The Race for Iran

It is hard to do serious political analysis of a contested political environment when one is, in effect, “rooting” for one of the contestants. In 1979, much of the public commentary in the United States about the Iranian revolution that overthrew the Shah was characterized by disbelief that a stalwart American ally could be swept away so quickly and unexpectedly. Today, much American commentary on Iranian domestic politics is characterized by varying degrees of eagerness to see the Islamic Republic go the way of the Pahlavi dynasty—or, in a formulation that some neoconservatives prefer, the way of the Soviet Union.

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Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren says that the United States and Israel have not discussed using force against Iran. So far, the discussions have been limited to the possibility of imposing further sanctions.

The problem is that sanctions will perpetuate antagonistic relations between the United States and Iran while failing to stifle the development of Iran’s nuclear program. Thus sanctions will only serve to kick the can down the road and will eventually lead to a discussion of the use of force as a “last resort.”

A better policy would be to forgo both sanctions and threats – and to instead pursue more serious diplomacy with the Islamic Republic.

– Ben Katcher

National Security Council Chief of Staff Denis McDonough says that the United States is reaching out to its international partners in an effort to gain support for a fresh round of sanctions again the Islamic Republic.

It is difficult to imagine how additional sanctions will lead to anything other than a continuation of the status quo. Given that the current sanctions on Iran have been an utter failure, why does the Obama administration think that further sanctions will persuade the Iranians to make meaningful concessions related to their nuclear program?

– Ben Katcher

The Associated Press reported on Friday that Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that the Islamic Republic is willing to exchange uranium on Turkish soil as part of an agreement with the P5+1 countries. Previously, the Islamic Republic had only committed to exchanging the fuel on Iran’s own territory.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu indicated that Turkey would be willing to consider such an arrangement and has reportedly discussed the proposal with Obama’s National Security Advisor General Jim Jones.

The Obama administration and the other P5+1 countries should seize this opportunity to put life back into its negotiations with Iran. At the very least, the announcement should help those elements within the Obama administration who truly want to engage Iran to counter calls emanating from Congress and others to go down the strategically bankrupt road of more sanctions and threats.

– Ben Katcher

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak told a parliamentary committee that Iran will have the technology to build a nuclear weapon by early next year.

Putting aside the accuracy of this claim for the moment, it is important that the Obama administration not allow Israel to set an artificial time clock to end “engagement” with the Islamic Republic and move toward sanctions and threats.

The best way to ensure that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear capabilities do not pose a threat to U.S. interests is to move toward a more normal and cooperative relationship with Iran. That requires a sustained commitment to bilateral negotiations on a broad array of issues including, but not limited to the nuclear issue.

There is no military or diplomatic “solution” to Iran’s nuclear program as long as the bilateral relationship continues to be dominated by threats and mistrust.

– Ben Katcher

As we noted on this blog yesterday, the New York Times published an op-ed yesterday by Alan J. Kuperman calling for war against Iran.

Marc Lynch, blogging at Foreign Policy, has an excellent and important response. He notes that

The New York Times [publishing a piece advocating for war] is a serious step towards mainstreaming the idea, akin to how Ken Pollack and Tom Friedman’s support for the invasion of Iraq persuaded a lot of centrists and liberals. It’s as if we as a country have learned nothing from the Iraq war debate.

Lynch then breaks down the inanity of Kuperman’s piece one step at a time.

Does he rule out the alternative policy by default? Yes he does! “peaceful carrots and sticks cannot work.”

Does he reduce the policy options to two extreme positions, one of which is guaranteed to be rejected? Yes he does! “the United States faces a stark choice: military air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities or acquiescence to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.”

Does he warn that Saddam, um, Ahmedenejad will give WMD to terrorists? Yes, yes he does. “if Iran acquired a nuclear arsenal, the risks would simply be too great that it could become a neighborhood bully or provide terrorists with the ultimate weapon, an atomic bomb.” (the “neighborhood bully” is a nice touch.) Will, pray tell, the smoking gun be in the shape of a mushroom cloud?

Does he exaggerate the prospects for success? Yes, he does. Well, first he says “As for knocking out its nuclear plants, admittedly, aerial bombing might not work.” But he quickly moves on from that, since that will not do. Oddly, his main example of success comes from Iraq, where he claims that the first Gulf war led to the uncovering of the Iraqi nuclear program — not the Osirak raid — which is accurate, but rather completely contradicts his argument.

Does he minimize the risks of military action? Yes, he does. “Yes, Iran could retaliate by aiding America’s opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it does that anyway.” Try telling that to U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to leaders in the Gulf, who are slightly less cavalier with the lives of their people.

Does he suggest that if all else fails regime change would be easy and cheap? Yes, dear lord, he does. “If nothing else, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the United States military can oust regimes in weeks if it wants to.” Truly, this was the lesson to be drawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. I’m still marveling over how easily we overthrew Saddam and the Taliban and got out of Iraq and Afghanistan more or less costlessly. That was special. On the other hand, as Matt Duss helpfully points out, “if we don’t have an Iran war, how are we supposed to have an awesome Iran surge?”

Does he accuse those who oppose military action of appeasement? Yes, yes, of course he does. “in the face of failed diplomacy, eschewing force is tantamount to appeasement.”

Lynch’s response is important and we will continue to watch for and push back on op-eds like Kuperman’s.

– Ben Katcher

(This post also appears at The Washington Note.)

Jay Solomon reports that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry is considering what would be the highest-level American visit to Tehran in thirty years.

The White House has endorsed such a trip.

This is a good idea – and an opportunity to stem the slide toward sanctions and ongoing antagonism that the Obama administration’s “engagement” policy appears headed.

But, of course, the key is not merely whether Senator Kerry goes to Iran but what message he delivers.

The message should be that the United States is ready to enter into comprehensive negotiations with the Islamic Republic that go beyond the nuclear issue and address all of the major bilateral issues along the lines of the ‘Grand Bargain‘ laid out by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett last year.

– Ben Katcher

The New York Times published an op-ed today that calls for war against Iran.

Alan J. Kuperman, director of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Program at the University of Texas at Austin, argues that the unraveling of the uranium enrichment agreement proves that the United States must conduct air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities to prevent the Islamic Republic from developing a nuclear weapon.

Kuperman’s analysis is problematic for several reasons. Here are two.

First, Kuperman cites the failure of the P5+1 uranium enrichment proposal as evidence “that Iran, for domestic political reasons, cannot make even temporary concessions on its bomb program, regardless of incentives or sanctions.” Kuperman rejects out of hand the possibility that the Iranians simply did not view the P5+1 offer as promoting the Islamic Republic’s national interest.

Second, Kuperman says that the United States could limit the Iranian response to a bombing campaign because, “If nothing else, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the United States military can oust regimes in weeks if it wants to.” It is difficult to know where to begin here. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown much more than the American military’s capacity for ‘regime change’ – they have shown the limits of American military military power and the supreme difficulty of filling the vacuum that ‘regime change’ creates. Does anyone seriously think that another war and occupation in the Middle East is in the United States’ strategic interests or politically feasible for the Obama administration?

The entire article can be read here.

– Ben Katcher

Yoram Evron, a lecturer in the Asian Studies Department at the University of Haifa, has a new piece called “Iran, China, and the Israeli Stick.”

The article touches on several of the themes laid out by Flynt Leverett, Hillary Mann Leverett, and John Garver in their monograph published earlier this year, Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus For Managing Its Persian Gulf Dilemma.

The piece identifies four key Chinese interests with regard to Iran: China’s drive to establish itself as an alternative to American power; Iran’s importance to China’s energy security; China’s desire to have positive relations with all major actors in the Middle East; and finally, China’s desire to weaken the United States’ military dominance in the region.

My only quibble with the article is that it overstates the credibility of the U.S.-Saudi offer to “make up for” Iran’s oil supplies to China in the event of sanctions that affect Iran’s export capacity. This kind of arrangement is highly risky to China and it would have been shocking if they had agreed to it.

– Ben Katcher

In keeping with the thrust of yesterday’s post, which asked whether America’s traditional Arab allies might “strike their own deal with Iran”, we are publishing two posts, back-to-back, which present different perspectives on the implications of the Islamic Republic’s “rise” for America’s regional allies and the most appropriate U.S. policy response. The first of these posts, by Dr. Christian Koch, Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai, provides an excellent overview of important currents in the views of GCC elites regarding Iran. The second, appended below, is by Hillary Mann Leverett. Both Christian and Hillary appeared at the 18^th annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, held in Washington, DC on October 15-16, 2009. The texts of their posts are based on the remarks they offered at this conference.

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In keeping with the thrust of yesterday’s post, which asked whether America’s traditional Arab allies might “strike their own deal with Iran”, we are publishing two posts, back-to-back, which present different perspectives on the implications of the Islamic Republic’s “rise” for America’s regional allies and the most appropriate U.S. policy response. The first of these posts, appended below, is by Dr. Christian Koch, Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. The second is by Hillary Mann Leverett. Both Christian and Hillary appeared at the 18th annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference of the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, held in Washington, DC on October 15-16, 2009. The texts of their posts are based on the remarks they offered at this conference.

From Dr. Koch: When it comes to the Iranian nuclear program, the GCC states find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, while the Arab Gulf States have voiced their support for a civilian program in Iran, they have been clear that they oppose any military application that might develop out of Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – are of the view that Iran as a military nuclear power would pose a direct threat to their internal as well as external security.

On the other hand, these states have also stated clearly that they do not want to see a military confrontation develop out of the current stand-off as this contains equally damaging consequences for their security. Yet, given the GCC’s own limited mechanisms to bring about an Iranian change of mind and to ensure that Tehran comes out clearly and verifiably with its peaceful stated intentions, the Arab Gulf finds itself at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere – in Washington, Paris, Moscow and Beijing.

This dilemma stems from the fact that the Iran-GCC relationship is defined by deep mistrust about the intentions and motivations of the other. While Iran wants to keep the issue of Gulf security within the region so that it can better play its dominating and powerful role in the Gulf, the Arab Gulf states seek to more or less internationalize regional security in an effort to bring about as broad a commitment as possible from external states to Gulf stability. In its efforts to suggest alternatives to the current Gulf security stalemate, Iran repeatedly asks for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the region as a prerequisite. The GCC states, meanwhile, seek such foreign protection to compensate for their own deficit in self-defense capability and because they do not want to be thrown under any sort of Iranian mantle.

Without a doubt, there is the clear perception among Arab Gulf policymakers that Iran remains acutely oblivious to the security concerns of the GCC states, and that it solely seeks to measure up to the United States, even seeing itself in the same league as Washington. Viewed from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi or Doha, Iran does not appear to have a serious policy towards the GCC which takes into account in any way the security perceptions of the Arab Gulf. The result is an Iranian approach to its neighbors that, in essence, borders on contempt and is framed within suggestions of superiority. Iran, in fact, displays a high degree of arrogance that does nothing more than perpetuate existing perceptions. This was highlighted recently when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad referred to the GCC states as “those little nations of the Gulf.”

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Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, writing in the Washington Times, makes a compelling case that the Obama administration should not be so quick to abandon the idea of a uranium enrichment swap.

Afrasiabi points out that indications from Iran are that the Islamic Republic is ready to deal.

From his piece:

Recently, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told international media that Iran is willing to accept the proposal but with the following modification: Instead of sending out 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in one go, Iran would be willing to send out 400 kilograms, initially placed under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Persian Gulf island of Kish. Upon delivery of new fuel rods from Russia and France, Iran would place a second such shipment in the IAEA’s hands.

Iran’s counterproposal has many advantages, including the fact that it meets the U.S. demands two-thirds of the way and could well set into motion a new dynamic favoring resolution of other issues on the U.S.-Iran plate. Another advantage is that by virtue of including both the U.S. and France in the deal, it breaks Russia’s monopoly on Iran’s nuclear market. Equally important is the side effect in terms of confidence-building and thus improving the overall climate between Iran and the international community.

You can read the entire article here.

– Ben Katcher

On Sunday, the Speaker of the Iranian majlis (parliament), Ali Larijani, met for two hours with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo. Ostensibly, Larijani was in Egypt to attend a meeting of the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which includes Turkey, Kuwait, Niger, Azerbaijan, and Uganda in addition to Egypt and Iran. Larijani publicly described his meeting with Mubarak as “very good and constructive”, and official Egyptian and Iranian media reported that the two men discussed bilateral relations and regional issues of mutual concern. After meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit, Larijani declared Iran’s support for Palestinian unity and, following a meeting with Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, noted that “relations between the two countries could be a great help for creation of peace and security in the region”.

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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Friday—in an interview given to AFP while he was attending the climate change summit in Copenhagen—that “Iran is ready to strike a uranium enrichment deal if the United States and the West respect the Islamic Republic and stop making threats”. Referring to proposals to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that would entail Iran shipping part of its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country, Ahmadinejad stated that “everything is possible, 400 kilos, 800 kilos, it’s nothing. But not in a climate where they threaten us. They have to change their vocabulary, in respect and legality. In this case we will say, very good you want to keep your word, in this case we are ready to sit down at the table to reach an agreement.” Ahmadinejad’s references to “400 kilos” or “800 kilos” of LEU reflect Iranian counterproposals to the demand of the United States and its partners that Iran must ship 1,200 kilos of LEU abroad in a single batch before receiving any fuel for the TRR.

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In his most recent post, Ben Katcher highlighted a piece from The Guardian citing a number of Chinese and Western analysts who are doubtful that China will support serious sanctions against Iran.  On that point, we also want to draw your attention to a recent article in Haaretz. 

The article has attracted considerable attention because of its lead: “U.S. President Barack Obama has warned his Chinese counterpart that the United States would not be able to keep Israel from attacking Iranian nuclear installations for much longer, senior officials in Jerusalem told Haaretz.”  But the article is also noteworthy for what it reports about China’s reaction.  According to Haaretz, Obama’s warning to Chinese President Hu Jintao resulted in China’s support for a resolution criticizing Iran at the International Atomic Agency’s Board of Governors meeting on November 27.  But, the article notes that ,

[T]he Chinese have maintained their hard stance regarding the West’s wishes to impose sanctions on the Islamic Republic. The Israeli officials say the Americans now understand that the Chinese agreed to join the condemnation announcement only because Obama made a personal request to Hu, not as part of a policy change.  The Chinese have even refused a Saudi-American initiative designed to end Chinese dependence on Iranian oil, which would allow China to agree to the sanctions…Saudi Arabia, which is also very worried about the Iranian nuclear program and keen to advance international steps against Iran, offered to supply the Chinese the same quantity of oil the Iranians now provide, and at much cheaper prices. But China rejected the deal.

All of this, of course, is consistent with our longstanding analysis of Chinese policy towards Iran.  In this regard, it is also interesting to note that a face-to-face meeting of the P-5+1 political directors, which the Obama Administration had anticipated holding this month, had to be delayed because the Chinese reportedly said they could not fit it into their schedule.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Writing in The Guardian, Tania Branigan quotes a number of Chinese and Western analysts who shed doubt on the idea that China might support sanctions against Iran.

One question is whether China will be willing to veto sanctions even if Russia chose to go along with the sanctions (as unlikely as that may be). According to Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University in China,

China is at risk of being isolated [due to Russia's shift] – but its interests in Iran are huge. I don’t think either China or the west can risk a public confrontation. China will be extremely reluctant to veto any resolution, but the west will be reluctant to put out a resolution which China does veto. As a last resort, China might back sanctions, but not if they are tough. Maybe China will do a little more, but it will still be a long distance from where especially the US wants it to be.

Also among the experts quoted is Georgia Institute of Technology Professor of International Relations John W. Garver, who co-wrote a monograph on Chinese-Iranian relations with Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett earlier this year.

– Ben Katcher

We are pleased to publish another post by Dr. Jasim Husain Ali, a prominent economist and columnist in Bahrain and Member of the Bahrain Parliament.  Dr. Jasim provides an interesting an timely readout of the recently concluded Manama Dialogue on regional security, focusing on Iranian participation and its impact and implications:

But for Iran, the 6th Manama Dialogue would have failed to achieve its very objective, namely serving as a forum for debating regional security.  Held in Bahrain from 11 to 13 December, the occasion attracted Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki following a two-year absence from the annual event. 

Senior Iranian officials shunned the 2007 and 2008 versions of Manama Dialogue due to differences between the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Institute of Political and International Studies (IPIS).  (IISS organizes the Manama Dialogue while IPIS serves as the research arm of the Iranian Foreign Ministry.  The dispute between the two organizations was focused on anti-Israel stands  taken by President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.) 

The IISS and the host country, Bahrain, clearly recognized that the summit could not deliver on its theme, namely regional security, without an authoritative Iranian presence.  Not surprisingly, Mr. Mottaki was granted the honor being the lead speaker in the first plenary session, which focused on regional security cooperation.

With regards to Iran’s nuclear program, the “hottest” topic at the summit, the Iranian minister presented some thought provoking arguments.  He contended that his country was not seeking possession of nuclear weapons –in part, because such a capability could guarantee neither security nor military success. Iranian officials frequently refer to the experiences of the IDF in Gaza, the Russian military in Chechnya, and the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan to underscore the broader point that Mottaki was making.  (And, in fact, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, a regular speaker at the Manama Dialogue, could not attend this year’s event due to the Obama Administration’s expanded military buildup in Afghanistan.  Mr. Gates visited American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq during the time of Manama Dialogue.  Instead, CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus served as the ranking American military official at the event.)

At the same time, the Iranian delegation to the 6th Manama Dialogue stressed the imperative to create a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.  In this regard, Iranian officials questioned the true intentions of Western powers  for singling out Iran over its nuclear program while others enjoy unrestricted access to nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction.

As expected, Yemen emerged as another leading topic during the conference,  amidst charges of Iran supporting Shia rebels fighting government troops.  In the recent past, the conflict in northern Yemen has assumed a regional dimension, with reports of rebels infiltrating into southern Saudi border areas.  In reality, some interpret Yemen troubles as evidence of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, reflecting their broader regional rivalry.

Speaking to members of the Iranian delegation at the Manama Dialogue, I learned that some in Tehran attribute Yemen’s problems to the lack of governmental attention to development.  To be sure, the 2009 Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ranks Yemen number 140 amongst 182 countries reviewed for its human development index (HDI).   Among other indicia of inadequate attention to development, the incidence of adult illiteracy in Yemen was estimated at 41 per cent for the period 1999-2007.

Moreover, the Iranians argued that Yemen’s problems are not confined to Shia areas in the north, as the country faces a secessionist movement in the south as well as nation-wide activities by al-Qaeda.  A number of participants in the summit challenged Saudi Arabia to present evidence of infiltration.  One Western diplomat told this writer that his country’s embassy in Sanaa could not confirm rebel infiltrations into Saudi Arabia.  He went on to suggest that al-Qaeda, not Shia rebels, poses the greater security threat to Saudi Arabia.

At any rate, Saudi Arabia all but shunned the 6th Manama Dialogue, to show its displeasure over Mr. Mottaki’s attendance.  Bahraini officials linked the absence of Saudi officials to the return of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz  to the Kingdom following more than a year of medical treatment abroad.  However, this made little sense, as Saudi Arabia could have at least sent its envoy to Bahrain to attend the debates.  At the same time, the United Arab Emirates, another arch rival to Iran, opted for a low profile presence at the summit.  Indeed, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan failed to show up for a scheduled presentation at the third plenary session dealing with nuclear power, energy and security.

Undoubtedly, the Manama Dialogue confirmed that Iran cannot be excluded from debates dealing with security in the Middle East. 

–Dr. Jasim Husain Ali, Member of Parliament (Bahrain), www.jasimhusain.com jasim.husain@gmail.com

Matt Duss over at the excellent resource Think Progress does a nice job laying to rest many of the illusions surrounding the possibility of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

His post links to a number of important articles and can be found here.

– Ben Katcher

We want to draw your attention to a brilliant piece, “Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy After Saddam”, just published by Kayhan Barzegar, an Iranian scholar and foreign policy analyst currently at the Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  We have previously posted about an Op Ed that Barzegar published on Iranian perspectives about proposals to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor.  His new article offers an equally compelling analysis of Iranian perspectives on the regional balance of power following the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and how Iranian leaders have worked to interweave the nuclear issue with broader regional dynamics.  He states his main thesis clearly and upfront: 

The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and Iran’s increasing presence in the region has been offensive, expansionist, opportunistic, and often ideological.  Though Iran has occasionally taken advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations have been exaggerated in the United States.  Instead, Iran’s actions should be perceived in a more pragmatic light.  Though Ahmadinejad may himself be an ideological and divisive figure, Iran’s foreign policy strategy predates him and ought to be viewed as a wider Iranian effort to secure its geostrategic interests and national security concerns.  Despite Ahmadinejad’s tendencies to indulge his eccentricities, the logic of Iran’s foreign policy decisionmaking process always ensures this return to pragmatism. 

Barzegar also provides powerful affirmation for our argument that President Obama, for all his fine rhetoric about engagement and dealing with the Islamic Republic on the basis of mutual respect, has not changed the strategic fundamentals of American policy toward Iran: 

[W]ith the arrival of the Obama administration, there has been much talk of a substantive change in the U.S. approach to Iran.  From the Iranian perspective, however, the long-term U.S. approach to the regional balance of power remains largely unchanged. For over half a century, U.S. policy in the Middle East, and especially in the Persian Gulf, has been to maintain a balance of power while preventing regional supremacy. As a result, the Iranian leadership perceived Obama’s overtures to Syria to be a continuation of the Bush administration’s policy to isolate Iran and minimize its ability to influence regional developments. Obama’s tactical visits and public diplomacy in Turkey and Egypt, as well as his conciliatory pronouncements toward the broader Islamic world, were all seen as efforts to shore up regional support against Iran and weaken its ability to withstand international pressure. It is this belief that led the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to reply to Obama’s Persian New Year greeting by stressing that a change in Iranian attitudes would be contingent on ‘‘genuine’’ and ‘‘real’’ changes in the U.S. position vis-a`-vis Iran. 

Barzegar rightly argues that ill-informed observations about Iranian domestic politics should not divert U.S. policymakers from correctly assessing the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and making choices that serve American interests and the cause of regional and international security: 

After Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, Western commentators and policymakers have speculated about divisions among the Iranian political elite, and how to exploit them to gain leverage on Iran’s nuclear program and various outstanding regional disputes.  Such a policy, however, will bear little fruit.  Though there are of course differences in style and approach among the elite, it is clear that Iran’s nuclear program has the capability to unite them, especially in the face of foreign threats of increased sanctions and military attack. 

Of course, Barzegar’s argument about the overarching aims of Iran’s foreign policy strategy has profound implications for U.S. policy—implications which he draws with admirable clarity: 

If the Iranian leadership’s actions are perceived as offensive and expansionist, then the rational choice for the United States is to maintain robust deterrence.  In contrast, if Iran’s policies are defensive, then the rational choice for the United States is to seek cooperation with Iran and eventually to help integrate Iran into the regional political-security architecture.  Such integration is certainly inseparable from settling the ongoing nuclear dispute and reaching a broader and much anticipated détente with the United States.  It is essential that Washington not misinterpret Iran’s actions.  Misreading Iran prevented the Bush administration from pursuing engagement and cooperation.  President Barack Obama must not make the same mistake.  He should reexamine the current perception of Iran’s regional aims and redefine Iran’s place in U.S. Middle East policy…

If the Obama Administration seeks to bring further pressure to bear on Iran in the form of another round of sanctions at the UN Security Council, Obama’s promise of reorienting U.S. strategic relations with Iran will be irreparably damaged, and the Iranian leadership’s pronouncements of distrust and fears of U.S. double-speak will be vindicated.  Eloquence and pleasant new year greetings will prove to be far from enough, if there is any hope of breaking the deadlock.  Obama has a choice between going for long-term stability in a region that is strategically important to the United States and the world or for short-term gains in the futile hope that such leverage will yield a win-lose outcome in which the United States will be the sole victor.    

We couldn’t have said it better ourselves.  We encourage you to read Barzegar’s outstanding article in its entirety. 

We are posting about Barzegar’s article on the same day that the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Berman bill authorizing additional Iran-related secondary sanctions, with the Obama Administration’s acquiescence and the private encouragement of some Obama advisors.  The overwhelming vote in favor of the Berman bill underscores the profound disconnect between the short-term political calculations that are increasingly driving America’s Iran policy and the long-term strategic imperatives highlighted by Barzegar’s piece.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

Today is the 22^nd anniversary of the founding of the Movement of the Islamic Resistance, otherwise known by its Arabic acronym, HAMAS (which is also the Arabic word for “zeal”). To commemorate the occasion, HAMAS organized a public rally in Gaza that attracted more than 100,000 people. At the rally, Ismail Haniya—the Palestinian Authority’s last elected Prime Minister—pledged that “HAMAS will not retreat from jihad and resistance until it achieves freedom and independence for our people…We will not recognize Israel and we will not abandon resistance”. More immediately, Haniya made clear that HAMAS will not roll over for a widely anticipated announcement this week by the PLO’s Central Committee extending the term of PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazin) on debatable legal grounds: “We say to PLO Central Council members who will meet tomorrow in Ramallah that any decision that contradicts the constitution and contradicts the will of the people will not be binding”.

Read the full post »

Western media commentary continues to depict Iran as having “rejected” the Baradei proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), thereby setting the stage for the Obama Administration to pursue, at a minimum, tougher multilateral and unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

As we wrote about on this blog, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told The Hindu’s Siddharth Varadarajan last month that Tehran viewed the Baradei proposal positively, but wanted finished fuel assemblies for the TRR to be exchanged for Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU) up front, and for the exchange to take place in Iran, rather than in a third country (link here). Mottaki’s statements were clear about Tehran wanting an upfront exchange of finished fuel for LEU, but ambiguous about whether Iranian LEU, once swapped for finished fuel, could be sent to a third country or would need to stay in Iran.

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President Obama’s speech accepting this year’s Nobel Peace Prize has elicited an extraordinary amount of commentary already. Neoconservatives (e.g., Michael Gerson, John Hannah, and Robert Kagan), in particular, seem delighted. The speech seemed calculated to justify Obama’s recent decision to deploy an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. But his address also has potentially profound implications for American policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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Defense Secretary Robert Gates said today that he expects additional sanctions to be placed on the Islamic Republic as a result of the breakdown of the P5+1 negotiations.

It looks increasingly like we voted for “engagement” and all we got was a single, narrow proposal on the nuclear issue that falls far short of the kind of broad dialogue necessary to reorient U.S.-Iranian relations.

– Ben Katcher

Gareth Porter has written a detailed analysis of the P5+1 negotiations from an Iranian perspective. A version of his piece was originally published in Le Monde Diplomatique, but I recommend the original version of the article, which can be found here.

Porter explains that the failure of the uranium enrichment swap must be understood in the West not as a result of Iranian dishonesty or internal political divisions, but a rational, calculated decision by the Islamic Republic that the proposal did not serve Iranian interests. He says

Objections to the plan all reflected recognition that the ElBaradei draft would deprive Iran of the bargaining leverage they have so painfully accumulated in the form of its LEU stocks. Senior Iranian national security officials had acknowledged in informal conversations that their main purpose in accumulating low enriched uranium was to compel the United States to sit down and bargain seriously with Iran. They had observed that, in the past, before the enrichment program began, the United States exhibited no interest in negotiations. From that strategic perspective, Iran is now in a position to negotiate with the United States in a way that it was not under Rafsanjani and Khatami, thanks to its LEU stocks.

Porter is concerned that the Obama administration plans to use the P5+1 offer as evidence of its attempt at “engagement” and as an excuse to move on to the familiar path of sanctions, threats, and indefinite hostility. Porter concludes

It now seems certain that the G5 plus 1 will declare an end to the negotiations before the end of December and move to the next phase of sanctions. Thus the talks with Iran will have ended without having attempting to explore the possibility of a larger bargain with Iran. That would have involved an end to overtly hostile U.S. policies and a symbolic recognition of Iran’s legitimate interests and status in Middle Eastern politics. That the Obama administration did not even try, despite Obama’s commitment to diplomatic engagement, is partly due to the desire of Samore and other advisers to try to impose a diplomatic solution on Iran that could be portrayed as a diplomatic victory over Iran, even if only in the short-term.

– Ben Katcher

Over at the Middle East Report Online, Farideh Farhi offers a thorough analysis of the P5+1 negotiations from an Iranian perspective.

I can’t speak to the accuracy of all of Farhi’s conclusions, but I do agree with her assessment that the Islamic Republic’s approach to the negotiations is more complex than simply an effort to buy time.

Her critique of the Obama administration’s response is also worth paying attention to:

But neither is the Obama administration fault-free, if the US intent at Geneva was to strike a bargain limiting Iran’s enrichment program and instituting a robust inspection regime. (If the intent was to make pro forma overtures designed to be disdained, so that the US might garner support for further sanctions, then all bets are off.) When the agreements encountered opposition, the US could have counseled forbearance, allowing the P5+1 to wait for a counter-offer from Tehran. The White House could have reflected upon the fact that the hardliners themselves had floated the ideas of keeping Iran’s LEU stockpile small and enriching no more uranium beyond 5 percent. Instead, impatient with Iran’s messy domestic dynamics, the US chose a more familiar path: announcements of deadlines, patronizing speeches and ominous reminders that the clock was ticking. In effect, Washington’s insistence that the Geneva and Vienna drafts were the only offer on the table turned the tentative agreement into an ultimatum — and the IAEA censure became a foregone conclusion. Already under fire for caving into Western pressure their political opponents likely imagined, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad could hardly bow to pressure that was real.

The entire article can be read here.

Saurav Jha has a nuanced, even-handed assessment of the bilateral relationship between India and Iran over at World Politics Review.

Ramber concludes that

Indo-Iranian relations are characteristic of 21st-century statecraft, with both countries careful to compartmentalize their interaction by pursuing convergent interests, even as they agree to disagree on other issues. Iran, in particular, may be trying to add economic substance to the relationship by reviving dormant energy ties. It remains to be seen however, whether this will ease India’s current dependence on Saudi oil.

You can read the entire article here.

– Ben Katcher

There has been a lot of focus on Turkey this week in Washington, prompted by Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit and his Oval Office meeting with President Obama. Erdoğan has had a number of high-profile speaking engagements in town, as have Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (whom some observers describe as “Erdoğan’s Kissinger”) and key advisers to the Prime Minister. Today, at the New America Foundation, we hosted an extremely interesting roundtable with Ibrahim Kalin, Erdoğan’s chief foreign policy advisor (who assumed this role earlier in the year when Davutoğlu moved from the Prime Minister’s staff to become Foreign Minister) and Suat Kiniklioğlu, deputy chairman of the governing AK Party for external affairs and a senior member of the Turkish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee.

Read the full post »

Some quick thoughts on Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Washington this week.

-It is clear that Turkey and the United States have different approaches to Iran’s nuclear program. The United States is still calling for “zero enrichment” and is threatening additional sanctions if Iran does not cede to the P5+1 demands. In contrast, Turkey has maintained that Iran has a right to nuclear power, though it should not develop a nuclear weapon. Prime Minister Erdogan generated headlines and aroused Western criticism when he traveled to Tehran last month and called Iranian President Ahadinejad a “friend.”

Read the full post »

Nuclear weapons guru and New America Foundation/Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative Director Jeffrey Lewis has an interesting post over at Arms Control Wonk on NATO’s nuclear weapons in Turkey.

As Jefferey mentions in the post, the comments he cites by Turkish Foreign Policy Advisor Ibrahim Kalin were made at a New America Foundation forum organized by The Race for Iran publishers Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett.

– Ben Katcher

Hillary Mann Leverett published an important op ed, “President Obama’s Dangerous Afghan Gamble”, in today’s POLITICO; to link to her article, click here.  Hillary’s piece offers a trenchant analysis of the policy framework for Afghanistan articulated by President Obama at West Point last week.  For purposes of The Race for Iran, one of her arguments deserves special highlighting here:  the Obama Administration has almost completely dropped any serious effort to forge a political strategy for resolving Afghanistan’s ongoing civil strife.  Such a strategy would include a political process aimed at a broad-based power-sharing arrangement.  As Hillary writes,

In the end, there is no solution to Afghanistan’s ongoing civil strife save a power-sharing arrangement involving the Northern Alliance and the Taliban along with other militant factions and tribal leaders.  President Karzai, to his credit, understands this and for years has wanted to bring the Taliban into a serious political process.  But, like its predecessor, the Obama Administration refuses to consider meaningful engagement with the Taliban.  Obama’s statement in his West Point speech—offering to accommodate those Taliban “who have renounced violence”—means that the United States will only engage those low-level elements of the Taliban that have no political relevance.  

But a real political strategy for Afghanistan would mean not only serious engagement with the Taliban.  It would also entail serious engagement with the country’s neighbors—including, without question, the Islamic Republic of Iran—to facilitate and implement such a power-sharing arrangement.  In its retreat from even considering serious engagement with Tehran, the Obama Administration set not only its Iran policy on the path to failure, but also its Afghanistan policy.      

–Flynt Leverett