While many of those now advocating containment as the optimal U.S. strategy toward the Islamic Republic see this as the moderate (and superior) alternative to preventive war and/or coercive regime change, such an approach would be inherently unstable. In all likelihood, the pursuit of a containment strategy by the United States vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic would ultimately lead to a U.S.-Iranian military confrontation.
The Iran policy debate in the United States is certainly turning in an increasingly hawkish direction. Recently, though, the debate took an even more curious turn, when James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article and Washington Post Op Ed (aptly titled: “The Force Needed to Contain Iran”) against what they see as a “false distinction between containment” and preventive war in America’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. They assert that, as Iran’s nuclearization proceeds, Tehran “can be contained only if Washington is prepared to use force against an emboldened adversary armed with the ultimate weapon”. They argue that, for containment of a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran to work, the United States will need to draw and enforce clear “red lines”:
“No initiation of conventional warfare against other countries; no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material, or technologies; no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities. Washington would need to be just as explicit about the consequences of crossing those lines: potential U.S. military retaliation by any and all means necessary. Tehran would probably test U.S. resolve early on, believing that regional dynamics had shifted sharply in its favor. In that case, the United States would face a momentous credibility crisis because it had failed to stop Iran from going nuclear after persistently declaring that such an outcome was unacceptable. Even close U.S. allies would doubt Washington’s security guarantees. An emboldened Iran would test Washington in several ways…Such dangerous and destabilizing actions cannot be addressed by tough diplomatic talk or yet more U.N. Security Council resolutions. It can be addressed only by a willingness to respond with force. And in the curious logic that governs deterrence, a Tehran that believes Washington will retaliate will be less likely to act aggressively in the first place.”
In other words, to contain and deter a nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable Iran, the United States will almost certainly need to demonstrate its willingness to use force against the Islamic Republic over lower-level, non-nuclear provocations. Earlier this month, Steve Walt wrote a post on his blog that takes a critical look at Lindsay and Takeyh’s arguments. In particular, Steve usefully dissects Lindsay and Takeyh’s incorporation in their analysis of “a series of worst-case assumptions” and “familiar alarmist rhetoric that has been a staple of hawkish commentary for decades”. Steve reminds us that, “in the run-up to the war in Iraq, a critical moment came when moderates and liberals joined forces with the neoconservatives who had been pushing for war since the late 1990s. The poster child for this process was Kenneth Pollack, whose pro-war book The Threatening Storm (written under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations) gave reluctant hawks a respectable fig-leaf for backing the invasion.” Steve then notes that “alert readers with good memories will notice that [Lindsay and Takeyh’s arguments] are the same arguments that pro-war hawks made about Iraq.”
Steve also points out that,
“like most Americans writing about Iran these days, Lindsay and Takeyh never consider the one approach that might actually have some small chance of heading off an Iranian bomb. That approach would be to take the threat of regime change and preventive war off the table and accept Iran’s enrichment program—on the strict condition that it ratifies and implements all elements of the NPT Additional Protocol. At the same time, the United States would engage in serious and sincere discussions about a range of regional security matters, including a public U.S. guarantee to forego regime change.” (And, he is kind enough to link to one of our articles as a paradigmatic example of the “grand bargain” argument.)
But that, unfortunately, instead, containment is fast becoming the “moderate” alternative policy option for those who don’t like military options against Iranian nuclear targets or explicit support for regime change in Tehran. Many advocates of containment argue that the United States has decades of Cold War experience with containing a nuclear-armed hostile power and deterring that power’s use of its (very large) nuclear weapons arsenal. So, why not take that experience and apply it to the task of containing the Islamic Republic?
During the Cold War, containment—eventually supplemented with détente as a political framework for managing Soviet-American tensions—made sense as an “interim” American strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, at a time when fundamental East-West conflicts were not likely to be resolved pending substantial political change in the Soviet bloc and both sides had an existential interest in avoiding direct military confrontation. But this is not likely to work between the United States and Iran, for at least two reasons.
First, while the United States and the Soviet Union were roughly at parity in their military capabilities, the United States is and will remain vastly superior to Iran in every category of military power, conventional or otherwise. As we have explained the significance of this point,
“Almost 30 years after the Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic is incapable of projecting significant conventional military forces beyond its borders, and would be severely challenged to mount a conventional defense against U.S. invasion. Thus, absent a broader strategic understanding with Washington, Tehran would continue to assume and act as if the ultimate objective of U.S. policy toward Iran were the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.”
This leads inexorably to our second point—in an atmosphere of ongoing uncertainty about America’s ultimate intentions toward the Islamic Republic, Iranian leaders will continue working to defend their core security interests in ways that are guaranteed to be maximally provocative to the United States. Lacking conventional military capabilities, Iran pursues what Iranian officials have described to us as an “asymmetric” national security strategy.
- As we have discussed at greater length in other settings, this strategy includes the use of proxy actors—political, paramilitary, and terrorist—in neighboring states and elsewhere, to ensure that those states will not be used as anti-Iranian platforms. Iran’s ties to Hizballah and HAMAS clearly fall under this chapter of the Islamic Republic’s national security strategy. According to Iranian national security officials, the cultivation of these proxy actors provides the Islamic Republic with an effective measure of strategic depth it otherwise lacks.
- Iran’s asymmetric strategy also includes developing unconventional military capabilities—missiles, chemical weapons, and at least a nuclear weapons “option”.
No U.S. administration, of either party, would be able to maintain domestic support for a containment strategy vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic as it pursues such policies.
And, so, we come back to our main argument, as we stated at the outset—a U.S. strategy of containing Iran is likely to lead to a U.S.-Iranian military confrontation. This, ironically, is something that Lindsay and Takeyh acknowledge with their argument that the United States may well have to use force against Iran relatively early after the formal declaration of a containment posture, in order for America’s commitment to that posture to be seen as credible.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
wow…. amazing information…
Cyrus, I understand your definition of a “natural hegemon.” However, Germany, for example, was the natural hegemon of Europe in the period 1870-1939; that fact didn’t stop her from being expansionist. After 1945 the Soviet Union was in many respects the natural hegemon of all Eurasia. Your argument doesn’t hold up against the evidence of history.
Let me say again that you guys seem to think I’m proposing containment as my preferred policy toward Iran. As I’ve already said at some length, it isn’t. I’m not going to recapitulate my reasoning, it’s my previous posts.
Kooshy, I mentioned the Gulf States, not Egypt or Jordan. You can throw around the word imperialism as much as you like, by the way, it doesn’t bother me. As an American, my first concern is for the welfare of the American people. I would very much like to see the U.S. forge a partnership with Iran, because I think that would further the interests of the American people. Now, I have stated that I doubt such a partnership is achievable. IF a grand bargain is not on the cards, I personally would prefer to see the US withdraw completely from the Middle East. That, however, is even less likely to occur than a US-Iranian grand bargain. If neither a grand bargain nor withdrawal is going to happen, then I would prefer that we adopt a policy of containment. Containment would not have to be “active” in any way — unless Iran attempted to extend its power throughout the Gulf area. We would simply remain in the area with sufficient force to deter any temptation that Iran might feel to extend its power and influence in ways harmful to the US. As an American I have to think of my country and my fellow citizens first, just as any Iranian or Chinese or British citizen naturally thinks first of his own land.
I’m sorry if you resent the fact that we are talking about America in Iran’s backyard. I’m sure I wouldn’t be happy if Iran was messing around in the Western Hemisphere. But it’s not my fault that the US has grown into the greatest power on earth, while Iran’s day as world power number one came and went 2,500 years ago.
Guys, I have to admit that I’ve had enough of this topic for now. Please feel free to have the last word, and I will carefully read whatever you may have to say.
Jon – a NATURAL hegemon means that Iran doesn’t need to be expansionist etc. The US is in no position to contain things such as the relative size of Iran’s population or historical cultural influence, if that’s what we’re supposed to be containing in Iran.
Jon
“Kooshy, if Iran’s credit rating is so high, why haven’t the Gulf States asked us to leave?”
Jon your question above, which in reality is your justification for the US continued presence in the gulf, is laughable.
Jon, who do you think, is supposed to ask, US to leave the region? King Abdullah, a client and a viceroy of US? or Mr. Mubarak’s government.
Look, we are not talking credit rating with the opinions of the region’s kings and Presidents for life, the only reason they are still in power, is because of the US support.
Do you know the justification for USSR invading Afghanistan back in 79 was that the Afghan government of Babrak Karmal asked them to move in. do you see a difference between your justification and that of Leonid Brezhnev. This is an old imperialistic reasoning, which has further distanced the US from the regions public and as the result
will work against the long-term US interests in the region.
If it’s a “natural hegemon” Cyrus, then of course US national security imperatives demand (absent a rapprochement) a policy of containment. You’re making the argument for me — thanks.
Kooshy, if Iran’s credit rating is so high, why haven’t the Gulf States asked us to leave?
The US may indeed leave the region some day. That wouldn’t bother me in the least. Indeed, I would welcome it under some circumstances. It’s not clear to me, however, that the US will be forced to go. While Iran is the biggest power in the Gulf region and perhaps indeed its “natural hegemon,” it remains a second-rate power with formidable internal problems. Iran as the wave of the future is not a scenario I take very seriously. Partnered with the US, it possesses major advantages. On its own it will have difficulty achieving that “natural hegemony.”
Well Jon, with the understanding I have of, the region’s culture, history, and geography, eventually US will have to leave the region, just as the British did in 70’s. Guess what, before they leave they also had to make a deal with the Shah’s Iran with regard to the Persian Gulf’s new arrangements, the simple fact of economics will force the US to leave, the pain is already visible after almost 10 years, is easy to say but expensive to maintain.
Like Nam, leaving might be painful especially when you have nothing to show for, but long term I do not see how US could stay considering its 60 years regional policy of humiliating the Arabs. A rapprochement with Iran will not fix this US problem, but will add considerably to Iran’s problems.
Therefore, like you at this time I am also skeptical a grand bargain rapprochement will work, without having a grand restructuring of US regional strategic policy, which I also think it, is too early to hope for one. A mutual trusted small steps are the only options and that is what Iran is willing to take for now, but apparently not enough for US.
And Jon about the
“Because Iran has not followed an expansionist line for 250 years means little, especially since it was restrained by Turkish, Russian and British power during most of that period.”
Jon, of course this means something, here in the west this is called the Credit Rating, now just guess, who has a better credit rating in the opinion bank of the region, US or Iran?
Well Jon, I think if we’re supposed to contain alleged Iranian expansionism because hey, it COULD do so, then the Swedes have to worry about the Danes, and the Finns about the Russians, and the Brits have to worry about the French, and everyone worries about the Germans, etc. etc. There are a lot of countries who COULD engage in expansionism if historical external restraints are removed, so in that sense Iran is not unique. But there’s no real evidence or any indication that Iran seeks expansionism. It doesn’t need to, as others have said, because it is a “natural hegemon” both due to its massive size, population, geographic position, social and cultural influence etc. In fact Iran’s interest is to reduce perceptions of threat from it by its Persian Gulf arab states, not to promote it. The iranians say so themselves. So again, what exactly are we “containing” when we say we should contain Iran? The word “containment” brings up a Cold War analogy, but Iran is simply not the Soviet Union.
Well Kooshy, as I said in reply to Fiorangela, if one eschews containment and it turns out that one’s expectations of the power not contained are wrong, then it’s too late. Because Iran has not followed an expansionist line for 250 years means little, especially since it was restrained by Turkish, Russian and British power during most of that period. You can’t base power relationships on past behavior. Iranian soft power is a reality, I’ll concede, but it hasn’t led the Gulf States to invite us out, has it? It’s not decisive, in other words.
Remember, I said I’m 100% behind efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Iran. If that proves impossible, my preference would be for the US to exit the region. However, my preferences count for nothing in this. The US isn’t leaving the Middle East in general or the Gulf in particular. So, if a rapprochement doesn’t happen (for whatever reason) and a US departure is not on the cards, then containment is the least bad option left. Surely, we don’t think war is preferable? If the US remains in the region, and US-Iranian relations remain hostile, the alternatives are containment (or an “armed standoff” if you prefer) or war. We may not like that picture. But that’s the reality.
Jon
“Containment simply means having sufficient force to deter another power from either direct expansion or the overawing of its neighbors. It seems pretty clear that in the absence of US power, Iran would have the ability to overawe the Gulf States (i.e., compel them to follow the Iranian foreign policy line),”
Jon Iran’s regional strategic policy is not, and has not, been based, on a military expansion to its neighbors for almost 3 centuries going back to when one, with the same last name as mine invaded India. If, it was they would have attacked the Taliban when they killed Iranian diplomats in Mazar e Sharif. However, Iran historically has tremendous amount of soft power with regards
To its cultural ties with next of kin neighbors, like what is evident in Iraq or Afghanistan specially among the Shih and disconnected Muslim communities in all the region’s states, how do you propose to contain that soft power, you mentioned above that in absence of US power Iran has the ability to “overawe “ the Gulf states, so can you
Explained why with presence of US in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Gulf why Iran still has such tremendous influence.
The truth is that Iran does not need to overrun its neighbors, to influence their policies and get her in the same quagmire that currently US has put her.
So to go over the list
Economic containment – we have done our best and so far not much to write home
Political containment – Iran is culturally and socially connected with its neighbors will not have an effect as seen in the past
Military Containment – No need, since Iran is not exercising an expansionist policy for past 300 years( I have seen this number as low as 250)
Military Economic Blockade = War in the Gulf or as GWB said the No. 3 is coming
Fiorangela, thank you for saying my argument was nuanced rather than my prose opaque!
I think we simply have a disagreement re the Soviet model. Mind you, I don’t claim the parallel is exact. But I think the Cold War model is close enough in its essentials to warrant the comparison. You may be quite right to say that Iran does not harbor ambitions in its neighborhood comparable to the expansionsit impulses of the Soviet Union. My retort would be that if by chance you’re wrong, then it’s too late for containment. With containment you cover your bets. With containment war is almost certainly OFF the table (here I disagree with the Leveretts), whereas war seems likely to me if engagement fails and no containment policy is ready to hand.
Again, I personally favor going the last mile on engagement with Iran. I just don’t think we can get an administration in the US that will do this. Should our hopes for engagement wither, I would prefer to see the US withdraw from the Middle East entirely. That, however, is not going to happen. If engagement and withdrawal turn out to be nonstarters, where do we stand — not theoretically, but in the real world? Seems to me that IF we came to that point, containment would be the best of several bad choices we would have. That’s all I’m saying.
As always I appreciate your thoughts, whether I happen to agree with them or not.
Containment simply means having sufficient force to deter another power from either direct expansion or the overawing of its neighbors. It seems pretty clear that in the absence of US power, Iran would have the ability to overawe the Gulf states (i.e., compel them to follow the Iranian foreign policy line), exert even greater influence than it now does in Iraq, and (if it so chose) make mischief in Lebanon and elsewhere. I’m not saying it would necessarily do any of these things, but it would certainly have the capability. Containment means keeping Iran from following any of these temptations.
But I don’t want to get too wrapped up in the containment question. All is not yet lost. I prefer to focus on what can and should be done to further US-Iranian engagement. There’s no question that a rapprochement/strategic partnership, if achievable, would be of enormous benefit to both nations.
Jon Harrison, I read your initial post thoroughly. I apologize for using a phrase that I thought encapsulated your thoughts but that, on closer consideration, missed the nuance of your argument.
I do maintain, however, that containment and engagement are in opposition to each other. It’s as if Vince Lombardi said, “Winning isn’t the only thing; coming in second is not so bad; maybe you’ll win the next game….”
I’m with Persian Gulf: the answer to failed engagement is more engagement, not less. Rather than spend energy needed for a very difficult effort, I prefer to stir up creative juices to figure out more ways to get the point across that engagement is the ONLY alternative. It’s important to break the frame that’s been locked onto the Iran debate, such that only narrowly prescribed actions occupy the field of the possible. Those of us who advocate for engagement should work to change the frame — as Carole Tavris writes in, “Anger: The Misunderstood Emotion,” we should step out of the dance, refuse to dance, rather than accept that the proffered set of steps is the only choreography that is acceptable.
Nothing about the Iran debate is framed is intellectually honest. To formulate policy based on non-facts and hidden assumptions flies in the face of the Enlightenment thinking process that America’s Founding Fathers relied upon to shape this unique democracy. I understand your point, that it’s prudent to have a fall-back position, but I reject it for being a capitulation to something seriously at odds with American values.
In my opinion, the Cold War/Soviet model is flawed in many ways: for one thing, the Soviets were expansionist and did have nuclear weapons; neither fact applies to Iran. Eisenhower engaged with Kruschev; as we all know, Eisenhower also warned of the dangers of industrialized/commercialized militarization. Eisenhower did not pursue containment. Also, in spite of the claims of Reaganites, the case has not been made decisively that ‘containment’ brought about the downfall or the Soviet Union; there were numerous causes for the disintegration of the USSR, not least of which was the internal contradictions of the system (much like zionism). Further, Joseph Cirincione has presented evidence that the ‘threat’ posed by USSR that ‘necessitated’ containment was deliberately overblown in order to support the case for — containment! (see Eisenhower)
We all know the nuclear issue is just another mean and not the cause. By reviewing the US policy toward Iran for last 30 plus years, which is modeled to contain Iran(Islamic Revolution)by all means , to name a few war, coup, regime change, dual containment, go it alone sanctions, UN sanctions , color revolutions, insurgency, etc.(did I missed something?). One would want to ask what the new containment means, do we mean an economic blockade, do we mean a political containment, or a military containment, what kind of containment we haven’t tried that we now should now, and what would make us think that this new one will work if what we have tried so far didn’t .
What are we talking here? Iran is not Grenada, and folks who are talking like this they should go and take a trip to see how big Iran is (no, I do not mean just the landmass)
If what Ray is suggesting, is we make sure Iran understands that in case it attacks any of its neighbors she will be crushed and so on and so on, fortunately or unfortunately that indicates that he like other Iran scholars doesn’t have any idea what Iran’s regional policy since the revolution is . Trouble with this line of thinking is, the recommended policies, is continually view through a US reading glass.
But Jon HarriSON (my typo previously – sorry!)
What exactly are we going to “contain” in Iran? They’re not expansionist. They lay no claims on territory outside of their own existing, internationally-recognized borders. Their support for HAMAS is exaggerated (HAMAS receives most of its funding from Saudi Arabia not IRan) and Hezbollah is far from an Iranian creature (they have their own solid based in Lebanon.) Are we going to contain their development, for example in the arena of economic/technology? How will Iranians view this? FYI Iran is already showing fastest scientific growth of any country (http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn18546-iran-showing-fastest-scientific-growth-of-any-country.html) They’re sending satellites into space, cloning, and developing nanotechnology. Their stem-cell research is world-class. This is all WITH sanctions.
Why indeed hasn’t Obama mentioned the fact the we and Iran share interests in Afghanistan? I’m not sure why he hasn’t, but the fact that he isn’t saying it tells me he’s not all that serious about engagement. If we don’t have even Obama on our side, the road to engagement looks very long, with our goal by no means in sight. Hence my words about the need to contemplate containment as a fallback and an alternative to war with Iran. We’ve got to remember that politics (and diplomacy, too) is the art of the possible. Wishes cannot replace facts.
Jon Harrison,
Given the fact Iran wants to prevent a return to power in Kabul of the Taleban, would it not make sense for the Obama administration to mention this fact to the American public? Why would it be concealed from view? Sadly, most Americans demand to be spoon-fed when it comes to foreign policy matters.
Iranian,
The US and Iran do indeed have many common interests, unlike the US and Israel where the Israeli effort to repress the Palestinians permanently so grossly injures American interests in the Middle East.
Back in 2001-2002, when Iran was helping the US plan the attack on Afghanistan, idiots working for the Bush administration were travelling back and forth across the Atlantic (staying at expensive hotels, naturally), trying to arrange for subversion of the Iranian government. Many Americans detest this state of affairs, but sadly most Americans are not even aware it exists.
Persian Gulf: The short, snappy answer to your question is that nothing in life is inevitable except death and taxes. The real answer is that the goal of containment is to prevent war while waiting for better days. (What do I mean by better days? The election of a US president and Congress that truly want to engage Iran, for example. Or the evolution of a more “moderate” regime in Tehran. There are other possibilities as well).
I personally believe the Soviet example is applicable. We contained the Soviets for over 40 years until the regime collapsed. Containment and mutual deterrence prevented World War III, there’s no doubting it. In the absence of better alternatives (i.e., engagement) containment looks better to me than economic warfare, covert operations, or an actual attack on Iran. To my mind this seems self-evident.
Cyrus: By “the powers that be” I meant those who make policy in the United States, specifically the executive and legislative branches of government. Of course, you are quite right, the Lobby has tremendous influence in the US — in government and in the media. And the Lobby receives important support from the still quite powerful forces of the Christian Right. I didn’t spell this out in my earlier comment for the simple reason that it seems, to me at least, self-evident. However, perhaps I overestimate some people’s knowledge of American political realities. In any case, I was not being coy.
I think Liz makes a shrewd point. I did not realize that the people to whom she refers are receiving that much largesse from US sources. Are they? Is this why Takeyh seems to have changed? I thought he seemed a sensible fellow five years ago. Now he appears to be virtually a neocon.
Let me reiterate: I am NOT advocating that the Leveretts or anyone else fighting the good fight for engagement and a grand bargain should give up and start advocating containment. I am 100% behind efforts to engage Iran and develop a strategic partnership between the two countries, which I believe would lead to huge benefits for the American people. What I am saying is that we ought to keep in the back of our minds the thought that engagement may very well not happen, and if it doesn’t we shouldn’t allow ourselves to be caught, as it were, flat-footed. I submit that IF engagement cannot be achieved, and IF a hands-off policy by the US is also a nonstarter, then “containment” would be preferable to the remaining alternatives — economic sanctions, covert operations, or war. This, again, seems self-evident to me.
“Israel’s right wing”, “AIPAC”, “Israel lobby”, whatever you would like to call them, they hold the power in America.
Their main strategy towards Islamic republic is this: “Brainwashing the American and international public opinion”, “Crippling Sanction”, “Military Action” or “Regime Change”.
We are wasting our time, if we think anything else is going to happen.
After the astounding humiliation of Vice President Joseph Biden by Israel’s rightwing government, we can easily conclude that Israel’s right wing has Washington in its pocket.
The unprecedented influence that Israel’s rightwing government holds over Washington is making a mockery of any talk of rapprochement with Iran.
I have said this before and I repeat it again: Obama must first break the Zionist’s stranglehold on Congress, failing which, there will never be peace in the Middle East or rapprochement with Iran.
Sakineh:
As Liz pointed out people like Takeyh are only interested in their own careers in DC. Who cares about dead Iranians, dead Iraqis,…
I completely agree with what Liz says. This is a major problem in the US:
One of the biggest problems is the fact that the US government is funding all sorts of so called green websites, television stations, and political entities in the US, UK,…and the only way that these people can continue receiving support from the federal government is for tensions between the two countries to remain high.
They are funded by the government and through the influence and power that they gain as a result, they prevent the government from gaining a realistic understanding of the country as well as moving towards conflict resolution.
A lot of these people are constantly flying across the Atlantic, staying at expensive hotels, furthering their personal interests in the name of freedom and pushing the rest of us towards conflict.
Jon Harris — you say “But if the powers that be won’t have it” but don’t specify which powers those are who don’t want any engagement between the US and Iran. The answer, of course, is Israel and the Israel lobby. THat’s where the root of the problem lies. Until that’s addressed, we will see a gradual and incremental slide towards war with Iran. Even the proponents of sanctions and “containment” make little secret of what they expect will follow when these strategies fail, as widely expected. In the meantime, Obama continues to box himself in over Iran, by for example refusing Iran’s perfectly reasonable compromise offer on the uranium swap — one shot deal, on Iranian soil — which will be dismissed and ignored, along with all of Iran’s other compromie offers (to operate their nuclear program as a joint venture, for example.) Why? Because “powers that be” just want to see a war with Iran that will benefit Israel by removing Iran as a regional competitor – and the nuclear issue is pretextual.
I wish “nuclear capable” would not be confused with “nuclear armed.”
According to the IAEA, there are about 40 countries that have the theoretical capability to make nukes. This is simply a function of having a civilian nuclear program. In theory, any country with a basic nuclear program “could” decide to weaponize in some indefinite point in the future. Iran’s nuclear program is subject to intensive IAEA inspections (far more so than Egypt, S. Korea, Argentina and Brazil and Japan, all of which “could” make nukes to varying degrees) and the Iranians have already agreed to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol (unlike all of those countries) and the Iranians have offered to place additional restrictions on their nuclear program BEYOND even the Additional Protocol. Short of giving up enrichment entirely, the Iranians have shown far more willingess to restrict their nuclear program than any other country in the world. They’ve even offered to operate their nuclear program as a joint venture with the US and other governments. Is this what a country that wants to keep open an “option” to build nukes does?
I am befuddled. How can an Iranian (Ray) ask for force against his own country? Be that it may, for those who advocate force, I’d say OK, let’s have you and your family moved to the front lines, then we can have at it. It is easy to press a button 10,000 miles away (read: drones) to kill and maim scores of people and not have any feelings about it. It is just another to be right there, when you yourself is affected.
One of the biggest problems is the fact that the US government is funding all sorts of so called green websites, television stations, and political entities in the US, UK,…and the only way that these people can continue receiving support from the federal government is for tensions between the two countries to remain high.
They are funded by the government and through the influence and power that they gain as a result, they prevent the government from gaining a realistic understanding of the country as well as moving towards conflict resolution.
A lot of these people are constantly flying across the Atlantic, staying at expensive hotels, furthering their personal interests in the name of freedom and pushing the rest of us towards conflict.
Jon:
I have question for your containment strategy evaluation. absent formal relation between the two nations and given the degree of the U.S involvement in the Mideast, wouldn’t containment inevitably lead to war? I don’t think North Korean or Cuban models are applicable here for the U.S. nor for that matter the USSR model. what is the ultimate objective of containment? let’s say in 10 or 20 years? collapsing the regime? wasn’t the collapse of containment policy the leading force for invading Iraq. what then would be the outcome in the same scenario for a nuclear Iran? a nuclear exchange?! as the U.S makes more problems for Iran, the resentment just go up, making it impossible at some point in future to turn the clock of confrontation back to normalcy, for whatever the admin and system coming to the power in these two countries at the latter.
the alternative for the failing prospects of a democracy used to be, as still is, more democracy. so, I think in pretty much the same manner, the answer for a failed engagement would be more engagement, but not less.
Folks, I try to keep my comments brief so that people will actually read them. I did not say, “containment is the way to go.” What I did say is that containment would be preferable if engagement fails and withdrawal from the Middle East is not an option. Containment is number 3 on my list of preferences. Engagement will always be number 1. I do feel, however, that we need to think about where we go if engagement is not tried, or is tried and fails. We can simply nod our heads at each other like bobble-head dolls, because we all agree that engagement is in the interest of the US, Iran, and everybody in between. But we also need to recognize that we have little or no prospect of getting an administration in the US that will take the idea of engagement seriously (or as seriously as we would like). We need to think about what happens next if engagement doesn’t happen.
I like to think my prose is tolerably clear. I’d appreciate it if the fine people who participate on this site would take the time to read and understand what I write before commenting on it.
I do agree that “inroads are being made.” However, progress has been and continues to be very slow. There is no prospect at this point of our getting an administration that will take engagement seriously. We thought we had one with Obama, and look where we are. Callers to C-Span are motivated people. They do not represent an accurate cross-section of opinion. This is not to say that the pro-engagement argument is not making progress — it probably is, albeit at a snail’s pace. If I thought the situation was hopeless, I wouldn’t waste time reading and commenting on this blog. But we need to recognize just how uphill a battle we are facing. Further, once we recognize this, we ought to consider what is the next best thing to do. It would be imprudent to do otherwise.
The point is that as long as the US threatens Iran, the Iranians will continue to believe that they must continue to weaken the Americans throughout the region. People in the region, including Iranians, believe that the US and its allies are rapidly moving towards decline, while rivals such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil are on the rise.
On the one hand, there is a sort of balance of power between the two sides. The US simply can not win a war against Iran. On the other hand, both sides have similar interests and if tensions can be decreased a great deal of progress can be made without so much energy being wasted to the benifit of America’s rivals.
While I agree that Iran’s alliances and support for regional intra-state or non-state actors represents a measure of strategic depth for Iran’s national security strategy, I don’t necessarily find this condition extraordinary by any means, particularly for the region it inhabits, Furthermore, exactly how would Gaza and Lebanon make “effective anti-Iranian platforms”?
The identification of an Iranian chemical weapon capability is curious, within the framework of Iran’s asymmetric stratagem. This potential capability has never been adequately proven, nor is it ever held up publicly as a means of deterrence, which is key to Iran’s defensive posture. Surely Iran’s SSM and AshM weapons are far more viable, inclusive within its overall Mosaic doctrine.
I disagree, Jon Harrison, that “containment is the way to go” because “”it’s an Everest of an uphill battle” to achieve a “grand bargain”/ engagement.
Containment and engagement are not on a continuum, they are on different trajectories leading to different outcomes: containment leads inexorably to war and loss of life and treasure on a massive scale; engagement leads to the avoidance of loss of life and at least detente, at best, rapprochement.
Indeed it is a long, hard slog to “keep writing and talking about the advantages of engagement,” but inroads are being made. The Leveretts are gaining a toehold in the American consciousness; based on my own barometer — callers to C-Span — I perceive that more and more Americans are wary of arguments against Iran that sound a lot like arguments that got the US into Iraq, just as Walt pointed out. Further, Americans are sympathetic to the Green movement in Iran: Iranians have become humanized, and war can only be successfully waged if the warred-upon is cast in terms of total demonization. Americans were fooled once into believing that smart bombs hit only finely tuned targets in Iraq; Fool me once, shame on me…..
So, we have spokespersons for an other-than-hawkish policy choice gaining credibility, and an American public increasingly sympathetic to Iran and skeptical about hawkish American intentions toward Iran.
To shift efforts to containment would be to abandon the ground gained and move in the opposite direction.
Instead, how about an engagement SURGE: deploy a beefed up contingent of informed advocates for engagement with Iran; send them door-to-door to explain to the people behind the door how the new policy of engagement will achieve security and economic prosperity.
I say, redouble the efforts at talking and writing for engagement with Iran.
If containing Iran requires “a willingness to respond with force”, it looks like we are gearing up for it.
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/world-news/final-destination-iran-1.1013151
This is probably the Leveretts’ best piece yet.
“Containment” invariably means “Deterrence” and the latter means that US forces will continue their presence in the region, costing American lives and money in the process.
Containment also means creating as many internal problems for the Iranian regime, including support for subversion and terrorism, to distract it from its regional ambitions.
The only solution is a strategic grand bargain and deal taking all issues into consideration.
One thing I will criticise Flynt and Hillary for is not formulating a roadmap for a rapprochment based on the shared interests both nations have. We need a policy document to take to the State Department and make them see sense!
There is so much to be gained and nothing to be lost for both nation-states.
The Iranians continue to suggest a negotiated agreement for exchange of Iranian LEU for 20% U needed for the Iranian research reactor, is still possible. Iran has argued for conducting the exchange on Kharg Island, while Turkey and Japan have offered to serve as middlemen. The Obama administration foolishly, in my view, has ignored the Japanese and Turkish offers.
I am wondering what has gone wrong with Takeyh since last June after Iran’s presidential election? he became a different man as his writings show.
Look, I agree that engagement leading (one hopes) to a grand bargain is the way to go. But if the powers that be won’t have it, and we can’t get a government that shares our views, isn’t containment the least of evils? We can’t (or shouldn’t)discuss this matter in a vacuum, as a purely academic exercise. If engagement remains a nonstarter (and it very well may), then containment it’s gotta be. I would prefer withdrawal to containment, but that’s never going happen. The US simply isn’t going to withdraw from the Middle East voluntarily; a grand bargain is more likely.
I do believe we could contain Iran if we had to, and I don’t believe that it would likely lead to war. The greatest danger is the one Lindsay and Takeyh point out: that having allowed Iran to get the bomb after proclaiming such an outcome unacceptable, we may not be taken seriously by the Iranians. But I think the danger they face from Israel would keep them cautious.
In any case, I put it to you that containment is the wise choice, absent the election of a government in the US that’s really prepared to go the last mile for a grand bargain. We can hope for a breakthrough on the diplomatic front, we can keep writing and talking about the advantages of engagement, but we need to remember that it’s an Everest of an uphill battle. Containment has to be the fallback position, unless we prefer war (I sure as hell don’t).
Let me stress that I favor engagement first, last, and always. No wavering there on my part. But if that goal eludes us. . . .