The Race for Iran

Last week, Hillary spoke at the American University in Washington, DC—where she’s now teaching U.S. foreign policy, in addition to her appointment at Yale University.  She spoke about the Arab awakening and its impact on the Middle East’s balance of power.  Please click here to listen to her talk, and see highlights below:

“The Middle East is going through a period of momentous change, turmoil.  Many describe it as the ‘Arab awakening’—a ‘bottom up’ phenomenon; a dramatic manifestation of ‘people power’.  There are good reasons to look at what’s happening in the Middle East this way. 

But as someone focused on U.S. foreign policy and international int’l strategy, I think it’s important also to look at and interpret what’s going on in the Middle East from another angle: the breakdown of the U.S.-led political and security order in the Middle East…What we’re seeing in the Middle East today is a dramatic shift in the regional balance of power—a shift in the relative distribution of power against America and our regional partners in favor of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies.  

While this shift has been ongoing for at least a decade, one of the most important consequences of the Arab awakening that is unfolding today will be an acceleration and intensification of this shift in the regional balance.

Beyond the shift in the relative distribution of power among important regional actors, the very essence of power politics in Middle East—is shifting—from hard military power, where America has the advantage, to soft power, where the Islamic Republic its allies have the advantage…

What is driving these shifts? 

To answer that, it is important to look, first, at the basis for U.S. dominance in Middle East.  U.S. dominance in the Middle East has rested on two things:  capacity and legitimacy. 

Regarding capacity, America remains uniquely capable of projecting enormous amounts of conventional mil power into the Middle East.  No one else can project this hard power, conventional military power into the Middle East, today.  But prolonged, strategically indeterminate U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq have underscored the limits of what U.S. military might can accomplish. 

Regarding legitimacy, America has tried—under the first President Bush, President Clinton, The second President Bush, and now, President Obama—to gain buy-in of Arab states for a U.S.-led, highly militarized political and security order in the Middle East on the grounds that U.S. leadership would bring good things to the Middle East, including greater security and a resolution to the Arab/Israeli conflict.  But, simply put, America hasn’t delivered on those promises…And, it has cost America dearly in terms of the perceived legitimacy of America’s purposes in the Middle East.  

Likewise, it’s become increasingly clear to the people of the Middle East that America isn’t going to deliver an end to the Arab/Israeli conflict.  Instead, the United States is now widely seen in the Middle East as enabling an Israeli national security doctrine that requires a kind of regional hegemony for Israel, through permanent occupation and the freedom to use military force, unilaterally and disproportionately.  That, too, has cost America dearly, in terms of the perceived legitimacy of its purposes in the Middle East…

When Obama became President, in January 2009, he pledged to change how America dealt with the Middle East and to put our Middle East policies on a more effective, sustainable trajectory—in Iraq, Afghan, on Arab/Israeli peace, and to pursue “engagement” with the Islamic Republic.  But, instead, Obama is presiding over the demise of a two-state solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, turning America into a quasi-perm occupying power in Afghanistan by surging additional troops into Afghanistan with no strategy for a political settlement there, and discrediting engagement as a strategy by saying he tried but failed to reach out to Iran when, in fact, he never seriously tried.  There has been no Nixon to China moment under Obama. 

As a result, the Middle East’s balance of power has shifted even further away from the United States and toward the Islamic Republic and its allies…And, now, Obama stands by, for the most part, as new openings for Iran to reset the regional balance in its favor emerge in Bahrain, Egypt, Tunis, Yemen, and perhaps elsewhere.  (Obama is standing by with the possible exception of Libya where he may end up in a Somalia-like military intervention.)

The fact is:  every Middle East regime that has been seriously challenged by sustained popular unrest so far is either a close U.S. ally (Bahrain, Egypt, Tunis, Yemen) or a former rogue that made a surrender-type deal with America (Libya).  That’s the pattern.   Rather than acknowledge this fact, this pattern, and deal with the deficiencies in America’s Middle East policies, Washington has focused on the possibility that the wave of popular unrest that’s taking down one U.S. ally in the Middle East after another will now bring down the Islamic Republic—and, perhaps, Assad’s government in Syria, too. 

In my view that is wishful thinking.

But why is this—why has the Islamic Republic defied conventional wisdom and not only survived but strengthened to the extent that Iran can now balance effectively against the United States in what is now a competition for influence in the Middle East?

The Islamic Republic has come through because, even at the height of the opposition Green Movement’s activism following Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, the Green Movement did not represent anything close to the majority of Iranian society, and, the majority of Iranians continue to support the idea of an Islamic Republic—even if they want it to evolve in significant ways.  What’s left of the Green Movement in Iran today represents an even smaller portion of Iranian society than it did in the summer of 2009.  Moreover, recent efforts to restart protests in Iran have taken place at what most Iranians inside Iran understand is their moment in the Middle East—which has further reduced political space for the Green Movement’s message. 

So, from the perspective of many in Iran—and, I would argue, in reality—the relative distribution of power in the Middle East is shifting away from America and our allies and toward the Islamic Republic and its partners in the resistance camp.  In this context, Iranian policymakers are confident—with good reason—that any government in the Arab world which becomes at all more representative of its people’s values, beliefs, concerns, preferences, and interests will become, first of all, less enthusiastic about strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel, and that is a plus for Iran. 

Iranian policymakers are also confident—again, with good reason—that any Arab government which becomes more representative of its own pop will become more receptive to the Islamic Republic’s message of resistance to U.S. and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East.  This message appeals not just to Shi’a.  Public opionion polls and just the experience of spending time in these societies indicate that the message of resistance resonates throughout the region, and has tremendous appeal not just to Shia but on the Sunni Arab street. 

As long as currently or once pro-American regimes aren’t replaced by salafi-dominated Islamist orders, Arab governments that emerge from the present turmoil will want to follow an independent foreign policy line.  Iran calculates that this will work in its favor, and this is a real plus for the Islamic Republic.    

But the regional balance of power is also shifting at another level—in the very essence of the Middle East’s power politics.  On this level, the critical point is that the balance of power in the Middle East is becoming relatively less defined by “hard” military capabilities, quantifiable economic indicators, etc, & relatively more defined in terms of a “balance of influence” in the Middle East. 

Here it’s important to discuss “soft power”, famously defined by Harvard University’s Joseph Nye as the capacity of “getting others to want what you want”, and which Nye contrasted with the ability to coerce others through the exercise of “hard” military and/or economic power. 

One of the most remarkable things about the shift in the Middle East’s balance of power over the last decade, away from America and its allies, in favor of the Islamic Republic and its partners, is that this shift has virtually nothing to do with military capabilities or other forms of hard power.  It’s very much about soft power, and the fact that the Islamic Republic has picked winners rather than losers as its political allies in key regional theaters.    

The Islamic Republic has cultivated an expanding reservoir of soft power, derived from its support for resistance movements on the front lines of the Arab/Israeli conflict and its defiance of U.S. and other Western powers over the nuclear issue. 

For the last decade or so—and especially since Ahmadinejad’s initial presidential election in 2005—the Islamic Republic has worked to maximize the strategic leverage it derives from its soft power edge.  In particular, the Islamic Republic has used its standing as the de facto leader of the Middle East’s resistance bloc to mobilize regional publics’ most intensely felt grievances—including grievances against America, Israel, and the region’s pro-Western regimes. 

Many Western analysts dismiss the significance of soft power in the coldly competitive venue of the Middle East’s power politics.  But the kind of soft power that the Islamic Republic has cultivated has real world impact. 

Zbigniew Brzezinski has written with particular insight about what he describes as the “global political awakening”, in which “nearly universal access to radio, television, and the Internet is creating a community of shared resentments and envy that transcends sovereign borders”.   In the Middle East and other regions scarred by memories of colonial or imperial domination, this is generating a yearning for human dignity and cultural respect among local populations.  Consequently, those same populations, disliking the status quo, are susceptible to being mobilized against those whom they perceive as self-interestedly preserving it. (i.e., America propping up Mubarak)

Iranian policymakers, before Brzezinski made his observation, grasped the potential for Middle Eastern populations mobilized against the status quo to challenge existing regimes, a regional order dominated by America, and a regional balance of power tilted against the Islamic Republic.  In strategic terms, the Islamic Republic is using the political awakening of Middle Eastern publics to alter the very nature of power politics in the region. 

More specifically, the Islamic Republic is working to transform the Middle East’s traditional balance of power framework, defined by conventional military capabilities and other “hard power” assets in which Iran is deficient, into a balance of influence, defined by aspects of “soft power” in which the Islamic Republic enjoys unique advantages.  This transformation is bolstering Iran’s ability to shape strategic outcomes in the Middle East.  

America faces serious challenges in the Middle East.  Our strategic position in this vital part of the world is eroding before our eyes.  To forestall the collapse of our strategic position in the Middle East, the United States needs to come to terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, just as President Nixon discarded 20 years of dysfunctional China policy and came to terms with the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s.

This week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other Obama Administration officials complained publicly that Iran was “meddling” and “interfering” in events in the Middle East which are threatening the downfall of one U.S. ally after another.  But the Obama Administration’s response to the latest flashpoint—Libya—has been to exhort the Libyan people overthrow its government, declare that Qaddafi “must go”, and engage in an embarrassing, intra-administration but thoroughly public debate about U.S. military intervention in Libya. 

Can no one in Washington really understand that Iran’s narrative of resistance to injustice, foreign occupation, and Western hegemony has more appeal to Middle Eastern publics than the prospect of yet another U.S. military attack on Muslim country?

The Obama Administration’s handling of the ongoing conflict in Libya is an unfinished case study in how not to conduct “great power” foreign policy.  No less than President Obama himself said publicly that Muammar al-Qaddafi has lost his legitimacy to lead, and that it is time for him to go.  But the Obama Administration has no ready means to bring about that outcome, should Qaddafi not be moved by the persuasive power of Obama’s words. 

Last week, Secretary Clinton stopped just short of calling for the imposition of a “no fly” zone over Libya.  After it dawned on people in the Administration that other permanent members of the Security Council might not be prepared to back such a proposal—Russia’s Foreign Minister and China’s UN ambassador have both publicly dismissed the idea—State Department officials floated a scenario with various media outlets that the United States could recognize a “provisional government” in Libya, composed of various figures opposed to Qaddafi, which would then request the United States to impose a no fly zone.  But it seems very hard to say just who could constitute a provisional Libyan government with sufficient credibility and presumed legitimacy to play this role. 

Even more importantly, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, backed by the senior leadership of America’s uniformed military, went public saying that imposition of a no fly zone would first require the United States to attack and destroy much of Libya’s military establishment.  (Gates made this point not long after his West Point speech in which he argued that any future Defense Secretary who recommended that the United States start another war in the Middle East “should have his head examined”.)  Secretary Clinton was forced to retreat, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the Obama Administration was a long way from taking a decision about a possible no fly zone over Libya.    

It is embarrassing enough that President Obama is demanding things he has no capacity to bring about, and Secretary Clinton talks about having the United States attack another Middle Eastern country when she clearly has not given any serious thought to what such an action would entail.  But now Qaddafi is putting up a real fight, and may well be able to hold out for quite a bit longer than anyone in the Obama Administration seems to have considered. 

Does no one in Washington remember that, after suffering a substantial military defeat by the United States in 1991, Saddam Husayn put down a (U.S.-instigated) Shi’a rebellion in southern Iraq?  After that, with two no-fly zones and a comprehensive oil embargo in place against Iraq, Saddam held on to power in Baghdad for almost another 12 years.  And, in the end, it wasn’t the Iraqi people who got rid of him.  It took a U.S. invasion to do that—with, of course, horrible consequences for both the Iraqi people and U.S. interests.      

Undoubtedly, Qaddafi will crush the rebel forces if he can.  At a minimum, though, he is working to hold off the rebels and force the start of a political negotiation—at the end of which (at least in his vision) he would still be playing a significant role in Libyan politics. 

With its no doubt emotionally gratifying but feckless rhetoric demanding Qaddafi’s departure, the Obama Administration has ensured that it can play no constructive role in a process of political transition in Libya.  Can anyone with a clear head, an appreciable measure of historical memory, and decent intentions honestly think it would be a good idea for the United States to invade Libya—under the rubric of humanitarian intervention and with the stated aim of restoring the Libyan people’s “freedom”?   Can no one in Washington remember Somalia, let alone Iraq?

All of this is playing out as the Obama Administration seems increasingly inclined to support the Bahraini ruling family in resisting the most important demands of the opposition there for real political reform—an episode at which we will look more deeply in coming days. 

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Director of Tehran University’s Institute for North American Studies, was interviewed on CNN’s In the Arena by Eliot Spitzer earlier this week; Mohammad also answered questions for In the Arena’s blog; see here for the blog and here for video of a small part of the interview.  As usual, Mohammad made a number of very important and timely points.  We append the online Q&A below.   

From CNN:  Answering today’s seven OFF-SET questions is Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literature at the University of Tehran and head of Department of North American Studies.

Marandi’s father was imprisoned for nearly half a year during the Shah’s regime—prior to the 1979 revolution—and was about to be arrested again for criticizing Pahlavi’s rule.  He fled Iran and Mohammad was born in Richmond, Virginia.  The family then moved to Dayton, Ohio.  When Mohammad was 13, the family moved back to Iran and he volunteered in the Iran-Iraq war.  In that fighting, Marandi experienced two major chemical attacks and blames the US and its European allies for providing them to Saddam Hussein.

Marandi’s main interests are American Literature, Colonial and Postcolonial Studies, as well as Middle East-US relations.

Marandi appeared on In the Arena on Monday, Feb. 28, 2011.

When people in the West look at what’s happening in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and other Middle East countries, some think:  could this happen in Iran?  How do most Iranians view the current turmoil in the Middle East?

Iranians are very pleased with what they see as an awakening interlinked with Islamic values in the Middle East and North Africa.  They believe these countries are all controlled by Western-backed corrupt and despotic regimes that do not reflect the will of their own population or the people in the region at large.

Iranians believe that as a result the balance of power is rapidly tilting away from the United States and that this will significantly strengthen Iran’s position as well as the position of other countries and actors critical of current US and EU policies.

Contrary what is being said in many circles in the United States, there is no chance that these events will be repeated in Iran, since the current political order in the Islamic Republic has firm popular support.

President Ahmadinejad, whom I didn’t vote for, has a high job approval rating throughout the country and he won the presidential election by a landslide.  I should point out for a Western audience that no evidence of electoral fraud in the June 2009 presidential election has ever been produced.  My colleague Dr. Abbas Akhoundi, who was Mr. Mousavi’s personal representative in the Interior Ministry for the election and who had representatives at almost all the ballot boxes throughout the country, has specifically said that there was no electoral fraud.  When Mousavi failed to provide evidence of fraud and after the riots in central and northern Tehran, he lost most of his supporters.  As time went by and Mousavi effectively aligned himself with Western-backed organizations and even dreaded terrorist organizations such as the Mujahideen-e Khalq, which worked and fought for Saddam Hussain during the Iran-Iraq war, he became almost completely isolated.

Dr. Khabbaz, a prominent reformist MP, made a speech in parliament less than two weeks ago and on behalf of the reformist faction he denounced Mousavi and Karrubi.

Despite wishful thinking among much of the political elite in the US, the so called Green Movement does not have any popular support in Iran and most of President Ahmadinejad’s critics, whether principalist, conservative, or reformist are supportive of the Islamic Republic and its institutions.  The Green Movement’s most significant body of supporters live in the United States.

There are reports that the opposition leaders Mir Hossein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi are reportedly now under house arrest. Do you know if that’s true?

The spokesman for the judiciary has said that they’re facing newer restrictions because of their almost open cooperation with the US government.  However, there are serious calls for the two men to be put on trial for the riots in Tehran after the elections in which over forty people died including members of the disciplinary forces.

Is there a large enough opposition to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to vote him out one day?

Despite his current popularity, Dr. Ahmadinejad will no longer be Iran’s president after his current term in office comes to an end.  According to the Iranian constitution, a president cannot serve for a third successive term in office.

Heydar Moslehi, Iran’s intelligence minister, told Iran’s state television on Friday that Iran had arrested an armed person, who was on a mission to kill during recent antigovernment protests.  He also said an individual with ties to the CIA was arrested February 14 someone he described as having been under a period of surveillance, and that person was working in coordination with the CIA. It wasn’t clear if the two individuals were the same person.  Do you believe that the United States is behind the opposition movement in Iran?

I don’t know if the armed person who was arrested is the same person who is linked to the CIA.

Regarding the American role in Iran, the general belief here is that the US is heavily involved with extremist groups as well as with the violent opposition.

The fact that tens of Persian language televisions stations, hundreds of websites and weblogs, as well as a large number of political organizations and terrorist entities, are funded and supported by the US government leaves little doubt that the US is heavily involved in Iranian affairs.

However, one should be wary of using the term opposition, because there are many active political parties in Iran that are opposed to or highly critical of the current administration and who have newspapers and websites.

However, unlike, the different green groups, they are independent, they do not seek foreign support, and they are very much opposed to western involvement in Iranian affairs.

Current American policies of confrontation and intervention only serve to create greater anger and even hostility towards the US.

Do the changes in a number of Middle East countries mean that Iran may want to take more of a leadership role in the area?

I think that Iran will be looking for greater regional cooperation rather than leadership.  As the number of friendly countries increase, economic and political cooperation will increase as well and this alone with significantly strengthen both Iran as well as other regional countries.

What would need to happen for the United States and Iran to have a closer relationship?

The United States must adopt a more realistic approach towards Iran.  Most of the so-called Iran experts that influence US government policy towards Iran, know relatively little about the country and many of them are agenda- driven and basically say what people in positions of power want to hear.

Over the years the many ridiculous predictions made by these people about the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran have all turned out to be false.

Needless to say in the months and years ahead, these incurably confident triumphalists will continue to caricature Iran and see imminent signs of revolution in the slightest flicker of militancy.

However, what is extraordinary is that there seems to be no accountability in the US.  No matter how often these people get it wrong, they remain well paid, well funded, and influential in DC.

The most important thing is that the US political establishment must recognize that the Islamic Republic is here to stay and that it is becoming increasingly powerful, confident, and influential.

Instead of making useless threats, it should look for common ground and make real moves towards rapprochement.  If this happens, the Iranians will reciprocate.

As the balance of power shifts in the region and countries like Saudi Arabia are looking more and more unstable, countries like China, India, and Brazil are looking to Iran for secure oil and gas supplies as well as stable markets, the US would be foolish to do otherwise.

Just curious: do you still have an Iranian passport and a U.S. passport?

My parents are Iranian nationals.  However, since I was born in the United States I have dual nationality and, thus, I have an American passport.  I was definitely not an “anchor baby” though!

Photo from voltairenet.org

We were interviewed on NPR this weekend about the shifting balance of power in the Middle East, which we have been predicting for some time, see here.  The interview with NPR can be heard here; a transcript is below:

NPR’s GUY RAZ: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been one of the loudest supporters of the uprisings across the Arab world. It’s no secret he regards certain Arab leaders as rival, and proxies of the United States. And Flynt Leverett and his wife, Hillary Mann Leverett, both former National Security Council staffers, argue that Iran has much to gain from the changes taking place in the Middle East.

Ms. HILLARY MANN LEVERETT: Their influence has really been on the rise, particularly since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which – you know, one of the most important things they did was essentially liberate the Shia in Iraq.

Iran was able to really use what we call its soft power; its ability to exert influence throughout the region. It was able to use, in particular, the liberation of the Shia to take its policy that it’s had really since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and almost put it on steroids to use the influence it could use in Iraq, to use it more broadly throughout the Middle East.

They are really in a position to take advantage of, to be open to people who are newly becoming empowered in their states, to hear their grievances, and to tap into their grievances.

RAZ: And of course, there was no great love between the Iranian government and some of these Arab leaders – like Mubarak, like Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, and Gadhafi in Libya.

Mr. FLYNT LEVERETT: I think that’s right. The Islamic Republic is very, very confident in the proposition that any government in the Arab world which becomes at all more representative of its people’s values, beliefs, concerns, preferences, interests; any government in the Arab world that becomes more representative of its own people will, first of all by definition, become less enthusiastic about strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel. And that’s a plus for Iran.

Any government like that will also become, in some ways, more receptive to the Iranian message of resistance to U.S. and Israeli hegemony in the region. That’s a message that doesn’t just go to Shia. It goes throughout the region, and has enormous appeal on the Sunni Arab street.

RAZ: Ahmadinejad is encouraging these protests all over the Middle East – and these uprisings. And of course, he faced a pretty significant turmoil in 2009, on the streets of Tehran and other cities in Iran. I mean, wouldn’t Iranians find that somewhat rich coming from a man who essentially, crushed an uprising in his own country?

Mr. LEVERETT: Well, I think that some Iranians might find that – as you say – rich. But I think that the reality is that the green movement, as it emerged, did not represent a majority of the Iranian population, and that a majority of Iranians actually living in Iran still like the idea of an Islamic republic.

Even if some of them want that Islamic republic to evolve in some ways, or be different in some ways than it is today, the majority of the Iranians still buy into the idea of an Islamic republic.

Ms. LEVERETT: And there’s a really important distinction that I think is routinely missed in Washington – that the Islamic republic, the system in the Islamic republic, it belongs to the people of the Islamic republic of Iran. Warts and all, flaws and all, it’s their system. It’s an independent system. Its foreign policy, its policy decisions are independent.

So with all of the criticisms that you have within the Islamic republic and for all the – many of the people inside Iran want the system to evolve in different ways, they want it to be their system, and they want it to continue to be the Islamic republic. That is completely different, completely the opposite of nearly every other state in the region.

RAZ: What if what emerges in the Middle East, throughout the Middle East is a collection of essentially, non-aligned states – you know, governments with no interest in serving as proxies or pawns, you know, in a strategic struggle between the U.S. and Iran?

Mr. LEVERETT: If that happens – and I think we are very much headed in that direction already – the United States is going to have to get serious about a skill that it has really allowed to atrophy for several decades.

RAZ: Which is?

Mr. LEVERETT: Which I would call classical diplomacy: the ability to align with multiple states, you know; find areas of common interest; play those to build relationships; and manage the areas where there are going to be very, very strong disagreements.

This is not the way the United States is used to dealing with the Middle East. We really function as a kind of hegemonic power in this region. That is just not going to be tenable anymore. And the United States is going to have to have a much more creative, adaptive, strategically grounded foreign policy in this part of the world than it’s had for a long time.