We are pleased to publish the following post from Peter Jenkins, who has previously contributed outstanding posts to www.RaceForIran.com. Peter is a partner in ADRgAmbassadors, an international dispute resolution partnership, and a former member of the British diplomatic service who served as the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency from 2001 to 2006—a critical period in the development of the Iranian nuclear issue. We thank him for another fine piece.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
“Getting to Yes” with Iran
The US and its European partners are continuing to set stiff conditions for recognising Iran’s nuclear rights and addressing issues of concern to Iran. That is the implication of the stress in recent statements on Iran “meeting its international obligations”, since it must be assumed that Western capitals believe that the UN Security Council has turned various demands made of Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors into “international obligations” (though whether they are right to believe that can be disputed). These demands include suspending uranium enrichment work at Natanz and Qom and reactor construction at Arak, re-applying and ratifying the Additional Protocol, and transparency measures that extend beyond the formal requirements of the standard IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol.
These stiff conditions make it hard to be optimistic about the P5+1/Iran talks that are due to resume later this month. Iranian spokesmen have been reiterating that they are not prepared to discuss a halt to uranium enrichment. Tehran’s unwillingness to re-apply the Additional Protocol as long as Iran remains subject to UN sanctions is well-documented. And experience suggests that Iran’s leaders are resilient enough to withstand the “pressures” (sanctions) to which they have been subjected.
Back in 1981 two Harvard academics, Roger Fisher and William Ury, produced a guide to success in negotiations: “Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In”. They argued against what they called “positional bargaining” and in favour of “principled bargaining”. The essence of principled bargaining, they maintained, is to focus on interests, not positions, and to invent options for mutual gain. Their book is still in print, over two million copies later, and their thesis has stood up well to the test of experience.
For confirmation of the sterility of positional bargaining one can do worse than study the last five years of negotiation on the Iranian nuclear issue. The West has not varied its core demands. Iran has as steadily insisted that these demands infringe Iranian rights and amount to an illegitimate elaboration of the NPT.
So a switch of approach is overdue. It is time to give principled bargaining a try.
Western negotiators would not have to look far to find areas where Iranian and Western interests overlap. Both sides have an interest in Iran addressing and resolving questions that still hang over aspects, past and present, of its nuclear programme. Both sides would benefit from measures to mitigate the fears that Iran’s nuclear activities have aroused in neighbouring Arab states, as these fears could lead some of those states to seek nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability. (References to Saudi Arabia in the new Iranian foreign minister’s first press conference suggest that this is well understood in Tehran.)
The challenge would be to give expression to these shared interests in ways that were mutually acceptable. In 2003 application of the Additional Protocol was both an obvious and a mutually acceptable way for Iran to set about accounting for 18 years of undisclosed nuclear activity. Now alternative arrangements, to allow IAEA inspectors to complete their audit, would have to be devised, as in Iran the Additional Protocol has become a symbol of Western double standards and duplicity. It would be surprising if a formula could not be found.
To mitigate fears and reduce proliferation risks negotiators could draw on past non-proliferation and US/USSR arms control practices. Nuclear weapon free zones now cover much of the Non-Aligned world. They have proved their worth as neighbourhood reassurance schemes. They do not have to be regional in extent; a variant which covered part of a region could serve as well.
Equally, arrangements for mutual reassurance through reciprocal inspections or visits have acquired a sound diplomatic pedigree. They do not depend on the elimination of all the issues that divide pairs or groups of states, or on old enemies discovering the blessings of friendship.
Of course the chances of any of this coming to pass are close to nil. As was pointed out on this site and elsewhere last month, the Obama administration appears to have lost whatever appetite it may once have had for a creative approach to the Iranian nuclear issue. Its instinct is to play safe. “Playing safe” means sticking to well-established positions, reiterating familiar demands, offering Iran “incentives” that Iran is bound to reject, proclaiming Iran “intransigent” when the rejection occurs, and ratcheting up “pressure” a further notch.
This is understandable. The average Congressperson views Iran’s Islamic regime with deep suspicion and even deeper distaste; he or she would sooner engage in principled negotiation with the devil. US media comment and reporting rarely deviate from a line honed in Israel: the Islamic regime has firm plans to acquire nuclear weapons and is a mortal threat to all that Americans hold dear. Prime Minister’s Putin’s statement on Larry King Live on 2 December (“we do not have grounds to suspect that Iran aspires to possess nuclear weapons”) seems to have passed almost unnoticed. (It is unlikely that on a matter such as this the Russian Prime Minister would be less well-informed than the President of the USA or the Prime Minister of Israel.)
Yet it is a mistake to imagine that for the US or Europe playing safe is a low-cost option. It is not. The longer a majority of Americans are left believing that Iran is a nuclear threat, the greater the risk that the White House will have to bow to pressure for extreme measures to deprive Iran of its enrichment capability. At least one of the current crop of aspirants to the Presidency would require little inducement to declare Iran guilty as charged and round up a lynching party. The likely consequences for the US and Europe of a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities have been spelled out often enough for readers to need no reminder.
The same perception – that Iran is a nuclear threat – appears to be driving, at least in part, costly investments in a missile defence screen for Europe, with unhelpful implications for NATO/Russian relations. In time it may also, if left unaddressed, drive proliferation in states neighbouring Iran – the very outcome that the West has long sought to avert.
Non-Aligned support for the Western position is a pale relic of what it was in 2003. Most NAM states have come to doubt that Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. They dislike the Western emphasis on suspending or halting enrichment, because they cannot find justification for it in the NPT, because they detect a whiff of victimisation, and because they see a glaring double standard. So Western handling of Iran is not consolidating NAM support for the NPT; it is sapping it.
As the executive-director of the International Energy Agency warned in October, sanctions are hampering much-needed investment in Iran’s oil and gas sectors, and this threatens global energy security and price stability. The ability of non-Western companies to make up for the absence of Western investment is uncertain. Meanwhile, in other sectors, as a result of sanctions, Western companies have lost market share to Newly Emerging competitors. The impact on employment in the West, on corporate profits and on economic growth is measurable.
Playing safe is also a lost opportunity. America’s reputation has suffered over the last decade. America’s moral authority – a belief in the US as a force for good – used to win respect for US leadership in most parts of the world. That stock of moral authority is now lower than it once was. The Iranian nuclear issue offers an opportunity to replenish it (and quell criticism of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee’s 2009 choice). An agreement with Iran that reduced the risk of conflict and proliferation in South West Asia, in the teeth of populist American prejudice, would be seen far and wide as a fine achievement.
I am not advocating the resolution of all the West’s differences with Iran. There is no reason to think that at this stage the Islamic regime is ready to recognise Israel’s right to exist, or to cut off support for Hezbollah and Hamas, or to start complying with human rights obligations. I am merely making a case for taking the first steps in an incremental process, as President Nixon did when he went to China in 1972, and as President Kennedy did in negotiating the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. Even if the first fruits of a “principled” negotiation with Iran are modest, as they probably will be, a negotiation can generate significant cost savings (see above) and political gains.
Nor am I suggesting that Iran should be allowed to violate its NPT obligations. Demanding full compliance with the NPT is one position that the West may legitimately, and should, hold firmly. There needs, however, to be a better understanding that NPT obligations are not synonymous with the “international obligations” to which Western speakers like to allude. The NPT requires Iran to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in its possession, and to refrain from the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. It does not require Iran to refrain from enriching uranium or to abandon construction of heavy water reactors. It requires Iran to re-apply Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangement; it does not require Iran to re-apply the Additional Protocol or implement exceptional transparency measures.
Finally, I am not proposing that the West drop its guard. On the contrary the West should maintain all the measures that are in place to complicate Iran’s acquisition of nuclear and ballistic missile technology (just as it did after taking the first steps towards détente with Russia and China). The US should continue to extend protection to any state that feels threatened by Iran. And Iran’s leaders should have impressed upon them that, were evidence to emerge that they were attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, all but a handful of states would be united in making them regret their folly.
–Peter Jenkins
Lysander: 1) The US will not launch a conventional war with Iran under the current circumstances. If Gwynne Dyer is correct (see my comment January 9, 2011 at 11:06 pm) then the US is almost certain to avoid a conventional war altogether.”
We agree to disagree on that, OK.
“2) While the US *could* Destroy Iran via nuclear attack it never will. If, as you say, 3-4 nukes are ’strategically irrelevant” then the US will not launch a nuclear war that would destroy its image once and for all all over the world. Period. If you still insist that the US will attack, then you are, for all practical purposes, conceding that 3-4 bombs are in fact a strategic game changer.”
Ah, not necessarily. As I said, IF the US regards that level of Iranian nuclear weapon capability as REALLY “unacceptable”, it might do attack with nuclear weapons (or more likely escalate from conventional attacks to nuclear weapons if the conventional attacks clearly are not preventing Iran from deploying those weapons.)
I agree, however, that the likelihood of any of that is small – primarily because Iran very likely is NOT going to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. Never, to use your term, in all probability.
3) “If the US has not yet launched a war by that time, then it never will.”
You are probably quite correct on that. But of course I believe it will. So again we agree to disagree.
“As for the advisability of Iran actually building a bomb, the fact of the matter is, if the US does not attack in the next 4-5 years then Iran will be in a position to build a bomb if it wanted to.”
Correct.
“The circumstances at that time will dictate whether it should or will.”
Correct.
“US missteps in other parts of the globe (war with Korea, financial collapse, oil spike to 200$, Israeli attack, etc) may afford Iran an opportunity to withdraw from the NPT.”
Perhaps. Obviously anything is possible. But again, even if Iran proceeds to do so and starts deployment of nuclear weapons, there would have to be a real major impediment occurring to prevent both a US or Israeli attack.
And of course, if my basic premise is correct, that the US wants to attack anyway and just hasn’t decided the “time is right”, then none of this is relevant. And in that case if YOU are correct then perhaps Iran should not wait at all to withdraw from the NPT and start deploying nukes. Unfortunately it remains true that all that will do is justify the US attack to the public and enable the US to get off “scott free” from any international legal problems since it will undoubtedly be able to get a UNSC resolution condemning Iran under Article 39, probably with Russian and Chinese acquiesce or abstention.
“As for Iran’s government agreeing with your position, perhaps. But the Iranian government is working towards all the things enumerated in point 3 above.”
To be precise, they are working to master the full fuel cycle. The motivation for doing so has not been established, and all indications are there is no intent to develop and deploy nukes, even if the leadership recognizes that the “Japan Option” is inherent in their program (which I assume they do but have no intent to actually “break out”).
“Yes, a country has to know its limitations. But it also has to see its opportunities.”
I don’t see much of an opportunity there at all to achieve anything but considerable damage to Iran’s society.
Eric,
Article 25 requires that all amendments to the Safeguards Agreement enter into force when “The Agency receives from the Government of Iran written notification that Iran’s statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met”. There is no comparable language regarding Subsidiary Arrangements.
Masoud
RSH,
This will be my last comment (for a while at least) on this topic.
Here is what I believe:
1) The US will not launch a conventional war with Iran under the current circumstances. If Gwynne Dyer is correct (see my comment January 9, 2011 at 11:06 pm) then the US is almost certain to avoid a conventional war altogether.
2) While the US *could* Destroy Iran via nuclear attack it never will. If, as you say, 3-4 nukes are ‘strategically irrelevant” then the US will not launch a nuclear war that would destroy its image once and for all all over the world. Period. If you still insist that the US will attack, then you are, for all practical purposes, conceding that 3-4 bombs are in fact a strategic game changer.
3) As we speak, Iran is advancing its nuclear program while under the NPT. Eventually, it will have enrichment facilities beside Natanz. Eventually, Arak will produce plutonium. Eventually, Iran will develop more efficient centrifuges. Eventually it will learn how to shape 20% enriched uranium into fuel rods. When all this has taken place, still within the NPT mind you, Iran will have accumulated enough fuel that can be enriched into several bombs. It will have also developed an enrichment infrastructure to enrich quickly.
If the US has not yet launched a war by that time, then it never will.
As for the advisability of Iran actually building a bomb, the fact of the matter is, if the US does not attack in the next 4-5 years then Iran will be in a position to build a bomb if it wanted to. The circumstances at that time will dictate whether it should or will. US missteps in other parts of the globe (war with Korea, financial collapse, oil spike to 200$, Israeli attack, etc) may afford Iran an opportunity to withdraw from the NPT.
As for Iran’s government agreeing with your position, perhaps. But the Iranian government is working towards all the things enumerated in point 3 above.
Yes, a country has to know its limitations. But it also has to see its opportunities.
Masoud,
“I don’t understand what you are talking about. Entry into force of the Safegurads Agreement seems to be regulated by article 25.”
Take a look at Articles 24(b) and 24(c). Then, to understand fully what 24(c) means, look at the first sentence of Article 25.
*ahem*
The article governing Subsidiary Agreements is Article 39
=
The article governing Subsidiary Arrangements is Article 39
Richard,
“Article 39 on the other hand requires an agreement by both parties at the time of implementation AND an agreement by both parties to amend the initial agreement. This seems to enable either party to hold the other “hostage” to the agreement, as it were, by simply refusing to agree to any amendment without any way for either party to take steps to resolve the issue other than acquiescence.”
I think this has got to be the thrust of the “IAEA’s argument”. I think, in general, Iran’s counters to this have to be either developing some kind of rational for ‘withdrawing’ from some specific Subsidiary Arrangement, or alternatively downplaying the ‘binding nature’ of the Subsidiary arrangements. Eric’s strategy seems to be claiming that a failure to get Majlis approval is sufficient rational to withdraw from the Arrangement, I don’t find that the Safeguards Agreement offers much support for such an argument, and think Iran needs to look elsewhere to find a counter.
Masoud
Hi Eric,
“Safeguards Agreement expressly requires “Government of Iran” approval to amend Subsidiary Arrangements, just as it expressly requires “Government of Iran” approval to amend the Safeguards Agreement itself, I argued earlier (and again here) that it is reasonable, though not inevitable, to conclude that the required “Government of Iran” approval for amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements must be given in the same manner as “Government of Iran” approval must be given for amendments to the Safeguards Agreement itself. After all, exactly the same phrase is used in both places,”
I don’t understand what you are talking about. Entry into force of the Safegurads Agreement seems to be regulated by article 25
==================================================================================
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
Article 25
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Agency receives from the Government of Iran written notification that Iran’s statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.
==================================================================================
The article governing Subsidiary Agreements is Article 39
===================================================================================
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 39
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall
specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.
====================================================================================
The language is very much different as far as I can see.
If we are going to be treating the subsidiary arrangements as binding agreements, then they either require Majlis approval to ‘enter into force’ or they don’t. In the first case, this would mean none of Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements arrived at over the past decades have ever actually ‘entered into force’, even though they are meant to be binding agreements. In the second case, your rational for Iran’s reversion is directly undone. So there don’t seem to be many promising arguments down this road.
I think that if Iran did lawfully withdraw from code 3.1, this must have been an explicit feature of the Subsidiary Arrangements themselves, not due to some kind of bug relating to the “Government of Iran”‘s internal machinations.
As for Article III of NPT, I only invoke it to answer the question,(which i admit did not specifically spell out)”Is a violation of the the Subsidiary Arrangements a violation of the NPT or Safeguards Agreement?”. My answer is no. I think referring to the NPT is not necessarily out of court here.
I understand it can be difficult to be lead down what must seem like someone else’s garden path, but i did put five or six questions to you in my previous post, none of which I considered rhetorical. I’d be quite appreciative if you could share with me how you would answer each of those questions.(I’m not expecting you to treat each one like an essay question, but feel free to expand on any of them if the mood does take you)
Masoud
And another, for the record:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/9/israel-us-push-back-estimates-of-nuclear-iran/
Meanwhile, back at the ranch:
“Abu Dhabi: Iraq will buy armaments worth $13 billion from the United States by 2013 and will spend another $13 bn on weapons later, a Baghdad newspaper reported citing an Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman.
Al Ittihad quoted Major General Mohammed Al Askari as saying that Iraq has already concluded a contract worth more than $13 bn with the United States.
The money will be used to buy aircraft, helicopters, tanks, other armored vehicles, warships and missiles, to enter service with the Iraqi defense and interior ministries.”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=22721
Lysander: “you are so committed to the certainty of attack and that Iran is totally helpless”
Which is not what I’ve said at all. Please do not amend my words. I would advise quoting me in entirety if you don’t understand what I said.
I have never said that Iran is “totally helpless.” In fact, I’ve just said that I doubt the US can COMPLETELY destroy Iran’s conventional military absent going nuclear.
What I am saying has to be considered under two different scenarios:
1) A strictly but intense conventional US military attack.
2) A US nuclear attack.
Under 1), the US can destroy the bulk of Iran’s infrastructure, as well as the bulk of Iran’s conventional military. This is just a fact of relative military strength. What the US CANNOT do is COMPLETELY destroy Iran’s conventional military power, nor can it destroy Iran’s Fourth Gen War capability. And it is the latter which can prevent the US from occupying and controlling Iran. Which latter goal is the only one Iran really needs to be true and therefore its capabilities are adequate for the purpose. And therefore Iran does not need nuclear capability. And the Iranian leadership apparently agrees with that assessment and has mostly said so.
Under 2) the US can MORE completely destroy the bulk of Iran’s infrastructure (not to mention literally millions of its citizens, to the tune of as much as fifty percent of the population depending on distribution, which if I’m not wrong is concentrated in the major Iranian cities), as well as MORE completely destroy the bulk of Iran’s conventional military. It is a matter of degree. A nuclear attack is something totally different in capability than a conventional attack. The effects of a major nuclear attack on a country like Iran which has a much less extensive infrastructure than a country like the US would most likely be so devastating as to render that country unable to function cohesively in any nuclear development program, underground or otherwise. Can we really assume that with ninety percent of the infrastructure destroyed, and fifty percent of the population killed, that Iran is going to produce nuclear weapons and retaliate? I submit that concept is ridiculous.
If one wants to argue that the US would never conduct such a level of nuclear attack, that is fine. I’m simply saying that IF the US REALLY decided that an Iran with X number of nuclear weapons (whatever that number turns out to be as a red line for the US or Israel) is REALLY “unacceptable”, then the US will do whatever it takes to achieve that, up to and including such a devastating level of attack.
“There is not the slightest chance the US will use nuclear weapons on Iran. Not because it’s nice, but because the consequences to US interests, including ‘elite’ interests, would be cataclysmic.”
Under “normal” circumstances, I completely agree. What I am discussing here is the hypothetical concept that if Iran is attacked severely by conventional means that it will be able to produce and deploy nuclear weapons during or after such a war. I am submitting that if the US is willing to go to war to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons – especially when the US knows that Iran doesn’t have such a program or that if it did a few nukes would be irrelevant in the strategic calculus – then clearly the US is likely to be willing to escalate that war to an even higher level should Iran then clearly and provably be developing and deploying nuclear weapons.
And therefore the notion that Iran SHOULD be trying to do so is counterproductive for Iran.
“So what would happen if the US started lobbing nukes at Iran? For one, every single country that can make nukes WILL make nukes.”
Probably true. Your argument boils down to “the genie will be out of the bottle.” You’re very likely right. But the consequences of such actions are not relevant to the hypothetical discussion that has been proposed. What is under discussion is whether Iran should deploy nuclear weapons either to deter an attack or as a consequence of an attack.
“Come to think of it, why hasn’t the US nuked North Korea? I suspect the US could launch a surprise attack destroying every military installation in North Korea before they could fire a single artillery shell. And yet it hasn’t.”
Absolute not. Despite your belief that I am over-emphasizing US military capability, North Korea has WAY too many weapons for the US to silence its military in any reasonable time frame – again, short of going nuclear. If the US DID go nuclear, however, I emphasize again that the situation would be vastly different. This is primarily why the US hasn’t attacked North Korea – conventional means would result in a “hell war” of significant duration, and a nuclear attack would risk retaliation by China.
Neither situation relates to Iran in any way as I’ve demonstrated repeatedly.
You claim many other countries would aim nukes at the US. Well, the Soviet Union did this for fifty years. Nonetheless, there were those analysts in the US defense industry who explicitly claimed the US could survive a first strike from the thousands of Soviet weapons and still destroy the Soviet Union. This WAS the basis for the nuclear detente of the Cold War. The Soviets knew they could not stop the US second strike from destroying their elites, and the US knew a Russian first strike could destroy enough of the US to make being an “elite” a serious problem.
But that was because the Soviet Union had as many or more nukes than the US did. Iran is NOT in that position and can NEVER BE in that position, even most likely with regard to Israel let alone the US (although Iran probably could survive a nuclear war with Israel much more easily than it could with the US.)
And if many other countries started developing nukes and pointing them at the US, the US would merely resume an arms race with those countries. Since the US spends 47% of the WORLD’S military spending, it would undoubtedly bankrupt both those other countries AND the US to engage in that race. And probably would result in more, not less, nuclear wars. But unless ALL of those countries joined together to attack the US, the end result would more likely be the large US arsenal being used against the smaller countries’ arsenals one country at a time, which would see the smaller countries losing.
More likely, the result would be the US nuking those smaller countries BEFORE they managed to get their arsenals up – exactly like the case of Iran.
Once again: Iran has to know its limitations. So does the US – but since the US starts off with fewer limitations, it’s going to take a lot longer for the US to realize them. And then, to quote Alfred in the Batman movie, “What happens on the day that you do?”
This is all extremely hypothetical, however, because Iran is not going to go nuclear before the US attack, nor do I believe, but cannot be sure, that they will do so after a US attack. The issue is whether Iran should do so, and as I’ve proven, Iran should not and the Iranian government appears to agree with that.
Richard,
I HAD WRITTEN:
“Somehow or other, I anticipate that you’ll disagree with a great deal of what I’ve just written. Just a hunch – can’t say I “know” it, but I tend to “believe” it.”
YOU REPLIED:
You would have been wiser to “know” it!
COMMENT: Well, I’ll confess that I was pretty darn close to “know” on that one.
Masoud: “Rather, it is insisting on the Article 39 provision that Subsidiary Arrangements are to be changed by mutual agreement.(naturally it is withholding from providing such an agreement)”
If I may interject, I think Article 39 is pretty wishy-washy while at the same time being rather different than a “contract”. In a “contract” both parties must agree at the time of entering into it, and how a later disagreement is to be handled is either specified in the contract itself (binding arbitration or whatever) or in common law or by going to a court of last resort.
Article 39 on the other hand requires an agreement by both parties at the time of implementation AND an agreement by both parties to amend the initial agreement. This seems to enable either party to hold the other “hostage” to the agreement, as it were, by simply refusing to agree to any amendment without any way for either party to take steps to resolve the issue other than acquiescence.
And then it goes one step further by saying “to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner”, which in essence says Iran is forced to agree to whatever the IAEA wants in order to enable the IAEA to do its job. This gives the IAEA the upper hand in any such disagreement.
In essence, Article 39 says “we agree but our ‘agreement’ is the one that takes precedence over your ‘agreement’.”
I may be wrong on this. Thoughts? Is this a distinction that matters in the real world or is it just one of Eric’s “gaps”?
RSH,
You have made enormous contributions to this board, but you are so committed to the certainty of attack and that Iran is totally helpless, that you have entered the realm of non-credible hyperbole.
There is not the slightest chance the US will use nuclear weapons on Iran. Not because it’s nice, but because the consequences to US interests, including ‘elite’ interests, would be cataclysmic.
There is a reason why the US has never used nukes since 1945, and why other nuclear powers have never used them at all. In 1950, an entire US army was threatened with destruction in Korea. And yet, the same president who casually used nukes on a defeated Japan, would not do so in Korea to save his own army. What had changed? The soviets had just detonated a nuke, but the US arsenal was MUCH bigger than that of the USSR at the time and its delivery systems much more advanced. And Truman still wouldn’t resort to nukes in Korea.
So what would happen if the US started lobbing nukes at Iran? For one, every single country that can make nukes WILL make nukes. From Argentina to Brazil to Turkey to Japan to Germany to South Africa. China, which has a modest arsenal of a hundred or so weapons, will build thousands and put them on ICBMs pointed straight at us. ESPECIALLY at the ‘elites.’
Come to think of it, why hasn’t the US nuked North Korea? I suspect the US could launch a surprise attack destroying every military installation in North Korea before they could fire a single artillery shell. And yet it hasn’t.
The long and short of it is, the US really doesn’t have any options against Iran if it decides to go fully nuclear. And it knows it.
Fyi: “Iran building a nuclear bomb does not justify or make a legal case for war against her; by US or anyone else.”
I agree completely. But the issue under review is whether building a nuke does Iran any good at all while at the same time allowing her enemies to “justify” (incorrectly) an attack. I have demonstrated logically that it does not. And equally importantly, there is clear evidence that the Iranians agree with this.
Anyone advocating that Iran leave the NPT or build a nuke needs to address the arguments I have made on this and has to admit to disagree with the Iranian government itself on the issue.
Having inflated views of Iran’s status in the world or Iran’s capability to ignore its actual limitations does not do Iran any good.
Eric: “For me, though, the gap between “believe” and “know” is important.”
As I’ve said before, I always keep a two percent degree of skepticism about any proposition to cover this exact issue of the difference between “believe” and “know”.
However, I insist that dwelling on epistemological distinctions between the two in many cases – such as the existence of God or an Iranian nuclear weapons program – is hair splitting: a “difference which makes no difference” – and has no useful philosophical difference either. All it does is weaken your ability to confront the proponents of the incorrect view.
“If I were running the US government and believed what you and I believe, I would keep this gap in mind as I formulated my policy toward Iran.”
If I were running the government, knowing as I did that the existence of any Iranian nuclear weapons would be tactically and strategically irrelevant vs either the US or Israel arsenals, I would be much less interested in the question at all. Instead, I would be looking to alter the Iranian geopolitical calculus to put Iran in the debt of the US by doing as the NPT requires – assisting Iran in its nuclear energy program, and addressing Iran’s concerns in the region and vis-a-vis the US and otherwise keeping the US at arms’ length from trying to impose my views on an alien culture.
I’m sure you agree with the above concepts of engagement. The point here is that the US has no need and achieve no useful benefit by worrying about a possible “gap” between “believe” and “know” absent ANY useful intelligence about a POSSIBLE Iranian nuclear weapons program – especially one that has been ginned up almost entirely by one’s own political establishment.
This latter is an important point: Let’s say I invent a lie of any kind. I tell you that lie. You don’t know whether I’m lying or not – but you DO know I’m a liar. I’ve ALWAYS lied to you, just yesterday in fact! Are you now going to impose on yourself some “gap” between your “belief” that I’m lying and your “knowing” that I’m lying in this instance? What advantage does that provide you in dealing with me? Is it not safer to assume I’m lying in the absence of ANY evidence to the contrary?
Worse, since I myself invented this lie, am I now to tell MYSELF that there is “gap” between my “belief” that what I said is a lie and my “knowing” that it is a lie?
Because that is precisely where the US government is. We KNOW – again, KNOW – that the US has deliberately lied and distorted the facts about the Iranian program as presented by more independent parties such as the IAEA. This has been a consistent, day in and day out practice by the US.
Am I now supposed to assume, as you do, that the US has a legitimate concern about the Iranian energy program? What benefit do I receive from doing so?
“It’s hard not to notice that you backpedaled from “know” later in your 2:47 post, as illustrated by a comparison of your first and second passages quoted below.”
I did not back pedal one whit. I merely pointed out that the use of the word “know” can have meanings of absolute certainty or less than absolute certainty. The point is that the distinction is meaningless in the case under consideration. Whereas you continue to insist it has meaning, but are completely unable to specify WHY except to use the idea to advance your concept that Iran should unilaterally comply with the AP – despite the fact that the prescription of “unilateral” has no bearing on the issue of “certainty” at all. Whether Iran observes the AP or not, we STILL KNOW that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program.
One should also keep in mind that when I refer to an Iranian nuclear weapons program, I am referring to a DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT program – not a nuclear weapons research database, i.e., the attempt to learn HOW to build a nuclear weapons. And for a development and deployment program there is even LESS evidence. ALL the supposed “evidence” for a weapons program in general could apply to a research program alone, and have nothing to do with a deployment program. The US, however, makes no such distinction. For the US, any attempt by Iran to even gain the knowledge to build a nuke is to be prohibited, let alone actually building and deploying them.
“Later, though, you back away from “know,” as the next passage indicates.”
I did NOT “back away from ‘know’” – I pointed out the distinction between “knowing in absolute certainty” and “knowing in practical terms”. It is YOU who insist that the word “know” means “absolute certainty”. And you do so in order to advance your notion that this supposed “gap” between what we “believe” and “know” must be filled by Iran’s unilaterally adopting the AP while getting nothing in return.
I submit again that it is YOU who must explain the “gap” between Iran getting nothing in return for doing so and Iran getting the simple concession from the West that its enrichment program is entirely legal.
THAT is the issue involved here, no some epistemology argument over word meanings.
Without your supposed “gap” between the FACT that there is ZERO evidence of an Iranian weapons program and the alleged “belief” on the part of the US that Iran does have one, there is NO justification for your policy prescription.
“But if we instead don’t “know” for sure what Iran is doing, and so would like some objective support for our belief that Iran is doing nothing wrong, it might make better sense for us to ask Iran for such objective assurances, and for Iran willingly to provide them.”
And here you admit exactly what I claim: that your whole emphasis on this issue is to justify what cannot be justified: your policy prescription that Iran give away the farm.
I really don’t get your insistence on this policy concept or why it means so much to you that you continually re-iterate it despite the complete absurdity.
“Finally, you argue that one is justified in ignoring the gap between “believe” and “know” because the other side does that.”
Not exactly. I say that BECAUSE there IS NO such “gap” in this situation, one gives up too much to the other side to emphasize it.
“When one side exaggerates or makes baseless claims, many people agree with you that the other side is justified in offsetting this by exaggerating or making baseless claims in the opposite direction.”
Which of course is nothing I said here.
“Some people indeed may be moved by your recommended “competing exaggerations” approach.”
Now you are completely wrong. I said nothing of the kind. Since I do not view any “gap” between “belief” and “know” in this case, there is nothing “exaggerated” in my recommendation to ignore the distinction in this case. That is YOUR presumption.
“Somehow or other, I anticipate that you’ll disagree with a great deal of what I’ve just written. Just a hunch – can’t say I “know” it, but I tend to “believe” it.”
You would have been wiser to “know” it!
UU,
Thank you for your words!
Like VoT, I appreciate your phraseology. It is as if you reached the crevasses/ inner-sanctum of my mind and pulled the words right out to express the feelings that I have re the discussion of, will US attack Iran or won’t it. The verbal jousting and the certitude that goes along with it, is as if Svengali looked people in the eyes and mesmerized the concept of war into their psyche. They claim that this site’s raison d’être is to discuss war, otherwise, why bother?
That said, I don’t quite agree that any scale can be tipped in any direction however you put your mind to it (apply logic to it.) That is just nature, human or otherwise. Some unknowns will stay unknown until they become known. I think you already knew that!
In closing I leave you with a quote: “Death is a physicality. War is a state of mind” (Horsemen)
Also, this, for Empty: “Wired declared the web is dead.” I promise, I read on it on the web. :)
Mr. Canning: Re Hillary Clinton, indeed. There’s no doubt she’s as right wing on Israel vs Iran as the neocons.
Masoud,
Thanks for your response.
I don’t think Article III of the NPT, or any other NPT article, has anything to do with this.
The analysis starts with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. It would end there as well (and in no event would it involve the various other international agreements cited and discussed in the article you cited earlier, none of which has anything to do with our question), but for the point you raised in your first post: the Safeguards Agreement doesn’t state expressly how the required “Government of Iran” approval is to be given for amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements.
I think we agree on these three points:
1. Amendments to the Safeguards Agreement itself, as distinguished here from amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements, must be approved by the “Government of Iran” in exactly the same manner as the Safeguards Agreement itself was required to be approved by the “Government of Iran.” In essence, this means approval by Iran’s national legislature, the Majlis. See Article 24(c) of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
2. Revised Code 3.1 was never approved by Iran’s Majlis (or any other high government official), and the IAEA knew this. Therefore, if revised Code 3.1 were an amendment to the Safeguards Agreement itself, rather than an amendment to the Subsidiary Arrangements, there would be no question that it was never validly approved.
3. The Safeguards Agreement makes clear that Subsidiary Arrangements may be amended without amending the Safeguards Agreement itself. Such amendments also require “Government of Iran” approval, however, just as amendments to the Safeguards Agreement itself require “Government of Iran” approval. The Safeguards Agreement does not specify how “Government of Iran” approval is to be given for amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements.
Because the Safeguards Agreement expressly requires “Government of Iran” approval to amend Subsidiary Arrangements, just as it expressly requires “Government of Iran” approval to amend the Safeguards Agreement itself, I argued earlier (and again here) that it is reasonable, though not inevitable, to conclude that the required “Government of Iran” approval for amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements must be given in the same manner as “Government of Iran” approval must be given for amendments to the Safeguards Agreement itself. After all, exactly the same phrase is used in both places, and nothing in the Safeguards Agreement suggests that the phrase means something different in the two places where it is used.
Nevertheless, several writers have explained that a “custom” has developed under which Subsidiary Arrangements are adopted and amended informally through an exchange of letters between a country’s IAEA representative and an IAEA official. I have seen no citation of authority regarding this “custom,” nor even an IAEA document in which the custom is explained. Even so, it makes good sense to me that a country’s national legislature should not be bothered with Subsidiary Arrangements under a Safeguards Agreement. For this reason, I’m willing to accept that this is how Subsidiary Arrangements are adopted and amended in practice – specifically here, that this is how Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements were originally adopted, and how Code 3.1 was changed in 2003 (pursuant to the February 26, 2003 letter from Iran’s IAEA representative to the IAEA, which letter remains non-public, as far as I know).
What I find very much harder to accept, however, is that some mid-level Iranian government functionary (Iran’s IAEA representative) had – or was understood to have – implicit authority to bind his government irrevocably to a Subsidiary Arrangement (he certainly has no explicit authority, at least to my knowledge). Absent some reason to believe otherwise, it seems to me that the second of the following two “paraphrased” interpretations of the February 26, 2003 letter from Iran’s IAEA representative to the IAEA is the more reasonable one:
INTERPRETATION ONE (LESS REASONABLE):
“I am writing to inform you that Iran hereafter will observe the revised version of Code 3.1, which calls for earlier disclosure of certain nuclear facilities. As you know, I have not received or sought approval of this decision from Iran’s Majlis, President or Supreme Leader, and I have no authority to bind Iran’s Majlis, President or Supreme Leader. You nevertheless should consider this decision to be irrevocably binding on the Government of Iran, not subject to revocation by Iran’s Majlis, President, Supreme Leader or any other Iranian official, unless the IAEA consents to such revocation.”
INTERPRETATION TWO (MORE REASONABLE):
“I am writing to inform you that Iran hereafter will observe the revised version of Code 3.1, which calls for earlier disclosure of certain nuclear facilities. As you know, for reasons of administrative convenience, I have not received or sought approval of this decision from Iran’s Majlis, President, Supreme Leader, or any other official of the Iranian government, and I have no authority to bind Iran’s Majlis or any other Iranian government official. Accordingly, you should consider this decision to be subject to revocation by Iran’s Majlis, President or Supreme Leader. Unless and until you are given written notice of such a revocation, however, you should understand that Iran will consider itself bound to observe the revised version of Code 3.1.”
I find it very difficult to believe that either Iran’s IAEA representative or the IAEA official to whom the February 26, 2003 letter was delivered believed that the letter-writer was even claiming authority to bind his government irrevocably, much less that he actually possessed such authority. The letter-exchange custom strikes me as nothing more than an administrative convenience aimed at avoiding the need to seek high-level government approval for operating-level changes. Accordingly, I strongly suspect both sides understood that Iran’s representative was committing Iran to new Code 3.1 unless and until his decision was reversed at a higher level of Iran’s government. That is exactly what happened in March 2007, and the reversal was promptly reported to the IAEA.
The February 26, 2003 letter may shed a different light on this question, of course. Assuming here that it does not, however, I find the IAEA’s preferred interpretation (the first one above) to be shaky, and Iran’s preferred interpretation to be considerably more reasonable.
Rd: “Your over emphasis on the military advanced technology is very telling.”
I disagree that I am over emphasizing the US technological advantage. I am merely saying that 1) that Iran cannot match US military capability, and 2) that even if Iran can defeat the US ultimately on the ground on its own soil – and it can using Fourth Gen War methods – this does not preclude the fact that the US can wreak major damage to Iran’s infrastructure in the same manner as it did in Iraq.
While the US cannot completely prevent using conventional weapons a reasonably modern military the size of Iran’s from surviving a US attack and being able to continue operations against the US in the region, this does not translate in any way to Iran’s being able to interdict the US sufficiently to deter the US from attacking Iran.
Nor does it preclude the US having the ability to devastate Iran were Iran to produce and deploy nuclear weapons before or during any war – which is one of the points under discussion. If the US has to nuke Tehran and the top 50 Iranian cities to prevent Iran from deploying or using nuclear weapons, it can and will do so. Israel can and would do the same albeit with likely fewer city targets based on its much smaller arsenal.
People who ignore or deprecate these facts are not doing Iran any favors. People need to review the level of devastation that a US nuclear attack could do to Iran and understand that few societies are in a position to recover and conduct military operations under such an attack.
A strictly conventional attack by the US is a simpler matter, but still capable of being quite devastating if properly targeted. A sustained, consistent aerial and cruise missile bombardment of Iran by the US for a period of months simply will destroy much of Iran’s infrastructure: power, water, transportation, communications, you name it, it will be targeted and destroyed or degraded beyond usability. It would be EXTREMELY difficult for Iran to conduct an effective nuclear development and deployment program under such conditions. It probably would extend the deployment time by years. And the more likely the US thought it was continuing, the worse the attacks would become, eventually shifting to nuclear if necessary.
And for what, as some advocates say here: to “try” to produce a few nukes which then couldn’t be delivered because virtually every possible launch site in the country has been bombed or nuked, and any mobile launcher destroyed months or years before?
It’s a ridiculous concept. It’s a fantasy. It’s wish fulfillment.
Iran does not and never will have the capability to defeat the US military in a conventional or nuclear conflict. The ONLY way Iran can defeat the US military is via Fourth Gen War methods on its own soil.
And enough that is, too, for Iran’s purposes. But never doubt that Iran will pay a massive price for the victory.
fyi,
I agree the Iranian people are not afraid of the US, so that they stop producing LEU, and even going to 20% to refuel the TRR (if IAEA continues to fail to deliver). But I see no indication the government of Iran intends to follow your advice and build nukes while campaigning against nukes.
Iranophobia vs Tunisian Protests
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/11/iranophobia-vs-tunisian-protests/
fyi,
Yes, a megalomaniacal dictator, Saddam Hussein, attacked Iran, and yes he was encouraged to do so by Persian Gulf countries concerned about the radical regime that was newly in power in Tehran. Nothing of the sort obtains today.
China and Russia do not want a war in the Persian Gulf.
Eric,
To sum up, there are two basic 3.1 strategies Iran can take:
1. The original adoption of modified 3.1 was in some sense invalid or incomplete due to a lack of ratification, and this basic invalidity justifies the reversion to the original 3.1.
2. That subsidiary arrangements are inherently weak instruments, and no special justification is required for reversion to the original 3.1.
You prefer door number one, and i prefer door number two.
Masoud
FYI
“You are incorrect in your assessment of the Iranians’ methods – some were soft and some were hard.”
My exact sentence did emphasis “majority of”, but what proven example can you name of a hard tactic used by Iran against the western objectives in the region, besides the war with Iraq.
Kooshy: “A soft regional war against western hegemony is what Iran has been fighting, for majority of this 3o some years…….”
“The Iranians’ successes – such as they are – are mostly due to the failures of other international actors in that region of the world (in my opinion): failure to deal with the Ba’ath and Zionist states multiple aggressions, failure to resolve the religious war in Palestine, failure to end the war in Afghanistan and many other such things by other actors.”
But isn’t it the message of Iranian revolution which the west for over thirty years has been struggling to contain (an anti hegemonic revolution based on a common regional believe that resonates in the streets) that is causing the hard and soft setbacks for the west, I also recommend reading an earlier post by Unknown Unknown, he summed it up pretty well.
Eric,
I’m just spit-balling here, so give me some latitude, but why would it be impossible for Iran and the IAEA to agree to come to understandings regarding some logistical details, and furthermore to put these understandings in writing but stop short of agreeing that these understandings should constitute legal obligations? If such an arrangement is not impossible, what in article 39 of Iran’s safeguards agreement would have to change for you to agree that it represents the formalization of such an agreement?
The wording of article 39 strikes me as quite minimalistic when compared to the comparatively muscular Article III of the NPT which is the basis of the safeguards agreements. Article III explicitly indicates that party states ‘undertake to accept’ these agreements, and spells out exactly how these agreements be negotiated and will enter into force, while article 39 basically reads ‘details to be worked out later by mutual agreement, and are not set in stone’. If you want to be pedantic, article 39 sets out that Iran and the IAEA will negotiate arrangements, but doesn’t set out that Iran and the IAEA are bound to abide by the them, which, again, is a sharp contrast to Article III. I think it’s reasonable to treat these two ‘linking’ articles as different animals entirely. Specifically, it is clear that a violation of the Safeguards Agreement is automatically a violation of of the NPT, and at the same time it is not clear at all that a violation of the Subsidiary Arrangements is automatically a violation of anything else, and since the Subsidiary Arrangements have never been entered into force in and of themselves, I’m not sure violating them is in fact a violation of any treaty. Is violating the Subsidiary Arrangements much more of a severe offense than arranging in writing to meet on Wednesday at three o’clock, and then failing to show?
I take it from your previous post that you do believe that the Subsidiary Arrangements constitute a treaty, and that Joyner’s line of reasoning is flawed, but you don’t highlight what Joyner’s flaws are. Can you expand on this point?
If we do accept that a violation of the Subsidiary Arrangements is important, and that mutual agreement is needed to alter these as specified by Article 39, Article 39 is silent on the right of states to ‘withdraw’ from Subsidiary Arrangements. Am I mistaken in believing that, in general, states can withdraw from agreements that haven’t been ratified through an exchange of letters? What, exactly is the law regarding withdrawal from these types of agreements?
==================================================================================== SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 39
The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall
specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.
===================================================================================
============================================================================
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
==================================================================================
“On the one hand, the IAEA argues (as you now do) that the SA’s prescribed method of amending the SA itself does not apply to amendments of Subsidiary Arrangements. On the other hand, once the IAEA reaches its conclusion that Code 3.1 (part of Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements) was validly amended in some manner other than as prescribed in the SA for amendments to the SA itself (i.e. through an informal exchange of letters), the IAEA looks more warmly on the SA’s amendment provisions, insisting that those stringent requirements apply to any effort by Iran to “re-amend” Code 3.1.
Is this a fair observation to make?”
The abbreviation ‘SA’ is unfortunate. I think the IAEA’s position is different from what you seem to be asserting it to be. I think the IAEA isn’t looking for Iran to make use of the Safeguard Agreement’s “amendment provisions” i.e. Article 24 of Iran’s Safeguard Agreement in order to amend the Subsidiary Arrangements. Rather, it is insisting on the Article 39 provision that Subsidiary Arrangements are to be changed by mutual agreement.(naturally it is withholding from providing such an agreement)
Masoud
kooshy says: January 10, 2011 at 3:21 pm
I assume no state will “protect” Iran.
I assume certain states, such as China or Russia, will endeavor to prevent an Iranian defeat in case of US-Iran War or to at least prolong that war as much as they can.
You are incorrect in your assessment of the Iranians’ methods – some were soft and some were hard.
The Iranians’ successes – such as they are – are mostly due to the failures of other international actors in that region of the world (in my opinion): failure to deal with the Ba’ath and Zionist states multiple aggressions, failure to resolve the religious war in Palestine, failure to end the war in Afghanistan and many other such things by other actors.
In regards to local states carrying out the US load; that has been a common pattern of behavior for other great powers historically. That is, great powers get other states to do their dastardly tasks for them; such as When Brazil and Argentina went to war against Paraguay and massacred half the population of that country in the 19-th Century; on behalf of England.
But I think any such foreign state must carefully consider the fate of such US friends and allies as Diem, Lon Nol, Marcos, Noriega, Torijos (sic.), Zia, Saddam Hussein, Shah of Iran and others.
But you are right; among those Iranians who think about these subjects there is a definite concern that there the possibility exist of a nucler attack by some foolish neighbor against Iran.
Given the empirical observations that states mostly go to war with their neighbors, that Great Powers often use other states to carry their load for them (so to speak, just look at the Ba’athist Iraq attacking Iran) one must accept that the concerns of Iranians are rooted in historical experience.
FYI
“But my point is, Iran building a nuclear bomb does not justify or make a legal case for war against her; by US or anyone else.’
Let’s assume Iran legally leaves NPT, and like NK without any further NPT restraints start making a nuclear Bomb, would you also assume, that Iran will be protected by China like nuclear NK , or would china agree to tougher measures by UNSC like authorizing military actions on Iran, in that case would once again US to protect her colonial states of PG unlash some Arab or Turk like Saddam to contained Iran, this time with perhaps with a nuclear weapon, would you also assume that in that case, can Iran get any support anywhere even with smaller countries of NAM, and still enjoy the non Shieh Arab street support. Iran for her independence sake must absolutely proceed with her nuclear work completely whiten her current NPT obligations which legally has provided her with a nuclear capability, as we all know Iran’s strategic situation is totally different than that of all 4 non NPT but nuclear states. In a region that is of most importance to the west, Iran has been walking a very thin fine line to maintain her long waited independence from western colonial states, no need to be strategically ignorant like Reza Shah. At the end of the day an Iranian redneck is no different than an American one, both, eventually can get themselves in quack mires, like Mr. Bush did. Iran and Iranians should not get carried away and adopt irrational policies. A soft regional war against western hegemony is what Iran has been fighting, for majority of this 3o some years, which Iran as evident shows Iran without being intimidated and becoming irrational, has done quite well in this soft cold war, and is proved that she currently holds the upper hand, one should stick with the one that she knows best, and is good at.
@UU
January 10, 2011 at 7:32 am
Dear Unknown Unknowns , where to begin and where to end , difficult to express what I felt , when I read your comment besides the fact that it took me at least 1 hour to understand your comment in its full beauty and value , expression power and spritual power ( whatever yo call it ) using the google English to German translator , as I did not want to miss a single point.( meaningwise )
Still I am struggling with the words to come up with a appropriate answer and I think I will leave it until I have gathered my thoughts.
I always wanted to formulate a statement towards RSH comments( which are excellent in its contents , to the point , grandios etc ) , but never found the right words , but you solved the ‘riddle’ for me , or what I wanted to express.
Of course the RSH issue is just a tiny side aspect , but I needed to let you know . I am asking myself why your comments touch me in such a way and I have not the slightest problem to admit it , on the contrary . I think I know the answer , but I am not capable to put it in words , it has deeply to do with the human essence and the ‘ FETRATE ELAHI ‘ , which is an unvisible bond between all human beings, ( and I still not have the adequate translation neither in German nor English language ) ,as if this ‘word’ simply does not exist at all in these cultures ( correct me if I wrong ) in the true essence of its meaning.
I thank you from the bottom of heart , words cannot accompany my feelings.
Mossad chief’s statement removes Iranian nuclear threat (Will the ‘Atlantic’ report it here?)
http://mondoweiss.net/
Masoud,
Thanks for the citation to the article written by Dan Joyner. I have considerable respect for Dan, but I disagree with this article. I think it’s very far off the mark, as I’ve separately pointed out to Dan – who, surprisingly, disagrees with me about that.
I think you spot the weakest part in my “Iran” argument on Code 3.1, though I think it’s nonetheless stronger than you conclude:
“I think your weakest point in your presentation of “Iran’s Argument” regarding Code 3.1 would be
“(5) nothing in the Agreement provides that “Government of Iran” approval may be given for amendments of a Subsidiary Arrangement in a different way from how “Government of Iran” approval must be given for amendments of the Agreement;” Why would such an assumption be made in the first place?”
I agree that it’s not entirely sound to conclude that, because “Government of Iran” approval for amendments to the Safeguards Agreement itself must be given in the manner specified in the SA that “Government of Iran” approval for amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements must be given in the same way. I believe I acknowledge that in the course of making my argument. But acknowledging that “stretch” does not lead one to the opposite conclusion: that amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements are valid if approved merely by a country’s representative to the IAEA. The fact remains that there is no “positive” basis for reaching such a conclusion. As I present as strongly as I can in the “IAEA argument,” there appears to be a custom of adopting and amending Subsidiary Arrangements informally, such as through an exchange of letters between a country’s IAEA representative and an IAEA official. But it strikes me as an open question whether that custom is adequate to preclude a country from changing its mind.
Bear in mind an important inconsistency in the IAEA’s argument on this point, which I graciously ignored in my Footnote 33 presentation of the competing arguments on Code 3.1:
On the one hand, the IAEA argues (as you now do) that the SA’s prescribed method of amending the SA itself does not apply to amendments of Subsidiary Arrangements. On the other hand, once the IAEA reaches its conclusion that Code 3.1 (part of Iran’s Subsidiary Arrangements) was validly amended in some manner other than as prescribed in the SA for amendments to the SA itself (i.e. through an informal exchange of letters), the IAEA looks more warmly on the SA’s amendment provisions, insisting that those stringent requirements apply to any effort by Iran to “re-amend” Code 3.1.
Is this a fair observation to make?
fyi – I hate to agree with you on this point. Washington forced King Reza Shah to sign NPT while kept the zionist-regime out of it so that the Zionist thiefs can steal bomb-grade nuclear material from US to produce country’s nuclear arsenal.
I am sure, if the dogs did not stop barking – Tehran is planning to get out of NPT and manufacture its own nuclear bomb.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/10/us-award-for-stealing-bomb-grade-uranium-for-israel/
James Canning says: January 10, 2011 at 1:52 pm
We will have to agree to disagree.
It was a mistake for Iran to sign NPT – another stupid decision in a chain of such decisions by an incompetent strategist; the Shah of Iran.
But my point is, Iran building a nuclear bomb does not justify or make a legal case for war against her; by US or anyone else.
The Iranian nuclear case has been, in my opinion, needlessly militarized by the US-EU Axis; I suppose to frighten the Iranians.
Which failed.
fyi,
Iran is a signatory to the NPT and Iran is leading the effort to get nukes out of the Middle East. Your recommended programme would guarantee an Israeli or US attack on Iran. I see it as lunacy. Iran should keep the moral high ground, and continue to oppose nuclear weapons and other WMD.
Richard,
Thanks for citing your January 7, 2:47 PM post as the basis for your claim to “know” that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons.
As I’ve mentioned several times, I “believe” the very same thing.
For me, though, the gap between “believe” and “know” is important. If I were running the US government and believed what you and I believe, I would keep this gap in mind as I formulated my policy toward Iran. And if I were running the Iranian government, I’d understand why the US government – and people in general – consider it important to narrow this gap. I’d probably conclude it was in my best interests to help them do so – keeping clearly in mind, as I did so, my nation’s dignity and the need to protect its military and other secrets.
Similar thinking led to Ronald Reagan’s technically oxymoronic but nonetheless sensible statement about the Russian nuclear program: “Trust but verify.” And the Russian government apparently concluded it was in Russia’s best interests to help the US carry out that verification. The US certainly never got to “know,” but it did get closer than it had been, close enough that the two countries were able to strike a deal that each side considered to be beneficial – because the US tried to narrow this gap, the Russians understood that desire and cooperated, and the US concluded that the gap had been narrowed to its satisfaction. Undoubtedly some Russians were offended that the US government did not simply take their word for everything, but they overcame this apparent slap at their dignity. The people who live in both countries probably ended up better off as a result.
**************
It’s hard not to notice that you backpedaled from “know” later in your 2:47 post, as illustrated by a comparison of your first and second passages quoted below.
FIRST YOU WROTE:
“We KNOW that the IAEA has been utterly unable to find any evidence whatsoever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program despite two years or more of observing the [Additional Protocol]. We KNOW that ALL the evidence presented publicly about Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program up to 2003 is almost entirely based on the “laptop of death” whose provenance is almost certainly bogus. We KNOW that Iran would derive little to no value from trying to develop and deploy nuclear weapons given the massive head start Israel and the US have. We KNOW that Iran has clearly and explicitly denied having any interest in doing so, even to the extent of official statements from the Supreme Leader.” (Emphasis in original.)
COMMENT: Though your second sentence is a bit shaky, you have listed several of the bases for my “belief” in the same conclusion. Our only difference is that you reach your conclusion with much greater assurance – your “know” versus my “believe.”
Later, though, you back away from “know,” as the next passage indicates.
BUT THEN YOU WROTE:
“Second, I am NOT presenting these statements as “indisputable fact”. I am presenting these statements as an assertion supported by evidence. If someone wishes to dispute those assertions, they can present their evidence.” (Emphasis in original.)
COMMENT: Evidence is important – no disagreement between us on that – and I also agree that no persuasive evidence of Iranian nuclear weapons development has been made public (or I’ve missed it, if it has). Nevertheless, some matters simply can’t be proved or disproved – especially those elusive “negatives,” as you and I and others point out in many posts. The fact that nobody can produce contrary evidence is a very important data point but, as some people occasionally write on this website, “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” (I’d never use that line myself, but I lower my standards when I’m just quoting someone else.) If the opposite of that statement instead were true, a country could claim to “know” anything it chooses, instruct its intelligence-gathering agencies to steer clear lest they uncover conflicting information, dismiss contrary data as “bogus,” opine that the other country would gain nothing by misleading others, and point out that the other country’s leader has given speeches in which he confirms what the first country claims to “know.”
This criticism ignores the possibility, of course, that a country’s intelligence-gathering efforts could be so extensive that the country was justified to conclude it had overlooked nothing. I’m skeptical that a country can succeed to that extent, but you apparently believe that the US has accomplished this and should base its policy toward Iran on that assumption. Many observers felt the same about the Russian nuclear program before Russia’s first atmospheric test in 1949. Others felt that way about Iraq before the first Gulf War. And this time around, some share your certainty about Iran.
Despite the US’ mistaken assessments in the past, I believe you’re correct this time. But “believe” is as far as I can go – I stop well short of “know.” I think the US government should use my “believe,” and not your “know,” as its operative assumption. That would still be a very large step in the direction of a sensible policy toward Iran – just not the leap of faith you think should be made.
*****************
You are not alone on this website in basing conclusions on “certain” assumptions that are in fact less than “certain.” I sometimes describe this sort of reasoning as “assuming one’s conclusions.”
For example, if, as here, the question is whether Iran should disclose more about its nuclear program to reduce people’s worries that Iran might be developing a nuclear weapon, and someone insists that we “know” Iran is not doing developing a nuclear weapon, what sensible conclusion can one possibly reach? Why impose additional disclosure obligations on Iran when we already know the answer to the question those disclosures are intended to help answer? But if we instead don’t “know” for sure what Iran is doing, and so would like some objective support for our belief that Iran is doing nothing wrong, it might make better sense for us to ask Iran for such objective assurances, and for Iran willingly to provide them.
For another example, if the question is whether Iran should develop a nuclear weapon as a deterrent against a US attack, and someone insists we assume that the US will bomb Iran back to the Stone Age no matter what Iran does or does not do unless, and only unless, Iran first develops a nuclear weapon and lets the US know it’s got one and is ready to use it, what sensible conclusion can one possibly reach? Why not try to develop a nuclear bomb if one has absolutely nothing to lose by trying? But what if we instead don’t “know” that the US will bomb Iran back to the Stone Age no matter what Iran does or does not do – in other words, if we insist on considering real life before we decide how to proceed? What if we cannot shake a nagging suspicion that the US’ attack/no attack decision might be influenced by its discovery that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear weapon? In that event, if we were running the Iranian government, we might recognize that launching a clandestine bomb-development program would entail some risk, and so we might think much longer and harder about whether that risk would be worth taking – or whether, instead, it might make more sense to consider, at least for starters, some other way to achieve the same goal – for example: volunteer more information about our nuclear program, so that more people will believe our assurances that it is entirely peaceful.
*******************************
Finally, you argue that one is justified in ignoring the gap between “believe” and “know” because the other side does that.
YOU WROTE:
“It seems to me that the vast majority of the mainstream media are daily presenting “as indisputable fact” – except for an obligatory one sentence about “Iran denies it has a nuclear weapons program” – that Iran does have such a program. Being wishy-washy about whether there is ANY evidence of this does not help the debate. Reducing the discussion to “well, we don’t really know” merely cedes the field to those who are more assertive.”
COMMENT:
When one side exaggerates or makes baseless claims, many people agree with you that the other side is justified in offsetting this by exaggerating or making baseless claims in the opposite direction. I don’t agree – and I don’t base my disagreement on some holier-than-though moral basis (though it rests on a moral basis too). When I read exaggerated or baseless claims, I become very eager to read what the other side has to say. I’m moved by counter-arguments that point out the absence of evidence for the first side’s exaggerated or baseless claims. I’m not moved at all, however, by exaggerations or baseless statements in the opposite direction, and I tend to discount whatever else that person has to say. I don’t consider someone to be “wishy-washy” merely because he sticks to the facts – quite the opposite, in fact.
Some people indeed may be moved by your recommended “competing exaggerations” approach. For the most part, though, such people will be the great unwashed, uneducated masses who can just as easily be swayed back to the other side. Such people tend to listen to whomever speaks last, and the other side in this debate pretty much controls that sequence – unless you come up with enough money to buy out some major US media organization.
Your contributions to this website are invaluable. I’ve learned a lot from you. But I do think you would be an even more valuable contributor if you’d be more careful to build arguments on assumptions that are firm enough to support those arguments.
Somehow or other, I anticipate that you’ll disagree with a great deal of what I’ve just written. Just a hunch – can’t say I “know” it, but I tend to “believe” it.
R S Hack,
Is it fair to say that the false understanding that currently obtains in the US, that Iran is in fact developing nuclear weapons, owes a great deal to knowingly false or misleading statements by Hillary Clinton on this subject? And is that why she gets so much favorable attention in US news media? Because she is an eager stooge of the Israel lobby?
James Canning says: January 10, 2011 at 1:24 pm
In matters not if Iran is building a nuclear weapon or not; she is a sovereign state and she can do so if her leaders decide that act is in the interest of Iran.
A US attack on Iran, on this pretext, is illegal.
But I wonder, would EU sanction US? Would Russia? Would China? Would our Muslim brothers? Would Iraq?
Iran, alive in the bitter sea.
Kathleen,
Any US attack on Iran would be illegal given that there still is no evidence available that the Iranian goverment wants nuclear weapons. This seems to be the reason no new NIE has been issued.
Phillip Weiss has a good one up about a conclusion made by the Mossad chief that could get in the way of building up the Yes case.
Mossad chief’s statement removes Iranian nuclear threat (Will the ‘Atlantic’ report it here?)
http://mondoweiss.net/2011/01/mossad-chiefs-statement-removes-iranian-nuclear-threat-will-the-atlantic-report-it-here.html#comments
I’ve missed this important story entirely. But last week Meir Dagan, the head of the Israeli Mossad, pooh-poohed the Iranian threat in a briefing with journalists by saying that the Iranians wouldn’t have a bomb for many years. The statement has pulled the rug out from under Netanyahu’s feet– and not just his. It has made Jeffrey Goldberg look even more like a pliant stenographer to Netanyahu (as Roger Cohen labelled him) in his willingness to pipe Netanyahu’s urgency about the alleged threat and urging to the U.S. to take action. Remember, The Atlantic ran Goldberg’s alarmist piece, “The Point of No Return,” last September.
Unknown Unknowns
Thanks for giving me hope, futures are ours, lets pary for it ameen
Richard Steven Hack says:
I repeat: “A nation has to know its limitations.”
It is possible that because of such limitations the ‘military aspect of the’ war plans are still on the table and not in action. The intent is there; however, perhaps some limiting factors are imposing on the decision, at least for the time being. You under estimate soft power and other means of countering force.
During the 2006 Lebanon war the mighty Israeli army and their mighty gdp were unable to reach their objective of the Litani River against a small militia force. That was a humiliating defeat to underscore the israeli military limitation despite the brutality and extent of their military advanced technology.
Just two simple shore to sea missiles fired by Hezbollah nearly sunk a corvette. Though it was sufficient to practically close the naval front. This was accomplished without Hezbollah maintain a large navy, or any air carriers, or submarines, no satellites, no AWACS.
Your over emphasis on the military advanced technology is very telling. Same as the military planners. This is the façade of the MIC to justify their never ending greed. Vietnam was a very telling story. Iraq and afghan experience have provided further truth. Military might is only one aspect of any given conflict/war.
Richard Steven Hack says:
“CIA Delayed Breakup of Khan Network for Decades, Journalists Assert There would have been no Pakistani nukes and Iran’s nuclear program might have been set back if the CIA had acted decades ago, these journalists claim.”
70-75 the soviet were around and India was in their camp. If that was the case, Perhaps, just perhaps the decision was by design. Which goes to show, there is a lesson to be learned here. I am sure empty would have one of his enlightened stories to cover this particular lesson. The US FP often makes decisions that in the longer term finds she just shot herself in the foot!
In the case of the foot, there is often a delay for the pain receptors in the brain to register the offending action.
fyi says: “This Iranian move helps increase Pakistan’s leverage; which is not a bad thing.”
Seems more and more, US is trying to catch up with events in the ME / afpak region. Perhaps indicative of a small case of ADD in US FP designs.
US bends to Pakistan’s wish
“The report estimated a “significant shift in [US] administration thinking” and Obama’s inclination to join the peace process and recognize that Pakistan has an important role, “if not a dominant role”, in reconciliation talks with the Taliban.”
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MA11Df01.html
“Hindutva Terrorism and Israeli Connection’
India’s independent political and crime-reporting magazine Tehelka in its January 2011 issue has reported the 42-page confession by one of Hindutva zealot member Swami Aseemanand. On December 18, 2010, Swami Aseemanand, told magistrate Deepak Dabas of the Tis Hazari court – that not Muslims but a range of Hindu facists (RSS) thugs were involved in a series of heinous terrorist blasts ranging from Malegaon (2006) to the Mecca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif, Samjhauta Express blasts and Mumbai terrorist attack carried out with the help of Israeli Mossad.
In his confession Swami Aseemanad named senior Rashtryia Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) leader Indresh Kumar, the murdered RSS pracharak Sunil Joshi, Sadhvi Pragya Thakur and senior RSS pracharaks Sandeep Dange and Ramji Kalsangra, Swami Aseemanad himself, among others, as being key conspirators in the terror blasts. According to him, Indresh Kumar financed several of the blasts, while Sunil Joshi and his team executed many of them.
Assemanad stated that RSS leaders picked-up those targets for Hindu terrorism because; 80 percent of Malegaon are Muslims, to scare the great numbers of Hindus who visit Ajmer Sharif (Zionist thugs applied similar terrorist tactics against the Jews in Iraq), the attack on Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) was a revenge for the last Muslim ruler of that princely for refusing to join Hindu-majority India and Samjhauta Express was chosen because it was mostly used by Pakistanis.
But then, there is a great difference between terrorism against Muslims and the so-called ‘the Chosen People’. Last month, the Zionist entity’s Embassy in India had slammed leader of the ruling Congress Party, Digvijay Singh’s comparison of RRS with the Nazis. “The RSS, in the garb of nationalist ideology, is targetting Muslims the same way Nazis targeted Jews in the 1930s,” said Singh (The Times of India, December 21, 2010). I have to agree with the Israeli spokesperson – One cannot compare Nazis with the RSS, because Nazis had 150,000 Jews among them, but the later has only some Israeli advisers. Hitler was also a popular foreign leader among Brahmin communities for his belief in the superiority of Aryan over the rest of mankind (like the Jewish philosophy of ‘chosenness’). The RSS ideologist, Guru M.S. Golwalkar, in his now-famous work Our Nationhood, wrote of his admiration for Adolf Hitler and suggested that the “race purification” carried out by Hitler was a perfect example to be followed by Hindu nationalists in dealing with India’s claimed 150 million Muslims as well as its Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and other minorities, all of whom should be denied even basic citizens’ rights.
The convicted terrorist, Indian Army officer, Lt. Col. Purohit, who had visited Israel, had admitted receiving arms and money from Israel to kill Muslims and carry false-flag operations, blaming on Muslims. Several RSS leaders, during BJP rule had visited Israel. Various Hindutva groups had welcomed and celebrated Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ visit to India on May 17, 1993, and the closer ties with Israel which ensued. Among leading Indian media reporting attempts by BJP-RSS-VHP leaders to get closer both to Israel and to the Zionist lobby in Washington is The Times of India.
The history of love-affair between the RSS and Zionist entity goes back to RSS’ founder, Vinyak Damodar Savarkar (died 1966). While Mahtama Gandhi and Pandit Nehru were against the partition of Palestine – Vinyak Damodar Savarkar had supported the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine to terrorize Muslim-majority Middle East for generation to come.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/10/hindutva-terrorism-and-israeli-connection/
If for nothing else, the posts on this site are worth reading for some of the humor.
Correction: The material that I observed were in mid 2005. The training may have begun sooner.
Pak, re your broken nail:
1. Was the nail broken due to your deliberate, careless, or neglectful act?
2. Were you taking all the care possible under the circumstances to prevent harm to the nail?
3. Did you fail to maintain your nail properly because the necessary nailcare supplies were forbidden to be sold to you?
3a. If so, by whom? Was the sanction on selling nailcare supplies legitimate? Were they within the rights of the sanctioning party? consistent with practice related to other persons seeking nailcare supplies?
4. Did the broken nail cause a loss of economic benefit, property, physical wellbeing, or life?
5. In a system claiming conduct of affairs according to the rule of law, if the answer to any question in #4, above, is Yes, and if the cause of that harm can be ascribed to the deliberate actions of another, then you may have the right to make a claim for redress of the harm against the person causing the harm.
Unknown Unknowns says, “under the leadership of the IRI, will not continue ‘absent some catastrophic catalyzing event’”.
1) That “catastrophic event” already happened in 2003. Carefully explore the evidence and read the statements that are coming out of key documents outlining the U.S. strategies for the next 100 years.
2) To argue that there “will be” a war with Iran, falsely assumes that currently there is no war between Iran and the U.S. Again, carefully explore the evidence and read the statements coming out of “statesmen” to see the facades of this war and the designs of ANY future wars.
3) Humpty Dumpty already “had a fall” and wasn’t pushed as it brought it onto itself. Only that, “it will make a sound tomorrow.” فردا صداش در میاد.
4) The new training manuals for army recruits in the U.S. since mid-2005 onward is training the soldiers for urban guerrilla warfare within specific Western city and town designs and not designs of mountains, valleys, jungles, and deserts of Iran. Again, explore the evidence.
5) Psychological training for the new recruits puts enormous emphasis on training of the soldiers to make “tough choices” when the “enemy” has a “familiar face”. Again, explore the evidence and you’ll see.
Not to belabor the point, Humpty Dumpty already fell and فردا صداش در میاد.
The “Pu” in my 7:33 post comes from a typo I forgot to remove.
Unknown Unknowns: I agree with you that “the US” isn’t going to win anything from this war. The ruling elites, however, will for as long as it lasts.
I also notice that despite my being “too certain” – you end up agreeing with me that there will be a war.
So how wrong am I?
I would also remind you that I believe I mentioned once or twice first, that I always reserve a couple percent skepticism about any proposition, and second, as you acknowledge, that said war might be delayed indefinitely by some other war.
So how certain am I?
The word “certain” should probably be banned from the English language – or any other language that uses an equivalent. But in any event, none of MY “certainty” is based on faith, but on a similar sort of confluence of historical forces you mention. That and the simple observation of events over the last ten years would be sufficient to predict – “with high confidence”, if one doesn’t like the word “certain” – an Iran war.
Eric: “If one assumes – incorrectly or not – that a country is working on a bomb, will it really be all that comforting to learn that the country won’t be finished until 2015 rather than, say, 2013?”
Pu
Would Hillary prefer that they did it “yesterday” – as per the famous Chico Marx line in “Night at the Opera”: “You pay us enough, we coulda leave yesterday!”
Two more years gives you two more years to work out a solution. As usual, Clinton is being deliberately obtuse – or perhaps just obtuse.
Not to mention deliberately lying since she knows – or should if she’s in the loop of White House intelligence – that Iran does not have a weapons program (presumed or otherwise). The State Department Intelligence department alone should have informed her of this fact. In fact, I think it’s clear they probably did, but she doesn’t give a damn any more than Obama or any of these other corrupt scumbags do.
Putin doesn’t seem to have any problem with understanding that. He’s explicitly said Russia has no evidence whatever that Iran is working on nuclear weapons.
No, Clinton is just doing what the US always does – equating the Iranian enrichment program with a weapons program. No “Japan Option” crap – just straight weapons program. It’s a deliberate lie.
Richard says: “Again, all this has been discussed before. It would be nice if someone would come up with something new instead of re-iterating the same old thing.”
Reminds me of a line from Zappa (the lead-in to Babby Brown on teh Sheikh Yerbouti album: “That shit’s been goin’ on two tours old now. We gotta come up with some new shit!”
I’ll give it a shot, knowing that Richard will not approve of my teleological bent.
First let me see if I can recap the situation here.
In one corner, which Richard has carved out for himself, is the position that war is pretty much inevitable, save some other distraction such as AfPak or the Koreas, or some other known unknown, which will delay the military-industrial Beast’s gorge-fest on Iran, for which he has been salivating for some time now. “Nothing can stop it”, etc. This position is arrived at through reason, given the realities on the ground: economic, political, ideological, technological, etc., all of which make of the Islamic Republic a morsel so tasty as to be irresistible to the Beast, who cares not a wit about the mores of ordinary mortals, not being one himself.
In the other corner, we have various objections to this ultra-cynical and ultra-confident prognosis, again based on reason, but with different analytical emphasis. For example, time is spent discussing the efficacies of elements such as the AP, and whether the pain the Noor ASM, say, will inflict is sufficient enough a deterrent or not; or, as another example, the length of time it takes to “go ballistic” (read nuclear), or the number of nuclear warheads required to act as a sufficient deterrent, and so on.
First, I would like to state that irrespective of its merits or demerits, Richard’s position is simply too positive (obviously in the non-normative sense): one should not be so adamant about such things, as world affairs cannot be predicted with certainty or even near certainty, especially in the Middle East.
On the other hand and secondly, I would like to state that I bellieve the scales tip in Richard’s favor as to the *probability* (rather than inevitability) of the conflict – but my belief must be qualified in that I do not arrive at it using Richard’s logic, which I believe to be false. In other words, I agree with Lysander that the article by the military historian that he pasted *is* indeed convincing *as far as it goes*. Richard is fundamentally mistaken in thinking that *if reason were to prevail* (and this is the important distinction, the crux of the biscuit) – and he assumes that it will – there is insufficient deterrence to prevent the war. In other words, the elite pulling the Beast’s strings don’t give a damn about a spike in oil prices or, say, 20,000 dead US soldiers, and that they do care about the whole show crawling to a standstill, but that is not going to happen due to technological mastery, etc. To repeat, Lysander is correct in agreeing that supertankers will be easy prey, the rapid result of which will be that their insurance rates will make it prohibitive for them to travel in the Persian Gulf. (And besides that, the various classes of MRBM (medium range ballistic missiles)with multiple warheads, which Iran manufactures indigenously and has in sufficient quantities, will rain down on the deep water ports of KSA, UAE & Kuwait, so as to render them useless for loading supertankers, and the repair of which will take a minimum of six months under ideal conditions, which they will not have. So yes, Lysander is correct that the war is not going to be “EXACTLY LIKE IRAQ” and “EXACTLY LIKE AFGHANISTAN”; it will be a qualitatively different animal altogether. Those same SRBM’s and MRBM’s with multiple warheads will wreck similar havoc (and render useless if not actually sink) an aircraft carrier or two (see The Arkenstone blog), unless the speedboats, mini-subs, suicides and drones don’t get them first (recall the video on YouTube shot by an Iranian drone that successfully hovered over a US aircraft cazrrier for five minutes – or was it 15? – before it was even detected!)
So why is it that if I agree with Lysander, I do not come to the same conclusion as he does, and agree with Richard’s conclusion (albeit in a more tentative tone, and arrived at from a different route)? A-ha! Well, I never thought you’d ask! But now that you have, it is because while the Known Unknowns are taken into account, the Unknown Unknowns are, as usual, forgotten about or conveniently ignored – the latter in the case of Richard, I believe, nesting his faith in atheism as he does.
The Beast may think that he has all his bases covered, but that is only because he is led to believe this by He who is writing the Script and Directing the Show. In the Beginning, there was teh Pen and teh Tablet. The broad outline of this Script as it pertains to our discussions here is that the chapter of teh bi-polar/ NAM world has closed and the chapter of the multi-polar world has just begun to unfold (with a brief unipolar interregnum – so much for PNAC), and in this new chapter, the tectonic forces at play other than the massive Chinese fault and the less dynamic Russian re-emmergance, India, and the Neo-Bolivarian zone, is patently the Islamic one, whose first adumbration manifested in the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In a sense, then, the 20th century was indeed a short one, starting with the War of 1914 and ending not with 9/11/2001, nor yet with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but with the Revolution of February 1979. To a teleological mind such as mine, the outlines are unmistakable: teh confluence of forces
(
The unexpected (to the uninitiated) Revolution of 1979 itself
The unexpected survival of the IRI through the Imposed War
The unexpected removal of Saddam
The triumph of the Iraqi Islamic coalition
The unexpected removal of the Taliban
The unexpected defeat of Israel in Lebanon
The unexpected survival of the Green putsch
The timing of Turkey’s inevitable re”orient”ation eastward
Etc.
),
if you read the Script carefully, the confluence of forces means that the rise of the Islamic Pole, under the leadership of the IRI, will not continue “absent some catastrophic catalyzing event” (if I’m quoting Rummy and Co. correctly), and that Event will be this war that looks to me to be scripted. And it may indeed start under false pretenses, like all the other false flags that have preceded the US’s entry into all of its major wars of teh last 100 years or so
(
Sinking of the USS Main: Spanish-American War
Sinking of the USS Lusitania: US entry into the War of 1914-1918
The Pearl Harbor LIHOP [let it happen on purpose]: US entry into the War of 1945
Gulf of Tonkin Incident: Vietnam Full-Throttle
Theft of Baby Incubators scam: Persian Gulf War One
9/11 [LIHOP or MIHOP]: Persian Gulf War Two
),
but it will be false not in the sense the US warmongers expect to benefit from, but in the sense that their expectations were false and their hopes dashed, just as the lie was given to their plans by the forces of Reality on the ground, be they in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Lebanon. And consequently, this war, if and when it comes, contrary to hopes and dreams of the bloodthirsty warmongers, will not be the consolidation of their hegemony in the Middle East, but the last nail in the PNAC full-spectrum-dominance, in-your-face-from-outer-space coffin. And good riddance.
They plan [their plans], and We plan [ours];
Verily, We are the Best of Planners
Ameen.
Post-Script: When the consolidation of Islamic power in the Middle East is effected
(i.e., when native Islamic values determine the fates of teh peoples of the middle east, thanks to the crimes and misdemeanors of the neocon-evalgelist-zionist triumvirate, there will be people like Richard who will say that Humpty Dumpty had a great fall, whereas the more teleologically inclined will know that
Humpty Dumpty Was Pushed!
The difference is in a materialist. random geology versus a purposive teleological anthropology.
Eric: Look at my January 7th, 2:47 PM post in this thread.
Eric,
I think your weakest point in your presentation of “Iran’s Argument” regarding Code 3.1 would be
“(5) nothing in the Agreement provides that “Government of Iran” approval may be given for amendments of a Subsidiary Arrangement in a different way from how “Government of Iran” approval must be given for amendments of the Agreement;”
Why would such an assumption be made in the first place?
Isn’t it more reasonable to read article 39(why is article 39 always the troublesome one?) as allowing Iran and the IAEA to make technical arrangements outside the formal constraints of a treaty? If it is not specified how the Subsidiary Arrangements were to be put into force, maybe they weren’t meant to be put into force at all.
http://jurist.org/forumy/2010/03/qom-enrichment-facility-was-iran.php
Pak and Eric,
The Dell designed keyboards that Eric says were specifically for the Iranian market must have been intentially flawed in order to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, Pak must somehow be linked to the nuclear program or to the US government. Either way he’s dead meat.
:)
Pak,
“I broke [my nail] while using my American-designed Dell laptop keyboard.”
Just as I suspected. It’s well-known that Dell designed different keyboards specifically for the Iranian market.
In the “Raw Story” article cited by Richard, Hillary Clinton said something I agree with, though I strongly disagree with her suggested US response (more and tougher sanctions):
“”The timeline [of Iran's presumed nuclear-weapon development] is not so important as the international effort to try to ensure that whatever the timeline, Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons,” Clinton told reporters on her plane as it arrived in Abu Dhabi. “I don’t know that it gives much comfort to somebody who is in the Gulf, or who is in a country that Iran has vowed to destroy, that it’s a one-year or a three-year timeframe.”"
If one assumes – incorrectly or not – that a country is working on a bomb (let’s say Cuba, to make the point more clear for Americans), will it really be all that comforting to learn that the country won’t be finished until 2015 rather than, say, 2013? What would make the US much more comfortable, in this example, would be some good reason to believe that Cuba is not working on a bomb at all.
That is why, though Nima’s long list of mistaken timetables for Iran’s presumed nuclear-weapons development efforts cast doubt as well on the most recent predictions, I doubt seriously that those past mistakes will have much effect on present policy. If someone had made the same mistaken predictions about Cuba many times in the past, and yet Cuba presently had a robust nuclear program that it insisted was entirely peaceful, I don’t think the US government would assign much weight to those past mistakes.
Dear Eric,
I broke it while using my American-designed Dell laptop keyboard.
This is “on topic” but nevertheless very narrow, and so a reader should skip it if he or she has no deep interest in the so-called “Code 3.1 dispute.
Peter Jenkins wrote above:
“The NPT requires Iran … to re-apply Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangement.”
Maybe. I’m not at all sure what the answer is to that question, but I’d give the nod to Iran if pressed.
In any case, I’ve laid out the arguments for each side as thoroughly as I can conceive them in footnote 33 to my “nuclear dispute” piece cited below. I’m interested to know whether others who’ve focused on this issue have different or additional arguments, or comments on mine. Note also, incidentally, that the second paragraph below mentions a distinct question (which Alan Smith explained to me) regarding Iran’s obligation to provide design information on already-declared facilities, on which I think the IAEA has the much better argument. (Again, though, I think Iran’s argument is better on the basic Code 3.1 dispute, though it’s nevertheless not clear to me who wins.)
FOOTNOTE 33 FROM “THE IRAN NUCLEAR DISPUTE – A NEW APPROACH:
Code 3.1 Dispute.
The “revised” version of Code 3.1 essentially requires disclosure of a nuclear facility as soon as a country has decided to build it. The original (1976) version requires disclosure only 180 days before nuclear material is introduced into the facility. Iran voluntarily complied with the revised version for several years (February 2003 to March 2007), but ceased when Iran’s parliament (Majlis) formally rejected it. The IAEA insists that Iran may not revert to the original Code 3.1 without the IAEA’s consent.
It should be noted that the IAEA makes an additional argument – related to the Code 3.1 dispute but nevertheless based on the Safeguards Agreement itself. The IAEA complains that Iran is not cooperating fully with the IAEA’s efforts to verify design information for certain declared facilities, which the IAEA argues Iran must do whether or not Iran had been required to declare the facility as early as it did. See, for example, paragraphs 12-14 and 18 of IAEA Director General’s report dated May 23, 2007 (GOV/2007/22); paragraphs 8-9 of IAEA Director General’s report dated February 19, 2009 (GOV/2009/8); paragraphs 7, 13 and 20 of IAEA Director General’s report dated June 5, 2009 (GOV/2009/35); paragraphs 11 and 26 of IAEA Director General’s report dated August 28, 2009 (GOV/2009/55).
Iran and IAEA Arguments on Code 3.1 Dispute.
Presented in more detail, the arguments of Iran and the IAEA on the Code 3.1 issue are likely to be essentially as follows. References are to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.
Iran probably would argue that (1) there is no dispute that Iran’s Safeguards Agreement itself did not become effective until it was ratified by Iran’s parliament (Majlis), which occurred nearly a year after the Agreement had been signed by Iran’s representative to the IAEA (see, Article 25 and preliminary Note 2); (2) Articles 24(b) and 24(c) provide that any amendment to the Safeguards Agreement must also be approved by the “Government of Iran” and “shall enter into force on the same conditions as entry into force of the Agreement itself,” which means that an amendment becomes effective only when “written notification [has been given by the Government of Iran to the IAEA] that Iran’s statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met,” as required under Article 25; (3) no such notification was ever given with respect to revised Code 3.1 (and those “statutory and constitutional requirements” in fact were never met, as the IAEA knew); (4) although Article 39 provides that Subsidiary Arrangements may be amended without amending the Agreement itself, Article 39 also provides that amendments of Subsidiary Arrangements, just like amendments of the Agreement itself, require “agreement between the Government of Iran and the [IAEA];” (5) nothing in the Agreement provides that “Government of Iran” approval may be given for amendments of a Subsidiary Arrangement in a different way from how “Government of Iran” approval must be given for amendments of the Agreement; (6) since the “Government of Iran” never approved the revised version of Code 3.1 in the manner required for approval of Agreement amendments (as the IAEA knew), it never became binding on Iran, and so Iran’s voluntary compliance with revised Code 3.1 could be terminated at any time, which Iran did in March 2007 by notifying the IAEA that Iran’s Majlis had formally disapproved revised Code 3.1; and (7) Iran’s voluntary compliance with revised Code 3.1 for several years, approved only by Iran’s IAEA representative, did not “estop” Iran later from enforcing the Agreement’s requirement that amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements be approved by the “Government of Iran,” since Iran’s IAEA representative had no authority to modify this amendment-approval requirement and neither he nor the Government of Iran ever represented to the IAEA that he did.
The IAEA probably would argue that (1) unlike the Agreement itself and amendments to the Agreement, Subsidiary Arrangements and amendments to Subsidiary Arrangements customarily have been approved by a country without formal satisfaction of the country’s “statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force;” (2) Iran had acknowledged the validity of this “informal” approval process for Subsidiary Arrangements decades earlier by agreeing (through its IAEA representative) to Iran’s original Subsidiary Arrangements without seeking or receiving formal approval from Iran’s Majlis; (3) Iran again acknowledged the validity of this “informal” approval process for Subsidiary Arrangements by agreeing (through its IAEA representative) in February 2003 to observe revised Code 3.1 without seeking or receiving formal approval from Iran’s Majlis; (4) Iran yet again acknowledged the validity of this “informal” amendment process by failing to inform the IAEA (until Iran formally notified the IAEA in March 2007 that it would no longer observe revised Code 3.1) that Iran considered its observance of Code 3.1 to be voluntary and revocable unless and until revised Code 3.1 had been ratified by Iran’s Majlis; and (5) since the amendment to Code 3.1 had thus become effective, it could not be amended again (to revert to the original Code 3.1) absent an “agreement between the Government of Iran and the [IAEA],” as required under Article 39.
A key document in this Code 3.1 dispute is the February 26, 2003 letter from Iran to the IAEA in which Iran informed the IAEA that it would observe revised Code 3.1. To this writer’s knowledge, that letter remains non-public, and the IAEA lacks authority to publicize it without Iran’s consent. That letter, and other confidential information, undoubtedly would be reviewed by an arbitration panel.
END OF FOOTNOTE 33.
Source:
http://brillwebsite.com/writings/Irannuclear.html#FootnoteOnCode31Versions
Richard,
“And as you know, I’ve detailed them in an earlier post in this thread.”
Since I didn’t notice those reasons in any earlier post, and you can probably find them quicker than I, maybe you can just quote them for me in a new post.
Pak,
“By the way, Fiorangela, I just broke a nail. Is that America’s fault too?”
Probably. How did you break it?
Which reminds me – I need to go download the premiere episodes of “The Cape”. Later.
Lysander: “But the US elites are deeply concerned about the inhabitants of Seoul?”
Never said that. But South Korea is a major trading partner with the US – not to mention that they probably make a lot of stuff used in the military-industrial complex. An attack by North Korea would be so damaging to the South as to affect the US economy seriously, most likely.
More importantly, the US electorate WOULD get upset at fifty thousand US casualties in ninety days. THAT kind of war the current electorate is not used to. They’ve never seen it. The US hasn’t had one since WWII. THAT could get the electorate riled up, which the elites would prefer to avoid in most cases – unless they thought they could profit by it in some way.
You can’t assume the elites like EVERY war – otherwise we would have had WWIII by now. They like nice long wars that can only be continued by being slow wars against weaker adversaries. This whole Fourth Gen War thing, as opposed to wars like WWII, has been a godsend for the military-industrial complex. Wars that last ten years and cost hundreds of billions steady every year because no one in the electorate cares or can do anything about it.
“BUT EVERY SINGLE OTHER INDUSTRY WILL GRIND TO A HALT.”
Not really. That’s an over simplification. Nothing ever “grinds to a halt” – it just gets more expensive, and the costs are passed on to – guess who? Meanwhile, the military-industrial complex gets huge multi-billion dollar contracts from the tax dollars of – guess who?
“As will just about every motorist.”
And they really don’t care about motorists. Did they care back in the ’70′s when they had oil tankers circling around NOT delivering oil to the US during the oil crisis?
“Feel free to think “the elites don’t care,” but even the devil will save others to save himself.”
True. But again, just as the elites in Iran aren’t hurting from US sanctions, neither will the US elites hurt from any damage an oil price spike might cause. And they don’t care if the rest of us are hurting.
Again, all this has been discussed before. It would be nice if someone would come up with something new instead of re-iterating the same old thing.
Lysander: “I submit to you, Richard, that If Iran has the means to kill 100,000 Israelis, they will not lightly attack Iran, even if they would kill all 70 million Iranians.”
No one said it would be done lightly. When I say not enough to “phase” Israel, let alone the US, I mean that the choice for Israel between allowing Iran to develop a nuclear arsenal and risking the chance that Iran might manage to deliver one in a preemptive war is no choice at all. Especially if they manage to identify where those nukes are. The Israelis would make sure every single Iranian nuclear weapon would be hit by a nuke before they launched.
And the Israeli will ALWAYS have more nukes than Iran – which is also why I say it will cost Iran a LOT of money to catch up. Iran has only four times the GNP of Israel, even though its population is over ten times the size of Israel. And Israel has a thirty year head start. How long would it take for to insure that enough of its nukes would remain after an Israeli first strike to insure an Iranian second-strike? That second strike capability is when you have a deterrent – not a first strike. And remember that Israel ALREADY by at least some accounts has a submarine-based second strike capability. So even if Iran takes out Tel Aviv, Tehran won’t last much longer. Is deterring a conventional war worth insuring the death of the population of Tehran vs the population of Tel Aviv, especially if it means a preemptive attack?
“I’m no expert, but if you could generate enough thrust to put a heavy object into space, it seems it wont be long before you could throw nuke across the gulf or even across the middle east.”
It’s not just the weight – and warheads weigh much more than small satellites – it’s the geographical accuracy as well as other technology matters that have to be solved to make an offensive missile rather than a relatively simple launch vehicle. France’s Ariadne can launch a satellite into space, but it’s completely useless as a missile vehicle.
Again, the problem for Iran is TIME. There is NO WAY Iran can develop an EFFECTIVE nuclear deterrent that REALLY deters its two main enemies BEFORE those one or both of those two main enemies put the kibosh on those plans – or on Iran itself.
It’s ridiculous to try. And ridiculous to quibble over whether that preemptive Israeli or US attack comes in days, weeks, months or whatever – as long as it comes in TIME.
Again: “A nation has got to know its limitations.”
Richard Steven Hack says: January 9, 2011 at 11:33 pm
Indeed, as you say, “A Nation Must Know its Limitations.”
One could always hope that US planners and leaders will take that dictum to heart.
RSH
“Unfortunately, he is either wrong or less than certain on this Straits closure thing. We’ve been over this before here.”
Yes we have. I find Dyers assessment quite credible you do not. Agree to disagree.
“Third, who says the US elites care that the oil price rises? The oil companies will LOVE that! The US elites aren’t going to be affected by an oil price rise, they didn’t design this whole plan to start an Iran war without EXPECTING such a rise! So that in itself is not a deterrent.”
But the US elites are deeply concerned about the inhabitants of Seoul? Sure Exxon will love 350-500$ oil. BUT EVERY SINGLE OTHER INDUSTRY WILL GRIND TO A HALT. As will just about every motorist. It would be a catastrophe from which the US will never recover. Feel free to think “the elites don’t care,” but even the devil will save others to save himself.
Lysander:
“In the early 1990s, Clarke revealed in an interview with the New York Times four years ago, the Clinton administration had seriously considered a bombing campaign against Iran, but the military professionals told them not to do it.”
Kenneth Pollack claims that it was the election of Khatami that restrained the U.S from attacking Iran; i.e. in revenge to the Kobbar bombing. which one should we believe?
And you guys blame me for diverting the conversation away from the main topic!? How is the hidden Imam, or fallen planes (as yet because of unknown causes) relevant to the topic of Iran’s nuclear program?
By the way Fiorangela, I just broke a nail. Is that America’s fault too?
Fyi: “A basic valid design can be replicated with minimal expenditures.”
I may perhaps have overstated the case in using the phrase “expending the bulk of its revenue”, but the fact remains that Iran would have to spend a LOT of money on both the processing of the uranium to provide sufficient highly enriched fissile material for enough warheads to matter, and probably even more on the missile systems to deliver them and all the infrastructure to support those kinds of numbers.
And for what? To get nuked before they can do any of that anyway?
It’s ridiculous for Iran to try such a thing, just as it was ridiculous for Saddam to try it.
I repeat: “A nation has to know its limitations.”
RSH,
“Lysander: “Iran does not need 50 or a hundred nuclear weapons. It needs 3-4.”
Not nearly enough to phase Israel or Pakistan, let alone the US.”
Really?
Charles De Gaul commenting on France’s arsenal.
“Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French.”
I submit to you, Richard, that If Iran has the means to kill 100,000 Israelis, they will not lightly attack Iran, even if they would kill all 70 million Iranians.
“I have no idea how far away they are from developing a delivery system. But they successfully put a satellite in space in early 2009.”
Satellites are irrelevant except as intelligence gatherers. Not the same thing as a warhead which can accurately delivered.
I’m no expert, but if you could generate enough thrust to put a heavy object into space, it seems it wont be long before you could throw nuke across the gulf or even across the middle east.
Lysander: “The United States would have no options for escalation other than the nuclear one, and pressure on it to stop the war would mount by the day as the world’s industries and transport ground to a halt.”
Unfortunately, he is either wrong or less than certain on this Straits closure thing. We’ve been over this before here.
First of all, the US military and various other analysts are not certain that Iran can COMPLETELY or ADEQUATELY close the Straits. But whether they are right or wrong, second, the US can do plenty to make it damn hard for Iran to KEEP doing that for weeks or months. As I’ve said before, the US can carpet bomb day in and day out on the Iranian coastline. The US could schedule air strikes during every single ship movement in the Gulf in they need to. The US doesn’t need to go nuclear and if it did it would be tactical nuclear in any event.
Third, who says the US elites care that the oil price rises? The oil companies will LOVE that! The US elites aren’t going to be affected by an oil price rise, they didn’t design this whole plan to start an Iran war without EXPECTING such a rise! So that in itself is not a deterrent.
“The end would be an embarrassing retreat by the United States”
In the end, yes. But that end could be ten years down the road.
“That was the outcome of every wargame the Pentagon played, and Mike Mullen knows it.”
And Mike Mullen does NOT run the country! He does what he is TOLD to by those who do.
“It is all bluff. It always was.”
We’ve been over this many times here. Once again, read my lips: If it is all bluff, THEN WHAT IS THE POINT? Who is getting any REAL benefit from this whole crisis if there isn’t going to be a RESOLUTION involving either a back down from the whole thing or a WAR?
This is NOT a case where all this is just for some internal domestic political show either in the US or Israel. That is ruminant evacuation from people who don’t understand how the war game is played. Apparently no one has the smarts to see where the Iraq and Afghanistan wars came from or how the Iran war is playing out in EXACTLY THE SAME WAY. Hell, you can go back fifty years and see where the VIETNAM war came from in EXACTLY THE SAME WAY.
And if this IS the case, that the whole thing is some sort of “bluff”, then ONCE AGAIN, this whole site is a complete waste of everyone’s time. If there is NO risk of war, who the hell cares about any of this? Is this some sort of diplomatic, foreign policy porn site?
It really gets old having to go over this again and again, listening to the same old arguments and seeing people conveniently forget how those arguments have been shot down again and again here.
Bottom line: The US ruling elite intend to attack Iran at some point. NOTHING Iran does, whether building nukes or not, whether ratifying the AP or not, can alter that course. NOTHING the US electorate does can alter that course. NOTHING the UN or the international community can do can alter that course.
The ONLY thing that can alter that course is geopolitical developments in other regions in which the US also has interests, such as Pakistan or the Koreas. If war breaks out in either location, an Iran war may be put on hold. Otherwise things will continue to proceed along a more or less straight track to an eventual Iran war JUST LIKE Iraq and JUST LIKE Afghanistan.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 9, 2011 at 10:34 pm
Yes, the following seems to be the Public Message of the US-EU Axis to the Iranian people:
1 – You have no right to learn things that we have determined you are not fit to learn.
2 – If you learn those things we will kill you.
Rather like the SS in WWII, walk into Russian villages and execute all men who could read or write.
James Canning says: January 9, 2011 at 7:31 pm
Libya had nothing but equipment in crates that she could not even assemble, let alone operate.
Fiorangela says: January 9, 2011 at 10:57 pm
I cannot agree with you in this regard.
The aviation sanctions predate Mrs. Clinton.
And Iranians are not entitled to avaiation supplied by US companies if for decades they have been shouting :Death to America”.
I believe the United States is within her rights to deny trade in airplanes to Iran.
If Iranians want air transport, they should try to develop it themselves or license it.
These are the wages of anti-Americanism.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 9, 2011 at 6:04 pm
The statement below is factually incorrect.
“Fyi: The primary problem with your nuclear-armed Iran is that without expending the bulk of its revenue on the deployment of nuclear weapons, it will decades before it can even begin to catch up with the nuclear arsenals of Pakistan and Israel”
A basic valid design can be replicated with minimal expenditures.
Eric A. Brill says: January 9, 2011 at 5:12 pm
Regrettably, I concur with that statement.
I think the shredding of the CWT during Iran-Iraq War, the shameful attack of NATO on Yugoslavia during the Unilateral Moment, and the US attack on Iraq inn 2003 have made the world insecure for smaller and weaker states that do not have a great power protecting them.
In fact, some would argue that 1991 war against Iraq was the starting point for increased global insecurity. For after the US-Iraq War in 1991, the North Koreans began moving their forces towars the DMZ and began in earnest the process of taking Seoul hostage.
I have not thought about all the realistic options available to all players in the Middle East. There are things that are do-able; such as the 99-year Cease Fire offered by HAMAS that, unfortunately, are also not reasltic given the internal politics of US-EU Axis and Israel.
RSH,
“Eric, Lysander and Persian Gulf: Once again, North Korea is in no way comparable to Iran.”
While agree with your take on North Korea’s ability to inflict enormous pain, I’m not at all sure about your take on Iran. This is from Gwynne Dyer, military historian and veteran of the Royal and Canadian Navies.
“There’s no way for the U.S. to win a non-nuclear war with Iran”
By Gwynne Dyer, August 3, 2010
When Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the highest-ranking American officer, was asked recently on NBC’s Meet The Press whether the United States has a military plan for an attack on Iran, he replied simply: “We do.”
General staffs are supposed to plan for even the most unlikely future contingencies. Right down to the 1930s, for example, the United States maintained and annually updated plans for the invasion of Canada—and the Canadian military made plans to preempt the invasion. But what the planning process will have revealed, in this case, is that there is no way for the United States to win a non-nuclear war with Iran.
The U.S. could “win” by dropping hundreds of nuclear weapons on Iran’s military bases, nuclear facilities and industrial centres (i.e. cities) and killing five to 10 million people, but short of that, nothing works. On this we have the word of Richard Clarke, counter-terrorism adviser in the White House under three administrations.
In the early 1990s, Clarke revealed in an interview with the New York Times four years ago, the Clinton administration had seriously considered a bombing campaign against Iran, but the military professionals told them not to do it.
“After a long debate, the highest levels of the military could not forecast a way in which things would end favourably for the United States,” he said. The Pentagon’s planners have war-gamed an attack on Iran several times in the past 15 years, and they just can’t make it come out as a U.S. victory.
It’s not the fear of Iranian nuclear weapons that makes the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff so reluctant to get involved in a war with Iran. Those weapons don’t exist, and the whole justification for the war would be to make sure that they never do.
The problem is that there’s nothing the U.S. can do to Iran, short of nuking the place, that would really force Tehran to kneel and beg for mercy. It can bomb Iran’s nuclear sites and military installations to its heart’s content, but everything it destroys can be rebuilt in a few years. And there is no way that the United States could actually invade Iran.
There are some 80 million people in Iran, and although many of them don’t like the present regime they are almost all fervent patriots who would resist a foreign invasion. Iran is a mountainous country, and very big: four times the size of Iraq. The Iranian army currently numbers about 450,000 men, slightly smaller than the U.S. Army—but unlike the U.S. Army, it does not have its troops scattered across literally dozens of countries.
If the White House were to propose anything larger than minor military incursions along Iran’s south coast, senior American generals would resign in protest. Without the option of a land war, the only lever the United States would have on Iranian policy is the threat of yet more bombs—but if they aren’t nuclear, then they aren’t very persuasive. Whereas Iran would have lots of options for bringing pressure on the United States.
Just stopping Iran’s own oil exports would drive the oil price sky-high in a tight market: Iran accounts for around seven percent of internationally traded oil. But it could also block another 40 percent of global oil exports just by sinking tankers coming from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab Gulf states with its lethal Noor anti-ship missiles.
The Noor anti-ship missile is a locally built version of the Chinese YJ-82. It has a 200-km range, enough to cover all the major choke points in the Gulf. It flies at twice the speed of sound just metres above the sea’s surface, and it has a tiny radar profile. Its single-shot kill probability has been put as high as 98 percent.
Iran’s mountainous coastline extends along the whole northern side of the Gulf, and these missiles have easily concealed mobile launchers. They would sink tankers with ease, and in a few days insurance rates for tankers planning to enter the Gulf would become prohibitive, effectively shutting down the region’s oil exports completely.
Meanwhile Iran would start supplying modern surface-to-air missiles to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and that would soon shut down the U.S. military effort there. (It was the arrival of U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles in Afghanistan in the late 1980s that drove Russian helicopters from the sky and ultimately doomed the whole Soviet intervention there.)
Iranian ballistic missiles would strike U.S. bases on the southern (Arab) side of the Gulf, and Iran’s Hezbollah allies in Beirut would start dropping missiles on Israel. The United States would have no options for escalation other than the nuclear one, and pressure on it to stop the war would mount by the day as the world’s industries and transport ground to a halt.
The end would be an embarrassing retreat by the United States, and the definitive establishment of Iran as the dominant power of the Gulf region. That was the outcome of every wargame the Pentagon played, and Mike Mullen knows it. So there is a plan for an attack on Iran, but he would probably rather resign than put it into action. It is all bluff. It always was.”
Now Richard, you are welcome to disagree with his assessment, but it sounds pretty convincing to me.
Fiorangela says: January 9, 2011 at 10:57 pm
Yes Indeed. Yes, indeed.
Eric,
“You’re acknowledging that a US attack is less than certain, which is a step in the right direction that I’m glad to see. But you’re still offering the same prescription, just as if a US attack were a certainty. Once you acknowledge that a US attack is not certain to occur, I see no alternative but to weigh the risks created by developing a nuclear deterrent, which necessarily must be done secretly. That course of action is not risk-free. What if some Iranian nuclear scientist decides to defect to the West before the bomb is finished, and the US decides to attack even though it otherwise might not have?”
That is correct. I’m also not certain the world will not be struck by a cataclysmic asteroid tomorrow. But I will conduct my affairs as if it will not be.
Given America’s past behavior and its repeated statements regarding attacking Iran it is close enough to certain that the US WANTS to attack Iran. All that is missing is the right occasion.
Iran’s method for building a bomb would be to do all the heavy lifting while in the NPT. Then, when opportunity presents itself, (A war with North Korea, financial collapse in the west, oil prices reaching 150-200$ per barrel, etc) Iran can withdraw from the NPT and turn the screw.
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/201119173242385438.html
More Iranian blood on Hillary Clinton, Stuart Levey’s hands:
Iranian airplane crashes; 70+ dead.
Talking of selling wars by US;
Selling the first Gulf War
http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/listeningpost/2011/01/2011187029114467.html
Castro weighs in again:
Castro: Israel, US Killed Iran Nuclear Scientists
http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=220234
And Hillary once again is NOT trying to “get to yes with Iran”:
Clinton gathers support for more Iran sanctions
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/01/clinton-gathers-support-for-more-iran-sanctions/
Eric: “You say only your reasons are the same as the US government’s reasons for knowing that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. But I’m asking what those reasons are.”
And as you know, I’ve detailed them in an earlier post in this thread.
“As is probably obvious, I’m really pointing out that you don’t know this. Nor does the US government. I believe that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, but I don’t know that. If I were running the US government, I wouldn’t base my policy toward Iran on knowledge that I don’t have.”
And as you know, I think we’ve agreed to disagree on this point.
If I were running the US government, I wouldn’t be doing any of this crap.
In fact, if I were running the US government, to quote Karl Hess, “I’d quit.”
This appears to close out this incident, which was nothing short of weird:
Report: Iran frees American woman, saying she lied about being spy
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/01/09/iran.woman.deported/index.html
Richard,
You say only your reasons are the same as the US government’s reasons for knowing that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. But I’m asking what those reasons are.
As is probably obvious, I’m really pointing out that you don’t know this. Nor does the US government. I believe that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, but I don’t know that. If I were running the US government, I wouldn’t base my policy toward Iran on knowledge that I don’t have.
Eric: “If it remains the case that no evidence of Iran nuclear weapons development is found, it would be impossible to use that argument to sell a war.”
NO – not impossible. I said difficult, and I meant difficult. The US couldn’t sell that to the UNSC – mostly because of Russia and China, unless the US offered them something big in return – or most of the NAM nations. But it certainly COULD sell that to the US electorate and probably the poodle nations in the EU (not that the EU would join the US, except maybe France and possibly the UK).
All they have to do is what they ARE doing – equating Iran’s legal enrichment to a “nuclear weapons program”, relying on the inability of the electorate to distinguish the two or the complexity of the concept of a “Japan option”.
“But this would leave one other useful argument: that Iran’s refusal to disclose more about its nuclear program means it’s probably working on a bomb, and we’d better stop it before it’s too late. That’s the argument that Iran needs to worry most about, and it’s an argument that Iran can take at least some steps to weaken – such as by observing the AP.”
And if Iran were able to get the US to acknowledge its legal right to enrich in exchange, that would make it DOUBLY hard for the US to justify a war. Which is precisely why Iran should not UNILATERALLY agree to the AP.
Nice try, Eric, but repetition to other people isn’t going to help you here.
“Many people, especially those outside the US, think it really doesn’t matter whether the American public “buys” a war proposed by the US government. But it does matter. Some people reach this mistaken conclusion because it’s been so easy in the past to make the “sale” to the American public. But easy or not, the sale must be made.
We may differ on the degree to which the “sale” must be made, however. I think convincing the bulk of the electorate that Iran has a nuclear weapons program – which has been done – is sufficient. That only a quarter of the electorate support US military action against Iran might well be sufficient for the ruling elites, especially given that the electorate really can’t do ANYTHING about it short of voting out all of Congress as well as the elected officials. Good luck getting that to happen.
When push comes to shove, the electorate gets screwed every time. The only time that is threatened is when US casualties are considerably north of where they are now. It took ten years or more in Vietnam – AND a significantly more active antiwar movement than we have now – to get the US out at a cost of 50,000 casualties. Today, Iraq has much less and Afghanistan even less casualties – not enough to stir up the public to the degree that in this last election observers noted that the wars were almost ignored in the campaign rhetoric. So a war with Iran is not really on the electorate’s radar – which could allow the elites to “slip one over” on the electorate fairly easily.
“So far, no sale, but a few changed circumstances could move us close enough that the scales could easily be tipped.”
Agreed.
A fox and a duck fall into a prey pit. The fox keeps on pacing back and forth inside the hole saying, “I know of a thousand ways to get myself out of this trap.” Every once in a while, the duck sitting in the corner utters softly, “I have one way to save myself.” After a while, the fox gets really irritated and says, “you idiot duck, I have a thousand ways to get out of this hole and I still remain stuck. How silly are you to think that with only one solution you could save yourself.” After that, the duck sits there quietly without a peep out of her. The fox continues pacing back and forth and repeating his earlier assertion that he has a thousand ways to get himself out of his predicament. At dusk, they both hear approaching of the hunter’s footsteps. Suddenly, the duck collapses on the floor, completely limp and lifeless. The hunter uncovers the pit and sees the fox quite agitated pacing back and forth and the duck dead on the floor. Cursing the fox for having choked the duck, he grabs the duck and throws her away. He then grabs the fox and takes him to be skinned. And the duck goes on her merry way.
This particular war is a soft war. Get with the program.
Lysander,
“I certainly can’t state for sure that the US will attack Iran regardless. All I can do is point out that the US has attacked numerous countries where the possession of nuclear weapons was not even a remote possibility [and]- that it’s not unreasonable to conclude that the US wishes to attack Iran. Given that, it seems the only plausible long term deterrent to a US attack is a nuclear capability or an actual weapon.”
You’re acknowledging that a US attack is less than certain, which is a step in the right direction that I’m glad to see. But you’re still offering the same prescription, just as if a US attack were a certainty. Once you acknowledge that a US attack is not certain to occur, I see no alternative but to weigh the risks created by developing a nuclear deterrent, which necessarily must be done secretly. That course of action is not risk-free. What if some Iranian nuclear scientist decides to defect to the West before the bomb is finished, and the US decides to attack even though it otherwise might not have?
Eric: “Why do you say the US government knows that Iran is not working on nuclear weapons?”
For the same reasons I know it isn’t – and probably more, because they have access to more intelligence than I do.
What really matters is whether the US elites would care – other than to be delighted to discover Iran really was, of course. Since their goal is the same either way: war for profit and Israel.
Wow, bombshell if true.
CIA Delayed Breakup of Khan Network for Decades, Journalists Assert
http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110105_6508.php
There would have been no Pakistani nukes and Iran’s nuclear program might have been set back if the CIA had acted decades ago, these journalists claim.
Wonder what Valerie Plame would have to say about this? This was her bailiwick.
And WHY didn’t the CIA act? I’ll tell you why – because the US needs people to provide it with opportunities and “reasons” to start wars. So they LET situations happen that they can exploit later. This is a very consistent pattern in US affairs.
Eric wrote: “Some people reach this mistaken conclusion because it’s been so easy in the past to make the “sale” to the American public. But easy or not, the sale must be made. So far, no sale, but a few changed circumstances could move us close enough that the scales could easily be tipped.
When you start reading a lot more about “surgical strikes,” you’ll know the Iran war salesmen believe the American public is just about ready to approve the deal.”
Yes, Americans will need a smoking gun, even if the cops have to plant it on the bad guy.
Which is why James Canning’s congratulations on al Sadr’s statement are premature.
Richard,
Why do you say the US government knows that Iran is not working on nuclear weapons?
Persian Gulf,
Richard wrote:
“As the Leveretts have emphasized, any attack made by the US will be SOLELY on the basic of Iran’s – legal – right to enrich. This is a difficult sell. Not impossible, but difficult.”
That probably would be the real reason and, as Richard points out, difficult to sell. If it remains the case that no evidence of Iran nuclear weapons development is found, it would be impossible to use that argument to sell a war.
But this would leave one other useful argument: that Iran’s refusal to disclose more about its nuclear program means it’s probably working on a bomb, and we’d better stop it before it’s too late. That’s the argument that Iran needs to worry most about, and it’s an argument that Iran can take at least some steps to weaken – such as by observing the AP.
Many people, especially those outside the US, think it really doesn’t matter whether the American public “buys” a war proposed by the US government. But it does matter. Some people reach this mistaken conclusion because it’s been so easy in the past to make the “sale” to the American public. But easy or not, the sale must be made. So far, no sale, but a few changed circumstances could move us close enough that the scales could easily be tipped.
When you start reading a lot more about “surgical strikes,” you’ll know the Iran war salesmen believe the American public is just about ready to approve the deal.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 9, 2011 at 6:40 pm
Correct and strategically for Iran right on most points you made
Persian Gulf,
What you’re arguing for is usually called the “Japan option,” as you know. Japan is acknowledged to be capable of making nuclear weapons, and the US doesn’t attack Japan. Therefore, some argue, it follows that the US doesn’t attack Japan BECAUSE Japan has this acknowledged capability.
Japan has some other things going for it, though. It adopted the Additional Protocol over 10 years ago, for example, and has observed it scrupulously since then. It has never been found (to my knowledge) to have committed any material violations of its Safeguards Agreement. It’s known as being pretty peaceful, at least for the last 65 years. It has no likely target for any nuclear attack, and a well-armed world superpower close by that would predictably become quite upset if it ever acquired and threatened to use nuclear weapons.
The US presumably takes all of this into account and concludes that Japan need not be pressured to disclose more or to restrict its nuclear activities.
If one or more of those additional factors were not in Japan’s favor – for example, if the US were to discover that it had not been making some required disclosures for 20 years (even if those violations appear to have ceased several years ago), or if Japan refused to comply with the Additional Protocol any longer (even if it claimed it had good reasons for doing so), or if many of Japan’s supporters were urging it to develop nuclear weapons, or if it lived in a more dangerous neighborhood and had had a lot of spats with its neighbors over the past several decades or so – maybe the US would be a little less confident about Japan’s peaceful intentions.
This is certainly not to say that the US treats Iran fairly. I don’t think that. But there are differences that we should acknowledge. Observing the Additional Protocol would eliminate one important difference between Japan and Iran. It might make no difference at all, or it might make a difference. I think it would, and I don’t see a lot of downside in giving it a try.
aren’t you kind, James Canning: ” The American taxpayers should thank al-Sadr.”
Meanwhile, the other hole in the American taxpayer’s pocket is hemorrhaging: Irving Moskowitz, American bingo magnate/millionaire, needed a place to rest his weary head, in Israel. Today, Israeli forces began the long-threatened demolition of the Shepherd’s Hotel (using Caterpillar bulldozers). Shepherd’s Hotel is in Palestinian occupied territory; it was the home of the Mufti of Jerusalem back in 1928-29, and before the British exiled the Mufti for opposing zionist encroachments on Arab property, and provocations of the Palestinian Arab people which resulted in “pogroms” which zionisits blamed on Arabs and used to generate contributions to support Israel.
The lord gives and the lord takes away. Blessed be the Irving Moskowitzses of this world.
Persian Gulf: “what is restraining the U.S from attacking Iran NOW?”
I’ve address that question in the past. There are “procedural” issues in starting any war. While the US COULD start one “now” – and in fact that wouldn’t surprise me if one were to start any time in the next couple years – it’s likely the US will wait until it has run through some more sanctions, some more negotiation efforts, etc., enough to convince the ignorant US public that “we did all we could”.
Also there is the little problem that Iran still hasn’t produced any nukes nor shown any interest in doing so.
As the Leveretts have emphasized, any attack made by the US will be SOLELY on the basic of Iran’s – legal – right to enrich. This is a difficult sell. Not impossible, but difficult. So it requires more prep than just declaring Saddam Hussein “has WMDs” and misinterpreting a bunch of crappy satellite photos. And even that took over a year right after 9/11.
“let’s assume that the U.S understood tomorrow that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear bomb, will she attack Iran right a way?”
Eric thinks yes, I think more “short term”. Because the US knows just developing a nuke is not really a threat, regardless of US rhetoric. DEPLOYING them is a threat.
“the same assumption should then be the case today as well.”
Not really. First off, the US KNOWS Iran is not developing a nuke, secretly or otherwise, as I’ve said repeatedly. It’s a red herring. Eric doesn’t believe this, well, he’s wrong, sorry.
Second, again as the Leveretts point out, the US has not been able to produce ANY evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program (except that laptop, which no one except the US takes as credible), so the US has to resort to EQUATING Iran’s legal enrichment with a “nuclear weapons program” – again, a hard sell to the world if not the stupid US electorate.
“if it’s about convincing the world, it will take more the time needed for Iran to build a bomb.”
You may well be right about that point.
“if it’s about the accuracy of the data, that remains so for long enough to allow Iran to build a bomb.”
Possibly.
“the fact that the U.S doesn’t attack Iran today says that she won’t attack tomorrow once she understood Iran is building a bomb.”
No, the two situations are completely different. The reason the US doesn’t attack today is because it knows there is no threat, and its plans to attack have not gone through the entire “process” of starting a war.
If Iran actually DID develop nuclear weapons, then ipso facto in your scenario the US and the world would know it, thus cutting the “PR prep” time way down and the “need” to attack sooner than later way up.
Even so, as I suggested earlier, the US might not attack right away because ALL the elements for Iran’s nuke – assuming it actually exists – to be an actual threat might not be present for some time, e.g., a delivery system. Nonetheless, the US would indeed attack if Iran actually made a nuke.
And certainly Israel would attack even sooner than the US. And that attack might well be nuclear if Israel could pinpoint where the bomb(s) was/were being made.
None of that is to Iran’s advantage.
Eric:
what is restraining the U.S from attacking Iran NOW? Iran will eventually be there based on the current trend. your argument for the U.S attack in the short notice is not firm enough. how can the U.S be sure Iran is secretly developing a nuclear bomb, assuming that Iran remains a member of NPT till reaching there? let’s assume that the U.S understood tomorrow that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear bomb, will she attack Iran right a way? the same assumption should then be the case today as well. if it’s about convincing the world, it will take more the time needed for Iran to build a bomb. if it’s about the accuracy of the data, that remains so for long enough to allow Iran to build a bomb.
the fact that the U.S doesn’t attack Iran today says that she won’t attack tomorrow once she understood Iran is building a bomb.
Lysander: “Iran does not need 50 or a hundred nuclear weapons. It needs 3-4.”
Not nearly enough to phase Israel or Pakistan, let alone the US.
“I have no idea how far away they are from developing a delivery system. But they successfully put a satellite in space in early 2009.”
Satellites are irrelevant except as intelligence gatherers. Not the same thing as a warhead which can accurately delivered.
“If it can send it across the Gulf to Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields, it will probably be enough to deter anyone from attacking Iran.”
There are two problems with that concept. First, this again requires a missile delivery system, very unlikely they can smuggle it in by camel. Second, ANY threat to the Saudi oil fields would result in an immediate US attack on the offending party – Israel excepted, of course. Even Israel would probably be attacked if the US really thought Israel was going to do it.
Your suggestion therefore is one that would definitely increase the US interest in attacking Iran well before Iran was capable of making such a threat. I fail to see how this is a “deterrent” if it provokes an attack before it can be made a deterrent.
“Now maybe Iran will be attacked before that happens. Or even IF that happens.”
Exactly.
“But you have stated frequently that an attack on Iran is a forgone conclusion regardless. So why should Iran not at least try?”
Because a) it won’t work for the reasons stated, it will merely accelerate the attack plans, and b) since it’s not a deterrent but an accelerent, why waste the money trying?
There are no points for “trying” in this game, only succeeding.
The ONLY “deterrent” Iran has against US attack is, frankly, the asymmetric warfare plans it has. And equally frankly, I don’t think any of that is a “deterrent” at all. What it is is a means for insuring that the US cannot CONQUER AND OCCUPY Iran, – not that the US can’t ATTACK Iran. For the US and Israel, ATTACKING Iran “is its own reward” in some sense. ANY damage, especially the SERIOUS damage the US could do to Iran, even in a conventional attack, is worth it for the US and Israel.
And the US and Israel don’t even care if an attack actually DID cause Iran to start to try to build a nuclear weapon. Because according to the “nuclear calculus” I’m citing, Iran would never be a significant threat to either country and the entire effort would merely justify ever greater attacks on Iran until the country was totally prostrate.
For Iran, developing a few nukes and trying to use them in any significant way against the US or Israel would basically be an act of desperation and probably would not produce any useful result except more destruction in the region and especially on Iran itself.
The same probably should be said about Saddam’s nuclear program. He was idiot enough to think he could produce nukes and use them to attack Iran or maybe Saudi Arabia or use them as a deterrent to the US. In fact, he would have ended up the same way – except Baghdad might be a glowing hole in the ground now as well.
To paraphrase Dirty Harry, “A country’s got to know its limitations.”
US Award for stealing bomb-grade uranium for Israel
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/10/us-award-for-stealing-bomb-grade-uranium-for-israel/
James Canning – As matter of fact, Gadhafi had built a plant without a nuclear reactor or Centrifuges.
Yes, Islamic Iran will never attack Jerusalem because not only the city is Islam’s third sacred place – it also have close to 500,000 Native Muslim and Christian inhabitants.
Castellio dreamed – “The only thing that will deter an invasion is Iran’s ability to kill Americans or Israelis ……”
Considering what less than 2,000 Hizbullah fighters did to 30,000 Jewish soldierts in Summer 2006 – I am sure Iran’s 8-year war hardened Army can do better than Hizbullah.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/08/27/hizbullah-changed-the-me-in-2006/
Eric: “I just don’t think the US would even think about a military attack on North Korea – or think about North Korea, period – if it didn’t have a bomb.”
Uh, no, I think that’s wrong. The US is inimical to North Korea for a variety of reasons. The sole reason the US doesn’t want a military attack on North Korea is that it would be a “hell war” – not some little, casualty here, casualty there war like Iraq and Afghanistan – but one in which Pentagon war games show 50,000 US casualties in the first ninety days.
The US would love to see North Korea go away, so they could expand their influence in South Korea right up to China’s border. This is why China is expending effort to see that North Korea does NOT go away, despite all the headaches this produces for China. These are fairly obvious facts.
The sole reason the US allows North Korea to have nukes, unlike Iran, is a) Israel doesn’t care about North Korea, and b) the aforementioned hell war, which even the ruling elites in the US who don’t give a damn about US casualties can see would jeopardize their little war profiteering game. They like long wars not short ones.
That said, I’m concerned as I said earlier that the US and South Korea DO seem to be making efforts to ratchet up tensions with NK for no valid reason I can see. The constant military exercises and the like are just irritating the hornets nest. The only other excuse I can see for it is that they’re trying to convince the new “Leader” when he ascends not to make waves in order to prove his worth to the NK hardliners, which does appear to be a concern of some observers. Still, the approach seems as dumb as expanding the Afghan war into Pakistan – which Obama is ALSO doing.
R S Hack,
Yes, nukes are dangerous for the country that has them. Gaddafi has said this, as part explanation of ending Libyan nuke programme. And in any event, Iran would not destroy Jerusalem.
The only thing that will deter an invasion is Iran’s ability to kill Americans or Israelis and block the trade in oil for an extended length of time. Iranians will find that much more cost effective if they forgo the nuclear weapon scenario…. It can be done through an overwhelming and consistent barrage of conventional weapons from rapidly moving locations targeted on civilian and Israeli nuclear centres. I believe the Iranian government figured that out a long time ago, which is why it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. What is does need is an air defense system that works.
The Israeli struggle against Iran is not about nuclear weapons. Why play into the red herring which allows all the mis-informed liberals to support Israeli aggression? The struggle is about support for Hezbollah and Hamas.
North Korea isn’t immune to attack because it’s nuclear. North Korea isn’t attacked because of its massing of conventional weapons against the civilian and military centre (Seoul) in South Korea. Also, no one really wants or fears North Korea that much that they want to attack it.
Eric, Lysander and Persian Gulf: Once again, North Korea is in no way comparable to Iran.
First of all, the CIA has always estimated that North Korea has the material for, and possibly the actual, two or more nuclear weapons. This was BEFORE the recent tests (both of which were very likely duds from what I’ve read – which didn’t help the North’s position any.)
Second, the possible actual existence of nuclear weapons is irrelevant in North Korea’s case. North Korea’s primary deterrent against US attack is its capability of blasting the crap out of South Korea’s capital city within 24 hours of an attack and of killing most of the US 27,000 troops in South Korea within 48 hours of an attack (less so now, because the US is moving those troops south of Seoul to protect them – something the US wouldn’t bother doing if it wasn’t worried about it.)
North Korea’s Special Forces troops, already the largest in the world at 120,000, are now estimated to be up to 200,000. It’s total forces is in excess of one million.
While it’s military equipment is aged and less technologically advanced as the US and South Korean equipment, there’s a hell of a lot OF it.
So none of this relates to Iran. If Iran were to start manufacturing and deploying nukes, I agree with Eric that the US – and especially Israel – would act very quickly. Not the next day that Eric perhaps hyperbolically suggests, but probably within a year. And again, as I have re-iterated over and over and every one here ignores it, without a DELIVERY SYSTEM you have an expensive and dangerous to your gonads paperweight – or a dud like the Koreans unless you test it.
So no, an Iran nuke is a complete waste of their time – and as I’ve said before, the Iranians know it and have said it.
Lysander,
I don’t think “the US” has nay interest in attacking Iran. And that such an attack is unlikely unless it appears Iran is actually building nuclear weapons. I do understand that a number of crazed warmongering neocons and some idiot “liberal” Democrats, would like to see an attack on Iran as a means of helping their friends in Israel to continue to oppress the Palestinians.
R S Hack sums the situation up very well.
I would add that Iran is leading the effort to get nukes out of the ME.
Eric: “In other words, since it didn’t work last time, try the same approach again. I find this logic a bit hard to understand.”
But that is not the logic at all! This is really disingenuous.
The logic is that if the West wants Iran to agree to the AP, it should make the offer of recognizing Iran’s legal enrichment rights. NOT THE REVERSE: that Iran should recognize the AP while getting nothing in return.
You can’t see a difference in those two positions? That’s ridiculous.
“Those who accept the “hold out for a new promise” logic undoubtedly contemplate that Iran would insist next time on performed promises, not just spoken promises. But all promises necessarily start out as spoken promises.”
NO – that is NOT the “contemplation”. There are no “promises” involved. What is requested is that the West explicitly and completely acknowledge Iran’s legal enrichment rights. This is NOT a “promise”. Whether the West ADHERES to the recognition of those rights afterward is not the issue. The issue is whether Iran can subsequently point to the West’s admission that Iran has enrichment rights, and whether those who oppose the course for war with Iran can point to that admission.
It disarms – albeit to some limited degree, as I said before – the West’s ability to justify its war aims. It is not a “promise” but an IMMEDIATE BENEFIT to Iran to extract this admission!
Whereas if Iran just ratifies the AP unilaterally, ALL your supposed “benefits” are entirely SPECULATIVE, depending as they do not on a specific and immediate concession of the West but on POSSIBLE concession that the West might offer or on supposed public opinion reactions to Iran’s action. The former has been demonstrated to be unlikely by the West’s PREVIOUS reaction to Iran’s following the AP, and the latter can be manipulated and spun by the West.
But the West’s specific recognition of Iran’s legal rights will be a matter of RECORD.
How MUCH benefit that gives Iran is speculative, I have admitted. But that it is a direct and immediate benefit cannot be doubted.
“Note that even this question presupposes a realistic possibility that Iran could “trade” its commitment to the AP for something worthwhile in return. I very seriously doubt such a deal is possible.”
Again – ALL of this irrelevant. The only concession the West can make that Iran can use in its negotiations is the West’s recognition of Iran’s enrichment rights. Everything else like the Tehran Declaration and the like are merely “confidence building measures” that Iran and the West can negotiate separately and which are not central to the main issue of Iran’s nuclear program – its right to enrich.
“I am confident in making this prediction: Any effort by Iran to use the AP as a bargaining chip will merely induce the US to either (a) continue on its present course: insist that Iran’s stubbornness is evidence that it is developing nuclear weapons; or (b) propose a “bargain” that will be very unattractive to Iran.”
Again, irrelevant. The ONLY bargaining chip Iran has is the AP. The ONLY thing Iran should demand in exchange for the AP is recognition of enrichment. This is the core of the dispute. Everything else is irrelevant.
“A narrow but nevertheless important point: If Iran indeed is not seeking nuclear weapons, complying with the AP won’t be all that burdensome”
Irrelevant. It is not “burdens” that Iran faces, it’s the West’s use of the AP to ferret out Iran’s military capabilities. And even that is mostly irrelevant to the nuclear issue – although clearly not to Iran’s military leaders.
“no scientist (or any other individual) needs to be identified to comply with the AP.”
Says who? The IAEA obviously needs to talk to PEOPLE on the ground at the facilities they visit to comply with the AP. Of course they will identify scientists and other technical personnel. You’re really reaching here.
“While some argue that AP language can be interpreted to allow IAEA inspectors to snoop around military installations that happen to be in the same neighborhood as some disclosed nuclear facility, I consider this to be an interpretive stretch, and have little or no doubt Iran justifiably would draw the line short of that.”
Perhaps – but of course then the IAEA and the US will complain that Iran is “not complying” with its AP requirements. A-a-n-n-n-d-d we’re back to square one…
“I acknowledge that Iran cannot count on the IAEA to maintain confidentiality – the IAEA’s record has been abysmal on that score – and so more AP disclosures arguably would yield more US targets if the US ever decided to attack.”
Agreed.
“But I suspect the US already has precise coordinates for most of those targets and many more; what few new targets would be added to the list probably won’t matter much to the US – certainly not enough to persuade the US to attack if it had not otherwise been inclined to do so.”
Probably true. Nonetheless, why make it easier on the US – especially if Iran ISN’T GETTING ANYTHING IN RETURN? THAT is the main issue here, not all this side stuff. The side stuff only matters if Iran DIDN’T GET ANYTHING IN RETURN! How hard is that to grasp?
“More important, the goal of all this would be to ensure that the US doesn’t decide to attack in the first place, and I predict that following the course I suggest would greatly reduce that risk.”
Now you’re out beyond Pluto in that supposition. Here you’re not merely saying that complying with the AP would serve Iran well in reducing public suspicion of Iran, you’re saying that the ruling elites of Israel and the US would actually stop considering an attack on Iran. I view this as approaching delusional status. While Iran’s complying with the AP would definitely make it HARDER for the US to JUSTIFY its attack on the basis of some supposed “nuclear ambiguity”, it would not “greatly reduce the risk” of such an attack overall.
Whereas if Iran sells the AP in exchange for legal enrichment recognition, THAT greatly makes it harder for the US to JUSTIFY the attack on ANY basis. But again, it will not overall greatly reduce the risk of an attack.
“But I am confident that enough people within the US government, and among the indispensable American public that would need to support an attack on Iran, do consider the nuclear dispute to be a “real” issue and, therefore, that increased disclosures by Iran would reduce the risk of an attack by the US.”
Again, we agree to disagree here completely.
“All in all, though neither I nor anyone else can predict the consequences, I see considerable upside, and little downside, from an Iranian commitment to observe the AP and, conversely, little upside and considerable downside from Iran’s continued refusal to do so.”
But the issue here is NOT whether Iran should observe the AP per se. The issue is whether Iran should UNILATERALLY observe the AP in exchange for nothing in return.
A-a-a-n-n-d-d-d we’re back to square one. (Sorry, I just like quoting Jason Patric in “The Losers”.)
Muqtada al-Sadr has made it clear yet again he wants all US troops out of Iraq. Praise God and praise Allah! The American taxpayers should thank al-Sadr.
Is it possible that Robert Gates and David Petraeus encourage Saudi Arabia and other Arab emirates to acquire sophisticated weaponry as a bulwark against Israel (besides the obvious goal of fattening Lockheed-Boeing bottom lines)? Surely our leaders are as aware as is a housewife with a laptop that Israel is a dangerous and out-of-control nuclear-armed, highly militarized society.
Fyi: “Now, you and others may want to tell the Iranians that their security is not threathened – well – go ahead and make that argument. I would like to hear that too since I might be mistaken.”
I’m not sure any one here is making that argument. The argument being made is that nuclear weapons do not help a nation’s security absent other geopolitical factors. The nuclear detente between the US and the Soviet Union is unique in history. We can not expect it to be a useful path for most other countries.
“The use of one class of WMD by one belligerent – endoresed by the so-called International Community – and the pursuit of a second class by the same belligerent”
You make an error here. Despite the fact that chemical weapons are considered “WMDs” in some political sense, the reality is that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, despite causing 100,000 or so Iranian casualties, is not in the same class as a nuclear weapon. No one who speaks of WMDs considers chemical or biological warfare as the same class as nukes. So your efforts to justify Iranian nukes by referring to chemical weapons attacks in the past is incorrect.
You are probably correct that Saddam wanted nuclear weapons to use against Iran. And you are probably correct that some other countries in the region aside from Israel might at some point want to do the same. But at THIS point in time, NO other countries than Pakistan and Israel in the region have nuclear capacity. Therefore the ONLY valid threats against Iran at this point are Pakistan and Israel. And frankly, I don’t see Pakistan as a valid threat – probably not even if some radical Sunni Islamists seize control of the government there. India will remain Pakistan’s main enemy, not the Shia in Iran.
So Israel is really the only main nuclear enemy Iran faces.
And here the problem for your policy prescription is again, as I’ve repeatedly said here, that Iran can never catch up with the countries which currently have nuclear arsenals, specifically Israel.
While Iran might be able to develop and deploy nuclear weapons first and thus stay ahead of countries like the current Iraq, should they decide to do so, all that would do is influence those other countries to develop nukes as well. The end result would be the same as Iran’s current position: those other countries will never catch up to Iran, let alone Israel and Pakistan.
But the result would be nuclear proliferation throughout the region. While the end result might be some sort of “MAD” doctrine prevailing, I don’t think any one really wants MORE nuclear weapons running around a volatile region like the Middle East.
There simply is no validity to your policy prescription for Iran. It’s all costs and little benefit.
test
Eric,
I certainly can’t state for sure that the US will attack Iran regardless. All I can do is point out that the US has attacked numerous countries where the possession of nuclear weapons was not even a remote possibility. And that the US talks about attacking Iran so casually and so frequently -and did so even during the Khatami Additional Protocol period- that it’s not unreasonable to conclude that the US wishes to attack Iran.
Given that, it seems the only plausible long term deterrent to a US attack is a nuclear capability or an actual weapon.
RSH,
Iran does not need 50 or a hundred nuclear weapons. It needs 3-4. I have no idea how far away they are from developing a delivery system. But they successfully put a satellite in space in early 2009.
It does not need to deliver the weapon to Washington. In fact, it probably doesn’t even need to send it to Tel Aviv. If it can send it across the Gulf to Saudi Arabia’s largest oil fields, it will probably be enough to deter anyone from attacking Iran.
Now maybe Iran will be attacked before that happens. Or even IF that happens. But you have stated frequently that an attack on Iran is a forgone conclusion regardless. So why should Iran not at least try?
Lysander,
Indeed my point was that North Korea, among your five countries, is the one most threatened by the US, and because it has a bomb and the others don’t. I certainly don’t suggest that North Korea is under any meaningful threat from the US, but it doesn’t take much to beat out the other four contenders you mentioned – Japan, Brazil, Argentina, Burma. I just don’t think the US would even think about a military attack on North Korea – or think about North Korea, period – if it didn’t have a bomb. While it doesn’t attack North Korea now that North Korea has a bomb, I’m not entirely convinced, though many are, that there is any cause and effect relationship there. I think the answer has more to do with (1) China, which considers that area of the world to be its playground, not the US’ (a fact that the US understands and reluctantly accepts); and (2) the fact that the US really doesn’t care all that much about the situation in that neck of the woods (as compared to the Middle East, at least).
Turning to your main argument, it amounts to little more than assuming your conclusion: Since (you argue) the US will attack Iran at the first opportunity if it can get away with it at an acceptable cost, Iran should develop a nuclear deterrent before that opportunity arises.
Hard to argue with that, but it requires that one accept your premise: that the US’ decision whether to attack Iran is not influenced at all by the US’ assessment of the nuclear-weapons risk posed by Iran. You simply declare that that risk assessment makes no difference whatsoever to the US. I, however, think it does matter. If the US believed that Iran was working on a bomb, I think the US would soon attack Iran to prevent that – whether or not that effort would be successful. Since I don’t think Iran is working on a bomb or will start doing so any time soon, I don’t think this is a practical risk.
What worries me much more is that I think the US might make the same decision if it becomes uncertain whether Iran has reached the point of no return. That is why I think Iran should take reasonable steps to prevent the US from mistakenly believing it is closer to that point than it really is. I’ve made clear that Iran should not agree to let the US, the IAEA, or anyone else snoop around in Iran’s sensitive military matters. To the contrary, I’ve recommended that Iran make clear that it will draw a clear line to prevent that. But I’ve also made clear that I think Iran would be well-advised to take reasonable steps – such as observing the Additional Protocol – so that the US does not mistakenly believe Iran has passed the point of no return (or claims to believe that even if it doesn’t).
I’m not naive enough to believe that the US would start liking Iran if the US were entirely confident that Iran did not have nuclear weapons and never would. I agree with you on that. But I don’t agree with you that the US will attack Iran whenever it feels it can get away with it
Mr. Canning: “The irony is that foolish “supporters” of Israel, especially in the US, have made it difficult for Israel to act in its own best interests.”
That statement only goes half way. The rest of the way is saying that the leaders of Israel – and much of the population if the polls are correct – make it difficult for Israel to act in its own best interests.
It’s not the US’ fault, or Christian Zionists fault, that Jewish Zionists started this crap back in the nineteenth century.
Fiorangela: Good points: “They’re saying this in the CIA . . .in CENTCOM . . .in the Defense colleges; they’re saying this in the State Department, but it’s not reaching the topmost level of government. The point is, Castellio, there were and, presumably, still ARE staff and capability to analyze Israel, but they cannot make their voices heard at the decision-making levels of government.”
And here is the crux of my argument: If the ruling elites of the US are “not hearing”, WHY IS THAT? Is it really true that all these various corporate heads and other elites, who are of varying religious faiths, varying backgrounds, even varying original nationalities, are all fixated on some belief in American exceptionalism that they “hold these truths to be self-evident” that the US has to attack IRAQ?
Or is it that they DO hold ONE belief to be self-evident: money talks – bullshit walks? And Iraq is where a lot of oil is.
Again, I believe it’s both to some degree. Some of these people are Christian Zionists, some of these are Jewish Zionists, and a LOT of them – INCLUDING the Christian and Jewish Zionists – are greedy SOB’s or people who just don’t like foreigners (like my father who was such a bigot).
A perfect storm of venal emotional attitude, venal philosophy, venal religion, and venal greed.
I don’t think any more detailed explanation is necessary. Rotten people run this country as they do most countries.
The implication, however, is that without getting rid of the rotten people running the country, NOTHING is going to stop their continued depredations.
So the question boils down to: how do you get rid of the rotten people running the country?
My solution back in the early 1990′s: Shoot the bastards and blow the system up. I could have been that guy in Arizona yesterday. Unlike every one else, I applaud his results – if not his philosophy or his intelligence.
As I said earlier, quoting someone else, “The US is in that awkward stage where it is too late to work within the system, and too soon to shoot the bastards.”
Arizona shows we’re getting there.
My current solution: Sit back and let them destroy themselves. Meanwhile just try and prevent them from destroying ME. Charity begins at home.
Fyi: The primary problem with your nuclear-armed Iran is that without expending the bulk of its revenue on the deployment of nuclear weapons, it will decades before it can even begin to catch up with the nuclear arsenals of Pakistan and Israel, let alone the US. It will also be at least a decade before it could develop missile systems capable of delivering those weapons to Pakistan or Israel, and more decades before it could develop systems capable of delivering them to the US in a manner which might be considered a real deterrent.
No one is going to allow that to happen. It’s that simple.
I’ve been criticized here for offering prescriptions for action that are not achievable. So while you may be right that Iran, given her situation, probably SHOULD have a nuclear arsenal equivalent to Pakistan and Israel, if not the US, the fact remains that Iran will never have such an arsenal in time to make a difference.
This is probably why you are insistent on suggesting that Israel has fewer weapons than the consensus of world intelligence agencies believes. You simply can’t accept that Iran is WAY too far behind to ever be a significant threat to Israel before Israel would act to remove that threat.
Sorry, but you’re wrong – and the burden of proof is not on anyone but you to prove your claims about Israel’s arsenal.
And I will repeat again that your prescription appears to go entirely against what the Iranian leadership has decided is in Iran’s best interests.
Fiorangela: Agree with your 12:09 post. It’s important to separate anti-Zionism from anti-Semitism and keep it that way.
Mind you, as a radical Transhumanist, I’m opposed to all religions. So I oppose the Hebrew religion as well as the Christian and Islamic religions. But I am not opposed to any ethnicity. Anti-Semitism is opposed to a people, not a belief system, and thus is incorrect.
OTOH, having said that, as a radical Transhumanist, I don’t much like humans at all.
So I guess one could call me an “equal opportunity bigot”: I hate everybody. :-)
Well, not hot women… :-)
Off topic, “The Cape” premieres tonight on NBC. Summer Glau for the win!
Eric,
I know that, but I did not understand what you meant by;
“Of the five countries you mention here:
1. Which one has nuclear weapons?
2. Against which one does the US most often consider using the “military option?”
Is your point that North Korea is the most threatened on the list because it has nukes? Well, Iran does not have nukes. Iraq did not have nukes, Vietnam did not have Nukes, Panama and Serbia did not have nukes. Now it may be that Iran will be attacked before it has a chance to develop a nuclear weapon, (assuming it’s actually building one, which, apparently, it isn’t) But my point is that Iran WOULD be attacked the moment the US and Israel feel they can get away with it. (The AP will not prevent that for reasons that others have explained better than I can.)
That being the case, Iran’s best chance of long term survival is to build a credible nuclear capability at the least, if not an actual deterrent.
In short my point is this: The US and Israel would gladly attack Iran at the earliest opportunity, if done at an acceptable cost. This will be done REGARDLESS of whether Iran actually enriches uranium or not. Iran’s best chance is to build a nuclear capability and possibly an actual nuclear force of several deliverable bombs. Iran may be attacked while trying, but if it will be attacked anyway, then it might as well try.
If you find that logic flawed in some, I’m happy to hear your reasons why.
Maverick: “I can not see anyone standing in their way if they deccided to barge into S Arabia, with their nuclear arsenal and second strike capability they are impervious to any threat but will hold the world to ransom over the Saudi oil. No problem will come from the US or EU which is emotionally ad politically incapable of reacting to such an Israeli move. The only resistence can come from populous neighbouring countries of S Arabia not bought by US money.
Am I being too far-fetched?”
A little bit. Again, most countries not run by nutcase dictators like Saddam are fairly hesitant to just grab territory by outright invasion. To be slightly ironic, it’s considered “bad form” as the Brits might say. The US under Bush is one of the few countries that do it, but even they have to manufacture an excuse, no matter how lame.
Israel is the other country that is willing and able to do it, but again, because they are trying to promote the facade of being “the only democracy in the Middle East”, they have to come up excuses for their invasions of neighboring countries.
Also, there IS the issue that, despite Saudi Arabia being a client state of the US, it STILL holds the oil and I’m sure they have ways of screwing the oil fields before Israel could dominate the country. And they know and the US knows and Israel knows that this would be bad for the US economy and US relations, so again every one has to be a bit hesitant about using naked force.
Israel isn’t really impervious to anyone. If they were to tick off the US, the Russians or the Chinese – and maybe even a couple other countries with nukes – their “second strike” capability would not save them from being totaled.
In the same vein, despite the fact that the Muslim world doesn’t like them, if they were to invade Mecca, the Muslim world would really turn on them, and despite their nuclear arsenal, they wouldn’t last long.
It’s a matter of risk and reward, checks and balances, and as history shows it takes quite a bit of maneuvering for countries to manage to grab more than their share of territory and resources.
People like Hitler end up getting their countries crushed. It’s a lesson I think Israel knows, at least pays lip service to, which is why they are careful to maneuver the US into doing their dirty work for them as much as possible and prepare excuses for such dirty work as they do themselves.
They are, after all, as Arnold frequently points out, a mere six million people in a sea of 200 million who don’t like them. It’s tempting fate to try outright violence against that whole sea at once, nuclear weapons or not.
Persian Gulf,
“if U.S was that quick, why did she allow NK to leave NPT without immediately testing a nuclear device?”
See my post of 5:40 PM, second paragraph.
“and why doesn’t she do it now?”
See my post of 5:40 PM, second paragraph.
Lysander,
The answer to both of my questions, of course, is “North Korea.” It’s the only one of the 5 countries you mentioned that has a nuclear bomb, and yet the one of the five that is most likely to be attacked by the US. Many argue that North Korea’s possession of a nuclear weapon prevents the US from attacking it, and so Iran should get itself one of those too, or at least get itself far enough along that the US is left guessing and thus reluctant to attack Iran.
Maybe that’s correct about North Korea, but I consider that a far more important reason is North Korea’s proximity to a certain large country that is not pleased by US meddling in that part of the world and would be even less pleased if the US increased that meddling by carrying out or seriously threatening a military attack on North Korea.
Even if people draw this conclusion correctly about North Korea, I am confident that the US will not let Iran either develop a nuclear bomb or reach the point where the US is sufficiently uncertain that it concludes it cannot stop Iran from developing one and dropping it on some nearby US ally. Some people apparently believe that Iran can somehow sneak into this status without the US noticing, and some even claim to think that the US believes Iran is already there. I think the US is confident that Iran is still far short of that status, and that it remains well within the US’ capability to keep it from getting there.
Eric,
if U.S was that quick, why did she allow NK to leave NPT without immediately testing a nuclear device? and why doesn’t she do it now? it’s easier when the perception is that there is no bomb. there is higher chance of success.
of course, I don’t advocate leaving NPT when the bomb is not ready; secretly I mean. 16-days period is shorter than the time needed to call IAEA for inspection, I think. and that’s with P1 and industrial scale. I am not sure if it’s feasible to do it in a small scale with longer time; higher security level.
Lysander,
I’m not sure why you suggest I’d like Iran to stop enriching uranium. With not a single exception, I’ve always made clear that I think Iran should not abandon enrichment. Quite to the contrary, I think that dangling an AP-commitment as an enticement to the US in negotiations makes it more likely that Iran will end up agreeing to enrichment restrictions. That’s why I’d take that off the negotiating table. If I were Iran, I’d accomplish that simply by agreeing to observe the AP, thus showing my good faith, draw a clear line that put an end to over-reaching questions about military matters, and be very reluctant to agree to enrichment restrictions.
Whatever enrichment restrictions ended up in some agreement, I am confident those restrictions would be no more onerous for Iran than they would have been had it not already begun observing the AP.
Eric A. Brill – Among the so-called P5+1, Germany is the only one ZOG, which doesn’t have a stockpile of nuclear bombs – but do have the “capability” to produce a nuclear device within six months. Islamic Republic also going for to achieve that “capability”. Canada, Brazil and Japan has achieved that “capability” long time ago.
Brazil and Argentina are demonized by the Zionist world mafia – because both countries have not only diplomatic relation with the Zionist entity – but also they don’t support Islamic Resistance groups such as Hamas and Hizbullah.
The countries which have nuclear weapons in addition to the P5, are – India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea.
Both the US and Israel have threatened to use nuclear weapons against other countries when they fail to win through conventional arms.
Persian Gulf,
The one-year time frame for Iran to complete a bomb after its withdrawal from the NPT is not my estimate. I have no idea what the time frame would be; if pressed, I’d estimate something much shorter. I note you point to a 16-day estimate.
My only point is that, whatever the proper time frame would be – or whatever the US government considered it to be when it learned of Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT – the US would fire up its bombers long before that time frame had passed.
If the US government thought the time frame was 16 days, for example, I suspect it’s thinking would go something like this:
“16 days? OK, let’s divide that by four just to be safe, and then subtract three more days for good measure. So let’s get those bombers in the air within the next 24 hours at the latest. Sooner, if possible.”
That’s why – though I certainly don’t advocate Iran’s development of a bomb or think it is attempting to do so – I’d never withdraw from the NPT if I were Iran and wanted to develop a bomb. I’d simply comply with the NPT as long as possible, pretend I was complying with it as long as possible after that, and work very feverishly on the finishing touches once neither of those two approaches remained feasible.
Eric, I’m not sure I understand you’re point or that you understand mine.
Is it your contention that if Iran ceased enriching uranium it would cease to be threatened? That we’d all be friends then?
I thank Rehmat for exposing the lies of the Zionist Javedanfar. And also to others on this list like Fiorangela who continue to remain vigilant against the Zionist lies in the Zionist Western media!
FYI,
“Furthermore, if I were a soldier, I would have hoped that my high-command would do its best to kill the enemy soldiers and protect my life.”
Doesn’t this mean every country involved in a war, or that might be involved in a war, has a moral duty to protect its soldiers by developing nuclear weapons?
Doesn’t this strike you as an unrealistic statement (coming, as so often happens, from one who considers himself a “realist”)? Why press such an argument? Surely you don’t believe that.
fyi:
I think, you need to consider this fact that “kooshy” lives in a city that is in the road to incarnate Cyrus the Great ;). generally, I have a very bad image for those Iranians insisting on “culture”! (a total b*******) it gives me an impression of “s********” (I am sorry to say this. I have actually a great deal of admiration for him). I am glad decades of living in the U.S did not have that effect on your mind. Iran is considered as rogue state in some part of the planet. her status would not change by a nuclear test. Iran’s status will even rise in the Arab and Muslim world by that test. I don’t think Indian or Chines world would care about a nuclear test, nor for that matter South American’ and African’. the spread of the nuclear weapon is inherent in the uncertainty of modernity.
Eric:
I have seen before in an analysis made in a U.S think thank that with 3000 P1 centrifuges, 3.5% enriched uranium needs around 16 days (or 32, not sure which one-and can’t find the report at the moment) to make a 20kg bomb of 90% purity. after all, Iran is a big country with so many mountains. your one year time lag is not right, I think.
Meir: Iran’s next Spiritual Leader
Meir Javedanfar is an Iranian-born Israeli Jew who is Israel’s “expert” on Iran-Israel affairs. He is Chief Analyst at Tel-Aviv-based ‘Middle East Economic and Political Analysis Company’. Earlier he had worked as “In-house Israeli affairs expert” for BBC Persian and the Spanish Embassy in Israel.
Naturally, with all those ‘progressive credentials’ – The West has to accept Meir’s anti-Iran and anti-Islam crap on face value. His latest rant, titled “The Missing Ayatullah” was published by Zionist mouthpiece, THE DIPLOMAT, on November 26, 2010.
In this rant he target not Iranian President Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but the real power behind the Islamic regime in Tehran – The Guadian of 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatullah Sayed Ali Khamenei. Meir claims that Ayatullah Khamenei has lost his popularity. Why? Because the a senior “Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani during his recent visit to Qom refused to meet Ayatullah Khamanei”. Furthermore, Meir states that his sources in the “democratic Green Movement (a CIA, Mossad and MI6 funded front), Khorasani didn’t even want to be in the same city as Khamenei”. Since Meir admits that Khorasani did go to Qom – I wonder who is the professional liar; the Jew or his source in the Green Movement? In reality the truth was the otherway around. Ayatullah Khamenei had earlier blasted Ayatullah Khorasani for his anti-Sunni (15% of Iran’s total population) sectarian views.
I do like to thank Meir for proving that their is more ‘freedom of thought’ in the Islamic Republic than the US or Israel. Whatever, reasons the Khorasani avoided meeting Khamenei – no group in Iran called Ahmadinejad’s government to censor as the Jewish organizations called Ben-Obama to censor the leader of the Nation of Islam Minister Farakhan for telling Abe Foxman of Anti-Defamation League (an Israeli lobby group) that Jews were behind the African slavery in the US. In the Zionist racist-regime, an Arab Knesset member was hounded by the Zio-dogs for boarding the Gaza Freedom Flotilla on which nine Turkish aid workers were murdered by Zionazi thugs in cold-blood on May 31, 2010 at the international waters.
Meir’s second holy prediction is that Ayatullah Khamenei is trying to gather support for the appointment of his son, Mojtaba, as his successor. Meir narrates his Jewish knowledge of Muslim history to prove his point. He wrote that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) had appointed his cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Talib his successor during his first and last pilgrimage to Holy Ka’aba (Makkah) in the company of 120,000 of his followers. Now, it’s as much a myth as the biblical G-d promising the ‘Holy Land’ to the Jews.
The leadership in Islam is not hereditary. It’s also written in the Constitution. When Imam Khomeini passed-away on June 3, 1989 – His son Ayatullah Ahmad, who was asked by the members of the Guardian Council to succeed his late father as the Leader of the Islamic Revolution – declined the offer and recommended the former President of the Islamic Republic, Ayatullah Ali Khamenei.
The leadership in the Zionist entity is hereditary based on who is the greatest terrorist or mass-murderer. All Israeli Prime Ministers and some of country’s Presidents have either been leaders of the European Jewish terrorist militias or general of Israel Occupation Army (IOF).
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2011/01/09/meir-irans-next-spiritual-leader/
Lysander,
Good to hear your thoughts, as always. But I have two questions raised by what you wrote:
“There is no modern state that is under greater threat than Iran today. John McCain did not sing “bomb bomb Japan.” Hillary Clinton did not threaten to “obliterate” Brazil. The media does not, night and day, demonize Argentina. The congress does not ceaselessly call for more and more sanctions and military action against Burma. The president does not constantly talk about his military “option” against North Korea. Anyone not seeing this is blind.”
Of the five countries you mention here:
1. Which one has nuclear weapons?
2. Against which one does the US most often consider using the “military option?”
I wanted to weigh in on the disagreement between fyi and some others on whether Iran should go fully nuclear. Let me make the following points.
1) Arab public opinion (at least in Egypt) is quite strongly behind Iran. Not because of some “moral high ground” of not building nukes, but because it stands up for its own interests and for the Palestinians while Arab governments openly and shamelessly collaborate with Israel and the US. In fact, as far as Arab public opinion is concerned, Iran can’t get nukes fast enough. Were Iran to test a nuclear weapon today, there would be joy in the streets of Cairo.
2) There is no modern state that is under greater threat than Iran today. John McCain did not sing “bomb bomb Japan.” Hillary Clinton did not threaten to “obliterate” Brazil. The media does not, night and day, demonize Argentina. The congress does not ceaselessly call for more and more sanctions and military action against Burma. The president does not constantly talk about his military “option” against North Korea. Anyone not seeing this is blind.
Given this, I believe Iran should pursue its nuclear program (under the NPT) as fast and best as it can. Build as many centrifuges as possible. Produce low and medium enriched uranium by the tonne. Create a stockpile of plutonium from Arak. And develop its space program to the point where satellite launches become routine.
In other words, Iran should put itself within a turn of the screw of making several bombs along with their delivery systems. Whether it should turn the screw depends on future circumstances.
FYI,
“I do not beleive moral high-ground will help the Iranian people; I have no doubt that with the posession of nuclear weapons, Iraq would not have dared to use chemical weapons against Iran.”
You’re probably right. Saddam Hussein probably would have put his chemical weapons back on the shelf and redoubled his effort to develop nuclear weapons. Who knows – had that happened, maybe he’d have been far enough along by January 1991 that the US would have been reluctant to attack him in Kuwait.
PRECEDING POST, WITH MINOR TYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTION:
BiBiJon,
Thank you for your thoughtful response (and, by the way, your website is very interesting).
I recognize that Iran got no concrete “tit for tat” by observing the Additional Protocol (AP) several years ago. The West did not keep its promises. This unpleasant experience causes many now to insist that Iran should hold out for a new promise before it re-commits to the AP. In other words, since it didn’t work last time, try the same approach again. I find this logic a bit hard to understand.
Those who accept the “hold out for a new promise” logic undoubtedly contemplate that Iran would insist next time on performed promises, not just spoken promises. But all promises necessarily start out as spoken promises. If the West fails (again) to perform whatever it promises, Iran may of course stop observing the AP, just as Iran did several years ago. Just as last time, most of the world – justifiably or not – probably would conclude that Iran (1) was not warranted in doing so; and (2) must have something sinister to hide. In short, if Iran has little or no faith that the West will keep its promises next time, and still can do nothing in response except to terminate its own conditional undertakings, is it really wise for Iran to put itself in the very same position once again?
Note that even this question presupposes a realistic possibility that Iran could “trade” its commitment to the AP for something worthwhile in return. I very seriously doubt such a deal is possible. Even if Iran can find some way (1) to ensure that the West would keep whatever promises it may make in exchange for Iran’s commitment to observe the AP, or (2) to avoid the adverse consequences (still-more-heightened Western suspicion of Iran’s nuclear intentions) that inevitably would follow if the West once again reneges on its promise and Iran responds by ceasing to observe the AP, I am confident in making this prediction: Any effort by Iran to use the AP as a bargaining chip will merely induce the US to either (a) continue on its present course: insist that Iran’s stubbornness is evidence that it is developing nuclear weapons; or (b) propose a “bargain” that will be very unattractive to Iran.
The newly offered bargain almost certainly would not include unrestricted enrichment rights (if you recall, the previous “deal” required just the opposite: a (temporary) suspension of all enrichment); instead, it would include several restrictions that Iran finds very objectionable (I could give examples, but I’m confident every reader can imagine well enough what the US would demand). The offered bargain also would require Iran to do more than merely observe the AP; for example, it probably would include some broad commitment, with no deadline, to answer IAEA questions about Iran’s possible military uses of nuclear material – the very sort of questions to which Iran has firmly objected since 2008, and grumbled about even before then. As for the sanctions, the proposed bargain probably would include an up-front commitment to remove only a few minor sanctions, and a well-hedged promise to remove more sanctions later if Iran performs its part of the bargain (translation: no meaningful reduction of sanctions when the deal is struck, and near-inevitable “deal creep” later on when Iran insists that sanctions be meaningfully reduced or eliminated).
If such a “bargain” is offered, Iran will have two choices, neither of them attractive:
1. Take the deal, in which case it will have agreed to restrictions it presently finds objectionable (and which it presently doesn’t observe, for that very reason) and will have agreed to provide information it now resists giving (especially concerning military matters). In other words, Iran will have given up a great deal more than just freedom from observing the AP, and it will have received a great deal less than it had expected to get in return for agreeing to that. In that light, how valuable a “bargaining chip” will an AP-commitment prove to have been?
2. Reject the deal, in which case Iran will be no better off than it is now, and the US will be in an even stronger position to say “See? We told you so. Iran refuses to disclose what 100 other countries willingly disclose. It must be hiding something very dangerous indeed.”
Given those two unattractive choices, it strikes me that Iran would be wiser instead to follow one of these two courses:
1. Continue not to observe the AP, thereby avoiding the burden of additional disclosures and maintaining its “dignity” by not giving up “something for nothing.”
2. Better, declare that it will observe the AP unconditionally (and then proceed to do so), but also announce that, having expanded its disclosures to the very same extent as nearly all other NPT parties (and well beyond what some NPT parties disclose – Brazil and Egypt, for example), it is nevertheless drawing the line short of what the IAEA unjustifiably demands from Iran but not from other countries: “transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals [and] documentation … as the Agency may request….” (translation: probing into sensitive military matters, with no apparent limits). Iran could add that it nevertheless will continue to cooperate in specifically defined ways to answer IAEA questions about the “alleged studies,” provided that a very clear arrangement is made to put an end to such IAEA questions, once and for all. Iran could point out that it has been answering such questions since the early part of the last decade, and regrets that its past cooperation has been misinterpreted by the IAEA as an open-ended undertaking to disclose sensitive military information that is not required under the NPT, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement or the Additional Protocol.
You undoubtedly are correct that Iran’s commitment to the AP would be met with yet another moving of the goalposts by the US and perhaps others. As you mention, for example (with a bit of intentional hyperbole, I hope), the US might demand that Khamenei take a polygraph test. But I don’t think the US can always count on having public opinion on its side when it moves the goalposts. It usually does now, but it inevitably seeks such support by citing Iran’s rejection of the AP – its refusal to disclose what approximately 100 other countries willingly disclose.
It would be wonderful for Iran if, as you suggest Iran should demand, Barack Obama would sign some piece of paper promising, for example, “that sanctions will be lifted at exact same time as AP gets reinstituted.” There are only two problems with that suggestion: (1) this will never happen, nor will anything remotely approaching such a commitment ever be given; and (2) even if it happened, Iran would be left with no more than another promise from the West, just as it had the last time it committed to the AP. It’s not clear to me why such a promise would be so much desired by Iran, since the likely consequence of that promise would be much the same as it was last time: (a) the US would not perform, at least not without demanding that Iran take additional steps that were not part of the deal struck; (b) in response, Iran would terminate its commitment to the AP; and (c) the US would “spin” Iran’s response as still more evidence of Iran’s bad faith and warlike intentions.
True, if all that occurred (again) – or if Iran simply “hangs tough” and refuses to observe the AP – Iran may receive even greater support from Turkey, Brazil, the non-aligned movement, and other countries, groups and individuals who do not possess powerful weapons that can be used to attack Iran, nor economic power sufficient to punish Iran severely even without attacking it. The only countries that will be displeased will be the ones that possess such powerful military and economic weapons but may still lack enough support to get those weapons used against Iran as effectively as they would like. This group will welcome whatever help Iran can provide to boost public support to the critical level.
A narrow but nevertheless important point: If Iran indeed is not seeking nuclear weapons, complying with the AP won’t be all that burdensome, especially after the initial disclosures. I don’t recall that Iran complained much about this burden when it previously complied with the AP. While I am quite concerned about the recent targeting of Iranian nuclear scientists, no scientist (or any other individual) needs to be identified to comply with the AP. While some argue that AP language can be interpreted to allow IAEA inspectors to snoop around military installations that happen to be in the same neighborhood as some disclosed nuclear facility, I consider this to be an interpretive stretch, and have little or no doubt Iran justifiably would draw the line short of that.
I acknowledge that Iran cannot count on the IAEA to maintain confidentiality – the IAEA’s record has been abysmal on that score – and so more AP disclosures arguably would yield more US targets if the US ever decided to attack. But I suspect the US already has precise coordinates for most of those targets and many more; what few new targets would be added to the list probably won’t matter much to the US – certainly not enough to persuade the US to attack if it had not otherwise been inclined to do so. More important, the goal of all this would be to ensure that the US doesn’t decide to attack in the first place, and I predict that following the course I suggest would greatly reduce that risk. Some people insist that the US uses the nuclear dispute as a mere “smoke screen” and that may be true for many within the US government (not to mention outsiders such as John Bolton). But I am confident that enough people within the US government, and among the indispensable American public that would need to support an attack on Iran, do consider the nuclear dispute to be a “real” issue and, therefore, that increased disclosures by Iran would reduce the risk of an attack by the US.
Despite all this, I don’t foresee any material risk of a US attack in the near future. But if certain pieces presently in place were to disappear or diminish significantly in importance, I might be much less confident about that. For example, if the Iraq and Afghanistan wars end (and no new US war takes their place), the US economy becomes much stronger, Obama is no longer president, and Obama’s replacement is more strongly influenced than he by outsiders (or insiders) pressing for war on Iran, I might become considerably less confident that the US would not attack Iran – especially if, in the meantime, Iran has maintained its current refusal to observe the Additional Protocol.
All in all, though neither I nor anyone else can predict the consequences, I see considerable upside, and little downside, from an Iranian commitment to observe the AP and, conversely, little upside and considerable downside from Iran’s continued refusal to do so.
BiBiJon,
Thank you for your thoughtful response (and, by the way, your website is very interesting).
I recognize that Iran got no concrete “tit for tat” by observing the Additional Protocol (AP) several years ago. The West did not keep its promises. This unpleasant experience causes many now to insist that Iran should hold out for a new promise before it re-commits to the AP. In other words, since it didn’t work last time, try the same approach again. I find this logic a bit hard to understand.
Those who accept the “hold out for a new promise” logic undoubtedly contemplate that Iran would insist next time on performed promises, not just spoken promises. But all promises necessarily start out as spoken promises. If the West fails (again) to perform whatever it promises, Iran may of course stop observing the AP, just as Iran did several years ago. Just as last time, most of the world – justifiably or not – probably would conclude that Iran (1) was not warranted in doing so; and (2) must have something sinister to hide. In short, if Iran has little or no faith that the West will keep its promises next time, and still can do nothing in response except to terminate its own conditional undertakings, is it really wise for Iran to put itself in the very same position once again?
Note that even this question presupposes a realistic possibility that Iran could “trade” its commitment to the AP for something worthwhile in return. I very seriously doubt such a deal is possible. Even if Iran can find some way (1) to ensure that the West would keep whatever promises it may make in exchange for Iran’s commitment to observe the AP, or (2) to avoid the adverse consequences (still-more-heightened Western suspicion of Iran’s nuclear intentions) that inevitably would follow if the West once again reneges on its promise and Iran responds by ceasing to observe the AP, I am confident in making this prediction: Any effort by Iran to use the AP as a bargaining chip will merely induce the US to either (a) continue on its present course: insist that Iran’s stubbornness is evidence that it is developing nuclear weapons; or (b) propose a “bargain” that will be very unattractive to Iran.
The newly offered bargain almost certainly would not include unrestricted enrichment rights (if you recall, the previous “deal” required just the opposite: a term; instead, it would include several restrictions that Iran finds very objectionable (I could give examples, but I’m confident every reader can imagine well enough what the US would demand). The offered bargain also would require Iran to do more than merely observe the AP; for example, it probably would include some broad commitment, with no deadline, to answer IAEA questions about Iran’s possible military uses of nuclear material – the very sort of questions to which Iran has firmly objected since 2008, and grumbled about even before then. As for the sanctions, the proposed bargain probably would include an up-front commitment to remove only a few minor sanctions, and a well-hedged promise to remove more sanctions later if Iran performs its part of the bargain (translation: no meaningful reduction of sanctions when the deal is struck, and near-inevitable “deal creep” later on when Iran insists that sanctions be meaningfully reduced or eliminated).
If such a “bargain” is offered, Iran will have two choices, neither of them attractive:
1. Take the deal, in which case it will have agreed to restrictions it presently finds objectionable (and which it presently doesn’t observe, for that very reason) and will have agreed to provide information it now resists giving (especially concerning military matters). In other words, Iran will have given up a great deal more than just freedom from observing the AP, and it will have received a great deal less than it had expected to get in return for agreeing to that. In that light, how valuable a “bargaining chip” will an AP-commitment prove to have been?
2. Reject the deal, in which case Iran will be no better off than it is now, and the US will be in an even stronger position to say “See? We told you so. Iran refuses to disclose what 100 other countries willingly disclose. It must be hiding something very dangerous indeed.”
Given those two unattractive choices, it strikes me that Iran would be wiser instead to follow one of these two courses:
1. Continue not to observe the AP, thereby avoiding the burden of additional disclosures and maintaining its “dignity” by not giving up “something for nothing.”
2. Better, declare that it will observe the AP unconditionally (and then proceed to do so), but also announce that, having expanded its disclosures to the very same extent as nearly all other NPT parties (and well beyond what some NPT parties disclose – Brazil and Egypt, for example), it is nevertheless drawing the line short of what the IAEA unjustifiably demands from Iran but not from other countries: “transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals [and] documentation … as the Agency may request….” (translation: probing into sensitive military matters, with no apparent limits). Iran could add that it nevertheless will continue to cooperate in specifically defined ways to answer IAEA questions about the “alleged studies,” provided that a very clear arrangement is made to put an end to such IAEA questions, once and for all. Iran could point out that it has been answering such questions since the early part of the last decade, and regrets that its past cooperation has been misinterpreted by the IAEA as an open-ended undertaking to disclose sensitive military information that is not required under the NPT, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement or the Additional Protocol.
You undoubtedly are correct that Iran’s commitment to the AP would be met with yet another moving of the goalposts by the US and perhaps others. As you mention, for example (with a bit of intentional hyperbole, I hope), the US might demand that Khamenei take a polygraph test. But I don’t think the US can always count on having public opinion on its side when it moves the goalposts. It usually does now, but it inevitably seeks such support by citing Iran’s rejection of the AP – its refusal to disclose what approximately 100 other countries willingly disclose.
It would be wonderful for Iran if, as you suggest Iran should demand, Barack Obama would sign some piece of paper promising, for example, “that sanctions will be lifted at exact same time as AP gets reinstituted.” There are only two problems with that suggestion: (1) this will never happen, nor will anything remotely approaching such a commitment ever be given; and (2) even if it happened, Iran would be left with no more than another promise from the West, just as it had the last time it committed to the AP. It’s not clear to me why such a promise would be so much desired by Iran, since the likely consequence of that promise would be much the same as it was last time: (a) the US would not perform, at least not without demanding that Iran take additional steps that were not part of the deal struck; (b) in response, Iran would terminate its commitment to the AP; and (c) the US would “spin” Iran’s response as still more evidence of Iran’s bad faith and warlike intentions.
True, if all that occurred (again) – or if Iran simply “hangs tough” and refuses to observe the AP – Iran may receive even greater support from Turkey, Brazil, the non-aligned movement, and other countries, groups and individuals who do not possess powerful weapons that can be used to attack Iran, nor economic power sufficient to punish Iran severely even without attacking it. The only countries that will be displeased will be the ones that possess such powerful military and economic weapons but may still lack enough support to get those weapons used against Iran as effectively as they would like. This group will welcome whatever help Iran can provide to boost public support to the critical level.
A narrow but nevertheless important point: If Iran indeed is not seeking nuclear weapons, complying with the AP won’t be all that burdensome, especially after the initial disclosures. I don’t recall that Iran complained much about this burden when it previously complied with the AP. While I am quite concerned about the recent targeting of Iranian nuclear scientists, no scientist (or any other individual) needs to be identified to comply with the AP. While some argue that AP language can be interpreted to allow IAEA inspectors to snoop around military installations that happen to be in the same neighborhood as some disclosed nuclear facility, I consider this to be an interpretive stretch, and have little or no doubt Iran justifiably would draw the line short of that.
I acknowledge that Iran cannot count on the IAEA to maintain confidentiality – the IAEA’s record has been abysmal on that score – and so more AP disclosures arguably would yield more US targets if the US ever decided to attack. But I suspect the US already has precise coordinates for most of those targets and many more; what few new targets would be added to the list probably won’t matter much to the US – certainly not enough to persuade the US to attack if it had not otherwise been inclined to do so. More important, the goal of all this would be to ensure that the US doesn’t decide to attack in the first place, and I predict that following the course I suggest would greatly reduce that risk. Some people insist that the US uses the nuclear dispute as a mere “smoke screen” and that may be true for many within the US government (not to mention outsiders such as John Bolton). But I am confident that enough people within the US government, and among the indispensable American public that would need to support an attack on Iran, do consider the nuclear dispute to be a “real” issue and, therefore, that increased disclosures by Iran would reduce the risk of an attack by the US.
Despite all this, I don’t foresee any material risk of a US attack in the near future. But if certain pieces presently in place were to disappear or diminish significantly in importance, I might be much less confident about that. For example, if the Iraq and Afghanistan wars end (and no new US war takes their place), the US economy becomes much stronger, Obama is no longer president, and Obama’s replacement is more strongly influenced than he by outsiders (or insiders) pressing for war on Iran, I might become considerably less confident that the US would not attack Iran – especially if, in the meantime, Iran has maintained its current refusal to observe the Additional Protocol.
All in all, though neither I nor anyone else can predict the consequences, I see considerable upside, and little downside, from an Iranian commitment to observe the AP and, conversely, little upside and considerable downside from Iran’s continued refusal to do so.
Fyi
“I do not believe moral high-ground will help the Iranian people; I have no doubt that with the possession of nuclear weapons, Iraq would not have dared to use chemical weapons against Iran”
Iraq in her aggression against Iran was encouraged, authorized, supported and supplied by US and western states to use chemical weapon, if Iran at time possessed nuclear weapons Iraq would have been supplied and encouraged and justified to make a first strike nuclear attack against Iran, Iran’s decision not to use chemical weapons was a correct decision in that war.
Iran in a cleaver way should and will defend her NPT rights, but Iran should not and would not, in a dumb move, facilitate a justifiable attack, like Japan in 41 or Ben Laden in 01 did.
Not accepting the AP is one thing, but leaving NPT and making bomb is one thing, one shouldn’t get carried away.
One old saying says “opinions are like………………..”
kooshy says: January 9, 2011 at 2:08 pm
I have endeavoured to demonstrate that Iran has very serious security concerns that could only be addressed, in my opinion, by the posession of nuclear weapons.
I do not beleive moral high-ground will help the Iranian people; I have no doubt that with the posession of nuclear weapons, Iraq would not have dared to use chemical weapons against Iran. Furthermore, if I were a soldier, I would have hoped that my high-command would do its best to kill the enemy soldiers and protect my life.
The US-EU Axis, the Russians, and the Chinese all stated that they were shocked, shocked that there was a very robust and vigorous nuclear weapons program in Iraq. That program, as its potential target, was meant for Iran. Iraq only needed to recuperate, arm herself with the nuclear weapons, and restart the war.
It was only the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq that saved Iran – a fluke.
Now, you and others may want to tell the Iranians that their security is not threathened – well – go ahead and make that argument. I would like to hear that too since I might be mistaken.
The Iran-Iraq War was a seminal event in the Middle East, like WWI and WWII combined. The use of one class of WMD by one belligerent – endoresed by the so-called International Community – and the pursuit of a second class by the same belligerent – with probable knowledge of a number of international actors – expands the possibilities of war in future wars. And not just in the Middle East but elsewhere as well.
Given this history, the Middle East as a nuclear weapons free zone is not even a pipe-dream. It is a dangerous delusion. Israelis will be well-advised to keep their nuclear assets, in fact.
I personally hope that there is a special place in Hell for those who gave us the Iran-Iraq War.
James Canning, thank you for your comment re India.
I recall reading an article in New Yorker magazine many years ago about India’s burgeoning population of highly-educated but unemployed young people. It was a major problem, straining the very highest levels of government to resolve.
India seems to have developed industries to absorb its talented people. As India continues to develop — along with China — the entire region will require resources.
It is a profound tragedy that: -US is entering a period where its young people will not find dynamic outlets for their intellectual and work energies; will US be able to survive the trial and emerge as India has done?
-the US is consistently missing opportunities to form alliances with all, enmity with none, in order to achieve a moderate and honest sense of fair trade and use of the world’s resources. Instead, the US still thinks it’s the bully on the block who gets to choose winners and losers. Chicken with its head cut off, and it doesn’t yet know it’s dead.
kooshy says: January 9, 2011 at 2:42 pm
Japan is a semi-sovereign state, occupied by US and under the US nuclear blanket of security.
There is no concievable and practical manner that external powers can assure Iran of her continued existence. None.
Iran must rely on her own devices.
Eric A. Brill says: January 9, 2011 at 2:04 pm
I have supplied a more extensive answer to Kooshy in a posting @ January 9, 2011 at 1:19 pm
James Canning says: January 9, 2011 at 1:42 pm
And you are fortunate that you are living under the nuclear blanket of security that US strategic planners have created for you.
Japan, is the only country that has been attacked by nukes, who would here argue that Japan should actively pursue a nuclear bomb program, true that consequentially and legally Japan currently possesses a nuclear capability and so does Iran, but if Japan leaves the NPT and tests a nuclear bomb, not only Japan will further endanger her security but she also immediately becomes a rouge state in world openion like what current US or Israel status is, in my opinion and many others on this planet, still after many years and perhaps forever US is suffering for the use of Nukes which considering the time and circumstances and lack of information technology was much easier decision to make that any time in this modern world.
With the understanding I have developed for this some forty years that I have lived here, if it was possible to use nukes US with a majority public approval (which is easy to prove a so and so poll) would have used it in Nam.
FYi
“The fact remains that the Islamic Republic of Iran, the successor state to the Safavid-Qajar states, was attacked by WMD. A very significant instrument of international disarmament was shredded when it came to Iran.”
FYI – I don’t understand what you are trying to say or do, but from your past posts, what I occasionally understand is that often you use Iran’s history out of context to recommend in my opinion a wrong prescription, case and point is what you sated above and what you conclude from it, true Iran was attacked with WMD, but she survived without resorting to use WMD to defend herself, with all likely hood the time and more importantly ability to sue nuclear weapons has come to end. Iranian official standing correctly is and it always should be that Iran not only doesn’t pursue WMD capabilities on strategic, and moral ground it believes no nations including Israel can ever use them against any enemies.
See in your cleaver posts you may not mention this but the reason Iran has such standing in Arab public opinion is that during war with Arab nationalists she did not kill Arab Sunni’s with WMD, so she can claim the moral high ground, there is no use of scaring Iran’s neighbors with WMD on the count of standing up to Israel , there is a better way to fight Israel, that is to delegitimizing it , but what you want to do it’s delegitimizing Iran by implementing a thought that Iran must want WMD and nukes, since it needs it for her survival, that’s why I got edgy.
In historical observation, regardless of change in form and kind of ruling government, a nation that continue to preserve her culture, language, and absorb (melting) incoming cultures is considered live, that is why as far as 1000 years ago a poet (Firdoosi) writes a book volumes about Iran, or do you need me to referee to 100s more poets and writers that during the entire period refer to their home as Iran.
FYI,
I asked you to confirm, and you did confirm (with a single word: “Yes.”) that you do believe this statement that appeared in an earlier post from you:
“The cohesion, survival, and the integrity of the Iranian state requires nuclear weapons.”
You might say that your reasons can be understood by one who looks back to your numerous posts on this and other threads. But it would help me, and others, if you could explain, in just one post, why you believe this.
fyi,
True, some colonists in what became the US did have fantasies of an empire taking in all of North American and perhaps more. Many other colonists were determined to remain part of the British Empire.
The annexation of Mexico and Cuba would have guaranteed the destruction of the Republic. The great Henry Clay vigorously opposed US annexation of Texas on grounds it would bring Civil War. He was of course quite right, though the civil war was an avoidable event.
Fiorangela,
India wants and of course needs stability and economic growth in all of South Asia. Its internal problems will require many decades to resolve even partially. War games players often go off into the realm of fantasy.
fyi,
Israel’s security would be enhanced if Israel accepted the Saudi peace plan and achieved normal relations with its neighbors. The irony is that foolish “supporters” of Israel, especially in the US, have made it difficult for Israel to act in its own best interests.
Castellio, one more swing at answering your question, “Does the American government have the ability, or staff, to analyse Israeli intentions objectively in any of its 16 (I think 16) intelligence gathering groups?” (fyi, you may be interested as well; Dower AND Sanho Tree attempt to wrap their heads around American “secular religion” and “group think” and exceptionalism.)
John Dower, professor of history who specialized in history of Japan, particularly in war years, recently complete and published, Cultures of War, in which he attempts to come to grips with American reactions to the destruction of the World Trade Center and those reactions in relation to US war-waging decisions and actions in World War II.
In the course of a conversation about the book with Sanho Tree, of the Institute for Policy Studies, Dower says: (from about 28 minutes)
“We became involved in what I call ‘faith-based secular thinking, in which we had our certain dogmatic ideas that were almost religious[ly held] . . .and the whole issue of underestimating the enemy [was clouded by that dogma]. . . .
“One of the striking things that emerged even after 9/11 was that the American government [here, Dower says it's important to distinguish between the US PEOPLE and the US GOVERNMENT] . . .there were many people in the US government all along, at almost every level, who were saying, ‘This is crazy — we should be going after Al Qaeda; war on Iraq is crazy.’ They’re saying this in the CIA . . .in CENTCOM . . .in the Defense colleges; they’re saying this in the State Department, but it’s not reaching the topmost level of government.
The point is, Castellio, there were and, presumably, still ARE staff and capability to analyze Israel, but they cannot make their voices heard at the decision-making levels of government. One caveat: if Mitchell Bard is to be believed, in the years since 9/11 and the war on Iraq, AIPAC worked to remove even more “Arabists” in the State Department and at positions very close to the president, and to replace those persons with “more experienced and effective people” — like Dennis Ross. (:http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/ArabLo)
The good news is that people like Dower are putting themselves to the difficult task of thinking through and writing about these painful issues. As Sanho Tree closed the conversation, he expressed the hope that Dower’s book would find its way into the nation’s war colleges.
I’m pleased to note that the library system in my town has about 10 copies of Dower’s book, and more-and-less pleased that most of them are NOT on the shelf but in the hands of patrons (-less pleased because I’m going to have to wait in line to borrow the book). The American people ARE paying attention.
In a terrible way, the acts of the shooter in Arizona can be interpreted as a demand to be heard. John Boehner still has not gotten the message: he thinks America’s elected representatives should be completely sheltered from negative consequences of the decisions they make.
In 2003 Americans in the millions massed on the streets to protest a war. Congress ignored the voices of the people.
In 2008, Americans voted for a president who promised to end the war in Iraq. He has not.
Can you hear me now?
fyi,
The people of Iran are fortunate that you are not in charge of Iranian defence strategy. The surest way to bring disaster to Iran is for Iran to seek nuclear weapons, particularly after leading the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons from the Middle East. War with Pakistan or India is exceedingly unlikely. And US use of nuclear weapons is virtually inconceivable.
kooshy says: January 9, 2011 at 12:53 pm
Yet again you are promoting a historical fallacy; that there were indeed such a thing as Iranian state that was in continuous existence; from the time of Cyrus the Great? Convniently skipping the Selucids, the Arab Conquest, the Seljuk Period, the Mongol Invasions, etc.
I am not trying to be pedantic here, rather I wish to correct misconceptions that seem to inform the minds of many men and women, that cause them to advocate unfruitful and unprofitable policies.
The fact remains that the Islamic Republic of Iran, the successor state to the Safavid-Qajar states, was attacked by WMD. A very significant instrument of international disarmament was shredded when it came to Iran.
It can happen again but this time with nuclear weapons.
Those who think that could never happen must be able to substantiate their claims on basis of the existing context as well as historical precedent.
There is an empirical observation that has been validated numerous times all over the world; that the highest probability of war obtains between neighbours.
With the nuclear weapons in the hands of Indians and Pakistanis any Iranian statesman must take into account the possibility of war with them. Furthermore, there is not guarantee at all that in the event of a war between Iran and some other non-nuclear state with Iran, the US-EU Axis, the Russians, the Chinese, or the Israelis will not give that adversary the know-how to build nuclear weapons in case the war with Iran starts to go badly for that state.
A nuclear armed Iran will also be immune to provocations and activities that helped break-up Yugoslavia.
Perhaps, as some others here have observed here and well as elsewhere, it is too late for Iran to leave NPT. That may be so (although I do not think so since things are always in the state of flux) but it is not too late to have the capability to become a nuclear-armed state if the survival of the polity is at stake.
If I were and Iranian leader, I would never trust any foreigner or any foreign power with the security of Iran nor would I hold any trust in the international treaties or other such niceties. US-EU Axis, Russia, China, and the Imperialist-in-Waiting called India are not to be trusted; hundreds of thousands of Iranians could be killed in a few minutes otherwise.
Fiorangela, good for you.
Eric A. Brill says: January 9, 2011 at 12:34 pm
FYI: “The cohesion, survival, and the integrity of the Iranian state requires nuclear weapons.”
Eric : “Do you really believe this?”
Yet again another non sense statement, which he wouldn’t explain why, she survived without it longer than any other nation in her region, another Garbage statement.
Eric A. Brill says: January 9, 2011 at 12:34 pm
Yes.
Unknown Unknowns says: January 9, 2011 at 12:19 pm
There will be mutual losses, as any type of conflict entails.
Iranian leaders believe that US-EU Axis will loose more.
And let them get everything through Pakistan.
The US-EU Axis are crucially dependent on that supply route and Pakistan (its Military) would/could cut it at its pleasure.
This Iranian move helps increase Pakistan’s leverage; which is not a bad thing.
FYI,
“The cohesion, survival, and the integrity of the Iranian state requires nuclear weapons.”
Do you really believe this?
Maverick says: January 9, 2011 at 12:23 pm
I went over this issue before.
The burden of proof is on you.
Fiorangela says: January 9, 2011 at 12:09 pm
From the time predating the Declaration of Independence, there were people in US who envisioned an empire; from Hudson Bay to Tierra del Fuego. The empire project has a deep historical root in North America.
The revivalist protestanism of 19-th century in England came to US and with it brought the ideas of New Jerusalem (William Blake), the City on the Hill, and affection for (Ancient) Israel.
Next came WWII and Imperial USA, in the sense that the position of each state in the international arena was determined by the nature and intensity of her relationship with the United States.
You take Truman, Barnard Bruch and his ilk, the Shoah, and the Arab weakness, mix them up, and you get Modern Israel in Palestine with its interminable religious war between Jews and Muslims.
Situation could still have been salvaged at various times – in 1948, in 1976, in 1999 but was not due to 2 causes: Arab stupidity and US/Israeli Hubris.
No amount of post facto analysis can salvage US policy in Palestine and in the Middle East; it is predicated on keeping Israel safe at the cost of other states.
The late Mr. Nixon had at least the virtue of looking for creating a win-win situation. And even he stumbled here.
FYI, Israel has possessed second strike capability since early 2000s. The nuclear-tipped cruise-missile can be launched from the Dolphin-class submarines supplied by Germany in late 1990s.
fyi re: Blockade continues:
“Staff at one United Nations office in Kabul were sent home on Sunday after they were told the blockade meant there was not enough fuel to run the generators.”
LOL
Its good to see the Islamic Republic felxing its muscle, but I wonder if the effect will be short-lived (this winter season only), the Afgans being able to divert their supply route and make up the difference through Pakistan, etc., whereas teh illwill garnered by the blockade might last well beyond this winter (setting off a trade war that bans Iranian imports into Afghanistan and so forth) ?
Rehmat, let me be very clear:
1. What you choose to say about Jews is up to you, your conscience, and the owners of this site. When you associate my name with what I consider offensive statements, I will call you on it and will push back as hard as I can.
2. I believe it is important to include in the totality of debate about US foreign policy about Iran the characteristics of zionism and the foundation of zionism in Jewish history and culture. It is a very sensitive topic to engage, and only by doing so with all the integrity and intellectual honesty possible can it be come to any good outcome. I have made up my mind to attempt to press that debate forward. Attempts to derail it into an agenda of name-calling, dehumanizing, or demonization I WILL OPPOSE. Strenuously.
3. Your other statements about being paid and in denial, to the degree that they are not merely ludicrous, are irrelevant.
I’d like to second Maverick’s 2:23 commnent
Maverick says:
January 8, 2011 at 2:23 pm
Thanks everyone for a marvellously thoughtful string of comments.
And suggest that the absence of The Unholy Trinity definitively has something to do with it. Please… don’t feed the trolls. Thank you.
But on to more positive praise: fyi, Eric, Richard and Fiorangela have outdone their own usual high standards in this thread. Castellio and Empty have been as sharp adn exacting as ever. Thank you for some great posts.
Blockade continues:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8248950/Afghans-vent-fury-with-Iran-over-fuel-blockade.html
Very funny fyi…..
Yes, Khorasan was never part of India – but many parts of Indian sun-continent were under Persian rule – and so was Palestine (Oooops1 I mean Israel). Persian forces destroyed the Jewish Temple in 614 CE. Arabs turned the ruins of the Temple to the Chief Rabbi of Palestine in 638 CE.
http://www.sacred-destinations.com/israel/jerusalem-temple-mount
Fiorangela – Of course my “acronyms” got to be offensive to someone who is paid to live in “self-denial”. Even Professor Daniel Bar-Tal (Tel Aviv University) reported in his study that the great majority of Israel Jews prefer to live in their “self-denial”.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/05/24/study-israelis-prefer-to-live-in-self-denial/
aljazeera complaining about double standards??
which way did the sun come up this morning?
Activist crackdown: Tunisia vs Iran
Jillian York 09 Jan 2011 13:39 GMT
The US state department denounces crackdown on Iranian bloggers, yet ignores attacks on activists in Tunisia.
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/20111981222719974.html
Fiorangela says: January 9, 2011 at 8:27 am
Khorasan was never part of any India that I can think of.
The modern state never included Iranian territories and a unified Inida existed, briefly under Asoka – which again did not include Khorasan.
Nor in the time of Guptas or Murrayas.
If the Indians thin that way they are even more uneducated and silly than I thought.
About Kaplan and the other arm-chair strategists; I agree. They are in a dream-world of hyper-rational system-making in which everything goes according to Plan.
Realy and truly for US to join Hinud Indians in a fight against Islam or Chia is suicide.
Maverick says: January 9, 2011 at 6:03 am
Yes, you are.
Israel does not have the force projection capabilities that you suggest.
Nor the second-strike capability.
It’s a very fine line to walk to understand Jewish history, zionism, and their relationship to US foreign policy and Iran while not dabbling in bigotry, broad-brushed explanations, and negative labelling. I worry all the time about crossing that line and rely on my ‘guardian angel’ to keep my mind and words fair and honest. My guardian angel suggests to me that while your mention of Israel Shahak’s writing is useful, Rehmat, your acronyms are offensive.
EDIT:
Khorasan is in Iran’s northEAST corner.
Castellio, I read a few more pages of “Israeli Exceptionalism, specifically, Alam’s broad sweep of Jewish history, and I find it fundamentally flawed. I think it’s important to study the history of the Jewish people factually, not from a constructed polemic narrative, and also–and importantly, in the context of the history of the other peoples in the same places at the same times.
Maverick, Robert Kaplan’s book, “Monsoon,” pushes the “chess game” onto an entirely new board: Kaplan argues that the new battlefield is maritime, is located in the Indian ocean; involves China, Indian, Pakistan, and the US. Iran is still intended to be kept in a marginal position: in a discussion of his book at the Navy War College in Rhode Island, Kaplan observed that India’s dream-map of how the region will be divided in the future harks back to a time when Khorasan, Iran’s culture-rich province in its northwest corner, was part of India. On the other hand, Kaplan acknowledged India-Iran cooperation on numerous oil and gas transit arrangements. Kaplan claimed that US retains maritime and air superiority, but that China is coming on strong, is building bases and harbors along the path from the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean, to China’s shore — including Taiwan, and that the US economic situation suggests that US will not long be able to compete to forestall Chinese dominance of the Indian Ocean.
Kaplan is stuck in the hypermilitarized, must-find-an-enemy mode that has characterized US (and Israeli) TRADE as well as foreign policy views of the world; China’s worldview is more closely aligned to Davutoglu’s Zero Problems thesis.
Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power.
The executive summary is: the game is larger than just Israel-Iran-Saudi Arabia.
Further to Maverick’s question re the Zionist entity…
The world is governed by symbols, not by laws.
Confucius, fl. 5th C. BCE
…all one has to do is look at its flag, with its two blue boundaries representing the Nile and Euphrates.
To understand Zionism as the secular messianic movement that it is, it is useful to think of it in terms originated by Eric Voegelin (and popularized by W F Buckley), i.e., as a modernist movement – similar to Marxism, Nazism and Empiricism/ Logico-Positivism – whose adherents, incapable of withstanding the post-lapserian tension [of life East of Eden, i.e., after the Fall, for the uninitiated] due to their (self-imposed) severance from the Divine, concoct ways and means (prematurely) to “immanentize” the Eschaton[= the Rapture, God's Kingdom on Earth "as it is in Heaven"], against the Divine Will. Essentially or at its core, this is why practically all Jewish rabbis including the chief rabbi of Jerusalem at the time, were adamantly against the establishment of the State of Israel (insisting that it has been written in the Scriptures that this is a task reserved for the Messiah alone.
I guess this is my way of saying that there is no telling how someone with an ants-in-my-pants mentality will behave, and that all we can know with certainty is the original (neurotic) impetus, and God only knows how He, in His wisdom, will continue to unfold the bloody aftermath of this abortion.
Certain outlines can be discerned, however. We know, for example, that He likes to make deals (cf. the Covenant of Alast), and that He likes to give rope to those who repeatedly fail to honor their Covenant.
Sorry if this is not “scientific” enough an alalysis ;o)
Richard, Castellio and Fiorangela, Thanks for your ressponses.
Given that Iran and Israel are separated by at least two countries in terms of borders, the behaviour of Israel has always looked like a chess move aimed at winning a position two moves down the line. In other words, presence of the Iran piece is an obstacle to a wider aim and given the effort being expended by Israel and its agents in US/EU government the signiificance of the move implied is substantial. Richard’s comment about Eretz Israel may well fit the religious justifications of their next move but given their overwhelming military superiority over all their neighbours, is mastery of the Saudi/Kuwait oilfields the real reason, after all S Arabia is only 15km away from Israel’s southern borders.
I can not see anyone standing in their way if they deccided to barge into S Arabia, with their nuclear arsenal and second strike capability they are impervious to any threat but will hold the world to ransom over the Saudi oil. No problem will come from the US or EU which is emotionally ad politically incapable of reacting to such an Israeli move. The only resistence can come from populous neighbouring countries of S Arabia not bought by US money.
Am I being too far-fetched?
Thanks, Fiorangela. Some of what you recommend I have read, but not all.
Castellio, re your follow-up question, “Does US have staff, ability, to analyze Israel.”
This is the tragedy: US does not have the WILL, nor does it have the psychological ability to distance itself from Svengali-like influence of zionist propagandists over institutions of government, of think tanks, and in the universities (I refer you again to the essay by Karin Friedemann: The Emotional Abuse of Jewish Advocacy. For the most part, Americans don’t even understand why they are unable to think and speak objectively and critically about Jewish people and topics. In the American psyche, it is taboo to fail to shelter Israel/Jewry from critical analysis, as if to do so were unpatriotic. In my view, it is essential, and the essence of patriotic, to assess zionist, neocon, and Israeli patterns of behavior and intentions with the goal of elevating American interests.
Michael Mandelbaum, who teaches at Nitze School of International Studies, an important center for training the next generation of foreign policy experts, is one example of oppressive zionist influence. Mandelbaum’s views border on rabid in their neocon commitment to perpetual war, and to distortion and demonization of Iran.
:http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Frug
:http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Mandelb
Castellio, Haggai Ram’s “Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession” is a sociological explanation of the mindset (I would say the profoundly sick mindset) that motivates Israelis/neocons/zionists to harbor such hatred against Iran (with the proviso that Iran is the scapegoat of the moment: as I noted in my response to Goli in the prior thread, Iran became the scapegoat when Israel’s other boogeyman/existential threats disappeared, for example, when Israel & Egypt achieved a peace.
Ram’s book is one part of the puzzle but not an all-encompassing explanation. “Israeli Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism,” by M. Shahid Alam, is a second contribution toward fleshing out the entire picture. Alam’s writing is much clearer than Haggai Ram’s, and dares to cross that Maginot line of relating zionism intrinsically to Jewish mytho-historical patterns and characteristics.
Goli claims and RSH agree that Israel’s conflict with Iran is both ideological and geopolitical. I agree, with an emphasis on the ideological component and the intrinsic quality of that ideology.
I believe it is important — even essential — to study and master the history of zionism, from as many perspectives as possible. Read the foundational documents — Der Judenstaat; the papers from the zionist conferences; biographies of Herzl, Jabotinsky, and Arthur Ruppin. You can also gain some insights by acquainting yourself with Judah Halevi, 15th century Toledo-born Jewish physician and poet who, though having achieved wealth and status in Toledo then Cordoba, longed for “zion” and not just prosperity for the Jewish people but for their sovereignty over their own land. He is said to be the “first modern zionist.”
Arrive at an understanding of the conflict between the Maccabees and those Jews in ancient Jerusalem who did NOT agree with the belligerent stance of Maccabees. Theodor Herzl declares in Der Judenstaat: “The Maccabeans will rise again.”
Read, also, at least the opening chapters of Niall Ferguson’s two-volume biography of the Rothschilds. Learn about Rothschild’s and Warburg’s involvement in German economy in the years immediately after the Franco-Prussian war, when Jewish financiers flocked to the newly unified Germany and ratcheted up a consumer economy heavily reliant on debt, that is eerily similar to the crisis currently taking place in US. Trace the path of that bubble-debt-crash-migration-unrest-war pattern. Coincidence that US established central bank at Jekyll Island in 1913, and that Woodrow Wilson, who gained the presidency on the promise of keeping US OUT of a European war, succumbed to the suasions of European and Wall Street bankers to embroil US in WWI.
A follow up question. Does the American government have the ability, or staff, to analyse Israeli intentions objectively in any of its 16 (I think 16) intelligence gathering groups?
Eric A. Brill says:
January 8, 2011 at 2:43 pm
Eric,
Whether it is testosterone, or frustration, there is no denying some of my (and others’) comments take an emotional tone. But, the substance ought not be dismissed just because of a poor tone. I for one benefit hugely from your thoughts.
AP as it happens has a rather well documented history. To summarize, straight out the gates, Iran adopted it in 2003. A set of tits for tats followed which eventually culminated in the EU-3 demanding a permenant suspension to enrichment, and Iran taking back what she had given, the AP.
The argument which I understand and agree with:
“Iran will derive no benefit from a nuclear arsenal, and setting a good example for other Mid East nations in terms of transparency is clearly in Iran’s interests.”
is negated by the circumstance of “But …. she has been pushed in a corner.”
Iran is no longer in a position to plead for fairness. Lengthy memos to UN about illegality of UNSC actions against Iran have been ignored; nuclear scientists have been assassinated; computer virus has been unleashed; etc.
The question is not the indignity that Iran may suffer at making concessions. Quite the opposite, Iran’s many unreciprocated concessions have earned her great respect from NAM, OIC, Brazil, Turkey, and China. The question is the repercussions of further dignifying her accusers’ baseless accusations. I am being quite serious, would they next ask for polygraph test of Iran’s, Islam’s spiritual leaders? Forget about it.
I only see one possibility. If President Obama in writing commits to Brazil, Turkey (and this time, India and Egypt, too) that sanctions will be lifted at exact same time as AP gets reinstituted, then I suspect Iran will bend, as I am equally certain Obama will once again renege. Another words, for some time now, Iran has been making concessions through intermediaries with assurance of denting US credibility when (not if) those concessions turn out to be for naught.
http://www.bibijon.org/iranimage/#Nuclear
Maverick, I think your question posed at 2.23 pm on Jan 8th critical. Essentially, “What are Israel’s intentions?” It is, as we all know, the least publicly explored aspect of the cascading and enduring wars.
RSH has taken a shot at the answer, at 2.58. Does anyone disagree with what RSH has written, or have anything to add? Has someone somewhere done a more compelling job of answering that question? Book length, graduate thesis or essay, where is the best material for understanding Israeli ntentions, rooted in a well-argued historical-sociological approach. In any language.
Castellio: McBride says: “Some components of the military-industrial complex are along for the ride for war profiteering motives, but they aren’t the lead ideologues of this messianic movement, which exhibits some of the worst characteristics of both Nazism and Communism.”
I’m not so sure about that relative importance. The neocons are fanatical theorists. Without the backing of the people who OWN the stuff the neocons need to bomb the Muslims, the neocons wouldn’t get anywhere.
So who’s really driving the show?
Personally I prefer to think of it as a perfect alliance between people who want war and people who profit by war. Without taking down BOTH sides, you can’t stop the war.
But certainly he’s right that the cheerleaders for the process are the neocons and the Zionists and the Christian Zionists.
We need to remember, though, that Obama is not a member of any of those groups. He’s a politician under the control of members of the Israel Lobby. It’s the corruption of this country’s politicians that enables the rest of these scum to steer the country against the interests of the general electorate. And it’s the ignorance and stupidity of the electorate that permits any of this to happen. And it’s human nature to be ignorant and stupid.
Q.E.D.
Israeli Mossad’s top assassin, Gen. Meir Dagan in a briefing on his retirement has warned the Zionist regime that attacking the Islamic Republic, before Israel is under attack, would be a fatal mistake (especially without the active participation of the US forces).
“Israel should not hasten to attack Iran, doing so only when the sword is upon its neck,” said Dagan.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/09/dagan-we-better-not-attack-iran/
Sean McBride has posted at the link below some interesting information in terms of organized neo-con support for ginning up the “Afpak” war.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2011/01/straw-in-the-wind-fb-ali.html#comments
I am sure some Americans are still wondering how in 1965, 587 pounds of highly enriched uranium missing from NUMEC (USA) ended up in Israel. The amount was enough to produce first five “Jewish nuclear bombs”.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/05/05/pakistan-%e2%80%93-the-next-%e2%80%98rogue-state%e2%80%99/
shot accross the bowl
http://en.rian.ru/world/20110108/162075715.html
Fyi: “I cannot give credit to the global consensus for fusion-type weapons in Israel.
As I stated several threads before, those weapons require heavy water with a half-life of 12 years. As far as I know, Israel does not have a heavy water production facility.”
That may be. I wouldn’t argue the case for fusion weapons, But I quote you this information”
Quote
Vanunu also claimed that Israel possessed fusion boosted weapons, and has developed hydrogen bomb technology. He provided information about both lithium-6 and tritium production. He stated that initially tritium was produced by a facility in Machon 2 called Unit 92 by separating it from the heavy water moderator where it is produced in small amounts as a by-product. In 1984 production was expanded when a new facility called Unit 93 was opened to extract tritium from enriched lithium that had been irradiated in the reactor. The large scale production of tritium by Israel has been confirmed by South Africa, which received a shipments of tritium totalling 30 g during 1977-79. This clearly indicates tritium production on a scale sufficient for a weapon boosting program. It is difficult to find any other rationale for such a large tritium production capability except some sort of thermonuclear weapon application.
It is quite difficult to develop gas fusion boosting technology like that used in US weapons and weapons tests are probably essential. Although radiation implosion weapons could be developed without testing, they would tend to be large and heavy and would perhaps be incompatible with Israel’s available delivery systems. It is quite possible then that a Sloika/Alarm Clock type system has been developed using lithium-6 deuteride fuel surrounding the plutonium core (in fact a weapon mock-up photographed by Vanunu appears to be this type of weapon). Tritium could be used to spike the fusion fuel and boost the yield, just as the Soviets did with the 400 Kt “Joe-4″.
End Quote
You can argue the point from a position of less information than provided above, but I don’t think you can conclude the odds are in favor of your position.
“Furthermore, the design of such wepons have to be tested; on the penalty of death, I cannot credit a US Person having given them that information.”
They may well have stolen it; they’ve stolen nuclear material from the US before. And there is still speculation over whether an Israeli nuclear test occurred in the South Atlantic.
“So, I am afraid, I cannot concur.”
Fine. Bet Iran’s life on it if you wish. I wouldn’t.
“However, I found some of your statements to be insinuations such as when you stated US had given weapons to Belgium, Germany, etc. That is factually unture as US, to my knwoledge, has not relinquished controls over such weapons.”
I said nothing of the kind. I said the weapons are STORED in those countries. That is what the cable and the article I referenced from Global Security stated.
“Your next insinuation, in my opinion, is the inclusion of Turkey in the US-EU Axis against Iran.”
Again, I said nothing of the kind. The quote was from the article I referenced.
“I think I will stop here.”
Probably best.
In any event, my primary position was not that Israel could destroy Iran with nuclear weapons (unless they were willing to expend their entire arsenal, which is unlikely). The US, however, most certainly can. And very likely would if Iran would to develop a serious nuclear arsenal, and certainly if Iran were to threaten actual use.
“Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld urged his staff to “keep elevating the threat” and demanded “bumper sticker statements” to gin up public enthusiasm for the global war on terror. The key, he wrote, was to “make the American people realize they are surrounded in the world by violent extremists.””
“The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities … We pay for a single fighter with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. ”
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-tyranny-of-defense-inc/8342/1/
Richard Steven Hack says: January 8, 2011 at 3:29 pm
I cannot give credit to the global consensus for fusion-type weapons in Israel.
As I stated several threads before, those weapons require heavy water with a half-life of 12 years. As far as I know, Israel does not have a heavy water production facility. Furthermore, the design of such wepons have to be tested; on the penalty of death, I cannot credit a US Person having given them that information. So, I am afraid, I cannot concur.
Thank you for information regarding weapons in Turkey and elsewhere.
However, I found some of your statements to be insinuations such as when you stated US had given weapons to Belgium, Germany, etc. That is factually unture as US, to my knwoledge, has not relinquished controls over such weapons. Your next insinuation, in my opinion, is the inclusion of Turkey in the US-EU Axis against Iran. I find that incredible as I cannot see any benefits to Turkey in it. Certainly the end of the Cold War and the passage, into oblivion, of the so-called unilateral moment, has opened new vistas for Turkey that US-EU cannot match (US-EU Axis public position is more death and more destruction for Muslims in the Near East.)
I think I will stop here.
Fyi: “The abilities of Israel you are over-estimating; in my opinion. Neither the number of their supposed nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and their tonnage, are known with any certainity.
Based on UK disclosures of the number of their nuclear weapons (a state with 9 times the population of Israel and more than 10 times the GDP) at 200, I think Israel will have about 20 nuclear bombs – fission type. I cannot tell, based on public information, the tonnage.”
You are WAY off on that. The consensus of estimates is somewhere between 80 and 250 – including fusion weapons. And they have missile delivery systems and very likely cruise missile delivery capability from their German-made subs – which, by the way, gives them a second-strike capability.
“At any rate, Iranian leaders, in my judgement, are not specifically concerned with Israel – there can be a nuclear attack from a Central Asian state. The fact remains that Iran was attacked by WMD.”
What Central Asian state other than Russia, Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons?
“In regards to US using nuclear weapons against Iran; that is a definite possibility. However, it is a very low probability at the moment because of political constraints on the United States.”
At this moment is not what we’re discussing. We’re discussing if Iran actually develops and begins to deploy significant numbers of nuclear weapons.
“As for the war-gaming of Iran; my reading of public information regarding such war games has been that it will not be a cake-walk for US.”
As I said, the US cannot conquer and occupy Iran – it’s too big, too many people. But it CAN DESTROY Iran if necessary with nuclear weapons. That’s is just too obvious. If the US can seriously deter the Soviet Union for fifty years, what is Iran to the US in nuclear terms?
“I cannot judge the capabilities of Iranians when it comes to nuclear weapons. If they indeed have validated Chinese designs, they could build the skeleton devices and postpone the introduction of the core to a future opportune time.”
Again, if you can’t deliver it, it’s a paperweight.
“I do not know if US naval assets in the Persian Gulf carry nuclear weapons; is that information public?”
The presumption appears to be that some carry nukes, at least of a tactical size. The main point is that US nuclear subs accompany the carrier battle groups and I’m sure some of them have nuclear cruise missiles or nuclear ballistic missiles. In any event, policy appears to be for the US to neither confirm or deny the presence of nukes in the Gulf. Obviously that’s as good an answer as “Yes”.
“Likewise for the nuclear weapons in Turkey; what is their status? Are they still there? Or is that information classified?”
Here is the Wikileaks released cable which spilled the beans once and for all:
Following is excerpt from the cable which was send on the 12th of November, 2009:
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
¶8. (C) In response to Gordon’s question about how the
government planned to take forward the commitment in the
coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining
nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the
Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been
forced upon them by FM Westerwelle. Heusgen said that from
his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw
“the 20″ tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while
Russia maintains “thousands” of them. It would only be worth
it if both sides drew down. Gordon noted that it was
important to think through all the potential consequences of
the German proposal before going forward. For example, a
withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from
Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult
politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even
though it was still convinced of the need to do so.
According to Global Research:
The US has supplied some 480 B61 thermonuclear bombs to five so-called “non-nuclear states”, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Casually disregarded by the Vienna based UN Nuclear Watchdog (IAEA), the US has actively contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
As part of this European stockpiling, Turkey, which is a partner of the US-led coalition against Iran along with Israel, possesses some 90 thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs at the Incirlik nuclear air base.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 8, 2011 at 2:58 pm
I would not worry about such bilogical weapons.
It is, in fact (with metaphysical certainity), the obverse is much much easier to accomplish.
Persian Gulf says: January 8, 2011 at 2:49 pm
Iran leaving NPT in 1998 meant that Iran is not committed to non-proliferation. Israel, India, and Pakistan did not sign NPT and remained non-nuclear for years.
Richard Steven Hack:
The abilities of Israel you are over-estimating; in my opinion. Neither the number of their supposed nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and their tonnage, are known with any certainity.
Based on UK disclosures of the number of their nuclear weapons (a state with 9 times the population of Israel and more than 10 times the GDP) at 200, I think Israel will have about 20 nuclear bombs – fission type. I cannot tell, based on public information, the tonnage.
At any rate, Iranian leaders, in my judgement, are not specifically concerned with Israel – there can be a nuclear attack from a Central Asian state. The fact remains that Iran was attacked by WMD.
In regards to US using nuclear weapons against Iran; that is a definite possibility. However, it is a very low probability at the moment because of political constraints on the United States. But it is a definite threat and not just against Iran.
As for the war-gaming of Iran; my reading of public information regarding such war games has been that it will not be a cake-walk for US.
I cannot judge the capabilities of Iranians when it comes to nuclear weapons. If they indeed have validated Chinese designs, they could build the skeleton devices and postpone the introduction of the core to a future opportune time.
I do not know if US naval assets in the Persian Gulf carry nuclear weapons; is that information public?
Likewise for the nuclear weapons in Turkey; what is their status? Are they still there? Or is that information classified?
If I were Iran, I’d never leave the NPT, whether or not I decided to build a bomb. I think the US would fire up the bombers pretty quickly after such an announcement. If Iran really wants to build a bomb (despite its repeated claims to the contrary, which I believe), it would be wise to keep the “cover” of the NPT in place as long as possible. Sooner or later, of course, Iran would have some explaining to do – such as when it starts excluding IAEA inspectors because the time has come to enrich LEU to bomb-grade fuel. The IAEA would complain loudly, and then the US would complain even more loudly and probably fire up its bombers. Even then, if I were Iran, I wouldn’t withdraw from the NPT; I’d just stop complying with it. What would be the point of a formal withdrawal at that point?
This course would allow Iran to buy the most time. Why tip its hand sooner?
Some people have written here that, if Iran were to leave the NPT, it would take up to a year for it to develop a bomb. A few people seem to believe that the US would simply sit back, bite its nails, and hope that Iran does not develop a bomb during that year. I’m utterly baffled by this view. I’m very confident that the US would react to Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT much sooner than that. Very much sooner.
This stupid sentence: “All Iranian missiles capable of hitting Iran…” should be edited appropriately by the reader.
Maverick: “So what are Israel’s intentions and what are US and EU- maybe unknowingly – letting Israel do?”
My general impression is that Israel intends to wreck all of the Arab nations of the Middle East by using the US to reduce them to chaos and control like the US tried to do to Iraq and wishes to do to Iran. The ultimate purpose is control of the Middle East and the oil in the sense of an “Eretz Israel” that dominates “from the Nile to the Euphrates”. Money and power, as usual.
How they will do this is mostly at this point using the US as their pit bull, while the US elites use the Arab antipathy to Israel as an excuse to start wars and profit. Meanwhile, Israel seeks to control the US as completely as possible, by espionage, by economic means using the rich Jewish elites in the US and their control of many US corporations, by influence over the Christian Zionists, and other means.
What’s really scary are the rumors (which I read during the David Kelly murder probe) that Israel has genetic warfare research under way – basically looking for a genetic weapon that could kill non-Jews.
The Zionists are all crazed imperialists that could give lessons to the US elites.
Fyi: “3- Stationing of nuclear weapons in any non-nuclear Iranian neighbour; including those in Central Asia.”
Hasn’t that already happened? I believe US nuclear weapons are stored in Turkey.
“Introduction of US nuclear forces in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman”
Doesn’t that happen every time a US aircraft carrier is in the Gulf?
I don’t recommend Iran leaving the NPT for two reasons:
1) There is no benefit from doing so other than a symbolic nose-thumbing at the West – unless Iran really intends to build nuclear weapons.
2) Iran will never have enough nukes to threaten either Israel or the US. They certainly won’t have them before they’re subjected to such an attack as to render it extremely unlikely they will be able to develop and deploy them under war conditions. If this were attempted, Israel and the US would simply nuke Iran into the ground – all 73 million people or enough as would make little difference. The US can never conquer and occupy Iran, that is true – but it can render Iran completely incapable of producing nuclear weapons. This is a fact.
Some people say that a US strike could not prevent Iran from developing and deploying a nuclear weapons. I disagree with that completely. The only way the US could not do that would if it restrained itself because of the necessity to essentially completely destroy the bulk of Iran’s infrastructure with nuclear weapons itself. Frankly, if the US thought Iran was actually able to deploy any significant number of nukes – and by significant number I mean in excess of 20 or more – the US – or Israel – would simply destroy enough of Iran’s infrastructure to prevent this. Iran would have to live 200 meters underground for the rest of its existence to avoid this.
And then how would they be delivered – by garbage scow? Nothing that moves over Iran’s surface would be safe, air or ground.
And who would they attack? Israel? All Iranian missiles capable of hitting Iran would be destroyed long before a nuke could be put on one. Again, delivery by ship or camel would be Iran’s only option. And if they did that, they really would be nuked into non-existence by the US.
It’s a fantasy to believe Iran CAN deploy and use nuclear weapons. And the Iranian leadership knows this.
fyi:
In 1998, I was just a teenager; totally disillusioned with Khatami and his slogans. I even didn’t know at the time that Pakistan and India exploded nucelar devices! (it was of a little concern to me). however, I don’t understand one aspect of your statement.
Iran’ leaving NPT at that time should have meant she was close to assemble a bomb in a very short period of time. otherwise, leave NPT and do what? are you saying Iran had that capability back then? if so, why not doing that now immediately after nearly 13 years? I don’t think Iran would be sanctioned more than what we see today. I don’t know if you read the article about India’s relation with Iran and the U.S in IRNA few days ago (can’t find it there right now). I think, that’s the limit.
if not, could Iran stay outside of the NPT for so long without actually having the ability, or going toward it openly, to test a nuclear device?
Richard and Castellio,
You’re welcome (to the documents in the zip file). Please let me know if you have any problems downloading or opening any of them.
BiBiJon
“In such circumstances, Iran can make no gesture other than defiance.”
The talks on 20th Jan 2011 in Turkey will determine whether you are right.
I think a very complicated ‘ chess game ‘ is unfoldung and Iran will ‘surprise’ the world.
12 days to go….
BiBiJon,
“Iran will derive no benefit from a nuclear arsenal, and setting a good example for other Mid East nations in terms of transparency is clearly in Iran’s interests. But …. she has been pushed in a corner. Ayatollah Khmanei is effectively being called a liar when people disparage his anti-WMD fatwa. … Iran is not being taken seriously, while serious efforts are made diplomatically, politically, and economically to hurt the people and destabilize the government. In such circumstances, Iran can make no gesture other than defiance.”
I agree with every sentence except the last, and I question whether it really follows from the first three sentences.
A commitment to observe the AP would not reflect poorly on Iranian dignity, as you and a few other commenters appear to believe. Iran would merely be doing what approximately 100 other countries are doing. I grant that many people would still call Khamenei a liar; many would still not take Iran seriously. But many others would stop calling Khamenei a liar, and many would start taking Iran’s claims of peaceful intentions more seriously. You already believe those claims, and so do I, but most people in the world do not – in no small part because Iran refuses to observe the AP. This causes many millions of people to be suspicious of Iran, with little or no discernible benefit to Iran in return. The bomb-Iran crowd counts on those many millions of suspicious people to support the US’ march toward war, and very many of them are responding with great enthusiasm.
If I were Iran, I’d agree to the AP but hang tough on the never-ending “alleged studies” questions. (Even on the “alleged studies” questions, I’d make some effort to cooperate, but only if I received a very clear commitment that those questions would end once and for all.)
Suppose Iran instead follows your advice and continues its “defiance” (which, I acknowledge, sounds more noble than “stubbornness”). How would you see the situation playing out? Will the US government be so eager to have Iran commit to the AP that it will start offering all sorts of concessions? Or will it (and its more warlike backers) chuckle that Iran is playing right into their hands? Will Iran’s progress toward peaceful nuclear energy be delayed even further? Will its economy be crippled even longer? Will its people become subject to an ever greater risk of attack from the US or Israel?
Will Iran’s “defiance” really be worth all that? Or will many Iranians start to wonder whether a request to observe the AP, as 100 other countries are doing, is really asking too much of Iran? Will they wonder whether “stubbornness” is a better description of the behavior of Iran’s government?
Neither you nor I knows the answers to these questions, of course. We can only make educated guesses. Testosterone inevitably plays a part in such decisions. But recent comments on this website suggest to me it’s playing too large a part, clouding vision a bit too much.
Eric: Thanks for the Zip file. I’m sure I’ll find it very useful.
I agree with the thrust of your recent comments, BiBiJon. I wouldn’t phrase it as Iranian “defiance”, however, as that only plays into the Western blame game of calling Iran “defiant”. (Eric is hoping that Iran can take steps so it will not be called “defiant”. I agree, however, that assuming the AP will do no such thing.)
Perhaps we should call it Iranian “desire for fact-based negotiations”. So your last sentence would read “In such circumstances, Iran can make no gesture other than maintain its desire for fact-based negotiations.”
Castellio: Agree with your post of 3:10 AM. It certainly looks logical to me. I think the question that might be up in the air is whether Israel wants Iran or Pakistan taken out first. After all, Pakistan is not at the moment under the control of Islamists and isn’t likely to be in the immediate future whereas Iran is a thorn in the side of Israel right now with Hizballah and in general.
So this might be an interesting contest between Obama who wants to start a war with Pakistan and the Israel Lobby that wants a war with Iran.
The really STUPID thing is if Obama really believes that destabilizing Pakistan is a way to get his hands on the nukes. No one has ever called Obama stupid, but if he really believes this, he is stupid. Pakistan is no Iraq. It has 173 million people who don’t like the US. The one SURE way to get those nukes into the hands of extremists is to destabilize that country more than it is.
Also, I’m not sure China is prepared to stand by and allow the fallout from that across its borders, not to mention losing a key ally against India.
This is REALLY dangerous stuff Obama is doing, on a par with the uptick in pressure on North Korea. The end result could be wars that beggar anything so far, with scores of thousands of US casualties, millions of civilian dead, and a totally bankrupt US economy and, really, quite likely the fall of the US in international terms.
Thanks everyone for a marvellously thoughtful string of comments.
The underlying picture from most comments posted here is that both behaviour and demands of the US and EU with regards to Iran’s nuclear programme is driven by Israeli government and its lobby groups in US (APAC, JINSA etc), UK (CFoI, LFoI etc), Germany and France. What continues to intrigue me are Israel’s long term intentions. Is all this for security? I don’t think so. Is all this aimed at making Israel’s settlement in West Bank concrete? Again I don’t think so; they are doing there what they want anyway and with US and EU’s active support or acquiescence the occupation would never be reversed. So what are Israel’s intentions and what are US and EU- maybe unknowingly – letting Israel do?
Eric, thank you for the specific access to the documents.
Eric A. Brill says:
January 8, 2011 at 12:32 pm
“An aside to BiBiJon: I don’t understand what this has to do with the AP. Can you explain?”
Eric,
When I take stock of the overall situation over the past 8 years what becomes clear is that the West has pushed the country into an impossible corner. I emphasize that my reading is that Iran IS in a corner.
You and others have competently evaluated the pros and cons of AP. I am suggesting, stuck in a corner, Iran cannot make good will gestures regardless of whether they make sense. As per John Mueler, Iran will derive no benefit from a nuclear arsenal, and setting a good example for other Mid East nations in terms of transparency is clearly in Iran’s interests.
But …. she has been pushed in a corner. Ayatollah Khmanei is effectively being called a liar when people disparage his anti-WMD fatwa. Hasan Rohani, also a cleric, and the nuclear negotiator under president Khatami, was dismissed as your typical Moslem liar, when he said:
“A nuclear weaponized Iran destabilizes the region, prompts a regional arms race, and wastes the scarce resources in the region. And taking account of U.S. nuclear arsenal and its policy of ensuring a strategic edge for Israel, an Iranian bomb will accord Iran no security dividends. There are also some Islamic and developmental reasons why Iran as an Islamic and developing state must not develop and use weapons of mass destruction.”
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1192435,00.html?iid=perma_share
Iran is not being taken seriously, while serious efforts are made diplomatically, politically, and economically to hurt the people and destabilize the government.
In such circumstances, Iran can make no gesture other than defiance.
Persian Gulf says: January 8, 2011 at 11:30 am
I agree that at some point Iran should exit NPT if the present trend of threats against Iran continue (not all of them due to US).
As I had stated before, Iran should have exited NPT in 1998 when Pakistan and India exploded their nuclear weapons.
The cohesion, survival, and the integrity of the Iranian state requires nuclear weapons.
The Iranian leaders committed a grave error when they did not exit NPT at that time.
Especially haveing experienced repeated WMD attacks by Iraq – aided and abetted by US-EU Axis and condoned by USSR and China.
Furthermore, the deterioration of the political and social conditions in Pakistan are increaing threats to Iran.
In spite of these, I do not think that this is the opportune time to exit NPT.
I think there are situations under which Iran must leave NPT immediately:
1 – US/Israel Attack.
2- Overthrow of the existing political dispensation in Pakistan
3- Stationing of nuclear weapons in any non-nuclear Iranian neighbour; including those in Central Asia.
4 – Passage of another set of UNSC sanctions against Iran.
5 – Introduction of US nuclear forces in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman
Notice that Bushehr LWR is the only that concievable benefit of NPT to Iran.
Iran should be prepared to write-off that investment and moth-ball LWR when the time comes.
There is no other way; Iranian leaders cannot risk the surviuval of Iran and hundreds of thousands of Iranians on basis of pieces of paper emanating from US, EU, Russia, or China.
kooshy says: January 7, 2011 at 6:47 pm
I have stted my opinion based on my redings and my knowledge of past and more recent history.
I found those Iranians that give prominence to the ide of Ancient Iran to deny the religious component of the Iranian polity.
I found very many Iranians who give preponderance to the religious (Muslim) nature of that polity to be also fervently denying any schism between Shia and Sunni.
The would be going so far as to deny the repeated attacks on Iran by Central Asian states (prior to Russian Annexation of those states) being approved by the Sunni Ulema as Central Asia as a war against infidel “Rafezis”.
I find your position ironic in this regard.
As for the recent war against the Ba’ath state; I think you are ignoring the evidence: the war messages, the names of the Iranian military formations, the spirit of the soldiers, their last wills and testaments, the experiences of the POWs, etc.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 7, 2011 at 6:23 pm
Agreed.
James Canning says: January 7, 2011 at 6:07 pm
You have to look at this from the point of the zero-sum game that obtains among great powers.
Chinese want a dependency.
So does US-EU Axis, Russia and others.
In that manner, their policy-making would be so much simpler as less powerful states will fall into line when they are told to do so.
A non-Iranian example could be the unified Korea – Chosun – almost 70 million soul and armed with nuclear weapons and with deep technological expertise in physical sciences. Chosun could chart an independent course from these foreign powers like Chian, US, Japan, and Russia. Do you seriously think China or Russia or US or Japan are not going to do their best to prevent it?
Norman Robbins (Jan. 8, 2011 at 10:44 AM),
I commend you for taking the time to wade through the IAEA’s fact sheet.
You should consider reading Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and the model Additional Protocol. The link I gave you to the Additional Protocol was correct, but (as both you and I discovered), if you click on it in my earlier post, it picks up the closing parenthesis symbol in the parentheses where I’d placed it. Here it is again, without the offending parenthesis:
Link to model Additional Protocol (substitute a period (.) wherever you see DOT):
wwwDOTiaeaDOTorg/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c
OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS:
It occurred to me that you and others might find useful the documents listed below, in the forms I’ve found useful for research. A Word and a PDF version of each document is included in the zip file cited at the end of this post. I’ll represent that they’re all virus-free. The IAEA Reports document (number 6 in list below) still needs a lot of formatting work, but the others are all well-formatted, with key words color-coded or otherwise highlighted (you can easily remove this in the Word version if you like), with page-numbering and (in most) with a table of contents added. The Word versions are very useful for key-word searching, and I find that the color-coding speeds up my analysis. I hope others find them as useful as I have.
DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THE ZIP FILE LINKED BELOW (each in both Word and PDF formats, except for number 6, which is in Word format only):
1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
2. Iran’s Safeguards Agreement under the NPT.
3. IAEA Statute.
4. United Nations Charter.
5. Iran Constitution.
6. Reports of IAEA Director General (all from June 6, 2003 through September 6, 2010. NOTE: These are only the DG reports, not the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions).
HERE IS THE LINK FOR THE ZIP FILE CONTAINING THE DOCUMENTS ABOVE:
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0B6xrXj0IOjhEMzhkMWI3YzQtYmMyZC00MTUzLTkyNmItN2UzMjk0ZTNkYWEy&hl=en
James,
The NYT article cited by BiBiJon vindicates the faith in the Iranian development program that you (or at least I recall it was you) expressed early last year: that Iran would figure out how to make fuel plates for the TRR. I had no idea how long it would take, but it always struck me as somewhat short of “rocket science” – just a matter of time.
More important, what choice did Iran have? Its talks with the West on refueling the TRR were dead and buried after the Tehran Declaration was unceremoniously rejected last spring.
This is good news – whether it presses the West to reconsider some refueling deal or instead enables Iran to do it alone.
An aside to BiBiJon: I don’t understand what this has to do with the AP. Can you explain?
“Iran Says to Make Own Fuel For Research Reactor”
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2011/01/08/world/international-us-iran-nuclear-salehi.html?_r=1&hp
Obviously AP or no AP is NOT the question.
More generally, the current climate does not allow Iran to make any concessions. Even Iran showing up to a Geneva meeting avowedly not to discuss her rights to nuclear technology was construed as the ‘sanctions are working!’
I suspect AP will be instituted in parallel with a regional ratification of a nuclear free zone.
In a situation where Iran is being coerced, even the appearnce of negotiation, let alone actually negotiating and any Iranian concessions will be used to her disadvantage.
The idea of providing incentives to Iran is so insulting, and accepting any such incentive for Iran will be so self-incriminating, that lets not go there at all.
The big picture is this: if the so called ‘world powers’ competency is demostrated by the way they have managed the rise of a country such as Iran, then it is time for looking at other centers of power.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12143171
unless Iran shakes the middle east with a nuclear test, this dispute WILL NOT be resolved, no matter the tactic. a perceived nuclear status is meaningless in this case. the next step is to start Arak’s reactor, and the one after, I hope, making the much delayed “mushroom cloud” in either “dashte kavir” or “kavire lout”. I personally like to see the pics from “kavire lout” :)
I also think, you people are wasting your time advocating something that its occurrence need not be explained to this detail.it’s either inherent in the logic of balance of power or inevitable force of history.
To Eric Brill;
Thanks for your thoughtful response to my question about how Iran could be assured that the AP was not being used for Western espionage. The link you supplied did not work but I found that IAEA fact sheet on AP at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html
If I were Iran, I would have to assume that the results of every AP investigation would be leaked to Western intelligence. Therefore, given the current Western pressures on the IAEA, the following provisions of the AP (in quotes) would cause considerable anxiety, if there were any question of a near- or middle-term attack by Israel or the US.
“IAEA short-notice access to, all buildings on a nuclear site.”
Therefore any buildings nearby, including those housing e.g. ant-aircraft or anti-missile weapons would be fair game.
“IAEA collection of environmental samples at locations beyond declared locations when deemed necessary by the Agency. (Wider area environmental sampling would require IAEA Board approval of such sampling and consultations with the State concerned).”
This opens almost any location to IAEA inspectors supposedly for sample collection, but perhaps in reality to check out installations of military significance.
“State provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies, and IAEA verification mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations in the State.”
Iran would have to reveal every site where it builds say centrifuges, no matter how sensitive this info would be for a later attack.
In sum, I would argue that Iran would take a large risk in accepting the AP, and in return has every right to demand the strongest possible security guarantees against attack. This problem will need serious discussion if the US ever decides to have genuine give-and-take negotiations. I do agree, as do most arms control experts, that Iran’s adoption of the AP would provide Israel and the US with much greater security.
Dear Voice of Tehran and Nahid,
If I could take credit for anything, I honestly would. But I can’t. Therefore, I won’t. But I would give credit to the One on Whose payroll I am:
دو دهان داریم گویا همچو نی ….یک دهان پنهانست در لبهای وی
Empty says:
January 8, 2011 at 8:31 am
thanks for beatifull commenet. I will use it in class papares
Empty says:
January 8, 2011 at 8:31 am
Dear Empty , I must say I truly and honestly admire your comments ( Aghebatet Bekheir )
“Dives qui sapiens est!”
and this one with special thanks to you :
“Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas”
It appears that a few armchair strategists have been sitting in the comfort of their living rooms and dispensing out loud musings and churning out blueprints about what Iran should or shouldn’t do. At the risk of ruffling your delicate feathers, here is a few counter strategies:
1. کل اگر طبیب بودی….سر خود دوا نمودی = If the bald man knew how to cure baldness, he would’ve cured his own baldness first. First demonstrate the evidence of how successful you have been with the affairs of your own government and keeping them in line, then try to write prescriptions for other nations. Based on your own repeated admission, you don’t even have a viable strategy to get your own government to look out for your own interests. Don’t you just want to bust out laughing when you so confidently dispense recommendations for others?
2. اظهار عجز نزد ستم پیشگان خطاست….اشک کباب موجب طغیان آتش است = Don’t err by negotiating with cruel and oppressive forces from the point of weakness ….Notice how the tears of a roasting meat erupts the flames of a raging fire. Again, please provide a single valid and reliable evidence of your respective governments to refute the nulls that they have actually not been cheap shots going after the weak; that they have not gone for the kill when they have smelt the blood of the defenseless; that they have negotiated with the vulnerable. The very fabric of your society is designed to exploit the weak. The entire stock market, the banking system, the health insurance industry, the “defense” industry, the real estate market, etc. etc. etc. are anchored in sucking the blood of the weak and fattening up. What evidence do you have to suggest that they’d be any more lenient about Iran and the Iranians?
3. چو ایران نباشد تن من مباد…..بدین بوم و بر زنده یک تن مباد = May I not exist if Iran doesn’t exist….It is NOT up to Ahmadinejad, Salehi, Khamenei, etc. etc. etc. to negotiate away any of Iran’s rights. They are in power and supported so long as they represent the interest of Iranian people. Again, show a shred of evidence from the history that Iranians have not dealt with those who disregarded their interest; that they have not paid absolutely any price with their lives, their wealth, their children, and everything else to ensure that those who betray them could continue to exist safely in Iran. You should learn a thing or two yourself and instead of sitting and complaining how this lobby or that lobby or this candidate or that candidate or this government or that government is watching out not for your interests but for the interests of someone else. If you don’t like to give a ride, don’t bent over. Full Stop.
And last but not least, 4. ما را از پتک نابودی مترسان….که ما با آسمانها عهد داریم = Do not try to frighten us with your batons of annihilation….We already have a solid and binding contract with the heavens.
Noam Chomsky in his recent Op-Ed in the New York Times, titled ‘Breaking the Israel-Palestine Deadlock’, have come up with a novel way of helping the Zionist entity. He suggests that the current world-wide delegitimation of Israel momentum can be reversed by “those concerned with Palestinian rights should call for Israeli takeover of the entire West Bank, followed by an anti-apartheid struggle of the South African variety that would lead to full citizenship for the Arab population there”.
Chomsky and the ‘legitimation of Israel’
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/08/chomsky-and-the-legitimation-of-israel/
RSH: It’s late, I’ll be brief. I think Pakistani nukes have been targeted by the US for isolation and control, one way or another. I think this was understood as a priority prior to Obama coming to power, and Obama leveraged precisely on the wild card of Pakistan to gather some of the his most important “elite” support. He talked about it more coherently in meetings than anyone else wither Republican or Democrat. It is a “foundational” promise he made and he will work to uphold it. I think Hillary was late getting on that particular bandwagon, but is on it now.
The only Muslim power of genuine immediate threat to Israel is Pakistan. It is nuclear, it has a delivery system, and America has, I believe, agreed to put itself into a position where it can, at least on short notice, defang it. Obama rationalizes this as an appropriate goal – limiting the use and threat of nuclear weapons in a volatile region – and as therefore fitting within his larger public value system and persona. It just happens to dovetail with Israeli concerns and, as an added bonus, thrills the Indians while serving notice to China that America won’t let the Chinese-Pakistani relation develop outside of its control.
The US is probably arguing to Israel that Israeli preoccupation with Iran gets in the way of American intentions in Pakistan. However, Israel is currently planning for a simultaneous war with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran with a date target, I believe, set within the next 36 months.
I have no insider knowledge, I am just weaving the most visible strands together in a logical pattern.
Neither the US nor Israel, frankly, are concerned about building in East Jerusalem, etc.. They have moved on.
Castellio: Yes, I’ve begun getting interested in the notion that the US really intends to expand the Afghan war into Pakistan much more significantly than it has done to date. Some people compare this to the extension of the Vietnam war into Cambodia. It is another example of Obama going for the “double-down” strategy rather than a retreat.
Whether this is being considered solely for the purpose of bringing US military power to bear on the Tribal Areas in order to interdict the Taliban, or whether there is a hidden agenda to destabilize and overthrow the Pakistani government with the intent of seizing the nuclear arsenal, perhaps in concert with India, is an interesting question.
I assume this is why Colonel Lang is interested in the operational range of Pakistani missiles. He indicates his interest is because Pakistan is unstable and could be taken over by radical Islamic elements. I’ve heard a number of analysts dismiss that scenario, so I’m not sure how important it is. However, if the US were to go to war with Pakistan over its lack of pursuit of the Taliban or other reasons, I could see a very quick radicalization of the bulk of the country and a collapse of the government resulting in that scenario.
The risk of that seems to me to be so high that it seems clear to me that some people in the Obama administration would be happy to see that happen for reasons of their own. And Obama does not seem to have any stated objections or concerns over that, or he would not be in such a hurry to agree with those advisers who recommend the initial steps to this course of action, such as expansion of drone strikes in Pakistan, which alone have radicalized many Pakistanis against the US.
The end result of this strategy is almost certainly going to be very bad.
And it is the one thing, next to a war with North Korea, which could delay a war with Iran.
In fact, given the behavior of South Korea and the US vis-a-vis North Korea, and an article I read stating that the current head of South Korea is a right wing unification proponent – someone who wants to force unification of the two Koreas no matter what – and he was described as “the most dangerous man in Asia” right now – I wonder if the US elites are flirting with the notion of a new Korean war, possibly as a way to ratchet up tensions with China and thus justify even more military spending. This would be an even greater disaster than a war with Iran.
Mr. Canning: “include in the US “elite” the old-money WASPS, and I think it is fair to say a good percentage of them want or would like Israel to stop oppressing the Palestinians.”
I tend to doubt it. Care to point to any of them that have indicated so, publicly or privately? Other than their own anti-Semitism, which is certainly possible, what would be their motivation?
Mahmoud Abbas, has sacked Mohammed Dahlan, formerly head of the Presidential Guard in Gaza, and regarded by everyone I’ve ever met as the hand of Israel in Palestine.
Although there is certainly no proof of this, very many Palestinians point the finger at Dahlan when they talk of the mysterious death of Yasser Arafat, now almost universally regarded as murder by poison by Israel.
http://www.redress.cc/palestine/rcox20101106
Castellio – Pakistan has been under Zionist threat even before it was established – but since is a nuclear power, Israelis being good on shooting unarmed Palestinian – don’t have the stomach to attack Pakistan. Even though, the Zionazi idiot told Knesset members in 1950s:
“It is essential that we strike and crush Pakistanis, enemies of Jews and Zionism, by all disguised and secret plans,” – David Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Zionist entity.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/06/08/vultures-over-pakistan/
“Through its incitement against Israel, Hamas continue to shaow that it is not a partner for peace and reconciliation, nor a force of moderation. The anti-Semitic ideas expressed by Zahar do not occur in vacuum, but a carbon copy of rhetoric of Hamas’ major supporters, Iran and Mahmud Ahmadinejad,” Abraham Foxman, the Israeli mole in the US.
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2011/01/08/adl-hamas-denies-holocaust/
A fresh link that some might like to follow as it develops, when considering the current intentions of the US in Pakistan.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2011/01/can-pakistan-strike-israel.html
RSH wrote: “I consider the “elite” those who actually have some control of what happens in the government. That doesn’t include a lot of “think tank” or “public opinion” types. Those guys are henchmen. The real elite are the people who run corporations, banks, etc. If any of them want Israel to stop the occupation, it’s only because it’s embarrassing publicly for the US to be supporting such crimes or because they want the Palestinians to “go away” publicly so they can get on with promoting new wars. In other words, they just want the oppression to be “quiet”. They don’t care that it actually stops.”
important definition. thanks.
R S Hack,
I include in the US “elite” the old-money WASPS, and I think it is fair to say a good percentage of them want or would like Israel to stop oppressing the Palestinians. But I agree with you many powerful Americans do not want to be bothered even to think about the matter. And there is no question but that retaliation is to be expected for speaking out against Israeli oppression.
I doubt the US will get involved in large-scale military activities in Iraq. And why would anyone think the US is controlling Iraq’s oil?
Richard,
“At least now Iran has something it can hold out as a negotiating point. If Iran does as you wish, it will have nothing. Maybe that negotiating point isn’t worth much as you assert. You may be right about that. But I assert it’s worth more NOT PLAYED than cast off into the wind on a speculative hunch about possible benefits.”
I think we’ve sufficiently clarified where each of us stands.
I’m curious. Perhaps the Leveretts would like to weigh in on the question of whether Iran should unilaterally implement the AP without asking for any US concession in return in a future post?
That would be a really interesting post.
Mr. Canning: “It seems to me that all US troops will be out of Iraq by the end of this year or fairly soon in 1212.”
I suspect that will only happen if the Iraqi government almost literally “turns on” the US. The return of al-Sadr, who is critical to the Iraqi government and who explicitly wants all US troops out, is important. I suspect that by 2012 either the US will be forced out – or we will back at war in Iraq at least with Shia forces controlled by al-Sadr and possibly some of the Sunnis again.
“But I do not see this as part of a plan to prepare for an attack on Iran.”
Well, that depends on how it goes. If the Iraqi government backs down despite al-Sadr’s demand that US troops go, the situation will continue as it is, for a while at least. Eventually either Iraq must rise up against the US or US troops will remain indefinitely. The longer they remain, the more likely they are there not merely to maintain control of the oil, but to prepare the ground (air bases, pre-planted weapons caches, etc.) for war with Iran.
“I think a significant part of the American “elite” would just as soon Israel stop oppressing the Palestinians. But many are afraid to say so openly, due to retaliation that so often results.”
Depends on who you consider the “elite”. I consider the “elite” those who actually have some control of what happens in the government. That doesn’t include a lot of “think tank” or “public opinion” types. Those guys are henchmen. The real elite are the people who run corporations, banks, etc. If any of them want Israel to stop the occupation, it’s only because it’s embarrassing publicly for the US to be supporting such crimes or because they want the Palestinians to “go away” publicly so they can get on with promoting new wars. In other words, they just want the oppression to be “quiet”. They don’t care that it actually stops.
Eric: Let me cut your Gordian knot.
When I say a deal might be negotiable, that means I think Iran and the US – IF the US were legitimately interested, which they’re not – might be able to come to some agreement.
This has nothing to with my own prescription if I were running Iran, which as I said is quite simply, “We accept no restrictions on enrichment except those in the Agreement.” And further, “The US has no business telling us what we can or can’t do.”
“I have no idea where on the spectrum you think a deal might be struck”
Where I think a deal MIGHT be struck and where I think a deal WILL be struck are two different things. I said at the outset that I have no idea what restrictions might be feasible for either the US or Iran. MY preference is NO restrictions. Iran can negotiate its own preferences. What I think will happen is that NO deal will be struck – ever.
Does that clarify things?
“I’m quite pessimistic that there is such a “sweet spot” in the current circumstances.”
Agreed.
“Given my pessimism, I’m left to wonder this: In the absence of any deal, would Iran be better off volunteering to observe the AP or continuing to refuse?
I think it would be better off volunteering. You apparently think it would be better off refusing. So be it – not much more I care to discuss if that’s the case.”
Yup. Especially if you can’t really cite any evidence for your speculative “benefits” actually occurring given the history we KNOW where they did NOT occur.
“It may be, instead, that you really believe that some sort of deal can be struck,”
Nope.
“and that Iran’s sticking to its “no AP” position will improve the chances of striking such a deal.”
Here is where you fail again. It’s not a matter of whether it “improves the changes of striking a deal.” It’s a matter of Iran has no choice. The ONLY diplomatic offer it can make is to implement the AP in exchange for US recognition of its enrichment rights. Without that, Iran has no bargaining chips at all – not legal ones anyway. It can always start making trouble for the US but this far more than a failure to implement the AP would be bad PR for it.
Let’s try this approach: What do YOU think Iran should do if, once it has unilaterally implemented the AP as you wish to do, absolutely NONE of the benefits you cite come to pass? Even if none of the negatives I cite as possible come to pass, what does Iran do once it’s “shot its wad”, to use the vernacular?
Now we’re right back in the same boat we’re in now – except Iran has nothing to offer any more?
At least now Iran has something it can hold out as a negotiating point. If Iran does as you wish, it will have nothing.
Maybe that negotiating point isn’t worth much as you assert. You may be right about that. But I assert it’s worth more NOT PLAYED than cast off into the wind on a speculative hunch about possible benefits.
“If so, I hope you’re right and I’m wrong. We’ll find it out in a few weeks.”
Well, what we’ll find out in a few weeks is whether whatever negotiations are engaged in work or not. Unless Iran specifically puts this offer on the table in exchange for US recognition of enrichment, this may not be resolved in this round of talks. I’ve not been up on latest news about the talks – is it expected that this will be the negotiating track? Robert Dreyfuss seemed to suggest it would be, but I’ve heard no confirmation from anyone on either Iran or the US side. I would expect the Tehran Declaration to be up first in these talks. Whether Iran will demand a concession in connection with that about enrichment rights has not been specified. If Iran talks about the Tehran Declaration but not about the AP, our argument will still be unsatisfied. If the US offers acceptance of the Tehran declaration in exchange for the AP, then the issue of legal enrichment will still not be resolved. Only if both the US and Iran make the explicit offer of concession for AP will it be resolved.
James: If you’d like to name a few recognizable names in the American elite who a) wish that Israel would agree to the offered peace plan by Saudi Arabia and b) realize that Iran does not have and is not trying to get nuclear weapons, then that would be comforting.
Mr. Canning: “In any event, I see Iranian enriching to 20% as a continuing PR disaster because it enable the Iranophobes to say that Iran said it would enrich no higher than 5%, and here they are doing it to four times that level. Implying the next step will be to quadruple the purity yet again.”
Well, the Iran detractors can do that. Those in the know are well aware that Iran explicitly said that if it didn’t get its TRR fuel from the West in a reasonable time, it would have to enrich to 20% itself. And they were true to their word. Once the November negotiations broke down, Iran told the US it would have until end of December 2009 to return to the table. The US instead abandoned the negotiations to concentrate on sanctions which was likely the game plan all along, so in January or February Iran began its enrichment.
Which, as far as I know, is still totally legal under the NPT.
The entire onus of this situation falls on the US which deliberately sabotaged the negotiations by insisting on a “take it or leave it” proposition which exposed Iran to losing most of its LEU, as Arnold has pointed out. Whatever fault lies in Iran based on the reports of bickering over the US offer isn’t relevant compared to that basic US fault.
I agree it’s not a good PR situation for Iran, but then nothing is in the Western media. Nothing Iran does will ever get it in good graces with the US.
Eric,
I agree with you Iran would do well to accept the AP. But maybe a meeting off-the-record and away from the media needs to take place.
Castellio,
It seems to me that all US troops will be out of Iraq by the end of this year or fairly soon in 1212. But I do not see this as part of a plan to prepare for an attack on Iran.
I think a significant part of the American “elite” would just as soon Israel stop oppressing the Palestinians. But many are afraid to say so openly, due to retaliation that so often results.
Richard,
I’m still not sure what your position would be if you were Iran. On the one hand, you write this:
“Personally, I don’t think Iran should accept any restrictions except as specified in their IAEA Agreements.”
That means “none.”
On the other hand, you write this:
“Arnold has suggested the US would like Iran to restrict its available LEU to an amount less than would be capable to make a bomb. This might be negotiable if the US offered something of value, but I’m not sure all factions of the Iranian government would find that acceptable. I believe Iran has in the past offered to restrict enrichment to LEU levels (and remove the 20% enrichment if they get their TRR fuel) and also to restrict the types and numbers of centrifuges they would use, in exchange for US concessions. So these sorts of things might be negotiable.”
It’s easy enough to imagine some restrictive conditions on Iran’s enrichment rights that the US would accept but that Iran would reject. That gets us nowhere. Conversely, It’s easy to imagine very limited restrictions that Iran would accept but that the US would reject. That gets us nowhere either.
I have no idea where on the spectrum you think a deal might be struck, and I’m quite pessimistic that there is such a “sweet spot” in the current circumstances. Given my pessimism, I’m left to wonder this: In the absence of any deal, would Iran be better off volunteering to observe the AP or continuing to refuse?
I think it would be better off volunteering. You apparently think it would be better off refusing. So be it – not much more I care to discuss if that’s the case.
It may be, instead, that you really believe that some sort of deal can be struck, and that Iran’s sticking to its “no AP” position will improve the chances of striking such a deal. If so, I hope you’re right and I’m wrong. We’ll find it out in a few weeks.
FYI
“The Ancient Iranians fought the Turanians over the Din Behi – the damn Turanians even murdered Zoraster.”
Do you have any historical evidence for this epical narrative.
“More recent history, the war of Uzbeks against Iran by Sheibanian was declared on basis of Fatwas of the Sunni Ulema.”
Sure a lot of tribes from central Asia invaded Iran but again was not due to one religion against another, not even Afghans invaded Safavied Iran due to Shieh religion.
“And the battle field cry of Nader Shah was “Alluho Akbar””.
You even see that on a green back, that does not mean we spend it in the name of the god (with one exception Bernanke )
And those who are familiar with the Iran-Iraq War are familiar how that war was cast, by the Iranians, as the war of Islam against Unbelief.
FYI- this whole garbage you wrote, we both know is “safsateh”, Iran’s defense against invading Iraqi army was not for religion or for one religion against another.
Fio- Shieh Islam by now is a fabric of the Iranian culture in every respect as is many of pre Islamic Iranian traditions, no longer any group including Khomeini or Reza Shah can separate the two.
James Canning wrote to RSH:
“Important point: too many ignorant Americans think Iran and North Korea are in the same boat, and assume Iran has nukes and is unstable in the same manner as North Korea.”
Yesterday, I listened to several hours’ worth of one American who “thinks Iran and North Korea are in the same boat.” That person is Michael Mandelbaum, professor of American foreign policy and director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. SAIS is one of Washington’s most influential schools, where America’s next generation of foreign service officers are trained. (I’m sure you get the point, James; America’s “ignorance” is a trickle-down phenomenon: it comes from its elites on down. I think that’s called propaganda. In my opinion, more and more Americans are becoming less and less ignorant, and are pushing back against their propagandists. “If the people lead, the leaders will follow.”)
http://www.booktv.org/Program/11949/The+Frugal+Superpower+Americas+Global+Leadership+in+a+CashStrapped+Era.aspx
and
:http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/Mandelb
In the second video, in which Mandelbaum is interviewed by Jacqueline Grapin, of the European Institute (who never quite manages to take off the kid gloves), Mandelbaum briefly mentions the question Arnold Evans raised the other day: is the US more interested in supporting the democratic will of the people, or in sustaining in power leaders who advance American interests?
At about 11 minutes, Grapin and Mandelbaum are discussing protests in foreign cities against American policies. Mandelbaum waves them away: “In most places it’s the people who protest. Only in North Korea and Iran do governments express anti-American sentiment.”
R S Hack,
I also agree China sees large business opportunities in Iran. And that it will pursue them, though hampered by US demands for sanctions etc.
R S Hack,
I agree Russia is not concerned about a tiny Iranian enrichment to 20%, solely related to refueling the TRR if the IAEA continues to fail to act on the application.
And I agree Russia and China, to a degree, go along with US demands regarding sanctioning Iran, in order to gain other concessions important to them.
In any event, I see Iranian enriching to 20% as a continuing PR disaster because it enable the Iranophobes to say that Iran said it would enrich no higher than 5%, and here they are doing it to four times that level. Implying the next step will be to quadruple the purity yet again.
Voice of Tehran,
I share your concern that some German newspapers are pushing the line that “Judeo-Christian” society is threatened by Islam and Muslim immigrants, in that it is a element of a continuing effort globally to attempt to convince people that Israel is under the same “threat” as Europe and America, and that a need is present to make common cause. When in fact it is Israel’s actions that is creating much of the problem.
Mr. Canning: I could just see some interest in Russia in keeping Iran at a certain level given its proximity and geopolitical history with Russia, but certainly not China which is only interested in Iran’s oil and gas and perhaps some geopolitical interest in Iran given its proximity to Central Asia.
Iran is uniquely positioned in the region to be a lynch pin for the region. So clearly no one around it would want it to turn into a regional power that might be inimical to their interests. But I don’t see Russia and China really interested in suppressing Iran except to the degree they can do so in order to further their negotiations with the US in regards to other matters of more importance to them.
This is why I have always disagreed with you that Russia really cared about Iran’s enriching to 20% as opposed to Russia agreeing to the new sanctions primarily in order to try to extract concessions from the US on other matters such as the missile defense shield. Given Putin’s comment quoted below and other similar comments made repeatedly by the Russian diplomats, I can’t see Russia caring that Iran has a small amount of 20% enriched uranium for its TRR reactor. That never made any sense to me.
R S Hack,
Important point: too many ignorant Americans think Iran and North Korea are in the same boat, and assume Iran has nukes and is unstable in the same manner as North Korea.
Fiorangela,
In Colonial America, the Presbyterians tended to resent or even hate the Anglicans, and this in part reflected the Scotch-Irish resentment of England and the Anglican estabilishment. Lowland plantation owners tended to be English and Anglican, and upper class, while the Scotch-Irish were more typically in the hills where land was less valuable. A simplification, to be sure.
In New England, the various Protestant denominations had complex relations, with plenty of hate and resentment to hand.
I might add, as an aside, that it seems to me that a lot of people who get their Iran news from the MSM are viewing the Iran nuclear situation as somehow similar to the North Korea nuclear situation. The two are totally different, and the only reason people make that connection is Bush’s “Axis of Evil” nonsense (and perhaps that Iran received some technological assistance from North Korea).
Neither Iran’s nuclear energy program, its form of government or internal issues, or its geopolitical situation has anything even remotely to do with North Korea’s circumstances.
There was an excellent piece on North Korea put out today in Asia Times. I recommend it.
Misunderstandings may prove fatal
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MA08Dg02.html
fyi,
I think China wants to compete with Russia and other countries in building nuclear power plants. China and Russia do not want an Iran armed with nukes, but I see no wish on their part to “keep Iran down”. Doesn’t make sense (in absence of nukes).
Eric: “What restrictions, if any, on Iran’s enrichment rights do you think Iran should find acceptable?”
I can’t think of any particular restrictions. Arnold has suggested the US would like Iran to restrict its available LEU to an amount less than would be capable to make a bomb. This might be negotiable if the US offered something of value, but I’m not sure all factions of the Iranian government would find that acceptable.
I believe Iran has in the past offered to restrict enrichment to LEU levels (and remove the 20% enrichment if they get their TRR fuel) and also to restrict the types and numbers of centrifuges they would use, in exchange for US concessions.
So these sorts of things might be negotiable.
Personally, I don’t think Iran should accept any restrictions except as specified in their IAEA Agreements. Iran is appropriately proud of its technological achievements, and absent any real evidence of weaponization, I don’t think it is appropriate for any other country to impose limitations. In my view, suspicion is not sufficient grounds for this sort of behavior.
Eric,
Iran has suggested clearly it is willing to suspend enriching to 20% if TRR deal goes through, and to restrict enrichment to production of LEU. This is a reasonable position to take. I still think Iran was provoked into enriching to 20%, as part of a scheme to demonise Iran even further.
Eric: Excellent response on the AP issue. Let’s dissect it.
I acknowledge that the past bargaining-chip value of Iran’s observance of the Additional Protocol was practically nil.”
Good start since it’s historical fact.
“I think its present bargaining-chip value is virtually nil as well.”
Probably.
“The latter fact, however, is precisely what makes me wonder why so many people insist Iran must hold out until it gets something worthwhile in return. I don’t think it ever will.”
Whether it will or not is irrelevant to whether it COULD or SHOULD.
“Any offer the US might approve in exchange for Iran’s commitment to the AP would almost certainly be an offer that Iran will find too unattractive to accept – or, if it is acceptable, an offer that Iran would be just as likely (if not more likely) to receive if it had already started observing the AP before the offer was made.”
And here is where you fail.
First, if the US were to offer acceptance of some form of Iranian enrichment, as I indicated in an earlier post here, this would materially change the public face, if not the basis, of the conflict. It would make more difficult – although not, as I said below, impossible – for the US to justify a preventive war absent any real evidence of nuclear weapons, at least as long as the US was using the Iranian nuclear program as its casus belli.
Second, there is ZERO evidence that the US would make any offer to Iran if Iran were to unilaterally begin observing the AP. While the US might applaud such a unilateral move in public, as you mention below, in reality the US is more likely to merely ramp up its demands.
“So why pretend that Iran’s refusal reflects negotiating savvy?”
No one has. It reflects the REALITY that unless Iran got something for it, the chip really does have no bargaining power – and therefore no benefit and therefore no relevance.
“If Iran’s commitment to the AP indeed is valued by the world, Iran will achieve much or all of that value without conditioning its commitment on the receipt of something in return – indeed, the additional good will that may flow from a voluntary commitment may yield more benefits than a negotiated bargain ever could. People will be more likely to believe that Iran intends to carry out its commitment.”
But that would apply only to those nations who already accept that Iran has a legal right to enrichment. Iran would gain NO such benefit from those countries who do NOT believe Iran has a legal right to enrichment, i.e., the US, Israel and the poodle countries of the EU.
So once again, you recommend giving up a potential – if not actual – bargaining chip – in return for something Iran already has: legitimacy in its case for enrichment.
“Why bother agreeing to the AP nevertheless remains a valid question, since it would impose additional reporting burdens on Iran. I acknowledge this.”
OK.
“My principal answer is that doing so probably will enhance Iran’s standing in the eyes of key potential allies – Russia and China, especially – which may make them reluctant to approve harsher sanctions, less inclined to “look the other way” (as they did for Iraq) if the US or Israel decides to attack Iran, and even somewhat inclined to ease existing sanctions, or at least to enforce them less zealously.”
The key word here is “probably”. I would lessen that word to “possibly”. Again, in exchange for nothing CONCRETE, Iran would give up a potential – if not actual – bargaining chip. Russia and China already are perfectly aware that Iran has no nuclear weapons program – see Putin’s comment quoted in an earlier post here. Russia and China’s reactions to Iran sanctions are more a function of their issues with the US than any particular support for Iran (more so in the case of Russia than China, since China has real designs on getting Iranian oil and gas.)
Without previous evidence of such benefits being presented to Iran in advance by Russia and China, it would be folly for Iran to sacrifice a bargaining chip in advance of same.
“Iran’s observance of the AP also will make it more difficult for the US to marshal support among the American people for an attack on Iraq.”
Again, this is speculative at best. 60 percent of the US electorate already believe Iran has a nuclear weapons program (although a much lower percentage believe in using military force against Iran.) More importantly, the US electorate does not control the US government in this regard and hasn’t for years. The US ruling elites control whether the US goes to war with Iran – and they couldn’t care less if Iran agrees to the AP, at least not as far as the US electorate’s opinion is concerned.
Furthermore, even if Iran unilaterally implemented the AP, the US and the US media would merely spin that, and then ratchet up their demands, or shift the focus from the nuclear program to “Iranian support for terrorism” or “Iran oppresses its own people” or the other nonsense the neocons used to demonize Saddam and justify the Iraq war. There would be little or no change in the US electorate’s attitude toward a war. The most that might be plausible would be a delay in the progress toward war of a few months or a couple years until the effect of Iran’s AP action were neutralized. Again, not worth the loss of a bargaining chip.
“There is some value in preventing matters from getting worse, even if they do not get better.”
The issue is whether the value is greater than the risk for Iran especially since there is ZERO evidence that Iran’s actions really would prevent matters from getting worse.
“In short, I think agreeing to observe the AP is advisable for Iran since (1) refusing to do so will preserve no “bargaining chip” value, since its present refusal has little or no “bargaining chip” value in the first place;”
Again, this is not necessarily the case. Iran demanding the US recognize its right to enrichment in exchange for Iran’s AP is a perfectly legitimate diplomatic tactic. Other than things like making life difficult for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan – which itself would be used against Iran to justify war – Iran in essence has no other diplomatic offer to make. Whether the US would accept such an offer is irrelevant. Iran has no choice but to make such an offer. To some degree, it puts the onus on the US to “put up or shut up” – and it has the very real benefit of being completely legal and in accordance with the NPT. To surrender that demand would leave Iran with essentially nothing of significance to offer to the world, especially once that demand was given away with nothing in return.
“(2) assuming that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons and doesn’t want to, complying with the AP won’t pose a significant risk that military secrets will be disclosed;”
This is completely untrue, unless the AP agreement was very explicit in what exact facilities Iran would have to allow the IAEA to inspect. And this is a double-edged sword: the US can always claim Iran is not allowing the IAEA to inspect military facilities that it claims are “nuclear weapons related” in order to force Iran to either allow militarily intrusive inspections or be demonized for “not complying”. Even if Iran were successful in preventing IAEA leaks of military secrets, the US can always use the inspections for propaganda purposes. Only the context of recognizing Iranian enrichment would offset this claim to some degree because the US would have to actually show some indication that benign nuclear activities were actually weapons related.
“(3) complying with the AP isn’t all that burdensome – approximately 100 other countries already do so, after all;”
Irrelevant. The issue is how Iran would be treated, not 100 other countries.
“(4) if cynics are correct to suspect that Iran’s hold-out is motivated partly by a desire to keep the world guessing about its military intentions, I don’t agree that Iran’s hold-out is justified on this basis and I think it’s dangerous for Iran to play such a “hide the ball” game;”
And as I’ve said, you’ve provided zero evidence that Iran is in fact playing such a game. In fact, all the evidence is to the contrary. Therefore this is irrelevant to the cost-benefit analysis.
“(5) many other countries, including several with substantial influence over the world’s treatment of Iran going forward, will consider this to be a meaningful step in the right direction – perhaps more so if Iran takes it voluntarily rather than in exchange for some near-worthless quid pro quo approved by the US.”
Again, an acknowledgment by the US of Iran’s legal right to enrich would not be a “near-worthless quid pro quo” even if the US then shifted its opprobrium to other issues. And offering the AP is the ONLY legal bargaining chip Iran has to offer for that concession.
“I recognize you also believe that the nuclear issue is nothing more than a “smoke screen,” and so it makes no difference how Iran behaves on that issue. If you’re correct about this, then I agree it makes no difference what Iran does or doesn’t do, and so it might as well do nothing. I just don’t agree with you that the nuclear issue is entirely a smoke screen. Of course it’s overblown by the US government, for reasons too obvious to require explanation.”
So this is the underlying issue on which we shall probably have to agree to disagree.
“But most of the world thinks it indeed is important how Iran behaves”
And most of the world seems perfectly happy to me with how Iran has behaved so far, and quite annoyed with how Israel and the US has behaved on this issue.
“The world’s perception of Iran will be significantly enhanced by Iran’s agreement to observe the AP.”
Not if they view Iran as caving in to US pressure with no return in sight.
“Lots of benefits. Few costs. If I were running Iran, I’d commit to the AP without further delay.”
Lots of potential costs. Few benefits. If I were running Iran, I’d continue doing exactly what they’re doing now.
“Incidentally, you may believe that your view on this matter – that Iran should not volunteer to observe the AP – is flatly contrary to the view of the US government. I believe just the opposite. I think the US government, and even more so the bomb-Iran crowd that eggs it on, likes it just fine the way things are going. It makes it much easier for them to convince the world that Iran poses a nuclear threat.”
I agree. Unfortunately that is not something Iran can influence by giving up its one bargaining chip, however weak that chip actually is.
Richard,
“As I’ve said, Iran SHOULD implement the AP – but only if the US gives up some concession, preferably that Iran has the right to enrich – which sole admission by the US would make it VERY difficult for the US to justify military action in the present circumstances of ZERO evidence of any actual nuclear weapons.”
What restrictions, if any, on Iran’s enrichment rights do you think Iran should find acceptable?
Specific rules of war:
“You shall fight in the cause of God against those who fight you but do not be an aggressor as God does not love the aggressors [190]. You may kill them if they attack you, and evict them from where they have evicted you; oppression is worse than murder. Do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they attack you in there. If they attack you, then you may kill them and this would be their just retribution [191]. However, if they refrain and pull back, then God is the forgiver the merciful [192]. You may fight them to prevent oppression and to be free to practice God’s religion. Once they refrain, however, there shall be no aggression [193]. If they attack you during the sacred (Harraam) months, then you may fight them during those months. If they attack you, you may attack them to inflict an equivalent retribution. You must follow God’s guidance and God can observe everything [195]. And spend in the cause of God but do not throw yourselves with your own hands into disaster. You shall be generous and charitable as God loves those who are charitable. [195]
–Translation from Qur’an, Chapter 2 (Al-Baqarah), Verses 190-195
**By design, all translations are interpretation.**
Eric A. Brill says: January 7, 2011 at 5:12 pm
Precisely.
Thus they best pay the price for Iran to do so.
Everybody wants things for free from Iran; well it is not going to happen.
“Tell them, oh, unbelievers [1] I do not worship what you worship [2] Neither will you ever worship what I worship [3] Nor have I ever obeyed the commands of what you obey [4] You will never worship what I worship [5] You follow your own path, and I follow my own path [6] –Translation from Qur’an, Chapter 109 (Al-Kaferoun), Verses 1-6
**By design, all translations are interpretation.**
FYI,
“I think that Russia and China are jealous of their nuclear prerogatives. Furthermore, they want to keep Iran down – but perhaps not too down for her to be over-run by US.”
Doesn’t this argue for Russia and China to press Iran to observe the AP?
FYI,
“I personally think that US have better prospects than Iran: she has water, minerals, rich soil, abundant energy resources, relatively educated people, and more capable and stout women.”
Stout? I promise not to pass this on to my wife (who’s not stout).
Eric A. Brill says: January 7, 2011 at 4:38 pm
You wrote: “…is that doing so probably will enhance Iran’s standing in the eyes of key potential allies – Russia and China, especially.”
I think that Russia and China are jealous of their nuclear prerogatives. Furthermore, they want to keep Iran down – but perhaps not too down for her to be over-run by US.
AP is only marginally important.
At any rate, Israelis have come out with a new estimate putting Iranian nuclear bomb comfortably during the last year of Mr. Obama’s second term. How very convenient.
kooshy says: January 7, 2011 at 4:49 pm
The Ancient Iranians fought the Turanians over the Din Behi – the damn Turanians even murdered Zoraster.
More recent history, the war of Uzbeks against Iran by Sheibanian was declared on basis of Fatwas of the Sunni Ulema.
And the battle field cry of Nader Shah was “Alluho Akbar”.
And those who are familair with the Iran-Iraq War are familiar how that war was cast, by the Iranians, as teh war of Islam against Unbelief.
kooshy, how prominent is the notion of “Iran as the fortress state of Shia Islam?” Israel Shahak places the “Islamic Republic of Iran” in the same category as the “Jewish and Democratic State of Israel,” but I never thought of Iran as so totally committed to Islam. Am I once again viewing Iran thru idealized glasses? My understanding of Iran wrt to Islam is rather in the same sense as Colonial America was Christian.
All:
I think secret negogiations in which all of the nuclear issues are bargained over at the same time is amust.
Iranians would love to go to a meeting in which everything has been decided and the heavy-lifing done.
These negogiations must be separate from any other issue – Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, etc.
Sorry Castellio. I just realized that I have been mis-spelling your title all this time and writing as “Castillo” instead. It was unintentional and I hope it doesn’t have a bad meaning.
Iran has SOME friends in some places in the US
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/01/ex-cia-officer-accused-of-leaking-iran-spy-secrets-to-reporter/1
fyi says: January 7, 2011 at 2:16 pm
I respectfully decline.
Israel is the Fortress (state) of the Jews.
Iran is the Fortress of the Shia.
FYI- Iran has never in her history (including pre Islamic) been engaged in any religious or ideological war, how ever that does not mean religion is not part of her fabric, from the pre Islamic time.
Cyrus,
I acknowledge that the past bargaining-chip value of Iran’s observance of the Additional Protocol was practically nil. I think its present bargaining-chip value is virtually nil as well. The latter fact, however, is precisely what makes me wonder why so many people insist Iran must hold out until it gets something worthwhile in return. I don’t think it ever will. Any offer the US might approve in exchange for Iran’s commitment to the AP would almost certainly be an offer that Iran will find too unattractive to accept – or, if it is acceptable, an offer that Iran would be just as likely (if not more likely) to receive if it had already started observing the AP before the offer was made.
So why pretend that Iran’s refusal reflects negotiating savvy? It reflects nothing more than a grossly inflated assessment of the value of this “bargaining chip.” If Iran’s commitment to the AP indeed is valued by the world, Iran will achieve much or all of that value without conditioning its commitment on the receipt of something in return – indeed, the additional good will that may flow from a voluntary commitment may yield more benefits than a negotiated bargain ever could. People will be more likely to believe that Iran intends to carry out its commitment.
Why bother agreeing to the AP nevertheless remains a valid question, since it would impose additional reporting burdens on Iran. I acknowledge this.
My principal answer is that doing so probably will enhance Iran’s standing in the eyes of key potential allies – Russia and China, especially – which may make them reluctant to approve harsher sanctions, less inclined to “look the other way” (as they did for Iraq) if the US or Israel decides to attack Iran, and even somewhat inclined to ease existing sanctions, or at least to enforce them less zealously. The weaker the sanctions, the sooner even the US will conclude they’re a bad idea: if China, Russia and everyone else are selling widgets to Iran, it’s only a matter of time before US widget-makers complain that they should be allowed to do so too. Iran’s observance of the AP also will make it more difficult for the US to marshal support among the American people for an attack on Iraq.
There is no way to prove in advance that any of this will happen, of course, as some have insisted must be done before Iran should agree to the AP. While Iran’s past observance of the AP did not yield the hoped-for results, the fact remains, in my opinion, that its situation has become even more dangerous since it stopped doing so. There is some value in preventing matters from getting worse, even if they do not get better.
In short, I think agreeing to observe the AP is advisable for Iran since (1) refusing to do so will preserve no “bargaining chip” value, since its present refusal has little or no “bargaining chip” value in the first place; (2) assuming that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons and doesn’t want to, complying with the AP won’t pose a significant risk that military secrets will be disclosed; (3) complying with the AP isn’t all that burdensome – approximately 100 other countries already do so, after all; (4) if cynics are correct to suspect that Iran’s hold-out is motivated partly by a desire to keep the world guessing about its military intentions, I don’t agree that Iran’s hold-out is justified on this basis and I think it’s dangerous for Iran to play such a “hide the ball” game; and (5) many other countries, including several with substantial influence over the world’s treatment of Iran going forward, will consider this to be a meaningful step in the right direction – perhaps more so if Iran takes it voluntarily rather than in exchange for some near-worthless quid pro quo approved by the US.
I recognize you also believe that the nuclear issue is nothing more than a “smoke screen,” and so it makes no difference how Iran behaves on that issue. If you’re correct about this, then I agree it makes no difference what Iran does or doesn’t do, and so it might as well do nothing. I just don’t agree with you that the nuclear issue is entirely a smoke screen. Of course it’s overblown by the US government, for reasons too obvious to require explanation. But most of the world thinks it indeed is important how Iran behaves, and is verifiably perceived to behave, in the conduct of its nuclear program. The world’s perception of Iran will be significantly enhanced by Iran’s agreement to observe the AP.
Lots of benefits. Few costs. If I were running Iran, I’d commit to the AP without further delay.
Incidentally, you may believe that your view on this matter – that Iran should not volunteer to observe the AP – is flatly contrary to the view of the US government. I believe just the opposite. I think the US government, and even more so the bomb-Iran crowd that eggs it on, likes it just fine the way things are going. It makes it much easier for them to convince the world that Iran poses a nuclear threat.
Fyi: I will agree to this extent. Many of the ruling elite may well harbor religious beliefs and some may actually act primarily on the basis of those beliefs. In my view, however, this does not make the overall situation one that constitutes an actual “religious war” in the sense that the PRIMARY motivation is conflicting religious doctrine in the sense of some of the medieval religious wars in Europe.
Most of these clowns don’t even know Christian doctrine per se, let alone Islamic doctrine. It’s merely the face that Islam is different from Christianity that motivates the dislike – and this reflects a more fundamental division than religion.
The motivation for the conflict goes deeper in my view. I believe humans enter conflicts because of their fears of being less than others of their kind, and that this fear reflects the basic primate fear of death. I usually express this attitude in the following manner: “If you’re right, I’m wrong, and if I’m wrong I’m dead – and that can’t be allowed. Therefore I’m right and you’re wrong – and I’ll kill you if I have to to prove that.” This is the basic attitude of humans regardless of religion. Religion is a codification of that pre-rational emotional response.
So we would have these conflicts even if the major monotheistic religions had never been invented.
By the same token, the urge for money and power is motivated by EXACTLY the SAME fears.
So as I said, whether the issue is religion or money and power is not an “either-or” situation – it is both. If the underlying fears are not addressed, no solution is possible. So a focus on the religious issues alone is insufficient.
Which is one more reason why I hold little optimism of a non-violent resolution to the current situation, either in the US vs Iran crisis, or the Palestinian-Israel issue or the Pakistan situation.
Israeli scientist has asked Saudi Arabia to release the rare breed of vulture along with its transmitter carrying great scientific information which could revolutionize the espionage industry……
http://rehmat2.wordpress.com/2011/01/07/it%e2%80%99s-just-a-%e2%80%98vulture%e2%80%99-stupid/
Voice of Tehran: I completely understand your 3:58 post and have no problem with that. Such analytical points are useful.
The Germans in particular have always been too religious in that respect. When Hitler was appointed Chancellor, the German Catholic Church applauded, anti-Semitic as it was. It is interesting that today, the Church can maneuver to support Israel against the Muslim religion. It would seem to me to be an indication that the Church, while always wishing to keep Judaism down due to its hijacking of the Jewish prophet, views any larger scale religious movement such as Islam to be a bigger threat. So it is prepared to ally itself temporarily with Judaism against Islam.
In the same way, as has been noted many times by commentators, the right wing Christian movement in the US is willing to support Israel – even while at the same time proclaiming that the Second Coming will only occur once Israel is destroyed. As some wags have put it, “When friends like these, Israel doesn’t need enemies.” But the Israelis have no problem with using such “friends” to its own benefit in pushing the US to destroy Israel’s enemies. The cynicism is breath-taking.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 7, 2011 at 3:51 pm
In regards to Al Mahdi or the 12-th Imam; it is in the hands of God when he will appear. It may be that God decides that he is not needed. But the Evangelical Christains in US want to engineer a re-appearance of Christ; they want o test God and expedite his plans (if any).
I am suggesting that when Mr. George Herbert Walker Bush spoke of US being a Judeao-Christain country he meant it. That there was something more than mere bombast behind him ending every speech by “God Bless the United States of America.” And such examples can be multiplied; Mr. Clinton attending the National Cathedral with his old Bible in hand; the Houses of US Congress’ invocation of the Almighty and other things like that.
I do not know what is in their hearts. But even for the non-religious ones, the values that they invoke: Human Rights, Freedom, Democracy etc. are directly tracebale to the Revelations; that man was created in God’s image and thus all men partake of Divine Essence. It is in this sense, of the geneology of ideas, that I made my statements regarding the root of secular humanistic ideas.
My responses to MHF was meant as rebuttals to statements that I found empty of any content.
Cyrus: “The Obama administration is caught up in too many issues to go to war against Iran now, and will instead continue the policy inhereted from the Bush administration and will kick the can down the road.”
This is quite possibly true. What isn’t clear is how far down the road the can will be kicked. I could see Obama kicking it up to and even past the 2012 elections. I’m not sure we can be confident that if he wins that election that he will kick it another four years down the road. He might, IF he’s not as dedicated to the permanent war economy and under the control of his benefactors as I think he is. But if he loses the 2012 election, and that means a Republican President and probably Republican control of the House and Senate, things could get much worse very quickly.
And beyond that, we have another midterm election, and then another Presidential election in 2016 – another full four years before 2020. The odds don’t look good for avoiding a conflict for that entire time.
Cyrus: Agree with your 3:31 post. Eric has never addressed those facts in his recommendations that Iran unilaterally observe the AP. He’s always weaved around them. As I’ve said, Iran SHOULD implement the AP – but only if the US gives up some concession, preferably that Iran has the right to enrich – which sole admission by the US would make it VERY difficult for the US to justify military action in the present circumstances of ZERO evidence of any actual nuclear weapons.
And that’s why I suspect Israel views that as a “red line”. Far more than any NIE statement that Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapons program, as long as the US can claim that its ENRICHMENT program is tantamount to the same thing, the US can continue to pursue a war course.
If the US is forced to allow Iran to enrich, it becomes much harder for the US to justify war. Not impossible, of course, the US can just switch its justification to “Iran supports terrorism” or “Iran oppresses its own people”, etc., just as the neocons did with Saddam.
But at least one justification would be removed to some degree.
So Iran needs to withhold AP observance in exchange for a real concession from the US. The fact that the US will probably never actually provide such a concession is a different matter altogether. But it is reverse thinking to believe Iran can compel a concession by unilaterally ratifying the AP in the absence of a US concession.
Fiorangela says: January 7, 2011 at 3:51 pm
About the Armenian guide and his businesss:
In Tehran Bazar you will meet many men between ages of 25-50 who are also very keen on expanding their businesses.
What keeps them back is mostly the older Bazaris who are risk averse and content with their lives and achievements as old men (no Mojo as Americans say).
To that you must add the self-inflicted wounds of the pesudo-socialism of the Iranian state.
I personally think that US have better prospects than Iran: she has water, minerals, rich soil, abundant energy resources, relatively educated people, and more capable and stout women.
Fiorangela says: January 7, 2011 at 3:51 pm
About the Armenian guide and his businesss:
In Tehran Bazar you will meet many men between ages of 25-50 who are also very keen on expanding their businesses.
What keeps them back is mostly the older Bazaris who are risk averse and content with their lives and achievements as old men (no Mojo as Americans say).
To that you must
BiBiJon: If I read this correctly, and I might not be: “However, if these benefits can be deconstructed, some elements of them may well be within what each party is willing to provide the other without costly conflict.” – you are suggesting that there is a “Middle Way” that the US and Iran can compromise such that the ruling elites on each side get what they want.
I would be interesting in hearing what notions you have on how that might be if I am correct about the motivations of the US elites, i.e., war profiteering, absolute support of Israel, etc.
I’m pretty sure that Iran get what it wants to some degree. I have considerable doubts the US and Israeli elites can get what they want in even a small measure that would cause them to back off Iran.
RSH
I share fyi’s point of view.
I grew up in Germany and I am very much familiar with each aspect of life there.
In my wildest imaginations I would never have expected , that religion would play even a minor factor there , not in the past nor in the future.
During the last couple of years and especially in the last 2 years there was a fundamential change in this policy , which was massivley supported by the Zionist controlled media there . Nowadays almost on daily basis , in virtually every major news outlet , they speak of ” Christlich-Jüdische Leitkultur ” = ” Christian-Jewish Guiding Culture ” vs. Islam.
What I want to say is , that even in the most non-religious ‘ atheistic’ society which one could imagine , the trend is to confront the Muslims in Europe ( and elsewhere ) on religious basis , a basis which I thought had died a long time ago . In France and other countries in Europe a similiar trend is in place.
I leave it to you to think about the consequences and to draw your own conclusions
Note also that the Iranians don’t really have the option of giving in to US demands. Any Iranian regime that gives up enrichment will automatically and immediately be accused of having sacrificed the national rights of Iran in order to keep itself in power — thus losing any legitimacy. It would be regime suicide.
Fyi: I have no problem with your 3:15 pm post. I agree that there is a huge religious component in the US electorate’s siding with Israel against Iran. Of that there can be no doubt since a huge fraction of the US electorate are in some respects at least “fundamentalist” Christians who believe that they must aid the Israelis to bring about Armageddon – which is just as bad a notion as any “Twelver” similar belief if such exist. In fact, the majority Jewish component of the electorate in the US is probably mostly against any war with Iran and only the Jewish elite are in favor. Also the Jewish component of the US electorate is mostly out of touch with Israel and doesn’t realize how right wing it has become. So the bulk of the anti-Iran sentiment in the US electorate is mostly driven by right wing Christians and Jewish elites.
Where I would not agree is that the ruling elites in the US are primarily driven by religious motivations, even in the context of your assertion that most people’s beliefs are driven by religion. That is not the case in my case, and I assert confidently that it is not the case in the ruling elites. Some of them, of course, are religiously driven as well as driven by notions of money and power. As I indicated earlier, these are not mutually exclusive positions since religion is mostly about power, if not money. It is about establishing oneself as “morally superior” to everyone else, and attempting in a pre-rational way to derive the benfit from acknowledging any “gods” that might be around, and that is an issue of power and also of the fear of death.
I have no objection to discussions of this sort. It was statements like your “How do you know the Hidden Imam, the Al Mahdi does not exist? God could produce him at any moment if he so desires; or are you suggesting God does not exist either?” that concerned me that you might be straying into a more religious advocacy position. If I was incorrect in that, please accept my apologies.
fyi wrote: “But note that while his demands on Iran is quite concrete, the benefits to Iran are quite vague.”
Yes, I got that point — the carrots got squeezed to juice and the dog drank it.
Not only were the benefits vague, mention of the concept was patronizing, like telling a child “we’ll give you candy if you do thus-and-so.” So insulting.
US is exhibiting phantom limb syndrome: it does not realize that its economy is so weak that it’s functioning without its right arm — the message has not yet got to its head; it can’t afford “carrots” for Iran. For all the punishment US and dastardly doer Stuart Levey have heaped upon Iran, it has better prospects than does the US. US needs Iran’s oil, but Iran has learned how to live without involvement in US-led financial system — you know, the one that’s so completely corrupt?
on the other hand, I keep thinking about the Armenian guide we met in Isfehan, who said life would be a lot easier in Iran if it were possible to obtain credit to build up businesses.
The Obama administration is caught up in too many issues to go to war against Iran now, and will instead continue the policy inhereted from the Bush administration and will kick the can down the road.
Meanwhile the Iranians are betting that while the US is continuing to press for the unachievable (zero enrichment),the Iranians will be able to establish “facts on the ground” that will have to be either simply accepted by the US or can be used as bargaining chips for any future compromise with the US. (Note that the US was vehemently opposed to Iran’s Bushehr reactor, and only recently conceeded that it does not pose a weapons threat — vindacting Iran’s steadfastness.)
And in the meantime, the Israelis are hoping that the continuation of this policy will 1- serve as a distraction from their own activities in Occupied Palestine, and 2-will effectively blocking any chance of an actual US engagement of Iran, something they see as an anathema, and 3- eventually, will have not only prepared the groundwork in public opinion for a war on Iran to remove Iran as a potential regional competitor (which is their desired and ulimate goal) but it will have also effectively “boxed-in” the US into the false choice of “war now or war later” because everytime the US imposes a sanction on Iran, the policy gains more momentum and it becomes that much harder for the US to do an about-face on Iran. Obama is, quite simply, being led down the garden path.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 7, 2011 at 3:15 pm and Voice of Tehran
I have endeavoured, with some success I should hope, to demonstrate that those who are positing a secular and no-religious point of view are holding untenable positions – that their point of view, one way or another, is either inspired by the Revelationss or is a descendant of the ideas first revealed in the Revelations.
That religious sentiment underlies US-EU Axis support for Israel.
That Muslim countries cannot be secular and democratic at the same time.
That a religious war was declared by Osama bin Ladin and after 10 years of war we are facing more escalations.
Every peace must be based on some sort of conceptualization of what is possible. For the Muslim world, the centrality of Islam must be acknowledged. This centrality does limit, however, what is possible.
In Palestine, for example, Peace will not be possible as the Al Haram Al Sharif would then need to be in the hands of Muslims – Al Quds. In the absence of such sovereignity over (East) Jerusalem, Syria will not sign a separate peace treaty with Israel and become the Judas of Islam.
Iran, the Fortress of the Shia, will not give up on the Shia of South Lebanon, on the Hazara of Afghanistan, the Arab Shia of the Persian Gulf, and the Shia of Pakistan. The Qum-Najaf Axis will be the de facto Shia Vatican with attendand consequences
US, out of religious sentiment, will support Israel and will not be forthcoming – indeed could not be forthcoming even if she understood its desirability – with an acceptable peace settlement to Arabs and Muslims.
Once all of this is understood and accepted, we could move on to see what could be possible: e.g. Cease-Fire in Palestine and the rump Palestinian state, confessional government in Iraq, etc.
But unless the constrains that these religious sentiments are imposing on the various international actors are acknowledged, I am afraid we will be looking to more of the same; and with the possibiliy of a religious war lurking behind the current events.
Regarding the Additional Protocol, I should point out that it is largely irrelevant. The US position has been consistently that countries (not just Iran) should be deprived of the right to enrich uranium (said right being characterized as merely a “loophole” in the NPT by the US) and so it is unlikely that Iran’s formal accession to the AP would resolve this dispute.
Note further that the US accuses Iran not of having a nuclear weapons program now but instead accuses Iran of seeking the “capability” or “option” to make nukes at some indefinite point in the future.
No amount of IAEA inspections, whether under the AP or not, can disprove that a country won’t potentially do something in the indefinite future. Thus, even if Iran formally accedes to the AP, the issue won’t be resolved.
Indeed, Iran did voluntarily implement the AP for over 2 years, and Iran went further than even the requirement of AP in many instances (such as allowing inspections at Parchin, or in resolving the “Outstanding Issues” listed in the Aug 2007 Modalities Agreement with the IAEA) But despite that, there was no end to the continuous hostility and drumbeat of war and talk of “nuclear weapons programs” in Iran. In short, this isn’t about the AP. Iran can sign 50 APs and the issue would still not be resolved because, like I keep saying, you have to address the underlying political conflict rather than being misdirected by the booga-booga about the nuclear issue.
With reference to Mr Jenkins’ piece which in turn references Roger Fisher and William Ury’s “Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In”, I had earlier asked some questions, which may have been unclear. so, here are some clarification, hoping it will qualify it for some thoughtful answers.
BiBiJon says:
January 7, 2011 at 11:13 am
Cyrus says:
January 7, 2011 at 10:22 am
I have a few questions about the pretext idea
1) How can one be sure ‘objectively’ that anything that does not meet one’s own ‘minimalist’ position is automatically perceived as a pretext.
If we put ourselves in the West’s shoes (a necessary mental exercise if one takes Ury and Fisher seriously) then what Iran claims as unreasonable or a pretext, can from Western eyes look like Iran is digging in her heels. A bit more pressure, surely would make Iran foot-loose and have her retreat further back from her previous red line.
Question is how can Iran ever convince the West that a particular red line is really it, she will retreat no further, come hell or high water, while not pushing the situation to actual hell or high water.
The only answer seems to me is if the West proposes a solution, then surely if Iran accedes, then Bob’s your uncle. Unfortunately, after Obama’s letters to Erdogan and Lula, and then Obama reneging, even that avenue has become constricted . Henceforth all meetings must be on c-span I guess.
2) Related to above, how can we be sure that a volunteered solution (e.g. enrichment consortium) is the minimalist position., seeing as it was volunteered?
When Iran says that she understands and agrees and thinks the West has legitimate concerns, Iran can be interpreted/misinterpreted to be faking a good global citizen. And, when Iran follows through with trying to find creative solutions to what she has announced she regards as legitimate Western concerns, then her proposals can be interpreted/misinterpreted as ‘well, Iran was after this goal all along, she can be pushed further’.
Is there anything Iran can propose that will not be misconstrued as an openning for further hagling by the West?
3) Assuming it is a pretext (I am personally convinced that it is) then, what is the US’ real objective? Attacking Iran is just a ‘means’. But, a means to which attainable goal, in what timeframe, for what short-medium-long term benefit?
Thank you RSH for your response.
However, if these benefits can be deconstructed, some elements of them may well be within what each party is willing to provide the other without costly conflict.
BiBiJon asks “How can we be sure that a volunteered solution (e.g. enrichment consortium) is the minimalist position., seeing as it was volunteered”
WE don’t have to be sure about whether it is the minimalist position or not — the point is that there are solutions in dealing with Iran (other than the “war vs. sanctions” false choice being promoted in the media, which is actually a “war now vs. war later” option) which have never even explored and were instead dismissed off-hand by the US which instead continues to insists on an impossible target of zero-enrichment, something which they know is not achievable, and so they know will mean a continuation of the conflict.
The history of this standoff with Iran over the nuclear issue is quite clear and consistent: everytime Iran has made a compromise offer, it was either ignored or actively torpedoed. Everytime the US has made a compromise offer to Iran it contained a ‘poison pill’ designed to ensure that the offer would not be accepted by Iran (latest example was the Brazil-Turkey Uraniaum swap agreement fiasco, in which the US imposed an last-minute deal-killing additional demand for suspension of enrichment — much to the surprise of the Brazilians and Turks.)
Fiorangela says: January 7, 2011 at 2:59 pm
I have followed his suggestions over time.
I think if his ideas are adopted, NAM will bolt out of NPT.
But note that while his demands on Iran is quite concrete, the benefits to Iran are quite vague.
Richard Steven Hack says: January 7, 2011 at 2:31 pm
I have had several reasons in using a Religious conceptualization.
I wanted to point out that the roots of the conflict in Palestine are the religious sentiments of Protestant Christains in US & UK as well as Jews both in Israel and in the North America and Europe. That, in fact, there is nothing reasonable in the US-EU Axis support for Israel if you leave out this dimension. Furthermore, in my opinion, the Jewish Fantasy project in Palestine now has brought Jews in opposition to Islam. This project can only be understood as a Religious one.
By emphasizing the religious nature of this conflict, I am hoping to warn all those who are interested in Peace and Tranquility that the continuation of the religious war in Palestine (as well as the US-EU Axis War in Afghnaistan and Pakistan) will have the great potential to ignite something that has not existed for 800 years; a religious war between Protestant Christans and Jews on one side and the Sunni Muslims on the other.
[An attack on Iran will add Shia Muslims to this religious war.]
This could become a religious war between the United States and both houses of Islam.
That foolish man, Newt Giungrich, has already stated that every Muslim that takes Sharia seriously is a radical Muslim and and enemy of the Unitted States.
Now, I believe with a lot of money and diplomatic work, the war in Palestine may be brought into something that can be resolved on basis of Land-for-Peace. But, as of now, even cease-fire seems too distant an aim.
Secondly, the fact that Iran (or Israel for that matter) is religious polity for an specific religious sect, constrains the political dispensation that is possible. That is (and if I am correct in my conceptualization) a secular democractic government in Iran is not a feasible project. That, in fact, a secular government in Iran, just like the Ba’ath states of Iraq and Syria or the government of Egypt, will have to be a dictatorship to keep Islam out of the government. The ramifications of this are quite clear to the regime-change crowd, I hope.
As of this writing, events in Palestine, in Yemen, in Iran, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Iraq all point to escalation – largely driven by US-EU Axis and their policy formulations.
Voice of Tehran: “I persoannly see no sign of “religious war ” on this website whatsover.”
Not yet, except in a couple of Fyi’s posts below. What I’m trying to do is head off one.
“The religious & spritual factor is, so to say, ‘ incorporated ‘ , whenever you discuss about Iran , whether you like it or not.”
As I said, as long as it is expressed in analytical terms, not in advocacy terms I have no problem with discussions of Iran’s religious basis – although I still view it as I do the “civil rights” issue as “off topic” in terms of the nuclear issue if not in terms of the overall issue of engagement with Iran. There is some wiggle room. As the Leveretts have suggested, a separate set of threads for discussions of Iran’s internal matters, including the religious issues, would be useful.
“Ignoring this essential point simply deprives you of a proper understanding of the complexity of the standpoints on this blog , unless you are intentionally reducing it to power and money to apply your own ‘ simple’ thought structure.”
Not at all. I’m simply trying to head off a religious discussion which I suspect many readers of this site – not necessarily the posters – would find off putting and irrelevant to the nuclear issue.
Let’s put it this way, If this site devolves into a religious war, I’m out of here. So do what you think you must and so will I.
Fiorangela: Agreed. Although I think Matt’s point was that Iran believes the US can not really do anything about its nuclear energy program, and that sanctions ultimately will fail miserably. They’re probably correct about that part. Where I am concerned is if they really believe that their “deterrent value” as Arnold might put it is sufficient to prevent the US from attacking. I think if they believe that, they are dangerously deluded. It’s a mystery to me how they can correctly recognize US and Israel imperial ambitions and yet believe that somehow the cost-benefit of a war with Iran is such that the US AND Israel will both sacrifice those ambitions just because it would cause much misery in the region and some economic pain -disproportionately suffered not by the ruling elites in either country, but the ordinary consumer – in the US.
I suspect Iran really doesn’t understand the US dynamic any more than the US understands Iran. But at least Iran is probably trying whereas the US is not.
Castellio: Agreed, IF Matt is correct that Israel has a red line about the US accepting any Iranian enrichment and that further Iranian military development may be sufficient to deter an Israeli strike in the future. I rather doubt the latter – simply because Israel does not need to be successful in ANY strike – just enough to provoke an Iranian response that draws the US in. So I don’t think Israel cares too much about Iranian military development – except of course that it would rather not lose 20 planes vs losing, say, 2.
In any event, while the timing cannot be reliably predicted, the longer the “crisis” goes on, the likelihood of war goes up, not down, as some people think. OTOH eventually there will be a “tipping point” after which an attack on Iran will be seen clearly for the illegal war it is and before that point it will be considered as “legitimate”. I believe that tipping point is well in advance of the year 2020 which is why I don’t believe the notion that this “crisis” will go on in some sort of stalemate for the next twenty years or more.
RSH
“”There is no surer way to kill a blog site than to allow a “religious war” to start in the comments thread..however I believe money and power, which as I’ve said here are integral to religions, are equally or more significant..”"
With all respect , with above statement you are ‘sinking’ deeper into contradictions.
I persoannly see no sign of “religious war ” on this website whatsover.
To say it in short . The religious & spritual factor is, so to say, ‘ incorporated ‘ , whenever you discuss about Iran , whether you like it or not.
Ignoring this essential point simply deprives you of a proper understanding of the complexity of the standpoints on this blog , unless you are intentionally reducing it to power and money to apply your own ‘ simple’ thought structure.
I personally value your comments , but in this point you are fundamentally on the wrong path.
fyi, I stopped reading the Pierre Goldschmidt article after the first paragraph — the dogs had rung the bell, demanding their carrot juice, and I had to react as programmed. Pierre had nothing new to say but the dogs are now quiet.
Voice of Tehran: “you will never ‘ understand ‘ Iran without the spritual and religious aspects.”
That’s not the point. It’s perfectly reasonable to say that Iran’s leadership is guided by religious principles, to enumerate those principles, to offer evidence that Iran’s leadership, being guided by those principles, is either not pursuing nuclear weapons or is otherwise in the “right” in its conduct in Iran. No one can object to an objective exposition of the influence of religion in Iran.
Where it is not useful in the context of this site is to make assertions about the certainty of the validity of those religious principles as FYI has done. In other words, advocacy rather than analysis. That merely leads to responses from people who don’t agree, and the thread descends into vituperative “religious arguments” as the term is used on the Internet, meaning insults and name calling and discussion that go no where and fill up threads with posts no one interested in the main topic cares about.
If the Leveretts follow through on their suggestion that they may establish a means for off-topic threads, then that would be the place for such discussions.
Re RSH at 2.27 pm.
I think the window for an Israeli attack on Iran, which is being organized as we speak, is within the next two and a half years. It has to be done while AN is still in power.
I think the US is in a rush to organize the pieces to that end, and this includes what is currently happening in Pakistan, Iraq and Palestine.
At the end of the day, it’s not a military decision taken by the Generals after rational analysis (sorry Arnold), but a civilian decision taken by the government in power, representing interests of the American-Israeli elite.
That previous Attorney-General Mukasey, an important facilitator of the cover up of 9-11, can openly support terrorist groups in Iran (MEK) clarifies for all how far the political corruption has, and continues, to spread.
I hope I’m wrong, but that’s my analysis at this moment.
RSH re “Matt” comment on Dreyfuss blog: also need to factor in the US presidential elections, 2012. Iran may think the US “irrelevant,” but wealthy Jews in US and abroad do not; they have been a mainstay of US elections, particularly Democratic party, since Woodrow Wilson.
PLUS, while some blogs are celebrating that Rahm Emmanuel & David Axelrod are out of White House, recognize that Axelrod left Washington in order to set up Obama campaign in Chicago, where Obama’s major backers, Pritzker & Crown, hold court.
PLUS, Republican party in US is even more stridently pro-Israel than is Democratic party. The jousting for Jewish campaign contributions will be fierce.
PLUS, Ron Paul and his son, Rand Paul, appear to be two of the very, very few voices of reason in Congress, that could shift some votes away from the Republicrats to a third/independent party. In my estimation, David Frum has foreseen this dreaded outcome and is working to derail it: He has created the “NoLabels” organization, with funding from a co-inventor of Facebook. “NoLabels” intends to set up campaign offices in each of the US’s 435 congressional districts THIS YEAR.
As Frum tells it, the purpose of NoLabels is to blur the line between Democrats and Republicans. “Can’t we all just get along” is the mantra for the “Axis of Evil” author. Frum does, however, have one bright line: Iran must be brought to heel at all costs.
None of this bodes well for Iran.
Castillo,
RE: “That the phenomenon of the hidden Imam allows for a timely (re)definition of who should govern and how, relative to an evolving context? That it is a kind of tool which allows a population to question the appropriateness of historical mindsets (be they hereditary, democratic)?”
That seems to fuse the general concept about “imamat” that I was alluding to with the specific concept of the hidden Imam which I didn’t refer to, discussed, or meant to discuss. This fusion that you made, however, does not take away how interesting your question is. I had not thought about it that way.
Eric: ““My main objection is that Iran is not doing this at all.” By “this,” you meant “developing nuclear weapons.”
While that is true as well, no, I am referring to the notion that Iran is deliberately being ambiguous about whether it is doing so. I believe Iran has done nothing to be ambiguous about its nuclear intentions. I believe Iran has explicitly and clearly stated numerous times at various levels of policy that it has no interest in nuclear weapons development and deployment. The fact that some people take Iran’s stopping the observance of the AP as proof that Iran is either engaging in a nuclear weapons program or is engaging in some Saddam scheme to convince its enemies that it is doing so or even that Iran is aware that it could do so does not make it so in the absence of ANY real evidence that Iran is doing so.
“As we’ve discussed in the past, I think you’re correct to believe that Iran is not doing this. But I don’t know it. Nor do you.”
This is completely incorrect. This is the “Flying Sphagetti Monster” argument. We can’t prove there is no “Flying Spaghetti Monster” ruling the universe as the One True God somewhere, therefore we have to accept that there possibly is a God.
This is bogus reasoning. Without getting into the religious angle, let’s stick to Iran. We KNOW that the IAEA has been utterly unable to find any evidence whatsoever that Iran has a nuclear weapons program despite two years or more of observing the AP. We KNOW that ALL the evidence presented publicly about Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program up to 2003 is almost entirely based on the “laptop of death” whose provenance is almost certainly bogus. We KNOW that Iran would derive little to no value from trying to develop and deploy nuclear weapons given the massive head start Israel and the US have. We KNOW that Iran has clearly and explicitly denied having any interest in doing so, even to the extent of official statements from the Supreme Leader.
“Can you make your arguments just the same without needing to insist that you “know” this, since you don’t know it?”
Absolutely not. Your insistence that I “don’t know it” as a complete and total certainty is completely irrelevant to the issue. What I KNOW is congruent with everything else I KNOW. I am not going to entangle myself in vague philosophical and epistemological notions of “certainty” vs “non-certainty”.
What we KNOW – as the 2007 NIE states “with high confidence” – is that Iran does not now have and – with lesser confidence – did not have a nuclear weapons program.
“More important, whatever you might think you know about this, few if any others in the world will simply take your word for it. And they might discount what else you say if it is based on such a statement presented as an indisputable fact.”
First of all, it is not relevant to me what number of others in the world “take my word for it” or not. I certainly do not expect anyone to “take my word for it”. I expect them to read what I’ve written above – the listing of the FACTS. Therefore this argument is not relevant.
Second, I am NOT presenting these statements as “indisputable fact”. I am presenting these statements as an assertion supported by evidence. If someone wishes to dispute those assertions, they can present their evidence.
It seems to me that the vast majority of the mainstream media are daily presenting “as indisputable fact” – except for an obligatory one sentence about “Iran denies it has a nuclear weapons program” – that Iran does have such a program. Being wishy-washy about whether there is ANY evidence of this does not help the debate. Reducing the discussion to “well, we don’t really know” merely cedes the field to those who are more assertive.
So I cannot comply with your wish to water down my arguments.
The absurd notion that Iran is a “threat” to Berlin, or London, or Paris, is an excuse to squander hundreds of billions of dollars on useless ABM system.
Richard,
Thanks for the link to Robert Dreyfuss’ article (http://the-diplomat.com/2011/01/06/us-hardliners-lose-ground-on-iran/).
He expresses some optimism about the upcoming talks, as well as a great deal of pessimism. I agree with the second part of that. I suggest we read this article again in about a month, and judge it then.
Fyi: “This is all about Religion.”
I agree to a certain extent – however I believe money and power, which as I’ve said here are integral to religions, are equally or more significant.
What I’m suggesting is that discussing whose religion is better or discussing the issue solely in terms of religious conflict is not going to help if it descends into unprovable religious proclamations.
There is no surer way to kill a blog site than to allow a “religious war” to start in the comments thread.
Richard,
I’ll respond to your thoughtful posts in more detail later, but one important comment for now on this statement:
“My main objection is that Iran is not doing this at all.”
By “this,” you meant “developing nuclear weapons.” As we’ve discussed in the past, I think you’re correct to believe that Iran is not doing this. But I don’t know it. Nor do you. More important, whatever you might think you know about this, few if any others in the world will simply take your word for it. And they might discount what else you say if it is based on such a statement presented as an indisputable fact.
Can you make your arguments just the same without needing to insist that you “know” this, since you don’t know it?
Someone named Matt makes an interesting point in the comments on the Dreyfuss article. I reproduce his comment here.
Quote
Matt
January 6, 2011 at 1:23 pm
The problem for Obama is that the covert project under cuts his outreach, but without it Iran would already have come online in 2009. Sanctions and diplomacy will not prevent Iran from going online, so he has to gamble on either his goodwill is more important, than the covert project. He cannot have both, which brings into question if the covert project continues what point is the diplomatic outreach. One key concession Obama will have to bring to the table is the halt to the covert project, which will mean he has to convince the Israelis. Simply banning Jundullah and PJAK is not enough for the Iranians. This matter will be brought up at the P5+1 meeting. It gets worse because if the Israeli’s decide to keep the military option open, they will have to expand covert operations to other areas to keep a viable Israeli military option on the table, conventional weapons platforms, air defense, BM technology. Otherwise only the US military would be capable of launching a military option against Iran. So delaying the program, is on track but to keep the military option open then a second track has to be expanded, otherwise delaying the program is worthless if the window for a strike closes. That will be the end of the US diplomatic outreach, because Iran see Israel as a client of the US. Just as Hizbullah and Hamas do not act without Iranian approval, they believe the same in relation to the US and Israel. It may not be true, but that is how they see it.
The other issue is that Iran see the US largely as irrelevant, this can be seen from the fact Iran has snubbed the US twice once Secretary Clinton, now the visit to the nuclear facilities after the concession on enrich was made. If US had been invited to Iran, the gesture of goodwill as a response to US good faith would have been played up as a diplomatic achievement for Obama, a sign of progress that his policy is working.
I would suggest the original time line of late 2011 or early 2012 is still correct, with covert action pushing it back another 6 to 8 months getting us into 2013. The key dates being 2011 and 2012. The dates of 2013 and 2014 are disinformation meant for both the Americans and Iranians. Also I would be surprised if the Israeli PM was to go to an election without the Iranian matter being dealt with, like Bush and Cheney I suspect that Netanyahu does not trust others to deal with the Iranian matter either. Israel’s war in Gaza, the war that Obama stopped in Lebanon was for a large scale long term operation in the east against Iran. This was set up during the time of the former US Administration and it started in the final days of the Bush Administration with OP Cast Lead. Obviously because it was expected that Obama would not be capable or qualified to deal with the Iranian matter, would not contravene the UNSC launching a unilateral strike on Iran. In which case he would seek a compromise that was dangerous, such as allowing the Iranian to enrich.
End Quote
What I get from this dense comment is that he believes that Obama is merely delaying the onset of an Israeli strike by using a covert operations approach against Iran. And that this covert approach by definition undercuts his (supposed) “diplomatic outreach” efforts. And that therefore he has to sacrifice one or the other. But then the problem is that Israel probably can not be forced to sacrifice its covert operations against Iran because if Iran continues its military development – local development of an S-300 radar system, etc. – it will be increasingly difficult for Israel to attack Iran alone (if it can even now). But if Israel continues its covert ops in preparation for a strike, Iran will see this as part of a US plan to attack it, thus continuing to hinder a resolution.
So the suggestion Matt makes basically is that the diplomatic outreach (if it is real) is a dead end.
Then Matt suggests that the Iranians don’t even see the US as relevant any more.
Then he suggests that Israel, in attacking Gaza and Lebanon, was merely setting in motion its long term plan to attack Iran. And that this attack may occur in either 2011 or 2012, with reference to Netanyahu’s political prospects. He also appears to suggest that if Obama engages Iran in the manner Robert Dreyfuss believes is possible – that Obama would accept limited enrichment in exchange for the AP – that Israel will find this a “red line” which will trigger their own attack.
I find these comments intriguing and possibly correct. Anyone else wish to comment?
“”Fyi: I would ask again that we remove religious discussions as much as possible from this site’s threads as they invariably descend into immovable and unprovable assertions from all parties involved and usually descend into chaos in a matter of a few posts. I regret any effort on my part which stimulates such.”"
Your request lacks any logic . Even asking for it is a grave mistake , as you will never ‘ understand ‘ Iran without the spritual and religious aspects .
The name of this Blog is Race for IRAN and not for Norway or Denmark….
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42225#5
I personally would like to learn what these are that Mr. Pierre Goldschmidt is stating in his next to last paragraph.
“Every effort should be made to inform the world of the impressive list of positive actions that would be taken in Iran’s favor as soon as the IAEA and the UNSC are able to determine that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”
Richard Steven Hack says: January 7, 2011 at 2:04 pm
I respectfully decline.
The War in Palestine is a religious war.
US-EU Axis are involved in a war against adversaries that are inspired by Islam.
Israel is the Fortress (state) of the Jews.
Iran is the Fortress of the Shia.
Around all this swirls the anti-Church delusions of the Enlightenment Tradition as espoused by EU states in their post-Christian phase.
Even the moral ideas of your own beliefs are inspired by the Revelations of God.
This is all about Religion.
Eric: I failed to add an additional point to this quote:
““I think all of us recognize that Iran’s failure to observe the Additional Protocol enhances Iran’s ability to keep the IAEA and the world uncertain as to whether Iran is developing nuclear technology for military purposes.”
My main objection is that Iran is not doing this at all. While it is technically correct that Iran could use the lack of the AP to do this, I believe Iran has made it abundantly clear multiple times that it has no interest in doing so and no interest whatsoever in developing and deploying nuclear weapons.
Therefore the lack of observance of the AP is not really a relevant issue in that regard. It is used as such by the US and Israel but it is not a valid complaint especially given the depth of penetration into Iranian affairs by US and Israeli intelligence. If Israel or the CIA can run Jundallah operations that kill Iranian prominent personnel inside Iran with near impunity, they can determine the state of the Iranian program without the AP.
Fyi: I would ask again that we remove religious discussions as much as possible from this site’s threads as they invariably descend into immovable and unprovable assertions from all parties involved and usually descend into chaos in a matter of a few posts. I regret any effort on my part which stimulates such.
Eric: You need to be careful here. You’re leaving out one rather important individual in you enumeration of the opinions on the Additional Protocol: me.
“I think all of us recognize that Iran’s failure to observe the Additional Protocol enhances Iran’s ability to keep the IAEA and the world uncertain as to whether Iran is developing nuclear technology for military purposes.”
I don’t really agree with that in the first place. I think the existing protocol – especially coupled with the previous Iranian behavior in observing the Additional Protocol even without ratification – is sufficient to remove uncertainty to a high degree (if not provide complete certainty, which NO regime short of total physical occupation of a country could no – and even that is questionable.)
“Some people think that is a good thing – arguably it has worked well for North Korea, for example – since Iran can more effectively withstand US pressure if the US is uncertain whether Iran has a nuclear bomb, or at least is far enough along that it can build a bomb if pressed too hard.”
I am not one of those people. The first reason I am not is because I don’t believe the US at the highest levels believes that Iran has a nuclear weapons program and therefore is completely unconcerned about it except as a pretext. Even if some US officials believe Iran has a weapons program, they should know quite well – as I and the Iranians have said – that it would be almost totally useless to Iran for quite some time even after developing a dozen or more nukes.
“Others argue that Iran need not justify its choice not to observe the Additional Protocol (neither the NPT nor Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires it to do so), and they point out that other countries have made exactly the same choice (Brazil and Egypt, for example) without being strongly pressured by the US and the IAEA in response.”
Which is true, but not terribly relevant other than as self-evident point of legal fact as you correctly point out.
“Still others (I am in this group) acknowledge that all of these points are technically correct, but argue that Iran nevertheless should acknowledge what many other countries acknowledged a long time ago: the original Safeguards Agreement inspection regime was insufficient, and the Additional Protocol, which was drafted after the world learned that Saddam Hussein had been working on a nuclear bomb notwithstanding Iraq’s compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, gives the world much-needed additional assurances without requiring access to a country’s military secrets (assuming, at least, that those military secrets don’t involve the country’s use of nuclear technology for military purposes, which the NPT prohibits).”
This was the crux of our previous long-running disagreement here. First of all, Iran certainly acknowledges that the Additional Protocol was developed for a reason. The reason Iran does not follow it is not any disagreement with that notion. The reason Iran does not follow it is simply because it was used against it and Iran derived no benefit whatsoever from observing it. Iran stopped IN RETALIATION for the behavior of the West, nothing more.
You argue – and here you have never established the case – that Iran should UNILATERALLY – without any concessions from the West – return to observing the Additional Protocol because it would provide various benefits to Iran in slowing the course for war by the US and Israel. I have argued that these benefits are mostly speculative on your part and by definition because we have IMMEDIATE RECENT HISTORY that when Iran did so it DID NOT receive those benefits.
In short, your cost-benefit analysis of observing the Additional Protocol is completely lacking in any evidence.
Having said that, if Robert Dreyfuss in the article mentioned below is correct, and the Obama administration IS prepared to backtrack on one of its core demands – that Iran suspend ALL enrichment on Iranian soil – in exchange for Iran ratifying and observing the Additional Protocol, I WOULD AGREE that Iran should do so PROVIDED that Iran’s military intelligence is not compromised in the application of the AP.
Therefore MY position is not exactly the same as any of the positions you have articulated in your recap. I require that the US give up something in order for Iran to give up something. You believe Iran should give up something in return for nothing concrete. Correct me if I’m wrong.
Castellio says: January 7, 2011 at 1:44 pm
The fondational ideas of all states in the Americas, Europe, and the Near East are the Revelations of God.
In fact, the same holds true for South Africa, Nigerai, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
Any attempt to move away from the Revelation of God as the basis of the state – implicitly or explicitly – will lead to new forms of Idol Worship and Barbarism.
Judge Bork, of the Saturday-Night-Massacare fame, wrote a book on this very topic; “Slouching towards Gommorah”.
To fyi regarding MHF :
“..Omnia aequo animo ferre sapientis est!..”
I figured out why the headline/content of this article caused me to be anxious: my lawyer gave me a copy of “Getting to Yes” during a very difficult event. The negotiating tactics are interesting, but ultimately, the negotiation is not the crucial factor. The emotional overlay is what disables many people in tense negotiations.
Israel specializes in evoking a hyper-charged emotional atmosphere. The premier concept of hasbara is to appeal to an emotional — not rational — reaction. The concept and design of Yad Vashem, to which so many US government officials have been taken, is calibrated as emotional indoctrination — see Mark Braverman to amplify that point.
As Karin Friedemann and Avigail Abarbenal have explained and diagnosed, Israelis have been indoctrinated in emotional reaction to non-Israelis and trained from childhood on in ways to maintain a “one-up” status relative to non-Israelis. It’s a taught behavior.
It’s extremely difficult to uproot all these emotional experiences and learnings, and the influence of emotional processes over higher order neurological functioning is powerful and takes years to revise.
Israel specializes in propaganda — emotionally charging the perceptions of others. Propaganda starts wars. Wars don’t resolve propaganda, but I don’t know of any full-bore propaganda campaign, such as the one Israel is waging against Iran and the Palestinians, that has not resulted in a war.
The debate is so one sided in the US that it makes people like Peter Jenkins looks reasonable, despite the fact that he repeats the western narrative for the most part.
It’s the Iranians that are constantly being threatened and it is western countries that are supporting Israeli oppression and occupying independent countries.
Empty, what are you saying?
That the phenomenon of the hidden Imam allows for a timely (re)definition of who should govern and how, relative to an evolving context? That it is a kind of tool which allows a population to question the appropriateness of historical mindsets (be they hereditary, democratic)?
I’m not sure if you’re right, but its a new and interesting take on the phenomenon.
This is an excellent post, although containing nothing new that we who have followed this issue for a while don’t already know. But it is articulated very well.
The one point on which it falters is precisely what Cyrus says – whether the nuclear “issue” is in fact a real issue.
BiBiJon asks what is the purpose if that is the case. I refer him to most of the posts I’ve made here over the past months which highlight the “permanent war economy” of the United States, the influence of the military-industrial complex, the notion of “war profiteering” and of course the influence of the Israel Lobby which in turn depends entirely on its ability to raise corrupting campaign funds for US politicians.
The short answer: money and power.
Meanwhile, Robert Dreyfuss again raise the possibility of a small “breakthrough” in the negotiations IF the US is willing to accept some level of enrichment in Iran provided Iran applies the full Additional Protocol.
US Hardliners Lose Ground on Iran?
http://the-diplomat.com/2011/01/06/us-hardliners-lose-ground-on-iran/
Of course, the operative word is “IF” – and as I’ve said, if my view of the situation is correct, this is more like Peter Jenkins line above: “Of course the chances of any of this coming to pass are close to nil.”
NORMAN ROBBINS WROTE:
“I have never seen a good explication of how Iran could possibly agree to the Additional Protocol or “exceptional transparency measures” as long as the US and Israel refuse to offer a credible binding iron-clad pledge (whatever that means) that they will not launch a military attack. Iranians know full well that privileged information from the UNSCOM inspections of Iraq was relayed to America prior to the invasion, and they would be loathe to have a re-run if information on Iranian military secret installations were divulged by IAEA inspectors to the US. Indeed, they suspect that targeting of their nuclear scientists was based on IAEA information.”
COMMENT:
It’s worth distinguishing here between the Additional Protocol and the “exceptional transparency measures” referred to in the IAEA Board resolution from which you are presumably quoting (GOV 2006/14).
Once the IAEA stumbled upon the so-called “alleged studies,” which first came to light on the now-infamous “laptop of death,” the IAEA pressed Iran to accept “exceptional transparency measures” that essentially included carte blanche IAEA access to any person or information the IAEA might consider useful to detect a possible “military dimension” of Iran’s nuclear activities. Though Iran cooperated with those IAEA requests for several years, it eventually stopped, complaining that every question it answered merely led to another question (or several questions) from the IAEA. The IAEA appears to have concluded that Iran’s pre-October 2003 disclosure violations (none of which involved any military or other activity that would have been prohibited under the NPT or Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, if Iran had only disclosed what it was doing) required Iran for the indefinite future to prove that no nuclear material was being used for any military purpose. Iran pointed out that neither its Safeguards Agreement nor the NPT requires Iran (or any other country) to prove such a “negative,” and that the IAEA has never insisted that any country other than Iran was obligated to do so.
I can see no way for Iran to satisfy fully the IAEA’s requests for “exceptional transparency measures” without creating the very risk you mention (given the IAEA’s poor record of maintaining confidentiality), though I understand the IAEA and Iran nevertheless are still making limited efforts to meet somewhere in the middle.
But wherever in the “middle” one thinks the IAEA and Iran ought to meet (if at all) concerning the “alleged studies,” the Additional Protocol is a separate matter. (See http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf).
There is no question that the Additional Protocol is more intrusive than the current inspection regime under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. Nor is there any question that some disclosures required under the Additional Protocol would require Iran to divulge sensitive military information – but IF AND ONLY IF Iran is using nuclear material (or other nuclear-related items or technology described in the Additional Protocol, which covers much more than just “nuclear material”) for military purposes that are prohibited under the NPT. If Iran is NOT using nuclear material or nuclear technology for prohibited military purposes, then the Additional Protocol does not appear to me to require that Iran disclose anything at all about its military activities, including locations of military facilities. (I acknowledge that there may be some very rare exceptions – for example, military locations at which items required to be disclosed under the Additional Protocol are also located, even though those items are not being used for military purposes, but my layman’s review of the Additional Protocol leads me to conclude that such exceptions (if any) indeed would be rare.)
As you may be aware, there is a considerable difference of opinion among some people who post on this website on the question of whether Iran should agree to the Additional Protocol – which it voluntarily observed for several years but stopped doing so because it had not received the promised quid pro quo. I think all of us recognize that Iran’s failure to observe the Additional Protocol enhances Iran’s ability to keep the IAEA and the world uncertain as to whether Iran is developing nuclear technology for military purposes. Some people think that is a good thing – arguably it has worked well for North Korea, for example – since Iran can more effectively withstand US pressure if the US is uncertain whether Iran has a nuclear bomb, or at least is far enough along that it can build a bomb if pressed too hard. Others argue that Iran need not justify its choice not to observe the Additional Protocol (neither the NPT nor Iran’s Safeguards Agreement requires it to do so), and they point out that other countries have made exactly the same choice (Brazil and Egypt, for example) without being strongly pressured by the US and the IAEA in response.
Still others (I am in this group) acknowledge that all of these points are technically correct, but argue that Iran nevertheless should acknowledge what many other countries acknowledged a long time ago: the original Safeguards Agreement inspection regime was insufficient, and the Additional Protocol, which was drafted after the world learned that Saddam Hussein had been working on a nuclear bomb notwithstanding Iraq’s compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, gives the world much-needed additional assurances without requiring access to a country’s military secrets (assuming, at least, that those military secrets don’t involve the country’s use of nuclear technology for military purposes, which the NPT prohibits).
In short, while I recognize that Iran is not required under its Safeguards Agreement to observe the Additional Protocol, I think it should do so – just as approximately 100 other countries have already done. Maintaining what I call “useful ambiguity” concerning the uses to which Iran is putting its nuclear technology may strike some as a good idea for Iran, but I disagree. It is not a good idea, either for the rest of the world or for Iran itself. It enables the US to persuade the rest of the world that Iran is up to no good even though there is no evidence that Iran actually is up to no good. This could lead to a US (or Israeli) attack which otherwise might be avoided.
Some argue that Iran will soon reach a point (or may already have) where it will be too risky for the US to attack (a good result), since an attack would provoke Iran to retaliate with a nuclear bomb if it already has one, or to put the finishing touches on a nuclear bomb that it otherwise would not have finished. If Iran is already there, they argue, observing the Additional Protocol would only enable the world to figure out how scary (or not) Iran’s nuclear capability really is, and exactly where Iran should be bombed to neutralize that capability. If Iran is not yet there, observing the Additional Protocol would prevent Iran from ever achieving the peace-ensuring deterrent value of a nuclear bomb (real or imagined).
I find this argument unpersuasive. I am confident that the US does not believe Iran has reached that point yet, and I think the risk is quite high that the US will use military force if it comes to believe that Iran will soon reach that point unless the US acts first.
I should emphasize that I agree entirely with Iran that it is not obligated to – and could not, even if it were obligated – prove the “negative” that many unfairly insist it must prove: that it has no “nuclear material” devoted to non-peaceful purposes. Iran correctly points out that the IAEA routinely certifies this very “negative” for other countries even though those other countries cannot actually prove it either. But Iran should also acknowledge this: The IAEA certifies this only if the country in question has agreed to observe the Additional Protocol and the IAEA concludes that it is doing so. As others will undoubtedly argue, it may very well be that some “Member States” of the IAEA will persuade the IAEA not to give Iran this certification even if Iran does agree to the Additional Protocol and observes it. I don’t consider that prospect – whether likely or not (and I certainly don’t discount this possibility) – a sufficient reason for Iran not to observe the Additional Protocol. I think its doing so would be a useful step in the right direction, for Iran and the rest of the world.
Oh, yes, about “getting to yes” with Iran, the answer is:
عروس رفته گل بچینه
“Who” should be really governing people has been the subject of much debate. The debates mostly show a deceptive conflation of two completely different concepts. One revolves around the idea of “who” and the other revolves around the idea of “how”. When people discuss who is governing this or that country and this or that state, an answer usually follows that “by so an so, the one “who” is elected by the people of this or that country or state.” Or, in the case of monarchies, the answer would be: the one “who” isselected or inherits this or that governing position in this or that country or state. This is to confuse the process, the mechanism, of reaching the position of governance (i.e. the “how”) with the characteristics of the “who”.
I believe, the deceptive focus on defining the “who” in terms of “how” is as misleading and dangerous as debating whether one should sauté, boil, broil, or barbeque at the expense of completely neglecting and disregarding the actual food itself. In other words, it is to forget about the content and quality of that food itself. Is it poisonous or is it safe? Is it contaminated with a ton of different toxic chemicals or is it organic and pure? Is it corrupt or is it fresh? Once you eat it, is it going to work toward maintaining and strengthening your health or is is going to cause different diseases? Is it going to give you indigestion, gas, and diarrhea or is it going to smoothly run its course and after it has gone through the digestive process, the overall health is maintained?
Similar to reflections about the quality and content of a food, should there be any consideration about the quality and content of those “who” govern? Should they be just, honest, pure, and wise? Should people, for example, demand that those who govern them MUST be held to the highest standards of honesty, justice, wisdom and purity? Could the governed, for example, demand that the continued legitimacy of the elected, or the selected for that matter, must be fully dependant upon the degree to which that person in position of governance adheres to the principles of justice, honesty, wisdom and purity? Do elections automatically and by themselves ensure that the elected persons are indeed just, honest, pure and trustworthy? If that were the case, why would candidates have election prices tags ranked in millions (promising to reach even billions)?
There are people in the world who believe that they deserve to be governed by those who make every attempt to be just, honest, wise and pure. The highest standard for them, of such person, is enshrined in the concept of imamat. These people would not lower their standards just because it is a tough road to take. Nor will they give up on the ideal because a whole bunch of other folks believe they deserve to be governed by corrupt thieves, crooks, and morons. Let’s have high standards. We deserve the best and no less.
MHF says: January 7, 2011 at 12:51 pm
Besides nonsensical and vacuuous statements just like this, what practical program or policy do you have in mind?
Please enlighten us benighted fools.
To: FYI
Every Iranian, and for that matter everyone in the world, can believe in anything they wish, but they cannot impose it on anyone else.
Goli, I responded to your compelling NIAC – AIPAC assessment in the previous thread. My response is there/here: http://www.raceforiran.com/moving-beyond-regime-change-in-america%E2%80%99s-middle-east-policy#comment-32665
Norman Robbins says: January 7, 2011 at 11:21 am
I agree that “Exceptional Transparency Measure” are out of the question.
Any way, Mr. Kay of the Iraq WMD fame, has already pointed out that no inspection regime can guarantee that there are not undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran.
The US-EU Axis best bet still remains the multilaterized enrichment facilities in Iran. [Jordan has uranium deposits, she can join Iran as a partner, for example.]
But none of this is going to happen.
Too much has happened and the US-EU Axis have gone too far; just like they pushed Iran too far back during the Iran-Iraq War.
For the rest of us, the best alternative is the current course; US-EU Axis sanctions and enmity and Iranian persistence in pursuing their policies, including the nuclear ones.
Really, with the danger of political instability in Pakistan, Iran would be foolish to accept any limitation on any of her policies that impinge on her security.
MHF says: January 7, 2011 at 11:26 am
So God is nonsensical and so is the Prophetic Tradition as a basis of governance.
Then, pary, tell me on what basis should the government be formed?
And will the Iranian people, who have stood for the Wise Lord for 3000 years, accept what you propose?
Goli
The information that you’ve provided on the previous thread about Parsi was very interesting. Personally, I believe that anyone who cooperates with Parsi and the NIAC must be pretty sick.
Personally, I’m glad we Iranians have not woken up. You can keep your Harvard professors and we’ll keep our religious scholars and our own professors.
Harvard professors? The same academics who help sustain US hegemony over the globe? They are to liberate our minds?
to: FYI.
You could believe on any nonsense you like. But you are not permitted to run a government based on nonsense.
Jenkins: {the NPT} “does not require Iran to re-apply the Additional Protocol or implement exceptional transparency measures.”
I have never seen a good explication of how Iran could possibly agree to the Additional Protocol or “exceptional transparency measures” as long as the US and Israel refuse to offer a credible binding iron-clad pledge (whatever that means) that they will not launch a military attack. Iranians know full well that privileged information from the UNSCOM inspections of Iraq was relayed to America prior to the invasion, and they would be loathe to have a re-run if information on Iranian military secret installations were divulged by IAEA inspectors to the US. Indeed, they suspect that targetting of their nuclear scientists was based on IAEA information.
If we are to get to “yes”, the interests of the US and Israel not to have an Iranian nuclear weapon will need to be melded with Iran’s interest in being secure from military attack.
If anyone knows of reports that address this dilemma, I and probably others would be interested.
Scott Lucas,
You know quite well what I mean and, by the way, just to remind you this was in Karaj last week:
http://www.iribnews.ir/News/Video/263487_c2259df1.wmv
(pretty painful stuff)
Cyrus says:
January 7, 2011 at 10:22 am
I have a few questions about the pretext idea
1) How can one be sure ‘objectively’ that anything that does not meet one’s own ‘minimalist’ position is automatically perceived as a pretext.
2) Related to above, how can we be sure that a volunteered solution (e.g. enrichment consortium) is the minimalist position., seeing as it was volunteered?
3) Assuming it is a pretext (I am personally convinced that it is) then, what is the US’ real objective? Attacking Iran is just a ‘means’. But, a means to which attainable goal, in what timeframe, for what short-medium-long term benefit?
I think some of these questions need to be answered/deconstructed to avoid spinning in circles.
MHF says: January 7, 2011 at 11:00 am
How do you know the Hidden Imam, the Al Mahdi does not exist?
God could produce him at any moment if he so desires; or are you suggesting God does not exist either?
Am I to conclude that you are seriously entertaining a secular government in a region of the world that for 3000 years has been inhabited with religious people?
Why is it that some of these “philosophers” have not yet understood the character of the Mullah regime in Iran– it is not because they have not said it, and or they have not practiced it. I think it is because these people do not want to educate themselves and learn and read what mullahs are saying.
The regime in Iran is after an “emam” who has been hiding at the bottom of a well for over a thousand years, to appear and get everyone in the world into justice and peace. Now you could have a thousand Harvard profs write and talk until the Hell freezes, this regime is waiting for the non existent emam. If you think Bin Laden is talking nonsense, you should hear what these mullahs are saying.
People must wake-up and understand what is going on.
Liz,
It might help you to read EA to find out what we are covering before you hit the “Submit Comment” button….
S.
Cyrus wrote:
“Two points: First, the IAEA Board did not impose “demands” as much as they imposed “requests” on Iran. It was the UNSC that attempted to convert these requests into demands.”
Correct, though eventually the IAEA Board itself imposed “demands” on Iran – after the UN Security Council had helpfully transformed the IAEA Board’s requests into Security Council demands. For those who are not familiar with the subtle steps by which “requests” became “demands,” I offer this passage from my piece entitled “The Iran Nuclear Dispute – A New Approach” (http://brillwebsite.com/writings/Irannuclear.html):
QUOTATION FROM “IRAN NUCLEAR DISPUTE – A NEW APPROACH:”
Each Iran Resolution includes at least one statement – sometimes several – that Iran has violated an IAEA directive, and at least several assertions suggesting to all but the most careful and well-informed readers that Iran is thwarting the IAEA’s efforts to enforce Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. This Part 3 explains how Iran can obtain an independent arbitration ruling that such assertions often are incorrect and misleading.
The Iran nuclear dispute is often presented less than clearly in the lengthy preambles to the Iran Resolutions. A good example began with the IAEA Board resolution that formally “referred” Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council in early 2006 (GOV/2006/14). The IAEA Board stated that, in order for “confidence [to be] built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme,” the Board “deems it necessary” for Iran to take several “confidence building measures:” suspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider whether to build a heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and take various “transparency measures…which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals [and] documentation … as the Agency may request….” The Board expressly acknowledged that each of these “confidence building measures” would be “voluntary and non-legally binding.” For this reason, it could not and did not require Iran to take any of them.
But the Board instructed the Director General to tell the Security Council just the opposite: “The Director General [shall] report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are REQUIRED of Iran by the Board….” (Emphasis added.) The dutiful Director General’s misstatement to the Security Council was soon reflected in Security Council Resolution 1696: “The Security Council … calls upon Iran without further delay to take the steps REQUIRED by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14….[and] DEMANDS that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities….” (Emphasis added.)
Since then, as the Iran nuclear dispute has moved up and down the imaginary chain of command (see Part 1 of this article), Iran’s failure to take these voluntary steps has been repeatedly cited by both the Security Council and the IAEA as a serious violation of the resolutions adopted by both bodies. By the time the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 four years later, its displeasure had ballooned to this:
[Quotation from UNSC Resolution 1929 preamble follows:] Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/15), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and DEPLORING Iran’s refusal to take these steps…. (Empasis in original). [end of quotation from UNSC Resolution 1929 preamble]
A casual reader may be forgiven for not noticing that neither the preceding paragraph, nor any of the IAEA reports or Security Council resolutions it cites, states that Iran is breaching any obligation under its Safeguards Agreement.[31] If Iran were to point this out, the reader might ignore its protest.
END OF QUOTATION FROM “THE IRAN NUCLEAR DISPUTE – A NEW APPROACH.”
Cyrus says: January 7, 2011 at 10:22 am
You are right, of course.
Just like in Iraq, there were multiple motives in US-EU Axis.
One certainly is to make the Middle East safe for Israel.
As long as Israel is in a religious war with Islam (to be joined by US) she cannot be safe on this planet.
There is also the fact that a nuclear-armed Iran is not easy prey to military attacks by the US-EU Axis.
Two points: First, the IAEA Board did not impose “demands” as much as they imposed “requests” on Iran. It was the UNSC that attempted to convert these requests into demands.
Second, and more broadly, Amb. Jenkins proceeds on the laudable assumption that “the West” does in fact view Iran’s nuclear program as the main issue — when it is in fact just a pretext — and that the US has an actual interest in resolving this standoff — when quite the contrary, the US is more interested in exacerbating and prolonging the conflict.
Look folks, we have seen this movie before. “WMDs in Iraq” was a similar pretext. Every effort by Saddam to prove that he had indeed gotten rid of his (US-backed) arsenal of WMDs were dismissed (remember IRaq’s 12,000 page Final Declaration, that was simply dismissed by Sec of State Rice as a “lie”?) because WMDs were NOT the issue — the issue was that the US wanted an excuse to attack Iraq. In the case of Iran, we have a clear and unambiguous history that shows that the US has consistently dismissed or ignored or even actively undermined any approach that would have resolved (or at least could have resolved) the nuclear dispute peaceafully. Moving the goalposts and playing rope-a-dope is standard operating procedure. The issue is simply NOT Iran’s nuclear program.
Dan,
Thanks for the link to the YouTube video on Mike Wallace’s Emmy received for his Ahmadinejad interview (http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=DE&feature=related&hl=de&v=onNzrNEFs).
The line in question (“I think the Israeli government is a fabricated government.”) was the beginning of a long answer by Ahmadinejad in which he focused most on his proposed solution on the Israeli/Palestinian problem: a democratic referendum in which the Palestinian people are permitted to vote on their future.
CBS’ editors cut off his response, however, after the line quoted above, and let Mike Wallace finish Ahmadinejad’s answer in Wallace’s own words. Wallace explained that, just as Ahmadinejad believed the Israeli government is fabricated, so does he think that the Holocaust was fabricated. To his (meager) credit, Wallace did not go on to say that Ahmadinejad also wants to exterminate the Israeli people.
Certainly Ahmadinejad’s long answer needed to be edited to fit into a short 60 Minutes episode. But it would have taken no more seconds for Wallace to summarize the answer Ahmadinejad actually gave – give the Palestinian people an opportunity to express their preference in a democratic referendum – than were required for Wallace to distort Ahmadinejad’s answer with references to the Holocaust that appeared nowhere in that answer.
In his Emmy acceptance speech, Wallace noted that Ahmadinejad has become a famous world figure, leaving those who watched the edited interview clip to conclude that he’s achieved this status by denying the Holocaust rather than by challenging Israel to live up to its democratic ideals by allowing Palestinians to vote on their future.
A final note: The YouTube video you cited indicates that it’s been viewed 205,487 times. I wonder how many people watched 60 Minutes on the night of that interview, and how many watched the Emmy awards that night.
Pak says:
January 7, 2011 at 2:29 am
Given the fate of Richard Goldstone’s report accusing Israel of possible war crimes is gathering dust on a shelf, could you please explain how Iran (of all countries) efforts at de-nuclearizing Israel would have snowball’s chance in hell of getting any where?
“Yet it is a mistake to imagine that for the US or Europe playing safe is a low-cost option.”
One of the significant costs of the Western position has been to legitimate regional proliferation aspirations.
1) One cannot have, on the one hand, Miliband, Sarkozy, Rice, and Mrs Clinton frequent Mid East venues and stress the mortal ‘nuclear’ danger of Iran to her neighbors, and on the other hand not recognize the legitimate defensive nuclear aspirations of Mid East nations thusly scared out of their wits. Indeed, the blowback was so predictable from the get go that the fear of regional proliferation is one of the reasons given simultaneously for why Iran’s nuclear programme must be opposed by any and all means.
2) One cannot on the one hand, from day zero proclaim ‘all options (including a nuclear first strike) are on the table’ vis-à-vis Iran, and on the other hand, reasonably expect that other nations are not wondering who in the post Iraq-WMD-world will be next, and plan rationally accordingly.
‘Positional bargaining’ is even more counterproductive when the two sides negotiate indirectly through others — a beauty contest of sorts.
The above paradoxes highlight the problem of ‘positional bargaining’, which is self-entrapment.
Scott Lucas,
This was in Karaj last week:
http://www.iribnews.ir/News/Video/263487_c2259df1.wmv
(pretty painful stuff)
I never understood the rationality of all these people who writes article after articles to resolve ZOG Ameriica’s problem with Iran’s civilian nuclear program – while ignoring the very Devil which with an arsenal of 240-400 nuclear bombs sit nextdoor to Iran? I mean even if Iran finally get its own “Islamic Bomb”, the country has not attacked its neighbors for over 100 years. On the other hand the Devil with hundreds of “Jewish Bombs” have invaded each of its neighbors during the last 60 years.
No coming to this “legitimacy” crap. Iran or Persia has been on world map for over 5,000 years while my 1947 world map doesn’t show any country by the name of Israel in the Middle East – though it did appear in Russia under Crypto-Jew dictator Stalin for a short period. Furthermore, it the Tel Aviv which is seeking for its “legitimacy” of its occupation of an Arab land and not Tehran.
Birobidjan – The First Jewish State
http://rehmat1.wordpress.com/2010/06/13/birobidjan-the-first-jewish-state/
Scott Lucas,
If you are honest, let’s see you spend a few weeks on this:
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/20111614145839362.html
Pak
I’m surprised that you use the work “legitimacy” in such a way. According to this definition, the white man defines what is legitimate and what is not. Of course, that is what the west says (and probably what I used to think once upon a time), but people like you shouldn’t repeat it.
Great article:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/the-new-middle-east-narra_b_788703.html
Dear Castellio,
I am going to provide a short response to your questions, for which I apologise in advance, because a deadline is fast approaching and I am well behind.
“Iran is pursuing, and has frequently called for, a nuclear-weapons free Middle East. As Putin said, and as the article records, “we do not have grounds to suspect that Iran aspires to possess nuclear weapons””
What you are missing is that, despite Putin’s supposed beliefs, Russia has consistently approved UN resolutions against Iran, which represents a failure by the regime to mitigate the perceived threats of its nuclear ambitions. I personally believe that Putin is simply playing a political game with the US by sending mixed messages about Iran; his/Russia’s ultimate goal is to contain Iran, and in the process gain concessions from the US.
Regarding the regime’s calls for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East, I believe their calls have no weight because of their lack of legitimacy in the international arena. By international arena I mean the UN and the current power dynamics. I do not mean organisations such as NAM, which may represent numerical majorities, but not power and importance majorities. This is the reality we live in, and Iran must work within this reality. Clearly, Iran is not working within this reality, which is why nothing has been achieved. And as I said before, Iran can only gain legitimacy by demonstrating commitments that it has not currently demonstrated, and conduct itself in a manner that is not currently being done.
“And as to an international framework for nuclear development for energy purposes, the NPT is that agreement, and Iran is a signatory who is fulfilling its legal obligations.”
The NPT, much like the UN, was not developed to create global justice; it was developed to contain and mitigate the superpowers/nuclear powers so that the world would not be dragged into a nuclear war, especially during the Cold War. Regardless of this fact, and despite the protests of many, there are some who can argue that Iran has been and continues to be in violation of the NPT. I cannot confirm or deny this, because I have no specific legal knowledge.
But what I said in my previous post was that Iran should pursue regional goals, such as a nuclear-free Middle East. Iran’s focus should not be on its own nuclear development, rather it should be on protesting Israel’s nuclear program. Israel is the only threat to Iran, because the US is ultimately a natural ally of Iran. Other nuclear weapons states are not a direct threat to Iran, and many would argue that mutually assured destruction renders nuclear weapons useless, especially in the 21st century. The biggest threat beyond state borders is nuclear terrorism, and given that the Middle East and bordering regions are unstable (just look at Pakistan), Iran can avoid a great deal of instability by pursuing an entirely nuclear-free Middle East. Instead, it can promote cooperation and interdependence.
What am I missing here, Pak? Iran is pursuing, and has frequently called for, a nuclear-weapons free Middle East. As Putin said, and as the article records, “we do not have grounds to suspect that Iran aspires to possess nuclear weapons”. So what do you know that Putin, Jenkins and the Leverett’s don’t know? Specifically?
And as to an international framework for nuclear development for energy purposes, the NPT is that agreement, and Iran is a signatory who is fulfilling its legal obligations.
Thank you for an interesting article. My main concern is this point:
“Both sides would benefit from measures to mitigate the fears that Iran’s nuclear activities have aroused in neighbouring Arab states, as these fears could lead some of those states to seek nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability.”
This point is relatively hypocritical, given the fact that Iran has itself failed to mitigate fears that its nuclear program is beyond civilian purposes. Furthermore, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power will ultimately spark a regional nuclear race (it kind of has already), regardless of motives, intentions and so on, purely because Arab states would want to maintain a balance in power. Yet why does the author presume that Arab states would want nuclear weapons capability?
From my own perspective, which is that Iran is pursuing nuclear power for security and other geopolitical factors, Iran’s ambitions for nuclear power is counter-productive, precisely because of the distinct probability of a regional nuclear race. I believe that Iran should instead aggressively lobby against the Israeli nuclear program by creating a united regional front, and pushing international organisations such as the IAEA and UN to address this grave problem. Ultimately, Iran should pursue a nuclear-free Middle East, or some sort of framework where Middle Eastern states cooperate together for interdependent nuclear power.
Of course, given the lack of legitimacy that Iran has at the moment, this agenda would be very difficult to pursue. It is comparable to the failure and hypocrisy of the ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach; i.e. Iran cannot oppose Israel’s nuclear program and promote nuclear non-proliferation, while at the same time pushing forward with a tainted nuclear program of its own. Iran must demonstrate a commitment to non-proliferation and regional security by showing far more leniency and pragmatism with its own nuclear program. Iran must also change its rhetoric and conduct in the international area in order to head a genuine and legitimate front to create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
Watch video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=DE&feature=related&hl=de&v=onNzrNEFs1E
Mike Wallace Interviewed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on 60 Minutes. At the request of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad, the FULL UNEDITED version was shown on C-SPAN. “The cable public affairs net will air the 60 Minutes edited version, followed by the full 90-minute interview, to give viewers a window on what is left on the cutting room floor.” – John Eggerton — Broadcasting & Cable, 8/11/2006
We can see what they cut out, a call for democracy.
This is another example of Mainstream Media’s continuing suppression of basic facts concerning Israel and the Palestinians and other dramatic details related to the Middle East.
It is a scandal for news editors to suppress the fact that democracy is being denied to people and that U.S. policy makers are behind the injustices.
It is a scandal that the mainstream media suppresses the fact that the President of Iran is calling for democracy.
The text in red was edited out of the 60 Minutes broadcast:
Interestingly, the WikiLeaks furor comes as the combined 16 US intelligence agencies are reportedly preparing to release a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) unanimously concluding Iran is not building nuclear weapons. Quite a coincidence, to say the least.
Washington sources say this latest NIE reconfirms the previous 2007 NIE finding that Iran had ceased all development of nuclear arms four years earlier. Before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, CIA and UN reports that Saddam Hussein’s regime had no weapons of mass destruction were ignored or covered up by the Bush White House, which was racing toward war.
Now, a fierce struggle over the next NIE is raging in Washington between groups urging war against Iran and the US intelligence community and elements in the Pentagon. There are still officials in Washington who put America’s national interests first and resist bending to political pressure or financial inducements.
The upright Adm. Dennis Blair, the last US national intelligence director, was reportedly ousted because he refused to endorse claims Iran was making nuclear weapons.
President Barack Obama appears to have ducked this explosive issue. Politically wounded and unable to fully control all the levers of presidential power, Obama seems unwilling or unable to stand up to the pro-war party.
Meanwhile, WikiLeaks is at least doing in part what America’s elected leaders and supposed free media should have been doing: telling citizens what’s really going on.
http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis217.html
For Nima to add to his chronicles of Iran’s nuke predictions, yet another date for Iran nukes
Outgoing Mossad chief: Iran won’t have nuclear capability before 2015
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/outgoing-mossad-chief-iran-won-t-have-nuclear-capability-before-2015-1.335656