The Race for Iran

In keeping with the thrust of yesterday’s post, which asked whether America’s traditional Arab allies might “strike their own deal with Iran”, we are publishing two posts, back-to-back, which present different perspectives on the implications of the Islamic Republic’s “rise” for America’s regional allies and the most appropriate U.S. policy response. The first of these posts, appended below, is by Dr. Christian Koch, Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. The second is by Hillary Mann Leverett. Both Christian and Hillary appeared at the 18th annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, held in Washington, DC on October 15-16, 2009. The texts of their posts are based on the remarks they offered at this conference.

From Dr. Koch: When it comes to the Iranian nuclear program, the GCC states find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, while the Arab Gulf States have voiced their support for a civilian program in Iran, they have been clear that they oppose any military application that might develop out of Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – are of the view that Iran as a military nuclear power would pose a direct threat to their internal as well as external security.

On the other hand, these states have also stated clearly that they do not want to see a military confrontation develop out of the current stand-off as this contains equally damaging consequences for their security. Yet, given the GCC’s own limited mechanisms to bring about an Iranian change of mind and to ensure that Tehran comes out clearly and verifiably with its peaceful stated intentions, the Arab Gulf finds itself at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere – in Washington, Paris, Moscow and Beijing.

This dilemma stems from the fact that the Iran-GCC relationship is defined by deep mistrust about the intentions and motivations of the other. While Iran wants to keep the issue of Gulf security within the region so that it can better play its dominating and powerful role in the Gulf, the Arab Gulf states seek to more or less internationalize regional security in an effort to bring about as broad a commitment as possible from external states to Gulf stability. In its efforts to suggest alternatives to the current Gulf security stalemate, Iran repeatedly asks for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region as a prerequisite. The GCC states, meanwhile, seek such foreign protection to compensate for their own deficit in self-defense capability and because they do not want to be thrown under any sort of Iranian mantle.

Without a doubt, there is the clear perception among Arab Gulf policymakers that Iran remains acutely oblivious to the security concerns of the GCC states, and that it solely seeks to measure up to the United States, even seeing itself in the same league as Washington. Viewed from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or Doha, Iran does not appear to have a serious policy towards the GCC which takes into account in any way the security perceptions of the Arab Gulf. The result is an Iranian approach to its neighbors that, in essence, borders on contempt and is framed within suggestions of superiority. Iran, in fact, displays a high degree of arrogance that does nothing more than perpetuate existing perceptions. This was highlighted recently when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad referred to the GCC states as “those little nations of the Gulf.”

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Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, writing in the Washington Times, makes a compelling case that the Obama administration should not be so quick to abandon the idea of a uranium enrichment swap.

Afrasiabi points out that indications from Iran are that the Islamic Republic is ready to deal.

From his piece:

Recently, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told international media that Iran is willing to accept the proposal but with the following modification: Instead of sending out 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in one go, Iran would be willing to send out 400 kilograms, initially placed under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Persian Gulf island of Kish. Upon delivery of new fuel rods from Russia and France, Iran would place a second such shipment in the IAEA’s hands.

Iran’s counterproposal has many advantages, including the fact that it meets the U.S. demands two-thirds of the way and could well set into motion a new dynamic favoring resolution of other issues on the U.S.-Iran plate. Another advantage is that by virtue of including both the U.S. and France in the deal, it breaks Russia’s monopoly on Iran’s nuclear market. Equally important is the side effect in terms of confidence-building and thus improving the overall climate between Iran and the international community.

You can read the entire article here.

– Ben Katcher

On Sunday, the Speaker of the Iranian majlis (parliament), Ali Larijani, met for two hours with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo. Ostensibly, Larijani was in Egypt to attend a meeting of the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which includes Turkey, Kuwait, Niger, Azerbaijan, and Uganda in addition to Egypt and Iran. Larijani publicly described his meeting with Mubarak as “very good and constructive”, and official Egyptian and Iranian media reported that the two men discussed bilateral relations and regional issues of mutual concern. After meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit, Larijani declared Iran’s support for Palestinian unity and, following a meeting with Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, noted that “relations between the two countries could be a great help for creation of peace and security in the region”.

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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Friday—in an interview given to AFP while he was attending the climate change summit in Copenhagen—that “Iran is ready to strike a uranium enrichment deal if the United States and the West respect the Islamic Republic and stop making threats”. Referring to proposals to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that would entail Iran shipping part of its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country, Ahmadinejad stated that “everything is possible, 400 kilos, 800 kilos, it’s nothing. But not in a climate where they threaten us. They have to change their vocabulary, in respect and legality. In this case we will say, very good you want to keep your word, in this case we are ready to sit down at the table to reach an agreement.” Ahmadinejad’s references to “400 kilos” or “800 kilos” of LEU reflect Iranian counterproposals to the demand of the United States and its partners that Iran must ship 1,200 kilos of LEU abroad in a single batch before receiving any fuel for the TRR.

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In his most recent post, Ben Katcher highlighted a piece from The Guardian citing a number of Chinese and Western analysts who are doubtful that China will support serious sanctions against Iran.  On that point, we also want to draw your attention to a recent article in Haaretz. 

The article has attracted considerable attention because of its lead: “U.S. President Barack Obama has warned his Chinese counterpart that the United States would not be able to keep Israel from attacking Iranian nuclear installations for much longer, senior officials in Jerusalem told Haaretz.”  But the article is also noteworthy for what it reports about China’s reaction.  According to Haaretz, Obama’s warning to Chinese President Hu Jintao resulted in China’s support for a resolution criticizing Iran at the International Atomic Agency’s Board of Governors meeting on November 27.  But, the article notes that ,

[T]he Chinese have maintained their hard stance regarding the West’s wishes to impose sanctions on the Islamic Republic. The Israeli officials say the Americans now understand that the Chinese agreed to join the condemnation announcement only because Obama made a personal request to Hu, not as part of a policy change.  The Chinese have even refused a Saudi-American initiative designed to end Chinese dependence on Iranian oil, which would allow China to agree to the sanctions…Saudi Arabia, which is also very worried about the Iranian nuclear program and keen to advance international steps against Iran, offered to supply the Chinese the same quantity of oil the Iranians now provide, and at much cheaper prices. But China rejected the deal.

All of this, of course, is consistent with our longstanding analysis of Chinese policy towards Iran.  In this regard, it is also interesting to note that a face-to-face meeting of the P-5+1 political directors, which the Obama Administration had anticipated holding this month, had to be delayed because the Chinese reportedly said they could not fit it into their schedule.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett