Our colleague, Siddharth Varadarajan, strategic affairs columnist for India’s The Hindu, published a fantastic column on Sunday analyzing the backdrop for and implications of last week’s resolution on Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors. We will be offering our own thoughts on the resolution shortly, but want to give Siddharth’s piece the widest possible circulation.
The Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it will build 10 new uranium enrichment sites in an effort to expand its nuclear program.
The West’s reaction so far has been limited to a renewed call for sanctions.
We’ll see whether the P5+1 can muster the creativity and persistence to reach a comprehensive, game-changing deal with the Iranians. Giving up the “zero enrichment” illusion would be a good start.
– Ben Katcher
Kayhan Barzegar , an Iranian scholar and foreign policy analyst currently at the Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, recently published an op ed, “A Middle Way, Best Solution to the Nuclear Crisis”, in Iran Review. It deserves the widest possible notice. Barzegar offers an extremely insightful analysis of Iranian perspectives on the Baradei proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor, going well beyond the “Iran has rejected a very reasonable proposal” and “Iran can’t make up its mind” boilerplate that passes for analysis in most Western commentary on the issue.
We strongly agree with Barzegar’s point that Iranian reactions to the Baradei proposal are inevitably colored by the ongoing insistence of the United States, Britain, and France (along with Israel) on “zero enrichment” as the only acceptable outcome from nuclear negotiations with Tehran. While some Western hardliners express concern that the Baradei proposal implicitly accepts the reality of enrichment in Iran—thereby undermining “zero enrichment” as a Western negotiating position—many Iranian elites worry the proposal would set a precedent that any enriched uranium produced in the Islamic Republic should be sent abroad. From this latter perspective, acceptance of the Baradei proposal as originally advanced would put Iran on a “slippery slope” to zero enrichment in nuclear negotiations with the P-5+1.
This certainly helps to explain Iran’s counter-proposal, advanced by Foreign Minister Mottaki last week, that Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU) would need to be swapped for new fuel up front, inside Iran. France—in the person of Foreign Minister Kouchner—has already declared Mottaki’s counter-proposal an effective rejection of the Baradei plan. But that result will only confirm Iranian suspicions that the United States and its partners were all along out to leverage Iran toward zero enrichment. And it could give Tehran an “excuse” to enrich some portion of its LEU stockpile to 20 percent—hardly a great moment in Western nonproliferation policy.
We wish all our readers a Happy Thanksgiving. We will take Thursday off, but will be back after the holiday with, among other items, our promised analysis of Israeli views on proposals for a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
The New Republic’s Michael Crowley suggests that Russia may be becoming more amenable to supporting sanctions against Iran – if the Islamic Republic cannot reach a deal with the P5+1 over its nuclear program.
Crowley argues that Russia’s decision to delay the shipment of an anti-missile defense system coupled with its announcement that the Bushehr nuclear plant won’t be operational by the end of this year suggest that Russia may be inclined to take a harder line against Iran, and may be open to sanctions.
Last week, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett explained why Russia is extremely unlikely to go along with anything approaching “crippling” sanctions.
And even if Russia were to go along with sanctions, Crowley’s article does not address the fact that even “crippling” sanctions are unlikely to produce the kind of capitulations on Iran’s nuclear program that the Obama administration appears to be seeking.
– Ben Katcher
Iran sent WTO members a memorandum outlining its trade policies, in an effort to build momentum toward its WTO accession.
While minor, Iran’s move underscores the immense economic opportunities that the United States could offer Iran, if it were to engage in comprehensive strategic negotiations with the Islamic Republic.
It’s difficult to pursue “bigger carrots” when negotiations are limited to the nuclear issue.
– Ben Katcher
Stratfor’s George Friedman on gasoline sanctions:
No one expects Russia or China (or even many of the European states) to fully comply with a sanctions regime on gasoline. Even if they did, no one expects the flow of gasoline to be decisively cut off. There will be too many people prepared to take the risk of smuggling gasoline to Iran for that to happen. Even if the U.S. blockaded Iranian ports, the Caucasus and Central Asia are far too disorderly and the monetary rewards of smuggling are too great of an incentive to make the gasoline sanctions effective. Additionally, the imposition of sanctions will both rally the population to the regime as well as provide justification for an intense crackdown. The probability of sanctions forcing policy changes or regime change in Iran is slim.
You can read the entire article here.
– Ben Katcher
Later this week, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors will meet in Vienna, with Iran’s nuclear program at the top of the agenda. Of course, the Board will discuss the IAEA’s recent inspections of Iran’s newly declared enrichment facility near Qom, as well as the Iranian response to outgoing director general Mohammed ElBaradei’s proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor. But, as has been the case since 2006, discussions of Iranian matters in Vienna will take place under the cloud of three United Nations Security Council resolutions calling on the Islamic Republic to stop all activities related to uranium enrichment. In retrospect, the Board’s decision to refer the Iranian file to the Security Council has hardly facilitated a negotiated solution to the issue; rather, referral to the Security Council—and the Council’s subsequent insistence on suspension—has made it more difficult to reach a solution through thoughtful diplomacy.
On Friday, I linked to a report in The Economist that General Raymond Odierno and Ambassador Christopher Hill, the United States’ two most senior officials in Iraq, met with General Qassem Suleimani, who commands the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force.
For the record, the CENTCOM Public Affairs office e-mailed me to deny that the meeting took place.
I don’t know whether the meeting took place or not – but it should have. The United States’ interests in Iraq are served by engaging all of the regional stakeholders, including Iran.
– Ben Katcher
Representatives from the five security council countries and Germany met today in Brussels to discuss the fact that the Islamic Republic has not accepted the P5+1 offer to ship its uranium out of the country for enrichment.
Meanwhile, President Obama is talking about sanctions and “consequences”.
Tony Karon provides an excellent analysis of the state of play in the negotiations. His central point – that neither Russia nor China will go along with meaningful sanctions – is spot on.
From the article:
President Barack Obama spent much of his time in Asia warning Iran that his patience for nuclear diplomacy is wearing thin. “Iran has taken weeks now and has not shown its willingness to say yes to this proposal,” Obama said Thursday in Seoul, referring to a deal under which Iran would export the bulk of its stock of enriched uranium to Russia for conversion into reactor fuel. “And so, as a consequence we have begun discussions with our international partners about the importance of having consequences.”
But Friday’s meeting in Brussels between representatives of the group of Western powers, Russia and China that has been negotiating with Iran produced little indication that new sanctions may be imminent if Iran continue to prevaricate. The difficulty facing Washington in mustering support for ratcheting up pressure on Iran was already clear in Thursday’s statement by a Russian foreign ministry official that, “As far as we know, there has been no final official answer from Tehran”, and that “there is currently no discussion on working out additional sanctions against Iran.” And Friday’s Brussels meeting simply reaffirmed disappointment in Iran’s failure to embrace the deal thus far, but reiterated the commitment of the Western powers, Russia and China to continue to engage in dialogue with Tehran.
You can read the entire article here.
The bottom line is that if “engagement” is going to be successful, it is going to require a much more significant commitment from the Obama administration. No one said strategic rapprochement was going to be easy, but we did say that it is the United States’ only viable option.
Does the Obama administration really think that “sanctions” or “threats of sanctions” can lead to an outcome that promotes U.S. interests?
– Ben Katcher
The Economist reports that General Raymond Odierno and Ambassador Christopher Hill, the United States’ two most senior officials in Iraq, met with General Qassem Suleimani, who commands the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force, to discuss Iraqi politics.
This meeting underscores the important role that Iran continues to play in Iraq – a role that is only likely to increase as American troops leave the country.
Ensuring Iraq’s stability is one of the many reasons that it is so important that the Obama administration engage in comprehensive strategic negotiations with the Islamic Republic.
– Ben Katcher
A senior European diplomat, speaking in Paris this week, reportedly told The Jerusalem Post that Iran has already rejected Mohammed ElBaradei’s proposal for refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), but President Obama is withholding the news . As readers ponder how many national governments were involved in spinning this story, we note that Siddarth Varadarajan—strategic affairs editor for India’s The Hindu and a journalist with deep expertise in Iranian issues—published a front-page story earlier this week reporting an exclusive interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who has been traveling in India. The link to Siddarth’s article is here; the full transcript of his interview with Mottaki is here.
The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has just published an excellent four-pager called “Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal.”
The report lays out the United States’ policy options with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, and makes a clear and concise case for why the United States must move beyond its insistence on “zero enrichment.” According to the report, “Zero enrichment is so unlikely it should not be the basis of policy.”
Instead, the “least bad” option for the United States is to reach a deal with the Islamic Republic that allows some enrichment in exchange for an Iranian commitment to safeguards against the weaponization of its nuclear program.
The argument made in the report is similar to one made by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett in their paper, “Time for a U.S.-Iranian ‘Grand Bargain’,” published last year.
– Ben Katcher
In Beijing, President Obama is continuing his administration’s efforts to win China’s support for imposing “crippling” sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities. While U.S. officials cling to the hope that China will not, in the end, stand alone among the P-5+1 in opposing new sanctions, Chinese President Hu Jintao politely declined to indicate any support for additional pressure on Iran. Following discussions with Obama, Hu said only that “we both stressed that to uphold the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and to appropriately resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations is very important to stability in the Middle East and in the Gulf region.” (see full transcript here.)
Marc Broderick, writing in the Moscow Times, argues that Russia’s opposition to sanctions on Iran can be attributed to its desire for a high price of oil. Conflict between the West and Iran – according to Broderick – is a good thing for Russia because it is likely to lead to a higher price of oil.
I think there is something to Broderick’s argument, but understanding Russia’s opposition to sanctions requires a broader framework for analyzing Russia’s interests. Flynt and Hillary provided this analysis yesterday.
– Ben Katcher
Yet again, U.S. officials, Western media, and various “experts” are telling us that Russia is finally coming on board for really tough sanctions against Iran over its nuclear activities. See, the latest media report on Russian President Dmitry Medvedev “joining forces” with President Obama on the need for tougher sanctions against Iran here.
In today’s weekend edition of Haaretz, Akiva Eldar offers a very good profile of/interview with Hillary Mann Leverett, focusing on Iran. To read the article, click here. Next week, we will write more about Israeli perspectives on nuclear diplomacy with Iran.
– Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
Michael Slackman has a very revealing “Memo from Riyadh” in today’s New York Times that explains how the balance of power in the Middle East is shifting away from Egypt and Saudi Arabia (American allies) and toward the Islamic Republic and its proxies. He also demonstrates that neither Saudi nor Egypt has a plausible solution to reverse this trend. Saudi Arabia’s call for “Arab unity” just isn’t going to cut it, and Egypt’s “peace” card looks less and less plausible with every American misstep.
Five months after its most recent national elections, Lebanon has a new government. The new government amounts to a coalition between Saad Hariri’s March 14 movement, on one side, and Hizballah’s March 8 movement (which has close relations with Iran and Syria), on the other. It effectively preserves Hizballah’s “veto” over any significant government decisions.
• Hariri will become Prime Minister and his group will take 15 seats in the cabinet.
• Hizballah and its allies will hold 10 seats.
• Lebanon’s President, Michel Suleiman—who strongly supports Hizballah’s participation in a unity government—will name five cabinet members.
As usual, Lebanese politics is never about purely Lebanese issues. Rather, Lebanese politics is, in many ways, an arena in which broader regional divides play out.
• In this regard, Lebanon’s June elections were wrapped up with an ongoing struggle between Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Iran and Syria, on the other, for regional influence.
• In this context, the announcement of a new Lebanese government is a tacit acknowledgment – by March 14 and its chief external supporter, Saudi Arabia – of Iran’s position in Lebanon.
The New York Times published an article on Saturday with the following headline: “Medvedev Says Russia May Back Sanctions on Iran if Deal Falls Apart.”
The headline makes it sound as if Russia has changed its position on sanctions, but this is not the case.
Here is what the article quotes Medvedev as saying
If agreements are reached on the programs linked to uranium enrichment and its use for peaceful purposes in Iran, we will with pleasure take part in these programs. If the Iranian leadership takes a less constructive position, then anything is possible, in theory…We would not want this to end in imposing sanctions under international law, because sanctions, as a rule, are a complex and dangerous path,” he continued. “But if there is no forward movement, no one can rule out this scenario.
While the headline is technically true (anything is possible), it is misleading. Past experience shows that Russia is unlikely to support meaningful sanctions. The statement above sounds much more like diplomatic hedging than a clear statement of policy.
The problem with headlines like these is that they reinforce the false notion in Washington that if “engagement” fails, the Obama administration should pursue other options, including sanctions, in an effort to isolate the Islamic Republic into submission.
This narrative is erroneous because it is that it is based on two false premises. The first is that the Russians and Chinese will (or might) go along with sanctions. The second is that more sanctions will force Iran to give up its nuclear program.
– Ben Katcher
The IAEA has suggested that Iran send its uranium to Turkey – instead of Russia or France – as part of the P5+1 proposal to enrich Iranian uranium for medical purposes. The idea is to allow Iran to send its uranium to a country that it may trust more than the French or the Russians. It is likely that Turkey would relish such a role, though it has not given any official statement on the matter.
In recent weeks, Turkey has been criticized for its friendly approach to Tehran and for Prime Minister Erdogan’s statement that it believes the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program is for civilian purposes only.
If Iran were to accept the IAEA’s proposal, it would constitute a concrete example of how Turkey’s increasingly assertive engagement in the Middle East can, in fact, enhance Turkey’s value to the West.
– Ben Katcher
The Washington Post Editorial Board has the following headline today: “Tehran Gains Time: How much longer should the Obama administration tolerate the regime’s intransigence?”
The editorial echoes the common refrain in Washington that Tehran’s counter-proposal to the IAEA last week is an insincere effort to “play for time.” The editorial goes on to question whether the Islamic Republic should be “granted” another two months to come around and send its uranium abroad for enrichment.
The big question that the Post leaves unanswered is this: What exactly does it want the Obama administration to do? It is ridiculous to call for the end to diplomacy without even bothering to suggest an alternative strategy.
The fact is that diplomacy is the Obama administration’s only real option.
– Ben Katcher
Dilip Hiro, over at the Asia Times, has an excellent article that explicates the emerging security, energy, and economic ties among China, Russia and Iran – and lays bare the futility of the Obama administration’s “carrots and sticks” posture toward the Islamic Republic.
Hiro really “gets” the international and historical dynamics at play.
For example, on the (im)possibility of imposing gasoline sanctions:
Foremost among these [proposed sanctions] would be a ban on the export of gasoline to Iran, whose oil refining capacity falls significantly short of domestic demand. Chinese oil corporations have already started shipping gasoline to Iran to fill the gap caused by a stoppage of supplies from British and Indian companies anticipating Washington’s possible move. Between June and August 2009, China signed $8 billion worth of contracts with Iran to help expand two existing Iranian oil refineries to produce more gasoline domestically and to help develop the gigantic South Pars natural gas field. Iran’s national oil corporation has also invited its Chinese counterparts to participate in a $42.8 billion project to construct seven oil refineries and a 1,600 kilometer trans-Iran pipeline that will facilitate pumping fuel to China.
The entire article is well worth a read and can be found here.
– Ben Katcher
Marking the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, President Obama called today for a new bilateral relationship. He said
This event helped set the United States and Iran on a path of sustained suspicion, mistrust and confrontation. I have made it clear that the United States of America wants to move beyond this past, and seeks a relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran based upon mutual interests and mutual respect.
This is all well and good – but such a relationship is not possible while senior Obama administration officials continue to talk about “crippling sanctions” and “carrots and sticks.”
These statements do nothing to strengthen the American bargaining position, while complicating efforts to build the mutual trust necessary to develop the relationship President Obama has in mind.
– Ben Katcher
This is a joint post by Jeffrey Lewis, Flynt Leverett, and Hillary Mann Leverett. This post is cross-posted at Jeffrey’s blog, “Arms Control Wonk.”
Bloomberg’s Jonathan Tirone has a story today revealing that Iran has dramatically expanded operations at its Gchine uranium mine. Tirone worked closely with Jeffrey Lewis at the New America Foundation, as well as other nuclear experts, to analyze satellite photographs of the Gchine mine.
We believe that it is important to place this development in a larger context: what does Tirone’s story say about Iran’s nuclear program, and what are its implications for diplomatic efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue? The bottom line is that Iran appears to be developing a significant indigenous source of uranium—a source that, while nowhere near what the Islamic Republic would need to fuel a civil nuclear power program, is relatively large compared to the requirements of a nuclear weapons program. This development provides additional confirmation for the argument that the diplomatic pursuit of “zero enrichment” in Iran is folly. The objective of nuclear diplomacy with Tehran should be to improve the international community’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities.
The Economist is the latest to weigh in on Turkey’s growing diplomatic role in the Middle East and to question whether Turkey is moving away from the West and toward what has been called a “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy that increasingly emphasizes strengthening ties with Turkey’s southern and eastern neighbors.
Turkey’s activist policy in the Middle East has been in the spotlight recently due to Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Iran last month and his support for the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.
The article provides a thorough and mostly helpful account of Turkey’s recent foreign policy, but I think it shares one key misconception with much of the recent Western commentary on this subject.
Here is what The Economist describes as the roots of Turkey’s new, eastward-looking foreign policy:
The Turks are now back in the Middle East, in the benign guise of traders and diplomats. The move is natural, considering proximity, the strength of the Turkish economy, the revival of Islamic feeling in Turkey after decades of enforced secularism, and frustration with the sluggishness of talks to join the European Union. Indeed, Turkey’s Middle East offensive has taken on something of the scale and momentum of an invasion, albeit a peaceful one.
This explanation, while partially accurate, is incomplete. Turkey’s foreign policy posture must be understood in context.
A significant reason for Turkey’s increasingly independent, “zero problems with neighbors” policy in its neighborhood is the fact that the United States’ recent policy in the Middle East has been an unmitigated disaster – particularly since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 over Turkish objections.
Ian Lesser hit the nail on the head when he said back in 2006 that
For decades the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship was based largely on the defense of the regional status quo, territorial and political – an approach well suited to Turkey’s essentially conservative foreign-policy outlook. Today, Turkey faces an American partner with more dynamic, even revolutionary objectives in areas of shared interest
Siding with the United States against the status quo in the Middle East is simply too risky of a strategy for Turkey, which does not enjoy the option of withdrawing to the safety of North America.
Remarking on the divergence of American and European foreign policies after September 11, Tony Judt said that “America’s strategy of global confrontation with Islam is not an option for Europe. It is a catastrophe.”
The same could be said for Turkey.
– Ben Katcher
This clip from Al Jazeera provides the latest on the Islamic Republic’s deliberations with regard to the IAEA proposal.
– Ben Katcher
Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center and publisher of The National Interest, has written an important piece for Time Magazine that criticizes the Obama administration’s diplomatic approach to Russia and warns that these mistakes will complicate U.S. negotiations with the Islamic Republic.
Simes argues that the United States’ clumsy, bipolar Russia policy will make it much more difficult to elicit Russian support for further sanctions on Iran. He cites Vice President Biden’s statement last week that “the process of Georgia’s deeper integration into NATO is very important” as well as Secretary Clinton’s failure to meet Prime Minister Putin while in Russia.
Simes’ argument is well taken, but my question is whether even the most adept American diplomacy could persuade the Russians to support sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
It appears that Russia’s strategic interest in a healthy relationship with Iran is worth more than anything Washington is prepared to offer.
– Ben Katcher
Tony Karon, writing in The National, explains one of the key reasons that the P5+1 negotiations with Iran have failed thus far.
Underlying the talks in Vienna last month was the key question of whether Iran has the right to enrich uranium on its soil, an issue the parties deliberately put aside.
As Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett have written, it is highly unlikely that the Islamic Republic will forfeit its uranium enrichment capacity. The question is whether the United States and its P5+1 partners are prepared to accept that reality and negotiate some kind of arrangement that accepts Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity in exchange for safeguards against weaponization.
That should be the United States’ goal with regard to these negotiations – and that goal can only be achieved in the context of comprehensive negotiations.
– Ben Katcher
In an interview for Russia Today, Flynt Leverett discusses the Iranian counter-offer to the P5+1 uranium enrichment proposal. In contrast to many commentators, Flynt considers the Iranian response to be a good faith negotiating position rather than a tactic to play for time or an indication of Iranian obstinance.
– Ben Katcher