influence’ over the US, although, of course, that resides in the meaning of the word ‘considerable’. The UK could, I believe, have considerable influence if it used it, but it doesn’t use it… so it doesn’t exist. “Use’ in this sense means disagree with… set up other options… create alternatives.
What alternatives in any field of foreign policy action is the UK openly promoting in a sustained fashion?
The U.K. (for a rhetorical flourish) has become a figment of its own imagination.
Castellio,
“Interestingly, this reality [that deals with the US inevitably result in the US insisting on its own rights and the other party's obligations] is increasingly met not with rancour, but a kind of tired sigh that this is how business is done in America, and the recognition that the American government has a structural incoherence which is actively used to that State’s international advantage on a case by case basis.”
Good observation. Good enough that one must wonder why, despite this predictable result, some observers consider it worthwhile trying to strike a fuel-swap bargain that can succeed only if the US-controlled parties can be counted on to perform their obligations without some provision to ensure that they do or that Iran is protected if they don’t.
In the present context (the upcoming renewed fuel-swap talks), given the US’ decades-long failure to honor its NPT undertaking to help non-nuclear weapons states develop their peaceful nuclear programs, does it make sense for Iran to negotiate toward a fuel-swap deal in which its LEU ends up anywhere except a neutral country that Iran trusts to return the LEU if the US and other countries fail to perform their obligations? And if that points toward a fuel-swap deal only if Turkey acts as the escrow holder (assuming no other mutually acceptable neutral escrow can be found), and Turkey is scratched off the list early in the negotiations, will it be worth Iran’s while even to discuss a fuel-swap deal – much less actually to sign one and ship its LEU off to, say, Russia or France?
The Tehran Declaration would put performance of the West’s obligation to return Iran’s LEU if things didn’t turn out as contemplated under the deal (i.e. Iran would receive the promised fuel for its TRR) in the hands of a neutral party (Turkey). That meant to me that (1) it was somewhat more likely that things would turn out as contemplated; and that (2) if they didn’t, Iran would not have suffered a serious setback.
Absent a neutral escrow, a fuel-swap deal is not even worth discussing. And since (1) the recent breakdown in Israel/Turkey relations leads me to conclude that Israel has no interest in seeing Turkey achieve this elevated and US-approved escrow-holder status; and (2) I can’t help suspecting that Israel’s preferences will have considerable influence on the US’ negotiating stance in these upcoming talks, I doubt that any fuel-swap deal will emerge from these talks (assuming, as I do, that a “simultaneous exchange” deal is not feasible).
I’ll make one exception to that prediction. I can imagine Israel and the US approving a Turkey-escrow fuel-swap deal if Iran agrees to a temporary suspension of enrichment.
(Predictably, Iran would also agree to observe the Additional Protocols temporarily, though, for reasons I’ve explained, I don’t think that would count for much if anything: either Iran’s agreement to suspend enrichment would be enough by itself for the US and Israel or, if it wasn’t, tossing in the AP wouldn’t change their minds; thus, it would not hurt Iran’s negotiating position, and might do some good as I’ve argued earlier, for Iran simply to start observing the AP right now without continuing to believe that it has some “bargaining chip” value.)
But an agreement by Iran to suspend enrichment temporarily would probably cause Iran more grief down the road than this concession would gain Iran in the short-term context of a fuel-swap deal. When the enrichment-restriction period expires and Iran resumes enrichment, the US’ spin on that resumption almost certainly would resemble the US’ spin of Iran’s resumption of enrichment several years ago, or of Iran’s termination of its compliance with the AP and new Code 3.1 several years ago. The US would not mention, just as it did not mention back then, that Iran had merely exercised its plainly-stated rights under the fuel-swap agreement. Instead, the US would argue that Iran had reneged on its promise to cease enrichment, and would ask the American public and the rest of the world whether this made them wonder whether Iran really has peaceful intentions.
It would probably not be sufficient for Iran merely to point out that the fuel-swap agreement’s specified time period had expired. Almost certainly, any fuel-swap agreement that included Iran’s promise to suspend enrichment would not provide simply that Iran could resume enrichment upon a certain date. Instead, it would provide that Iran’s right to resume enrichment would arise only if, by that specified date, other specified events had not occurred. Iran would argue, of course, that those other events had not occurred, upon which the US predictably would respond that that was all Iran’s fault too — just as the US argued when Iran previously resumed enrichment and ceased its voluntary compliance with the AP and new Code 3.1.
And thus, the end result would be that, Iran’s resumption of enrichment, even though plainly authorized under this hypothetical fuel-swap agreement, would be spun by the US as just another step in Iran’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons. And if Iran had also promised to observe the Additional Protocols during the enrichment-suspension period and had discontinued observance of the AP at the same time it resumed enrichment, that too would be characterized as another step in Iran’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons.
In short, if Iran can extract a fuel-swap deal out of the upcoming talks only in exchange for a promise to suspend enrichment temporarily (and perhaps to observe the AP temporarily as well), Iran should think very long and hard whether that fuel-swap deal is worth taking.
Fiorangela:
This bill is a very very bad idea as it subjects young women to the powers of older men that will be staffing this as-yet-to-be-created bureaucracy.
James Canning:
Ask them what they reasons are to try to keep Iran down.
Ask them why they shredded the CWT during Iran-Iraq War.
And why did they impound a billion dollars last year in UK?
Quite frankly, I do not find UK leaders trustworthy.
This statement by Ahmadinejad …
“We have always been after compromise. The important thing is what should we compromise about? Our basic rights? There can be no compromise on such issues. Can you compromise on your independence and freedom? But when we talk about nuclear cooperation, it means we can cooperate to [alleviate] concerns. We have also concerns about the US. Why has the US stockpiled thousands of nuclear warheads? How a government that is unable to control an oil spill can have such an amount of nuclear warheads? The US has more than 100 military bases across the world and is keeping nuclear bombs in all of them, putting all the world in danger. Who will be responsible if one of them explodes? It is us who should protest.”
… is far more articulate and makes far more sense than anything you will ever hear from the Obama Regime about Iran.
Re. Rangel’s service act: though it has no cosponsors now, it’s very very convenient for Obama to have it in the pipeline if/when he decides to unload on Iran. Folks keep saying that he’ll never do it because such a move would set the region on fire. Right. Maybe so, but looking at it the other way, it should be evident that unifying disparate wars into one war has considerable attraction to the US High Command, which is at least part of why – as Ahmadinejad points out – the US High Command, along with the Israeli High Command, keeps looking away from their various failed wars to Iran. They work hard to maintain an implication hanging in the air that ‘if only we could take out Iran we could solve all this’.
Shimon Peres, shoring up his UK flank: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/01/israel-shimon-peres-british-arab-bias
Arnold Evans, @ 11:41 am:
“How many US soldiers would you be willing to pay to stop Iran from getting a Japan option? John Bolton is not president. The military people in the Obama administration have some idea of the costs Iran could impose on US forces. How many US soldiers do you think Obama is willing to sacrifice to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option?”
Anybody speculating why 80-year old Charlie Rangel is being rope-a-doped just now over ethics charges that, presumably, nobody was aware of at any time during Rangel’s 20 terms in office? Any speculation that the sudden awakening of the conscience of the US House of Representatives has something to do with the arrow Rangel removes from his quiver at inconvenient times, the arrow of HR 5741, The Universal National Service Act, otherwise known as a national Draft:
“To require all persons in the United States between the ages of 18 and 42 to perform national service, either as a member of the uniformed services or in civilian service in furtherance of the national defense and homeland security, to authorize the induction of persons in the uniformed services during wartime to meet end-strength requirements of the uniformed services, and for other purposes.”
HR 5741 has no co-sponsors; Rangel is equally inconvenient to Democrats AND Republicans. Wonder why?
“There is no mistaken impression that Iran is working on weapons.”
This is demonstrably incorrect. The vast majority of Americans indeed do have the “impression that Iran is working on weapons,” as shown by numerous polls.
I would have done better to say mistaken informed impression, or mistaken reasonable impression. Or I could have said impression subject to Iranian action.
Eric,
The Saudis have persuaded more than 50 Muslim countries to accept Israel as a fact of life and a permanent member of the community of nations. Provided Israel ends the occupation of the West Bank. Saudi Arabia is doing a great deal of work to secure Israel’s future security. Ironically, foolish “supporters” of Israel in the US are doing their best to wreck the work of the Saudis.
fyi,
I can assure you that William Hague is well-grounded in his understanding of history, and that he sees no merit in efforts to “keep Iran down”. The British “elite” (that Shimon Peres complains about) see no merit in trying to keep Iran down. What would be the reason?
Arnold,
A point of clarification on my 1:21 PM post:
One might argue that the Saudi rulers need not express hostile personal views toward Israel in order to persuade the US to keep them in power. Could the Saudi rulers not accomplish this objective, after all, by expressing relatively moderate personal views, thus emphasizing to the US just how much worse it could be if a more representative Saudi government should ever take power – a sort of “good cop, bad cop” diplomatic approach?
That argument has some merit, but not enough, for several reasons, to persuade the Saudi rulers to refrain from expressing hostile personal views about Israel: (1) I believe that is how they actually feel about Israel, and expressing one’s true feelings is usually more convincing; (2) if they were to express more moderate personal views, at least some US listeners might wonder whether many Saudi people hold the same moderate views, despite the Saudi rulers’ insistence to the contrary; and (3) the Saudi rulers know that, as long as the Saudi people continue to hate Israel, the Saudi rulers have the luxury of expressing their personal hostile views about Israel because the US will know the alternative (an overthrow of these personally-hostile rulers) would be even worse.
James Canning:
In a nutshell; keeping Iran down as an emerging power.
Same goal as US and same as France.
fyi,
The UK has considerable influence on the US even though this does not please much of the Israel lobby in the US.
What is it that the UK is seeking, in your view?
More stupidity from the Obama administration: Robert Einhorn, special adviser for non-proliferation and arms control, said in South Korea yesterday he is en route to China to attempt to cajole China into pulling out of Iran. Sheer idiocy.
James Canning:
UK does not war if she can get things without incurring that cost.
US & EU have escalated their positions against Iran since 2002.
They were hoping for Iranians to surrender.
Iranians did not.
Now US & EU are in a dead-end position.
They either have to climb down or to escalate militarily against Iran – an escalation to nowhere.
We will know by October if US & EU are willing to climb-down.
I personally doubt it for they think they have all the cards.
Arnold,
“I think we’re arguing past each other on Saudi Arabia. But you will agree that Saudi Arabia is much less hostile to Israel than Iran, could be much more hostile to Israel than it is and that a representative government of Arabia would have the potential to be just as hostile as Iran, and be a more effective threat as it has more money and is geographically closer.”
I’ll concede all of these points.
I’ll add one observation – I think the Saudi rulers are every bit as “hostile” in their hearts toward Israel as Iran’s government is, perhaps more so, and I think all parties concerned understand this very well. But since I think “hostile is as hostile does” in this situation, I don’t think it matters all that much what’s in Saudi rulers’ hearts. So I don’t think this observation diminishes your point.
Ironically, as long as the US believes (as I think it presently does) that what’s in the hearts of Saudi rulers concerning Israel reflects what’s in the hearts of the Saudi people generally, the more hostile the Saudi rulers feel in their hearts toward Israel and the more clearly they make their hostile feelings known to the US, the more likely the US is to keep those Saudi rulers in power. At least they’re easier to control than would be the unwashed Saudi masses. If the US someday were to conclude that the Saudi people feel more sympathetic toward Israel than Saudi’s rulers do (a prospect presently hard to imagine), the days of those Saudi rulers might be numbered, and I’m confident they understand this.
For this reason, it is in the interests of the Saudi rulers that the US continue to believe two things: (1) that the personal views of those Saudi rulers about Israel are an accurate reflection of the Saudi people’s views; (2) that this uniform Saudi view toward Israel is a very hostile one. To improve the odds of accomplishing both objectives, the Saudi government obviously would, and does, find it useful to (1) internally suppress the expression of any contrary views by Saudi citizens; and (2) do its best to ensure that the views of the Saudi people toward Israel are and remain very hostile.
For now at least, I don’t think much effort is required to accomplish either objective, since I doubt there’s much sympathy for Israel among Saudi citizens. Nonetheless, whether or not it reflects excessive caution, the Saudi government appears to do what it can to make sure it stays that way.
Castellio wrote:
“Interestingly, this reality is increasingly met not with rancour, but a kind of tired sigh that this is how business is done in America, and the recognition that the American government has a structural incoherence which is actively used to that State’s international advantage on a case by case basis.
Hubris? Bad faith? Or just the American way of doing things?
In that respect Ahmadinejad comments seem parochial: America doesn’t do principle.”
Eventually, won’t trading partners do a credit check on the American “State’s … Bad faith … way of doing things” and decide the risk is too great?
On the other hand, while the American state is on a roll and collecting fines hand over fist based on demonization of Iran, Iran can expect to remain in the hot seat. Until a cost-benefit analysis of doing business American style no longer seems profitable.
Here are some ledger entries from the Demonize Iran enterprise, shop run by the late New York district attorney Robert Morgenthau:
Lloyds of London, paid $350 million to “settle” charge that Lloyds did business with Iran, contrary to sanctions.
Credit Suisse, paid $536 million (negotiated) settlement of charge that it did business with Iran, contrary to sanctions.
Barclays, ABN AMRO (Royal Bank of Scotland) paid multimillion dollar fines to settle charges that they did business with Iran, contrary to sanctions.
Citigroup paid multimillion dollar fine to settle charges that it did business with Iran, contrary to sanctions.
On at least two of these fines, Morganthau graciously split the take, 50-50: half to US Treasury, half to New York City.
This is just Morgenthau’s shop; this ledger does not include entries for fines Stuart Levey has extracted from international corporations for THEIR ‘crimes’ of doing business with Iran, contrary to sanctions.
fyi,
The UK does not want another war in the Middle East, and Hague believes such a war likely would be a catastrophe. The UK has the ability to show the way forward, for the US itself. Had it not been for Tony Blair’s quasi-religious delusions, and intense attraction to the arrogant ignoramus in the White House (including the sense of power), Britain well could have delayed or even blocked the idiotic US invasion of Iraq.
Richard Steven Hack,
Ahmadinejad seems to have been suggesting strongly that Israel would attack Lebanon and Syria, with US support, within the next three months. The Zionist propagandist, Charles Krauthammer of the Washington Post, in effect claimed this suggestion was absurd. But he would say that, wouldn’t he?
paul,
The votes of Russia and China, in favor of the latest sanctions, apprarently were largely the result of Iran’s enriching U to 20%. A suspension of such enrichment, as part of the proposed “exchange” would do a great deal to help create more trust. (As fyi pointed out earlier.)
Arnold,
“We disagree on this. Take away the 600,000(!) ground troops and Hussein would have hunkered down and not only not accepted a new inspection regime, he would not have even left Kuwait.”
You misunderstood my point, which was not to argue the plausibility of this outcome. To the contrary, for the sake of my argument, I was acknowledging that Abdullah might have considerable doubt that this outcome would be achievable and that, therefore, he would not be inclined to support a US attack on Iran based on the assumption that he could count on a result similar to what the US achieved in Iraq in 1991. That was my only point.
Arnold,
I favor gradual evolution, and as you know I think Jordan’s government serves the interests of the people of Jordan rather well. You haven’t suggested in what way Jordan’s foreign policy could be improved.
Universal suffrage, and unlimited powers in the hands of elected representatives, in the context of a citizenry largely illiterate, is a formula for disaster in most countries.
Arnold,
“There is no mistaken impression that Iran is working on weapons.”
This is demonstrably incorrect. The vast majority of Americans indeed do have the “impression that Iran is working on weapons,” as shown by numerous polls. You must know this and so I’m surprised you would make a statement flatly to the contrary. It may well be that this impression is “mistaken,” as you believe, I believe, and some people even claim to know. But, if we are correct, that means only that there is a “mistaken impression that Iran is working on weapons.”
Do any of your arguments depend on the truth of what you’re saying about this?
Castellio:
Dysfunctional is the word.
And yes, other states havet to swallow all of this since they feel/think/believe they have no choice than to conduct business with US.
But that only goes so far and as global power devolves to smaller states this incoherence will be tolerated less and less.
But that is still several decades into the future.
Arnold/Nasser – sorry for the opacity, it had the wrong connotations outside my head, so to speak. My point is simply that an end to the “Zionist regime” tomorrow would mean Ahmadinejad can no longer invoke its demise as a source of his own legitimacy. Mind you, he’s well past his peak on the Arab street now anyway, which seems to be corresponding with increasingly ill-advised Iranian rhetoric.
Many countries in the world realize that negotiating a treaty or agreement with the US is to define their country’s obligations, but not the American obligations, because those obligations will be ignored in any case. And when the ‘dispute’ mechanism goes into action, the negotiations begin again, and the goalposts are moved. There are cases where the dispute goes to court and financial judgment is made and, rather than pay the fine, the American government begins ‘another negotiation’. It is endless: monies are held in escrow, the agreements limp along in tatters, but the smaller country is expected to ‘maintain it’s part of the bargain.”
Interestingly, this reality is increasingly met not with rancour, but a kind of tired sigh that this is how business is done in America, and the recognition that the American government has a structural incoherence which is actively used to that State’s international advantage on a case by case basis.
Hubris? Bad faith? Or just the American way of doing things?
In that respect Ahmadinejad comments seem parochial: America doesn’t do principle.
Eric, FYI and Richard:
I think we’re arguing past each other on Saudi Arabia. But you will agree that Saudi Arabia is much less hostile to Israel than Iran, could be much more hostile to Israel than it is and that a representative government of Arabia would have the potential to be just as hostile as Iran, and be a more effective threat as it has more money and is geographically closer.
a sustained but short-of-regime-change US attack that ends up with UN inspectors crawling all over Iran, essentially as happened in Iraq after the first Iraq war in 1991 – ferreting out and terminating Iran’s nuclear-weapons program
We disagree on this. Take away the 600,000(!) ground troops and Hussein would have hunkered down and not only not accepted a new inspection regime, he would not have even left Kuwait.
Your idea that the US has a plausible option of attacking Iran from the air until it surrenders strikes me as silly. It is just not an option available for the US.
How much do you think the US is willing to pay in Iraq and Afghanistan for these attacks? That’s a serious question. Do you think it would be worth it if the US expended a Vietnam-like effort and was thereby successful at preventing an Iranian Japan option? Do you think preventing such a Japan option would be worth 1000 US soldiers, 10,000?
How many US soldiers would you be willing to pay to stop Iran from getting a Japan option? John Bolton is not president. The military people in the Obama administration have some idea of the costs Iran could impose on US forces. How many US soldiers do you think Obama is willing to sacrifice to prevent Iran from getting a Japan option?
And so, if Iran conducts its nuclear program so that the world does not get the mistaken impression that Iran is working on a bomb or has any plans to do so, Iran probably need not worry about Saudi support for a US attack than Iran need worry about a US attack at all.
That’s really not the issue. Iran has gone from 1 to 2 tons of uranium. It will later go from 2 to 3, then 3 to 4. There is no mistaken impression that Iran is working on weapons. Iran’s fissile material, without which there can be no weapons, is supervised at Natanz.
Iran is going to look as it looks right now for the foreseeable future. Going from one number of tons which is sufficient to make a weapon to another number of tons. Iran’s position is not acceptable to Israel right now because by Israeli calculations, Iran is effectively nuclear capable right now.
We’ve gone over this. You’ve never said how you feel about Iran being nuclear capable. Would it be a good thing or a bad thing, in your personal opinion, if Iran’s nuclear program stabilizes in the state Japan has reached or the state Brazil has reached?
Your answer to that strongly colors your perception of Iranian behavior and also your perception of US efforts to prevent that.
Arnold,
“I’m not sure what you’re asking. The 2002 initiative is an example of Saudi Arabia being relatively non-hostile to Israel.”
That initiative was something I’d have supported, and I suspect you would have too. It was not well-received by either the US or Israel. Most important here, it was not something that Abdullah had to come up with. He could have just sat back and done nothing at that summit.
Arnold Evans:
I think Israel will remain a fortress in the Middle East with hostile relations with all her neighbour’s for the next few decades. There is no chance of a peace settlement.
I also think that US is being led down the path of isolation. Have you noticed how US embassies are becoming more and more like Fort Apache all over the world (and not just in Mulsim countries)?
It is a shame really but US leaders seem to percieve everything through a primarily security perspective.
If I were a US leader, I would ask myself first: “How come we seem to have so many enemies? How did we get here?”
Arnold,
“There is no question in my mind that the Saudi king really opposes Iran.”
By “Iran,” do you mean the country and the Iranian people, or just Iran’s Shiite-dominated religious government? If the latter, as I’ll guess you mean, is Abdullah’s statement that Iran doesn’t deserve to exist a rough equivalent of Ahmadinejad’s statement that Israel will/should disappear from the pages of time?
If so, might that mean that Abdullah’s view on the desirability of a US attack on Iran depends on whether the US attack would be designed – and likely – to overthrow the Iranian government and replace it with a non-religious government (since a Sunni-dominated religious government clearly is not in the cards for Shiite Iran)? What do you suppose Abdullah thinks are the odds that the US will devote the decades of time, trillions of dollars and tens of thousands of ground troops’ lives necessary to accomplish this? Even if the US did, would Abdullah be happy with just any old non-Shiite secular government, or would it have to be a non-democratic regime like that of the Shah? How would Abdullah feel about having a large US-supported secular democracy right next door, along with the other US-supported secular democracy recently installed next door (Iraq) and the third US-supported secular democracy he’s long had to his west (Israel)? Do you suppose Abdullah is confident that, if successful, the US this time wouldn’t get silly ideas about installing a democracy in Iran as the US has tried to do in the last two Middle Eastern countries whose regimes it has changed?
Might Abdullah instead be happy with a bargain-basement US attack that merely wipes out Natanz and a few other nuclear sites, predictably inducing Iran, still controlled by the same Shiite-dominated religious government that Abdullah detests, to take its nuclear program deep underground and produce a nuclear bomb, just as Saddam attempted to do after Israel bombed its Osirak reactor? Presumably Abdullah recognizes the wisdom in the old saying that “If you’re going to shoot a bear, be sure you kill him,” especially when that bear is smart enough to figure out who helped to shoot him.
Or, if Abdullah doubts the likelihood of the first outcome and would dread the second outcome, might Abdullah be happy with an outcome somewhere in between: a sustained but short-of-regime-change US attack that ends up with UN inspectors crawling all over Iran, essentially as happened in Iraq after the first Iraq war in 1991 – ferreting out and terminating Iran’s nuclear-weapons program? This might not be so bad, Abdullah might think – provided, of course, that he could count on the US not only to seek and achieve this degree of military success but also to remain able and willing indefinitely to monitor Iran closely enough that its post-war rulers — that same detested Shiite-dominated religious government that the US had failed to remove — would not start up a clandestine nuclear weapons program at the first opportunity.
I suspect Abdullah might have serious doubts about the US’ staying power – on top of some doubt that the US could achieve this degree of military success in the first place. For this reason, I think Abdullah would consider it sensible to support a US attack on Iran — if at all — only if Abdullah were firmly convinced that Iran really had nuclear weapons or was so very close to getting them that, if the US didn’t act quickly, Iran could not be prevented from obtaining them. In other words, his criteria probably are the same as the US government’s criteria.
And so, if Iran conducts its nuclear program so that the world does not get the mistaken impression that Iran is working on a bomb or has any plans to do so, Iran probably need not worry about Saudi support for a US attack than Iran need worry about a US attack at all.
fyi:
My point is that useless is ok compared with hostile. Saudi Arabia wouldn’t need long range missiles to reach Israel. Southern Israel could be put under anti-aircraft cover entirely from Saudi territory.
An independent Saudi Arabia with even a chance of voting for a Saudi Ahmadinejad would make Israel unsustainable.
Arnold Evans:
You are wrong since the timing of 2002 proposal did not do anything for US.
If US were calling the shots, the proposal would have been put on the table in 1997 – where it could do some good.
By 2002, the proposal was useless.
“Iran and the US appear to need Israel as badly as each other. Which is amusing really, considering the bride that the two suitors are squabbling over is so fearsomely ugly.”
- I thought the US and Iran was squabbling over Iraq and the future of power balance in the Persian Gulf.
Eric:
In this light, why do you think Abdullah suggested the so-called Arab peace initiative in 2002?
I’m not sure what you’re asking. The 2002 initiative is an example of Saudi Arabia being relatively non-hostile to Israel. It’s Abdullah’s job as a local subordinate in the US colonial structure in the region. It’s what his father would have done for the British Empire.
Keeping Abdullah in power, in a position to perform this service for the United States and not subject to opposing pressure from any contrary power is what motivates Abdullah’s hostility towards Iran and apart from the direct strategic threat Iran poses to Israel, motivates some of the hostility Iran receives from the United States.
An independent Saudi Arabia would be no more likely to sponsor an Arab peace initiative to recognize a Zionist Israel than an independent Ghana would be to sponsor an African peace initiate with conditions to recognize an Afrikaaner-majority South Africa.
Iran and the US appear to need Israel as badly as each other. Which is amusing really, considering the bride that the two suitors are squabbling over is so fearsomely ugly.
Alan, it’s fine for something to appear to you differently than it appears to other people. But in that situation you explain why it appears that way to you.
Until you explain, I have no idea what you’re talking about.
Arnold,
“King Abdullah hates Iran … because Iran threatens the regional US colonial structure that maintains his throne in exchange for being relatively less hostile towards Israel.”
In this light, why do you think Abdullah suggested the so-called Arab peace initiative in 2002?
As for the post ….. blah blah blah Israel blah blah blah Zionists blah blah blah Israel.
Iran and the US appear to need Israel as badly as each other. Which is amusing really, considering the bride that the two suitors are squabbling over is so fearsomely ugly.
In 2006 a Universal National Service Act was proposed in the US Congress. It did not gain much traction.
On July 15, Rep. Charles Rangel raised the issue again; HR 5741 is in the first stages, working its way through the legislative process.
On several blogs, Rangel has been blasted for proposing a bill that would amount to “slavery” or “indentured servitude;” the blogs have noted that women are included in the those required to perform national service — “all persons between 18 and 42.” As well, those blogs critical of Rangel observe that he put the bill in motion just days before H Res 1553, the resolution that would have the US giving to Israel support for waging war on Iran, received the endorsement of 1/3 of the Republicans caucus.
I think the blogs are doing Charlie Rangel wrong: his bill is not a stealth draft, it is a pushback against the warmongering H Res 1553.
Prof. Sahimi observed in the article Eric Brill posted (12:04 am) that H Res 1553 marks the first time that the government of one country has endorsed a second country’s purpose of waging war on a third country.
In “Treacherous Alliance,” Dr. Trita Parsi tracks the process by which AIPAC first imposed sanction on Iran by means of an executive order, signed by Bill Clinton. Executive orders can easily be undone; therefore, on the strength of Clinton’s executive order, AIPAC went to work to make sanctions the law of the land — the Libya-Iran Sanctions Act, or the D’Amato amendment. Similarly, a resolution is ‘just a resolution,’ it’s not a law. It’s a prelude to a law.
Arnold/Richard: This is of course the same King Abdullah who, resplendent in a comfortable old pair of trainers, interrupts his meetings with Hillary Clinton to watch truck racing on the telly.
Richard Steven Hack:
I am saying the effects of hubristic habits of the mind effectively causes one to try to negogiate from a false (in my opinion) position of strength.
In DC, as far as I can tell, the idea is that Diplomacy should be cost free and other nations’ interest are not worth any consideration.
May be things have changed at top, but the middle is probably the same.
But I agree with you that Obama’s Iran policy has not borne fruit – and given the Hillary “Obliterate Iran” Clinton as the Diplomat-in-Chief, it will not.
Arnold: “He didn’t feel this way under the Shah though, and Iran was just as Shiite then as it is now. King Abdullah hates Iran not because of a Sunni/Shiite difference, but because Iran threatens the regional US colonial structure that maintains his throne in exchange for being relatively less hostile towards Israel.”
I really don’t see how you can have that precise a feel for what the Saudi king feels. How do you know he doesn’t hate Iran – or more precisely Iran’s leadership, since I doubt he thinks about the Iranian people any more than he thinks about his own people – based on BOTH a distaste for Shiism as well as Iran’s resistance to the US? That’s all I’m saying, and I can’t see what evidence you can produce for the Saudi king’s NOT hating Iran based on the traditional Salafist view of the Shia sect.
If you want to argue that the Saudi king has NO religious beliefs at all, be my guest. I don’t think you can establish that, but I can’t prove otherwise. OTOH, you can’t prove I’m wrong when I say the Saudi king and/or any number of the Saudi crowd don’t like the Shia.
Here’s the results of a quick Google from random articles:
“Saudi clerics on the government payroll have repeatedly made statements deprecating Shia, who constitute 10 to 15 percent of the kingdom’s population, without any countervailing action by the government. In a sermon on January 1, 2010, Shaikh Muhammad al-‘Arifi, the government-paid imam of the Buradi mosque in Riyadh, called Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, considered the highest religious authority for many Saudi Shia, an “obscene, irreligious atheist.”"
“On May 30, 2008, 22 prominent Saudi Wahhabi clerics, including Abdullah bin Jibrin, Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak, and Nasir al-’Umar, known for their hardline opinions, issued a statement calling the “Shia sect an evil among the sects of the Islamic nation, and the greatest enemy and deceivers of the Sunni people. ” Of the 22 signatories, 11 are current government officials and 6 are former government officials. Human Rights Watch documented systematic discrimination against Saudi Shia in a September 2009 report, “Denied Dignity.”"
“So far, King Abdullah has shown no sign of opting for a policy of inclusion – not even a token gesture, such as a Shia minister. Moreover, Abdullah is unable even to stop Wahhabi satellite TV stations from denouncing the Shia “heretics,” or the hundreds of Wahhabi Web sites that call for the outright elimination of the Shia.”
However, I don’t want to overstate the case. Apparently King Abdullah has spent some effort to try to ease tensions with the Shia in his own country and has tried to promote interfaith harmony abroad. So you may be correct in his case to some degree that the primary motivation in his case is his own dependence on the US. Or this may be simply the efforts of someone motivated to reduce the suspicion that his own country is the source of much of the world’s Muslim terrorism as well as reducing the unrest in his own country.
This article makes a nuanced case that there is some reason to believe that it is the US and Israel who are accentuating the Sunni-Shia conflict – and I can buy that easily, too:
The Shia-Sunni Divide: Myths and Reality
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19047
Arnold: “So what do you think Obama, Mullen or Gates think a war with Iran would look like?”
Not sure they care. And I’m sure Obama has less clue than Gates who has less clue than Mullen. How much clue any of them have in toto, however, I’m not sure. The one thing they all know for sure is it won’t cost them anything. Just like it won’t cost Bill Kristol to cheerlead.
“On June 5, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia reportedly told French Defense Minister Hervé Morin, “There are two countries in the world that do not deserve to exist: Iran and Israel.”
There is no question in my mind that the Saudi king really opposes Iran. He didn’t feel this way under the Shah though, and Iran was just as Shiite then as it is now. King Abdullah hates Iran not because of a Sunni/Shiite difference, but because Iran threatens the regional US colonial structure that maintains his throne in exchange for being relatively less hostile towards Israel.
Richard:
So what do you think Obama, Mullen or Gates think a war with Iran would look like?
The interview shows that the real “nutcases” are in DC
Sahimi: “At the same time, Obama’s goal has always been the same as that of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, namely, to dismantle Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities and program. There is a negligible difference between demanding suspension of the uranium enrichment program before entering the negotiation room, and demanding the same just as soon as one enters the room. The president also set a superficial deadline, December 2009, for significant progress on the issue. Why is it that Washington politicians — Democrats and Republicans alike — oppose deadlines when it comes to Iraq and Afghanistan, but enthusiastically support one when dealing with Iran? Because when it comes to Iran, their bellicose fantasies have yet to be realized.
In fact, it is becoming abundantly clear that the president’s promise to pursue diplomacy with Iran has always been similar to many other promises that he made during his campaign: bogus. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has repeatedly made it clear that the “diplomatic effort” is not directed at reaching a solution but about convincing the Europeans that diplomacy will not work.
So, it is now crystal clear — if it had not long been already — that the administration’s plan has been to go through the diplomatic motions, as Israel’s man in the White House, Dennis Ross, wanted, in order to set the stage for crippling sanctions and possible war against Iran.”
By George, I think he’s got it! More so than anybody else I’ve read recently.
Arnold: Read this quote from the Sahimi article Brill references:
“On June 5, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia reportedly told French Defense Minister Hervé Morin, “There are two countries in the world that do not deserve to exist: Iran and Israel.” This statement was reported by Georges Malbrunot of Le Figaro, who said that it was confirmed by two sources from diplomatic and military circles.”
I think that says it all about the Saudi attitude toward Iran.
Fyi: However, the issue of bad faith strikes to goals, not beliefs. It is one thing for US leaders to think they can order the world to their intentions. It’s another to LIE about it. That is directly bad faith. Obama says he believes Iran can have a peaceful nuclear energy program without uranium enrichment. If he really believes that, then he’s not merely a victim of hubris, he’s a complete idiot. Since I don’t believe he is a complete idiot, we return to his being a liar. Which is bad faith.
You’re basically arguing that Obama is a moron who really believes the US is so good and wonderful and never wrong that Iran CAN trust us completely when we tell Iran that if it ships its nuclear material to France or wherever that we will insure they get back their fuel rods.
That makes you deluded, given Obama’s reaction to the Turkey-Brazil deal. Not to mention, AGAIN, that the US KNOWS Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program, and the US also KNOWS that Iran is LEGALLY ENTITLED to have a uranium enrichment program just like Japan does regardless of whether Iran wants or does not want the so-called “Japan Option”.
Therefore Obama is lying, and it is bad faith, not ONLY hubris. It’s cognitive dissonance to insist otherwise.
Obama is NOT an honorable person, no matter what he might think of himself.
Sincere thanks for the links to the Press TV transcript, Leveretts.
As FP policy statements go, I’d rate it as similar in stature to the circa 20/9/2009 CNN interview with Dmitri Medvedev preserved, under President Speeches, on the Kremlin website.
Interesting article by Dr. Sahimi on the many recent calls for war on Iran:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/07/the-drumbeats-of-war-with-iran-are-getting-louder.html
To them, it is not bad faith as such. Like leaders of General Motors, they believe themselves so powerful that they do not need to negogiate on an equitable basis. They still think of themselves and the world situation as it obtained in 1940s through 1990s.
Fyi: I’m not sure the distinction can be made or matters. Hubris leads one to bad faith. The end result is the same.
As a side note, I notice that this translation does NOT claim that Ahmadinejad states that there will be a “war” against two nations in the Middle East, but instead uses the words “operations”. That’s a much easier term to explain.
Nonetheless, I think it is very clear that tensions are being ratcheted up in Lebanon and against Iran. I believe it is very likely that Israel will initiate a military operation against Lebanon, first as a prelude to a strike on Iran and second as a means of pressuring the US by making the US BELIEVE it is a prelude to a strike on Iran. The only question is when? This year? Next year?
Richard Steven Hack:
Not bad faith – hubris.
I’m always impressed by Ahmadinejad’s speeches (to the degree I can be with any politician’s speeches) in comparison to Obama’s. Ahmadinejad may not always be particularly articulate (although that may be a matter of translation), but he is always direct.
Obama, on the other hand, is your usual slick black hustler. His speeches and his remarks are always grand sounding but vague and dance around directness. They’re also full of lies and half truths. Did you know that President Kennedy, when asked questions by the press, used to make up statistics and facts on the spot?
Ahmadinejad will frequently embroider and embellish and make things sound better in Iran than they probably are. But he is very direct and correct at putting the onus on the US to stop dealing in bad faith, and bringing up the issues that the US can’t afford to deal with, such as Israel’s nuclear arsenal.
People need to keep in mind at all times the fundamental bad faith of the US in dealing with Iran, which is exemplified by Obama’s EXPLICIT statement that Israel has a right to nuclear weapons while simultaneously denying Iran the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program that includes native soil enrichment. This is FUNDAMENTAL PROOF of the US bad faith and the US ulterior motives in spinning this “crisis”. You CANNOT act as if the US is acting in good faith in this matter. It’s ludicrous. It is no more possible than it was for George W. Bush to act in good faith on the matter of WMDs in Iraq. In this respect, Obama is IDENTICAL to George Bush.
This has to be kept in mind at all times.
paul:
A win for Obama but also a step toward containment. That is the only policy left for US and EU.
I might be wrong and there could be a graual unwinding of this knot through the process of fuel swap.
But I seriously doubt it.
If it’s true that Ashton refused to negotiate until after the sanctions, then that makes it even more clear that the sanctions were never a response to Iran’s unwillingness to negotiate, but instead have a completely different function – and what was that? A ‘win’ for Obama? Yes. And a step towards war, in fact an act of war in itself.
Ah, but the alternapundits will all say ‘if Obama didn’t want peace, why ‘have’ Ashton offer talks at all?’
Right. It’s just exactly the way a bully, beating up another child, will cry out ‘leave me alone’. Every warmonger talks peace while making war.
So James, from the previous topic, do you favor constitutional monarchy, with a limited mostly figurehead role for the king, or do you favor what Jordan has today which is far from that for Muslim majority states in Israel’s region?
The question remains the same, for which states do you favor representative government and for which states do you favor autocratic monarchies?
Charles Krauthammer called Ahmadinejad “calculating and dangerous” for saying in effect that there was the possibility of a war between Israel and Lebanon (and Syria).
The US colluded with Israel to set up the insane Israeli smashing of Lebanon in 2006.
The Iranian president makes a good point, that if Germany is the “plus 1″, then having Turkey and Brazil, to be “5 +3″ is logical, provided the group does not get so large as to become unwieldy.
I very much agree Iran’s seeking a statement that the “west” is not hostile, is important.
Lady Ashton, not Sadly Ashton!
Ahmadinejad seems to see the merits on moving ahead with the nuclear exchange, to build confidence on both sides.
Fascinating, and important. That Sadly Ashton stalled on responding to Iran’s letter regarding moving ahead with the nuclear exchange (as per May 17th declaration), until the day after the UN voted more sanctions against Iran, suggests she was helping the Obama team who wanted to post a “win” in the “win column” (even when it clearly was counter-productive to have obtained the further UN sanctions).