The Race for Iran

The Afpak Channel at www.ForeignPolicy.com has a weekly feature, “Afpak Behind the Lines”, which highlights interviews with experts on various aspects of the Afghanistan-Pakistan challenge.  This week’s interviewee was none other than Hillary Mann Leverett, who addressed the topic of “Iran in Afghanistan and Pakistan”.  The full interview may be found here.  We offer highlights of Hillary’s answers to the Foreign Policy.com questions below.    

On Iran’s core interests in Afghanistan:  “Iran has a strategic stake in Afghanistan that has not changed in the last nine years.  Tehran’s overriding interest is to prevent Afghanistan (with its long and lawless border with Iran) from being used as a platform from which to attack or undermine the Islamic Republic or to weaken Iran’s standing as a regional power. 

To prevent Afghanistan from being used as an anti-Iranian platform, the Islamic Republic has worked, over many years, to form relationships with Afghan players who could keep Iran’s Afghan enemies (principally the Taliban but also other anti-Shiite and anti-Persian groups) and their external supporters (principally Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two of Iran’s most important regional antagonists) in check.  To this end, Iran has worked to strengthen and unite Afghanistan’s Shiite Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities (which together comprise about 45 percent of the population) as a counterweight to anti-Iranian, pro-Saudi, and pro-Pakistani elements among Afghan Pashtuns (roughly 42 percent of the population).  The Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities were, of course, the core of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban during the 1990s, and were supported by India and Russia as well as Iran.”

On allegations of Iranian support for the Taliban:  “Iran knows from bitter experience that the Hazara and the other Dari/Persian-speaking communities provide, at best, inadequate protection for Iranian interests in Afghanistan, because they cannot govern the country in a way that keeps it relatively stable and minimizes Pakistani and Saudi influence.  So, alongside its alliances with the Hazara and the other Dari/Persian-speaking groups, Iran has also cultivated ties to some Pashtun elements in Afghanistan and supported the country’s Pashtun President, Hamid Karzai.

As part of its cultivation of ties to Pashtun elements, Iran has almost certainly reached out to some Taliban factions.  But I would wager a substantial sum that America’s ‘ally’ Pakistan is providing vastly more support to the Afghan Taliban than anything the Islamic Republic might be doing.  And Tehran remains strongly opposed to the Taliban’s resurgence as a major force in Afghan politics, for two reasons.  First, the Taliban have traditionally persecuted Iran’s Afghan allies—especially the Shia Hazara—and have even murdered Iranian diplomats.  Second, Tehran sees the Taliban as a pawn for the expansion of Pakistani and Saudi influence in Afghanistan…

In the political and security vacuum that is today’s Afghanistan, Karzai’s effort to engage the Taliban is generating deep unease among Iran’s allies in Afghanistan’s Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities.  Already, the leadership of these non-Pashtun communities—who also dominate the upper echelons of the Afghan military—are organizing to resist, by force, any serious attempt at power-sharing between Karzai’s government and the Taliban.  If the Taliban’s political influence across Afghanistan continues to grow—particularly in an environment conditioned by what Tehran sees as America’s strategic and tactical incompetence—Iran will support its Afghan allies as they ‘push back’ against a resurgent Taliban.”   

[Note from Flynt Leverett:  The Washington Post’s Colum Lynch reported this week on his “Turtle Bay” blog at www.ForeignPolicy.com that the Obama Administration’s “Afpak” special envoy Richard Holbrooke is in New York this week “to help Afghanistan negotiate the removal of select Taliban members from a U.N. anti-terror blacklist, according to senior U.N.-based officials”.]    

On the complementarity of Iranian and U.S. goals in Afghanistan:  “As Tehran pursues this strategy of multiple alliances within Afghanistan, it must also assess the evolving role of the United States there and the implications of the U.S. posture toward Iran for Iran’s Afghanistan policy.  If the United States and NATO could convince Iran that they want an independent and stable Afghanistan that would be friendly to Iran, then U.S./NATO and Iranian strategies and tactics could complement each other very constructively.  (This was very much the case in the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, when I was one of a small number of U.S. officials engaged in ongoing discussions with Iranian counterparts about how to deal with Afghanistan and al-Qaeda, and U.S. and Iranian policies regarding these issues were rather closely coordinated.)

But, if Tehran perceives Washington as hostile to its interests—which, unfortunately, is currently the case, given the Obama administration’s drive to impose sanctions and continued use of covert operations to undermine the Islamic Republic—then Iranian policymakers will regard the United States, along with America’s Pakistani and Saudi allies, as part of the complex of anti-Iranian external players that Iran needs to balance against in Afghanistan.  In this context, Iran has a strong interest in preventing U.S. troops in Afghanistan from being used to attack Iran directly, used as covert operatives to undermine the Iranian government, or used to strengthen Iran’s regional rivals.”

On Iran’s reaction to a drawdown in U.S. military forces in Afghanistan:  “In contrast to the United States, which seems at least to be looking for a viable exit strategy from Afghanistan, there is no exit strategy for Iran.  Iran publicly calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, partly because U.S. forces there could be used against Iran.  But Tehran also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan because Iranian policymakers believe that the extended U.S. presence there is seen by much of the population as an occupation and that it is this occupation which is fueling an increasingly fierce cycle of violence and instability.  From Tehran’s perspective, this cycle of violence and instability empowers Iran’s Afghan adversaries, principally the Taliban, and their external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which are regional rivals to the Islamic Republic. 

From an Iranian standpoint, the most constructive American strategy would have been for the United States to begin a gradual but steady withdrawal of troops a few years ago when that could have helped shape a political settlement based on power sharing among all of Afghanistan’s major constituencies.  From an Iranian perspective, such a settlement could have included the Pashtun, though, at least at the time, not necessarily the Taliban, and would have given Iran’s Afghan allies—who, at the time, were also America’s allies—the upper hand.  Today, Iran is concerned that, as America belatedly positions itself to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan next year, the Obama administration still has no coherent strategy regarding President Karzai’s drive for a political deal—a deal which, because of mistakes made by Washington, must now include the Taliban and its chief external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia…

Iran is concerned that the United States’ interest in fostering sufficient stability in Afghanistan for long enough to allow U.S. troops to begin leaving next year will lead Washington to drop the “red lines” it has imposed on Taliban participation in a political process.  Iran is concerned that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will be able to use the Taliban’s unchecked involvement in a power-sharing arrangement as a proxy to expand their influence in Afghanistan at Tehran’s expense and to threaten the Islamic Republic.

Under these circumstances, Iran will intensify its support for key players among the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups, just as it did during the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996.  These dynamics raise the risks of renewed civil war in Afghanistan—a civil war that would simultaneously be a proxy war among Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the country’s most powerful external players.  These were precisely the conditions under which al-Qaeda found sanctuary and thrived in Afghanistan during the 1990s.” 

On Iran and post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan:  “Post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan requires recognizing and working with the integral connections between Afghanistan’s internal balance of power and the broader balance of power among major states in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia.  And that means cooperation with Iran is essential to stabilizing Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan.

Following 9/11, Iran worked with the United States on the short-term project of overthrowing the Taliban—but with the long-term goal of prompting Washington to reconsider its hostile posture toward the Islamic Republic.  In effect, the Iranians hoped that cooperation with the United States would facilitate a U.S.-Iranian “grand bargain”—but this approach did not work, largely because of American resistance to a broader opening to Iran.  

Under current circumstances, Iran would need to be persuaded to cooperate once again with the United States in Afghanistan—persuaded, in particular, that power-sharing could be done in a manner that addressed Tehran’s longstanding concerns about the Taliban, the regional balance of power, and U.S. intentions toward the Islamic Republic.  This cannot be done while Washington is pursuing sanctions against Iran—however feckless they may be—and offering progressively less veiled support for regime change in Tehran.  Today, cooperation with Iran on post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan has to be embedded in a broader strategic understanding between the United States and the Islamic Republic…  

[I]n other words, a U.S.-Iranian grand bargain has become essential to avoiding something close to strategic failure in Afghanistan.  The Islamic Republic will, as I described, continue supporting its longstanding Afghan allies in resisting a Taliban onslaught backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  But, in the absence of a broader strategic understanding, those efforts will be seen, in Washington, and elsewhere, as undermining whatever political arrangements the Karzai government has reached with the Taliban.  And that will fuel a regional proxy conflict with Afghanistan as the main battlefield, and with the United States drawn increasingly into supporting Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.  That is a position the United States has been in before.  We should not want to go there again.”   

–Flynt Leverett

The Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the United States, Yousef Al-Otaiba, is in the news for comments he made yesterday at the Aspen Ideas Festival–comments in which he apparently expressed some measure of support for a U.S. military attack on Iranian nuclear targets.  We have known Yousef since before his appointment as the UAE’s ambassador to the United States.  Based on our previous conversations with him, we do not believe that he wants to see a military confrontation between the United States and Iran. 

Unfortunately, neoconservative-flavored reporting of his remarks in Aspen will likely have a damaging impact on the Iran debate in Washington.  In particular, Yousef’s words will be taken as confirmation for some of AIPAC’s more ill-informed and strategically misguided talking points:  that Iran poses an objective and unacceptable threat to all U.S. allies, not just Israel; that the Arabs are concerned about the “real threat” of Iran much more than the “false problem” of Palestine; and that containment of Iran is unacceptable as a long-term strategy not just to Israel but to America’s Arab allies as well.

According to Eli Lake in the Washington Times, Yousef responded to a question from Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic about the possibility of an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities with the following remarks: 

“I think it’s a cost-benefit analysis.  I think despite the large amount of trade we do with Iran, which is close to $12 billion…there will be consequences, there will be backlash and there will be problems with people protesting and rioting and very unhappy that there is an outside force attacking a Muslim country; that is going to happen no matter what.  If you are asking me, “Am I willing to live with that versus living with a nuclear Iran”, my answer is still the same:  We cannot live with a nuclear Iran.  I am willing to absorb what takes place at the expense of the security of the UAE.” 

Goldberg himself reports the following observations from Yousef: 

“There are many countries in the region who, if they lack the assurance the U.S. is willing to confront Iran, they will start running for cover towards Iran.  Small, rich, vulnerable countries in the region do not want to be the ones who stick their finger in the big bully’s eye, if nobody’s going to come to their support.” 

“Countries in the region view the Iran threat very differently.  I can only speak for the UAE, but talk of containment and deterrence really concerns me and makes me very nervous.  Why should I be led to believe that deterrence or containment will work?  Iran doesn’t have nuclear power now, but we’re unable to contain them and their behavior in the region.  What makes me think that once they have a nuclear program, we’re going to be able to be more successful in containing them?” 

And here is how Goldberg renders Yousef’s response to the question, “Do you want the U.S. to stop the Iranian nuclear program by force?”: 

“Absolutely, absolutely.  I think we are at risk of an Iranian nuclear program far more than you are at risk.  At 7,000 miles away, and with two oceans bordering you, an Iranian nuclear threat does not threaten the continental United States.  It may threaten your assets in the region, it will threaten the peace process, it will threaten balance of power, it will threaten everything else, but it will not threaten you…I am suggesting that I think out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran.  Our military, who has existed for the past 40 years, wake up, dream, breathe, eat, sleep the Iranian threat.  It’s the only conventional military threat our military plans for, trains for, equips for, that’s it, there’s no other threat, there’s no country in the region that is a threat to the UAE, it’s only Iran.  So yes, it’s very much in our interest that Iran does not gain nuclear technology.”

Earlier today, a senior official at the UAE Foreign Ministry in Abu Dhabi declared that the statements attributed to Yousef were “inaccurate”:   

“These statements came as part of general discussions held on the sidelines of an unofficial gathering and were taken out of their context in which Al-Otaiba was speaking”.    

The UAE Foreign Ministry official went on to clarify the Emirati position vis-à-vis Iran, noting that the UAE “believes in the sovereignty of other states and in the principle of non-interference, of all forms, in their internal affairs”: 

“The UAE has already declared, more than once and in official statements issued by the Foreign Ministry, its position on the Iranian nuclear issue.  The UAE totally rejects the use of force as a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and rather calls for a solution through political means that are based on the international legitimacy, transparency as well as the need for working, through the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the right of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  The UAE, at the same time, believe in the need of keeping the Gulf region free of nuclear weapons”. 

Goldberg has already offered the following reflections on Yousef’s remarks:     

“[T]he ambassador’s position, though stated more plainly, and publicly, than usual, is the standard position of many Arab states.  It is not only Israel that fears the rise of a nuclear Iran; the Arabs, if anything, fear such a development to a greater degree.  The Jews and Arabs have been fighting for one hundred years.  The Arabs and the Persians have been going at for a thousand.  The idea of a group of Persian Shi’ites having possession of a nuclear bomb scares Arab leaders like nothing else—it certainly scares them more than the reality of the Jewish bomb.”

We can expect more commentary of this sort in the days and weeks ahead.  It is important to push back against this kind of (deliberate?) misreading of regional attitudes about a U.S.-Iranian confrontation.  In fact, attitudes in the countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, encompassing Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UAE) regarding Iran are much more conflicted and less clear-cut than they are usually portrayed in neoconservative commentary. 

As Tom Lippman wrote on www.TheRaceForIran.com last month, in a piece looking at Saudi King Abdullah’s meeting with President Obama at the White House:    

“On Iran, the Saudis are like the Americans in that they know what they want but do not know how to achieve it.  They want the Iranians to stop meddling in Iraq, stop supporting extremist groups and, most important, stop enriching uranium.  They do not believe the latest round of economic sanctions will deter Iran, but they oppose military action by the United States—or, worse yet, Israel—to halt the nuclear program.  Any such attack, they fear, would cause chaos in the Gulf and prompt Iran to strike at them as a way of inflicting pain on the United States. 

Saudi Arabia did not oppose the latest U.N. sanctions—Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal even went to Beijing to urge China to support them.  But after a meeting in February with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Prince Saud said that ‘sanctions are a long term solution, but we see the issue in the shorter term, maybe because we are closer to the threats than that.  So we need immediate resolution rather than gradual resolution in this regard.’

He did not specify what ‘immediate resolution’ he had in mind.  Nor could he have done so because, according to Saudi officials I talked to in Riyadh last month, no one has devised any ‘immediate resolution’ short of the war the Saudis don’t want.”

We also asked Dr. Jasim Husain Ali to provide a piece updating our readers on attitudes about Iran in the GCC states, with a focus on the UAE.  Jasim is a well-known Bahraini analyst of GCC affairs; we gratefully post his observations below (we note that Jasim wrote his piece before Yusuf’s remarks in Aspen were reported).  We are particularly struck by his comparison of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar—all of which seem focused on maintaining positive relations with Iran—on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other hand.        

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

From Dr. Jasim Husain Ali: 

Despite their deep differences on issues pertaining to GCC integration, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have one thing in common—making unfriendly gestures toward Iran.  In a span of two weeks, a UK press report alleged covert Saudi assistance to Israel for a prospective Israeli military strike against Iran.  At the same time, the UAE assumed regional leadership in going after Iranian business interests, under the pretext of honoring United Nations Security Council resolution 1929, adopted in New York last month.

Anti-Iran behavior and actions by Saudi Arabia and the UAE are abounding.  For example, chances are that Saudi Arabia could be tricked into facilitating a military assault on Iran, a development that would have far reaching consequences.  The Times of London alleged on 12 June that Saudi Arabia had considered allowing Israeli aircraft use of its airspace to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.  Saudi Arabia has categorically denied the report.  But the Saudis are not actively seeking a peaceful resolution to the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

Strangely enough, the UAE has assumed regional leadership in undermining Iranian business.  On 21 June, the English-language daily Gulf News reported that UAE officials have closed more than 40 local and international firms for allegedly exporting materials to Iran which could have been used in the country’s nuclear program.  However, it is believed that UAE authorities made the decision to target these firms prior to the passage of Resolution 1929 on June 9.  In addition, on June 28, another English-daily newspaper published in the UAE, Emirates Business 24-7, reported that the UAE Central Bank had ordered banks operating in the country to freeze 41 accounts in connection with the resolution.  Clearly, the selection of English-language newspapers rather than Arabic-language media as the venues for publicizing these decisions is driven by an interest in satisfying the United States and its allies.    

Clearly, Abu Dhabi has chosen the path of confronting Tehran after succeeding in marginalizing Dubai, the traditional trade hub in the region for Iranian-related business.  This development reflects Abu Dhabi having emerged as Dubai’s financial savior following Dubai’s debt debacle in late 2009.  With its abundance of hydrocarbon resources and hundreds of billions of dollars in state reserves and investment assets, Abu Dhabi cares much less than Dubai about the potential damage to business interests on both sides of the Persian Gulf.  Undoubtedly, the UAE’s anti-Iran policy also reflects the ongoing dispute over the ownership of the three Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb. 

The actions of Saudi Arabia and the UAE toward Iran threaten further divisions within the GCC, thereby further undermining prospects for attaining genuine regional integration.  For their parts, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait seem determined to maintain normal neighborly ties with Iran.  Also, Bahrain is said to be close in signing a deal allowing for the import of Iranian gas to help meet industrial demand.

The Islamic Republic has built up some 30 years of experience in dealing with different types of sanctions and hostile actions.  It is highly unlikely that new pressures would yield any outcome other than failure.

We are very grateful to all our readers for their interest and dedication to an informed debate on www.TheRaceForIran.com.  As we elaborated in our manifesto when we started this blog, we launched www.TheRaceForIran.com to track and understand the “race for Iran”, in all of its myriad dimensions. In practical terms, www.TheRaceForIran.com seeks to serve three main purposes:

First, The Race for Iran presents cutting-edge analyses of Iran and its geopolitics.

Second, The Race for Iran serves as a “clearing house” for essential material on Iran and its geopolitics.

Third, The Race for Iran provides a forum for an ongoing conversation about Iran and its geopolitics, for interested persons all over the world.

More specifically, the purpose of the comment section is to promote informed debate, share pertinent information and news items, and encourage constructive criticism and analysis about Iran and its geopolitics. Although we are very reluctant to block or take down any comments, we think that at this point it will sometimes be necessary to keep the blog focused on its purpose.  The comment section is monitored.   Messages containing any of the following elements will be taken down: 

Personal attacks against other contributors;

Racist, sexist, or otherwise discriminatory or hateful language;

Provocations designed to derail discussions away from substantive debate into dead-end arguments;

Links to commercial sites or posting of commercial messages;

Threats of death or violence.

Finally, we ask commentators to maintain a respectful tone with others and to be tolerant of opinions that may differ from their own.

Again, our many thanks for your readership and participation,

Flynt, Hillary, and Ben

A few days ago, The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran had sent Syria a “sophisticated radar system that could threaten Israel’s ability to launch a surprise attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities”.  The story, see here, cited reporting from “two Israeli officials, two U.S. officials and a Western intelligence source”, and was “confirmed…by the Israeli military”.  We are somewhat confused by the reporter, Charles Levinson, writing that the “Israeli military” has “confirmed” the transfer which had been “described” by his other sources.  As far as we can tell from the story as it was written by Mr. Levinson, only Iran and Syria could have “confirmed” the reports from Mr. Levinson’s sources.  (For the record, both Iran and Syria have denied that any radar transfer took place, as Mr. Levinson duly notes in his story.) 

Of course, none of Mr. Levinson’s sources offered any information as to “how they determined the shipment took place or discuss the radar’s type or capacity”.  But his sources assure Mr. Levinson that the new radar “would give Syria and its ally Iran improved visibility of Israeli air space and provide early warning of any imminent strike.” 

Furthermore, Mr. Levinson’s sources are concerned that Syria might share data from the new radar with Hizballah.  Mr. Levinson cites one non-official “electronic warfare and radar expert” arguing that, if this happened, it would “likely increase the accuracy and lethality of Hezbollah missiles aimed at Israeli cities (sic)”, as well as “incoming Israeli aircraft”.  But Mr. Levinson’s official sources seem to be focused on the potential contributions that the radar might make to Hizballah’s defensive/deterrent capabilities (and even Hizballah’s missile force is best understood as a deterrent capability):  “A clear picture of the skies above Israel and Lebanon would give Hezbollah greater freedom of movement during any conflict, since the group would know when its fighters were at risk of being bombed from the air”. 

So, if we have read Mr. Levinson’s story correctly—the transfer of sophisticated Iranian air defense radars to Syria (if said transfer actually happened) is/would be a bad thing because:

–it would give Iran more warning time, and hence a better chance to defend itself against an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear targets; and

–if data from that new radar were shared with Hizballah, Hizballah would be in a better position to defend Lebanon against offensive Israeli military action. 

It seems to us that there is a pattern here.  Israeli commandos repel down ropes from helicopters to board Turkish vessels on the high seas—and people on board those vessels “attacked” the commandos.  (As we wrote recently, what, exactly, is the legal basis for expecting people on board the ships to welcome, or at least acquiesce to, forcible boarding on the high seas?)  Russia concludes a contract to provide Iran with S-300 anti-aircraft missiles (which cannot possibly be used in an offensive manner) and the United States and Europe exert strenuous efforts to forestall delivery of such a “provocative” weapons system.  And now, anti-aircraft radars in Syria are another “threat” to Israel’s security. 

The pattern is grounded in a reality that we’ve previously identified, see here and here:  Israeli political and policy elites are intent on preserving a regional balance of power that is strongly tilted in Israel’s favor.  They want to forestall any developments—Iran acquiring a perceived nuclear “breakout” capability, Turkey delivering aid directly to Gaza, or Syria improving its air defense capabilities—that would being to constrain Israel’s currently unconstrained freedom of unilateral military action.  As we wrote in December, 

“One can readily appreciate why Israel values its status as the Middle East’s military hegemon and wants to maintain the maximum possible room for unilateral military initiative. But that strategic preference is not legitimated by the U.N. Charter, the laws of war, or any international convention. Moreover, Israel’s strategic preference for preserving and enhancing its military hegemony does not, at this point, serve the cause of regional stability or containing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities in the Middle East.” 

You do not have to take our word for this.  In May, a group of retired senior IDF officers, Israeli diplomats, and Israeli intelligence officials conducted a war game, under the auspices of the Interdisciplinary Center at Herzliyya, which assumed that Iran had acquired a nuclear weapons capability.  Our former colleague Dan Kurtzer played the U.S. President in the war game, which was also attended by the leader of the opposition in the Knesset, Tzipi Livni.  As Israeli conference participants subsequently told Western media (see here), the main problem with an Iranian nuclear capability is not that such a capability poses some sort of “existential threat” to Israel, but that it “would blunt Israel’s military autonomy”.   One participant, a retired Director of Military Intelligence for the IDF, even said that, if Iran obtained a nuclear weapons capability (which, of course, Iran denies it is seeking) it would treat that capability as a means of “self defence and strategic balance”.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Our friend and colleague Alastair Crooke, director of the Conflicts Forum in Beirut, has expanded his arguments, see here, about the emergence of a strategically consequential “northern tier” in the Middle East (including Iran, Turkey, Syria, and important non-state actors like HAMAS and Hizballah) and its implications for the regional balance of power into a compellingly rich article, “The Shifting Sands of State Power in the Middle East”, in the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly.  We commend the article to your attention; it may be accessed here. 

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett